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Information Operations, Finding Success as Afghanistan Draws to a Close

Maj Frank Lazzara, USAF

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ________________________

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Information Operations (IO) has been a common focus when examining the successes and failures of the U.S. and its allies in their execution of both Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) over the course of the last decade. Strategic Communication (SC) and IO [at the operational level] have been applied with varying degrees of success but have not been decisive in the counterinsurgencies (COIN) that followed the end of major military operations. This lack of decisiveness drove then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to initiate changes in the both definition and application of IO capabilities. Although there has been some degree of success, in order for the U.S. to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2013-2014 as announced by Secretary of Defense Panetta, a redoubled effort with a different focus is be needed in order to shape the information environment. The Joint ISAF Commander and his staff must exercise the new definition and application guidance to develop a decisive IO line of operation that will ensure the highest possible level of success leading up to the planned drawdown of U.S. forces. By focusing on IO as the central theme in the overall theater strategy in Afghanistan, the opportunity exists to successfully end the U.S. and ISAF mission in Afghanistan and successfully transition security responsibility to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Afghan National Security Forces.
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Abstract

Information Operations (IO) has been a common focus when examining the successes and failures of the U.S. and its allies in their execution of both Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) over the course of the last decade. Strategic Communication (SC) and IO [at the operational level] have been applied with varying degrees of success but have not been decisive in the counterinsurgencies (COIN) that followed the end of major military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This lack of decisiveness drove then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to initiate changes in both the definition and application of IO capabilities. Although there has been some degree of success, in order for the U.S. to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2013-2014 as announced by Secretary of Defense Panetta, a redoubled effort with a different focus is be needed in order to shape the information environment. The Joint ISAF Commander and his staff must exercise the new definition and application guidance to develop a decisive IO line of operation that will ensure the highest possible level of success leading up to the planned drawdown of U.S. forces. By focusing on IO as the central theme in the overall theater strategy in Afghanistan, the opportunity exists to successfully end the U.S. and ISAF mission in Afghanistan and successfully transition security responsibility to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Afghan National Security Forces.
Introduction

“In a major milestone toward ending a decade of war in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta said Wednesday that American forces would step back from a combat role there as early as mid-2013, more than a year before all American troops are scheduled to come home.”

Secretary Panetta later clarified that the U.S. would be committed through 2014 in an advisory role but the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) would be responsible for combat operations in defense of their country. This announcement brought with it much speculation and the implication that the U.S. will begin extracting itself from Afghanistan regardless of whether or not strategic and operational objectives have been met. Although there have been some measurable Information Operations (IO) success in Afghanistan, IO has not been a decisive factor. In order for the U.S to conclude its mission in Afghanistan successfully, there must be a change in the current Information Operations strategy that will more effectively synchronize IO lines of operation with conventional lines of operation to shape the environment in preparation for the transition in 2014. To accomplish this, the Joint International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)Staff must embrace the recent evolution of the definition of IO as directed by Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense and capitalize on past and present IO success by integrating them into an effective IO line of operation.

The Need for Change

In OSD memorandum 12401-10, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged the need for a definition and construct change in regard to Strategic Communication and Information Operations. A change in definition and structure is overdue. The
acknowledgement that IO needs to be fully integrated into conventional lines of operations but does not need to be marshaled under one entity, lends itself well to a more effective approach to shaping the information environment for the next several years in Afghanistan and ultimately, to the successful withdrawal of the majority of U.S. combat forces between 2013 and 2014.

**Information Operations Redefined**

Information operations is defined in joint pub 3-13 as the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.  

The core competencies of IO are Psychological Operations, Military Deception, Operational Security, Electronic Warfare and Computer Network Operations.  

In a December 2010 memorandum, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) was renamed. PSYOP is now referred to as Military Information Support Operations (MISO). PSYOP carried with it a sinister and dark connotation and since the issue is not just the message, but the nature of the messenger, this may be a useful definition change. While the joint pub has not yet been changed, the definition and construct of IO is in a state of fluctuation precipitated by OSD memorandum 12401-10 issued by the [then] Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. The memorandum addresses concern for and the need to change the nature of shaping operations. With this memorandum, Secretary Gates intended to reduce the confines of the five pillars of IO and increase the flexibility to respond to the requirements of information environment shaping. It requires
that it should be less binding to the traditional aspects of IO that are uncontested or are simply not part of the current problem set. In the memorandum, Secretary Gates stated:

The USD(P) and the CJC\text{s} will revise the relevant policy and doctrine documents to reflect a new definition of information operations that focuses on the integrating nature of IO. The new definition will be “the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.” The current definition lacks reference to the information environment and places too much emphasis on the core capabilities. This has led to excessive focus on the capabilities and confuses the distinction between them and IO as an integrating staff function. Successful IO requires the identification of information-related capabilities most likely to achieve desired effects and not simply the employment of a capability. Modifying the definition also will effect a needed change to the existing notion that the core capabilities must be overseen by one entity. Capability integration does not necessitate ownership.\textsuperscript{8}

The pillars of IO as defined in the joint pub and as applied over the course of recent history have a practical application in reaching operational objectives. However, the rigid application of the capabilities as described by Secretary Gates has not provided a useful line of operation that has had the environment-shaping effect that is needed in the COIN environment in Afghanistan. Moving toward a less rigid definition that promotes the application of IO capabilities in a way that produces operational effects is a step in the right
direction. “The information environment is characterized as a trinity of three distinct yet interrelated and integrated elements. The physical dimension constitutes the interconnectivity of information technologies and is the stuff that we see and use every day: wires, networks, phones, computers, etc. The information dimension is the content carried by those interconnected systems such as TV broadcasts, radio programs, databases, and phone calls. The cognitive dimension is the third and most important of them, because this is where the content that is delivered by the connectivity impacts human beings and how we think, decide and act.”

This change in definition directed by Secretary Gates will allow the practitioners of IO to focus capabilities on the dimension most useful for the IO effect being sought and consequently relieve them of the obligation to exercise capabilities for the sake of addressing all five pillars. This allows the operational needs of the JFC to be met through the focus on effects rather than capabilities. In a war where the enemy COG has been universally accepted to be the influence over the population, a logical weight of focus may be on the cognitive dimension more so than the physical dimension and so on. The emphasis could be shifted to meet the operational needs in the specific theater.

The Reality of Information Operations

IO is not a standalone solution. Wars will never be fought exclusively in the cyber realm absent of kinetic operations. IO must be executed in conjunction with and fully integrated into other lines of operation but must hold the same level of focus and priority as kinetic lines of operation. This idea is not new. It has been a focus of the U.S. Army’s implementation of the vision of full spectrum “information dominance” envisioned by DOD “Transformation”
and IO Roadmap” documents since 2003.\textsuperscript{11} “Some competencies, such as Electronic Warfare and Computer Network Attack are technically specialized and possess measures of effectiveness that are clear and quantifiable. Others, such as Psychological Operations (now MISO), yield more subtle and difficult-to-measure effects, which, according to a recent review of lessons learned, are often poorly understood by commanders who prefer to stick to more clearly measurable activities and outcomes (usually kinetic).”\textsuperscript{12} The paradigm shift is uncomfortable when viewed from a U.S. military cultural viewpoint; yet essential when viewed through the lens of experience from the last decade. Similarly, the paradigm shift involves embracing the notion that predominately kinetic approaches at the operational level are not standalone solutions either. In the modern military despite all the lessons learned in the last ten years of COIN, there is still the overall feeling that the solutions to the operational and tactical problems start with a kinetic approach and adjust from there.\textsuperscript{13} Although much focus has been given to IO as the solution to the problem, practical application of that thought has not occurred in a comprehensive way and effects have been difficult to measure. “Social processes are harder to assess and model since the outcomes are psychological and sociological rather than physical. This can present problems when attempting to predict the success of IO compared with kinetic or force-on-force encounters.”\textsuperscript{14} “As a result, accurately quantifying the effects of an IO campaign on adversary behavior or target population perceptions over time is a significant challenge, especially when faced with the uncertainty of military operations and an adaptive adversary.”\textsuperscript{15} Additionally, the well-known problem of influence operations in a COIN is that the insurgent has a much easier task when it comes to countering or projecting their own influence operations. They play by a different set of rules and are not bound by the same moral and ethical constraints as the U.S. and its allies. The
insurgents only need to make a statement or exploit their adversary’s mistake to achieve a desired effect. The information they use does not have to be true or accurate, it just has to be the first information presented in order to have the desired effect. However, a U.S. Army company commander on the ground may have to get information approved for release which consequently diminishes the impact and effectiveness of the message.\(^\text{16}\)

Although there are hundreds of scholarly pieces on the value, need or vital nature of effective IO, the U.S. and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) still have not found the right level of integration and priority to achieve the desired effects. Traditional operations which give primacy to kinetic or technological solutions are still the instinctive approach of commanders at every level.\(^\text{17}\) While some tactical level commanders have found a successful balance of IO and traditional operations, there is only loose adherence to new doctrine that guides the IO line of operation and because of this, when a tactical organization is replaced or rotated out, the effective IO line of operation may be changed completely by the new tactical commander. “Senior Department of Defense (DOD) leadership was quick to recognize the importance of systematizing the military’s approach to coordinating action in the information sphere. As a result, in quick succession, Information Operations (IO) evolved from a collection of supporting capabilities to a core DOD competence. However, the process of adapting and employing this capability has proven neither easy, nor straightforward.”\(^\text{18}\)

After more than ten years of conflict, the population of Afghanistan still has very limited knowledge about the ISAF’s presence.\(^\text{19}\) A 2011 research project by the New American Foundation surveyed a representative sampling of the population (of Afghanistan) to answer
some basic questions about both the understanding of the conflict in Afghanistan as well as the issues the population are most concerned about. The results are very revealing and indicate that information environment shaping has not only been unsuccessful but has barely moved the needle in one direction or the other. The biggest concerns of the Afghan population are centered on the corruption in the government and the interference in Afghanistan by border nations. Most Afghans are more concerned that the U.S. uses its influence to keep Pakistan, India and Iran from interfering in Afghanistan’s affairs than they are with the Taliban.\textsuperscript{20} Much of the population also believes that the current conflict is still an extension of the civil war which began in 1989.\textsuperscript{21} The survey indicates that despite the fact that most civilian casualties are cause by insurgents; the population cites civilian casualties as one of the biggest problems with the ISAF and the U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{22} After ten years, the Afghan population really just wants outsiders to leave the fate of the country to Afghanistan itself. In response to the data compiled in this research, Marine Brig. General Larry Nicholson had this to say, “If the population is the “prize” in counterinsurgency operations, all sides are failing. There is essentially very little difference in the respondents’ view of the Taliban and the Quetta Shura on the one hand and the NATO/ISAF and U.S. forces on the other. It is important to stress that the vast majority of respondents above and beyond those who are unfavorable of the Taliban and ISAF, are also unfavorable in their views about foreign fighters and global jihadists.”\textsuperscript{23}

\textbf{Success Illustrates Failure}

It hasn’t been all failure in Afghanistan, but success seems to be limited to tactical and regional instead of central and operational. Speaking about Afghanistan, in 2008, UK Chief
of the Defence [Sic] Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Jock Stirrup said “[I]n one particular area [the Taliban have] had the better of 2008: information operations. They’ve beaten us to the punch on numerous occasions, and by doing so they’ve magnified the sense of difficulty and diminished the sense of progress. This is down in part to their skill, and in part to our own failings.”

This has been a common theme in Afghanistan, not only in 2008 but throughout the entire operation. In as early as October of 2001, Brookings offered a piece on the subject of IO in Afghanistan that essentially forecast the failures of the U.S. in Afghanistan if it failed to apply an effective IO strategy. “The mission of destroying missile sites and arms depots is almost the easy part. The critical task in the days ahead is to continue to reshape the information environment and target points of fracture in the opposition. By taking away the Taliban’s tools of misinformation and recasting the situation on the ground, the battle of hearts and minds can be a success. It can unite the interests of the local populace against Bin Laden and the Taliban movement, potentially splinters the Taliban leadership, and even helps form the basis for a new peace process for Afghanistan.”

In retrospect, the article seems somewhat simplistic and tasks like taking away the Taliban’s tools of misinformation have been extremely difficult due to the Taliban’s impressive use of information and available media to shape the environment. The Taliban now broadcasts over FM radio, uses cell phones to send videos and has adapted in many other ways to counter ISAF attempts to thwart their shaping efforts. Over ten years later, ISAF and U.S. IO has not been decisive in Afghanistan because the environment is complex and IO continues to be a supporting function instead of a supported function. Suspect elections and the political environment have challenged the validity of some of the past IO efforts and have created new and more difficult obstacles even as the requirement for kinetic operations has diminished.
Additionally, the fact that any IO failure on the part of ISAF or U.S. personnel is magnified and easily exploited by the Taliban further complicates environment shaping efforts. A video on the internet which shows U.S. Marines urinating on dead Taliban, the accidental burning of the Koran by coalition forces and an apparent massacre of Afghan civilians by a U.S. soldier are examples of how relatively small-scale yet inflammatory acts can have enormous IO repercussions.

It hasn’t all been bad news. One example of small scale success that also illustrates the large scale failure is the use of the radio in a box system (RIAB).\textsuperscript{27} The RIAB concept has been used effectively at the tactical level with ineffective coordination or synchronization from the operational level. TF-31 (Special Forces) first used RIAB to counter the effective propaganda being produced by the Taliban in their area of operations. Confusing command relationships (for ISAF) aside, the Taliban had the advantage in delivering quick effective messages. They (the Taliban) would interact with the media to get their message out and they did not suffer the same approval process that their ISAF or U.S. adversaries were obligated to use. The Taliban would also produce videos to be sold in the bazaar as well as use “night letters” to intimidate the local populace into compliance.\textsuperscript{28} The RIAB was fielded next to firebases which enhanced the Special Forces (and later conventional forces) ability to counter Taliban propaganda. Broadcasts consist of music and poetry and open-mike interviews with local leaders and are heard across an entire province.\textsuperscript{29} “However, the centralized approval process for broadcast messages is retained at higher levels. Many messages were not approved for release until well after the time when they have relevance to unfolding events.”\textsuperscript{30} In the same article, the author talks about how this can be alleviated with a strategic IO plan that would delegate authority to the tactical commander. A
synchronized operational IO strategy would make concepts like the RIAB more effective. If there were a clearly articulated operational strategy on the use of IO, tactical commanders would know their lateral boundaries and would be able to make decisions at the tactical level much the same way they are empowered for normal operations.

Another example of successful tactical use of the RIAB was seen in remote areas where little technology existed. Employed on the initiative of some tactical commanders, the RIAB has helped compensate for the 72% illiteracy rate in Afghanistan.31 In Safar in the Garmser district in Helmand province, the RIAB was used extensively and successfully by Marines and Afghan National Army (ANA) working out of COP (command outpost) Rankel.32 A Marine officer working out of COP Rankel had this to say about information dissemination in the Garmser district:

There’s no tweeting in Safar, Garmser District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. No Gchat [Google’s instant message service], no Facebook messaging, no texting. No newspapers or television. Many of the locals have cell phones, but they use them for photos and music. There’s no cell phone tower in southern Garmser District; it wouldn’t be profitable in this far-flung farming community, and even if it were, the Taliban might destroy it if it wasn’t within shooting distance of one of our patrol bases. And there aren’t even any landline telephones—just a few storefront calling centers in the bazaar with unreliable satellite connections. So when we need to get a message out to the local people we use our Radio-in-a-Box, or RIAB, as our personal intercom.33
The RIAB is used to broadcast the words of the local Afghan commander, hundreds of prerecorded messages downloaded from the central RIAB website, music and Voice of America. All in all it was used quite successfully and had a coordinated and synchronized effect with regard to shaping the environment. However, when the unit at COP Rankel was replaced, the programming was changed. “The Marine Corps infantry battalion that came to replace us decided to control the RIAB a little more formally and systematically. They interpreted information operations as a form of “non-kinetic fire support and tasked artillery officers with shaping the flow of information.”

These anecdotal accounts illustrate the root of the problem. The operational commander must establish and provide guidance for the synchronized use of information shaping across the entire area of operations. The use of IO as a form of non-kinetic fire support captures the essence of the failure of IO at the operational level. IO should be used as the main effort for changing the environment, not as a supporting function. The RIAB program is just one example of how technology can be used even in the most undeveloped areas of Afghanistan. Due to technology lag, IO in Afghanistan may be more difficult than in other countries. The Arab spring has demonstrated the powerful effect that technology can have in shaping the information environment.

**Stay the Course and Withdraw on the Timeline**

It is possible that information operations are not enough to overcome the challenges faced in Afghanistan and that the timeline as set by the U.S. for withdrawal prohibits any chance of changing the outcome. Consequently, the U.S. should just continue to execute the current operational strategy, declare victory and withdraw on the timeline as it did in OIF.
population has grown weary of the long war and no longer really cares if it is successful. The amount of blood and treasure spent on the war far exceeds the value of the object and the U.S. has done all that could be reasonably expected to achieve success in Afghanistan. After all, NATO forces and the U.S. have prepared Afghanistan to handle its own security. The ANSF consists of the Afghan Army, Air Force, and National Police and is currently at about 300,000 troops. It is still in the process of growing, and will reach its end strength goal of 352,000 troops by September 2012. The ANSF is primarily funded by the U.S. and NATO with the U.S. bearing the brunt of the fiscal load. The insurgency although not defeated will arguably be at a manageable level for an ANSF of this size by the time the U.S. withdraws in 2014. Although still facing some legitimacy issues due to concerns about corruption, Afghanistan has a liberal and functioning government that is in a position to assume full responsibility for the challenges facing Afghanistan as a whole.

It is further arguable that information operations have failed to have a decisive impact on the outcome in Afghanistan and refocusing IO will have little impact on the final assessment of success when the U.S. withdraws in 2013-14. Although there have been individual IO programs that have proven successful, IO as a whole has not been a decisive factor. The U.S. should focus on a strategic communication strategy targeting coalition members and the international community with the aim of painting the mission in Afghanistan as statistically successful.

**IO Can Still Make the Difference: Conclusion and Recommendations**

The outcome in Afghanistan can still be measurably successful with a coordinated strategic communication and information operations strategy. Maintaining the status quo
until 2013 and then just pulling up stakes would send a very strong and negative message to U.S. allies and potential adversaries. No country or coalition should be willing to expend so much blood and treasure just to walk away in the end with an ongoing debate as to the validity and success of the mission. The U.S. and ISAF still have enough time to develop and execute a revised theater strategy that can incorporate better information shaping and influence lines of operation. There are many options available to the operational commander to reinvigorate IO in the wind down of this conflict. After ten years of lessons learned, it is not the lack of IO successes, but the lack of synchronization and coordination that has cause IO as a whole to fall well short of its potential for being decisive in Afghanistan. IO as it fits into the U.S. strategic communication strategy has attention through all the highest levels of government up to and including the President. Throughout the last ten plus years, different officials at all levels have focused attention on this problem and called for solutions. The solutions exist and need to be implemented under the right structure with the appropriate level of priority.

Although there are many recommendations on record over the course of the last decade, there are several that the author recommends as part of a focused strategy for the final push to 2014 and the end of full scale U.S. involvement in order qualify the work of the coalition in Afghanistan a measureable success:

1. Change the culture of the Soldier and Marine through more effective and more focused IO and influence operations preparedness training. Joint force commanders need to go beyond the typical pre-deployment snapshot training of information operations that U.S. Soldiers and Marines are exposed to. Along with “every soldier a sensor,” there needs to be
a mindset of “every soldier a messenger.” Soldiers and Marines at the tactical level are the most decisive instrument any military has in a COIN. Yet, presently they are trained from the very beginning to be instruments of kinetic influence above all else so that their natural way of thinking is normal kinetic operations. IO is typically something they receive relatively little training on. Given the knowledge that there is a deficit in this area, the operational level commanders must ensure that there is more valid training and reinforcement of that training for operating in a sensitive IO environment. Until the average Soldier, Marine, Airman and Sailor can look at a situation and instinctively consider the IO aspect, there will be similar challenges to those seen in the last decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan particularly in, but not exclusive to, the COIN environment.

2. Ensure IO has equal billing [with conventional operations] on the ISAF Joint Staff for the duration of U.S. involvement in the COIN in Afghanistan and in future COIN operations. In this environment, it is valid to give IO priority over conventional kinetic operations. Reestablish and clearly articulate a coordinated and synchronized IO line of operation that is the central focus and supported by what are considered normal military operations that are more kinetic in nature. Actions by the tactical commanders need to be guided by a central environment-shaping strategy that will allow for flexibility, but also predictability and consistency so that tactical commanders can decide and execute quickly based on clear overarching guidance. Additionally, clear operational lines of operation will ensure that when tactical units are relieved in place, the new command is not going to reinvent the IO strategy because of unclear theater strategic guidance.
In the study Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence led by Army Maj General Flynn, the authors advocate for a better collection, consolidation, evaluation and dissemination process of intelligence information in the theater of operations. Their recommendations included assembling Stability Information Operations Centers that are not confined by functional constraints. Maj Gen Flynn’s focus is on intelligence as a whole but the concept is well suited for IO. If these Stability Information Operations Centers were resident on the ISAF Joint Command Staff and were considered the lead on transition planning for the wind down in Afghanistan, they could recommend and implement the necessary information-centric theater strategy for the duration leading up to the planned U.S. withdrawal thus leaving the coalition and the Afghan population better suited to deal with the transition. The doctrinal foundation is already in place but it hasn’t been implemented with the priority it requires.

3. ISAF Joint Command should take advantage of the RIAB concept through a large scale development of Afghanistan’s multimedia infrastructure encompassing the more remote areas. The point of this is to allow existing indigenous media to grow. This will give even remote and illiterate Afghan civilians access to current information, news and entertainment previously prohibited by the Taliban. This investment will serve several purposes not the least of which will be to give the Joint ISAF further access to the information environment. Currently the Taliban is mostly limited to broadcasting from the border regions or from inside Pakistan and their range is limited. Rear Admiral Gregory J. Smith, as director of communications for U.S. Central Command, was quoted as saying “possible new approaches include funding an expansion of radio transmission towers and news stations to allow local broadcasters to connect with indigenous publics, or protecting cell phone towers so more people
can have access to cell phones to communicate amongst themselves through text messaging or just voice communications. The bottom line, Smith says, is to foster debate among Afghans, not preach American values. Of course, there is risk involved. Technological advances tend to level the playing ground in the information arena between the state and non-state groups. Such technology has given rise to the Arab spring which has given entire populations access to self-determination through the use of cell phones and the internet. Ultimately however, the goal in Afghanistan is to allow the population to decide their own fate without doing so because of fear and intimidation of non-state actors such as the Taliban.

Finally, one should realize that although Secretary Panetta announced the intended end of U.S. involvement in major combat operations in 2013 and the withdrawal of U.S. troops [other than advisors] in 2014, the mission in Afghanistan and the commitment of the coalition will persist well beyond that. Recently, President Obama announced a formal commitment to Afghanistan until 2024. Restructuring the IO strategy now to make it decisive will pay dividends not just with the measurement of success when the U.S. withdraws the bulk of its forces, but with the stability of Afghanistan through 2024.

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5. Ibid.


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