UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: THE REQUIREMENT OF METRICS FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMS

By

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June 2012

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United States Foreign Assistance Programs: The Requirement of Metrics for Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs

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N/A

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Foreign aid has been a signal component of United States foreign policy since the creation of the Marshall Plan. Since that time, as new requirements emerged, numerous foreign aid programs and initiatives were created and subsequently piecemealed together under various U.S. agencies. The confluence of programs, initiatives, and agencies has created a confusing and overly bureaucratized environment for expending funds in an effort to support the democratization and modernization of other countries. This study examines U.S. aid provided to Ukraine and Georgia to determine if they have progressed toward Westernized defense and military structures, in accordance with their stated national goals, within the realm of logistics.

The question is whether U.S. security aid in these states has helped to achieve these goals. Addressing this question, this thesis proposes a hierarchal construct with differing assessment criteria based on how and where U.S. aid is applied. In the end, this analysis shows that U.S. aid and assistance programs and funds have assisted both Ukraine and Georgia with their modernization efforts. However, U.S. policy makers and policy implementers need to consider alternative and new methods to accurately assess how well those funds are spent in-line with U.S. foreign policy goals.

Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, Foreign Assistance, Foreign Aid, Logistics, Ukraine, Georgia, Partnership for Peace (PfP)

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SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMS

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ABSTRACT

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The question is whether U.S. security aid in these states has helped to achieve these goals. Addressing this question, this thesis proposes a hierarchal construct with differing assessment criteria based on how and where U.S. aid is applied. In the end, this analysis shows that U.S. aid and assistance programs and funds have assisted both Ukraine and Georgia with their modernization efforts. However, U.S. policy makers and policy implementers need to consider alternative and new methods to accurately assess how well those funds are spent in-line with U.S. foreign policy goals.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## I. INTRODUCTION

- A. THESIS OVERVIEW ................................................................. 1
- B. THE QUEST FOR METRICS ....................................................... 5
- C. PFP PROCESS AND PROGRESS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE ............................................. 6
- D. ASSESSMENT: A PROPOSAL AND A PYRAMID ................................. 12
- E. SOURCES AND METHODS ....................................................... 14

## II. UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

- A. HISTORY OF FOREIGN AID.......................................................... 28
- B. DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 ............................................. 32
- C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAM ............................................................................. 36
- D. FOREIGN AID AND ASSISTANCE ISSUES........................................ 39
- E. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE .................................................................. 43
- F. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 48

## III. UKRAINE

- A. UKRAINIAN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ............................................... 51
- B. COUNTRY BACKGROUND ................................................................ 53
- C. ENTERING INTO NATO’S SPHERE ................................................... 57
- D. LOGISTICS MODERNIZATION FRAMEWORK .................................. 58
  1. Doctrine / Policy Modernization Efforts ........................................ 58
  2. Logistics Planning Efforts ............................................................... 60
  3. Procurement and Budget Modernization Efforts ........................... 61
- E. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION .................................................... 64
  1. Assessment................................................................................... 64
  2. Conclusion ................................................................................... 67

## IV. GEORGIA

- A. GEORGIAN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ................................................ 69
- B. COUNTRY BACKGROUND ............................................................... 70
- C. ENTERING INTO NATO’S SPHERE ................................................... 71
- D. LOGISTICS MODERNIZATION FRAMEWORK .................................. 74
  1. Doctrine/Policy Modernization Efforts ........................................ 79
  2. Logistics Planning Efforts ............................................................... 81
  3. Procurement and Budget Modernization Efforts ........................... 81
- E. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION .................................................... 83
  1. Assessment................................................................................... 83
  2. Conclusion ................................................................................... 86

## V. CONCLUSION

- A. RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................... 89
APPENDIX .................................................................................................................................99
LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................................101
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ..............................................................................................111
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.  Assessment Pyramid (From: ) ..........................................................................................16
Figure 2.  Department of State Foreign Assistance Framework Chart from the DOS Strategic Plan.(From: ) ........................................................................................................35
Figure 3.  Spectrum of Security Cooperation Activities (From: the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Handbook.) .................................................................................42
Figure 4.  Topology Chart of Professional Armed Forces from Forster, Edmunds, and Cottey. (From: ) .............................................................................................................99
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Departments of State and Defense Security Assistance Program Authorization Amounts derived from DOS and DoD historical data.(From: ) ........................................................................................................................91
**LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEECA</td>
<td>Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia</td>
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<td>AFU</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Ukraine</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Annual National Program</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>ARA</td>
<td>American Relief Administration</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>CCF</td>
<td>Complex Crisis Fund</td>
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<td>CCIF</td>
<td>COCOM Initiative Fund</td>
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<td>CCMR</td>
<td>Center for Civil-Military Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CRB</td>
<td>Commission for Relief in Belgium</td>
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<td>CRSP</td>
<td>Coalition Readiness Support Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTR</td>
<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCCEP</td>
<td>Developing Country Combined Exercise Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIB</td>
<td>Defense Institution Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>DISAM</td>
<td>Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighborhood Policy</td>
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<td>ERP</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Foreign Assistance Act</td>
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<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<tr>
<td>FREEDOM</td>
<td>Freedom for Russia and Emerging Democracies and Open Markets</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSA</td>
<td>FREEDOM Support Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAF</td>
<td>Georgia Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>GARIOA</td>
<td>Government and Relief in Occupied Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTEP</td>
<td>Georgia Train and Equip Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPAP</td>
<td>Individual Partnership Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRRF</td>
<td>Joint Rapid Reactionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NADR</td>
<td>Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDU</td>
<td>National Defense University</td>
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<td>NIE</td>
<td>National Intelligence Estimate</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMSA</td>
<td>NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MET</td>
<td>Mission Essential Task</td>
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<tr>
<td>METL</td>
<td>Mission Essential Task List</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Member Committee</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODC</td>
<td>Office of Defense Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARP</td>
<td>Planning and Review Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peace Keeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>PiP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAO</td>
<td>Security Assistance Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDR</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEED</td>
<td>Support for East European Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>STANAG</td>
<td>Standardization Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIF</td>
<td>Warsaw Initiative Fund</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

The following experience had by this writer in the midst of research for this thesis speaks to its core question of the quantitative measure of the value of security assistance. At a recent logistics modernization conference for the Ukrainian Rear Services held in February 2012, a certain Ukrainian officer, a major of the Military Cooperation and International Operations of the Army Command, stood out among the attendees.\(^1\) He was a recent military graduate of the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College and he was now attending this conference. He was an International Military Education and Training (IMET) recipient who had also attended language training prior to attending the Professional Military Education schooling in Quantico, Virginia. The fact that he successfully completed the language training and the Command and Staff College course is one indicator to critics that the IMET programs have worth beyond the dollars spent in aid of allies and partners.

However, there is more to the cost benefit analysis than the officer’s U.S. certifications. The value he provided at the logistics conference came not only through his ability to provide translation skills, but also in the greater depth of understanding of issues of policy and programs than those translation efforts between the U.S. and Ukrainian delegations. Overall, his contribution allowed for a greater understanding of complex problems of security and defense among the Ukrainian delegation, which ultimately will reduce future costs for additional retraining of the subject matter, which would arise if the delegation did not fully understand these questions during this visit.

Thus, there is no question that the investment of U.S. time and education in this officer has a positive effect now and in the future. But how can this longer-term effect be

\(^1\) During the writing of this thesis, the author had the opportunity to travel to Kyiv for research—in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, fostered by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. I realized that time and events changed not only a political ideology and a country but its people as well, and by extension, their military too. I attended a logistics modernization conference for the Ukrainian Rear Services and even provided a briefing on Marine Corps Aviation Logistics at their Officer’s Club in downtown Kyiv—an event that, twenty-five years earlier, I would have never thought possible. The Ukrainian military attendees were very friendly and open about the challenges they faced as they have gradually progressed from the legacy of a communist system to a more liberal democracy that takes into account the hard realities of the immense costs of building and sustaining a viable military force.
articulated, particularly to an audit and accountability community which oversees such programs often without direct experience of such efforts other than in a general sense and that prefers quantifiable results that accord with practices of management and public finance? The value that the Ukrainian officer added to the conference cannot be measured “objectively,” through common metrics as might apply in some conventional defense program or weapon procurement; rather it is subjective in nature as it provides verification of skills within the Ukrainian military hierarchy. The Ukrainian major provides a perhaps overly simplistic but real-life example of the fundamental issue that plagues policy makers and those charged with identifying the successful application of foreign aid and security cooperation funds—how to measure the success of foreign aid in the public and national interest.

Indeed, since the inception of the Marshall Plan in 1947 and the Mutual Assistance Program (aid of arms and technical assistance to European forces) in 1949–1950, the United States has spent more than $587 billion (inflation adjusted calculated through fiscal year 2009) in foreign assistance with the preponderance of aid, almost $310 billion, provided just since North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was instituted less than two decades ago. While $38.5 billion has specifically been allocated for PfP member countries, this trend indicates the growing political nature of providing ever-increasing aid that is specifically intended for promoting democratic ideals.

However, as a result of the Sept 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a rapid increase in foreign assistance funds were allocated through Department of State (DOS) and

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3 The Partnership for Peace program is, in its essence, a mechanism by which non-NATO members can interact and coordinate with NATO. It grew out of the breakup of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact, as well as the dissolution of Yugoslavia, as the established western democracies cast about for ways to engage and integrate democratizing Europe, but it also accommodates Europe's armed neutrals and states that, for various reasons, do not aspire to full NATO membership.

4 United States Agency for International Development, “Detailed Foreign Assistance Data.”
Department of Defense (DoD), by 264 percent,\textsuperscript{5} which focused primarily on transnational terrorism detection and prevention, and indicated a minor shift away from, albeit temporarily, democratic promotion to bolstering security. These funds have been provided to recipient nations under two primary Foreign Assistance programs, the DoD’s Security Cooperation program\textsuperscript{6} and the DOS’s Security Assistance program,\textsuperscript{7} with the goal of promoting U.S. policies and interests\textsuperscript{8} as well as enabling these nation states to flourish in international organizations as well as share the burden of defense.\textsuperscript{9} Two-odd decades later, experts and practitioners rightly ask whether the results are repaying the effort.

Taking up this question, this study examines the instances of Ukraine and Georgia—both former Soviet nation states that have accepted the membership conditions

\textsuperscript{5} The 264\% increase was calculated based on the USAID FY01 world total of $12.85 billion and the FY09 world total of $33.95 billion. It should also be noted that between FY01-09, over 21\% ($48.3 billion) of total world foreign assistance ($226 billion) was allocated specifically for Iraq and Afghanistan. United States Agency for International Development, “Detailed Foreign Assistance Data.”

\textsuperscript{6} Security Cooperation is the Department of Defense’s group of programs, authorized by Congress beginning in 2006 under Title 10 funding, which provides for military training, military exercises, and fosters military-to-military interoperability to support COCOM theater strategies. Primary Security Cooperation programs are WIF, Build Capacity of Foreign Military Forces (Section 1206), Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), COCOM Initiative Fund (CCIF), and Developing Country Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP). United States Department of Defense, \textit{Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms}, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 296.

\textsuperscript{7} Security Assistance is the Department of State’s group of programs, authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 under Title 22 funding, which provide military hardware, education, and defense-related services to further U.S. national policies and interests. Top Security Assistance programs are Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO). United States Department of Defense, \textit{Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms}, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 296.

\textsuperscript{8} For the purposes of this thesis, national security interests and policies are specific objectives indicated by the Legislative or Executive Branch which promote cooperation with foreign countries with the strategic goal of protecting U.S. citizens and economic interests. This can be achieved directly by providing assistance to specific security programs or indirectly by creating stable countries that, in turn, create stable regions. It should be noted that the specific objectives and interests can be politically motivated and are subject to wide variability from year-to-year.

\textsuperscript{9} For the purposes of this research, there are 13 major security assistance and security cooperation programs under the three agencies/departments that are considered: USAID – DoD Assistance; DOS – FMS, FMF, IMET, SEED/FSA/AEECA, and NADR; DoD – Section 1206, Section 1207, WIF, Coalition Readiness Support Program, and the Civic Engagement’s three humanitarian programs.
of the NATO PfP\textsuperscript{10} program without an associated Membership Action Plan (MAP),\textsuperscript{11} but that both have special NATO commissions established for providing even further dialogue and consultation on security issues—to determine if they have progressed toward a modernized and integrated security defense and military structure with the financial assistance provided from the U.S. government under the various Title 10 DoD and Title 22 DOS funding programs.\textsuperscript{12} In this connection, this thesis explores how and how well defense institution building functions, especially in its dimension of programmatic and budgetary oversight in the cases of Ukraine and Georgia. These two nations combined have received almost $5.2 billion through all aid programs between 1996 and 2009, though the types and amounts of aid provided to each country have

\textsuperscript{10}The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was major initiative proposed at the January 1994 Brussels Summit Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The initial aim of the program was to “enhance stability and security throughout Europe.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, \textit{NATO Handbook}, (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 69.

The PfP program has undoubtedly been successful in its application as it has allowed for member countries to work with NATO on their individual terms and not through a parochial set of goals. Additionally, PfP has enabled, though not all inclusive) greater interoperability, regional cooperation, opportunities for exercises and training, as well as the ability to enhance future operations through the experiences of others (lessons learned). David Yost, \textit{NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security}, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 98.

\textsuperscript{11}The Membership Action Plan (MAP), launched in 1999, is a grouping of programs designed to facilitate aspirant countries’ focused movement toward NATO with a desire for eventual membership. The MAP programs cover five areas: political and economic issues, defense and military issues, resources, security, and legal issues. NATO does make it clear that all five areas should not be considered a checklist for NATO accession and any offers of accession remain wholly at the geopolitical level. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, \textit{NATO Handbook}, 65-67.

\textsuperscript{12}The primary DoD and DOS foreign aid and assistance program considered in this paper are: DoD: Section 1206, Section 1207, Civic Engagement (includes Humanitarian Assistance-Other, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, and Humanitarian Assistance Program Excess Property), Coalition Readiness Support Program (CRSP), and the Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF); DOS: IMET, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA), and the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related programs (NADR). The AEECA funding account, established in 2009, combines two formerly separate accounts into one. The two accounts were: the Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (commonly known as the Support for East European Democracy or SEED, established in 1989) and the Assistance for the Independent States of the former Soviet Union (commonly known as the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) established in 1992). United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, \textit{Foreign Aid Reform: Agency Coordination} by Marian Leonardo Lawson and Susan B. Epstein, CRS Report R40756, (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, August 7, 2009), 13.

These five DOS programs do not constitute the totality of Program Areas provided under the Peace and Security DOS objective, nor does it include all of the accounts supported under the Peace and Security objective. This will be explained in greater detail with the Foreign Assistance Framework sheet.
varied widely.\textsuperscript{13} Ukraine and Georgia have been selected case studies based on their strategic as well as energy-security relevance to the European Union (EU) and ultimately to NATO countries, as well as the United States. Ensuring continued energy commerce to the EU will require stable and growing economies within each country. The question, then, is whether U.S. security aid in these states is helping achieve these goals.

A. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter I introduces the assessment pyramid which will be the basis for discuss through this paper as well as examining some of the issues that currently plague U.S. security assistance and security cooperation programs. Chapter II will provide a background of the U.S. foreign aid, which establishes the foundation for why U.S. aid and assistance continues to be given throughout the world today. This chapter will also present the DOS security assistance program and the DoD security cooperation program along a section on the background of the PfP. Chapters III and IV undertake a comprehensive examination of Ukraine and Georgia, respectively. While the modernization experiences of both countries diverge on some key points, their combined story shows that U.S. aspirations of security assistance and security cooperation have not yet been fully realized. Preceding each chapter’s detailed reform sections is a review of foreign aid along with a background of the significant political evolutions from Communism to acceptance in the NATO PfP structure.

Chapter V provides the conclusion and offers recommendations for policy makers, and those charged with the implementation of providing aid, to create a successful aid story that: funding provided equals U.S. foreign policy goals but without being restricted under a hard metric paradigm. In the end, this analysis shows that U.S. aid and assistance programs and funds have assisted both Ukraine and Georgia with their modernization efforts. However, U.S. policy makers and policy implementers need to consideration alternative and new methods to accurately assess how well those funds are spent in-line with U.S. foreign policy goals.

\textsuperscript{13} Since acceptance in the PfP program, and through FY09, the amount of aid distributed has surpassed $5.2 billion – broken out as: Georgia has exceeded $2.3 billion and Ukraine has exceeded $2.9 billion. United States Agency for International Development, “Detailed Foreign Assistance Data.”
B. THE QUEST FOR METRICS

The January 1994 creation of NATO’s PfP program opened a new venue for new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe to develop yet closer ties with NATO and its member nations from the advent of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in November 1991. (While initial funding for the PfP program came from the United States under PfP’s Warsaw Initiative Fund [WIF], the DoD and DOS have provided additional funds on an annual basis under programs and initiatives that predate PfP from the origins of security assistance in the Cold War and the creation of NATO in 1949–50.) For those central European states that departed from the collapsed Warsaw Pact and opted to seek out PfP and eventually NATO membership, after 1995, the closer relationship also came with security assistance and often funding from the United States and other allies for efforts at democratization, westernization, security sector reform, and the modernization of defense and military organizations to what the central European saw as a “western standard.” In reality, of course, such a “western standard” was partially an illusion, since the allies had poorly conceived of a process to enable new allies to join the alliance. This western standard, however, took on a life of its own in the second half of the 1990s, as these processes of enlargement consolidated in a give and take among central Europeans and the NATO allies, especially the United States. Of considerable importance in this process, of course, was the question of the costs and benefits of such

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14 For the purposes of this thesis, democratization is defined here as the process of a country transforming their previous regime to a multi-party political system which embraces open and fair elections. Despite the various types of democracies and levels of democratic rule, democratization in this paper indicates the movement away from the Soviet system of total rule. Guillermo O’Donnell, and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 8.

15 For the purposes of this thesis, westernization refers to the gradual process of a country that assimilates the values associated with Western Europe and the United States into their own culture and ethos. These non-inclusive values would include open and honest journalism, minimal corruption in law and government offices, and a strong legal system that advocates for the people. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 57.

16 For the purposes of this thesis, modernization is the process by which a country expands or improves policy-determined capabilities through the purchase of new equipment, creation and institution of new policies, and/or the restructuring of personnel and organizations with the intent to have an analogous end-state which is compatible with NATO and leading NATO member countries’ armed forces. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 68.
an effort, especially to those in the legislative and executive branch of the U.S. government.

In the ensuing decade and a half, however, neither academic scholarship nor government oversight have completely analyzed the need for PfP member states to modernize, in order to provide for territorial integrity along with NATO interoperability, with clear U.S. funding initiatives that are in concert with U.S. foreign policy goals. Although mandated through Congressional statutes, to date, specific metrics, standards, and measurements of success have only been subjective in nature at the DOS foreign policy level with more objective evaluative measurements at the tactical level. This circumstance has led to the advent of an event-based success model as opposed to an outcome-based model that takes into account actual modernization improvements within recipient countries. (In other words, service providers report the number of certificates that the Ukrainian officer in the introduction collected, as well as the number of U.S. sponsored events he attends, but neither the statutes nor the standard accounting conventions capture the broader effects of all this activity.)

Objective assessments by means of modern management techniques of how well these funds have been spent to the ends of policy and strategy and whether they have resulted in benefits for the target country, the United States, and NATO have proven elusive because of the lack of generalized understanding—either in the target country or in the U.S. government—of the character, evolution, dynamics and even short falls of defense reform. None can agree with any fluency on the political and programmatic point of departure in defense and security structures of partner nations who recently have become allies. Figures in the U.S. Congress, the U.S. State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as think tanks with an interest in this issue, continue to press for an agreed basis of such security, defense and military reform as well as metrics and measures of effectiveness for invested dollars, which poses an acute challenge for Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) who have for decades been the masters, more or less, of such programs in practice.

In particular, in the recent past and the present as the center of gravity of U.S. defense has shifted to other theaters and the budget rigors have taken hold in the financial
crisis, the European Command (EUCOM) Commander, where the predecessors of PfP began some around twenty years ago under the aegis of the late General George Shalikashvili, must respond to such imperatives of policy scrutiny, particularly because the command enjoys the preponderance of WIF dollars granted by the Congress and the Secretary of Defense. Although the EUCOM Plans Directorate (J-5), responsible for the implementation and tracking of WIF and other DoD funding initiatives within the European Area of Responsibility (AOR), has created its own table of metrics, these numbers are based more on the quantitative actualization of completed calendar events in support of wider security assistance and cooperation initiatives. Plainly stated, EUCOM’s metrics track dollars-to-events rather than dollars-to-outputs in policy and programs, even though this latter qualitative measurement has been the goal of the Congressional committees that oversee the funds and their results.

Part of the problem arises in the very quest for simple, quantitative measures amid defense management practices, whereas in reality, state building and the consolidation of security and armed forces in political flux embodies a diffuse process with imponderables that are poorly apprehended by routines of program analysis and evaluation on the model of Programming, Planning and Budgeting, which Robert S. McNamara introduced a half century ago into the U.S. Department of Defense. Although U.S. constitutional desires dictate the judicious use of the taxpayer’s treasure, as well as commercial experience, suggest that “good metric results equal funding spent well,” the reality is actually more troubling, though familiar not only in the defense sector but in many forms of public policy. In practice, the budgetary and bureaucratic motto runs more like: “Money not spent this year will mean less money next year,” and “It doesn’t matter if this program or weapon makes any sense, we have to buy (or spend on) it.” The interconnection between these two mantras becomes problematic as government fiscal officers and those in charge of executing those funds must attempt to evaluate the end–state of the “bang for the buck.” As a result, Congressional policymakers have tended to require the DoD and DOS to provide metrics in order to demonstrate that such treasure has not been wasted in the normal process of checks and balances connected with the power of the purse and arms in the state.
This imperative of policy ensures actual value for taxpayer dollars spent, in contrast to the Soviet system especially in its late phase of the 1980s, where the lack of parliamentary and civil society oversight and checks and balances bankrupted the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact in a way that was painfully apparent to those at hand in the 1990s in central Europe. It also speaks to the Taylorite\(^\text{17}\) “metrics culture” of defense management that is rampant throughout the federal government and especially within the DoD since the reign of Robert McNamara, but well before in the twentieth century with the bond between Wall Street and new forms of defense management in the era of total war that began in 1917 and reached its high point of managerial optimism in the 1960s. However, in the year 1990, almost no one in the U.S. government had a clear idea of how modernization and democratization of defense institutions in countries of the former Eastern bloc would operate in practice and how such a process would be joined with the routine of defense management. Rather, the central and eastern Europeans, who emerged from the rubble of the Warsaw Pact, set the agenda with their desire for partnership and full status as allies. The regulatory structure was even less well developed. The start of the collapse of the eastern bloc came as a huge surprise in the fall of 1989, and the response of policy in the U.S. and the leading NATO allies as well as the alliance leadership itself was an improvisation that evolved into a series of programs, in which the western defense bureaucracies employed certain existing entities as well as new ones (security assistance being an old one and PfP being a new one) to the needs of Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and Slovaks in the first years of enlargement. For instance, no regulation on the democratization of a former Soviet general staff or defense ministry

\(^{17}\) The term Taylorite is derived from Frederick Winslow Taylor’s 1911 book “The Principles of Scientific Management.” Taylor proffered that the most scientific man will certainly rise to the top much more rapidly than those who are not. He promoted his theory by illustrating the inefficiencies of the everyday citizen in the United States as they conducted their daily business. And in order to thwart these inefficiencies, scientific management must be applied. He believed that detailed planning and metrics of the scientific method could be applied to all aspects of human activity. Frederick Winslow Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management*, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1911), 6-7.

existed in DoD praxis in 1994, a fact that underscores plainly that certain programs within the security assistance and security cooperation sectors do not lend themselves to any meaningful quantification of outcomes in policy and strategy.

A prime example would the DOS’s IMET program, which provides funds to recipient countries to educate their military and defense civilians at U.S. schools and academies, as well as funding mobile training and education teams to respond to the needs of the host country. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 added enormous policy importance to IMET in the early 1990s. Although IMET reaches back half a century, neither DOS nor DoD has been able to devise long-term assessments of the training and education provided under this program at the departmental or upper echeloned bureaucratic levels. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) constructed a tiered evaluation system for the IMET program, with the top tier (Level V) asking about the return on investment. The wording of the question itself implies that the answer is a number derived by some conventional calculation and amenable to expression in some quantitative metric that is accepted by all concerned parties. Specifically, GAO asked: “How does the monetary value of results of the program compare with the related costs?” The GAO then reported that neither DOS nor DoD collect any data at this top-level of evaluation. The problem is not that either agency resists the Congressional mandate to provide metrics and assessments; rather, the trouble


is fixing dollar values to such processes and institutions as “democratic civilian control of the military” or “accountability.” Such problems are further manifest; one hardly need note, in the cases of the reform of Iraqi and Afghan security and military forces, enterprises which have been vastly more costly than any project undertaken in the past two decades in Central and Eastern Europe.

But how can the DOS and DoD assess such functions with a realistic measure that serves the interest of the taxpayer and the defense manager as well as the legislature while also offering insights into the actual process of defense institution building with its own dynamics and imponderables that makers of policy themselves cannot generalize about in practice? And what determines the “return on investment” when the answer is truly subjective in the realms of policy and strategy in a process that exists at the intersection of state building, democratization, and security sector reform?

Although managerial and technocratic elites and their overseers exert great pressure to quantify all functions and processes within the government—and for good reasons since most projects need benchmarks in order to justify future expenditures—not every funding program can produce measurable results of policy and programs within a budgeting cycle or even within a five-year plan. For instance, to state the obvious which is nonetheless lost on some interested in the question, the production of a new fighter aircraft has different traits than the foundation of a new general staff and high command structure in a young democracy escaping the political and institutional legacy of war and totalitarianism. Under current processes of the measurement of means and ends, how someone measures the success of foreign assistance and aid then becomes a matter of subjectivity borne from budgetary imperatives that require objective results. This already squishy analytical footing is made more perilous by the disciplinary prejudice of the metrics’ author, based on their particular area of expertise to the exclusion of others. This issue is further evidenced through the process of multi-layered checks and balances in the working of a democratic government with its own political forces that are anything other than open to quantification as shown by events in politics, society and economy of the last decade.
C. PFP PROCESS AND PROGRESS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

While the PfP program opened the door for reforms, it was not until 1995, at which time the effort began its regularization after the initial burst of activity, that the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) \(^{22}\) was instituted to “provide a structured basis for identifying partner forces and capabilities that could be available to the Alliance for multinational training, exercises and operations” while “also serves[ing] as a planning tool to guide and measure progress in defence [sic] and military transformation efforts.”\(^{23}\) The countries participating in the PARP, work with NATO allies to “assess their defense capabilities, identify potential contributions to NATO exercises and operations, and select specific goals for developing their defense capabilities and building interoperability. NATO has made modifications to the Planning and Review Process over time. For instance, in 2004, NATO modified the Planning and Review Process’ goals to further support defense reform, defense institution building, and the fight against terrorism.”\(^{24}\)

Since inception, thirty-four countries have signed the PfP framework document signifying their commitment to the bi-lateral cooperation between the Euro-Atlantic partner nations and NATO. So far, twelve countries have progressed from PfP program membership to full NATO membership with all of the new member states coming from

\(^{22}\) The PfP framework establishes an a la carte-style partnership program where the member country can choose from over 150 partnership goals. The PARP framework allows member countries the ability to have NATO assess specific goals, defense capabilities, and/or interoperability opportunities through joint planning and exercises. Additionally, the PARP framework constitutes a commitment from the political leadership, to their domestic constituency, that defense reforms are conducted reasonably and in a measured fashion, with the assistance from outside donors, namely the United States. The burden-shifting of security sector reforms, through PfP, fosters intellectual interoperability while lessening the appearance of allocating scarce domestic resources for guns vice butter. The desired result of the rhetoric is to create a strong security posture that reinforces political rewards with minimal domestic costs. Wallace J. Thies, Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO, (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 14-15.


the Baltics, the Balkans, and Central Europe. In contrast, for a variety of reasons, there has been a noticeable reluctance from NATO to offer full membership among the Eurasian PfP countries, including Russia and states on Russia’s immediate borders. Meanwhile, seven Eastern European countries have remained PfP program members, although with disparate reasons for eschewing Article X membership.

Whatever their formal relationship to NATO, these seven PfP nation states remain significant strategic partners to the United States, especially since the campaign of counter terror after 11 September 2001. Considering such factors as geography and policy, their fate influences on the stability of Europe and, hence, to be sure, that of the United States; these nation states are also closely linked with the region’s relations and fortunes of present day Russia. For example, the Transcaucasus and the greater Black Sea regions provide a strategic element for European energy security. The production and transport of fossil fuels from Central Asia through the Caspian and Black Seas create secondary and tertiary energy routes that bypass Russian pipelines and potential restrictions of those lines. Of particular concern are the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that transits Georgia, in addition to transiting Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the Gazprom Druzhba and Soyuz pipelines that transit Ukraine.

While the United States, NATO, the EU, and individual European countries have committed resources to ensure the region maintains its overall stability through aid

25 The 12 Partnership for Peace members who were offered and accepted NATO membership: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

26 The seven PfP Eastern European countries, as defined for this thesis as the former Soviet republics, remaining outside of NATO membership are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.

27 There are currently 18 PfP member states that are satisfied with solely a bilateral relationship with NATO and do not aspire for full NATO membership: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Finland, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malta, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. As such, there are only 4 PfP member states that are actively seeking NATO membership with the use of the Membership Action Plan (MAP): Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Georgia, and Montenegro. It should be noted that Georgia has not yet been formally offered a MAP, although a formal invitation for NATO membership has been extended. Consequently, there are several European countries that have no NATO or PfP ties or participation: Andorra, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and the Holy See. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Partners,” February 21, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/51288.htm (accessed March 21, 2012).
programs, the PfP program specifically targets military modernization, interoperability, and reform—though not to the exclusion of civil stability, economic growth, and political will. But, regional stability, even though the PfP, cannot be bought on the cheap or forced against the will of the people of a particular country. It must originate from the political leadership but supported through the civil will of the people and the legislative process of ensuring adequate funding for PfP goals.

The challenge that Ukraine and Georgia’s political administrations face is being able to convince their voters, especially during hard economic times, that additional funding for military modernization is valued-added for their country’s domestic defense when supporting NATO missions abroad. Their international desires, no matter where they currently lay, have very real local impacts. Since Ukraine and Georgia, economically have only mid-range gross domestic products (GDP), the consumer on the street becomes more interested in finding employment and feeding their families as opposed to providing security and food to other countries. While this definitely becomes a political concern, it illustrates the value that the PfP program can provide, by minimizing the recipient country’s financial requirements, when accompanied with funding and other types of gratis support from donor countries.

D. ASSESSMENT: A PROPOSAL AND A PYRAMID

The difficulty in measuring success for security assistance programs is that there is not a single or consensual management measurement to assess the public activity of security. Success must be measured, if it can even be categorized as an area that be adequately assessed, on a whole of government approach based on the overarching foreign policy goals of the United States in their complexity. What lacks in the measurement/assessment/success mantra is a clear dictum of a security assistance and security cooperation grand strategy concept that echo of the Economic Recovery Plan (ERP) of the 1940s, a circumstance that poorly allows comparisons to the multiform challenges as have unfolded with security assistance and cooperation since 1989. The world is vastly different environment than it was twenty-five years ago and the United States, in the lack of a grand foreign policy strategy, has piecemealed foreign aid on
market principles and outsourcing to a thousand points of light as it has become needed. The confluence of the multitude of programs, initiatives, and agencies has created a confusing and overly bureaucratized environment among branches of government and non-government for expending funds in an effort to support the democratization of other countries.

Correcting these problems will not necessarily create an ideal mechanism of management and control that directly links every U.S. dollar with concrete results in policy and strategy from recipient countries. This fact derives from the lack of consensus in the U.S. government as to what constitutes in reality effective defense institution building and because the process of the last twenty years took existing security assistance structure oriented to materiel and grafted them onto the ad hoc strategic requirement to rebuild central and eastern European defense establishments. Meeting the need for verifications and assessments, this author proposes a hierarchal construct with differing assessment criteria based on where, on the bureaucratic scale, the U.S. aid actions take place.

Understanding how NATO, and the United States in particular, have handled, supported, and provided financial aid for partner countries’ goals of modernizing their military structure through a comprehensive defense institution building process is essential in determining how we judge progress for these efforts. The cornerstone of this understanding must take into account, from the outset, that progress can only be measured based on where a country starts from and where they want to go based on gross military outcomes. One of the primary difficulties in evaluating success is that the funds, programs, and assessments are considered in isolation as compared to the total defense reform process or more comprehensively under the whole of government approach. Understanding how to overcome the disparate programs and initiatives from the various funding venues of the U.S. government, within a single methodological concept, can be accomplished by using the proposed assessment pyramid in Figure 1.

The proposed assessment pyramid was crafted on the premise that a bureaucratized one-size-fits-all metric missed the basic fundamental concepts that many scholars have proffered, that the human element of policy does not directly link to
successful and cost effective events at the basic level of military-to-military interactions. Each level of bureaucracy provides a unique aspect when identifying if events and funds are successful. The assessment pyramid provided here depicts a hierarchical system that applies different assessments for measuring the success of foreign aid and assistance programs based on where they lay as compared to their foreign policy goals. This approach aims to evaluate those programs that have quantifiable outcomes to those programs that require verification which supports U.S. foreign policy goals within target nations. The examination of U.S. security assistance programs necessitates a broad view of success as it is measured up and down the bureaucratic hierarchy of the pyramid.

![Assessment Pyramid](image)

**Figure 1. Assessment Pyramid (From: 28)**

As the assessments move from the base to the pinnacle they will become harder to quantify using objective measures of effectiveness and management customs and practice. The base-level evaluations consider specific tasks and accomplishments from

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28 The proposed assessment pyramid is the author’s vision logically to structure the foreign aid and assistance and provide a framework for rational assessments based on his understanding of the systematic shortfalls inherent in the current process.
tactical units that are easy to assess given the nature of the events, training, or desired interoperability. Evaluations could consider the type and amount of funding provided based on hard outcomes of numbers of people training, hours of instruction, or even units equipped. When assessments move higher up the pyramid, the evaluations convert to more subjective verifications based on political desires and goals. These types of verifications must consider the national policy directives as they are applied to the tasks given to the tactical and operational commanders. Success at one level does not necessarily imply success at the next level unless it is in line with the strategic and national policy goals. It is essential to ensure the leadership understands that comprehensive defense reforms cannot be accomplished without reforms spanning from the lowest tactical unit all the way up to the country’s president and parliamentary body.

The structure of the pyramid results from top-down political directives and goals that outline the country’s national security priorities. These priorities are remolded within the Ministry of Defense (MoD) for modernization initiatives, doctrine creation, specific military training, and other funding allocations to meet the president’s national security desires. When the DOS foreign policy objectives overlap with the recipient country’s national security goals, bi-lateral aid and assistance can be allocated to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.

Partnership for Peace countries can then leverage aid and assistance programs via the establishment of a NATO PARP and/or Annual National Program (ANP)/MAP/Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) goals in conjunction with the Office of Defense Cooperation’s (ODC) goals, as an extension of the COCOM’s Country Campaign Plans. These agreements, for funding and other military aid, fulfill the MoD’s needs and can be coordinated through the COCOM (EUCOM in this particular instance) who will consider which sub-component command, such as Marine Corps Forces Europe, will be responsible for the actual execution at the tactical and operational levels.

29 The MAP is constructively a political statement of intent that describes the country’s desires for membership. The ANP addresses a multitude of issues, of which defense is only a part of the total program. Conversely, the PARP and IPAP goals are defense driven and specifically address only defense related issues.
Building the foundation of the pyramid are the collaborative efforts of the ODC and EUCOM, using their planning documents (Ambassador Mission goals and the Theater Campaign Plan, respectively) to support the recipient country’s national security goals, which also supports U.S. foreign policy objectives of helping to build and sustain democratic nations. As mission essential tasks (MET) are created for each planning goal, training events and funding can be budgeted according to each of the mission essential task lists (METL)—those items deemed to be of necessity to achieve the successful completion of the task. It is at this level that the cornerstone of objectivity resides where assessments can be readily and objectively produced under quantifiable terms.

However, while allocated funding for specific events and the completion of those events does not necessarily indicate success in totality, it does provide an indicator for where additional funding should be focused for future events. For instance, a single military exercise based on interoperability or language training provided to one person will not provide the one-time check-in-box but, will require ongoing and sustained events which foster continued knowledge and comprehension until such a time that it becomes innate within the particular target area or task. The growing of the baseline of the number of those trained would, in itself, indicate progress toward the next stage and would be considered a successful and well-spent activity.

Once additional task lists are completed, the essential task could be considered complete after an evaluative process assesses if the PfP country can perform the task autonomously and therefore would graduate from future assistance in that area. However, this type of assessment would be circular in nature and could be repeated among all of the METs using this constant evaluative process. The end results would reinforce the tactical/operational EUCOM goals and ultimately the PfP PARP goals which could be objectively reported to policy makers as progress or even success.

The DOS structure is laden with both objective and subjective measurements of performance and effectiveness. These factors are not as easily divided between the strategic, operational, and tactical goals as they are in the DoD realm. It would stand to reason, though, that the more tactical goals are those that are more easily quantified under objective goals—such as those at the base of the pyramid. The tactical level DOS efforts
will prove easier to quantify since Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) equipment purchases can easily be measured based on the recipient country’s needs and success can be measured based on multiple possible criterion such as: delivery times of the materiel, sufficient operator training, sale of combined logistics packages which includes spares, maintenance training, and warehousing equipment to ensure stated readiness requirements based on the recipient countries’ pre-stated goals.

The IMET program should be considered both a subjective and an objective measurement since it provides military and civilian officials English language skills as well as educating the IMET recipient on U.S. policy issues and cultural awareness in general about the United States. This can be illustrated with the introductory discussion of the interaction with the Ukrainian major. The measurable result was the completion of the Command and Staff School while the subjective nature considers the secondary and tertiary benefits of the language training and formal schooling which enhances U.S. interoperability for years to come.

At the top of the DOS scale are the country ambassador’s U.S. foreign policy goals that are at the pinnacle of subjectivity where subjectivity is verified against the DOS initiatives such as providing economic stability, buying influence, and establishing U.S. goodwill for the target nation. An example of such an initiative was the recent launching of the New Economic Opportunities Initiative in Georgia where over $20 million over a four-year period was earmarked to reduce poverty, improve rural incomes, improve food security, and address water concerns in the target communities. While these projects are worthwhile, finding measurements of effectiveness will prove elusive as these are better suited under a verification of efforts that they are providing goodwill to Georgia and the Georgian populous at large. That is the measurement of success, though not quantifiable, nor should it be.

Although the United States and the U.S. embassy civil-military country teams effectively track the expenditure of funds for the programs, the method of accountability

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for individuals charged with executing these funds for specific outcomes is still imperfect for the needs of policy. There is a tremendous effort at all levels of government to ensure that Congressional funds are applied specifically for projects within the mandated legal boundaries. Comptrollers and legal advisors work with planners to ensure that fiscal law is strictly observed. COMCOMs task subordinate commands to execute funds towards their individual priority lists and ambassadors task their staffs to spend funds on in-country projects. Although “after action” and “lessons learned” reports are submitted by authorities up through the chain of command, no one is held accountable if the project, exercise, or program fails other then in a general way. As long as the money is spent legally and the event has finally occurred, it is labeled a success; at most, those in a position of authority signify potential areas for improvement for the work of the year to come. However, as of 2011, Congress has now mandated that metrics shall be developed and used to justify funds and the progress of current and future programs, although Congress has not indicated to what extent these metrics are to be applied or what they should look like. Conceivably though, if metrics are adopted, then organizational hierarchies can be held accountable for poorly performing programs. As a result, if greater emphasis were applied to the outcomes and if commanding generals and admirals, as well as ambassadors, were held accountable to Congress through the Department Secretaries, then greater efforts and focus would be brought to bear to ensure meaningful results with reasonable assessment criteria for the foreign aid programs. This could be easily brought in line with the assessment pyramid so that measurable evaluations are collected at the country-team and COCOM levels, while foreign policy driven outcome-based goals are measured more on a verification of progress through the ambassador and reported to the department secretaries.

E. SOURCES AND METHODS

Within Ukraine and Georgia, the early preponderance of literature on specific military modernization policies and doctrine has resided largely within national and defense policy documents such as national security strategies and defense reviews but recently more transparency of their security situation and modernization efforts have become available via open source venues. However at this time, Ukraine and Georgia
both shared the same initial concerns about their territorial security against a potential Russian resurgence and increase of their stated sphere of influence in their near-abroad. This was perhaps more of a concern for Georgia than Ukraine since Ukraine was left with a significant cache of nuclear ballistic missile and Georgia did not have such a capability.

The Ukraine and Georgia heads of state have published their national security and military strategies, which have provided the basis for their individual modernization requirements and needs. These works represent the strategic political policies for these countries while all other strategic doctrine and modernization guidelines are formed from the MoD and service strategies. While each country’s national security goals and strategies vary, a common theme resonates among them—the protection of its citizens from outside intrusion and territorial integrity. Although differences are inherent among their desired outcomes and approaches toward the same problems, Ukraine and Georgia have published in-depth goals specific to modernization efforts which have assisted them in identifying specific desired outcomes. Within the Ukrainian White Book, published annually since 2005, and the Georgian Strategic Defense Review (SDR), both countries desire complete renovations of their military structures and equipment as well as addressing specifics toward meeting the PfP goals of modernizing forces for NATO interoperability requirements.

In addition to the Ukrainian and Georgian national security and military policy documents, the internal evaluations of their modernization efforts have been supplemented through outside assessments. Detailed independent evaluations have been conducted by Jane’s Security Assessments. These reports are unbiased reviews of all aspects of a country’s military to include manning levels, equipment and hardware quantities and conditions along with current in-country events and actions but with minimal analytical opinion. However, the sources for Jane’s Assessments are primarily from open-source documents and do not represent in-depth personal reviews of specific modernization efforts.

However, there have been more in-depth assessments of Ukraine and Georgia’s modernization efforts. Both countries have had special assistance from the United States and other nations as well, to provide a detailed examination of defense reforms within
numerous areas of concern that correspond to individual NATO PfP PARP categories.31
Aside from the self-interested national policy documents, the Center for Civil-Military
Relations (CCMR) documents which specifically address the Ukrainian and Georgian
reforms present the best analytical framework for defense building assessments and are
used extensively throughout this research. Additionally, COCOM reviews and
assessments along with the Ukrainian and Georgian embassy Mission Strategic and
Resource Plans are considered to evaluate and compare against third-party assessments.

Building on such sources, his thesis examines Ukraine and Georgia by using a
comparative study of their proposed modernization proposals against U.S. funding
assistance and programs that support current U.S. policy. It will approach the
examination of these countries’ modernization programs through the lens of three key
support pillars of logistics32 as the basis for true modernization progress. It is clear that
without a comprehensive logistics support network, other modernization efforts will not
achieve full potential as they will not have the appropriate tools to sustain operational
readiness or the ability to deploy autonomously for extended periods of time. Logistics
also brings policy, planning, and funding together within a country, including major
outlays and projects.

31 While the PARP review documents are classified, other reports are available that were conducted
by groups of specialists, sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Naval Postgraduate
School Center for Civil-Military Relations. These reviews examined multiple aspects of defense institution
building reforms within each of the eleven categories and the analytical results are based on subjective,
though professional, opinions on defense institution building initiatives and whether the target country has
in reality moved from Soviet-style institutions to NATO compatible institutions.

32 For this thesis, “logistics” refers to the political manifestation exercised throughout all levels of the
government’s bureaucracy to include presidential guidance for logistics modernization and value, MoD
document for the use of logistics, acquisition of equipment and materiel, and sustainment of military forces
as outlined through a country’s national security goals. Logistics used in this manner is an extension of
national policies and as such, culminates the juncture of political desire, popular civilian support, and
military capability. A shortfall in any of these three key support pillars will severely impact the military’s
ability to deploy or even provide domestic humanitarian assistance in times of crisis. This understanding of
logistics is comprehensive without providing specific boundaries due to the complex nature of national
logistics. The point to be understood is that logistics is not just about pushing parts and supporting the
warfighter for extended operations at home as well as abroad. It becomes much more integral to the
national government’s policy and ability to allocate funds, specifically for military logistics modernization,
that furthers a country’s national security goals through all levels of the national support element to include
the president, the legislative bodies, the MoD, the Joint Staff, and the individual services.
In other words, a country puts its money where its political and strategic intentions are in the realm of logistics. Thus logistics tends to offer the clearest insights into the progress of security reform.

As the newly independent countries, specifically Ukraine and Georgia, modernize their military structures, the need for logistics reform among the three key support pillars at all levels is absolutely essential to ensure the new military structure is supported organizationally and sustained financially. The resulting product will attempt to narrow the chasm and identify whether the modernization efforts of Ukraine and Georgia have been effective given the amount of aid and assistance provided by the United States and ultimately determine if the combined assessment provides a better gauge of success than the congressionally mandated metrics effort.
II. UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

The means to measure generosity to the ends of the national interest form the point of departure for this analysis of the character of U.S. security cooperation and the way that its overseers and critics measure its effectiveness. The United States has been a long proponent of encouraging democratic-leaning countries to build a state and society based on western constitutional principles of good government and thrift. While some countries can be encouraged through verbal support and economic ties, a vast majority of others receive this encouragement of democratization through financial aid and assistance in the form of food and humanitarian programs, and legal and commerce cooperation, in addition to security assistance and cooperation programs.

The building and modernization of defense and military institutions concerns the U.S. and its agencies of security cooperation as much as it does the target country. The U.S. Congressional laws under the DOS and DoD Authorization Acts dictate the amount of funding available to the departments for foreign assistance. Each military or naval department is mandated by Congress to work with other foreign assistance agencies when assistance goals are similar. While the DOS is responsible for administering security assistance programs and the DoD is responsible for administering security cooperation programs, the nuanced differences tend to frequently blend at the consumption-level as


Although all of these programs are funded under one Authorization Act, each sub-division of funds creates multiple layers of bureaucracy as dollars are further sub-divided down until they ultimately reach the recipient countries. In many cases, a country will receive funds from multiple lead agencies. This decentralized approach leads to a high probability that funds spent within a country could be duplicative or even contradictory between funding objectives or more problematic, lack policy coherence. United States Government Accountability Office, NATO Partnerships, 36.
COCOMs and ODC teams\(^{34}\) work through statutory applications of Title 10 and Title 22 funds.\(^{35}\) It should be noted that the DOS and DoD Authorization Acts are Fiscal Year 2012 documents and have not been signed into law as of this writing and are subject to Presidential and/or other Congressional changes. However, despite potential changes in particular programmatic funding, the sense of Congress is clear enough that inter-departmental cooperation, along measureable performance goals, is required.

Supporting the two departments is a host of sub-organizational agencies that provide documentation on how expenditures are budgeted and accounted for. The DoD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) provides the throughput and budgeting estimates for twelve programs, inclusive of PfP’s WIF.\(^{36}\) Alternatively, DOS’s United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provides the throughput and budgeting estimates for thirteen programs ranging from global health initiatives to law

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\(^{34}\) Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC) can be located anywhere within the host country’s governmental structure (generally within the MoD or General Staff) and will have various naming conventions although the functionality of these offices remains analogous. The ODC reports to the regional COCOM as well as the Defense Attaché who is located at the U.S. embassy and reports directly to the country ambassador.

\(^{35}\) The Fiscal Year 2012 Foreign Relations Authorization Act authorized over $40 billion of U.S. taxpayers’ money to be loaned or given away to other countries. United States House, *Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2012*, H.R. 2583. However, how these funds are allocated and managed among the recipient agencies varies widely. Although standard governmental accounting practices meet Congressional mandates on dollar accountability, oversight of how the funds are spent is lacking. Comptroller responsibilities are primarily fiduciary to ensure that funds are spent within legal limits and not based on whether the spending supports foreign policy goals. The disconnect between financial accountability of foreign assistance and the execution of foreign assistance operations and initiatives creates a DoD and DOS policy gap within the management and oversight responsibilities within the executing agencies. This oversight and management gap between operations and comptrollers is not a new phenomenon but it becomes acute when security cooperation and security assistance planning are not synchronized with fiscal realities from the comptroller, and ultimately Congressional authorizations. As a result, the various agency planning staffs must balance foreign assistance priorities based on available funding without the benefit of clear directives from Congress, the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of State. Further complications occur when multiple agencies have security cooperation and security assistance roles within a target country and the priority of funds rankings for one agency is not analogous to another agency’s rankings. This funds management gap can create unorganized efforts within a recipient country that prolong, delay, or even undermine other funding efforts.

enforcement to foreign military financing. Further subdividing these major programs are a host of smaller and targeted programs broken out by country and specific activity. While the DSCA and USAID comptroller functions provide the nuanced funding streams and budget estimates, they only facilitate the function as bookkeepers and not as evaluators of programmatic success.

Although the Authorization Acts direct close cooperation between the foreign aid distributing agencies, a recent GAO report indicated that the DoD specifically needed to reassess how funds were being applied toward NATO PfP recipient countries. While the GAO report was comprehensive in nature, it did not provide any basis or a recommendation for performance reviews other than they should be conducted to evaluate PfP funding and specifically those funds supporting the WIF. The September 2010 report indicated that the last evaluation of Warsaw Initiative programs was conducted in 2001 and expressed the view that a new evaluation should be conducted after the publication of the new NATO Strategic Concept. The GAO report encapsulates the root of the issue. The changing world environment has changed PfP countries’ requirements but the funding mechanisms of the U.S. government have not reacted to institute comprehensive modernization efforts through a grand foreign policy strategy.

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38 United States Government Accountability Office, NATO Partnerships, 36.

39 In 2010, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was concerned about how the PfP program changes had evolved in scope and importance over seventeen years as more countries joined NATO in the face of a changing strategic environment since the early 1990s. The GAO responded with a report indicating that the DoD needed to reassess how WIF dollars were applied because no formal assessment of the WIF program had been conducted since 2001. Even though WIF comprises only a small fraction of the security assistance and security cooperation funds, the lack of a recent assessment illustrates the lack of a comprehensive assessment of all funding programs. United States Government Accountability Office, NATO Partnerships, in toto.

40 United States Government Accountability Office, NATO Partnerships, 35.

41 United States Government Accountability Office, NATO Partnerships, 36.
The result is that the personnel and organizations tasked with carrying out Congressional requirements attempt, at the best of their ability under legal constraints, to coalesce requirements, funding, and the joint foreign policy goals of the United States and the recipient country.

A. HISTORY OF FOREIGN AID

Before the First World War, the United States generally maintained an isolationist stance in its foreign policy, including the provision of non-military aid or resources to other countries. The majority of foreign aid, before this time, was provided by private citizens and companies and not by the U.S. government—for example, the humanitarian organizations that provided significant assistance for Russian famine relief in the early 1890s. This practice changed amid the severe and immediate humanitarian needs of the Europeans resulting from the war’s devastation. Herbert Hoover, who in 1914 was a mining engineer and living in London, helped organize the return of American citizens to the United States from Europe. His valiant efforts did not go unnoticed, and when the Germans invaded Belgium, he was appointed the chairman of the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB), an international organization chartered to provide foodstuffs to northern France and Belgium to prevent starvation of the invaded peoples.

However, Hoover and the CRB no longer were able to provide such assistance once the United States entered the war. As a result, the suffering and privations continued; the situation was even worse in Eastern Europe. After the war, the full extent of the suffering and starvation throughout Europe lead President Woodrow Wilson

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43 The need became especially prominent in Poland, and later in Russia, as the German government forbade relief efforts to be granted by non-governmental organizations to the civilian population without regard to feeding the armies first. What foodstuffs where available locally were requisitioned by the occupying German military forces with little regard for general population. The result was that the British and Allied countries withheld food support based on the viewpoint that support to Poland would ultimately result in support to Germany’s war effort since the Germans would take food destined for the Polish population. Matthew Lloyd Adams, “Herbert Hoover and the Organization of the American Relief Effort in Poland (1919—1923),” In European Journal of American Studies, No. 2, September 29, 2009, http://ejas.revues.org/7627 (accessed January 3, 2012), 2-3.
to enact the first U.S. foreign aid program, the American Relief Administration (ARA), in February 1919, using $5 million in discretionary funds.\textsuperscript{44} Later that year, Congress appropriated $100 million for ARA efforts and relief credits for Europe.\textsuperscript{45} The ARA continued to provide foodstuffs for Europe, excluding Russia, for the next three years and sustained operations in Russia until 1923 as a U.S. political effort to undermine the Bolsheviks and Vladimir Lenin.\textsuperscript{46} Although the foreign aid support to Europe was limited in nature and duration, it set the precedent for future financial aid to countries in need along with the new notion of providing carrot-and-stick support to countries that do not willingly yield to U.S. desires or national interests.

Both aspects of U.S. aid blossomed after the Second World War, and foreign aid has remained a key instrument in U.S. foreign policy ever since. However, unlike the ARA credit provisions to Europe in 1919, the 1941 Lend-Lease Act, signed into law by President Franklin Roosevelt, provided a majority of the aid gratis or with heavily discounted prices. The Lend-Lease Act was instrumental in providing much-needed materiel to Allied forces from 1941–1945 illustrating the current and future needs for close military cooperation among friendly nations. These efforts primarily supported Britain, France, and the Soviet Union financially and materially, which helped the Allies defeat the Nazis.

The end of the Second World War shifted U.S. policy makers’ focus from the waging of war to the building of a stable peace via the European reconstruction efforts and the eventual creation of the ERP in 1947.\textsuperscript{47} The ERP was designed as a multi-year economic aid and recovery package intended to rebuild the devastated European continent by providing immediate aid for recovery projects while creating the fiscal environment for a market-based economic system through investments. The financial aid

\textsuperscript{44} Adams, “Herbert Hoover,” 3.

\textsuperscript{45} Adams, “Herbert Hoover,” 4.

\textsuperscript{46} Adams, “Herbert Hoover,” 13.

\textsuperscript{47} The European Recovery Plan was also referred to as the Marshall Plan, named after the, then Secretary of State, George Marshall.
was provided, under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1948,\textsuperscript{48} to European countries so that they could increase domestic production, expand foreign trade, and “establish and maintain equitable rates of exchange and to bring about the progressive elimination of trade barriers.”\textsuperscript{49} These goals were coupled with U.S. required sales quotas for shipping and grain purchases as a requirement of the aid package.\textsuperscript{50} This arrangement created a doubly beneficial outcome for the United States, one as a foreign policy success and the other an economic success.

The aid package required the Western European countries to work together, which stabilized the continent politically and militarily, and it created an economic boom for U.S. companies providing basic staples and reconstruction supplies. A result from the U.S. domestic standpoint was that foreign aid and assistance not only helped the recipient country but also provided to secure U.S. jobs and economic growth. This outcome was not surprising, as it led to continued industrial growth, which helped to employ millions of returning soldiers after the war. The effect was that foreign aid was perceived to be good for the U.S. and created a liberal consumer-driven democracy for the recipient country. This win-win scenario for all became manifest in the minds of policy makers for future aid programs. Additionally, the end of the Second World War placed the United States in a unique and remarkable situation as the preeminent global economic and military superpower, which led to a major shift in foreign policy with European and Asian nations. In addition to becoming a new superpower, the United States now had the ability and responsibility to orchestrate events toward the promotion of democracy and peace in order to avoid another major global conflict.

\textsuperscript{48} The Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 was also inclusive of the Truman Doctrine which begat the first instance of funded aid in support of the Kennan “containment” policy whereby $400 million was provided to Greek government, after the British pulled out their support, to stave off the growing communist threat during the Greek Civil War. United States Department of State, “The Truman Doctrine, 1947,” accessed March 23, 2012, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/TrumanDoctrine


\textsuperscript{50} World Bank, “The Foreign Assistance Act of 1948.”
From 1947 to 1952, the United States provided, by way of the ERP, $13.3 billion for assistance and aid to Western Europe.\textsuperscript{51} Specifically, West Germany received the greatest preponderance of ERP assistance, totaling $6.5 billion,\textsuperscript{52} although Britain and France received larger amounts in total, through other assistance programs, which included loans. The effect of the ERP and the associated loan programs place a stranglehold on Europe to bend to the U.S. will of cooperation and reconstruction which eschewed the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries from participating in the ERP program as they viewed it as American economic imperialism. This refusal of the program by these countries further promoted the aid equals democratization belief since many of these countries became autocracies.

On the other front of the war, the United States did not create an analogous plan for Japan for a variety of reasons. Still, the United States provided other aid to rebuild and democratize the new, post-war Japan—to the tune of $2.2 billion in the same period (1947–1952).\textsuperscript{53} These programs represented a new and continuing foreign policy commitment for the United States and signified a sustained and intensive U.S. involvement in the affairs of its new allies.

The conceptual framework to provide grants and loans to civilian populations along with food, natural resources, farming material, and other relief supplies invoked the basic responsibility to provide compassion and assistance to promote goodwill and, hopefully, a strong socio-economic relationship as a bulwark against the growing

\textsuperscript{51} While the Marshall Plan was offered to both Allied and Axis Powers, the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries did not accept any of the aid package.

\textsuperscript{52} The total German package of aid and assistance overlapped the Marshall Plan due to the initially funding from the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA). The Marshall plan provided for $4.3 billion and the GARIOA provided for $2.2 billion. These figures would represent $45 billion in adjusted 2005 dollars.


This anti-communist stance of Kennan’s containment policy remained the focal point for foreign aid disbursements throughout the globe until the late 1980s and became representative of the ERP and Japanese successes for reconstruction without communism.

**B. DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961**

A decade or so later, formal policy and assistance doctrine was centralized and regularized through the FAA of 1961. The FAA grew out of the need to streamline and rationalize the foreign aid process, which had become a fixture of U.S. foreign policy in the years after the ERP. President John F. Kennedy summarized the state of affairs for foreign aid in 1961 when he addressed Congress:

> For no objective supporter of foreign aid can be satisfied with the existing program—actually a multiplicity of programs. Bureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow, its administration is diffused over a haphazard and irrational structure covering at least four departments and several other agencies. The program is based on a series of legislative measures and administrative procedures conceived at different times and for different purposes, many of them now obsolete, inconsistent, and unduly rigid and thus unsuited for our present needs and purposes. Its weaknesses have begun to undermine confidence in our effort both here and abroad.

President Kennedy signed the formal Foreign Assistance Act into Law in September 1961. The new law reorganized all non-military aid programs under the newly created USAID while leaving military aid programs structured under the DoD.

Since then, the Foreign Assistance Act has been amended multiple times along with annual revisions. Additionally, further government reorganizations aligned the USAID as a fully independent agency under the cognizance of the State Department. As

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a result, the Foreign Assistance Act currently provides funding through annual appropriations to the State Department, USAID, the Peace Corps, along with many smaller sub-agencies and organizations. Congress declared that the “principle objective of the foreign policy of the United States is the encouragement and sustained support of the people of developing countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential to development and to build the economic, political, and social institutions which will improve the quality of their lives.”57 The State Department’s response to such lofty guidelines was to establish aid programs with five primary objectives: Peace and Security, Investing in People, Governing Justly and Democratically, Economic Growth, and Humanitarian Assistance.58

Annual appropriations are now directed under five primary types of aid (Bilateral Development, Economic Aid, Humanitarian Assistance, Multilateral Development, and Military Assistance),59 which do not generally correlate directly to the DOS objectives.60 Under each type of aid are multiple programs designated for a specific allocation of funding based on the Congressional mandate of the annual appropriations. The varied types of aid used for multiple objectives create the condition for a single type of aid to be applied across one or more objectives. For instance, under the Military Assistance aid type, FMF can only be used for the Peace and Security objective, while under the Bilateral Development aid type, the Andean Counterdrug Initiative can be used across all five objectives. This cross-pollination between objectives and aid types is best illustrated through the Foreign Assistance Framework matrix, Figure 2. The difficulty is

57 Foreign Relations and Intercourse, U.S. Code, Title 22 (2010), sec 101.
recognizing which objective the type of aid is supporting and to associate effectiveness of
the program under the various DOS objectives. While it is understandable that in any
program, there can be instances for some overlap, too much overlapping creates vague
goals and even less clear objective measurements of success.

Although the DOS and USAID provide a wide variety of aid initiatives under the
Peace and Security objective, these are formally described as Security Assistance
programs with the preponderance of funds devoted to FMF, FMS, and IMET. These
categories of funding are solicited from the DOS by embassies as an avenue for building
partnership military capacity in order to provide for stable defense intuitions for emerging
democratic or post-Communist transitional governments. The planning and funding for
specific country requirements generally undertook a three-year planning cycle, which
allowed for a comprehensive vetting process prior to the release of funds or materiel.⁶¹
This vetting process would appear to provide adequate oversight of what the funds are
spent on considering the $10.4 billion allocated for the FY12 DOS security assistance
budget, a 28-percent increase from the previous year.⁶²

Assistance, and Building Partner Capacity: Enhancing Interagency Collaboration,” in Joint Forces

⁶² United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs: FY2012 Budget and Appropriations, 25.
Figure 2. Department of State Foreign Assistance Framework Chart from the DOS Strategic Plan. (From: 63)

C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAM

However, unlike the lengthy vetting process of the DOS, the Defense Department is required by law to execute funds within the fiscal year of appropriation.\(^{64}\) Before 2005, the DoD maintained a secondary position within the military assistance programs under the State Department’s 1961 FAA mandate\(^ {65}\) that the “Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs.”\(^ {66}\) However, following the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the urgency for building partner capacity for counter-terrorism efforts dramatically increased.\(^ {67}\) The call for rapid reactions against future attacks ran up against the slow and deliberate nature of the State Department’s processes and led senior DoD officials to examine other alternatives.

Defense Department leaders recognized that while the DOS was not able to react quickly enough to combat the emerging threats, the DOS did have many capabilities that were lacking in the military—for example, language capability and cultural background expertise. The inter-agency discussions lead to a 2005 proposal that provided for a DoD-funded and DoD-lead “Global Train and Equip” authority to increase U.S. support for foreign military and security forces in order to disrupt terrorist networks, to build the capacity of legitimate states to provide security within their sovereign territory to prevent

\(^{64}\) While the annual appropriation for defense is mandated by law, there are some programs authorized by Congress which allows for longer-term funding such as major weapon system acquisitions and construction projects.


\(^{66}\) Foreign Relations and Intercourse, U.S. Code 2382, Title 22 (2010), sec 622(c).

terrorists from establishing footholds, and to build the capacity of legitimate states to participate in U.N., regional, and U.S. coalition military missions.”

This proposal, which also required DOS concurrence, received high praise from both the Secretaries of Defense and State and was enacted as Section 1206, Global Train and Equip Program (GTEP), for Fiscal Year 2006. Congress approved of the missions for Section 1206 of training and equipping partner nations in counter-terrorism operations and/or supporting military and stability operations “in which the U.S. armed forces participate,” but it did not provide any additional funding. As a result, the DoD had to reallocate $100 million from its Operations and Maintenance (O&M) account during FY06 and another $274 million during FY07. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2008, Congress increased the DoD’s O&M account to reflect the increase for the Section 1206 funds.

Also new in FY06, Congress instituted a Section 1207 program that allowed the DoD to “transfer to the State Department up to $100 million per fiscal year in defense articles, services, training or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries.” Other provisions authorized by Section 1207 included DoD funding of the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization along with funding additional activities in other agencies such as the USAID. Similar

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to the Section 1206, GTEP, Section 1207 was not initially funded by Congress and required the DoD to reallocate funds from the O&M account for three fiscal years.\textsuperscript{74} Beginning in FY09, Congress increased the DoD’s baseline funding to reflect the mandated transfers. In FY10, the Congressional authority expired and Section 1207 officially ended. However, it was replaced by a new DOS program, the Complex Crisis Fund (CCF), which enables the “USAID and the Department of State to meet emergent requirements that fall under their purview without relying on the Department of Defense.”\textsuperscript{75}

The annual appropriation for the DoD Section 1206 group of programs, termed all-inclusively under Security Cooperation, created a new concept of applying funds to programs by partnering with DOS for concurrence and even implementation in some instances. This inter-departmental cooperation has become known as the dual-key decision-making process as it restricts having one department act unilaterally for military assistance as it relates to foreign policy. Although this new process for military assistance is not perfect, it has allowed for rapid responses to threats that the DOS framework would not be capable of. Ukraine and Georgia have received just over $30 million through the dual-key process, $12 million and $18 million respectively, of the nearly $1 billion provided globally between 2006 and 2009 with the greatest allocation of funds provided to Pakistan and Lebanon, equating to over 30 percent of the total Section 1206 funds.\textsuperscript{76}

The most prominent security cooperation programs include the Section 1206, GTEP; the Section 1206, Build Capacity of Foreign Military Forces; the WIF; and bilateral/regional military exercises with partner nations. Although these programs are DoD-specific, there are frequent mission overlaps with DOS priorities, even beyond those required from the Section 1206 funds, which still require ambassadorial permission


for DoD activities. These programs are normally conducted with the embassy’s Office of Defense Cooperation or the senior military advisor on the embassy staff.

D. FOREIGN AID AND ASSISTANCE ISSUES

While the inter-departmental coordination appears seamless, there are three issues between these entities, which create conflict. Although each issue does not indicate a single failure in the system, the combination of all of the issues creates an environment in which funds are not used as effectively as possible.

Perhaps the most problematic issue facing security cooperation programs is the limited nature of funding, which affects how long-term projects can be sustained. The State Department goals outlined under Section 901 of the FAA state more than once that U.S. foreign assistance goals should be achieved through ongoing economic support, sustainment of the global environment, and reinforcement of strategic partnerships, which all indicate long-term, multi-year planning and execution. This approach is generally not an issue for the State Department, which is not restricted by one-year budget obligations. In contrast, for the Defense Department, appropriations require funding to be allocated and spent within one fiscal year. As a result, long-term financial planning by the DoD or by recipient nations is limited by the ability and/or the willingness of either the DoD or the recipient country to sustain new projects or capabilities based on the limited nature of the DoD funding. According to a GAO Report, only 26 percent of the Section 1206 project proposals explicitly addressed the “recipient countries’ ability to sustain the projects, and nine (7 percent) of the 135 proposals provided specific estimates of the costs involved.” While the report concluded that “sustainment risks appear

77 The section 901 goals specifically mention seven “interrelated and mutually-reinforcing goals” of: Reduce global poverty and alleviate human suffering, Advance peace and mitigate crisis, Support human rights and democracy, Build and reinforce strategic partnerships, Combat transnational threats, Sustain the global environment, and Expand prosperity through trade and investment. Foreign Relations and Intercourse, U.S. Code, Title 22 (2010), sec 901.

78 Foreign Relations and Intercourse, U.S. Code, Title 22 (2010), sec 901.


minimal,” the DoD’s efforts in this regard could be provided indefinitely providing that funding is reallocated from its baseline. Such a measure becomes challenging when defense budgets are subjected to annual budget cycles that are influenced by Congressional politics, economic constraints, and defense reductions which impact long-term planning efforts. Moreover, this becomes particularly problematic considering that 76 percent of the Section 1206 projects are conducted in low GDP income countries. As a result, the fiscal constraints within these low GDP countries prohibit them from making up for U.S. funding variances for security assistance/cooperation programs unless they approach or are approached from more willing countries. This situation again presents the problem of other foreign involvement which may not support U.S. values or foreign policy goals.

The overlap of programming and prerogatives between DOS and DoD constitutes another problem of creating funding confusion among foreign policy executors. On one hand, the inter-departmental collaboration has been viewed favorably as it provides for a multi-perspective approach for assistance programs. The DOS relies on ambassadors to support the U.S. government’s policy initiatives in a bilateral process based on country-specific needs. Alternatively, the DoD relies on COCOMs to promote U.S. military policies for regional and/or theater perspectives utilizing bi-lateral or multi-lateral approaches. Because Congress has required that DOS and DoD must collaborate for security assistance programs, the COCOM-ambassador relationship allows for varying viewpoints and consultations on priorities of efforts. The use of the dual-key decision-making process establishes a “mutually beneficial architecture for enhanced collaboration between Defense and State in future SA [security assistance] and SC [security

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84 United States Department of Defense, *Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program*, 44.
cooperation] activities.” 85 However, the increased collaboration does not necessarily mean that mutually beneficial security assistance and security cooperation activities provide the beneficiary the best assistance, nor should it suggest that the collaboration works smoothly. Because the funding for specific activities can actually cross between DOS and DoD, as shown by the Marine Corps’ Title 10 and Title 22 Spectrum of Security Activities Chart, Figure 3, a heightened level of legal scrutiny is required to ensure that appropriated funds are spent within the legal guidelines and limitations for both departments and in accordance with the FAA. 86 As a result, increased military collaboration equates to increased military presence and funding within a designated country. This aspect is not always welcomed by the embassy staff, for broader reasons of the civil-military balance as well as out of the widely held perception that many military practitioners are poorly-trained 87 and lack experience either in the region, in diplomatic skills, or both. 88 In the event, military personnel are variously well educated and trained for foreign assistance missions, and this fact, coupled with short rotational tours, oftenhamstrings the military in terms of the actual value provided to ambassadors, the host nation, and the overall U.S. national goals for that country.

86 United States Department of Defense, Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program, 43.
87 Due to the complexity of security assistance and cooperation programs, many military and DoD civilians rotated into embassies through the Defense Attaché Office, have not been properly trained for the programs it supports. A report provided by the Inspector General on DOS and DoD surveyed eight countries and discovered that: only six of the eight Security Assistance Organization (SAO) officers had received training through the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), two of the officers had no FMS training, and six of the officers had no formal training of the acquisition process for security assistance programs. United States Department of Defense, Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Program, 32.
Collectively, the DOS and DoD have “incorporated little monitoring and evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 programs,” even though both agencies are required to provide performance metrics. The Central Command (CENTCOM) Commanding General formally non-concurred with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy when he declared that creating performance metrics would be “an unplanned and unresourced mission that ‘would require many currently unavailable man-hours’...and

89 This chart illustrates the blending and overlap of funding sources between Title 10 and Title 22 programs. While one program may be designated a Title 10 program, there may be an opportunity to use Title 22 funds (or vis-a-versa) depending on what activity is pursued making the assessment issue much more difficult. United States Marine Corps, Security Cooperation Handbook, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 51.

‘would communicate to our partners that we do not trust them to utilize capabilities provided to them.’”91 Although the Inspector General (IG) team acknowledged that performance metrics could become “burdensome,” the published report provided an example of how performance metrics could be applied.92 However, the examples provided were narrow in scope and illustrated only those particular activities that could be measured readily.93 Further, the 2009 IG report noted under their Observation Number 9 that metrics had been initiated for Section 1206 programs yet the “initiated metrics” were actually “Section 1206 program officials… [announcing] plans to establish metrics to measure.”94 As of this writing, those metrics still have not been published, if they have even been established. However, despite the shortfall in documented assessments or metrics, the Section 1206 and other military assistance programs have expanded each year without the DoD or DOS defining performance measurements.95

The culmination of unpredictable long-term funding for supporting low GDP country initiatives, along with limited experience of embassy and ODC military staff to leverage the intricate and overlapping details of assigning funding streams to projects, combined with a dearth of understanding of what initiatives actually can be evaluated with objective metrics creates the perfect storm for the disassociation between goals, ends, and means.

E. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought about a dramatic ending to the Cold War and threw open new arenas to NATO in central and eastern Europe. From a political


standpoint, the Soviet Union’s collapse was a victory for Western democracies. However, from a security assistance standpoint, the dissolution of the bi-polar world produced a security vacuum, orphaned armies and soldiers, as well as many unstable governments in the former Soviet Union and the Soviet sphere of influence. This fact created a new and immediate need for security assistance and humanitarian aid for the collapsing economies—a foreign aid role that the United States was uniquely able to provide. The past five decades of direct foreign assistance illustrated to Congress and the American people at large, that overseas involvement through military cooperation and financial support constituted a democratizing evolution. An extension of this mindset was capitalized upon once the newly independent countries emerged and U.S. aid and assistance had become the cornerstone of the U.S. foreign policy goals in order to transform these states into Westernized democracies. From the outset with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, then, the PfP program became the chief venue to determine which states would warrant bi-lateral funding if they were willing to move toward NATO and Western principles in general.

In a way, the wise men of the Alliance had anticipated the possibility of an end of the Cold War decades earlier. According to the 1967 Harmel Report, the Atlantic Alliance maintains two primary functions, with the first function “to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur.” The second function is borne out of the first as it permits for dialogue when the conditions of the first function are met and allows “for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved.” These two aspects were based on preconceived notions that the Soviet Union and the United States would the arbiters for peace in Europe.

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As the post-Cold War order emerged in central and eastern Europe, a new debate regarding “NATO’s proper role in the new Europe, its relation to other European security organizations, and how or whether it could stabilize the East soon replaced the issue of whether NATO could continue to exist now that its adversary had withdrawn.”98 The new NATO rhetoric which emerged from the 1989 Brussels summit indicated that NATO should seek new relations between the East and the West99 which was further defined by the Bush Administration’s Secretary of State James Baker who stated that NATO desired a whole and free Europe “based on Western values.”100 The change in threat culminated with a change in mission and policy, moving from strategic defense to unification under Western values. Additionally, a new strategic concept was introduced during the Rome summit that called for “smaller, more mobile forces that stood at lower levels of readiness.”101

It became clear the world environment had changed and NATO must change as well or face becoming superannuated. This reality was not lost among trans-Atlantic policy makers and a new NATO Strategic Concept (1991) was formalized to address the issues of the rapidly changing security environment. Western political leaders of the time recognized that NATO needed to become the “key security institution of the new era and the fact that NATO was to be involved in the promotion of good domestic institutions in the former Communist states.”102 Member states of NATO encouraged the emerging eastern European and Central Asian democracies to fully utilize other European institutions, with their efforts to transition to liberal democratic policies,103 such as the

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99 Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 144.

100 Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 145.

101 Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 151.


103 Gheciu, *NATO in the "New Europe,"* 69.
Western European Union (WEU), the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in addition to the United Nations (UN) and the United States.\textsuperscript{104}

Despite the changes in NATO’s new Strategic Concept and the millions of dollars in aid and assistance provided by outside agencies, the former Communist countries desired for NATO membership since they believed that holding NATO membership with the Article V\textsuperscript{105} assurances would protect them against any future Russian aggression. Invariably, the discussion of NATO enlargement ensued in Washington and the question of how to increase membership without excluding or inciting Russia was the key.

The NATO expansion issue occupied much of Bill Clinton’s presidency and he and his administration adamantly worked with the allies to determine who should be included in the NATO expansion along with the timing of the inclusion. While most Europeans were in favor of expansion, France was the exception whom adamantly opposed any NATO expansion eastward.\textsuperscript{106} The Clinton administration embarked on a domestic and international, primarily with Russia, crusade to fight for the acceptance of NATO expansion.

During the course of working the expansion issue, the Balkans erupted with an ethnic civil war. This new European crisis was met with paralysis inside NATO. The United States, as the most powerful ally, wished to remain outside active involvement for a strictly “European” problem and instead supported United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.\textsuperscript{107} Conversely, many Europeans viewed the increasing violence and unrest as the most horrific actions to take place on European soil since the 1940s.\textsuperscript{108}

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\textsuperscript{104} Yost, \textit{NATO Transformed}, 93.

\textsuperscript{105} The Washington Treaty Article V provides for collective defense against any armed aggression against one member would be considered an armed attack against all members. This assurance, given the overwhelming capabilities of the military forces of the United States, is greatly desired by member states and those aspiring to become members.


\textsuperscript{107} Ryan C. Hendrickson, \textit{Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action After the Cold War}, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006), 47.

\textsuperscript{108} Hendrickson, \textit{Diplomacy and War at NATO}, 47.
Even though the violence was escalating, the real issue that faced NATO was that there was no clear mandate to help in the former Communist Balkans.

Because Yugoslavia and the subsequent break off countries were not members of NATO, there was no precedent to intercede. However, the United States and other NATO members did eventually send in peacemaking forces, along with a substantial number of forces from Ukraine. The Ukrainian UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) contingent arrived in July of 1992 with approximately 1,300 personnel and remained on station until the end of 1995.\textsuperscript{109} Despite the fact that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) did not even have a signed military policy that outlined operational procedures, especially in the area of peacekeeping operations, prior to their assignment to the Balkans, the Ukrainians still deployed with the main tasks of: “providing security for humanitarian cargo convoys, facilitating of ceasing combat actions and improvement of security situation, and patrolling.”\textsuperscript{110}

Throughout the Balkan crises, several countries expressed desires to join NATO, especially Poland, but the Clinton Administration moved slowly on the matter while trying to identify a possible response from Moscow. However, in August 1993, “Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Polish President Lech Walesa signed a communiqué stating that Moscow did not object to Poland joining NATO.”\textsuperscript{111} This gesture opened the door for more aggressive talks between NATO and potential new members, including Russia, which now changed the political landscape.\textsuperscript{112} The Clinton Administration continued to work on the expansion issue as well which led to the U.S. initiative for a new “continent-wide security” umbrella under the PfP program.\textsuperscript{113}


\textsuperscript{110} Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, “The History of The Armed Forces of Ukraine Participation in Peacekeeping Operations.”


\textsuperscript{112} Asmus, \textit{Opening NATO's Door}, 41.

\textsuperscript{113} Asmus, \textit{Opening NATO's Door}, 35.
The impetus of the program was to provide cooperation but, it lacked the prime need of the Eastern European countries – full NATO membership and the security guarantee.

Government elites in Washington strongly favored PfP vice full NATO membership since PfP would not increase U.S. costs and potential military intervention needlessly. The debate on whether to give full membership or a partner membership under PfP and with which nations, became a Washington battleground as each politician had their own agenda. The internal battle was waged on both sides of the Atlantic but eventually, the agreed upon action was to provide for a limited NATO expansion to the Visegrád countries, instituting PfP as a potential pathway under the MAP for full NATO membership, and to create a special NATO-Russia consultation group.

The PfP program reflects the most recent evolution of foreign aid and assistance as it is applied through the multilateral institution of NATO with strong bilateral interactions that support ANP and PARP goals along with U.S. foreign policy goals. Ukraine and Georgia represent good case studies of how bilateral aid is provided to target countries based U.S. political strategies along with the individual national desires of modernization, westernization, democratization, and security sector reform through the formal process of the PfP program.

F. CONCLUSION

United States foreign aid has consistently been applied to assist target nations with humanitarian, economic, and military aid providing that the assistance benefits the long-term economic and military goals of the United States foreign policy goal of “building and sustaining democratic, well-governed states.” Since the implementation of the ERP, the United States has been the largest single donor of foreign aid in the world, with more than $587 billion disbursed worldwide. Although the

114 Asmus, Opening NATO's Door, 48.
115 Asmus, Opening NATO's Door, 41.
116 United States Department of State, Strategic Plan, 58.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports that even though the U.S. donations are the largest of the twenty-two member nations that comprise the OECD, the U.S. aid is the smallest by a percentage of the gross national income (GNI).\textsuperscript{119} However, OECD figures do not include any military assistance programs, which would skew the data set. Additionally, these nations do not spend nearly as much on defense as does the United States which permits them to apply resources elsewhere, such as in foreign assistance.

Despite what outside organizations may say about U.S. aid, the fact remains that U.S. military assistance applied through the DOS and DoD programs provide much needed support for target countries. Since 1993, the DOS and DoD have provided more than $3.4 billion in military aid to Ukraine and Georgia. While the bulk of the aid, about 90 percent, is disbursed from the DOS and USAID security assistance programs, the DoD’s security cooperation programs still provide basic and necessary bilateral opportunities to strengthen these countries’ militaries.

Given that such a large percentage of funds allocated comes from the DOS, the concerns of shortfalls of the annual Section 1206 funding is minimized since so many of the DoD and DOS programs overlap missions and can share funding under certain circumstances. To thwart the bureaucratic issues of the dual-key oversight and management, a new and clear Congressional policy should be enacted along with access to additional training for military and embassy staffers on how to use these funds collaboratively. While these steps would definitely help the application of funds for specific programs, establishing performance metrics appears to be the focus from Congress all the way down the COCOMs and embassies.

\textsuperscript{118} United States Agency for International Development, “Detailed Foreign Assistance Data.”

\textsuperscript{119} Gross national income (GNI) comprises the gross domestic product (GDP) along with income received from other countries (notably interest and dividends), less similar payments made to other countries. United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, \textit{Foreign Aid}, 22.
III. UKRAINE

With its own tragic history in the Twentieth Century, Ukraine is a pivot country that bridges between Europe, Russia, and the Caucasus region. The political leadership elected in 2011 under Viktor Yanukovych, desires to keep Ukraine in a neutral position among these three forces in an attempt to harness benefits from every arena possible. Ukraine accepts aid from the United States, Europe, and Russia, modernization and democratization efforts that are mutually beneficial for Ukraine and the United States focus on stability and security. While the main U.S. foreign policy goal for Ukraine is to maintain and foster a constructive bilateral relationship, helping build Ukraine’s emerging democracy will showcase the country as a model for its neighbors.\textsuperscript{120} Ukraine’s transition to a full market economy is still afflicted with corruption and crony capitalism, and recent democratic backsliding has downgraded the country’s Freedom House index from free to partially free,\textsuperscript{121} but Ukraine’s military still desires to modernize its forces and equipment with close cooperation of the U.S. and NATO. The challenge that the United States faces is how to capture the effectiveness of the funding provided for the military modernization and Defense Institution Building (DIB) efforts while supporting the ambassador’s foreign policy goals.

A. UKRAINIAN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

The United States has been a large contributor of aid and assistance to Ukraine since 1992 with the first aid provided, $55.9 million, under the DOS Commodity Credit Corporation Food for Progress initiative that not only provided food but demonstrated a


willingness to support the newly independent countries. A partial listing of U.S. aid programs have provided in excess of $920 million since FY07 (and budgeted through FY12) from DOS Foreign Operations Assistance under the five primary DOS areas of focus and the DoD Section 1206, WIF, and Civil Engagement programs. In toto, Ukraine has received more than $4.5 billion from the United States since 1992, with $1.4 billion applied specifically for security assistance and cooperation programs.

The difficulty is assessing whether or not these funds have provided for increased security and modernization efforts within Ukraine, to include logistics modernization efforts. At the tactical level, assessments must consider basic logistics measurements of available supplies and warehousing. While at the operational and strategic levels, verifications must be judged against whether doctrine and funding is aligning toward the president’s national security goals. To be sure, there are some notable successes for Ukraine’s national desires and U.S. foreign policy goals such as the funding provided

122 However, U.S. programs are not the only assistance Ukraine receives. In 1998, Ukraine entered into negotiations with the European Union for membership. And while Ukraine has not yet become a full member at this time, increased trade and assistance programs have benefited Ukraine economically. Since 2007 (and through 2013 budget requests), EU assistance funds and programs to promote Ukrainian reforms in the areas of “energy cooperation, strengthening border controls, bolstering the judiciary and the rule of law, and addressing environmental concerns” have exceeded $1.34 billion. Although the EU does not specifically provide for military assistance, Ukraine does have bi-lateral agreements for military and other support from many additional countries. However, obtaining exact details on specific countries, types of aid, and amounts of funding provided are not available. The take-away principle is that beyond the aid and assistance of the EU and the United States, Ukraine does have additional opportunities for military and economic aid. United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy by Steven Woehrel, CRS Report RL33460, (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, January 4, 2012), 7.


124 The five DOS areas of focus are: Peace and Security, Governing Justly and Democratically, Investing in People, Economic Growth, and Humanitarian Assistance. Refer to Figure 2 on page 38 for greater detail.

125 The DoD Civic Engagement Program consists of three sub-programs including: Humanitarian Assistance - Other (HA-O), Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA), and Humanitarian Assistance Program Excess Property (HAP-EP)


under the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) and the Cooperation Threat Reduction (CTR) programs to reduce the nuclear threat and promote non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While the decision to be a nuclear-free country rested solely within Ukraine’s political realm, the funding provided by the United States ensured the protection of the nuclear weapons until they were destroyed.

B. COUNTRY BACKGROUND

Ukraine spent most of the Twentieth Century as a Soviet Socialist Republic, that is, a constituent part of the Soviet Union, where Joseph Stalin had waged a campaign of mass murder in the 1930s and the Second World War exacted its toll in the following decade. Although Ukraine has not always been defined by its relationship with Russia, the history of Ukraine and Russia are inextricably linked through centuries of shared and common experiences, sometimes as friends and other times as enemies. The Soviet experience has left an indelible mark in Ukrainian “identity, politics, economics and even religion”127 and this experience looms large in Ukraine's post-independence efforts, such that they are, at modernization, westernization, and democratization. However, it was not until the 1991 Ukrainian referendum declaring independence128 that Ukraine could be considered a full nation-state with declared boundaries.129

The newly independent state of Ukraine was suddenly thrust into a vacuum, lacking non-Soviet experienced leadership, both in the political and the military realms. This situation was not unique to Ukraine as the transition away from Soviet-style political leadership, centralized economics, and military command structures affected all former Soviet republics. A result of this transition was an immediate decline in access to education centers since the “highly centralized nature of the Soviet Union assured that the

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128 The December 1991 referendum confirming Ukrainian independence was the natural continuation of the previous Ukrainian Declaration of Independence, introduced in 1941 by the radical Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Wilson, *The Ukrainians*, 153.

129 Wilson, *The Ukrainians*, xii.
best universities, research centers and think tanks were located disproportionately in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk and a few other Russian cities.”

Despite these intellectual centers outside of Ukraine, the early prospects, forecasted by the International Centre for Policy Studies in Kyiv, for Ukraine’s transition were considered to be excellent as “Ukrainians were eagerly looking for the Western experience.”

Although it was expected that a newly independent and nuclear-armed Ukraine would receive aid and assistance from Western nations, primarily to ensure nuclear weapon stability, the ensuing economic depression, lasting for nearly nine years, stalled Ukraine’s progress toward a modern liberal democracy.

In an effort to ease the post-Soviet dissolution, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991 which provided for a loose connection as described by Ukraine’s then-president, Leonid Kravchuk, where each of the “former republics were now independent states and the ‘commonwealth’ would have no separate status other than that voluntarily delegated to it by the participants.”

Boris Yeltsin’s failed attempt to maintain a degree of cooperation among the former Soviet republics brought the realization that the newly independent states would not necessarily go along with the Russian sphere of influence without Ukraine’s acquiescence.

Although the CIS touted itself as a means to provide for closer relations among the former Soviet States, especially within the economic sphere,

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133 The Commonwealth of Independent States based this collaboration on the aspect that signatory countries would recognize each other as sovereign entities. Currently the following countries are active members: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. Georgia was a member but acceded membership in August 2009. Interstate Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, “About Commonwealth of Independent States,” http://www.cisstat.com/eng/cis.htm (accessed January 22, 2012).

134 Wilson, The Ukrainians, 170.

135 Simes, “America and the Post-Soviet Republics,” 81.
the draw for Western aid increased as the failing economic transformation continued to reduce income levels to far below the poverty line as GDP declined by 60 percent within a few years.\textsuperscript{136}

The military legacy of the past emerged as a major problem of policy. The declining currency valuation made it quite difficult for the newly created AFU to pay uniformed personnel and maintain equipment. The Soviet dissolution had left the following oversupply of military units, personnel, and equipment in Ukraine at the end of 1991: a “rocket army, three combined arms forces, two armored armies, one army corps, four Air Force armies, separate Air Defense army, the Black See [sic] Fleet. The concentration of forces numbered about 780,000 personnel, 6,500 tanks, about 7,000 combat armored vehicles, 1,500 combat aircrafts, more than 350 ships, 1,272 strategic nuclear warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles and about 2,500 nuclear weapon[s].”\textsuperscript{137} This far too large cadre of personnel and armaments quickly became unsustainable with, then, current funding. As a result, military personnel were not paid regularly and maintenance and repairs to armaments were severely inhibited which only compounded the ability for Ukrainian forces to maintain high readiness rates. Low readiness was also a result of the Soviet legacy for logistics support from the rear services and it became even more pronounced as there was no longer a central command authority to coordinate support. Compounding these direct military issues was the lack of a Defense Ministry\textsuperscript{138} or a general staff who could advocate for increased spending.\textsuperscript{139} By

\textsuperscript{136} Nainivska, “The Impact of the Soviet Legacy on Reforms in Ukraine,” 170.

\textsuperscript{137} Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, “The History of The Armed Forces of Ukraine Participation in Peacekeeping Operations.”

\textsuperscript{138} The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense was formally established on 24 August 1991 with the first minister appointment occurring on 3 September 1991. The ensuing challenge was to create an entire ministry from scratch which is a monumental task considering the size of the military forces and equipment left behind from the Soviets.
1993, the military budget only amounted to, and equivalent of, $399 million (in 2009 constant U.S. dollars) or a meager 0.5 percent of GDP.\(^{140}\)

The declining economic situation coupled with a high number of nuclear weapons within an unstable country gave rise for immediate NATO and U.S. attention. As a result, the U.S. provided Ukraine an initial aid package of $23.7 million in FY92 under the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA)\(^{141}\) along with other aid initiatives totaling nearly $118 million.\(^{142}\) These initial efforts, and subsequent annual aid disbursements, were orchestrated to stabilize the Ukrainian government and economy to thwart any potential

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\(^{139}\) Understanding the Ukrainian armed forces typological model of how its armed forces should be constructed, will assist policy-makers, and those organizations providing funding to Ukraine, to ensure funds are applied in the appropriate venues. Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmonds, and Andrew Cottee present a rational approach to professional military models based on four basic outlines of a professional armed force. Each model meets the criteria for a professional armed force but, each one has different roles and force structures based on their particular requirements. Ukraine easily fits into an active engagement role and would be considered a “territorial defense” model. They define this typology as outlined in the appendix. Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds, and Andrew Cottee, *The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces*, (London: Palgrave, 2002), 9.


“Assistance programs funded under the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) account seek to facilitate the completion of transitions begun in 1991 to democratic governance and free economies by supporting emerging democratic organizations and market-based institutions. FSA-funded assistance has also helped reform antiquated health care systems, improve maternal and child health, and successfully treat tuberculosis. FSA-funded assistance also helps prevent the proliferation of WMD and related technology and expertise, and combats transnational threats such as drug trafficking, organized crime, and trafficking in persons.”

The FREEDOM Support Act (formerly known as the Assistance to the Independent States of the former Soviet Union) was created to “facilitate the completion of transitions begun in 1991 to democratic governance and free economies by supporting emerging democratic organizations and market-based institutions.”


\(^{142}\) United States Department of State, “Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance Fact Sheet, December 2009: Ukraine.”

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compromises to the nuclear caches along with filling the resources gap to circumvent other, potentially unfriendly, countries from gaining influence.

C. ENTERING INTO NATO’S SPHERE

Ukraine became the first CIS country to sign the PfP framework document on 8 February 1994. Acceptance to the PfP program created many training and reform opportunities for Ukraine’s military forces. Membership to PfP signified the Ukrainian government’s desire to move away from Russia and specifically Russia’s sphere of influence. Along with the PfP membership, came additional bilateral aid and assistance from the United States, initially amounted to more than $177 million in FY93 (with nearly $60 million specifically allocated for FSA and DoD security assistance), or about 0.3 percent of Ukraine’s GDP. This support was significant to Ukraine as it represented a fifteen percent increase for Ukraine’s defense structure.

The DIB framework that becomes especially central for member countries’ defense reforms. As indicated previously, Ukraine had only established its MoD in July 1992. Learning how to form, build, and staff a new ministry along with all of the ancillary departments became a monumental undertaking that stands at the center of this inquiry and which demands its tribute in theoretical and practical terms. To be sure, a full discussion of the inherent complexities of a complete defense sector reform would be quite lengthy and beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this section focuses specifically on defense logistics reforms as a feature of the effectiveness and durability of DIB and the totality of modernization efforts in Ukraine. It tackles the category of logistics reform in three broad areas: doctrine/policy, logistics planning, and procurements and budgets.


144 This figure was calculated based on Ukraine’s 1993 GDP, as indicated from World Bank statistics.
D. LOGISTICS MODERNIZATION FRAMEWORK

In Ukraine, the efforts of modernization for the logistics network are severely curtailed by the lack of published policy and specific guidance from the president. While it appears that operational and tactical-level logistics professionals are making efforts to modernize and gain efficiencies through reorganizations, they too are confined to making changes based on available funding. Still, the MoD has consistently not received their full budget requests from 2006–2010, begging the question of whether the Ukraine MoD has been able to satisfy the National Security Goals with what they have received. If the answer is yes, then the lack of full funding dictated by the Ukrainian Legislature would indicate that the MoD has not suitably allocated funds-to-requirements. If the answer is no, then a specific assessment should indicate security shortfalls and MoD officials should be able to illustrate the funding shortfall-to-mission risks.

However, given that the Ukrainian defense budget has been consistently underfunded in real terms, according to their definition of requirements, and with the priority of training and outfitting funds obligated for the Joint Rapid reaction Force (JRRF), which only received less than 25 percent of required funding in 2010, the probability of a significant amount of funds being provided for logistics modernization is low.

1. Doctrine / Policy Modernization Efforts

Since 1991, the Ukrainian defense organization has transformed itself from a Soviet-style military structure to an integrated military complex under a cabinet-level MoD. According to its founding statutes, the MoD is primarily responsible for

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146 The Ukraine Armed Forces has only received, by percentage, between 47-64 percent of required funding from 2006-2010. Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, *White Book 2010*, 21.


establishing policies and providing clear guidance on future actions based on the president’s national security strategy and has a General Staff to carry out that guidance. Since 2005, the Ukrainian president has provided an annual defense report, the White Book, in order to “regularly inform the public on activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as well as defense [sic] policy of the State and it’s [sic] challenges and solutions.” While this document provides a summary of the previous year’s events and outlines the goals for next year, it is primarily divided among the three services. Although the annual White Books are a product of the MoD’s national defense strategies, the first ever National Security Strategy, published in 2007, “failed to become the effective policy guidance for state institutions” as the policy guidelines were aimed for short-term goals and the requirement for strategic development was ignored. However, president Yanukovyck’s most recent National Security Strategy (2010) indicated that “protection of Ukraine’s state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of the state border,” was one of his five primary national security goals in addition to outlining security sector reform measures.

Among other gaps, the 2010 White Book does not address are specific goals for logistics reform beyond the note that “the Support Forces Command was re-organized to the Department of Logistics; the Department of Armament; and the Main Directorate of Operational Support to increase the flexibility and conformity of the logistics system according to the current stage of reforming the Armed Forces.” Though this step provides a structural reorganization, it does not correspond to a modernization of doctrine or the creation of a unified policy under the auspices of a national logistics concept that fully supports Ukrainian logistics interoperability with NATO and U.S. forces nor advances the needs of either.

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The creation of such a doctrine or policy is central to the argument of modernization as it provides the upper echelon support, and ultimately funding, to transition from the Communist legacy of the Rear Services and all that it entails. While a national logistics concept or doctrine does not necessarily have to mirror U.S. or even NATO logistics methods, it must provide the strategic guidance, in line with the national security requirements, for subordinate commanders’ modernization efforts. Otherwise, reform measures may not produce the desired efficiencies of the AFU’s Rear Services at the tactical level but, more importantly they may prove detrimental to deployed operations. Making these doctrinal changes will indeed become a costly endeavor (though it will be a much better use of funds than maintaining the status quo of waste) but it will be indicative of the Chief of the Logistics Department, the J-4, to ensure spares and warehousing are in not only in compliance with these changes but that the Chief has direct input to future doctrine reviews thereby ensuring modernization efforts are in compliance with the national logistics strategy.

2. Logistics Planning Efforts

Although logistics planning occurs at most levels, though in varying skill and scope throughout the command, the lack of a unified logistics doctrine along with legislative restrictions on stocking levels creates significant gaps within their armed forces support structure.\(^{154}\) Although the AFU Rear Services recognize that the application of the Soviet-style “push” logistics model does not adequately provide the operational planning flexibility required for peacetime or deployed operations, the implementation of a push/pull system, which is more responsive to warfighter’s immediate needs, has eluded the logistics command authorities as they continue to reform structurally vice operationally. While they are making progress in their operational planning training, provided through WIF events, the Rear Services still support a centralized chain of command with some movement toward decentralization at the lowest echelons. However, in the absence of explicit doctrine or policy directing close

coordination between the operational and tactical level planning, the possibility of creating large stockpiles of supplies in forward areas is greatly increased\(^\text{155}\) and thereby stifling unforeseen requirements on the battlefield, which will result in lower equipment readiness rates. At this time, Ukraine’s combat forces, exclusive of NATO’s Response Force JRRF, are not trained for out-of-country deployments and it could be implied that the logistics support does not plan or train for these types of deployments either since those forces that do deploy currently rely on third-party logistics assistance.\(^\text{156}\) However, despite this shortfall, the government stated its commitment in 2008 to reforming their logistics planning processes in conformance with NATO doctrine by 2011.\(^\text{157}\) Although progress has been made in this area, the AFU Rear Services has indicated that strategic logistics planning is still not up to the fully flexible and integrated logistics system they have envisioned.\(^\text{158}\) As a result, the Chief of the Ukrainian Rear Services has outlined a five-year plan to continue logistics modernization efforts with an estimated completion in 2017.

3. Procurement and Budget Modernization Efforts

Since 2006, the goal has been to consolidate the distribution and management of spares into three regional Joint Supply Centers, which task is purported also to include an electronic data interface to streamline asset tracking and accounting.\(^\text{159}\) However, due to funding shortfalls, this realization has not been brought online as of yet and the first testing of this network is scheduled for later in 2012. Additionally, it is not clear if this


\(^{158}\) Conference notes from Col Hristyev, Deputy Head of the Organization and Planning of the Ukrainian Rear Services, 27 Feb 2012.

system will conform to NATO transaction procedures under Member Committee (MC) document MC 319/1 or if the procedures will be standardized under Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2034 provisions in the near future.\textsuperscript{160} Considering that Ukraine has not entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreement with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NMSA) with regard to logistics support, it is unclear if these two systems will be compatible for interoperable deployments.

The AFU procurement desires have also been severely curtailed by budgetary shortfalls. Specifically for procurement and re-outfitting/re-servicing, Ukraine had reduced its outlays from 21.6 percent in 2006 and 16.3 percent in 2007 down to only 7 percent for years 2009 and 2010.\textsuperscript{161} Coupled with a total funding shortfall of 15.3 percent,\textsuperscript{162} the planned procurements of new materiel was grossly underrepresented as the bulk of the procurement funds went to the army for ten “Bulat” BM tanks\textsuperscript{163} and 76 utility vehicles of various types.\textsuperscript{164} For 2011, the Ukrainian government is forecasting investments of about $94.5 million but budget shortfalls will only allow for less than half of the requirements\textsuperscript{165} to become funded. Additionally, budget constraints have led to procurement delays of at least two years for the AN-70 and Mi-24 aircraft programs and a scaled back program of the Corvette-class stealth warship.\textsuperscript{166} Until such funding becomes available to modernize the force beyond the ground forces of the JRRF, service-life extension programs will be initiated for aircraft, tanks, and a submarine.\textsuperscript{167} Further

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{160} North Atlantic Treaty Organization, \textit{Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine AJP-4(A)}, 3-2.
\bibitem{163} The Bulat BM tanks are modernized T-64B tanks.
\bibitem{164} Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, \textit{White Book 2010}, 70.
\end{thebibliography}
exacerbating Ukraine’s budget concerns is that after a meager increase in 2012 funding, a leveling-off period will begin with the 2012–2015 budget years. The funding shortfalls become particularly problematic for future reform efforts when, considering the Ukrainian GDP per capita is $7,200 (in 2011 dollars based on GDP Purchasing Power Parity) and the military expenditures per capita amounts to only $75, future military spending does not keep in line with inflation or current operational commitments unless reductions in staffing and armaments is reduced at a faster rate. However, such manpower or armament reductions are matters of national goals and legislative policies.

With severe cutbacks in procurements and additional funds being allocated for service-life extensions the draw of funds away from logistics is compounded. A final indicator that the logistics network is severely degraded is the readiness of combat units’ major end items, specifically in the realm of aviation and maritime as these spares are the most expensive. As funds decrease, spares are not purchased and operability rates decrease which ultimately results in less training and operator proficiency. For 2010, Ukraine maintained operability rates of “most aircraft (24 percent), helicopters (36 percent), ships and support vessels (7 percent),” which leads to the final conclusion that logistics modernization has not sufficiently occurred and based on future funding streams does not look likely in the near term.


170 Data was calculated from the CIA World Factbook and the SIPRI index.

171 This figure could quite possibly be even lower as recent scholarship indicated that one airfield in particular, the Belbek airfield, reported a “one-in-twenty” readiness rate. James Greene, “A Trans-Atlantic View on Contemporary Ukrainian Security Issues,” (in National Security and Defence, No. 4), (Kyiv: Razumkov Centre, 2010), 32.

E. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION

1. Assessment

Despite all of the Ukraine’s efforts over the past twenty years, the larger question remains of whether the $4.5 billion provided by the United States has furthered Ukraine’s U.S. foreign policy goals to include: good governance, economic reform, rule of law, security sector reform, and engaging Ukrainian society. While some of these policy goals have met the internal measurements of the DOS, others have fallen short, based on a generic rating system of: above target, on target, improved but not yet met, and below target. Meeting success goals is something a misnomer because the DOS does not equate U.S. foreign policy goals to aid provided where some areas such as GDP measurement are merely reporting rather than influencing. On the Defense side, EUCOM measures success based on event completions of exercises, conferences, training, etc. such as Sea Breeze, Combined Endeavor, and mil-to-mil interactions.

To illustrate how the assessment pyramid could work in practice in the case of Ukraine, consider the security sector reform policy goals outlined in the U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, which has been approved and signed by both the United States and Ukraine; this document clearly indicated that this effort is a joint policy goal. The charter indicates that one aim is to “gain agreement on a structured plan to increase interoperability and coordination between NATO and Ukraine” through enhanced training and equipment for Ukrainian armed forces, among other things. The charter reflects the pinnacle of the pyramid under the presidential goals.

The Ukrainian president outlines his national policy directives for NATO interoperability—in this case within his annual national security strategy. These policy goals will be directed toward his MoD to incorporate logistics interoperability through the MoD’s annual White Book, representing the next lower tier on the pyramid. The next step is the MoD’s inclusion of logistics interoperability within the PfP PARP goals and


ANP. Alternatively, the U.S. embassy will ensure that security sector reform is included in the ambassador’s mission goals with a corresponding sub-goal of NATO interoperability. The embassy staff will work with the ODC to ensure that close cooperation and dialogue occurs between the ODC and the MoD so that COCOM goals that support the security sector reform, and ultimately logistics interoperability, are in line with U.S. foreign policy goals. It is at this point that the ambassador can verify the Ukrainian’s commitment for security sector reform by examining the Ukraine national security strategy and the MoD’s White Book to determine if these policy goals are included. Further, the ODC can verify commitment through the MoD based on the initiated goals through the PARP ANP. In this case, here is where the dividing line occurs that separates between evaluations at the tactical level and the verifications at the strategic level.

Once the MoD and the ODC come to an agreement as to what is required for NATO logistics interoperability, which in Ukraine’s case also requires significant logistics modernization efforts, a plan will be established at EUCOM that will address Ukraine’s goals. The EUCOM plan will consider what is needed and how much funding the COCOM can provide to incorporate Ukraine’s military within the logistics interoperability goal and ultimately participate in EUCOM’s annual Capable Logistician Exercise. Also, EUCOM will charge one or more of the sub-component commands to take the lead for detailed assistance on specific tasks that support the higher goal of NATO logistics interoperability, such as warehousing techniques provided by the U.S. Army. What may be required as well is formal logistics training that can be supported by the embassy through the IMET program. It is here at the COCOM and below level that detailed evaluative assessments can be applied and rated based on successful completion of training events and/or tasks performed by the Ukrainian Rear Services.

After the top-down requirements are completed, the bottom-up assessments flow to higher command authorities to determine if funds expended have met the foreign policy goals. In this case, Ukraine does require some logistics modernization prior to becoming fully interoperable with NATO forces. While Ukraine’s current warehousing policy is reminiscent of a Soviet-push logistics system, a multi-tiered approach must be
considered. Not only will Ukrainian military members need to be trained on a pull-logistics system, provided via IMET, but new computer systems and software suits must be acquired to handle this change, FMF or FMS requirements, plus the logistics technicians need to be trained on the system as well, IMET or FMF. While this initial package comes from DOS, it is managed through the DoD and particularly through EUCOM’s advocate, in this case the U.S. Army Europe command was tasked. Additionally, the Army can provide bilateral assistance and consultation along with mil-to-mil interoperability exercises to assess progress.

Bringing this all together, if the DOS provided the Ukrainian Rear Services funds for new computer systems and training through the FMF and IMET programs and U.S. Army Europe was allocated funds to conduct a mil-to-mil logistics exercise, then the completion of the training, installation of the computer network, and the subsequent successful bilateral logistics exercise would provide positive evaluations for the funds spent. The COCOM would assess that their funds and planning satisfied, or not, Ukraine’s initial logistics interoperability goal and indicate any remaining shortfalls or issues related to Ukrainian logistics progress. At this point, the ODC and embassy staff must verify that the evaluation of EUCOM is still meeting the U.S. foreign policy goals and consider probably causes for any remaining shortfalls of Ukraine’s logistics interoperability desires.

By examining Ukraine’s current national and MoD policies, the ambassador can verify if the proper emphasis has been directed from the national leadership. Specifically for Ukraine, the national policies are void of specific logistics reform measures which have hampered tactical modernization efforts. So, while the tactical efforts from the COCOM and below have produced positive results, based on the limited outcomes available, the U.S. foreign policy goal of security sector reform (within the realm of logistics) could be considered improved but not yet met target. When this aspect is considered within the context of other security sector reform efforts, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine can tell Congress that the funds have been well spent but additional work is still required on developing Ukrainian national policy that will foster further modernization efforts.
2. Conclusion

When considering Ukraine’s logistics modernization efforts, there are no direct links between U.S. funding and Ukrainian logistics within the realm of the three areas of the logistics modernization framework. Additional resources, such as independent evaluations and/or PARP assessments, must be examined by the country team to determine if logistics modernization progress has occurred. Strictly examining DoD COCOM after-action reports or the annual DOS embassy mission reports will not provide the level of detail to make a direct correlation. However, the use of these resources, in conjunction with the assessment pyramid, will permit greater fidelity in determining if Ukrainian logistics modernization, as an extension of U.S. foreign policies, has occurred. In other words, a lone report from DOS, DoD, PARP, or from independent analysis will only provide a narrow examination of one particular reform area for Ukraine. The intent of applying the assessment pyramid is to bring these resources together to determination how well the $1.4 billion provided in security assistance and cooperation programs to Ukraine furthers U.S. desired outcomes.

Bringing together these two forces under a single foreign aid framework such as the assessment pyramid will facilitate more meaningful assessments and verifications of U.S. efforts while linking them to U.S. foreign policy goals. However, despite the current assessment methods within both the DOS and DoD in addition to the convolution of funding between Title 10 and Title 22 programs, the reality is that the U.S. aid and assistance provided to Ukraine filled a post-communist needs gap within that country. By filling that gap, the United States bought time, influence, and security, which has brought Ukraine closer to the United States and Westernized modernization.
IV. GEORGIA

Georgia is strategically positioned at the base of the Russian Caucasus isthmus; bridging the Eurasian land mass with the Middle East and bordered by the Black Sea, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. While Georgia has been a major oil transportation route between Azerbaijan and the Black Sea since the late 1800s, their geostrategic position of importance as energy conduit for Caspian and Central Asian oil and natural has only increased in the intervening years. However, despite Georgia’s difficult transition from communism to democracy, the Mikheil Saakashvili administration has made tremendous strides in moving toward Western powers since the 2003 Rose Revolution.

Although Georgia has suffered economically and militarily from the civil war that afflicted it in 1991 as well as the 2008 Russian punitive incursion, the country still pursues ambitious political and economic reforms oriented to the West, though Georgia still lacks full democratic reforms.175 However, the United States strongly supports continued democratic reforms, and may realize these efforts in 2013 with the country’s first ever change of power through the process of free and fair political elections, and partnership building through the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership. Additionally, the United States, as Georgia’s biggest bilateral donor, has greatly influenced Georgia’s reform efforts and has helped to stabilize that country economically through the challenging times of 2008, as well as investing heavily into Georgia’s military reform efforts to include the GTEP—a key U.S. foreign policy program for supporting the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in

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Afghanistan that Georgia has supported with multiple deployments of troops (in excess of 2,000)\textsuperscript{176} In contrast, similar Ukrainian deployments account for only 22 military members\textsuperscript{177}

A. GEORGIAN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Since Georgia’s westward move toward the NATO allies, the United States has been the largest aid and assistance contributor for Georgia’s political, economic, and military transformations, along with providing much needed agriculture and humanitarian assistance such as the Food for Progress program, which provided $34.2 million to Georgia in 1994\textsuperscript{178} Following the Russo-Georgia war of 2008, the United States fulfilled its pledge in June 2009 of providing $1 billion to assist with internally displaced persons (already a problem after the 1991 war), rebuilding infrastructure, and helping to restore investor confidence in the Georgian economy\textsuperscript{179} with none of it being utilized for the Georgian MoD\textsuperscript{180}

The nearly $4 billion provided to Georgia since 1992—with $1.8 billion allocated specifically to military and security assistance—has made a significant contribution to


\textsuperscript{177} Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, “The History of The Armed Forces of Ukraine Participation in Peacekeeping Operations.”

\textsuperscript{178} While it is understood that true progression toward liberal democratic institutions resides within the economic stability of the country, Georgia, similarly to Ukraine, has also accepted economic and food assistance from the EU since it gained independence in 1991. Between 1992 and 2004, the European Commission (EC) provided €370 million with an additional €120 million in aid granted with Georgia’s 2006 acceptance into the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The EC future funding will continue to focus on supporting Georgia’s ENP commitments under four priority areas: democratic development (rule of law and governance), economic development, poverty reduction and social reforms, and the peaceful settlement of Georgia’s internal conflicts.


Georgia’s ability to embrace democratic and economic reforms. While military assistance funds and PfP membership have positively aided the Georgia Armed Forces’ (GAF) (an entity that did not exist prior to 1991) ability to recruit, train, and deploy military units, specifically in support of ISAF missions, an assessment of whether the logistics modernization efforts within the MoD are providing the desired outcome must be determined.

The security assistance and cooperation programs on which this chapter focuses each have specific desired outcomes based on broad U.S. foreign policy goals of democratization, westernization, security sector reform, and modernization. Georgia received more than $500 million for the IMET, FMF, Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA), and the WIF programs over the course of seven years, though none of these funds were designated for logistics programs. Still, positive results can be readily gleaned in the logistics realm, specifically within the IMET program. Moreover, while the IMET program provides for military and civilian training, primarily to introduce foreign students to U.S. concepts and thinking, with the added benefit of the actual training, Georgia has shown that specific graduate-level schooling is beneficial for professional advancement. This IMET success story can illustrated by the Georgian MoD’s appointment of Andro Barnovi, a former IMET recipient and Naval Postgraduate School student, as the Deputy Defence Minister for Training and Military Education as well as Human Resources Policy of the Defence Ministry of Georgia.

B. COUNTRY BACKGROUND

The formal Georgian-Russian bond began with Tsar Alexander I’s declaration that the East Georgian kingdom of Kartlo-Kakheti would be irrevocably joined to the

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182 For further delineation on specific programs, refer to note 9.

Russian empire on 12 September 1801. 184 This annexation of Georgia to Russia was welcomed by the Georgian ruler, Georgii XII, as an effort to bulwark against Muslim incursions into the region. 185 Although Georgia and the other South Caucasus countries remained under Russian and Soviet domination for almost two centuries, except for a three-year period between the revolution from Tsarist Russia to the Soviet Union from 1918 to 1921. 186 The Russian and Soviet influences, along with previous Persian and Ottoman cultures, have resulted in a diverse cultural region as the crossroads between the Black and Caspian Seas and North-South trade routes over the centuries. 187

It was not until the dissolution of the Soviet Union that Georgia was finally able to break the bonds of outside rule and established itself as an independent state in 1991. Although the newly independent nation was offered membership into the CIS, Georgia refused the offer and was penalized the former Soviet military hardware left within its borders. 188 As the Russian military forces pulled back into Russia (with enclaves that remained in Georgia into the 1990s), the remaining Georgian paramilitary and police forces became disjointed and severely lacked basic military equipment such as rifles, aircraft, and naval vessels. Similarly to other newly independent countries, Georgia was immediately thrust into civil unrest in 1991 as secessionists fought unsuccessful campaigns in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 189 against the Georgian National Guard and


185 Robert Fred Baumann, *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan*, (Fort Leavenworth (Kan.): Combat studies institute, 1993), 2.


independent militias. The result led to the overthrow of the sitting president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and the invitation to the former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to come to Georgia as the head of the State Council was accepted. He was later elected the speaker of the legislature in late 1992 and then the president under a new constitution in 1995.

The Shevardnadze reforms began in earnest as Georgia then reversed its previous decision to refuse CIS admission, and formally entered into the CIS in December 1993 under direct pressure from the Russian government. Additionally, Georgia was anxious to move toward Western military protectionism as the Georgian Foreign Minister, Alexander Chikvaidze, signed the formal Partnership for Peace Framework Document only four months later on 23 March 1994. The much needed military reformation under Shevardnadze began in earnest in 1993 as the uniformed services started to become unified with Moscow’s 1994 agreement to provide “the professional re-establishment and training of the Georgian Armed Forces,” in addition to “Russian military bases on Georgian territory and Russian Border Guards to patrol Georgia’s borders with Turkey.” By 1995, the militias were disbanded and in 1998 the Georgian


191 Although Eduard Shevardnadze was a high politburo member and worked for many years in the Georgian Soviet hierarchy, eventually attaining the high political office of First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party. His invitation to become the Georgian leader was by no mistake based on the fact that he was Georgian born and raised.


196 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and the CIS, “Georgia Armed Forces.”

197 Brzezinski and Sullivan, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 579.
National Guard was subordinated to the Ministry of Defence. Although the United States began providing assistance to Georgia in 1992, similar to the initial support provided to Ukraine, under the FSA, it came primarily under democratization auspices with food programs and other USAID initiatives. However, the close relationship and military support from Russia for the Georgian armed forces kept U.S. military assistance very minimal for nearly the next ten years, with the bulk of U.S. DoD military assistance allocated under the CTR Program.

While much of the earlier rhetoric about the benefits of CIS membership interested political leaders, the reality of Russia’s economic integration revolved more around geopolitical and military-political choices rather than based on sound economic rationale. As a result, the deep economic integration, so desired by Georgians, was not realized as the primary economic transformation was for Russia’s benefit at the expense of the CIS States. As Georgia’s GDP per capita fell 80 percent—from $4,762 to $953—between 1990 and 1994, coupled with sky-rocketing inflation that reached its peak of 7,400 percent in 1994, Georgia’s economic outlook was bleak. The combination of a weakening economy, still unresolved conflicts in the separatist regions, and the growing Russian military influences on Georgian territory continued to warrant U.S. aid and assistance to the Georgian government. As a result, USAID and the U.S. Department of Agriculture programs provided nearly $500 million in humanitarian and food assistance between FY92 and FY00 in an effort to stabilize the country.

198 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and the CIS, “Georgia Armed Forces.”

199 The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program was created under the Nunn-Lugar Act of 1992 which was designed to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction, especially focusing on nuclear weapons and demilitarization of those factories, within the former Soviet Union. United States Department of Defense, Defense Enterprise Fund, (DoD IG Report D-2000-176), accessed March 10, 2012, http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy00/00-176.pdf

200 Brzezinski and Sullivan, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 85.

201 Brzezinski and Sullivan, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 86.

202 Brzezinski and Sullivan, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 794.
C. ENTERING INTO NATO’S SPHERE

Although Georgia signed the PfP Framework Document in 1994, immediate U.S. aid and assistance did not flow into the country as rapidly as it did in Ukraine since Georgia did not pose an immediate threat, i.e. the lack of nuclear weapons within the country, to U.S. interests. Although the pro-Western Shevardnadze supported NATO integration through PfP, the staggering economic collapse of Georgia along with the Russian presence made reforms slow, although not non-existent. While the Georgian Armed Forces initially participated in a few exercises under the framework of PfP, the divergent nature between NATO’s PfP and Russia’s CIS military oversight brought the nation’s security issues to a significant decision point. Georgia had to decide to adhere to the values of the PfP or the CIS.

In 1997, Shevardnadze made the commitment for Western security preferences as Georgia entered into the newly expanded (enhanced) PfP, which included the additional adoption of “peace support operations” in addition to joining the newly created Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The expanded PfP elements provided a much needed basis, beyond that of the PfP Framework Document, which enabled Georgia to obtain greater involvement with NATO political and military bodies along with “political guidance and oversight.” Georgia’s active commitment for tighter bonds with NATO, despite having Russian forces still based in Georgia, also corresponded to larger aid packages from the United States beginning in FY98.

In addition to continued food aid, the United States immediately provided $6.5 million in FMS and FMF materiel and training opportunities to Georgia with steady annual increases thereafter. Correspondingly, aid and assistance increased two-fold,

203 In the same year, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova collectively formed GUAM with “the aim of fostering cooperation outside Russia and the CIS.” Zdzislaw Lachowski, Foreign Military Bases in Eurasia, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 18, (Sweden: CM Gruppen, 2007), 44.

204 Yost, NATO Transformed, 157.

205 Yost, NATO Transformed, 157.

from $54 million in FY97 to $221 million in FY98, with $98 million specifically allocated for FSA and DoD Security Assistance.\textsuperscript{207} It quickly became apparent to the Georgian government that accepting Western reforms led to increased aid, which allowed for a decrease in domestic military spending for the next five years.\textsuperscript{208} More importantly, these reforms allowed for greater interaction with NATO and its allies. As Georgia continued actively to engage in economic and military reforms, the government formally established their PfP PARP goals in 1999. Georgia’s PARP is aimed at increasing interoperability with NATO Allies and other PfP countries and receives, within the PARP framework, annual assessments of the partnership goals.\textsuperscript{209}

While the United States fully recognized Georgia’s unique situation of still having Russian military forces based in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and existing under the Russian sphere of influence, the U.S. supported Russia’s partial military withdrawal under the 1999 OSCE Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and Georgia.\textsuperscript{210} To assist with the planned withdrawal, the United States committed $10 million to facilitate the peaceful military transition.\textsuperscript{211}

Over the next five years, Georgia continued to reconstruct its military forces and participated in several NATO/PfP exercises while focusing on economic growth and

\textsuperscript{207} United States Department of State, “Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance Fact Sheet, December 2009: Georgia.”


political reforms. However, the remnants of Soviet-style “corruption, incompetence, and criminalization” remained rampant throughout the Georgian government and resulted in the deposing of Shevardnadze during the Rose Revolution in late 2003. The pro-NATO and pro-U.S. opposition leader, Mikheil Saakashvili, “marketed Georgia as a ‘beacon of democracy’ in the post-Soviet space.” Saakashvili was anxious to increase NATO relations, to the point of actively seeking full NATO membership and providing 300 peacekeeping forces to the coalition forces in Iraq in 2004 who were trained under the U.S. funded, $64 million, GTEP. By October of 2004, Georgia became the first country to agree to an IPAP in a specific effort toward NATO membership.

However, in August 2008, increasing tensions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, fueled by support from Moscow, led to military hostilities between Russian and Georgian forces. While the details of the conflict are important for defining Georgian-Russian boundaries and the resistance of secessionist desires, the results are significant for Georgian-NATO relations. During the war, the Russians destroyed significant quantities of Georgian military hardware and infrastructure. Immediately following the ceasefire, Georgia broke off diplomatic relations with Russia and withdrew from the CIS. The United States made a significant pledge for security and stabilization assistance under the Section 1207 funds and allocated $100 million (over the next two fiscal years) to aid in

212 Using the same construct of Ukraine’s topological assessment, the Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmonds, and Andrew Cottee’s approaches of professional militaries would place the Georgian model as a limited engagement “post-neutral” type of professional armed forces model, as outlined in the appendix. While this definition fits the Georgian armed forces, it would be practical to expound the concept in as much as the Georgian MoD’s acceptance of out-of-area operations are reliant on commercial and/or NATO Allied assistance with strategic lift for enduring logistical support. The overall structure of the Georgian military will be able to support NATO-led missions if full NATO interoperability can be achieved, especially within the context of logistics. Forster, Edmunds, and Cottee, The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe, 9.


214 Cornell, Georgia After the Rose Revolution, 7.

215 Cornell, Georgia After the Rose Revolution, 13-14.


war infrastructure reconstruction. Additionally during 2008, Georgia replaced the IPAP with the ANP, which “reflected IPAP commitments as well as the new activities.” In 2010, Georgia furthered its relationship with NATO with the implementation of the NATO-Georgia Commission, which assists with developing deeper political reforms.

However, Georgia’s Defense Institution Building framework of constructing a NATO-stylized defense organization in accordance PfP, EAPC, PARP, IPAP, and ANP guidelines has been a tremendous task. While Georgia forces have successfully been trained by the United States Marine Corps under the GTEP and deployed for ISAF missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the underlying factor that Georgian troops are not able to deploy at the strategic-level outside of their country without international assistance indicates an awareness of logistics limitations.

D. LOGISTICS MODERNIZATION FRAMEWORK

Georgia’s logistics modernization efforts appear to be solid and on the right track for future improvements. The logistics community’s biggest supporters for modernization are the President and the Minister of Defense, who have propagated clear doctrine and policies for logistics as well as DIB. The commitment for a deployable capability, in line with NATO integration, will still require some work although it should not impede their overall logistics doctrine, despite the lack of strategic airlift. Georgia has the ability, as a PfP country, to enlist the assistance of the NMSA for NATO deployed logistics integration through an MOU which would be highly encouraged as the Logistics Directorate continues down this path. The military drawdown and temporary increase in budgets indicates the MoD’s desire to place funds where they are most needed.


222 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Georgia Armed Forces.”
by creating a more agile fighting force with new equipment and a logistics structure that will be ready to support the warfighter. The desire is to improve “quality rather than quantity of the armed forces”\textsuperscript{223} and the GAF are well on their way.

1. **Doctrine/Policy Modernization Efforts**

Immediately following Georgia’s independence in 1991, the country faced an immediate vacuum of military leadership at the Ministry of Defense level and suffered the loss of most of the Soviet air force and naval assets when these were pulled back to Russia.\textsuperscript{224} While devastating in the near term, this stark diminishment did provide Georgia the opportunity to reexamine its entire national defense strategy and then form the defense structure according to its new needs. However, this reform did not occur immediately; the country’s defense structure limped along for another decade until clear political stabilization took effect in 2003. Since then, Georgia has aggressively pursued defense reorganization and modernization in line with the 2005 National Military Strategy and the 2005 Georgian Security Concept. These documents laid the foundation for the 2007 Strategic Defense Review, which outlined an eight-year restructuring plan based around NATO MoD organizational structures.\textsuperscript{225} The SDR provided for clear guidance on logistics structures and reorganizations to best support the entire Georgian Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{226} The Minister of Defense has also published his 2010 “Minister’s Vision,” which reinforces the GAF guidance for logistics, modernization, acquisition, and doctrine improvements and continued modernization.\textsuperscript{227} The MoD has further provided more detailed logistics policy doctrine,\textsuperscript{228} which delineates specific responsibilities for acquisitions, distribution, sustainment, and handling and storage based on the NATO

\textsuperscript{223} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Georgia Procurement.”
\textsuperscript{224} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and the CIS, “Georgia Procurement.”
\textsuperscript{225} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and the CIS, “Georgia Armed Forces.”
Allied Joint Publication 4.0. The MoD has been aligned under NATO staff structures and has implemented a Staff Logistics Directorate as well as establishing a Logistics Support Command under the Chief of the Joint Staff. Georgia has made great strides in structural command development which has provided a solid doctrinal basis for logistics modernization and reorganization efforts. The logistics doctrine provides a key component for ensuring everyone in the chain of command understands what is expected of them in order to achieve the desired outcome of the transformation. Based on these findings, the GAF appears to have the right direction and motivation to initiate changes.

The GAF has a national supply system supported by sixteen main depots. While there is a joint initiative between the MoD and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to review potential common logistics support for the Air Force and the Navy with an implementation goal of 2009, it is unclear if these efforts were enacted. Considering that the Navy is being realigned under the MOIA and the Air Force fixed-wing assets are due to be permanently eliminated by 2015 with the rotary-wing assets falling under the Army, the prospect of spending funds for realignment may not be worth the benefit. However, bearing in mind that the GAF has sixteen depots in a country that is a little smaller than the state of South Carolina, the MoD should seriously consider a complete warehousing review to look for efficiencies which could reduce the number of depots along with stocking levels, ultimately saving money for redundant spares and personnel. The application of an economy-of-scale methodology could also be coupled with the collocation of supply depots and maintenance and repair facilities along with fully converting their current push logistics system with a more flexible push/pull system.

231 Ministry of Defence of Georgia, Strategic Defence Review, 90.
232 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Georgia Armed Forces.”
The current literature does indicate that such an initiative is in the works but given that the GAF is scheduled to downsize by nearly fifty percent by 2015,\textsuperscript{234} prudence may dictate this action sooner rather than later.

2. Logistics Planning Efforts

Logistics planning occurs at all levels of command and is supported by the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate with short-term, long-term, and projected plans for future funding and initiatives.\textsuperscript{235} The lack of heavy/strategic airlift requires that out-of-area operations necessitate the planning cycle to address the use of third party support for the initial movements and for follow-on support needs.\textsuperscript{236} This policy is a vetted political determination that limits, though not necessarily in a negative way but by providing focus for modernization efforts. While this shortfall does not preclude out-of-area operations, as displayed with current and past deployments in Afghanistan, the cost for movement and support is much higher using third-party logistics and should be considered during the planning process. Engaging in joint-basing sustainment can mitigate some logistics and transportation costs by purchasing food, medical, and other non-technical supplies through a host basing agreement, which should be included with the NATO Operational Planning Process for logistics.\textsuperscript{237} Overall, the logistics planning cycle appears to be on track with NATO standards.

3. Procurement and Budget Modernization Efforts

Given that the Georgian government was severely lacking in equipment and structure upon independence, the MoD was forced into making large investments in the purchase of small arms weapons for the infantry forces. Once Georgia was politically stable, the GAF received much support from the United States and NATO allies in the form of Foreign Military Financing and low to no-cost provisions of military equipment

\textsuperscript{234} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Georgia Armed Forces.”

\textsuperscript{235} Center for Civil-Military Relations, “Status of Defense Institution Building in Georgia,” 42.

\textsuperscript{236} Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Georgia Armed Forces.”

\textsuperscript{237} North Atlantic Treaty Organization, \textit{Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine AJP-4(A)}, 2-6.
to include: ten UH-1H utility helicopters supplied by the United States and a “significant number” of maritime patrol vehicles provided several allied nations. However, it appears that these donated assets were not provided with sufficient spares packages, which accounted for the age of the platforms and increased maintenance costs to keep them operational. The Georgian Air Force has resulted to cannibalizing two of the helicopters for spare parts and the Georgian Navy began retiring surplus or unseaworthy vessels to reduce operating and maintenance costs. While this stop-gap measure to provide military end items to the GAF may have propped up the number of pieces of equipment, the actual utility of these items lays in question given the expenses for upkeep. The MoD has increased spending dramatically since 2003 and is expecting to continue budgeting higher than the NATO standard of 2.3 percent of GDP, although at a decreasing rate until meeting the standard in 2015. Since the budgets will be gradually decreasing, the MoD has planned acquisitions exceeding proposed Defense Budgets but these amounts will be offset by the drastic reduction in personnel expenses by reducing the authorized end strength allowances from 36,533 personnel to 18,755 personnel by 2015. The MoD’s No. 1 priority of spending will be within the Defense Capabilities Development category which will focus on air defense acquisitions, heavy artillery, and attack helicopters but more importantly will invest significant funds in the infrastructure modernization program which includes logistics modernization. The

238 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Georgia Procurement.”
239 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Georgia Procurement.”
241 The Strategic Defense Review published a revised estimation of future defense budgets as a percentage of GDP based on projected GDP. In 2010, the Defense Budget percentage was 4.5%. The forecasted Defense Budgets are: 2011 – 4.0%; 2012 – 3.5%; 2013 – 3.0%; 2014 – 2.5%; 2015 and beyond at 2.3%. Ministry of Defence of Georgia, Strategic Defence Review, 98.
242 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Georgia Armed Forces.”
243 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, “Georgia Procurement.”
244 Ministry of Defence of Georgia, Minister’s Vision 2010, 5.
result of the additional procurement funds applied towards logistics modernization will continue to yield improvements providing modernization efforts are targeted at logistics infrastructure and in coordination with new weapon systems.

E. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION

1. Assessment

However, bearing in mind Georgia’s desire for, and the offer of, full NATO membership, the question remains of how future funding should be applied, considering that Georgia still hosts Russian forces, namely: 147th motorized rifle division at Akhalkalaki, 145th motorized rifle division at Batumi, and peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Therefore, if the United States has achieved greater interoperability and developed closer ties with Georgia, then the goals of future interaction with the GAF and the Georgian government at large must also be considered prior to allocating future funds. It becomes clear that an evaluation of PARP goals and a verification of the U.S. foreign policy goals should be closely examined based on the assessment pyramid.

These considerations, as applied to the assessment pyramid, follow the same top-down process as Ukraine. A Georgian foreign policy goal, established by the ambassador, that can be used within the assessment pyramid framework could consider defense and security cooperation, specifically focusing in on NATO interoperability through “enhanced training and equipment for Georgian forces.” This policy goal, as outlined within the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, and signed by both the U.S. Secretary of State and the Georgia Minister of Foreign Affairs, provides the pinnacle of the assessment pyramid. Correspondingly, the Georgian president outlined modernization goals that further interoperability desires and gave the commitment to


\[246\] United States Department of State, “United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership.”

\[247\] The 2009 U.S.-Georgia Charter was signed by then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and then Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigol Vashadze.
“provide military and political support to the coalitions led by the United States”\footnote{248} in his national security concept. This policy goal was directed to the MoD and was further expanded upon through the 2007 Georgian SDR, which indicated the GAF’s commitment to supporting NATO-led operations along with ensuring the proper balance of logistics support for those operations.\footnote{249}

These top two tiers of the pyramid support the ambassador’s goal of interoperability and coordination between NATO and Georgian forces and are verified through the national strategic documents. The next tier down will start to bring policy into action as the ODC and the MoD begin to review and select specific PfP PARP goals which support the upper echeloned policy goals. While the national policy goal is NATO interoperability, the MoD and ODC agreed upon course of action to support this goal is the creation of the GTEP.

The GTEP concept is then passed to EUCOM and is then subsequently tasked to Marine Forces Europe for implementation. Here at the tactical level, the Marine Corps works in close concert with the embassy to outline numerous sub-tasks (METs and METLs) and requests funding to support the multi-year program. Although the Marine Corps is responsible for the results of the program, the early progress is a function of the DOS as it must provide significant funding under the FMF and FMS to ensure adequate materiel and equipment is available for the actual tactical infantry battalion training. This blending of responsibilities for funding and training is critical to understanding not only responsibility but providing coordinated actions in support of the upper echelon goals. A key difference, at this point, between Ukraine and Georgia is that Ukraine’s logistics modernization became part of the deployment mantra while the Georgian logistics policy, as promulgated by the SDR, specifically indicates that strategic out-of-area air and sea deployments is not a capability set for Georgia and these types of deployments will require commercial or other nation support.\footnote{250}

\footnotesize{\begin{enumerate}
\item Ministry of Defence of Georgia, \textit{Strategic Defence Review}, 92.
\end{enumerate}}
At this tactical level of assessment, reasonable and quantifiable bottom-up evaluations of progress and success are easily ascertained. The Marine Corps can readily determine, through the GTEP training program the number of Georgian soldiers trained and the number of hours spent training the Georgian battalion. At the same level, the DOS, through the embassy, can track the number of IMET students trained (where the bulk of IMET students attend English language training) and the quantity of uniforms, radios, etc. provided to the Georgian military under the FMF or FMS programs. The tactical level evaluation determines if the goods and services provided, as allocated through their specific programs, have met the bilateral agreement for requested quantities of materiel and training evolutions.

The next level up the pyramid will determine if the equipment and training have met EUCOM’s goal of preparing a Georgian infantry battalion for deployment to Afghanistan in support of NATO’s ISAF mission. Since Georgia has deployed several battalions, and the battalion examined in this case is ready to deploy, then the EUCOM evaluation would be considered positive and the funds expended would be reflected as well spent. Providing that these deployments are also building the national logistics structure, within NATO interoperability standards, to support the pre-deployment training requirements, the Georgian national goal of logistics modernization, through the GTEP venue, is being achieved. The logistics modernization progress would have to be verified by the ODC, through the ANP goals, because even supporting domestic training and exercises requires a robust and modern logistics network, despite the out-of-area logistics restrictions.

At the upper tiers of the pyramid, the ambassador must then verify if the Georgian president, and the MoD by extension, remains committed to NATO interoperability, to include logistics, through policy speeches and national security strategies but also by examining MoD funding to logistics and modernization endeavors in general. As long as the governmental hierarchy continues to fund as current levels or more, then the efforts and money the United States provides to Georgia is worthwhile and can be considered a foreign policy success, at least within the security sector reform foreign policy goal. The ambassador must then consider the input from EUCOM and the ODC, along with his
own internal verifications, to make the final assessment if Georgia has met or exceeded its target. If so, then recommendations to DOS and Congress could entail funding requests at current levels or gradually reduced levels, in the best case scenario that the Georgian military has advanced far enough to assume a greater financial burden.

2. Conclusion

As remarkable as Georgia’s transition has been, especially since the Rose Revolution, considering the U.S. investment of $1.8 billion in security assistance and security cooperation, the improvements in military logistics appears to be modernizing toward NATO standards.251 Although there are no direct links between U.S. funding and Georgian logistics, within the realm of the areas of the logistics modernization framework, the broader context of U.S. assistance programs for DIB should be evaluated against Georgia’s PfP PARP goals and the U.S. Mission Strategic and Resource Plan to ensure funding is ultimately being applied toward U.S. foreign policy ends.

The result of the $4 billion spent on Georgia’s democratization, Westernization, and modernization efforts along with security sector reform has provided suitable and sustainable tools to maintain themselves as a stable country that continues being a key energy resource conduit to Western Europe.252 While this is a reasonable and apparent success of funds well spent, can this same success be extrapolated out for all of the funds allocated for Georgia that furthers DOS foreign policy goals that includes: good governance and rule of law, regional cooperation, security sector reform, economic reform, and engaging the Georgian society.253 Under the current method of assessments, that determination, not necessarily specific to Georgia’s case, eludes policy makers which initiated the impetus for the Congressional quest for metrics. Without a comprehensive

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251 United States Department of State, “Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance Fact Sheet, December 2009: Georgia.”

252 United States Department of State, “Foreign Operations Assistance Fact Sheet, April 2011: Georgia.”

253 United States Department of State, “United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership.”
analytical tool, such as the assessment pyramid that bridges the DOS and DoD security assistance and security cooperation efforts, the answer will always be left to the subjectivity of government bureaucrats.

Despite the challenges Georgia is facing with continued Russian occupation, which is directly impacting further advancements from NATO to extend full NATO membership, the stalwart commitment of Saakashvili to continue training and deploying Georgian infantry battalions in support of ISAF, despite a forecasted military downsizing of nearly fifty percent over the next three years coupled with decreasing military budgets, indicates a willing and strategic partner that has earned the support of the United States. Continued security assistance and security cooperation efforts are essential to maintain the bilateral cooperation as well as providing accurate assessments and verifications of U.S. foreign policy goals to Congress under the assessment pyramid to ensure compliance and sustained financial support to Georgia.
V. CONCLUSION

The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a new era for the world. Many countries that were diametrically opposed on Christmas Day 1991 sought for a new understanding of the world and what had become of the Communist enemy by New Year’s Eve. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet States gained independence and new governmental structures. The withdrawal of the Soviet military from these new countries left varying degrees of equipment, experience, and culture behind. Within three years, Ukraine and Georgia sought admission to the Partnership for Peace program, NATO’s response to broadening cooperation with former Warsaw Pact countries, and were both accepted in 1994. Through the PfP process, Ukrainian and Georgian political leadership indicated the desire to overhaul and modernize their individual defense structures—from the Ministry of Defense and all the way down to the lowest soldier in the field.

However, in order to realize the extended benefits of a comprehensive military transformation for Ukraine and Georgia, they each require a sustainable and modernized logistics network that is interoperable with western NATO partners. To meet the PfP goal of interoperability, Ukraine and Georgia would need to have formal acknowledgment of logistics requirements starting from the political leadership through policy enactments addressing the spectrum of logistics requirements from the procurement and budgeting cycles to a workable system for spares management and maintenance and repair facilities. As it stands now, the foreign aid programs are too convoluted to provide precise allocations of funds for programs not specifically listed, such as logistics, which hinder the ability for these countries to modernize effectively for the long-term.

The efforts of the United States and NATO have provided hundreds of millions of dollars of financial aid and assistance, donated or sold military equipment and hardware, and offered thousands of training opportunities to these countries in support of their national goals which have corresponded with U.S. national interests and ambassadorial foreign policy goals. While both Ukraine and Georgia have engaged in drafting national security strategies and doctrines, outlining new planning methods, and initiating
procurement and modernization plans, the logistics network to support these changes has lagged. Through this study, it becomes apparent that Georgia has robustly developed its logistics network in accordance with the MoD’s directives and vision for supporting their military. Although there are still improvements that can be realized through logistics infrastructure realignments and the conversion to a push/pull system, the Georgian government’s willingness to modernize is promising for continued improvements. Conversely, Ukraine has made improvements in its logistics network but the modernization process has been stunted by unclear logistics doctrine and a shortage of funds specifically allocated for logistics.

While it is understood that each country’s government will set its own national priorities and budget accordingly, what is not clear is why there is such a disparity between the militaries with regard to their logistics modernization efforts. Although Ukraine and Georgia indicated challenges with regard to managing existing and future requirements with continually decreasing resources, the math of foreign aid doesn’t seem to reflect that perceived reality as much as it appears to be more of a misunderstanding of internal constraints under the myriad of foreign aid programs. It would be a mistake to evaluate the amount of security assistance and security cooperation aid with successful logistics modernization efforts as it would appear that the larger investment of foreign aid (refer to Table 1) should directly correspond to significant progress in logistics modernization since Georgia received a greater amount of aid and assistance, more than $567 million, as compared to Ukraine’s aid and assistance programs totaling nearly $340 million. Under U.S. Federal Law, these funds have a specific purpose and must be used accordingly. The problem that the logistics community has is that it does not generally have funds specifically allocated for logistics modernization.
While the U.S. Code, under section 1206, provides a type of assistance that can allow for the purchase of some spare parts and tools,\textsuperscript{255} infrastructure improvements—which can allow for new warehousing and logistics network purchases—are only allowed under section 1207 funding.\textsuperscript{256} The misalignment of requirements to funding streams creates a disjointed effort in building up the logistics network. Under these restrictions, the 1206 funding for spares and tools, Georgia and Ukraine benefit; while under the 1207

\begin{table}
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\hline
\multicolumn{1}{c}{} & \multicolumn{9}{c}{DOS Security Assistance Program Figures are in Thousands (000s)} \\
\hline
\hline
Georgia & & & & & & & & & & \\
FMF & 51,150 & 59,115 & 42,735 & 40,982 & 50,505 & 37,666 & 38,348 & 320,501 & 19,190 & 339,691 \\
IMET & & & & & & & & & & \\
AEECA & 18,461 & 12,938 & 9,320 & 26,328 & 4,885 & 5,390 & 4,904 & 82,226 & & \\
FMF & 11,880 & 9,700 & 9,000 & 11,500 & 16,000 & 15,968 & 16,000 & 90,048 & & \\
IMET & 1,275 & 1,160 & 799 & 1,426 & 1,806 & 1,900 & 2,000 & 10,366 & & \\
NADR & 3,137 & 5,115 & 3,210 & 2,200 & 1,300 & 2,575 & 2,025 & 19,562 & & \\
FMS & 49,527 & 72,329 & 13,444 & 10,939 & 9,363 & & & 155,602 & & \\
Ukraine & & & & & & & & & & \\
AEECA & 27,647 & 25,896 & 25,442 & 24,956 & 24,526 & 24,134 & 24,948 & 177,549 & & \\
FMF & 10,890 & 9,500 & 6,036 & 7,000 & 11,000 & 8,982 & 9,000 & 62,408 & & \\
IMET & 1,753 & 1,856 & 1,874 & 1,813 & 1,904 & 1,850 & 1,900 & 12,950 & & \\
NADR & 3,100 & 1,360 & 2,100 & 800 & 2,500 & 2,700 & 2,500 & 15,060 & & \\
FMS & 7,760 & 20,503 & 7,283 & 6,413 & 10,575 & & & 52,534 & & \\
 & 51,150 & 59,115 & 42,735 & 40,982 & 50,505 & 37,666 & 38,348 & 320,501 & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Departments of State and Defense Security Assistance Program Authorization Amounts derived from DOS and DoD historical data.(From: \textsuperscript{254})}
\end{table}


funding for infrastructure improvements, only Georgia benefits. While this corollary that Georgia receives both funding streams, and has a clearly more successful logistics modernization program at work, is perhaps more apropos than strictly the quantity of funds received. It would then reason that it is not the amount of funding provided, necessarily, but that funding is applied where it is needed.

Moreover, Congress wants to know if the $3.2 billion ($1.4 billion for Ukraine and $1.8 billion for Georgia) was well spent and produced reasonable outcomes, the response is not so easy to give along with tangible results. For instance, considering only Section 1206 programs from FY06–FY09, Georgia received $18 million for the Training/technical Assistance Program (along with five other programs). Should metrics be based on whether training and technical assistance was provided or whether the Georgians are now capable of providing their own training, such as train-the-trainer instruction, or how well the Georgians learned and retained the training given? Answers to these questions are difficult and can vary depending on the more specific nuances of how the funds were utilized.

However, strictly looking at the dollars for outcome measurement, it would appear that Georgia should be the furthest along in their defense institution building and military modernization efforts while Ukraine would be lagging in comparison. Validating such comparisons requires a much more detailed examination of each of the countries’ defense structures and an objective review must be conducted considering all military aid initiatives along with how well they have progressed within their national military structure and governmental policies over the years.


258 During this time frame, Ukraine received $12 million for five programs (Training/technical assistance, Spare parts/tools, Communication equipment/radios, Computers/software, and Facilities) while Georgia received $17.9 million for six programs (Training/technical assistance, Spare parts/tools, Communication equipment/radios, Radar/surveillance equipment, Ground vehicles, and Miscellaneous equipment). United States Government Accountability Office, International Security, 57-58.
The logistics modernization efforts for both Ukraine and Georgia reflect this situation; modernization, conversion from soviet-style logistics, and indoctrinating the military culture to Western/NATO standards is a slow and methodical process. However, the level of funding and length of support is partially determined on the willingness and commitment of the local government to back a true logistics overhaul that spans from the warehouse to the acquisition cycle with dedicated and sustained budgets.

Complete logistics reforms are critical in determining national priorities and should be weighed against political indicators to ascertain how U.S. foreign policy should be applied. While Georgia has received more U.S. aid and assistance funding than Ukraine, Georgia’s commitment to building a lean and effective military, to include specifically addressing logistics, in addition to their stated goal of NATO accession and their commitment to providing forces in support of ISAF, provides the right blend of rhetoric and action. This makes funding initiatives not only obvious but it also allows for better evaluations and verifications that funds are spent well.

Conversely, in Ukraine, the national documents do not specifically outline comprehensive logistics overhauls nor has there been a firm commitment from policymakers to funds such reforms. Although Ukraine has received significant amounts of aid and assistance from the United States, the president has eschewed NATO accession goals and wishes to remain in a non-aligned status. While many of the Ukrainian Rear Services personnel indicate their willingness to work with NATO countries, through the PfP program, their national government has not fulfilled its requirements for reasonable and sustained funding for basic operations and maintenance of facilities and equipment. This situation becomes problematic as logistics modernization efforts receive even less priority than the infantry or aviation units. Additionally, the lack of stated policy and doctrine makes modernization even more difficult if the J-4 does not have the guidance to know where they are going in order to properly request and budget for those changes. The result is that the lack of political commitment from Ukraine keeps U.S. aid and assistance at a reduced level when modernization efforts are much harder to evaluated and verify.
The United States Congress must re-evaluate these multiple funding streams and not align them so rigidly but allow the country teams and Combatant Commanders flexibility with their application. Accepting these changes would represent a major shift in U.S. foreign policy as it would relegate Congress to the oversight of funds in a holistic manner, by total efforts per country, vice allowing for individual projects that may not be in the best interest of the Combatant Commander or U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, methods of evaluation of progress needs to be created and applied within reasonable parameters which allow for greater flexibility as opposed to their current use which makes providing measurements of success untenable.259

Further exacerbating the situation, U.S. foreign policy practices favor special individualized projects, which do not create the basis for collaboration among U.S. agencies and departments. This is most prominent when examining Department of State Title 22 funds and Department of Defense Title 10 funds which many times can be used for the same endeavors. The result is that U.S. embassies and Combatant Commanders task Comptrollers and legal representatives to decipher Congressional mandates to ensure funds are spent specifically, regardless if it is in concert with the host country’s desires. Additionally, many of these Title 10 fiscal mandates are directed inappropriately as they greatly increase the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, without a comprehensive realignment of how U.S. foreign aid is structured, applied, and measured for effectiveness, security assistance and security cooperation efforts will remain disaggregated and confusing for those responsible for the execution of these programs as well as those charged with reporting successful application of such funds.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

Ideally, the basis in policy for modernization efforts should lay with the realm of economic development primarily, while military modernization efforts should be undertaken once a nation’s economy thrives. Such a dictum goes against the imperative of security, especially for nations damned to a military vacuum. The former Soviet states had no luxury as imagined in a think tank granted their history and geography. Territorial

security was needed much sooner than economic viability and as a stop-gap measure, the United States began investing billions of dollars into their economies through various aid and assistance programs. While some in civil society might believe that the provided aid equates to increased democratization in these countries, policy makers and program executors should exercise care when spending the nation’s treasure. The following recommendations provide one such avenue for monitoring the judicious use of funds.

1. The first aspect to consider is that a foreign aid organizational restructuring is desperately needed to meet the needs of the present and future. Throughout this thesis, numerous instances have pointed out the overlapping of programs, funding, agencies, and foreign policy goals. While there have been attempts over time to reduce redundancy and increase agency coordination, with some success, these efforts are misplaced since they do not address the fundamental problem of aid disorganization. This must be solved at the Congressional level through a comprehensive review of U.S. foreign policy goals in order to simplify the foreign aid framework.

It should be constructed so that every instance of foreign aid funding is applied to some greater foreign policy goal such as, the institution of the democratic rule of law, for example. When aid is applied in this manner, the Congressional requirements for providing metrics for success become obviated under the higher policy goal. Further, specific to DOS security assistance and DoD security cooperation programs, Congress must decide how foreign policy should be applied not only with respect to U.S. policy goals but how this support is viewed by the rest of the world.

Tip O’Neill was correct in that all politics are local; however, not all opinions are. International public opinion matters, especially when the United States wants to engage in military actions abroad. Therefore, how the United States provides aid, and how it is viewed by outsiders, matters, especially when that aid is perceived to be a militarization of foreign policy. Because of this truism, the current DoD security cooperation funding needs to be reallocated under the DOS, as part of the total foreign aid restructuring. Future DoD involvement, especially for mil-to-mil exercises and interoperability, should not be curtailed as long as it funded under the DOS to further foreign policy goals.
2. To support a revitalized aid structure, the need to evaluate if funding is indeed meeting U.S. foreign policy goals, the usage of the assessment pyramid will provide basic concept for how funds and programs should be evaluated and verified throughout the spectrum of tactical-level tasks, operational-level goals, and strategic objectives. But more than just using this concept, is educating policy makers and program executors about it and how it can alleviate needless metric reporting as well as countless hours of metric creation in order to just report the metrics.

To illustrate, a dollars-to-outcomes methodology is partially being created within the EUCOM J-5. The J-5 has been working to establish METs and METLs for specific country goals (agreed to by the recipient country’s MoD and the U.S. country team, in conjunction with EUCOM and the ODC) as a type replicator of the DoD’s newly instituted Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), which links resources to readiness metrics. While this methodology provides only one aspect of the dollars to outcome requirement, it is however a significant factor in determining the overall success of defense reforms. When it is used at the base level of the pyramid, it provides strong justifications for future funding requirements. However, these metrics would need to remain local because in and of themselves, they do not represent success or failure of U.S. foreign policy goals. They merely represent evaluations of what can be measured.

3. To culminate the previous two recommendations would be the simple assignment of responsibility for all foreign assistance initiatives. Within any particular country, it is the ambassador who is wholly responsible for the promotion of U.S. foreign policy goals, less those whom the United States does not have diplomatic relations with. Since there is no one of higher authority, it would stand to reason that the ambassador should render full accountability to Congress, through the State Secretary, for all aid and assistance within that country. Military aid and assistance should be no exception.

Although efforts have been made to orchestrate security assistance and security cooperation initiatives through the implementation of the ODC, the ODC still works for the COCOM while the Defense Attaché works for the ambassador. The added level of bureaucracy for the ODC would not be required if the policy was made such that the ambassador was held accountable for all events within their country. It is the serving of
two masters (the COCOM and the ambassador by the ODC), which has been brought about by the militarization of foreign aid and policy so that COCOM initiatives satisfy the COCOM while embassy initiatives satisfy the ambassador. It should be one policy, one effort, and one position of authority that holds the responsibility with broad coordinating powers—that person is the ambassador.

4. No matter what recommendations are acted upon or even considered, there is one aspect of the security assistance program that warrants much more emphasis and funding than is being currently given—the IMET program. The FY10 allocation for the DOS IMET program was $108 million and supported 125 countries with 7,100 students educated and trained.\(^{260}\) The value of this program to the greater national interest and needs of foreign security and defense policy cannot be overstated enough with the opportunities it provides to foreign governments and their militaries. Many of the IMET programs also require prior language training (about thirteen percent of program costs for the 453 IMET language students),\(^{261}\) which is also funded under IMET, and adds an additional level of interoperability once these trainees return to their home country.

As this thesis has illustrated, the value IMET provides ranges from the tactical level to the strategic level as IMET recipients are placed into positions of authority within their government, which has not been the 100 percent of the time, but still with sufficient frequency to warrant the endurance of the program as a feature of the U.S. security cooperation. The teaching of U.S. values, culture, and language enhances relationships between militaries and governments and is easily evaluated for its worth when compared against the assessment pyramid. When compared to the overall budget, IMET is low-impact fiscally (only 1.9 percent of the security assistance budget and a measly 0.2 percent of the total DOS foreign aid budget)\(^{262}\) but, high impact for relationship building as a key factor for DIB, as the example of the Ukrainian major reflected.

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\(^{262}\) United States Department of State, “International Affairs Function 150.”
Many times, success is measured in glacial movements that sometimes even recede slightly, rather than the rocket speed changes desired under U.S. Congressional timelines. However, divergence or even stagnation from these countries, as they are making serious efforts to reform under Western/NATO-style changes, should be considered very carefully. Any financial or perceived departures from current support levels will create a national security assistance vacuum, which will quickly be filled by other countries that might not share the same values or direction that will benefit the recipient country or even be compatible with U.S. foreign policy goals. I advocate that the stated methodology and recommendations, in addition to the practical use of the assessment pyramid by the COCOMs and embassies, could be applied so that they will satisfy Congressional mandates of providing objective progression metrics while still allowing for the art of diplomatic and subjective DOS and DoD initiatives that rely on building greater bilateral relationships through efforts that foster the greater U.S. foreign policy goals.
APPENDIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.1 Typology of professional armed forces in western Europe</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional characteristics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Role</td>
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<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sustainable forces away from national territory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Full interoperability with NATO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expertise Qualifications</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical expertise</td>
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<tr>
<td>Skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scene or recruitment forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Responsibility Command and control</td>
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<td>Delegation</td>
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<td>Promotion</td>
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<td>Examples (including aspirations)</td>
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Notes: DNT = defence of national territory; PP = peace-keeping; JC = peace-making. 

Figure 4. Topology Chart of Professional Armed Forces from Forster, Edmunds, and Cottee. (From: 263)

LIST OF REFERENCES


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