Global Stability Through Security Cooperation

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The sovereign states of the world today are characterized as either stable or in various levels of instability – failed, failing, or fragile. The President of the United States in the 2011 National Security Strategy called on the United States Government (USG) to conduct activities of engagement that would stabilize unstable states. Mandates such as the National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 and the Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 direct unity of effort between the Department of State and the Department of Defense to create stability in unstable sovereign states and regions for the sake of U.S. national interests. This project identifies the necessity to understand the strategic environment before the USG applies limited resources to improve the security, economic, and governance conditions that can stabilize a state or region. The development and use of a comprehensive strategic stabilization assessment model readily enables the USG to understand the proximate causes of a sovereign state’s instability. Once understood, the USG can correctly apply the appropriate “ways” with minimal “means” to achieve the necessary “ends” of stability.
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“Shaping through theater security cooperation… making our partners more capable today makes them better allies tomorrow. Investing in our partner nations’ readiness by building their capacity helps to shape the future of the region.”

—Lieutenant General Vincent K. Brooks
Commanding General, Third Army/U.S. Army Central Command

The world of 196 independent countries remains less stable today than the bipolar international system the United States of America found itself in with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War. The United States, given the strategic environment of globalization, numerous rogue and failed states, transnational terrorism, illicit smuggling of weapons, narcoterrorism, a global economic crisis, and many more international challenges must redefine its approach to global engagement ensuring the protection of its national interests. This project explores the opportunities that “unified action” presents while incorporating a “whole-of-government” approach to better shape, stabilize, and facilitate the reconstruction of partnered sovereign states in a more efficient and resourceful manner at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. By dissecting published national guidance, Congressionally mandated authorities, past and present Department of Defense and Department of State planning practices, and the cost/benefit analysis of programmed “shaping” monies; this project will highlight interagency challenges and propose alternative “ways” to use limited “means” to achieve strategic “ends.”

The United States of America assumed the role of world leader in 1945, at the end of World War II, given its peerless economic and military strength. The Marshall Plan facilitated the rebuilding of post-war Europe and Japan and remains in a
leadership role in the global war on terror. America, as a nation of people, continues to elect national leaders, which possess the motivation to ensure America maintains its military, economic, and diplomatic prestige throughout the world. As the United States successfully concluded its eight-year war in Iraq, plans for a 2014 withdrawal of American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Forces from Afghanistan, a $15 trillion national deficit, which is increasing, and a high domestic unemployment rate, there exists an increasing call for a pre-World War II “Isolationist” policy. This redirection of domestic issues, as several citizen groups and politicians indicate, allows America to reform and organize its internal/domestic challenges. The President of the United States, Barrack Obama, clearly conveys in the 2011 National Security Strategy that international engagement, not isolationism, is the appropriate long-term policy to guarantee America’s national security.

“It would be destructive to both American national security and global security if the United States used the emergence of new challenges and the shortcomings of the international system as a reason to walk away from it. Instead, we must focus American engagement on strengthening international institutions and galvanizing the collective action that can serve common interests such as combating violent extremism; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials; achieving balanced and sustainable economic growth; and forging cooperative solutions to the threat of climate change, armed conflict, and pandemic disease.”³

Engagement enables America to share with its partners and allies its “core interests: security, prosperity, universal values, democracy, human rights, and a just international order.”⁴ Our closest coalition partners in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and the Middle East possess ties with the United States in the aforementioned interests and shared values, and serve as the cornerstone of our “mutual security and the broader security and prosperity of the world.”⁵
After 10 years of continual combat operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation New Dawn, Operation Enduring Freedom, and a global operation against Al-Qaeda, United States foreign policymakers have relearned the hard lessons from the Vietnam Era. The key lesson learned is the military can win security in the short-term, but to gain stability, the United States must apply a “whole-of-government” approach. As President Obama states,

“Our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security, but they must be complemented. Our security also depends upon diplomats who can act in every corner of the world, from grand capitals to dangerous outposts; development experts who can strengthen governance and support human dignity; and intelligence and law enforcement that can unravel plots, strengthen justice systems, and work seamlessly with other countries.”

The U.S. Army’s *Stability Operations* manual defines a “whole-of-government” approach as “an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government (USG) to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.” In this case, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Commerce, and various Intelligence agencies share the goal in obtaining and developing sovereign state, region, and global stability.

The DoD’s *National Defense Strategy* reinforces the direction of the President’s *National Security Strategy* while describing a strategic environment “defined by a global struggle against violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international system.” Historically extremists fund their operations via piracy, smuggling of weapons, narcotics, human trafficking, conducting terrorist operations, and if possible terrorist operations with weapons of mass destruction. Extremists prey on fragile or failed states
because those states possess the inability “to police themselves effectively or to work with their neighbors to ensure regional security.” Extremists represent challenges to the international system and to our national security interests.

“If left unchecked, such instability can spread and threaten regions of interest to the United States, our allies, and friends. Insurgent groups and other non-state actors frequently exploit local geographical, political, or social conditions to establish safe havens from which they can operate with impunity. Ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas offer fertile ground for such groups to exploit the gaps in governance capacity of local regimes to undermine local stability and regional security.”

The DoD within the *National Defense Strategy* identified five key objectives providing enduring security for the American people. The two key objectives that will “check” the above-mentioned state instability issues are “Promote Security” and “Deter Conflict.” Both objectives focus their respective energies on strengthening and expanding alliances and partnerships.

Recognizing that our “allies often possess capabilities, skills, and knowledge we cannot duplicate,” we must reach out to them and “broaden our ideas to include partnerships for new situations or circumstances, calling on moderate voices in troubled regions and unexpected partners.” Through the conduct of a comprehensive assessment of a nation’s security capacity and capabilities, the Geographical Combatant Commander (GCC) must determine if the nation’s military is capable of conducting “missions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, or complex counterinsurgency and high-end conventional operations.” The more complex the military operation, the fewer partners exist with the capacity, will, and capability to act in support of our mutual goals. The assessment will ideally drive future “security cooperation” considerations with the partner country. As per Joint Publication 1,
“Security cooperation involves all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a region. Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations.”13

The National Defense Strategy focuses on the use of “security cooperation” programs to build partnerships that strengthen the host nation’s ability to confront security challenges. Security cooperation, the principal medium for building security capacity, supports these sovereign states by:

1) Encouraging partner nations to assume lead roles in areas that represent the common interests of the United States and the host nation;

2) Encouraging partner nations to increase their capability and willingness to participate in a coalition with U.S. forces; and

3) Facilitating cooperation with partner militaries and ministries of defense….14

“The National Defense Strategy recognizes the need to foster interagency coordination and integration in these three efforts. Such efforts draw a vital link between the DoD and the DoS in the conduct of stability operations.”15 As the DoD focuses its efforts on security, the State Department with USAID, INL, LEGAT, and Commerce can energize institutions that embody legitimate governance and create economic growth. The foundation of stability within a nation-state requires simultaneous attention to all three elements: the sovereign state’s security, governance, and economy.

In 2010, Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton published the inaugural Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). Modeled after the DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the State Department and the USAID collaborated to identify goals and set forth necessary reforms that enable both agencies to take their respective leads in foreign relations and development. Secretary Clinton’s desire “to elevate civilian
power alongside military power as equal pillars of U.S. foreign policy”\textsuperscript{16} inspired sweeping reforms within the Department of State. Together, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the USAID can in a purposeful manner stabilize wanting states that do not possess the institutions to provide the opportunities of a peaceful and prosperous existence. It is the Secretary of State’s intent under her thoughtful leadership and direction to provide the following:

“To initially respond to the dangers presented by fragile states with a clear civilian mission: prevent conflict, save lives, and build sustainable peace by resolving underlying grievances fairly and helping to build government institutions that can provide basic but effective security and justice systems. Over the longer term, our mission is to build a government’s ability to address challenges, promote development, protect human rights, and provide for its people on its own. To meet this responsibility, we need clearly designated, accountable leadership within and between State and USAID, as well as complementary capabilities in each agency.”\textsuperscript{17}

The most essential complementary capability is that of security, which the DoD provides directly by employing its forces or via its security cooperation program in concert with and under the direction of the DoS. On December 7, 2005, the President of the United States directed that the DoS take the lead for all “Reconstruction and Stabilization” efforts, as stated in the National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44.\textsuperscript{18}

NSPD-44 proclaims that “the United States has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies.”\textsuperscript{19} The directive empowers the Secretary of State to “coordinate and lead integrated United States efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”\textsuperscript{20} The directive further dictates “the Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary
of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.\textsuperscript{21}

The DoD, to complement the President’s objectives within NSPD-44, promulgated the Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05. “This directive recognized that increasing stability operations capabilities within DoD are essential to conducting major operations and advancing U.S. national security interests in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.”\textsuperscript{22} The DoDD 3000.05 directed “military commanders to plan for and execute stability operations in coordination and cooperation with non-military instruments of national power.”\textsuperscript{23} This type of coordination and cooperation toward common objectives defines a “unity of effort,” especially, between participants not from the same command or organization.\textsuperscript{24}

In 2009, the United States Congress passed Public Law 110-417, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that “codified the institutions, policies, procedures, and responsibilities originally set up in NSPD-44.”\textsuperscript{25} That same year, the Department of Defense affirmed the guidance in DoDD 3000.05 and reissued the guidance as an instruction. The instruction updated policy and assigned responsibilities for the identification and development of DoD capabilities to support stability operations and improve partnership within the interagency process. The authorities mentioned above clearly depict that the DoD will assume the primary role in unified action to “synchronize, coordinate, and/or integrate joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG agencies, non-governmental organizations, and inter-governmental organizations (e.g., the United Nations), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort.”\textsuperscript{26} It is through “unified action” and the interagency relationships that the
Departments of State and Defense’s planners collaboratively construct a synergistic stabilization strategy for conflicted sovereign states and regions.

Ideally, the first step is to understand the environment prior to the creation of a strategy, which positively affects the outcome or end conditions. To ensure the stabilization of a country or region, the decision-maker must understand in totality the underlying causes that either allows the respective country to remain in a stable (steady-state) condition or the proximate causes of its instability. Decision-makers must provide guidance to their planners with a full contextual understanding of the concerns or problems addressed in a strategy. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to determine the “ways” and “means” required to establish or reestablish the “ends” for stability in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) world, without the complete appreciation of the strategic environment.

Given future impending budget constraints, it is imperative to identify correctly the proximate causes of a state’s stability problems and effectively apply measures to rectify the state’s ailments with limited resources. With limited funding and time, organizations must approach problems with vigor and preciseness to achieve its ends. When multiple organizations participate to achieve the same ends, the process becomes more difficult given the cooperation, coordination, collaboration, and consensus required between these organizations. The aforementioned guidance in the national strategy documents to engage the world and create stability that in the end protects our national security interests is the foundation and motivation to build a successful engagement strategy. NSPD-44, NDAA 2009, and DoDI 3000.05 mandate a lawful unity of effort between the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and
the USAID given its congressionally acknowledged development expertise. Together the three organizations collaborate, coordinate, and cooperate to achieve the stability of a sovereign state and region. This collaboration, coordination, and cooperation require a unity of purpose and reading from the “same sheet of music.” The requirement for three distinct organizations to operate together and be on the same “sheet of music” must demand a strategic, comprehensive assessment model that provides analysis for each nation and within a given geographic region.

Currently no strategic, comprehensive assessment model exists within the DoD, DoS, or USAID. However, each organization, at various levels and locations, possesses assessment tools, which enables the decision-makers to select options. There exists decision-makers within each organization, which use no criteria other than their respective experiences and intuition to apply resources at the right place and time. Arguably, neither approach in a VUCA world, with little continuity between rotating leadership/decision-makers, and mandated teamwork/unity of effort will be consistently effective over time. In the age of limited resources and the advancement of U.S. national security interests, one would hope that the requisite collaboration to develop an interagency standardized assessment model may occur sooner versus later.

The question becomes why has the USG failed to develop an interagency model to assess worldwide stability? It makes sense from a resource standpoint to develop an assessment model as it would provide our decision-makers a more accurate method to apply the appropriate “ways” with justified “means” to resolve problems and obtain the “ends” of stability. A more pressing question though is who in the USG should develop such a model?
NSPD-44 clearly puts the DoS in the lead for “Reconstruction and Stabilization” efforts, but it fails to direct methods to garner efficiencies such as an assessment model. Within the DoD there exists numerous examples of assessment models that commanders directed their staffs to develop to track the changes and trends within their assigned areas of responsibility. Given the requirement to employ “unified action” to address sovereign state stability issues, is the DoD the best organization to build and maintain an interagency assessment model for the DoS’s use? The DoD remains a good choice as it does inherently strive to understand the environment it might fight in. The military’s doctrine dictates, “The commander must be able to describe both the current state of the operational environment and how the operational environment should look when operations conclude (desired end state) to visualize an approach to solving the problem.”27 The key phrases in the above sentence are “current state” and “end state.” Without understanding the current state, it is difficult to describe the end state and develop the required actions to achieve a stable environment.

In January 2010, the U.S. Army’s 1st Infantry Division, under the command of Major General Vincent K. Brooks, deployed to southern Iraq to command and control the forces assigned to United States Division-South (USD-S). The USD-S Headquarters was responsible for improving the Iraqi Security Forces’ capacity and capabilities, and supporting the DoS’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The DoS’s PRTs partnered with local Iraqi governments to increase civil capacity in each of Iraq’s southern nine provinces. These two efforts combined with day-to-day warfighting operations and the simultaneous drawing down of the force in Iraq could not occur
successfully without the development and use of the Southeast Iraq Assessment Model (SIAM).

The SIAM was a holistic assessment model that captured the conditions of the southern nine provinces on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. The model used the elements of the PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information) framework to describe each province’s state of affairs. The USD-S Operations Research and Statistical Analysis (ORSA) officers built and maintained the model. The collected data was input into the SIAM on a specific schedule from approximately 10 different sources. These sources ranged from local Iraqis, the Iraqi Security Force leadership, U.S. military force advisors, interagency assessments, and other collection sites. Within months of the 1st Infantry Division’s arrival to assume control of the USD-S area of responsibility, the USD-S senior leadership gained an appreciation and understanding of their decisions and how those decisions affected the operational environment within their operational environment. As the model matured, the SIAM not only described the environment that USD-S operated in, but it also became a predictive tool for the effects that external forces and nonstate actors had on the operational environment.

USD-S used the SIAM to inform the command on the progress with regard to the USD-S Campaign Plan and the three focused Lines of Effort (LOEs) employed for the Iraqis. The measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) captured within each element of PMESII (approximately 650 in total) provided a score based on a scale of zero to 10. The score for each element, within each province over time, depicted either a positive, neutral, or negative change in the environment. The
assigned ORSA officers could describe accurately what act or actor caused the change. When the provincial/PMESII scores were applied to the Campaign Plan LOEs, the USD-S command and staff could identify readily trends and modify action plans, as required, to obtain a positive result.

For each LOE there existed an end condition that USD-S and its partners (DoS, USAID, PRTs, Advise and Assist Brigades, Umm Qasr Joint Interagency Task Force, and the Office of Regional Affairs) strove to achieve. Within each LOE there existed specific objectives with numerous action plans, which led to objective accomplishment. The scores of the SIAM, as previously mentioned, depicted the progress of each LOEs’ major objectives. The PMESII elements of Political, Economic, Infrastructure, and Social supported the PRTs to Build Civil Capacity LOE. The PMESII element of Military provided information to the Increase Iraqi Security Force Capacity and Capability LOE, while the PMESII elements of Information and Social provided information to the Communication LOE. Working closely with the USD-S partners, the ORSA officers modified the SIAM MOEs and MOPs as necessary to gain the consensus of each, thus making the SIAM a legitimate and relevant model, which assisted in the decision-making process.

The above example of an assessment model possesses unlimited potential for use at the interagency-level to drive energetic and competent reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Without emphasis from either the National Security Council or Congress, the effort continues to be piecemealed at best and dependent on the personalities of the decision-makers. Regarding “Reconstruction and Stabilization,” the decision-makers are numerous and unity of command (“when all forces operate under a
single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose\(^28\) does not exist. To make matters more complex and difficult, the DoD’s GCCs and the DoS’s Bureaus of Regional Affairs do not share like boundaries. The geographic command of Central Command (CENTCOM), for example, is responsible for 20 countries – Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.\(^29\) To effectively coordinate “security cooperation” efforts for each of the 20 CENTCOM countries, the CENTCOM GCC must work with two DoS’s Bureaus. These Bureaus include the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.\(^30\) One could argue that realignment is not necessary as CENTCOM possesses the manning and organic abilities to plan and coordinate with both Bureaus, but without a standardized assessment model, unnecessary frictions will result, which requires additional resources.

For the sake of this project, the assumption is that the Department of State and the Department of Defense have implemented through their collaborative efforts a standardized stability assessment model. A training program must provide all personnel who work with, maintain, or provide input into the model the necessary skills to ensure its functional use. If employed correctly, the assessment model will inform the decision-makers at the Department of State and Department of Defense how best to stabilize a state and subsequently a region. From the perspective of the DoD, “shaping” the strategic environment through the use of security cooperation is less costly in terms of personnel and materiel, and easier than fighting.
The Chairperson of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directs each of the six GCCs through the *Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)* to develop a Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). Within each TCP, the respective GCC describes how their command will Shape (Phase 0), Deter (Phase I), Seize Initiative (Phase II), Dominate (Phase III), Stabilize (Phase IV), and Enable Civil Authority (Phase V), for any operation his command must conduct. The GCCs’ ability to conduct successful day-to-day Phase 0 “shaping” operations will determine the necessity of other follow-on phases. Ideally, the joint, multinational, and interagency “shape” phase activities “are performed in such a manner to dissuade or deter adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies.”

Security cooperation activities are the ways (tools) that the GCCs depend on to affect the stability environment of a country or region. These ways are effective if applied correctly. Today’s cause for concern is the difficulty of applying security cooperation activities in a timely, effective, and efficient manner. The cumbersome and bureaucratic process and the lack of a standardized assessment model make security cooperation activities less effective.

In both the DoD’s 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review* and the DoS’s 2010 *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, each respective secretary captures the crux of the problem as the interagency’s inability to plan strategically and make optimal use of all national instruments of power. Secretary Gates proclaims, “the complexity of 21st century conflicts demands that the U.S. government significantly improve interagency ‘comprehensive assessments,’ analysis, planning, and execution for whole-of-government operations, including systems to monitor and evaluate those operations in order to advance U.S. national interests.” Secretary Clinton identifies
numerous requirements that her department must address to maximize sound policy decisions with the right stakeholders who would include longer-term strategic planning and budgeting. Her concept to “work with the National Security Staff and our interagency partners toward a national security budgeting process that would allow policymakers and lawmakers to see the whole of our national security priorities” is original. This idea serves as a “whole-of-government” forcing function to make the assessment, planning, budgeting, and accountability process more transparent and ideally increase interagency effectiveness and efficiency to execute stabilization and security cooperation activities in a timely manner.

To fully grasp the complexity of the process an understanding of who the actors are is essential to effective participation in the process. NSPD-44 established a National Security Council Policy Coordination Committee (NSC/PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization of which the chairperson for this respective NSC/PCC is the Department of State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The purpose of the NSC/PCC is to provide policy oversight and approval of initiatives as they pertain to reconstruction and stabilization efforts throughout the world.

The S/CRS wasted no time in taking the lead to create an interagency framework for planning and coordinating United States reconstruction and stabilization operations. In March 2007, the NSC approved two of the three elements of the framework: 1) “the Interagency Management System (IMS) for managing high-priority and highly complex crisis and operations, and 2) procedures for initiating government-wide planning, including the IMS and the planning guide.” The third element, “a guide for planning specific reconstruction and stabilization operations was not approved by the NSC as it
required additional coordination within the 16 agency workgroup, to include the DoD, to reach a consensus on how best to plan strategically. Upon review of the planning guide’s principles, it appears to follow a DoD approach.

“The planning guide divides planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations into three levels: policy formulation, strategy development, and implementation planning. As currently envisioned, the guide states that goals and objectives at each level should be achievable; have well-defined measures for determining progress; and have goals, objectives, and planned activities that are clearly linked.”

In February 2010, the Joint Forces Command published the Handbook for Military Participation in the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Within that handbook, the Joint Forces Command describes the IMS as the system “to integrate planning and coordinate operations, ensuring harmonization of U.S. Government planning and operations within the context of a whole-of-government response.” The DoD clearly demonstrates “unified action” at the highest level of our military. So where does friction still exist in the strategic plans process?

In the November 2007 GAO-08-39 report there existed numerous examples where interagency partners and elements within the DoS were struggling with the S/CRS concept and the authorities it possessed. The USAID, Regional Bureaus, and Embassy Chiefs of Mission expressed “concerns about roles and responsibilities that have led to confusion and disputes about who should lead policy development and control resource allocation.” On November 22, 2011, the DoS established a new bureau, the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO). The CSO, subsuming the S/CRS, will “focus its efforts on conflict prevention, crisis response, and stabilization activities” with an assistant secretary instead of a director, thus possessing an equivalent rank status as the Regional Bureaus and other interagency department
leads. With this recent State Department organizational change, one can assume there will be less friction and more unity of effort across the interagency landscape.

The DoD possesses a relatively more effective and efficient chain of command to execute security cooperation activities. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is responsible for a broad range of defense-related issues including the building of the capability for United States partners and allies, security cooperation and foreign military sales, and oversight of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) mission. The assistant secretary or his deputy serves as the Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s representative to the NSC/PCC for Reconstruction and Stabilization. At the NSC/PCC level, the assistant secretary reviews the final coordination for the proposed Security Assistance Program and recommends it for approval. Once approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the deputy provides it to the DoS for the Secretary of State’s approval. The Secretary of State,

“under Executive Order 11958 (reference (e)), is responsible for continuous supervision and general direction of the Security Assistance Program. This includes determining whether (and when) there will be a program or sale for a particular country or activity (to include International Military Education and Training (IMET)) and, if so, its size and scope. It also includes the determination of budget requests and allocation of funds for military assistance.”

Upon the Secretary of State’s approval, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) receives the Security Assistance Program recommendation to determine the feasibility of the “means” required. The National Security Council and the President will review and provide a final approval of the proposed program before sending to Congress for the authorization and appropriation of funding.
The authorities associated with “security cooperation” and “security assistance” are Title 10 and Title 22 U.S. Code, respectively. Congress provides Title 10 funds to the DoD and the DoD employs those funds for the operations and maintenance of the military. Less restrictive than Title 22 funds (provided to the DoS), the DoD can move Title 10 funds “fairly easily among programs if Congress is notified and other restrictions placed on DoD Title 10 security cooperation programs are adhered to,” for example, Congressional mandates prohibit the U.S. military “from training foreign forces, but can conduct information exchanges and exercises that include both U.S. military and foreign forces.” The DoD provides its budgetary requirements to the OMB and the President separate from the Title 22 U.S. Code Security Assistance Program request.

The Title 22 system is less flexible than Title 10 in numerous ways. The first way it is less flexible is Congress authorizes and appropriates these funds on a by-country and program basis. Moving funds from one country or program to another requires congressional notification and permission. As addressed in the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Secretary of State Clinton identified that her department’s single-year focus “makes it very difficult to plan over the long term or change plans once they are authorized and funded.” Multi-year planning and funding creates flexibility and enables the Department of State and the Department of Defense to oversee and synchronize the security cooperation/assistance activities that their respective organizations conduct with foreign militaries.

The DoD, through the DSCA, manages many of the DoS’s Title 22 U.S. Code Security Assistance Programs. The DoD administers the following seven programs for the DoS: “1) Foreign Military Sales; 2) Foreign Military Construction Services; 3) Foreign
Military Sales Credit; 4) Leases; 5) Military Assistance Program; 6) International Military Education and Training (IMET); and 7) Drawdown.⁴⁸ The DSCA is the DoD’s focal point for government-to-government arms transfers, budget, legislative, projections, forecasting, and other Security Assistance matters…⁴⁹ All of these initiatives operate under “the premise that if they are essential to the security and economic well-being of allied Governments and international organizations, they are equally vital to the security and economic well-being of the United States.”⁵⁰ Based on this premise, the DoS and the DoD must partner at the lowest levels to shape sovereign states’ stability effectively through resourceful security cooperation and assistance strategies.

The process at the lowest level starts with each U.S. Embassy’s Office of Security Cooperation (OSC). The DoD mans each OSC with a Security Assistance Officer (SAO) who reports directly to his or her respective GCC. It is the SAO’s responsibility to work with the Embassy’s Country Team and advise the Chief of Mission (Ambassador), who is the President’s representative to a given sovereign state, for the best “ways” to build security capacity and capability of the foreign military via security cooperation and assistance programs.⁵⁰ The GCC’s J-5, Plans Officer will in turn provide guidance to each SAO based on directives received in the most recent GEF, the GCC’s TCP, and potentially a country specific campaign plan. Once the SAO and Chief of Mission come to a consensus, and receive their respective sovereign state leadership’s approval, they provide a Security Assistance Program budget request to the GCC.⁵¹

The Combatant Command reviews and modifies each SAO budget request to ensure that the request addresses all DoD requirements. After the review, the GCC
submits the budget data to the CJCS who confirms all DoD requirements are addressed. The GCC upon return of the CJCS review sends a copy of the budget data to the DSCA. Together, “the DSCA and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy Regional offices review the CJCS submission and make adjustments as necessary to address other factors that influence final budgetary funding recommendations.” After necessary modifications, the DSCA informs the Combatant Commanders and the Joint Staff of the intended budget recommendation package that the Deputy Secretary of Defense will approve for forwarding to the Secretary of State. The entire military assistance budget submission timeline takes almost five months, from mid-December until late April. If the DoD built the Security Assistance Program in collaboration with the DoS, both the Secretary of State’s approval and the delivery of the budget request to Congress occurs in a timely manner.

Interagency cooperation, collaboration, and consensus are prerequisites in achieving a comprehensive and resourceful security cooperation plan, and ultimately global stability. With almost a decade of warfighting and stability operations experience, the DoD and the DoS forged under complex and austere conditions a relationship, which if properly nurtured, enables further progress in stabilizing failed and fragile sovereign states. Closing in on an optimal method, the initiatives of the DoS to develop an interagency strategic planning process while taking a long-term vice short-term (yearly) approach to planning and budgeting security assistance programs will prove beneficial.

The DoD, an organization looking for ways to improve procedures, will provide a Regionally Aligned Brigade (RAB) to the U.S. Africa Command in Fiscal Year 2013 as a
“proof of concept” to give the GCC a security force assistance capability.\(^{54}\) This initiative answers the requests of the GCCs which possess no dedicated force to assist in the development of foreign military partners through approved Title 10 U.S. Code exercises and exchange programs. The RAB concept expedites foreign military development without sacrificing United States national security interests.

The DoD can enhance the security cooperation process by providing direct assistance to the DoS. This direct assistance will assist the DoS refine their strategic planning process. By assigning combat-seasoned, strategic-thinking, campaign design experienced DoD officers to the DoS, both could team aggressively together in the development of a standardized, comprehensive, strategic, stabilization assessment model. Such a model previously mentioned in this project, must be collaborative and ideally approved by the National Security Council to gain legitimacy in the eyes of all participants. Global stability in a resource-constrained world requires the USG to think “outside-the-box” to develop acceptable “ways” using feasible “means” to achieve suitable “ends.” Thoroughly understanding today’s strategic VUCA environment is the first step.

Endnotes


6 Ibid, i-ii.


9 Ibid.

10 Ibid, 3.

11 Ibid, 15.

12 Ibid.


15 Ibid.

16 Clinton, 2.


19 Ibid, 1.

20 Ibid, 2.

21 Ibid.

23 Ibid.


28 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, IV-1.


33 Clinton, 17.

34 Ibid, 18.

35 Bush, 5.


37 Ibid.

38 Ibid, 10.

39 Davenport and Layfield, i.


44 Ibid, 57.


46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.


49 Ibid, 45.

50 Colonel Andrew M. Berrier, former Security Assistance Officer to Azerbaijan, interview with author, Carlisle Barracks, PA, November 30, 2011.


52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Major General Peter C. Bayer, Jr., Director, Strategy, Plans & Policy, Deputy Chief of Army Staff, G-3/5/7, interview with author, Carlisle Barracks, PA, October 18, 2011.