The Guidance for Employment of the Force directs Geographic Combatant Commanders to develop Theater Campaign Plans that integrate steady-state military actions, composed primarily of security cooperation activities, and link them to strategic end states. This requires organizations that plan at the theater level to have staff officers who are as well versed in the theory, doctrine, planning, and practice of security cooperation as they are in warfighting. Professional military education institutions do not provide adequate instruction regarding security cooperation to produce theater campaign planners with the knowledge needed to create Theater Campaign Plans that efficiently and effectively employ security cooperation means to achieve strategic ends. The Department of Defense can correct this deficiency through a combination of direction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, adjustments in doctrine, and a collaborative approach to security cooperation curriculum development and instruction.

Security cooperation, engagement, steady-state, theater campaign plan, TCP, theater campaign planner, professional military education, PME.

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SECURITY COOPERATION AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION:

DEVELOPING BETTER THEATER CAMPAIGN PLANNERS

by

Terry L. Baggett

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps
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SECURITY COOPERATION AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION:
DEVELOPING BETTER THEATER CAMPAIGN PLANNERS

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Terry L. Baggett

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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22 May 2012

Thesis Adviser: Signature: James W. Purvis, Colonel, USA
James W. Purvis, Colonel, USA

Approved by: Signature: Joanne M. Fish, Captain, USN Committee Member
Joanne M. Fish, Captain, USN Committee Member

Signature: Robert M. Antis, PhD Committee Member
Robert M. Antis, PhD Committee Member

Signature: James B. Miller, Colonel, USMC Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting School
James B. Miller, Colonel, USMC Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting School
ABSTRACT

Professional military education institutions do not provide adequate instruction regarding security cooperation to produce theater campaign planners with the knowledge required to design, arrange, and implement the security cooperation activities that form the core of Theater Campaign Plans.

The Guidance for Employment of the Force directs Geographic Combatant Commanders to develop Theater Campaign Plans that integrate steady-state military actions, composed primarily of security cooperation activities, and link them to strategic end states. This construct requires organizations that plan at the theater level to have staff officers who are as well versed in the theory, doctrine, planning, and practice of security cooperation as they are in warfighting. Existing education curricula must incorporate comprehensive security cooperation instruction in order to produce these theater campaign planners.

Security cooperation planning is sufficiently different from the planning of traditional military operations to require specific and comprehensive instruction. Professional military education institutions must overcome three major impediments to improving security cooperation instruction: institutional reluctance, lack of doctrinal guidance, and scarcity of faculty experience. The Department of Defense can surmount these challenges through a combination of direction from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, adjustments in doctrine, and a collaborative approach to security cooperation curriculum development and instruction. Implementing these recommendations will result in professional military education graduates who are equipped to lead effective theater campaign planning efforts.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

During the development of this thesis, I benefitted from the knowledge and patience of many military and civilian Security Cooperation professionals. I would like to express my appreciation to the many Combatant Command planners, Service Security Cooperation professionals, and faculty members at Department of Defense and Department of State education institutions for their willingness to share information and ideas.
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INTRODUCTION

The Department of Defense (DoD) Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) construct requires military organizations and support agencies that plan at the theater level to possess military staff officers who are as well versed in the theory, doctrine, and practice of security cooperation as they are in warfighting. This thesis document will demonstrate that professional military education (PME) institutions do not provide adequate instruction regarding security cooperation to produce theater campaign planners equipped with the knowledge needed to design, arrange, and implement the security cooperation activities that form the core of TCPs.

The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) directs Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) to develop TCPs that integrate steady-state activities and link them to the attainment of strategic end states. Steady-state activities include ongoing operations, security cooperation, military engagement, deterrence, and other shaping or preventive efforts. Security cooperation encompasses all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Security cooperation also includes the preponderance of military engagement, which is defined as routine contact between U.S. armed forces and those of another nation or its civilian authorities: however, security cooperation does not include military

1 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), II-4.

engagements with domestic civilian authorities.\textsuperscript{3} Due to this wide scope, security cooperation constitutes the majority of steady-state activities that GCCs undertake to shape the strategic environment and pursue U.S. national interests.

The TCP construct requires GCCs to integrate a multitude of security cooperation programs, ranging from building partner capacity (BPC) to intelligence and information sharing, across widely varying areas of responsibility (AORs) to realize strategic end states. In order to accomplish this task, GCC staffs must rigorously plan, arrange, coordinate, and manage security cooperation activities. Poorly conceived or implemented security cooperation programs reduce the effectiveness of GCC TCP efforts, wasting military resources and jeopardizing progress toward desired end states.

DoD recognizes the need to improve how it plans and executes security cooperation programs. In 2010, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) created the Security Cooperation Reform Task Force (SCRTF) to conduct a comprehensive review of DoD security cooperation practices. The SCRTF \textit{Phase I Final Report} identifies multiple shortcomings in the development of the security cooperation workforce and in security cooperation planning processes.\textsuperscript{4} Although the SCRTF’s findings and recommendations do not directly address the impact of these deficiencies at the theater level and above, they do indicate a pervasive lack of understanding and knowledge within the joint planning community regarding security cooperation activities.\textsuperscript{5}

Today’s PME system does not adequately address security cooperation considerations in the context of theater strategy and campaign plan development. The

\begin{itemize}
  \item Ibid., 14.
\end{itemize}
result is geographic Combatant Command (CCMD) and Service Component Command (SCC) planning staffs that lack fundamental understanding of security cooperation concepts and programs. This knowledge deficit limits their ability to develop efficient and effective ways to employ military means during steady-state operations in pursuit of theater strategic end states. To rectify this educational shortfall and realize the full potential of the TCP concept, DoD must change how it educates theater campaign planners, defined for the purposes of this paper as the group of personnel who participate significantly in the development of TCPs. The military education establishment must place increased emphasis on instructing security cooperation concepts in order to equip theater campaign planners with the knowledge necessary to design, arrange, and implement security cooperation activities to attain strategic results for the GCC.

This paper will demonstrate that existing military education programs do not impart the knowledge required to plan, synchronize, and oversee the security cooperation activities that form the basis of TCPs, and will make recommendations to rectify this shortcoming. The doctrinal foundations of security cooperation will be established first, then the paper will describe knowledge areas unique to security cooperation planning, and detail the significant divergence between security cooperation planning considerations and doctrinal joint operational planning. Next, it will describe curricula available to current and potential theater campaign planners, and identify gaps in security cooperation academic programs. Finally, the paper will recommend actions to ensure that theater campaign planners possess the requisite knowledge to plan and execute security cooperation for the GCC.
CHAPTER 1: SECURITY COOPERATION IN CONTEXT

Security Cooperation Defined

Security cooperation encompasses all Department of Defense (DoD) interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.¹ By this definition, security cooperation includes nearly all non-combat activities involving U.S. military forces and foreign defense institutions that take place within a Geographic Combatant Commander’s (GCC’s) area of responsibility (AOR). Not only do these activities take a multitude of forms, they also entail a variety of funding mechanisms, executing organizations, and policy guidance.

The U.S. military has been performing these actions on a large scale since World War I, but only recently has the overarching concept of security cooperation figured prominently in national policy documents, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and been acknowledged as an essential element of America’s national security approach.² The defining moment in the rise in prominence of security cooperation was the release of the 2008 Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), which directed GCCs to develop Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) to synchronize all steady-state military activities within the AOR in order to attain theater strategic end states. By placing steady-state activities at the core of the TCP, with major contingency plans considered


branches to be executed in case the theater strategy failed to achieve its objectives, the 
GEF made security cooperation operations a primary focus of theater planning. This 
emphasis on continuous engagement, rather than contingency operations, as the principal 
military means to attain national objectives acknowledges the relative economy of 
conflict prevention and the importance of partner relationships and capacity in an 
increasingly interconnected world.

In order to understand the central place of security cooperation within the TCP 
construct, it is important to grasp the scope of security cooperation activities. Almost 
every military interaction with a foreign defense establishment falls under the definition 
of security cooperation, including programs that many military members are familiar with 
as “mil-to-mil” or “engagement” or “shaping” activities. Table 1.1 describes the ten 
focus areas that the GEF utilizes to categorize security cooperation activities.
These groupings include both programs authorized under Title 10 of the United States Code, which defines the roles of DoD and the Services, and those authorized under Title 22, which specifies Department of State (DoS) authorities and responsibilities.

Although Title 22 includes some DoD authorities for security cooperation programs, the majority of Title 22 programs are the responsibility of DoS. Foreign assistance programs...
that are executed under DoS authority and deal with foreign military and security establishments are referred to as Security Assistance (SA), and received over $8 billion in both the 2010 and 2011 budgets.\(^3\) Several Title 22 programs, although funded and authorized by DoS, are administered by DoD, normally through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). These programs are authorized by the *Foreign Assistance Act* (FAA), the *Arms Export Control Act* (AECA), or other related statutes, and enable the provision of assistance to foreign security establishments in support of national policies and objectives.\(^4\) They are implemented by DoD because the programs generally involve equipment or services that reside in the military establishment.

The DoD categorizes the seven DoS SA programs that it administers as subcomponents of security cooperation. Although these programs are the statutory responsibility of and are funded through DoS, they constitute a large percentage of DoD security cooperation activities and require significant management and oversight on the part of the Joint Staff, GCCs, and the Services. The military planners who develop and institute these programs must possess detailed knowledge of their statutory authorities and requirements and be able to integrate them within theater strategies and campaign plans. Table 1.2 describes the seven SA programs that DoD administers.

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Table 1.2. Security assistance programs administered by DoD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Assistance Programs Administered by DoD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Military Sales (FMS)</strong>&lt;br&gt;A non-appropriated program administered by DSCA through which eligible foreign governments purchase defense articles, services, and training from the USG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Military Education and Training (IMET)</strong>&lt;br&gt;The IMET program provides grant financial assistance for training in the U.S. and, in some cases, in overseas facilities to selected foreign military and civilian personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Military Financing Program (FMF/FMP)</strong>&lt;br&gt;An appropriated program administered by DSCA that consists of congressionally appropriated grants and loans which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase U.S. defense articles, services, and training through either FMS or direct commercial sales (DCS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Drawdowns</strong>&lt;br&gt;Section 506, FAA, authorizes the president to provide USG articles, services, and training to friendly countries and international organizations at no cost, to include free transportation; these non-appropriated authorities are administered by DSCA when defense articles, services, or training are to be drawn down.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leases</strong>&lt;br&gt;An non-appropriated program administered by DSCA allowing the lease of defense articles to friendly governments or international organizations for compelling foreign policy or national security reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Military Construction Services (FMCS)</strong>&lt;br&gt;An non-appropriated program administered by DSCA including the sale of design and construction services by the USG to eligible purchasers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Assistance Program (MAP)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Pre-1990 grant funding, now included as part of FMFP.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**The Security Cooperation Community**

Security cooperation programs are inherently interagency and international in nature, and their effective planning, coordination, and execution entails a multitude of organizations working together. The U.S. security cooperation community reaches from the President, who with the assistance of the National Security Council and Office of Management and Budget determines which security cooperation programs are executed, through the Secretaries of State and Defense to the embassy country teams. Figure 1.1 depicts the principal U.S. participants in security cooperation programs.
In accordance with the FAA and AECA, the Secretary of State is responsible for the supervision and general direction of military assistance, military education and training, and sales and export programs. DoS is a critical partner in nearly every military interaction with foreign nations, and is the lead U.S. agency for many security cooperation initiatives. DoS determines which countries are eligible for programs, which
major equipment sales will be made, and foreign assistance funding levels for grant programs such as Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET). The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is the principal link between DoS and DoD. Within this bureau, the Political-Military Policy and Planning Team coordinates strategic planning between DoS and DoD, and facilitates DoS input into TCPs and other military strategic documents.

The FAA and AECA also specify many of DoD’s responsibilities regarding security cooperation and SA programs. Principal among these are supervision of the training of foreign military and related civilian personnel, movement and delivery of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) items, and performance of any other functions with respect to the furnishing of military assistance, education, training, sales. DoD Directive (DODD) 5132.03, *DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*, establishes DoD policies for accomplishing these functions and assigns responsibilities relating to security cooperation. The principal DoD agencies involved in the planning of security cooperation activities are the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Joint Staff and military departments, geographic Combatant Commands (CCMDs) and Service Component Commands (SCCs), and the embassy Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs).\(^5\)

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense regarding security cooperation matters.

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and is assisted in this function by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Director of the DSCA administers and provides overall policy guidance for the execution of security cooperation programs for which it has responsibility, principally the Title 22 programs administered by DoD. DSCA also identifies requirements, criteria and procedures for the selection and training of personnel engaged in security cooperation activities over which it has responsibility, and represents SecDef and USD(P) interests in security cooperation and SA matters. The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) is a subordinate organization within DSCA that serves as DoD’s primary source for education and research regarding security cooperation. The USD(P) is also assisted by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, but the focus of this office is primarily post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, not theater shaping security cooperation activities.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) reviews GCC TCPs, including security cooperation aspects, oversees the Global Force Management process and the provision of forces for security cooperation efforts, and gives additional advice to the SecDef regarding the provision of security cooperation and SA to foreign nations. The CJCS also creates policies that govern the education of members of the Armed Forces, and thereby influences the topics instructed at professional military education.

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7 Ibid., 5.
8 Ibid.
The Joint Staff provides critical security cooperation program development guidance and facilitates the coordination of security cooperation activities with other government agencies. In the process of reviewing TCPs and their security cooperation activities, the Joint Staff recommends prioritization and resourcing solutions across geographic CCMDs for competing potential security cooperation programs.¹²

Services carry out international armaments cooperation, conduct military education and training, execute sales of defense articles and services, and provide personnel to fill security cooperation staff assignments.¹³ Each Service has internal organizations responsible for working with SCCs to plan and execute security cooperation activities, and to administer large SA programs such as sales of military equipment, provision of logistics services, and coordination of military education and training. Services and SCCs collaborate regarding security cooperation policy guidance and inputs to TCPs, and develop campaign support plans (CSPs) to detail security cooperation commitments and allocate resources in support of TCPs.¹⁴ SCC campaign planners work with geographic CCMD country desk officers and regional program managers, interagency counterparts, and embassy country teams to develop detailed security cooperation plans as part of CSPs.

The GCC is responsible for theater planning and directs security cooperation programs within the AOR. They create theater strategies, and their staffs develop TCPs

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¹¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 1800.01D: Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), Incorporating Change 1, December 15, 2011 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 15 July 2009), 2.


¹⁴ Ibid.
and the subordinate regional and country plans that implement them through steady-state operations. Geographic CCMD J-5 strategy or plans divisions and country or regional desk officers work with SCOs at embassies to identify and prioritize strategically relevant security cooperation requirements and potential activities. They also coordinate with SCC counterparts to assess partner requirements and identify, develop, and resource appropriate security cooperation activities.

Security Cooperation Organization, or SCO, is a doctrinal title that refers to the DoD security cooperation element located in a foreign country, normally at a U.S. embassy. Depending on the location, the SCO might be referred to as the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG), military assistance advisory group, military mission, liaison group, or another similar name. Regardless of the title, the SCO administers security cooperation programs under GCC guidance, simultaneously ensuring that the programs are compatible with the ambassador’s Mission Strategic and Resource Plan (MSRP).15 The SCO reports to the GCC, but maintains close coordination with DSCA, and is a component of the embassy country team. Due to its members’ familiarity with regional security matters and collocation within the embassy, the SCO also administers DoS SA programs officially on behalf of the ambassador, and acts as the primary interface with the host nation on all security cooperation and SA issues.16

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15 Prater, ed., 4-3.
16 Ibid.
Security Cooperation Guidance

There is no shortage of strategic guidance indicating the evolving belief in the importance of security cooperation activities to national security. From the *National Security Strategy (NSS)* to the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*, security cooperation concepts play a prominent role in the ways DoD is being directed to operate and its vision for how the military contributes to national security.

The 2010 NSS repeatedly references security cooperation themes as it sets forth how the nation will pursue its enduring interests. Security cooperation has a significant role in promoting U.S. interests by strengthening at-risk states through development and security sector assistance.17 Security cooperation initiatives are also discussed with regard to critical partners in North America, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. “Comprehensive engagement” is one of three pillars of the NSS strategic approach, with military aspects of this effort including collaborating with foreign counterparts, training and assisting security forces, and pursuing military-to-military ties – all of which are directly related to security cooperation.18 The NSS emphasis on international cooperation and partnership in pursuit of national security and prosperity provides significant direction to DoD regarding the role of military forces in national strategy execution.

The importance of security cooperation efforts is also reflected in *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, DoD’s most recent strategic guidance. Its description of the strategic environment repeatedly references the necessity to build, sustain, and expand security partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle

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18 Ibid., 11.
East, Europe, Africa, and Latin America. It states, “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.”

Security cooperation activities are major components of the missions identified as the highest priorities: “Counter Terror and Irregular Warfare” and “Deter and Defeat Aggression.” Security force assistance (SFA) is a primary element of the counter terrorism operating concept, and military relationships and interoperability with partners supports deterrence and the ability to defeat aggression. Security cooperation programs are also central to counter-proliferation within the “Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction” mission, and are the primary means by which the military will address the tasks described in the missions to “Provide a Stabilizing Presence,” “Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations,” and “Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations.”

The 2010 QDR is remarkable for its incorporation of security cooperation into the vision for shaping DoD. Security cooperation plays a significant role in three of the four priority objectives described in the QDR. Building the capabilities and capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces is central to prevailing in today’s wars. Conflict prevention and deterrence are based upon assisting partners to develop and acquire capabilities to improve security capacity, enhancing U.S. capabilities to assist partner nation security forces, and supporting diplomatic and development efforts through SA

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20 Ibid., 3.

21 Ibid., 4.
and security cooperation programs. Being prepared and postured to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies requires access to facilities and transit routes, and the stabilization of fragile states to prevent their exploitation by violent extremist organizations, both of which can be facilitated by security cooperation efforts prior to conflict. In a significant departure from previous versions, the 2010 QDR adds building the capacity of partner states as one of six key mission areas in which DoD should rebalance policy, doctrine, and capabilities, and states that building partner capacity will continue to be an increasingly important mission.

Security cooperation is also a prominent component of the 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS), with elements of security cooperation highlighted within descriptions of the methods the U.S. military will use to accomplish each of the four National Military Objectives. In the context of countering violent extremism, the NMS states, “We will strengthen and expand our network of partnerships to enable partner capacity to enhance security.” Security cooperation supports the objective of deterring and dissuading aggression by enabling effective operations with partner militaries, ensuring access to facilities and resources that lie within partner nations, and building relationships between military organizations. Security cooperation is clearly central to the objective of strengthening international and regional security, and is discussed extensively in this context, including examples of regional security cooperation efforts around the globe and specific discussion of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). Finally, the NMS describes

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23 Ibid., 26.
the security cooperation function of SFA as a skill that will be increasingly necessary as the nation shapes the future force.

The SecDef translates the strategic priorities established in the NSS, QDR and National Defense Strategy into authoritative direction through the GEF. The GEF provides planning guidance to GCCs, consolidating into a single document guidance previously promulgated through the Contingency Planning Guidance, Security Cooperation Guidance, and various policy memoranda related to Global Force Management (GFM) and Global Defense Posture. It directs the development of strategy-driven TCPs designed to attain specified end states through the coordinated execution of steady-state security cooperation, engagement, and deterrence activities. Priorities for security cooperation and partnership with key countries are set forth explicitly.\(^\text{25}\) The GEF also tasks the military departments and combat support agencies (CSAs) to prepare CSPs that focus on tasks conducted to support the execution of TCPs. The CSPs include programs, resources, and levels of effort for security cooperation activities; posture initiatives; and links to SCC plans.\(^\text{26}\)

The purpose of the synchronized ongoing operations directed by the GEF is to shape the strategic environment to favor U.S. national interests, and facilitate effective contingency operations if required. As a companion document to the GEF, the JSCP provides detailed guidance to Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), Service chiefs, and senior DoD leaders regarding steady-state activities such as security cooperation, as well


as the implementation of TCPs, posture plans, and campaign support plans. Despite the emphasis that the GEF and JSCP place on strategic planning for security cooperation and other steady-state activities, there is little doctrinal guidance describing how to plan, integrate, or execute these continuous and long-term efforts.

There is no Joint Publication (JP) that consolidates security cooperation concepts and provides fundamental principles to guide the U.S. military in the planning and execution of security cooperation activities. Although JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, dated 11 August 2011, addresses the TCP as a product of deliberate planning, there is little discussion of how theater strategic planning for steady-state activities differs from traditional military contingency planning. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, also published in June 2011, discusses in general terms the need to coordinate security cooperation efforts across all U.S. Government agencies through the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense, but does not address in any detail how this planning should be accomplished. Significant references to security cooperation planning come only in the context of planning doctrine that became obsolete with the release two months later of the new JP 5-0. The most comprehensive discussion of security cooperation in joint doctrine is contained in JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Due to the overlap of FID and security cooperation activities, the planning and operations chapters of JP 3-22 present considerations that are pertinent to security cooperation concept development and execution.

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28 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 24, 2011), II-5.
The 2009 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)* introduces the term “cooperative security” as one of the five broad challenges that will require the employment of joint forces in the future. It defines cooperative security as “the comprehensive set of continuous, long-term and integrated actions among a broad spectrum of U.S. and international governmental and nongovernmental partners that maintains or enhances stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and facilitates other operations when crises occur.”29 Having described this purpose for which joint forces may be required, the *CCJO* specifies four categories of military activities the force will employ to meet future challenges: combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction.30 The definition of engagement, activities which seek to improve the capabilities of, or cooperation with, allies and other partners, is congruent with the current doctrinal definition of security cooperation. The *Military Contribution to Cooperative Security (CS) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, published by U.S. Joint Forces Command in 2008, expounds on the concept of cooperative security, describing the steady-state activities a Joint Force Commander (JFC) might implement to promote peace and security in a region and preclude or mitigate crises.31 It proposes a conceptual framework for how the military might employ security cooperation methods in the future as part of the whole of government approach to national security, describes five objectives of sustained engagement, and details the capabilities JFCs will require to execute cooperative security operations. Neither the *CCJO* nor the *CS JOC*, however,

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30 Ibid., 12.

provides authoritative doctrinal direction, nor do they address theater campaign planning processes and the incorporation of security cooperation into these planning efforts.

Other doctrinal references that guide security cooperation activities are generally administrative in nature or focus on the technical aspects of high-dollar SA programs, such as FMS and FMF. DoD Directive (DoDD) 5105.65, *Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)*, describes the responsibilities, functions, authorities, and relationships of DSCA, and specifies that DSCA shall direct, administer, and provide overall DoD policy guidance for the execution of security cooperation. DoDD 5132.03, *Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*, establishes DoD policy relating to the administration of security cooperation activities. DoD 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)*, expands upon the responsibilities and administrative requirements described in DODD 5105.65, focusing principally on the technical and legal aspects of SA. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3141.01, *Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans*, designates TCPs as Top Priority Plans requiring SecDef review and approval, and details the in-progress review (IPR) process. Neither Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures*, nor CJCSM 3122.03C, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats*, reference theater campaign or security cooperation planning. None of the documents described above provides guidance or direction regarding how to design integrated security cooperation activities that implement theater strategy.
Security Cooperation and the Theater Campaign Plan

The GCC develops the theater strategy that articulates the vision for how the command’s resources and activities will achieve strategic objectives. These theater strategies normally emphasize security cooperation activities, force posture, and preparation for contingencies. Security cooperation supports flexible force posture and facilitates preparation for contingencies by ensuring operational access and freedom of action, enabling coalition operations through common doctrine and procedures, sharing information, and building political-military relationships. The TCP has become the vehicle by which these activities are designed, organized, and integrated, but this is a relatively recent doctrinal development.

In 1998, GCCs were first required to produce Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs) containing the CCDR’s Strategic Concept for his AOR and all engagement activities for the next five years. These activities were based upon regional objectives contained in the JSCP, but were largely designed to improve bilateral relationships and not directed specifically toward a theater strategic end state or an integrated global engagement strategy. The TEPs were reviewed by the Joint Staff but approved by the CCDR. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld instituted more meticulous security cooperation planning in 2003 through publication of the Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG),


33 Ibid., II-22.


which detailed U.S. interests by themes and objectives, established partnership priorities, instituted use of the term “security cooperation” in place of “engagement,” and directed GCCs to produce Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCPs).\textsuperscript{36} Still, routine theater shaping operations remained secondary planning activities until the release of the \textit{GEF} in 2008.

Prior to the advent of the TCP construct in 2008, theater strategies and planning were crisis-oriented, centered primarily on the major contingency plans for which the GCC was responsible. Engagement activities were synchronized by the CCDR and linked to strategic objectives, but were viewed as separate from ongoing operations and priority contingency plans. The TCP concept changed this paradigm by directing strategic focus in the planning of the activities executed throughout GCC AORs on a daily basis, including ongoing operations, security cooperation, engagement, deterrence, and other shaping activities.\textsuperscript{37} Although not all steady-state actions are security cooperation programs, there is an security cooperation component to most strategic shaping operations.

GCCs develop security cooperation aspects of TCPs in a highly collaborative manner. Although each GCC developed its own TCP planning process and the final products differ somewhat, TCPs generally consist of the base plan plus annexes, appendices and tabs that include the TSCP, regional and country campaign plans, as well as theater posture plans.\textsuperscript{38} Country cooperation/campaign plans describe partner nation


requirements and the blueprint for projected security cooperation activities. Requirements for these activities may originate from top-down direction via the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), bottom-up requests and recommendations from a partner nation or SCO, or requirements identification processes within the GCC structure. GCC country desk officers work closely with SCOS at embassies to design country plans in alignment with the ambassador’s MSRP and which take into account partner nation security shortfalls, U.S. foreign policy objectives, whole of government efforts, resource limitations, and feasibility of support by SCCs. GCC, SCC, Service and Joint Staff planners and SCOs collaborate to develop the individual security cooperation activities upon which country plans are built.

The TCP construct is based on the premise that properly planned and executed steady-state activities can achieve strategically significant objectives by using military forces to shape the environment to favor U.S. national interests. The challenge this presents to conventional military thought comes from the fact that the theater campaign framework actively seeks to prevent conflict through regional security cooperation, not to defeat adversaries through the application of combat power. Preparation for traditional application of military force through operation plans (OPLANs), often referred to as Phase 0 shaping, is conducted within the TCP framework, enabling branch plan execution if TCP aims are not achieved. The GEF in effect codifies steady-state security cooperation as a primary mission and focus area for GCCs and their military forces. If GCCs are to succeed in these efforts, they and their staffs must be able to plan proactive,

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comprehensive, strategically integrated security cooperation activities with as much rigor as is applied to the OPLANs currently produced for major contingencies. This will require theater campaign planners with significant education regarding the development, arrangement, and execution of security cooperation activities.
CHAPTER 2: THE CASE FOR SECURITY COOPERATION EDUCATION

Security Cooperation Planning – A Brief History

From 1998 until 2003, CJCSM 3113.01, *Theater Engagement Planning*, governed planning for security cooperation, or theater engagement, as such efforts were termed at the time. TEPs resembled today’s TCPs in that they were intended to tie shaping activities to strategic objectives; however, TEPs were more limited in their scope, did not encompass all steady-state activities or link to contingency plans, and were approved by the CCDR instead of the SecDef.\(^1\) Despite shortcomings in the TEP concept, CJCSM 3113.01 did include consolidated direction regarding TEP planning procedures, the review process, and the format and content of the plans themselves.\(^2\)

The 2003 release of the classified SCG, which replaced TEPs with TSCPs, rendered CJCSM 3113.01 obsolete, although the manual was not cancelled until 2006. The TSCP construct more clearly linked security cooperation objectives to U.S. security interests while providing the SecDef increased visibility on and control over security cooperation activities, but the SCG was not as explicit in its description of the security cooperation planning process. Cancellation of CJCSM 3113.01 created a gap in the doctrinal guidance for theater strategic planning based on security cooperation activities.\(^3\)

JP 5-0, dated 26 December 2006, brought renewed visibility to security cooperation by recognizing “Security Cooperation Planning” as a distinct function on par with joint operation planning, and defined it as follows: “The subset of joint strategic


\(^2\) Ibid., vii.

planning conducted to support the Department of Defense’s security cooperation program. This planning supports a combatant commander’s theater strategy.” Under the 2006 model, joint operation planning included the subsets of contingency planning and crisis action planning, but security cooperation planning maintained a separate place in the planning taxonomy, as indicated in figure 2.1. The doctrine did not elaborate on what constituted security cooperation planning, but the identification of this function as a discrete component of joint strategic planning was noteworthy.

Figure 2.1. JP 5-0 (2006) Joint strategic planning hierarchy
Source: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 26, 2006), figure I-1.

The doctrinal resurgence of security cooperation planning was short-lived.

CJCSM 3122.01A, JOPES Volume 1, published in September 2006, made no mention of

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4 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 26, 2006), GL-21.
security cooperation planning, instead providing a framework only for contingency and crisis action planning. The incorporation of the SCG into the GEF in 2008, although concurrent with the inception of the current TCP model, continued the trend away from the formal security cooperation planning function contained in CJCSM 3113.01.

JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, dated 11 August 2011, offers the only doctrinal source of guidance regarding the process for planning security cooperation activities. Unfortunately, this direction is both limited and contradictory. The opening sentence of the document indicates that CCDRs conduct joint operational planning in response to contingencies and crises; the omission of planning for steady-state activities is indicative of the marginal treatment of the subject throughout JP 5-0. According to the publication, “Global campaign plans and theater campaign plans (TCPs) are the centerpiece of the planning construct,” but despite this assertion, the doctrine combines TCP and contingency planning under the broad category of deliberate planning. This facilitates a streamlined joint planning paradigm which reflects only two forms of planning: deliberate (including both campaign and contingency planning) and crisis action planning. JP 5-0 provides the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) as the methodology of choice for all joint planning.

The elimination from JP 5-0 of the discrete security cooperation planning function reflects a lack of understanding of the essential differences between theater security cooperation planning considerations and those of traditional operation plans, and

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7 Ibid., II-3.
paradoxically has resulted in the neglect of security cooperation planning education at the precise time the GEF has increased its importance. As stated by the SCRTF Phase I Final Report, “DoD also lacks a single, overarching planning methodology and attendant mechanism to ensure the alignment of security cooperation resources to strategy.”

**Unique Security Cooperation Planning Considerations**

Security cooperation planning is sufficiently different from the planning of traditional joint operations that it requires specific instruction in intermediate- and senior-level PME curricula. Although Chapter II of JP 5-0 identifies campaign plans, and specifically TCPs, as products of deliberate planning separate and distinct from contingency plans, the remainder of the document largely conflates campaign and contingency planning. This results in the presentation of operational art, operational design, and JOPP primarily through the lens of combat operations. Although one can interpret portions of these concepts to fit the planning of security cooperation activities at the theater level, adapting them properly requires a thorough understanding of a wide variety of security cooperation concepts.

The creative process of operational art is certainly applicable to the formulation of theater strategy and TCPs. Operational art must, however, be supported by skill, knowledge, and experience. Without understanding of how security cooperation activities are planned, developed, coordinated, and executed, both CCDRs and their staffs will be limited in their ability to envision ways to sequence security cooperation actions throughout the AOR to achieve desired end states, and to understand the resources.

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required to do so and any associated risks. DoD PME institutions must provide this knowledge, particularly given the lack of operational-level security cooperation experience of most officers.

Security Cooperation Planning Knowledge Requirements

From the time they enter service, military officers are trained and educated in the employment of armed force to attain warfighting objectives. This knowledge and experience provides the foundation for proficiency in planning campaigns that employ military forces to fight the nation’s battles, but not to promote national interests through carefully arranged security cooperation that shapes a favorable strategic environment. If the U.S. military is to plan, program, budget, and execute security cooperation activities with the same degree of attention and efficiency as other DoD activities, campaign planners require knowledge and skills distinct from, and in addition to, those currently taught at PME institutions in the context of joint operation planning.

Theater campaign planners must understand the cooperative nature of the relationship between the United States and potential partner nations, and be able to translate U.S. defense, development, and diplomatic policy into campaign plan activities. Familiarity with U.S. military doctrine and operations is not sufficient to accomplish this task. They must also consider political-military relationships within host nations or partner organizations, and be able to understand partner perspectives and motivations. Security cooperation planners must understand the whole of government approach with respect to specific nations, regions, and the AOR as a whole, and be aware of ongoing efforts of other U.S. and foreign government agencies. The provision of military equipment, services, or training may be wasted effort if it does not build an advantageous
partnership or is not aligned with other U.S. government (USG) initiatives to promote regional stability and growth.

Theater campaign planners must be able to analyze partner militaries and anticipate future requirements by assessing the capabilities, needs, and shortcomings of organizations and nations within the AOR in order to determine where and how security cooperation tools might have strategic effect. They must be familiar with partner planning and budgeting processes and timelines in order to understand what types of security cooperation programs may satisfy the requirements and needs of the host nation while also complying with U.S. fiscal and legislative cycles. Additionally, they need to be skilled relationship builders and negotiators, capable of cultivating partner willingness to participate in programs that yield mutually beneficial, long-term effects.

Security cooperation activities, in addition to being inherently multinational, require a uniquely close partnership between DoD and DoS. Most military planners are familiar with the traditional military chain of command, in which the CCDR exercises a doctrinal form of command authority over personnel participating in combat operations. Security cooperation activities, however, often fall under the authority, funding, and management of the U.S. ambassador to the host nation, and his staff.\textsuperscript{10} The planning and execution of security cooperation programs, therefore, requires more than simple coordination with DoS and appropriate embassy representatives. Theater campaign planners, working with and through SCOs at the embassies, must have the concurrence and support of DoS and ambassadors in potential partner nations in order to implement effective security cooperation activities. This relationship is further complicated by the

organizational disparities between DoD and DoS.\textsuperscript{11} Although SCOs are well placed to provide country-level operational interface between DoD and DoS, CCMD theater strategists and TCP developers do not have analogous counterparts at the DoS regional bureaus. DoS regional bureaus provide policy guidance, but do not exercise directive authority over embassy operations.\textsuperscript{12}

TCP developers must be familiar with distinctive resourcing challenges that security cooperation activities present. They must understand the multi-year DoD fiscal and force sourcing processes, and be able to plan on a strategic time scale in order to arrange activities that can take between eighteen months and five years to implement. Additionally, they must possess knowledge of the annual routine by which Congress appropriates Title 22 funds and other funds for security cooperation activities. Security cooperation programs executed under Title 22 foreign policy authority are funded, supervised, and directed by DoS, but executed by DoD.\textsuperscript{13} The differences in authorities for Title 10 and Title 22 programs has led to the development of separate DoD and DoS security cooperation/SA organizations, cultures, and budgeting cycles that security cooperation planners are required to navigate.\textsuperscript{14} Yearly Title 22 legislation often includes specifications regarding countries and programs against which funds must be allocated, limiting the GCC’s capability to plan strategically or to direct resources toward priority partners and efforts once funds are authorized.\textsuperscript{15} Campaign planners cannot develop

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{14} Kelley, et al., Security Cooperation Organizations, 6.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
executable TCPs without understanding unique security cooperation resourcing considerations and statutory authorities for the expenditure of different categories of security cooperation funds.

There are many other legislative requirements security cooperation planners must be aware of relating to DoD interactions with foreign entities. These include procurement and export regulations regarding what equipment can be sold or transferred to foreign nations, legislation that governs the transport of military articles, and end use monitoring requirements. Additional legal constraints that TCP planners must consider include “Leahy vetting” to scrutinize potential security cooperation participants to ensure compliance with legislation that prohibits the use of USG resources to train units or personnel suspected of gross violations of human rights, and requirements designed to prevent security cooperation activities with human traffickers and countries that have recently undergone coups.16 This very abbreviated list of regulatory limitations illustrates the challenges this aspect of security cooperation poses to theater campaign planners.

Perhaps the most valuable knowledge that a theater campaign planner can possess is an understanding of the theory and history of the application of security cooperation means to achieve strategic end states. Doctrinal discussions of campaign planning refer primarily to the arranging of large-scale kinetic operations, and PME institutions do not devote significant time to planning for the strategic use of the military in steady-state operations, as will be illustrated in the following chapter. Theater campaign planners need to be aware of prevailing theories regarding the employment of the military element of national power to develop partners and relationships, to ensure access, and to prevent

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conflict and build stability. They should also have a foundation of knowledge about the successes and failures of past programs in order to envision the effects that potential security cooperation activities might create under various conditions.

**Security Cooperation Planning, Operational Design, and JOPP**

Operational art, the cognitive and creative approach by which commanders and staffs fashion strategies, campaigns, and operations, is certainly applicable to the development of TCPs and security cooperation strategies.\(^{17}\) Theater campaign and security cooperation planning, however, diverge from JP 5-0 operational planning in significant ways.\(^{18}\) Operational design and JOPP are intended to solve discrete, if complex, problems, and the elements of operational design are principally applicable to conditions where there is a clear enemy.\(^{19}\) In order to implement something approximating the current constructs of operational design and JOPP, campaign planners must be aware of ways in which security cooperation and TCP planning differ from doctrine, and be prepared to interpret creatively the guidance in JP 5-0.

The scope of GCC AORs seldom yield a single distinct problem appropriate for resolution through military activities; rather, each nation and organization within the AOR presents individual, though sometimes interrelated, complex challenges. The U.S. European Command AOR provides an illustrative example. What is the theater “problem” that the GCC’s operational design efforts must identify and assist in solving? Is Russia the problem? Or Israel, the Balkans, or Turkey? Or maybe NATO? There is

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no monolithic adversary to be conquered or problem to be solved in this AOR or in most others. While the multiple separate plans for dealing with each of the entities in a CCDR’s AOR may individually be suitable for the application of operational design, the host of widely differing challenges and plans cannot be aggregated into a unifying problem and solution, as operational design attempts to accomplish.

The elements of operational design, in particular, do not easily fit the TCP construct of continuous, on-going engagement designed to shape a stable and peaceful environment throughout AORs that may include scores of countries and organizations. Termination and military end state are especially unsuited to TCP development and security cooperation planning at the theater level because the GCC mission to protect U.S. national security is continuous and enduring. The GEF provides strategic end states to guide planning, but GCC steady-state operations will never “terminate,” at best transitioning to maintaining favorable strategic conditions. Similarly, the GCC will never create theater-wide conditions that achieve all military objectives, the definition of military end state. These terms and concepts are relevant in the design of country cooperation plans or regional campaign plans and their specific security cooperation activities, but not in theater-wide campaign and security cooperation planning.

Centers of gravity (COG) and other adversary-focused operational design elements, including decisive points, culmination, and forces and functions, require creative interpretation of JP 5-0 definitions to apply to country-level security cooperation planning, and cannot reasonably be stretched to apply to broader TCP development. The concept of an adversary COG, or the source of power that provides moral or physical

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20 Ibid., III-19.
strength, freedom of action, or will to act, has little or no meaning in a theater where there is no single enemy or organized opposition to U.S. interests. The idea of decisive points determined by analysis of COG critical factors is, by extension, also flawed in the context of theater steady-state operations. The lack of a theater enemy also precludes planning to bring such an enemy to culmination. Additionally, JP 5-0 describes the design element of forces and functions strictly in the context of defeating an adversary. Each of these concepts may find application at the program, country or regional planning level, but only if there is an identifiable enemy, or if the term “adversary” is liberally interpreted to encompass such intangible enemies as instability, corruption, or lack of military professionalism. Other elements of design, such as lines of effort and direct/indirect approach, require similar flexibility to serve usefully in TCP development.

Current doctrine is even more lacking in its description of the methodology by which campaign planners translate theater strategy into a TCP. The doctrinal process that JP 5-0 provides for making the leap from the CCDR’s operational approach to an executable plan is JOPP, a logical set of steps to analyze a mission, select the best course of action, and produce a joint operation plan or order. This process is poorly suited for the development of TCP security cooperation activities because the purpose of the GCC’s plan is not to solve a problem, but rather to shape the entirety of the theater’s widely varying strategic environment on a continuous basis. The steps of JOPP that direct the development, wargaming, and comparison of multiple courses of action are impractical in the context of theater spanning steady-state plans, and do not reflect the process by which geographic CCMDs, SCCs, SCOs and other joint planning and execution community

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21 Ibid., III-22.
22 Ibid., IV-1.
entities create TCPs. Finally, the TCP document itself resembles a standard JOPP product in its base plan administrative format only, with the annexes, appendices, and tabs varying widely between CCMDs.

The deficiencies of operational design and JOPP with respect to security cooperation and TCP planning as described above are not implicit recommendations for modifications to JP 5-0 doctrinal definitions or terminology. Rather, they are indicators that the current deliberate planning paradigm does not fit TCP and theater security cooperation planning, and that, in order to operate within existing doctrinal guidelines, theater campaign planners require specific security cooperation planning education.

**The State of Security Cooperation Education**

The security cooperation planning that is at the center of TCP development requires knowledge and understanding that are not associated with typical deliberate planning, and insight to properly interpret areas of commonality. It also demands understanding of planning processes that are separate and distinct from the current doctrinal joint operation planning methodologies. Despite these facts, there is very little guidance regarding security cooperation education, particularly for PME programs. DoD Instruction (DODI) 5132.13, *Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) and the Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel*, provides specific direction for the education of personnel assigned to SCOs in foreign countries, but only suggests that other personnel involved in security cooperation activities be considered for training at DISAM or via online DISAM courses. This leaves a gap in guidance regarding the

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education of theater campaign planners, who require both strategic and operational planning expertise, as well as familiarity with security cooperation concepts that DISAM teaches to SCO personnel. Noting this inadequacy, the SCRTF reported, “DoD lacks a comprehensive development program for the security cooperation workforce. As a result, personnel selected to fill security cooperation positions … lack the experience, skills, and training necessary to carry out their responsibilities most effectively,” and identified the need for improved education of the security cooperation workforce.\(^\text{24}\)

Although published in 2009 and updated in 2011, well after the implementation of the current TCP construct, CJCSI 1800.01D, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), explicitly mentions security cooperation only twice. Security cooperation planning is included as a topic within the Theater Strategy and Campaigning learning areas for the Joint Forces Staff College’s Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) and Advanced Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME) course for reserve component officers.\(^\text{25}\) There is no reference to security cooperation in the requirements for precommissioning and primary Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), which introduce the concepts of joint warfare and campaigning. Similarly, there is no mention in Service intermediate-level college (ILC) requirements and objectives, even though specified learning areas include the roles and functions of CCDRs, strategic guidance documents, and joint planning. The JPME Phase I and Phase II requirements for Service senior-level colleges (SLC) also contain no explicit reference to security


cooperation, despite their emphasis on national strategy, theater strategy, and campaigning.

ILC and SLC institutions must teach a wide array of topics in comparatively little time, and OPMEP dictates syllabus focus areas. Perhaps in recognition of the conspicuous absence of security cooperation from OPMEP, in both 2010 and 2011 the CJCS included two security cooperation activities in the nine JPME Special Areas of Emphasis (SAE): Building Partner Capacity (BPC) and SFA. This additional guidance has raised interest in teaching security cooperation concepts at PME institutions, but the methods and the degrees to which security cooperation topics are instructed vary significantly, as shown in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3: SECURITY COOPERATION EDUCATION PROGRAMS

As evidenced by the introduction of the TCP construct, the findings of the SCRTF, and the inclusion of security cooperation concepts in the CJCS SAEs, there is a need for security cooperation courses at military education institutions. There are currently several DoD initiatives and institutions that provide security cooperation education. Each Service also has an organization responsible for overseeing its security cooperation efforts, including security cooperation education programs in some cases. Additionally, DoS provides training to selected embassy personnel and those involved in SA programs. The various security cooperation and SA curricula available are summarized in the pages that follow.

Department of Defense Programs

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, is subordinate to DSCA and is the DoD organization with primary responsibility for providing security cooperation education to military personnel. As implied by the organization’s name, DISAM courses and products focus heavily on the technical management of security assistance programs such as FMS and FMF. DISAM does, however, provide the only mandatory security cooperation educational program in DoD. SCO and Defense Attaché Office (DAO) personnel
assigned security cooperation program management functions are required to attend the Security Cooperation Manager Overseas (SCM-O) course.¹

DISAM’s three-week SCM-O course is the most comprehensive instruction available in DoD regarding the operational aspects of security cooperation. The course provides functional information about security cooperation and SA program management policies and procedures, and is intended for personnel assigned to SCOs and DAOs, as well as for geographic CCMD and SCC personnel involved in security cooperation efforts.² The curriculum includes separate periods of instruction detailing characteristics of all major categories of security cooperation programs, plus discussions about the major agencies and organizations involved, and multiple practical exercises to reinforce learning. The SCM-O course has recently incorporated new emphasis on security cooperation planning at the country level; however, it does not specifically address theater level security cooperation planning.³

DISAM offers several other courses targeting specific audiences in the security cooperation field; although none provides detailed instruction regarding the planning of security cooperation activities, the comparatively streamlined agendas offer models and content that might be useful in the construction of alternative courses. The Security Assistance Management Continental U.S. (SAM-C) Course, a five-day syllabus with a prerequisite online course, is tailored for mid-level SA program managers, and focuses on


³ Ibid.
the technical, legal, and administrative aspects of program management. The Executive and Defense Industry Course (SAM-E) is another five-day course, but is designed for senior government and industry personnel involved in international sales. The objective of this course is to increase understanding of policies and procedures for the transfer of defense articles and Services. Two online courses, the 90-minute Security Cooperation Familiarization Course and 40-hour Security Cooperation Management Online Orientation Course (SCM-OC), present basic information for personnel new to the security cooperation field, with the latter providing more detailed instruction.

Notably, DISAM is in the process of developing a one-week course that will be taught by mobile training teams in support of GCC security cooperation education requirements. The Security Cooperation Management Action Officer Course (SCM-AO) will provide instruction for personnel in billets with security cooperation responsibilities at geographic CCMDs and SCCs. The course content will consist of selections from the three-week DISAM SCM-O program, tailored to the application of security cooperation at the theater level.

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National Defense University

National Defense University’s joint colleges include the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National War College, and the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). JFSC provides the only noteworthy security cooperation instruction within the National Defense University system. The Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) one-year curriculum addresses security cooperation in the context of TCP operational design during the OP6500 Operational Art and Campaign Planning course and during the ST6300 Strategic Foundations course. The week-long Theater Campaign Planning module commences with a two-and-a-half-hour seminar discussion of TCP development entitled “Introduction to Theater Campaign Planning,” during which the importance of steady-state planning is examined.8 This is followed by three days of instruction and practical exercise when students work in groups to develop and brief theater assessments and operational approaches linking security cooperation and other steady-state activities to theater objectives. The Strategic Vulnerabilities Exercise is a four-day practical exercise during which students analyze a TCP and assess it in terms of the strategic environment to evaluate the plan’s effectiveness.9 Although JAWS devotes significant time to discussing TCPs in general terms, the syllabus lacks foundational instruction regarding the characteristics of the security cooperation tools available to a CCDR, and how to plan and employ them to achieve theater strategic end states. JFSC also is home to the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS), a 10-week JPME II syllabus. This course of instruction includes a two-hour lesson entitled “Building Partner

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8 Steven Guiliani, “OP6513: Introduction to Theater Campaign Planning,” Joint Forces Staff College Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Norfolk, VA, November 2011 (student guidance).

9 John Torres, “ST6309A-D: Strategic Vulnerabilities Exercise,” Joint Forces Staff College Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Norfolk, VA, undated (lesson plan).
Capacity/Security Force Assistance” that is significant for the fact that it examines in detail the fundamental strategic and programmatic underpinnings of these types of security cooperation programs, and their relationship to the TCP.\(^{10}\)

**United States Marine Corps**

**Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group**

The Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group (MCSCG) is the U.S. Marine Corps’ (USMC’s) repository of security cooperation expertise. It coordinates USMC security cooperation programs, planning, and education, and facilitates Marine Corps SCC support to GCC security cooperation activities and missions.\(^{11}\) MCSCG is the only military command other than DISAM with a primary mission of providing security cooperation education to U.S. military personnel.

MCSCG conducts several five-day Security Cooperation Planners’ Courses each year. DISAM has approved the course content, but the syllabus has a different focus than those DISAM currently provides. Rather than concentrating on the management of SA programs, the USMC course teaches the fundamentals of military security cooperation programs, then examines in detail the development, planning, and tactical execution of security cooperation activities.\(^{12}\) Practical products provided by the course include the MCSCG’s Security Cooperation Office Desktop Guide and Security Cooperation

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Handbook. The primary target audience is personnel who conduct security cooperation planning and execution at the Marine Corps SCC level or within Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters, but the course content is appropriate for GCC country and regional desk officers, although it has a country-centric perspective rather than a theater-wide one.

**USMC Intermediate- and Senior-Level Colleges Security Cooperation Curricula**

In the course of its year-long syllabus, the Marine Corps University’s Marine Corps Command and Staff College (MCCSC) conducts a two-hour small group discussion designed to impart understanding of the interagency aspects of security cooperation activities. The material covered in this seminar is similar to that of the JCWS BPC/SFA lesson. MCCSC also offers a 10-lesson, 20-hour elective entitled “Strategy of Engagement through Security Cooperation,” which is facilitated by MCSCG instructors. This course describes in detail security cooperation history, policies, doctrine, programs, resourcing considerations, planning constructs, and assessments, with the objective of providing functional knowledge to enable security cooperation planning and coordination at the theater level. It is also noteworthy for its significant examination of security cooperation history through case studies, and of security cooperation strategy, albeit from a Service perspective.

Neither the School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) nor the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) addresses security cooperation in significant detail in any single period of instruction. Theater campaign planning is addressed during the MCWAR National Security and Joint Warfare course, during a two-hour “Operational Art

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(Operational Design)” seminar, but security cooperation is described only in general terms. Security cooperation concepts are revisited during the capstone planning exercise at the end of the MCWAR academic year, when the students fill the roles of CCMD staff members managing a TCP, but the security cooperation planning process is not the major focus of the exercise.

United States Army

Until late 2011, the only formal security cooperation training the Army provided was for personnel deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan to become advisors for SFA activities. Recognizing a gap in education, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) implemented its first Security Cooperation Planner’s Course in December 2011. The purpose of the course is to instruct security cooperation action officers at the Army SCC/Theater Army level and their supporting agencies to plan and manage international engagements in support of GCC TCPs. Its content is similar to that of the MCSCG’s Security Cooperation Planners’ Course, and is also approved by DISAM. As indicated below, Army ILC and SLC institutions are in the process of incorporating significant security cooperation instruction into elective courses.

Army Security Assistance Command

The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) is a component of the Army Materiel Command (AMC). As its name indicates, USASAC primarily deals with

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SA programs, and does not play a role in the education of Army personnel regarding security cooperation. USASAC implements and oversees Army SA programs, with principal focus on the management of FMS cases.18

**Army Intermediate- and Senior-Level Colleges Security Cooperation Curricula**

The Army Command and General Staff College (ACGSC) includes both the Army Command and General Staff School (CGSS) intermediate-level education program and the follow-on School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). The SAMS curriculum does not specifically address security cooperation. CGSS briefly examines security cooperation as part of a four-hour lesson in the core course curriculum. The lesson discusses a wide range of DoD organizations and processes, and introduces security cooperation as a method of shaping the strategic environment.19 It describes the characteristics of security cooperation, including the differences between Title 10 and Title 22 authorities, the relationship between security cooperation and SA, relevant DoD and DoS agencies, and some challenges of the security cooperation environment.

CGSS also offers two elective courses that investigate security cooperation in depth. The first, “A520: Security Cooperation” is taught at a classified level, and incorporates examination of security cooperation guidance, key participants, legislative and legal constraints, and major programs.20 This course consists of 12 two-hour lessons and resembles the MCCSC elective, but includes writing and presentation projects.

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requiring students to interface with geographic CCMD country desk officers to research security cooperation programs, partners nations, or regions. It is unique in the level of research required of the students and the interface with geographic CCMD staff members. The other elective course is an unclassified version of the first, and covers much of the same material, but in a manner tailored to foreign students and those without security clearances.\textsuperscript{21}

One of the objectives of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) curriculum is to produce graduates who can develop theater strategies, estimates, and campaign plans to employ military power in a unified, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment.\textsuperscript{22} The USAWC Theater Strategy and Campaigning module includes three hours of seminar instruction and discussion regarding how a CCDR translates national strategic direction into a TCP.\textsuperscript{23} Approximately one third of the lecture specifically addresses the significance of security cooperation within the TCP, and the complexity of the DoD-DoS relationship in conducting security cooperation activities.\textsuperscript{24}

USAWC is preparing to offer a 10-lesson, 30-hour elective entitled “Fundamentals of Building Partner Capacity.” This course will examine the planning and implementation of security cooperation related activities that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law,

\textsuperscript{21} Daniel Gilewitch, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, e-mail message to author, December 12, 2011.


\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.

and critical government functions.\textsuperscript{25} Its content is similar to the MCCSC elective, “Strategy of Engagement through Security Cooperation.” Additionally, USAWC offers through its Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute several other electives that address topics related to security cooperation.\textsuperscript{26}

USAWC also offers a 14-week curriculum, the Basic Strategic Art Program (BSAP), designed to educate personnel designated Functional Area 59 strategists in the fundamentals of national strategy.\textsuperscript{27} The program has a three-hour “Theater Strategic Direction” seminar dedicated to discussion of TCP development, from the translation of national strategic direction into theater strategy, to the development of security cooperation activities to attain TCP objectives.\textsuperscript{28} The structure and content of this lesson is similar to that of the JAWS “Introduction to Theater Campaign Planning” seminar, and suffers from the same lack of time available to discuss the characteristics of different security cooperation programs and planning requirements for their effective implementation.

**United States Air Force**

Despite heavy involvement in security cooperation and SA programs around the world, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) does not have any Service-specific resident courses dedicated to security cooperation education, and relies primarily on DISAM to provide

\textsuperscript{25} Michael Marra, “Fundamentals of Building Partner Capacity,” U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, October 2011 (elective course action form).


in-depth education for its security cooperation workforce. The Air Education and Training Command (AETC) has, however, developed an on-line Irregular Warfare / Building Partner Capacity course hosted on its Advanced Distributed Learning System designed to educate USAF SCC planners regarding irregular warfare (IW) and BPC programs. Although it does not provide as much detailed information as the USMC or Army security cooperation planners’ courses described previously, several lessons within the syllabus address themes common to many security cooperation programs. The “Planning Considerations” lesson, in particular, provides a brief but informative overview of SCC planner responsibilities, processes, tools, and legal, funding and coordination issues.29

**USAF Security Assistance Center, Security Assistance Training Squadron**

The USAF manages thousands of FMS and IMET cases through the Air Force Security Assistance Center (AFSAC) and Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron (AFSAT), but provides no formal security cooperation education to its workforce. AFSAC, located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB) in Ohio, oversees USAF security cooperation/SA programs. Its focus is the management of systems sales and support to foreign militaries.30 AFSAT, based at Randolph AFB in Texas, has the mission “to build and strengthen enduring international partnerships by building partner

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capacity.” Its primary function is to manage U.S. training and education of foreign military air and space force personnel. In addition, AFSAT Country Management Division personnel develop international training programs in support of and in coordination with GCC security cooperation efforts.\textsuperscript{32}

\textit{USAF Intermediate- and Senior-Level Colleges Security Cooperation Curricula}

The Air University, located at Maxwell AFB in Montgomery, Alabama, is home to the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), and Air War College (AWC), each of which approaches the subject of security cooperation education in a different manner. ACSC, the Air Force's intermediate-level PME school, includes a two-hour lesson entitled “Big Air, Little Air, or Something Else,” that focuses on the Foreign Internal Defense (FID) subset of security cooperation, utilizing case studies of USAF FID efforts in Vietnam and Latin America.\textsuperscript{33} Although the class concentrates on the challenges of employing airpower in irregular warfare through FID and does not address program development, management, or the role of security cooperation within a TCP, the historical observations are applicable to modern steady-state operations. The ACSC curriculum specifically addresses security cooperation during a three-hour lesson in the “Stability Operations” elective, describing basic characteristics of building partner capacity, FMS, and other major security


\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{33} William Dean, “Big Air, Little Air, or Something Else,” U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College, Montgomery, AL, December 20, 2011 (lesson plan).
cooperation programs.\textsuperscript{34} SAASS, a follow-on school to intermediate-level PME comparable to the USMC SAW and Army SAMS, raises the topic of security cooperation in several lectures and seminars, but there are no formal periods of instruction that address security cooperation concepts in detail.\textsuperscript{35}

The AWC senior-level college syllabus includes approximately four hours of lecture and seminar discussion on the subject of “Security Force Assistance (SFA), Building Partnership Capacity (BPC), and Stability Operations.”\textsuperscript{36} This lesson differs from JAWS and USAWC core curriculum classes in that the instruction, discussion and readings focus on specific security cooperation programs, rather than on TCP development in general, and address through case studies how specific security cooperation activities have been implemented in the past to achieve strategic objectives. There is also a two day, eight hour TCP practical exercise, with one of the objectives being to identify security cooperation tools to facilitate the achievement of theater objectives, similar to the TCP module taught at JAWS.\textsuperscript{37} In addition, AWC students participate in a Regional and Cultural Studies (RCS) course. This is a 16-lesson, 32-hour module during which students study national security interests and efforts regarding a specific geographic region, and includes a 14-day field study trip that enables students to discuss security policy issues with senior political, military, cultural, and academic

\textsuperscript{34} Allan Rich, U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College, e-mail message to author, January 24, 2012.

\textsuperscript{35} Michael Kometer, U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, e-mail message to author, December 6, 2011.


leaders in the area of interest. This course includes one two-hour lesson focused on the TCP-driven security cooperation efforts specific to the region, and provides additional exposure to security cooperation concepts and activities both in the academic discussions and through interactions during the field study trip with personnel directly involved in security cooperation program planning and execution. AWC’s combination of classes and exercises relating to security cooperation, and the regionally oriented RCS course and associated field study combine to provide the most comprehensive security cooperation exposure and instruction available at senior-level colleges.

United States Navy

Similar to the USAF, the U.S. Navy (USN) relies on DISAM to train personnel assigned to billets requiring technical knowledge of SA program management.

Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity

The Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity (NETSAFA) is the organization responsible for USN international training programs. NETSAFA provides support to foreign governments and organizations, enabling the education of naval personnel; it does not provide security cooperation education to U.S. military personnel.  


USN Intermediate- and Senior-Level Colleges Security Cooperation Curricula

The Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, is home to the College of Naval Command and Staff (CNCS), the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School (MAWS), and the College of Naval Warfare (CNW). An objective of the Naval War College PME programs is to produce officers skilled in joint warfighting, theater strategy and campaign planning.40

The intermediate-level CNCS and senior-level CNW have parallel syllabi, instructed by common faculty, with courses tailored to the level of seniority of the students. Both programs provide instruction in three core subject areas: National Security Decision Making, Strategy and Policy, and Joint Military Operations.41 The Joint Military Operations course for both colleges includes a one-hour lesson entitled “Security Cooperation” that describes the relationship between security cooperation activities and the TCP.42 The subsequent JOPP lesson includes a three-hour classified seminar during which students examine a TCP, and is followed by a multi-day planning problem that culminates in a three-hour practical exercise during which students design and brief an security cooperation concept in support of campaign plan objectives.43

MAWS is a 13-month advanced intermediate-level course analogous to SAMS/SAASS/SAW. Its objective is to produce officers prepared for assignment to

planner billets on numbered fleet, Navy SCC, and CCMD staffs. The MAWS curriculum is focused primarily on operational art and planning from the Naval perspective, with heavy emphasis on Joint Force Maritime Component contingency and crisis planning. The syllabus briefly mentions security cooperation during the “Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX)” lesson, noting its place as a component of the CCDR’s TCP, but the period of instruction is not designed to explore the subject in detail.

**United States Coast Guard**

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) does not have intermediate- or senior-level schools, but sends officers to those of the other Services. The Coast Guard Director of International Affairs and Foreign Policy, Security Cooperation Division, is responsible for USCG security cooperation efforts, with primary focus on training programs for foreign personnel. USCG officers requiring specific security cooperation education attend DISAM courses or the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Planners’ Course.

**Department of State Programs**

DoS executes a multitude of development and SA programs, and provides funding and authorities under which DoD executes many security cooperation activities. DoS representatives from the embassy country team to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs are involved in the development of GCC country, regional and theater campaign plans.

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46 Stephanie Ataman, Chief, Maritime Capability Development Training and Technical Assistance, Office of the Coast Guard Director of International Affairs & Foreign Policy, e-mail message to author, November 22, 2011.
There is no formal or mandatory SA course of instruction for these personnel; however, the DoS Foreign Service Institute (FSI) does offer a five-day course, “PP505: Political-Military Affairs,” designed to prepare DoS officers to work with DoD counterparts.\(^47\) The course currently includes a one-hour period of instruction describing SA, but is designed primarily to expose students to DoS-DoD interactions at a very basic level. There is no instruction on SA/security cooperation programmatic planning or strategy.

### Security Cooperation Education Program Summary

As illustrated above, PME schools are not teaching security cooperation in a consistent manner and are not devoting significant core curriculum time to the subject. With the exception of the USAF AWC, no senior-level college currently has more than a one-hour period of instruction dedicated to security cooperation, and most address the subject only conceptually, as a component of the TCP. The Air War College’s combination of security cooperation classroom instruction, TCP exercise, and Regional Cultural Studies offers the most comprehensive investigation of the strategic application of security cooperation in any senior level college curriculum. The Army War College security cooperation elective currently under development holds potential to mitigate the college’s security cooperation education shortcomings for that portion of the student population that chooses to take the course. Intermediate-level schools are similarly short on security cooperation instruction in the core curricula, with the USMC CSC and Army CGSS security cooperation elective courses providing thorough operational-level security cooperation instruction, but only to a limited number of students. The instruction that

does exist tends to address security cooperation in generalities, or focus on specific types of security cooperation, usually in the context of ongoing post-conflict stability operations.

The best security cooperation instruction available to campaign planners is the DISAM SCM-O course. Drawbacks of this course are its three-week length and the level of detail in which it addresses technical aspects of program management, which may be excessive for theater strategic planners. Introduction of the weeklong DISAM SCM-AO course, to be taught on-site at CCMDs, will provide better focused instruction for personnel already assigned to geographic CCMD and SCC billets that routinely operate in the security cooperation environment. The one-week programs offered by the USMC MCSCG and the Department of the Army Headquarters are additional alternatives to extended DISAM instruction, providing thorough education regarding the planning of security cooperation at the operational level. None of these courses, however, addresses the strategic arrangement of security cooperation activities in support of a theater-wide coordinated plan to achieve GEF-directed end states.

The greatest deficit in the programs described above is the lack of instruction regarding the strategic employment of security cooperation – how best to apply security cooperation ways to achieve strategic ends. The various intermediate- and senior-level college curricula devote the majority of their instructional time to the theory and history of warfare, the application of warfighting processes, joint functions and capabilities in conflict, and how to put together the pieces of an OPLAN or CONPLAN. Strategy courses delve into national security strategy, economic and foreign relations theory, the joint strategic planning system, and the GCC requirement to develop a TCP, but do not
examine how the security cooperation components of the TCP are designed and integrated, or theoretical concepts regarding how to employ security cooperation effectively to shape the strategic environment. If theater strategy is truly implemented primarily through the TCP and its steady-state security cooperation activities, with contingency plans as branches to be avoided, then PME instruction should produce strategic thinkers who are as adept at theater security cooperation planning as they are at OPLAN development.

There are three major impediments to improving security cooperation instruction at PME institutions. First is the reluctance of the military and its educational institutions to accept security cooperation as a core military activity that must be taught and mastered on par with the strategy and concepts associated with employing the military in combat. Second is the lack of doctrinal guidance upon which to base security cooperation curricula. Without authoritative and applicable security cooperation planning direction, faculty cannot know what to instruct. Finally, because of the recent arrival of security cooperation as a central component of theater planning, there is only a small pool of personnel well versed in its strategic application, from planning through execution and assessment. Due to this scarcity of expertise, PME institutions are challenged in their ability to develop and credibly instruct security cooperation curricula.
CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS

PME institutions must adapt their curricula to reflect the policy change that has resulted in the centrality of the TCP in military strategy and the associated prominence of security cooperation activities in theater planning. If this does not happen, they will continue to produce joint staff officers who are unfamiliar with one of the CCDR’s most critical and frequently employed tools for shaping the strategic environment.

Unfortunately, PME schools often reflect the attitudes of the military at large, in this case sharing a strong bias toward traditional warfighting subjects, and lack of familiarity with the planning and employment of security cooperation. Action must be taken to overcome institutional resistance to acceptance of the TCP as the “centerpiece of DoD’s planning construct,” to provide guidance regarding what aspects of security cooperation to instruct, and to facilitate the development of curricula that adequately address security cooperation as a foundational military activity.¹

Although the military as a whole cannot change quickly, revision of CJCSI 1800.01D, OPMEP, can direct modification of joint PME academic curricula almost immediately. In keeping with the OPMEP-specified JAWS and JCWS emphasis on operational, strategic, and campaign planning, the CJCS should change Annex A to Appendix A to Enclosure A of OPMEP to identify theater campaign planning as a focus of education for JFSC. Further, the instruction should identify JFSC as the lead institution for the development of JPME security cooperation courseware, the continued academic investigation of security cooperation concepts, and their application within the

¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), xvii.
TCP construct. Existing *OPMEP* learning areas for service and joint intermediate- and senior-level PME institutions should incorporate the following changes to increase curriculum emphasis on security cooperation. Deletions from existing *OPMEP* verbiage are indicated by strikethrough notation and additions by underline notation.

- **Change Service ILC Joint Learning Area 3, Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War**, as follows to specifically include security cooperation:

  e. Comprehend the relationships between all elements of national power and the importance of the whole of government response, multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of homeland security and defense.

- **Change Service ILC Joint Learning Area 4, Joint Planning and Execution Process**, as follows to specifically include security cooperation:

  d. Comprehend how security cooperation, IO and cyberspace operations are integrated at the operational level.

  g. Comprehend the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans, to include security cooperation, weapons of mass destruction/effects (WMD/E); IO; cyberspace operations; Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR); intelligence; logistics; and strategic communication.

- **Change Service SLC JPME Phase II Learning Area 3, Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy, and Campaigning in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environment**, as follows to specifically include security cooperation:

  d. Analyze the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans, to include security cooperation, WMD/E, IO, cyberspace operations, SSTR, joint intelligence, joint logistics, and strategic communication.
• Change National War College Learning Area 3, The Military Instrument in War and Statecraft, as follows to emphasize steady-state use of the military and specifically include security cooperation considerations:

c. Analyze the capabilities and limitations of the use, or the potential use, of the military in environments of peace including steady-state, crisis, war and post-conflict, including the challenges of multinational operations.

d. Examine key classical, contemporary, and emerging concepts (to include IO, cyberspace operations, security cooperation, traditional and irregular warfare), doctrine, and approaches to war, in all its aspects.

• Change Industrial College of the Armed Forces Learning Area 4, Joint Warfare, Theater Strategy and Campaigning in a Joint, Interagency, International, and Multilateral Environment, as follows to emphasize steady-state use of the military and specifically include security cooperation considerations:

a. Evaluate the principles of joint warfare (to include traditional and irregular warfare), joint military (Capstone and Keystone) doctrine, command and control, and emerging concepts in peace in steady-state, crisis, war, and post-conflict operations.

b. Evaluate how campaigns and operations support national objectives and relate to at the national strategic, theater strategic, and operational levels of war, with emphasis on the resource component during peace steady-state operations and war.

d. Evaluate how security cooperation, information and cyberspace operations are integrated into national security, national military, and theater campaign strategies and applied to support strategic and operational endeavors in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.

• Change JAWS Learning Area 1, National Security Strategy, Systems, Processes, and Capabilities, as follows to emphasize steady-state strategy:

a. Analyze the strategic art to include developing, applying and coordinating diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) elements of national power during steady-state, crisis, war, and post-conflict operations.
• Change JAWS Learning Area 2, Defense Strategy, Military Strategy, and the Joint Operations Concepts, as follows to specifically include security cooperation:

c. Evaluate the organization, responsibilities, and capabilities of the Military Services (and related organizations) and the processes by which operational forces and capabilities are integrated by combatant commanders during steady-state, crisis, war, and post-conflict operations.

• Change JAWS Learning Area 3, Theater Strategy and Campaigning with Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Assets, as follows to emphasize steady-state campaign planning:

a. Analyze joint operational art, emerging joint operational concepts, and how the military instrument of national power is employed during steady-state, crisis, war, and post-conflict operations full spectrum dominance is attained to achieve desired end-states at the least cost in lives and national treasure.

To bridge the gap until OPMEP is adjusted, the 2012 CJCS JPME Special Areas of Emphasis (SAE) memo should consolidate the 2011 SFA and BPC topics within a single security cooperation area of interest. The new SAE topic description should include direction that JPME curricula provide students with understanding of the following concepts.

• Indirect approaches and the non-combat use of military power across the range of military operations – the theoretical underpinnings of security cooperation, its historical application, and the current joint operating concept describing the military contribution to cooperative security.
• Existing security cooperation mechanisms – the taxonomy and relationships of security cooperation activities (such as SA, FID, SFA, BPC, FMF, FMS, and IMET), key stakeholders, authorities, funding, and unique planning considerations and tools.
• Integration of security cooperation activities into campaign planning at the operational and strategic levels.
• Contributions of other USG agencies in the conduct of preventative strategies.
• Approaches to achieving cultural and sociological understanding of areas of interest.
• Methods of assessing the effectiveness of security cooperation and other steady-state activities.

There is no need to produce a new Joint Publication dedicated to security cooperation; however, the Joint Staff should change JP 5-0 to describe TCP planning considerations more clearly and with greater emphasis. The revision should include a separate chapter or appendix that specifically explains TCP and associated security cooperation planning considerations and how the elements of operational design and the steps of JOPP apply in the context of TCP development. Alternatively, the Joint Staff could include this information in a new CJCSM, analogous to the cancelled CJCSM 3113.01 Theater Engagement Planning series. These solutions would distinguish TCP and security cooperation planning from JOPP as executed for contingency and crisis action planning, enabling detailed explanation of steady-state theater campaign planning factors and reestablishing a doctrinally independent planning category. The Joint Staff should also create separate enclosures to JOPES volumes I and II to establish guidelines, procedures, and formats specific to the development of TCPs and the strategic planning of security cooperation activities. Doing so would address the major doctrinal shortcoming identified by the SCRTF when it reported, “Without a common planning methodology designed to achieve regional and country objectives, DoD pursues uneven and disjointed security cooperation activities, and is not well prepared to present a unified security cooperation strategy to its interagency partners, Congress, industry, and partner countries.”

Although no joint doctrinal publication focuses specifically on security cooperation, several DoD publications contain useful information on the subject. JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*, provides an in-depth investigation of this form of security cooperation, and contains discussions of many topics common to a variety of security cooperation activities, including program relationships, participating agencies and organizations, planning and execution considerations, and legal requirements. DISAM’s *The Management of Security Cooperation*, also known as the Greenbook, an annually published compendium of the most current information available regarding U.S. international security programs, includes information regarding legislation and policy, security cooperation and SA organizations, major security cooperation activities, program constraints and restraints, and security cooperation history.³

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) is currently drafting a document entitled “Theater Campaign & Country Planning: Planners’ Handbook.” It is an interim guide for theater campaign planners, designed “… to provide combatant command level planners with a useful conceptual approach to developing campaign and country-level plans.”⁴ It is worth noting that the handbook is not a Joint Staff product, and that future APEX instructions will incorporate pertinent security cooperation planning information and replace the handbook in the future.⁵ Another reference not yet published, Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 11-31, *Security

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⁵ Ibid.
Cooperation Handbook, will provide excellent information on security cooperation from a Service perspective.

There are many more documents available to assist faculty in developing security cooperation courses. Table 4.1 includes an abbreviated list of references recommended for consideration, with additional resources noted in the bibliography of this document.

Table 4.1. Recommended curriculum key references

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<th>Recommended Curriculum Key References</th>
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<tr>
<td>* DBSAM Greenbook</td>
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<td>* JP 5-0, Planning</td>
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<td>* Phase I Final Report, Security Cooperation Reform Task Force</td>
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<td>* Capstone Concept for Joint Operations</td>
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<td>* Military Contribution to Cooperative Security (CS) Joint Operating Concept</td>
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<td>* DA Pamphlet 11-31, Security Cooperation Handbook*</td>
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<tr>
<td>* DoDD 5132.03, Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>* JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Integrating the Full Range of Security Cooperation Programs into Air Force Planning, RAND publication</td>
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<td>*Not published at the time of this writing</td>
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The wide scope of security cooperation subjects and limited guidance regarding what security cooperation material should be instructed at the different levels of education combine to hinder PME institutions in their development of appropriate security cooperation curricula. The CCJO definition of engagement as a basic military activity, as fundamental to joint operations as combat activities, points to a useful construct for understanding how to organize security cooperation instruction. Just as senior military staff officers and planners must be versed in combat tactics, operations, and strategy, they must have analogous understanding of the fundamentals of security cooperation: how individual activities are executed at the tactical level, the operational
planning and coordination required to develop and implement programs, and how to arrange security cooperation efforts to achieve theater strategic end states. Table 4.2 provides recommended categories for instruction across the tactical-operational-strategic continuum.

Table 4.2. Recommended security cooperation categories of instruction

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<th>Recommended Security Cooperation Categories of Instruction</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SC Doctrine and Guidance</strong></td>
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<td>Roles, Responsibilities</td>
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<td>Major Programs</td>
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<td>Authorities, Legislation</td>
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<td>Resourcing</td>
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<td>Planning</td>
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<td>Execution</td>
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<td>Assessment</td>
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<td>Case Studies</td>
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**Tactical Level (Service Primary PME)**
- Focus Areas: Activity planning
- Activity Execution
- Case Studies (execution focus)
- Additional Topics: Doctrine and Guidance
- Roles, Responsibilities
- Country Planning
- Resourcing
- Assessment

**Operational Level (Intermediate-Level College)**
- Focus Areas: Doctrine and Guidance
- Roles, Responsibilities
- Major Programs
- Authorities, Legislation
- Resourcing
- Activity Planning
- Country Planning
- Assessment
- Case Studies (planning focus)
- Additional Topics: Theater Campaign Planning
- Activity Execution

**Strategic Level (Senior-Level College)**
- Focus Areas: Doctrine and Guidance
- Major Programs
- Theater Campaign Planning
- Case Studies (strategic impacts)
- Additional Topics: Roles, Responsibilities
- Authorities, Legislation
- Resourcing
- Country Planning
- Assessment
- Activity Planning

As this paper has described, the USMC, and HQDA one-week security cooperation courses provide excellent foundations for the development of concise security cooperation modules within existing ILC and SLC curricula, as will the DISAM SCM-AO course. The elective courses taught or under development at MCCSC, and USAWC and CGSS offer models that are more extensive. Depending on the amount of time available within a school’s schedule, it would be possible to tailor a syllabus based
on one of these templates to address focus areas appropriate to the desired level and duration of instruction.

While developing their security cooperation curricula, PME institutions should consider collaboration and partnership with organizations that already possess security cooperation expertise. The DISAM faculty is the greatest repository of security cooperation information and experience in DoD, and should be relied upon as a primary reference resource and as a potential source of guest lecturers. USMC MCSCG personnel may also be able to augment PME school staffs for brief periods. Similarly, schools should consider inviting Joint Staff and GCC security cooperation planners to speak on the subject and facilitate exercises if the requisite expertise is not resident on the faculty.
CONCLUSION

The 2008 advent of the theater campaign planning construct elevated the importance of steady-state military activities, which consist primarily of security cooperation initiatives. As the vehicle for implementing the CCDR’s theater strategy and attaining strategic end states, the TCP became the centerpiece of the GCC’s planning hierarchy.¹ Since the 2005 version of JP 5-0 identified security cooperation planning as a function distinct from joint operation planning, DoD should have recognized that the new emphasis on steady-state planning required increased attention to the doctrinal treatment of security cooperation planning and the instruction of security cooperation concepts at PME institutions. Instead, the 2011 version of JP 5-0 mistakenly sought to streamline the doctrinal taxonomy by combining security cooperation and joint operational planning, and eliminating references to a separate category of planning associated with security cooperation. Rather than clarifying doctrine, this produced confusion through neglect of the unique characteristics and considerations required in security cooperation planning. This gap in doctrine could not have developed at a worse time, as GCCs were struggling to understand how best to develop and implement TCPs.

DoD has begun to recognize that better security cooperation planning direction and instruction are needed, as demonstrated by efforts underway to produce new guidance and implement security cooperation planners’ courses. The Marine Corps has devoted significant effort to this area, creating the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, teaching multiple iterations of its Security Cooperation Planners’ Course, and

¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), II-3.
drafting Service-specific security cooperation references. The Army is preparing to publish DA PAM 11-31, *Army Security Cooperation Handbook* and held its first “Security Cooperation Planner’s Course” in December 2011. OUSD(P) has drafted “Theater Campaign & Country Planning: Planners’ Handbook.” The Joint Staff J-5 is in the process of incorporating additional TCP format guidance into the APEX series of documents. Additionally, DISAM has restructured its SCM-O resident course to include more emphasis on security cooperation planning, and is developing abbreviated courses to provide to GCC security cooperation planners. Revising JP 5-0 to describe more clearly the theater campaign planning processes would provide the guidance necessary to eliminate current confusion regarding the planning of steady-state activities, and provide the foundational information necessary for the development of supporting doctrinal procedures and instructional curricula.

PME institutions have been slow to embrace the concept of the TCP, recognize its divergence from operational planning for contingencies and crises, and understand the need to plan steady-state security cooperation activities strategically, with the same degree of rigor and detail expected when designing combat operations. Still, the PME community has started to devote more attention to security cooperation. Although most core syllabus courseware only discusses security cooperation in general terms or focuses on specific aspects, such as SFA and BPC in the context of ongoing stability operations, several institutions offer robust security cooperation elective courses, and others have similar modules in development. Unfortunately, security cooperation planning has not obtained a place of prominence within core curricula, despite its criticality in TCP development. The Joint Staff must direct PME institutions to instruct security
cooperation more comprehensively, requiring schools to devote more than token attention to the subject.

The GEF codifies the concept that, through rigorous theater campaign planning, day-to-day military activities can and should achieve strategic end states. This relegates traditional kinetic operation plans to the status of branch plans, to be executed if the TCP does not achieve its objectives, or in case of unforeseen crises. If geographic CCMDs, SCCs, and other agencies are to achieve strategic ends through steady-state security cooperation means, they will require theater campaign planners who are well versed in security cooperation and its distinct planning considerations. This includes the theory and history of security cooperation, programmatic considerations, and other factors that shape TCP development. Accordingly, the DoD must change how it educates military officers in order to improve their understanding of security cooperation and build better theater campaign planners.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACGSC</td>
<td>Army Command and General Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSC</td>
<td>Air Command and Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AECA</td>
<td>Arms Export Control Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AETC</td>
<td>Air Education and Training Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSAC</td>
<td>Air Force Security Assistance Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSAT</td>
<td>Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJPMIE</td>
<td>Advanced Joint Professional Military Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>Army Materiel Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEX</td>
<td>Adaptive Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWC</td>
<td>Air War College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>building partner capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSAP</td>
<td>Basic Strategic Art Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCJO</td>
<td>Capstone Concept for Joint Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMD</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGSS</td>
<td>Army Command and General Staff School</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCSM</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNCS</td>
<td>College of Naval Command and Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNW</td>
<td>College of Naval Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>center of gravity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>cooperative security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>combat support agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>campaign support plan</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAO</td>
<td>Defense Attaché Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>diplomatic, informational, military, and economic</td>
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<td>DISAM</td>
<td>Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>Foreign Service Institute</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
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<td>GFM</td>
<td>Global Force Management</td>
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<td>HQDA</td>
<td>Headquarters, Department of the Army</td>
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<td>ILC</td>
<td>intermediate-level college</td>
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<td>IMET</td>
<td>international military education and training</td>
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<td>IPR</td>
<td>in-progress review</td>
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<td>IW</td>
<td>irregular warfare</td>
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<td>JAWS</td>
<td>Joint Advanced Warfighting School</td>
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<td>JCWS</td>
<td>Joint and Combined Warfighting School</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
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<td>JFSC</td>
<td>Joint Forces Staff College</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>joint operating concept</td>
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<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
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<td>joint operation planning process</td>
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<td>Joint United States Military Assistance Group</td>
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<td>MSRP</td>
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<td>OUSD(P)</td>
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<td>PME</td>
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<td>QDR</td>
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<td>RCS</td>
<td>Regional and Cultural Studies</td>
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<td>SA</td>
<td>security assistance</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>SAASS</td>
<td>School of Advanced Air and Space Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAE</td>
<td>special area of emphasis</td>
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<td>SAM-C</td>
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<td>Security Cooperation Reform Task Force</td>
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<td>senior-level colleges</td>
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<td>SSTR</td>
<td>stability, security, transition and reconstruction</td>
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<td>TCP</td>
<td>theater campaign plan</td>
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<td>theater engagement plan</td>
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<td>United States Navy</td>
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<td>WMD/E</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction/effects</td>
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</table>
VITA

Lieutenant Colonel Baggett graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1992 with a degree in Systems Engineering and his commission as a Marine Corps Second Lieutenant. After designation as a Naval Aviator, Lieutenant Colonel Baggett spent his first Fleet tour flying UH-1N helicopters based in New River, NC, and deployed with the 22\textsuperscript{D} and 24\textsuperscript{TH} Marine Expeditionary Units. He then became an instructor at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One in Yuma, AZ, deploying in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) with the III Marine Aircraft Wing Tactical Air Command Center. Lieutenant Colonel Baggett attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College in Quantico, VA, in 2003. He subsequently returned to New River, NC, and deployed with Marine Aircraft Group 26 as the Future Plans Officer in support of OIF 04-06.1. He then deployed with Marine Light/Attack Helicopter Squadron 167 in support of OIF 04-06.2 as Director of Safety and Standardization, and again in support of OIF 05-07.2 as the squadron’s Maintenance Officer. In 2007, Lieutenant Colonel Baggett reported to Headquarters U.S. Africa Command as a founding member of the organization, and served as the Executive Officer for the Director of Operations and Logistics, then as the Effects Branch Chief. Most recently, Lieutenant Colonel Baggett was the Commanding Officer of Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, in Okinawa, Japan.