Negotiating Separateness and Accommodation: An Informed Reconsideration of Multiculturalism

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In an age marked by widespread human migration, transnational security threats, and other political, economic, and social pressures born of globalization, strategic leaders must understand the dynamics of cultural assimilation to both realize the promise and reduce the risk of contemporary immigration trends. For harmonious reconciliation to occur, the identities and goals of both the immigrant and the receiving state must be established, understood and be mutually receptive to negotiation. A comparative study of the immigrant assimilation experiences of the Amish in America and of Muslims in modern France explores two varied but tenable cases of immigrant-state interaction. Moreover, these examples shed light on the viability of future multiculturalist strategies for assimilating diverse populations in twenty-first century societies in a manner that promotes both tolerance and state cohesion.
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In the increasingly borderless twenty-first century world, a world rife with both promise and risk created by easier immigration in most western countries, it is imperative that strategic leaders and policy-makers better understand the dynamics at work in the cultural assimilation of modern immigrant groups. Whereas successful cultural assimilation may reap a harvest of diverse and productive societies, failed assimilation can engender radicalized groups at violent odds with society’s established aims. For harmonious reconciliation to occur, the identities and goals of both the immigrant and the receiving state must be established, understood and be mutually receptive to negotiation.

Admittedly, this thesis introduces a number of terms subject to widely varying popular and scholarly interpretation. In parts of the globe confronted by large scale human migration, cultural assimilation is frequently suggested as a panacea for all manner of social ills ranging from latent prejudice to violent extremism. The proponents of this “solution” -- spanning the gamut from policy-makers to pub patrons -- are as numerous and diverse as the problems they seek to solve. To further confound understanding and categorization, the term has as many nuanced definitions as it has advocates and detractors. Social scientists have both conflated and contrasted the term assimilation with other concepts such as acculturation, integration, and accommodation. By coupling such qualifiers as cultural, social, religious, ethnic, or ideological to each of the terms listed in the previous sentence, one is easily overwhelmed by a bewildering mélange of conflicting or overlapping ideas. A thorough
review of the scholarly literature on these varied and interwoven concepts is beyond the scope of this study. Ultimately such a compendium may be of less value than an offering of clear and comprehensive definitions.

To that end, *cultural assimilation*, as it is used in this paper, *is meant to signify the reconciliation of differences between human groups*. This understanding has three important components. First, the adjective *cultural* is used as an admittedly broad but heuristically necessary economy of expression to include most of the italicized qualifiers from the previous paragraph. In this manner it coincides with the expansive definition of culture as advanced by Jiyul Kim in his discussion of the cultural aspects of strategy. This shorthand does not dismiss the crucial ethnic, religious, political, social, and economic dimensions of culture as those items will be addressed in greater detail later in this study. Second, cultural assimilation implies a dynamic process rather than an end-state. In this context, two groups should not be described as culturally assimilated, which would imply a final stage. Instead, the relationship between the two groups exists at any given time somewhere along a spectrum extending from violent discord to harmonious integration. Third, the term *reconciliation* is used deliberately by the author in this definition to be value-neutral. Reconciliation does not exclusively denote productive interaction among groups, but may include largely separate and peaceful coexistence. In the same manner, reconciliation, when used as a financial accounting term, is not necessarily a final record of debts paid, but may rather be a snapshot ledger of existing debits and credits at any given time.

Having acknowledged the broader discourse and defined the key terms, it is essential next to address why cultural assimilation is strategically relevant. Western
Europe is currently experiencing significant and ongoing migrations of Muslims from Africa, the Middle East, Pakistan, and Turkey. In a world acutely mindful of terrorism since 2001, these large-scale migrations have raised concerns about the prospect of radicalization of certain individuals among inadequately assimilated groups. As an example, the 2007 attack on the London transit system, perpetrated by home-grown al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists, spiked alarm in the United Kingdom. A less catastrophic, but equally worrisome concern relates to the potential for civil unrest precipitated by these macro demographic shifts. Many attributed the riots that broke out in the Paris suburbs in 2005 to inadequate assimilation of young, unemployed Muslim immigrants living in the banlieues. Clearly, there are profound strategic ramifications related to cultural assimilation for the security and stability of states receiving waves of foreign immigrants.

In light of these trends, two familiar models for immigrant adaptation have re-emerged, namely, the “melting pot” and the “mosaic.” The first model has been used to describe the European immigrant experience in the United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries whereby ethnic identities merged or were subsumed over time by an evolving national “American” identity. In the mosaic model -- known as “multiculturalism” in the contemporary vernacular -- separate immigrant groups maintain their unique characteristics as part of a diverse, multicultural society. This mosaic model has also been applied to the U.S. experience and is manifested by the expression of hyphenated identities, such as “Italian-American” or “Polish-American.” It is significant to note that these models have been applied as both observations of how immigration has occurred, and as prescriptions for how immigration should occur.
Within the framework advanced by this paper, both immigrant adaptation models may be seen as strategies to promote reconciliation at the harmonious end of the cultural assimilation spectrum.

If we are to believe the statements of some Western European leaders in recent years, the mosaic model has lost traction as a workable strategy for cultural assimilation. In October of 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel told a youth group of her Christian Democratic Party that the concept of multiculturalism “has failed, and failed utterly.”9 British Prime Minister David Cameron expressed similar pessimism in February of 2011 at the Munich Security Conference when he noted that “under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives” yet “we’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong.”10 In 2003, then French Minister of Interior Nicolas Sarkozy took a decidedly different tact when he lamented that “under the pretext that integration would occur spontaneously in the republican melting pot, we have ignored the problem.” He continued in a more ominous vein, “an identity denied is an identity that radicalizes.”11 Even if such comments are discounted as politicians merely playing to the galleries, each statement illustrates a sense of public policy experimentation and a level of frustration with the two strategies.

At a basic level one could evaluate the comments of the Western European leaders as two votes cast for the melting pot model (Merkel and Cameron) and one for multiculturalism (Sarkozy). Nonetheless, a closer reading may reveal an unspoken yet discernible interplay between the two strategies. As incongruous as it initially seems, both arguments may have merit without contradicting each other. In this manner, the
mosaic may be the sequential first step toward the melting pot. Alternatively, the mosaic may be an adequate and relatively enduring state, in its own right, on the cultural assimilation spectrum. To extend the metaphor, the physical key to the mosaic art form is the adhesive that binds the fragments to the backing, while the aesthetic key is the artful arrangement of the fragments in relation to each other.

For harmonious reconciliation to occur, the identities and goals of both the immigrant and the receiving state must be established, understood and be mutually receptive to negotiation. This thesis in many ways merges and selectively draws from the work of two other scholars. First, Terrence Cook, currently a professor of political science at Washington State University, highlighted the importance and categories of cultural interaction strategies between minority and majority groups. Second, Donald Kraybill, a distinguished professor at Elizabethtown College and a renowned scholar of Anabaptist groups in North America, further developed the negotiation model to explain the interactive bargaining that occurs consciously or inadvertently in the cultural assimilation process.

To explore and support this thesis, this study will compare two profoundly different cases of immigrant cultural assimilation: the Amish in America from 1737 until the present and Muslims in France since the end of the colonial era. While the second foil is far more germane to the current concern about the demographic trends in Europe, the Amish case provides a valuable contrast that may offer possible, positive ways forward in dealing with current immigration issues, both in the U.S. and Europe. Some would argue that the very small size of the Amish minority paired with their fervent desire to remain separate makes their experience an irrelevant or prohibitively
exceptional case in comparison to the dramatic immigration-born challenges in France. In fact, this is precisely why this foil was selected. The Amish example marks a reconciliation of differences at a very low level of integration that is nonetheless remarkably free from conflict. For this reason, it is a case that serves to extract and distill, as extremes will do, the possibilities that may exist on the cultural assimilation spectrum between the markers of separateness and accommodation. Additionally, the two selected foils provide a thought-provoking divergence of cultural assimilation strategies -- both within the multiculturalist milieu -- adopted by the immigrant group, the state, and the broader receiving society.

In terms of structure, this study will present each foil sequentially while using repeated themes to enable subsequent comparison. A review of settlement history along with identity, demographic, political, and socio-economic factors will serve as unifying categories. For each case, the author will highlight the “negotiation terms” of the immigrant group and the receiving state. A final section will then draw conclusions regarding the possible combinations of separateness and accommodation strategies and their prospects for diminishing threats of radicalization and civil unrest.

Amish in America: Background

The Amish are a small and distinctive Christian religious group of German, Swiss, and Dutch descent whose adherents now live almost exclusively in the United States and Canada. In terms of cultural traits, the Amish are unmistakable. They are committed agrarians and their tidy farmhouses and fields denote a culture rooted in a deep relationship with the earth. They can be instantly recognized by a very plain mode of dress characterized by black or dark brown clothing. Men wear beards with shaven upper lips. They tend to avoid modern technology (although not exclusively), they
operate horse-drawn carriages rather than automobiles and, if electricity is needed, prefer gas powered generators or direct-current electricity to public utility provided power. These traits and preferences are deliberate, outward expressions of Amish identity and represent rejection of an increasingly modern world that they feel threatens the virtues of Christian humility and traditional family and community life. Two fundamental concepts define the Amish way of life. *Ordnung*, roughly translated as “the ordering”, is the locally established -- and understood rather than written -- list of how the faithful should and should not behave. *Gelassenheit*, loosely meaning “submission”, is the meek and disciplined attitude and demeanor the faithful should embody while living *Ordnung*.15

The Amish faith is an offshoot of the Anabaptist movement that traces its roots to Switzerland in 1525 in the wake of the Protestant Reformation. Anabaptists -- the term literally means “second baptism” -- believe that each individual must make an adult choice to follow the teachings of Christ. Additionally, they believe that Christians should reject all forms of violence and must separate themselves from worldly materialism and pride. The first century of Anabaptism was marked by state persecution, imprisonment, and execution. The Amish branch of Anabaptists emerged in 1693 after a theological schism led by Jakob Amman, a Swiss-born follower of the evolving faith who later moved to the Alsace. The split revolved around the treatment of those who refused to abide by the strict but plain Christian lifestyle. While another branch of Anabaptists, the Mennonites, were content simply to expel non-adherents from the faith, the Amish took expulsion a step further by “shunning” or banning all social and commercial contact with
defectors. The severity of shunning along with an evolving list of “shunable” offenses continues to factionalize the Anabaptists sects to this day.\textsuperscript{16}

Amish immigration to America occurred in two waves: the first from 1737-1767, and the second from 1820-1860. While the era of extreme persecution and martyrdom that characterized 17\textsuperscript{th} century Anabaptism in Europe had largely subsided, the Amish were motivated to emigrate to escape high rents, taxation, and forced military service. In the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, motivations merged with opportunity, especially when William Penn’s colony in America beckoned as a religiously tolerant “holy experiment.” As a result, southeastern Pennsylvania became the destination for roughly 500 Amish immigrants in the first wave. The second wave of immigration in the mid 19\textsuperscript{th} century was spurred at first by crop failures and later by a general weariness of the revolutions and wars of central Europe. Although many second wave immigrants were drawn to America by the correspondence of earlier Amish settlers in Pennsylvania, a large number were enticed by the opening of the frontier and the possibilities of space for separateness in the American Midwest. New second wave settlements were established in Ohio and Indiana. Roughly 3,000 Amish migrated to North America in the second wave.\textsuperscript{17}

In an ethno-geographic sense, the Amish have clear Germanic roots as they came to America from the Rhine River valley and its contiguous regions of the Palatinate, Alsace, Swabia, the northern Swiss cantons, and Holland. The descendents of these first settlers steadfastly maintained a consistent ethno-linguistic identity by speaking the “Pennsylvania Dutch” dialect at home among loved ones, and High German in formal worship, even to the present day. In most other regards, by virtue of
their extreme penchant for “living apart” and their distinct Anabaptist creed, the Amish do not have much in common religiously, socially, or politically with their fellow Germans. Although they generally followed the same immigration waves, and with the exception of being the subject of shared discrimination during the first and second world wars, Amish and general German-American cultural assimilation reveals a pattern so distinct that it would require a third foil.\(^\text{18}\)

Because of the insularity of Amish life and the extremely low level of enrollment of new members by conversion, the Amish may still be ethnically characterized as German or Swiss. Nonetheless, religion is the core element of Amish life. Moreover, the religious dimension of Amish identity is supremely dominant and indivisible from all other identity features. There is no such thing as a non-observant Amish person as one can find among those who self-identify as Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or Muslim. Indeed, when an Amish person chooses a casual approach to belief and plain living, that person is excommunicated and shunned and, in effect, is no longer considered Amish. When there are larger group theological disputes about the community of the faithful or acceptance of technology, this usually occasions the emergence of a new sect. While this has occurred periodically since 1865, the Old Order Amish -- representing the strictest definition and adherence to the *Ordnung* -- remains the largest branch.\(^\text{19}\)

From their earliest European roots, the Amish have predominantly been farmers. Aside from being the primary occupation throughout America during the 18\(^{th}\) and 19\(^{th}\) centuries, farming served two other important functions. First, it placed the Amish in the countryside, away from the moral contaminants of city life. Second, it reinforced the
value of work, family, and community. The agrarian way of life also determined other features of Amish society such as education. Amish families typically had seven or eight children which provided for necessary labor on non-mechanized farms. Amish education, a local affair taught in one-room schoolhouses, has remained virtually unchanged over the last century, and only extends to eighth grade. They feel that education beyond that level takes children away from much needed work on the farm and offers more temptation than value to adherents of plain living and humble Christian values. Students are taught reading and writing in English and, in some locales, German, along with lessons in history and geography. Practical vocational skills are taught by the family on the farm or other places of livelihood.20

Although the majority continues to live in rural areas, more and more Amish, particularly those living in areas that are subject to encroaching urbanization, are turning to non-agricultural forms of employment including carpentry, tailoring, baking, and even small industry and local construction.21 Ironically, the unique nature of the Amish way of life has drawn outside attention -- indeed some would say fascination -- that has manifested itself in a regional tourist trade, particularly in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. Unemployment is virtually non-existent among the Amish. It is important to note from an assimilation perspective, however, that the Amish are generally not competing with non-Amish in tight labor markets, so they are not seen as an economic threat in the regions where they live. Nonetheless, the increasing trend of non-agricultural occupations among the Amish, and the concomitant increase in social and economic intercourse with the non-Amish, may present the greatest cultural challenge to a group that seeks to “live apart”.

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As in other matters, the Amish are submissive and respectful when dealing with the state, although they are generally ambivalent about government and are politically invisible. As such, there are no political organizations or blocs among the Amish. *Ordnung* does not prohibit voting although the Amish tend to vote mostly in local elections if at all. Holding public office is prohibited because of its association with worldly status. Interestingly, while the Amish are known for their firm rules and discipline, beyond the family, farm, and local district Amish social and religious life is very loosely structured. Twenty to forty contiguous family farms and plots are organized as congregations known as districts, each led by a locally selected bishop. A roughly county-sized grouping of districts constitutes a settlement, although this level of organization is leaderless and without any religious hierarchical meaning. Amish will visit, intermarry with, and provide mutual aid to inhabitants of other settlements and recognize the adherents of their order, wherever they reside, as fellow members of the faith.22

**Amish in America: Conflict and Negotiation with the State**

The Amish inevitably are forced to “negotiate with Caesar” as they interact with the local, state, and national government. Most Amish conflict with the state has revolved around military service, public education, land use, horse-drawn conveyance, and taxes and social security. Before examining each of these interactions in greater detail, it is essential to summarize Donald Kraybill’s negotiation model for the reconciliation of differences. In each case, Amish-State interaction is characterized by concessions, compromises, non-negotiables, and a predisposition by both parties to amicably settle disputes and optimize outcomes. In the case of “concessions” both
sides have yielded points to the other, and in “compromise” both groups have agreed on alternative solutions somewhere in between each party’s starting position. There are “non-negotiables” -- for instance, for the Amish military service has historically been and continues to be a concept on which they cannot yield, while public health and safety has been an immutable objective of the State. The Amish concept of Gelassenheit creates the cultural predisposition to submit to authority and the Dordrecht Confession of Faith, one of the earliest and most enduring statements of the Anabaptist creed, further codifies the legitimate roles of earthly government as derived from the Gospel of Matthew. For the United States, the preeminence of individual rights, as enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, generates an inherent proclivity to accommodate minority preferences and practices.²³

Amish in America: Military Service

Rejection of violence is one of the most deeply held beliefs for the Amish, and has been non-negotiable throughout their history within the United States. During the American Revolution, most Amish initially felt compelled, as humble and obedient subjects of the British Crown, to oppose insurrection of any kind. Although others bore some private sympathy for the patriot cause, the Amish universally refused to take up arms for either side. Many paid fines rather than serve in the Continental Army or hired substitutes. Historical records indicate that most Amish paid “war taxes” in what they naively believed was a general fund for the relief of the consequences of war rather than to support its machinery. During the Civil War, most Amish continued to avoid military service by finding a substitute or by paying a legally sanctioned commutation fee for conscientious objectors. A few allowed themselves to be drafted, but refused to
fight or found ways to serve as teamsters, cooks, or in other non-combatant roles. Others moved to the western frontier, beyond the reach of state enlistment.24

World War I brought about a more evolved and nuanced relationship between the state and pacifist church groups. The U.S. Government allowed for drafted young men of various religious sects -- including Amish, Mennonites, and Quakers -- to declare conscientious objector (CO) status, but still required them to receive military training in non-combatant roles. In this manner, the War Department hoped that the pressures of conformity and socialization in the time-honored context of initial military training would soften the convictions of young men, typically away from home for the first time in their lives. The policy was largely a failure, as most Amish draftees refused to wear uniforms or drill under arms. This led many frustrated officers and drill sergeants to subject Amish conscripts to reduced rations, confinement, verbal and even physical abuse. By 1918, Congress enacted an early form of farm deferment that, while not directly addressing the issue of conscientious objection, conveniently coincided with Amish agrarian mores and enabled many Amish to avoid military service beneath the fig leaf of family economic necessity.25

As the Selective Service system grew to accommodate the military manpower demands of the Second World War, so too did the ways the U.S. Government dealt with COs. Recognizing both the depth of Amish non-violent convictions and the failures of the military socialization strategy of World War I, representatives of the state and of the “peace churches” negotiated alternative service options acceptable to both parties. The 1940 Draft Act allowed for COs to perform work of “national importance under civilian direction.” In practice, many young Amish men still qualified for farm deferments, and
for those who did not, the option of hard work in national parks and forests while living in remote and austere camps seemed to jointly satisfy the government’s desire for fair public service and the Amish desire for separateness, honest labor, and the avoidance of violence.26

In a seemingly ironic way, the Amish reconciled the military service dilemma almost too well in the period following the Second World War. Throughout the Korean War and during the first half of the conflict in Vietnam, the U.S. Government was extraordinarily accommodating in providing alternative service options. By the 1950s and early 1960s most of the Civilian Conservation Corps-type jobs in the remote American interior had dried up, and the greatest demand was for workers in government or non-profit health and charitable enterprises. Unlike the wilderness camps of the Amish COs during WW II, the new alternative service options put the faithful in the very midst of non-believers in city hospitals and municipal public works departments throughout the country. Having avoided the moral peril of bearing arms, the new character of alternative service now clashed with the abiding Amish desire to be separate. In a remarkable turn of events, the U.S. Government continued to accommodate Amish preferences by allowing alternative service at Amish-run farms. The one stipulation, agreeable to both parties, was that these farms could not be in the home communities of the COs in order to approximate the pain of family separation experienced by drafted soldiers.27

Although compulsory military service is no longer an issue in America, the history of interaction between the Amish and the U.S. Government on this subject is an illustrative case of cultural reconciliation containing all of the elements of Kraybill’s
negotiation model. It is rich with examples of non-negotiables, concessions, compromise, and willingness to find workable solutions. One important point especially bears emphasis: for the Amish to successfully negotiate they had to create the National Amish Steering Committee, formed in 1966 to represent Old Order positions to the officials of the Selective Service System. This organizational measure (in many ways inimical to their nature) was a radically new means for the Amish to build consensus, select representatives, and confront authority in a unitary fashion. Equally noteworthy, it was the U.S. Government that prompted the Amish to take this step. These factors will resurface throughout this study as essential prerequisites for harmonious immigrant-state reconciliation.28

**Amish in America: Public Education**

As noted earlier in this study, the outward manifestations of Amish education have remained largely unchanged over the past century. The same may not be said for the broader development of public education throughout America. Two trends in public education policy throughout this period -- namely, strict enforcement of state laws requiring mandatory school attendance up to a specified age and the consolidation of rural school districts -- led to inevitable Amish-State conflict.29 Once again, the Amish desire to “live apart” ran headlong into the state goal to provide uniform minimum standards of public welfare. While the military service issue placed the federal government as a unitary actor on one side of that confrontation, the education question was complicated by the fact that most education issues in the U.S. are handled at the state and local levels.
Between 1852 and 1929, all American states and territories enacted laws establishing the ages of mandatory school attendance. All of these states required compulsory education until at least 16 years of age, with some extending the requirement to 17 and 18 year-olds.\textsuperscript{30} As noted, the Amish only promoted, and still maintain, formal schooling through eighth grade in order to provide necessary labor as soon as possible on non-mechanized family farms. Additionally, Amish leaders past and present felt that additional schooling failed to add value to those seeking to live a simple Christian pastoral existence. Indeed, they believed it actually threatens such a lifestyle.

For many decades, Amish educational practices roughly conformed to those of their non-Amish neighbors in rural communities. As populations grew in these areas, local governments began to build larger consolidated schools drawing students from wider geographic areas to provide more thorough, efficient, and cost-effective primary and secondary education to meet the needs of the new industrial era. Consequently, the Amish acted on their concerns about moral contamination in such public schools by creating their own primary schools – in many cases purchasing the one room schoolhouses abandoned by the local school districts. This adaptation did not, however, resolve the issue of mandatory school attendance beyond eighth grade.\textsuperscript{31}

Three Amish fathers were fined in Ohio in 1914 for refusing to send their children to high school in one of the earliest school-related Amish-State conflicts. Similar incidents became more common in other areas of Amish settlement over the subsequent decades. An Amish man was imprisoned for refusing to send his daughter to a new high school in Pennsylvania in 1937. In some cases, school boards and local
governments arranged waivers and exceptions for the Amish, but increasingly states felt compelled to consistently enforce existing laws. One of the most dramatic and widely publicized confrontations occurred in Iowa in 1965 when a local sheriff and truant officer showed up at a small Amish parochial school to bus the students to a newly consolidated public school. As the sheriff was leading the weeping young pupils in a single-file line to the awaiting bus, an Amish mother shouted “run” in German and the students darted for the surrounding corn fields. Although some local non-Amish residents defended the actions of government officials, the incident produced widespread indignation and sympathy for the Amish cause.\textsuperscript{32}

In 1972, in what still stands as the decisive resolution of the Amish pursuit of educational separateness, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in \textit{Wisconsin v. Yoder} that “the enforcement of the compulsory formal education requirement after eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of their religious beliefs.”\textsuperscript{33} This ruling is profoundly significant because the highest court in the land gave the Amish a key tool in preserving their identity by controlling and isolating the formative development of their youth. It is noteworthy that the legal defense of Yoder’s case was argued by non-Amish attorneys with the assistance of an advocacy group, the National Committee for Amish Religious Freedom, consisting of non-Amish religious leaders, academics, and lawyers. Although discrete acts of passive resistance were performed by individual Amish in accordance with their religious beliefs and with full acceptance of the sanctions of the law, the concerted expression of their cause fell to a sympathetic external group. In this sense, the unsolicited -- but no doubt appreciated – material and legal support of others was instrumental in the momentum leading to the \textit{Wisconsin v. Yoder} decision.\textsuperscript{34}
Encroaching urbanization and environmental concerns led to greater government regulation of American agriculture since the late 20th century. These regulations, enacted by local, state, and federal authorities, inevitably collided with generations of rural land use practice in farmlands throughout the country. The Amish were certainly not alone in this predicament, nonetheless, as environmental law attorney Elizabeth Place notes, “the Amish are equipped with fewer political tools than the non-Amish to deal with these concerns.” Traditional farming practices were challenged by new ordinances (or in some cases, newly enforced ordinances) regulating construction, zoning, subdivision of lots, and sewage management. In many cases Amish farmers tilled the earth for decades in blissful ignorance of the statutes they were violating. Often, only the introduction of adjacent residential or commercial development brought their infractions to light. Although the Amish are inherently inclined to comply with the law, many Old Order farmers were stunned by the economic cost of compliance. The easiest and ultimately most lucrative recourse for many farmers of any ilk was (and frequently still is) to sell their land to developers. Although a few Amish in long-established settlements have taken this path in order to fund new settlements in the Midwest, most are reluctant to leave their ancestral farms and close-knit communities.

Many of the agricultural regulations of the past thirty years have been driven by pollution and run-off concerns. Protection of the environment is a theme that resonates deeply with the Amish belief that they are stewards, not owners, of God’s creation. Recognizing the increased expense for farmers to comply with environmental laws, many state governments offer financial assistance to offset costs and incentivize
compliance. Ironically, these measures (which could be seen as generous accommodations by the state) are spurned by the self-sufficient Amish who are obliged to reject government financial assistance. Similarly, seemingly positive zoning regulations intended to protect agricultural land have had the negative consequence of prohibiting non-agricultural “cottage industries” such as woodworking or carriage repair shops on Amish farms. This has become a significant problem for large Amish families who do not have enough land to sub-divide to support subsequent, and equally large, generations. Nonetheless, some local governments in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania have been extraordinarily accommodating. In response to a petition by local Amish in 1988, Eden Township authorities selectively allowed small businesses to be operated from residences or accessory buildings on agriculturally zoned land or in “farm support” zones.

The typical Amish redress to these issues is to “suffer in silence,” although they will often sign petitions, mostly initiated by similarly aggrieved non-Amish neighbors, challenging proposed local ordinances. Unlike military service and education related conflicts, land use regulations do not pose a direct threat to deeply held Amish beliefs. The existing threat, indirect though it may be, is that the increased cost and headache of bureaucratically regulated farming will drive the Amish away from their cherished agrarian lifestyle. Alternative forms of livelihood will bring the Amish into increasing contact with the outside world, with all of the perceived moral and cultural danger that entails.

One saving grace for the Old Order in places like Lancaster County, Pennsylvania is that local governments have a vested interest, driven by tourism
revenues, to preserve the traditional Amish farm. Local authorities are very aware that the non-confrontational Old Order has historically escaped life-threatening persecution and even far less dramatic challenges to their separate lifestyle by “voting with their feet.” For a politician or the local non-Amish hotel and restaurant owner, there is an ever-present fear that adverse land-use regulations may cause their Amish “cash cow” to seek greener pastures. A Chamber of Commerce spokeswoman from Lancaster remarked, “Obviously we’d be slititng our throats if we got rid of agriculture and tourism.” In this manner, the state is a negotiating partner eager for compromise, and in many instances more than willing to “look the other way” rather than confront minor land use infractions.39

Amish in America: Horse-Drawn Conveyance

Perhaps nothing is more emblematic of Amish culture than the sight of a horse-drawn carriage rolling down a country lane. At first glance, this could be mistaken for a tranquil pastoral scene from a 19th century landscape. On closer inspection, however, the result of decades of cultural negotiation becomes apparent. The quaint buggy most likely is affixed with an orange or red reflective warning triangle. It probably has rearview mirrors and battery-powered lanterns as well. More than just a means of conveyance, horse-drawn carriages are a mark of cultural distinction, particularly in the age of the ubiquitous automobile which is seen by the Old Order as a symbol of baneful convenience and status. Although the horse and buggy have become totemic of Amish resistance to modernity, their use on public roads among fast moving cars and trucks creates obvious safety concerns and brought about inevitable conflict with the state.
Amish-State horse-drawn conveyance conflicts have included controversies regarding the use of metal wheels on carriages, types of horseshoes, horse manure on public roadways, hitching posts, and alternative horse paths. Most of these minor issues were resolved by means of local compromise. The single greatest conflict with the state revolved around the use of Slow-Moving Vehicle (SMV) markers. At first, many state and local governments encouraged the Amish (and non-Amish tractor and construction equipment drivers) to voluntarily place reflective material on their vehicles in the interest of highway safety. Members of the Old Order were instinctively resistant to any measure that would make them more obvious, visible, or “flashy”, as the recommended bright orange SMV markers clashed with the deliberately subdued black, white, or grey colors of their carriages. After numerous court cases in various states from 1970-1990, the Amish dutifully complied with what eventually became law, and SMV markers on buggies are now commonplace and uncontested. In this case, the state’s demand for public safety was non-negotiable, and the Amish acquiesced.\(^{40}\)

The related issue of Amish eschewal of automobiles highlights a more significant cultural conflict beyond minority-state interaction. As private use of automobiles became more common in the 20\(^{th}\) century, the Old Order struggled with the demands of modern transportation and commerce as they sought to maintain their traditional and plain existence. Gradually, the Amish began to change the local *Ordnung* to allow members to be *driven* by non-Amish for lengthy journeys or for emergency trips. What many outsiders viewed as hypocrisy, Donald Kraybill characterizes as a conscious internal negotiation with modernity. In this way, the Amish preserved the outward and practical distinctions that separate them from “the world” while making incremental
accommodations to technology and modernity. Similar thoughtfully considered “deals” have been reluctantly struck by the Old Order regarding telephones, tractors, and electrical power.41

**Amish in America: Taxes and Social Security**

A necessary prerequisite for separateness is self-sufficiency. For some minorities, self-sufficiency is essential to maintain autonomy from the political and economic control of the majority. For the Amish, self-sufficiency also serves a second and equally important function -- to limit interaction, be it positive or negative, with the outside world. To briefly return to the automobile dilemma, aside from the inherent cultural conflict of operating a motor vehicle, driving would also require the Amish to obtain licenses, register vehicles, and maintain valid insurance -- all requiring regular and active interaction with the government. Clearly all contact with the state, as has been demonstrated, cannot be avoided. Payment of taxes, a requirement of all wage-earning citizens of the United States, is an accepted practice among the Old Order. The Amish are mindful of Christ’s injunction to “give to Caesar that which is Caesar’s”, and they understand the common good provided by the state. Nonetheless, Social Security and other forms of government subsidies, while happily received by most citizens, are avoided by the Amish. Since 1965, the U.S. Government has exempted the Old Order from paying into Social Security and, because of their moral objection, the Amish do not receive pay-outs from the system once they reach the age of 65. Like many other examples of Amish-State interaction, the unfolding of the Social Security challenge was another illustrative case of cultural negotiation.42
The enduring Amish concept of mutual aid -- whereby the faithful pool resources to assist neighbors beset by hardship, infirmity, or old age -- offers a generally sufficient social “safety net”. Large, close-knit, multi-generational households typically have the resources to handle most misfortune and adversity. When family assets are inadequate, the broader district or settlement will pitch in to cover the deficit. Additionally, by virtue of their simple and disciplined Christian lifestyle, the Amish are rarely confronted with many modern social ills which necessitate the provision of government aid for other populations. The Old Order tends to live within its means, both economically and socially. To accept state-provided welfare or insurance is not only unnecessary, it also runs counter to the Amish religious tradition to take care of their own.\textsuperscript{43}

Payment into the Social Security system did not become an issue for the Amish until 1955 when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began to collect “contributions” from self-employed farmers. The Amish objected to the program not because it was seen as a tax, but because it involved government-backed payouts upon retirement. The plight of Valentine Byler, an Old Order farmer from Lawrence County, Pennsylvania, brought the issue to the public consciousness in a dramatic way. Moreover, the case illustrates how the Amish hesitantly and demurely navigated all three branches of American government to reconcile the dilemma.\textsuperscript{44}

In 1961 IRS agents, determined to recover unpaid Social Security taxes, interrupted Byler’s spring plowing, unhitched his three horses, and sold them at auction. The resounding nation-wide public outcry forced the tax agency, never the most popular arm of government, to meet with Amish bishops in Washington. The IRS proposed a
number of compromises that were as objectionable to the Amish as the standard Social Security scheme. The IRS, countering that they did not have the authority to make an exception, essentially pushed the bishops to the courts by offering a moratorium on Amish contributions to Social Security until a judicial decision settled the issue. In 1962, the Amish reluctantly filed a suit, but quickly withdrew it upon consideration of its implications for their belief in legal non-violence. By this point, a number of legislators from states with significant Amish populations, urged the bishops to circulate petitions to change the law. As a result perhaps more of public sympathy for the Amish cause than the active measures of the Amish themselves, a Social Security exemption was written into the Medicare bill, which became law in 1965.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{Amish in America: Negotiating Advantages}

In the case of the Social Security dilemma and other confrontations with the state, the Amish had a number of interrelated negotiating advantages. First, in spite of their consistent population growth, the Amish are still a very small minority relative to other ethnic groups in the United States.\textsuperscript{46} Although this may at first appear to be a liability, the small size of the group immediately disarms a bargaining opponent who fears a gathering threat. Second, the Amish have built a reputation for sincerity which is underscored by the steadfast way that they adhere to the tenets of a very demanding faith. In this manner, they have largely avoided both public and government criticism (often common to other minority challenges) that their “separatisms” are either casually held or materially motivated. William A. Fischel, Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College, noted that the \textit{Wisconsin v. Yoder} decision, as written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, hinged on this very point of Amish sincerity and exceptionalism.\textsuperscript{47} Third, the Old
Order has many loyal and vocal supporters in the broader American public. Whether these loyalties are motivated by touristic fascination, a general desire to protect civil liberties, a romanticized notion of a simple agrarian folk, or genuine respect -- non-Amish have consistently and actively intervened to champion the Amish cause even when the “plain people” remain silent. Non-Amish support for the Old Order is not geographically exclusive to Lancaster, although it is most apparent in those regions with significant Amish populations. An interesting example of this phenomenon may be seen in LaGrange County, Indiana where the County Economic Development Plan includes an eleven page annex devoted solely to resources supporting Amish entrepreneurship.\textsuperscript{48}

Finally, and in what may be their greatest advantage, the Amish embody many of the behavioral traits of the idealized American. They are hard-working, law-abiding, God-fearing, self-sufficient, family-oriented citizens. This ideal does not have universal appeal, and certainly absolute pacifism, civil passivity, and rejection of technology are hardly considered typical American traits. Nonetheless, the positively perceived identity characteristics of the Amish have harmonized very effectively with an idealized sense of what Americans should be, if not what Americans truly are. Marc Olshan, Professor of Sociology at Alfred University acknowledges that most of his colleagues in the field of anthropology instinctively recoil from such normative conclusions. At the same time, he observes an apparent reluctance among scholars to address the less progressive features of Amish society such as limited education, restrictive gender roles, and severe child rearing. Recognizing that common admiration for the Old Order may rest more on sentimental nostalgia than on objective comparison, Olshan notes that “the Amish are
more visibly reminiscent of an earlier, presumably more virtuous, era.” Motivations and origins aside, the pervasive and wistful admiration that the Amish have earned among many Americans has been, and continues to be, one of their greatest advantages in cultural negotiation.

Cultural Assimilation Strategies

Terrance Cook argues that all cultural interactions between two distinct groups may be categorized, in his chosen lexicon, as separations, assimilations, or accommodations. It is important to understand these three terms as Cook intends rather than with the encumbered baggage of various and often contradictory or conflated definitions from decades of social science literature and popular usage. With this caveat in mind, Cook explains that these three strategies may be employed, in nuanced form, by either the stronger or the weaker ethnic group. Separation stresses differences and distancing between groups. Assimilation highlights similarities and seeks convergence. Accommodation recognizes both differences and commonality. The examples that Cook uses to examine separation as a strategy of weaker groups are focused on acts of migration or secession in a very geo-political sense. Although migration certainly applied to the Amish as they left Europe, they subsequently practice a form of spiritual and material “secession” as they live in the United States among non-Amish Americans.

In the context of this framework, and although he does not specifically address the Amish case, one could apply Cook’s strategy of separatism to the Amish themselves, and his strategy of accommodation to various levels of American government in dealing with the Old Order minority. The Amish pursue a strategy of
separatism that allows them to “live apart” in a religious sense and in a much localized physical sense, although within the geographic boundaries and political context of the United States. This model is useful as the study transitions to an examination of contemporary France as both the French government and Muslim immigrant groups have sought varying degrees of accommodation. In the true multiculturalist sense, Muslims seek to maintain a degree of cultural, religious, and ethnic distinctiveness while reaping the benefits of selective integration in a modern European state.

Muslims in France: Background

The history of Muslim immigration in France since the end of the colonial era has many features that distinguish it from that of the Amish in America. First, Muslim immigration is ongoing, while the last wave of Amish immigration ended in the mid 19th century. Second, Muslims are arriving from wider geographic, ethnic, and cultural origins than the Old Order immigrants. Third, Muslims are coming to France in much higher proportionate numbers than any other immigrant group as contrasted with the relatively small Amish immigrant flows to the United States from Europe. Perhaps the greatest distinction -- certainly related to the previous three -- is the perception of the immigrant minority by the receiving state majority. While the Amish never “threatened” the identity of the majority of Americans, Muslim immigration is considered with a much higher level of apprehension by many Europeans. Undoubtedly, this fear -- be it irrational or well-founded -- has been compounded over the last ten years by the association of radical Islam with terrorism. Additionally, some of this anxiety is likely caused by commonly-held expectations of continued high Muslim birthrates -- a problematic premise that will be examined in greater detail.
Muslims are not newcomers to France. History reveals that Charles Martel’s eviction of the Umayyad armies in 732 at the storied Battle of Poitiers marked the beginning phase, not the end, of France’s long and uneven relationship with the people of Islam. Nonetheless, the number of Muslims in France before 1952 never exceeded 230,000 or 0.55% of the overall population. The real spike in immigration occurred after France’s colonial holdings in North and Sub-Saharan Africa began to dissolve during the period from 1954 to 1962. In the wake of decolonization, Paris encouraged workers to immigrate from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and to a lesser extent from West Africa and Turkey, to alleviate labor shortages in France. This trend continued until 1973-1974 when the global energy crisis and related economic troubles reduced the demand for foreign workers. Clearly the motivation for migration was economic rather than religious. The “pull” was created by receptive immigration policies and job prospects in France, while the “push” came from the lack of similar economic opportunity in the homeland states. Moreover, particularly in West Africa, much of the impetus to leave came from a desire to escape the violent conflicts that have plagued the region. Although the Muslim immigrants during this era were largely young men, the subsequent decade brought on new waves of women, children, and the elderly as immigrant families reunited in Europe.

While this study groups immigrants largely from the Maghreb and West Africa -- and their descendents -- under the heading “Muslim” by virtue of their shared confession, this religious identity feature is only one among many. First, in terms of countries of origin, these immigrants are Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, Mauritanians, Malians, Senegalese, Guineans, Ivorians, and Nigeriens. Smaller
numbers of French Muslims hail from Turkey, Lebanon, Indian Ocean islands and South Asia, while a tiny fraction of ethnic French convert to Islam as well. Second, from an ethnic perspective, only half of these immigrants are Arabs. Two other significant ethnic groups are Berbers and Black Africans. Third, they are linguistically diverse. Depending on their origins, dates of immigration, and degrees of acculturation, many immigrants still speak Arabic, West African tongues, and Turkish, although their adoption of French is typically rapid and thorough. Regardless of native idioms and generational differences, most Muslims are able to pray and read the Quran in its old Arabic form much like most modern Jews outside of Israel are familiar with scriptural Hebrew. Lastly, even in a religious sense, Muslims may be further segregated by their varied orthodoxy to the beliefs of Islam. Unlike the Old Order Amish, there are degrees of religious adherence and observant practice among French Muslims.\(^5^4\)

Although Islam is undisputed (in terms of relative numbers of adherents) as France’s second religion after Catholicism, projections of the continued growth of the Muslim population are far less certain. This ambiguity rests on two primary factors. The first is the disputed estimate of the number of Muslims currently living in France. The French government, prohibited by law, does not collect religious or ethnic information in official census surveys, leaving room for various and debated accountings subject to considerable political distortion. At the low end, French demographer Michèle Tribalat estimated 3.65 million Muslims in France, using deliberately narrow group identity criteria. At the upper end of the scale, right wing political parties seeking to bolster support for anti-immigration agendas and some Muslim organizations eager to show a robust constituency have suggested numbers as high as eight million. The second
disputed factor is the anticipated rate of growth of the Muslim population. By adopting high-end estimates of the current Muslim population and simply extrapolating early immigrant birthrates, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National claimed that “France will be a Muslim country by 2020.” This type of projection ignores, however, the caveat of Woodrow Wilson Center senior scholar, Martin Walker, that “broadly speaking, birthrates among immigrants tend to rise or fall to the local statistical norm within two generations.” Clearly, those who wish to evoke either alarm or reassurance may selectively use demographic data to buttress their narratives about the future of France.  

Muslims in France: Socio-Economic Situation

Before 1974, the “immigrant-worker” origin of many Muslim arrivals to France reveals an important element of their early socio-economic station. Most significantly, and by design, these immigrants had jobs upon arrival in the labor-starved industrial and construction sectors of the French economy. New arrivals from the Maghreb and West Africa moved to urban areas where the demand for skilled and unskilled laborers was greatest. Most of the immigrant workers took up residence in hostels or tenements outside of major cities such as Paris, Marseilles, and Lyon. Although they are suburban in the geographic sense, the conditions of these banlieues, as they are called, are more akin to the American concept of inner city ghettos, than of green-lawned, picket-fenced, middle-class enclaves. As more immigrants arrived to the banlieues, more native-born French inhabitants moved out, creating a cycle of physical and ultimately cultural separation.
After the French government curtailed labor-based immigration in the mid 1970s, the employment status, if not the housing situation, changed dramatically for Muslims immigrants in France. As extended families were reunited by second-wave migration, more mouths arrived to be fed while first-wave immigrants were losing their jobs. The foreign-born populations of the banlieues rapidly increased just as their economic prospects significantly diminished. Of course, the economic hardships that befell France since the 1970s have affected more than just Muslim immigrants, although unemployment levels among native-born Frenchmen and European immigrants have been much lower than those for immigrants from Africa. By 1990, the overall unemployment rates for French-born and European Union immigrant workers was 10.4% and 11.3%, respectively. In a striking contrast, the average unemployment rate for immigrants from the Maghreb was 26.2%, while 27.6% of working-age arrivals from Sub-Saharan Africa also found themselves jobless.57

Although the overall employment picture in France improved by 2002, a marked gap remained between the unemployment rates among Muslim immigrants (over 23%) as compared to the native-born French population (roughly 7.2%). Indeed young, unemployed second-generation immigrants from the Maghreb constituted a large portion of those involved in the violent civil unrest that broke out in the banlieues outside Paris and many other French cities in 2005. In most respects, their anger was fired by disenchantment with the lack of economic opportunity rather than by a sense of deprived religious expression or identity. Aside from its implications for cultural assimilation which will be examined later in this study, this socio-economic disparity has relevant impact beyond metropolitan France. As in other parts of the developing world,
remittances from emigrants back to family members in the country of origin amount to a significant source of income in places like Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. To highlight the magnitude of this phenomenon, the World Bank estimates that roughly 6.8% of Morocco’s Gross Domestic Product is derived from remittances.\(^{58}\)

From the mid 1960s until the beginning of the current century, the economic ties between Muslim immigrants and their homelands shaped France’s relations with these foreign governments and provided the early nation-of-origin focal point for the identity and organization of the French Muslim population. This concept of mutual benefit between sending and receiving states is known as codevelopment. Marion Panizzon, Assistant Professor of International Economic Law at the University of Bern, notes that “France was one of the first countries to officially recognize the value of codevelopment and of the key transnational role the diaspora has played in source country development.”\(^{59}\) As Paris sought to identify broadly representative organizations to politically engage and help assimilate her growing Islamic minority, authorities in Algiers, Tunis, and Rabat were motivated to improve the lot of their faithful sons and daughters in France. Although this seemed to be a “win-win” proposition at first glance, often thinly-veiled agendas -- both from Paris and from Africa -- worked at cross purposes. Much of the French government’s codevelopment interaction with African states was motivated by a desire to encourage return migration, while the African governments sought to increase remittances coming from the diaspora. Furthermore, these foreign policies did little to reduce illegal immigration and inadvertently served to further atomize, rather than unite, Muslims in France.\(^{60}\)
Muslims in France: Political Factors

The greatest challenge to the development of a meaningful dialogue necessary for effective Muslim-State negotiation is the fragmentation and civic incoherence of the various people in France who consider themselves Muslim. This study has already acknowledged various factors of national-origin, ethnicity, language, and even religious practice that serve to differentiate the group. A more succinct way of labeling this amorphous collective would be to call them “French Muslims”. Indeed, this shorthand illuminates the goal of the républicaine agenda -- namely, to categorize inhabitants of the Republic in a manner whereby they identify first with their French citizenship, and second with their co-religionists. The French government has had some success in this effort, although it is admittedly a work in progress. In a 2006 survey, roughly 42% of Muslims in France identified themselves first as “French” compared with 46% that see their religious identity as predominant. For now, they remain “Muslims in France”. For Paris, this intermediate identity convergence is better than “Tunisian Muslims in France”, “Algerian Muslims in France”, and all of the other separate nation-of-origin distinctions that continue to divide the community and thwart consistent and efficient interaction with the state. In this manner, they are very different from the Old Order Amish in America who, although they are reluctant to establish a single political voice, have a very recognizable and cohesive group identity.

Whether Muslims in France speak or act in a unified manner or not, certain group behaviors can be observed in terms of voting practices and political representation. All data for Muslim voter participation is derived from unofficial sources, but seems to indicate a propensity to support left and center candidates. This revelation is hardly surprising considering the support that these parties have shown for more liberal
immigration policies. Assuming a population of 5 million Muslims in France, somewhere between 1.2 to 1.5 million are registered to vote.\textsuperscript{62} Recent evidence suggests that the Muslim vote is a more decisive factor in local elections in those districts where Muslims are concentrated and where a far right candidate (such as from the \textit{Front National}) is on the ballot. In these cases, political parties have sporadically courted votes in the \textit{banlieues}, but the broader national trend thus far -- reinforced by the relatively low electoral strength and high fragmentation of the immigrant voting public -- is to ignore Muslims as a viable political bloc.\textsuperscript{63}

Some French elected officials and party leaders have appointed Muslims to positions within national and local governments and party hierarchies, although these numbers have been very small. Equally low are the numbers of Muslims elected to public office. In 2004 there was not a single Muslim among 577 parliamentary deputies in the National Assembly. The ranks of canton and municipal-level \textit{councilors} of non-European origins fill less than one percent of the total. These numbers are a clear indication that Muslims in France are not unified in their political expression and are woefully under-represented at every level of French government. The significance of these sad statistics is that the French state is more likely to respond to Muslim issues when they affect the non-Muslim majority rather than to act on grievances from the Islamic community itself. To date, they’ve been unable to convert demographic potential into cohesive political power.\textsuperscript{64}

\textbf{Muslims in France: Interaction with the State}

The three related concepts of \textit{citoyenneté}, \textit{republicanism}, and \textit{laïcité} are integral to understanding the context of Muslim-State interaction in France. The first may be
translated as “citizenship” and defines the requirements of full civic participation in the French Fifth Republic. The second term deals with the expectations of citizenship. The last concept has no direct translation in English, but may be roughly understood as “secularism” and characterizes the relationship between the French State and organized religion. All three concepts have related analogues in other Western countries, although they also carry some uniquely French features that warrant further explanation for American readers.

Citoyenneté defines a French national identity based on exercising the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Citizenship may be determined by birth within the boundaries of metropolitan France or on French overseas territories. Additionally, citizenship may be granted based on acquisition (or “naturalization”, to use a term more common in the United States). The French take pride in the fact that this privilege is not reserved solely for the “sons of Gaul” and that citoyenneté has made Frenchmen from peasants, Huguenots, Jews, Eastern Europeans and immigrants from former French colonial holdings. President Nicolas Sarkozy, the son of a Hungarian immigrant, is a prominent example. While citoyenneté is principally based on legal status, the related concept of republicanism speaks to the responsibilities of French citizens and demands that both natives and newcomers eventually adopt a sense of collective national purpose over individual or cult prerogatives. Clearly republicanism places a high premium on assimilation and conformity in all sectors of public life.

The concept of laïcité evolved since the French Revolution and especially during the Third Republic (1870-1940) as a necessary complement to citoyenneté. Within its meaning, religion could not be permitted to become a communally divisive factor.
running counter to the collective ideal of national citizenship; therefore the state must assiduously avoid formal association with any particular sect. *Laïcité* acknowledges freedom of religion, but at its core seeks to preserve the autonomy and primacy of secular citizenship as the basis for national identity. Mindful of their own history, in which the Catholic Church frequently dominated the affairs of state, the French are keen to protect the state from the influence of the Church -- of any church. In contrast to the United States Constitution which enshrines the separation of church and state to defend religious freedom as an individual right, France strives to insulate the state and its republican ideals from segregating tendencies of individual faiths.67

In the context of receiving-state foundational political cultures, the Muslim inclination to cling to religious identity in France is a more difficult alignment than the Amish desire to “live apart” in the United States. Nonetheless, a Pew Research Center poll conducted in 2005-2006 asking respondents to consider whether Muslims in France want to “be distinct from society” or “adopt national customs” revealed some interesting differences of perception. Among the general French population, a slim majority felt that Muslims want to remain distinct. Among French Muslims, however, only 21% responded that they wished to remain distinct, while 78% said that they want to adapt.68

The concepts of *citoyenneté*, *republicanism*, and *laïcité* shaped, and continue to shape, the contours of Muslim-State interaction. Moreover, the ongoing cultural negotiation is actually refining and altering these long-held tenets of French tradition and policy. Whereas the Amish seek to resist the American melting pot in a religious, social, and cultural sense, Muslims in France want to assimilate in political and socio-economic spheres while maintaining varying degrees of distinctiveness, if not
separateness, in the religious realm. For this to occur with the least amount of difficulty the state will have to modify traditional views of laïcité and Muslims will need to adapt, in some measure, to republicanism. The French approach to state-subsidized religious spaces and the creation of the French Council of the Muslim Religion mark two government attempts to drive the accommodation. Yet the 2004 headscarf ban and widespread civil unrest in 2005 serve as two dramatic and illustrative examples of clashes – one sparked from the Élysée Palace, and one from the banlieues -- that have changed the nature of the discourse.

**Muslims in France: State-subsidized religious spaces**

In 1905, the French government enacted a law which prohibits the public funding or official recognition of religious communities -- often cited as the de jure foundation for contemporary laïcité. Brookings Institute-affiliated scholars Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse note that “while there is no state ‘recognition’ … there is, of course, state ‘acquaintance’ with religions in the interest of treating them equitably.” As noted, the concept of laïcité, while seeking to insulate the state from religious influence, never called for the complete severance of all links between the government and religious groups. For religion to play a personal role for individual citizens, private worship space must be available to keep faith, quite literally, out of the public square.

The 1905 law is routinely, and some would argue necessarily, circumvented to meet the worship needs of Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and more recently Muslims. Although the national government cannot directly fund prayer spaces, local governments and municipalities have greater latitude -- often offering long-term rents for symbolic fees. In one such case, the city government of Marseilles agreed to lease land
for ninety-nine years for the sum of €300 per year to support the construction of an Islamic cultural center. In fact, the cultural center is a relatively small part of the planned site which will include a mosque to accommodate 3500 worshippers. Although the funds directly allocated to the mosque will come primarily from foreign sources -- principally from the governments of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco -- the local government clearly enabled the effort by the inexpensive provision of valuable real estate. At the national level, the central government has a limited, though direct role in support of the Muslim faithful by paying the salaries of denominational chaplains for soldiers, prisoners, and patients in state-run hospitals.70

In spite of the acknowledged state roles relating to religion and the widespread use of circuitous legal and administrative routes to accommodate various faiths, Muslims still face a relative dearth of mosques to support their growing numbers. In 1994 there was a ratio of one mosque per every 2967 Muslims in France. This figure compares poorly with a ratio of 1:1033 for Catholics even when the proportion of observant practitioners is roughly the same for both faiths. Approximately two thirds of these Muslim prayer spaces are considered “micro-mosques” in storefronts, garages, and basements that can only accommodate fifty people or less. In many cases, congregations at Friday prayer services literally overflow onto adjacent sidewalks. To compound the problem, imams in France -- many of whom are older, on welfare, and don’t speak French -- are also in short supply. This deficit impacts not only the spiritual needs of the average Muslim but also the demands for chaplains funded by the state.71

The depressed socio-economic means of the Muslim population in France did not offer great hope that the Islamic community by itself would be able to reverse the
trends noted above. In the period from the late 1970s until the beginning of the twenty-first century, the French government turned to the countries of the Maghreb, Saudi Arabia, and Iran (through their diplomatic missions in Paris) to come to the aid of the Islamic faithful in metropolitan France. This approach had a number of advantages and a few, initially unrecognized pitfalls. First, this indirect approach avoided state-religion entanglements contrary to the secular intent of *laïcité* and the law of 1905. Second, “homeland” countries had both familial and economic interests (in the form of remittances) in maintaining positive ties with their diasporas. Third, because the Muslim community in France did not have the financial resources or the organizational wherewithal to help themselves, this policy offered a real possible solution.\(^72\)

On the other hand, this approach reinforced the nation-of-origin fragmentation of the Islamic community and retarded the republican goal of creating “French Muslims.” By March of 1982, there were fourteen separate Algerian associations registered in France, thirty Moroccan organizations, seven Tunisian-based groups, and over ninety groups affiliated with unspecified African countries.\(^73\) While a case may be made for the merits of this “associational pluralism”, it was not helpful in creating a unified Muslim interlocutor with the state or in consolidating the political potential of the broader Muslim immigrant community. Over time, particularly after 2001, some critics also derided this approach for encouraging undue foreign influence on the internal affairs of France.\(^74\)

**Muslims in France: Sarkozy and the French Council of the Muslim Religion**

The French government’s approach to dealing with its growing Muslim minority evolved during the beginning of the twenty-first century in ways that have challenged both the traditional views of republicanism and the prevailing European interpretations
of multiculturalism. The policy evolution pays tribute to, and in some ways seeks a middle path between the two concepts. To extend the earlier metaphor, France settled on a course, at least in the near-term, to craft a multicultural mosaic with a few big pieces rather than many small fragments. This approach, perhaps driven by administrative efficiency as much as philosophical compromise, acknowledges that it is easier to deal with a single Muslim body than hundreds of smaller and often competing constituencies. Given the dramatic heterogeneity of the Muslim population in France, the French government would have to prompt and assist the Muslim community to coalesce. This was the genesis and rationale behind the creation of the French Council of the Muslim Religion (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman or CFCM) in 2002. In contrast to a “divide and conquer” approach, this path could optimistically be labeled “unite and talk.”

Drawing from the most prominent of the many nation-of-origin Muslim associations, the CFCM was conceived in 1999 when Minister of the Interior Jean-Pierre Chevènement invited “six federations, six great mosques, and six experts on Islam to take a seat at the table of the Republic.” Subsequent interior ministers Daniel Vaillant and Nicolas Sarkozy kept the process alive through successive governments. The development of the CFCM could have been easily derailed by the wave of Islamophobia that swept the West following the attacks of September 11, 2001 but it managed to survive in large measure due to the commitment of Sarkozy, a rising political star in France. The initial agreements of the CFCM established the mutual recognition of both Islam and the state, constituent districts, and the framework for the election of representatives. Among the first substantive agenda items was the creation
of a working group “to propose CFCM policies and practices to meet Muslims’ religious requirements” for subsequent presentation to the government.77

Nicolas Sarkozy played a central role in the development of the CFCM and has been the most influential figure in the Muslim-State dialogue over the last ten years, although he has alternatively been accused of being too hostile or too sympathetic to Muslim and immigrant concerns. If anything, this split verdict confirms his adroit encampment in the “center” of French politics. Another less cynical conclusion may explain Sarkozy’s detractors from both the left and the right: he is experimenting. Confronted with France’s growing, fragmented, under-privileged, and largely unassimilated Muslim population -- first as Minister of Interior, and now as President -- Sarkozy has shown remarkable flexibility if not consistency. He has been a rare centrist advocate for positive discrimination (or “affirmative action” as it is known in the United States), pushing for reserved spaces for minority students in universities. It was the formation of the CFCM, however, that was his most notable course change as he recognized the shortcomings of the nation-of-origin approach and sought to shape a unified French Muslim identity. In this manner, Sarkozy hoped to create a single platform to give voice to disparate Islamic views that would not only serve the interests of Muslims in France, but would also provide a focal point for Muslim-State interaction.78

In terms of state initiation and intentions, the formation of the CFCM may be compared to the creation of the National Amish Steering Committee formed in 1966 to represent Old Order positions to the officials of the U.S. Selective Service System. In both instances, the central government needed to prompt the minority community to create a body to represent its positions in order to engage in productive dialogue. In the
admittedly narrow Amish case, the federal government had to urge the Old Order to organize in spite of their cultural aversion to hierarchy and self-advocacy. In the case the CFCM, the French government had to assist the Muslim community to consolidate its advocacy into one coherent voice. Both of these examples highlight the thesis that for harmonious reconciliation to occur, the identities and goals of both the immigrant and the receiving state must be established, understood and be mutually receptive to negotiation.

The longevity, legitimacy, and influence of the CFCM remains an open question, but it perseverance after ten years and its continued and prominent role in Muslim-State dialogue seems to reveal its enduring value as an agent of cultural negotiation. As recently as March 2012, French Prime Minister François Fillon met with CFCM President Mohammed Moussaoui to discuss the halal preparation of meat in French butcher shops -- an issue that is generating much controversy in the current presidential campaign.79 The CFCM also played a consultative role in the Muslim headscarf controversy and an important, if nuanced, role in the wake of the civil unrest in the banlieues in 2005 -- two subjects which will be examined further.80

Muslims in France: Civil Unrest 2005

In late October 2005, two young men of Tunisian and Malian descent were electrocuted at an electrical substation as they ran from the police who were responding to a reported break-in in the Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois. Two days earlier, then Interior Minister Sarkozy visited another banlieue and described the criminal elements there as “gangrene” and “rabble” that should be “cleaned out with a pressure hose.” Inflamed by Sarkozy’s comments, news of the deaths spread rapidly, first sparking
vandalism in the immediate surroundings of the Seine-Saint-Denis region, and eventually reaching urban areas throughout France. Three weeks of intense disorder led to the death of one bystander, the injuries of 126 police and firefighters, the arrest of roughly 2900 rioters, and over €200 million in property damage.

The significance of the riots has been subjected to considerable popular and political finger-pointing in subsequent years. Some, faulting government authorities, have attributed the conflagration of civil unrest to the failure of French integration policies. Others, fixing blame to Muslim youth, have viewed the riots as evidence that Islam is incompatible with the French republican ideal. A third view, largely emanating from social scientists at a comfortable distance from both the banlieues and the Élysée, contends that the root cause was economic exclusion exacerbated by racial discrimination. If anything, this panoply of perspectives reveals the multiple variables at play, while leaving the relevance and proportional influence of those variables open to critical review.

Of greatest interest to this study is the role of religion in the riots. Was there a religious motivation to the unrest or were many of the rioters coincidentally of the same faith? What role did “legitimate” Muslim organizations play to discourage violence and were Muslim extremist organizations responsible for aggravating the violence once it began? Finally, and of greatest strategic security relevance, what can these riots reveal about the potential for radicalization among socio-economically disaffected youth?

Stéphane Dufoix, an associate professor of sociology at the University of Paris-X Nanterre, noted “the complete absence of claim-making by the rioters as well as the non-existence of any kind of organized movement advocating the right to speak for
them. This observation highlights the spontaneity of the unrest without discounting the socio-economic conditions in the banlieues that served as dry tinder for the initiating spark. Writing shortly after the height of the unrest, Olivier Roy, a research director at the French National Center for Scientific Research, commented that “the religious dimension is conspicuously absent from the riots.” He goes on to acknowledge that although the vast majority of rioters were second generation Muslim immigrants, their co-religionists in the middle class and tens of thousands of Muslim university students abstained from active or rhetorical support for the unrest.

The role played by Muslim organizations to suppress the riots revealed the remaining fractures among various Muslim groups, even those under the CFCM umbrella. The CFCM itself was subdued in its response, deliberately seeking to prevent the “Islamization” of the conflict. Surprisingly, the Union of the Islamic Organizations of France -- a group within the CFCM fold with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and with a significant constituency among young Muslims -- issued a fatwa instructing the Islamic faithful to refrain from rioting. This difference in response raises questions about the CFCM’s legitimacy as a single voice for the Muslim community, although the organization’s reticence to get involved indicates an astute avoidance of potentially negative association. The most noteworthy factor, however, is that none of the various organizations affiliated with the CFCM encouraged or supported the riots. Instead, they choose to abstain from the discourse or respond by varying degrees to condemn the violence. Although there may have been some low-level opportunistic agitation by illicit extremist groups to fan the flames, the unrest never carried themes that would resonate with Muslim fundamentalists. As Time columnist Bruce Crumley noted, the
riots had “far more in common with the violence that shook Watts, Cleveland, and Harlem in the mid-1960s than they do with the Islamist extremism behind 9/11.”

There are at least four relevant strategic conclusions to draw from the civil unrest in France in 2005. First, the events were not religiously motivated, although many of the rioters were Muslim. Second, poverty and limited opportunities for socio-economic mobility create the potential for unrest. Third, legitimate Muslim organizations did not spark or encourage the upheavals, and in some cases actively discouraged them. Finally, and not to absolve hooliganism, the riots revealed the depth of inequality born not only of economic hard times, but also aggravated by lingering discrimination.

Whereas acculturation may be accomplished by the immigrant alone, assimilation requires the receiving culture’s acceptance of the minority. Unfortunately, bigotry cannot be legislated away, although state policies can expedite its reduction. Recent studies have revealed, in spite of earlier assumptions, that socio-economic disadvantages do not make populations more prone to radicalization. Professor of Political Science at the University of Exeter Jonathan Githens-Mazer notes, “What is becoming increasingly apparent in the literature is that participation in radical violent Islamism is not a function of economic condition or lack of education.” In this sense, the riots in France should not be seen as a harbinger of future terrorist recruiting in the banlieues, but rather as a sober reminder of an unfinished cultural reconciliation.

Muslims in France: The Headscarf Controversy

The 2004 law that prevented Muslim girls from wearing the hijab, or headscarf, in public schools created a firestorm of controversy both within France and abroad. The law actually banned any clothing that served as an ostentatious sign of any religious
affiliation, but in practice would affect mostly Muslim female students. The proponents of the law initially based their case on the defense of *laïcité*, claiming that outward expressions of faith had no place in public schools where the formative values of republican citizenship are nurtured. Over time, additional arguments were presented in favor of the ban to include curbing “internationalist Islamism” and liberating women from restrictive sectarian mores. The irony of the last defense was that many Muslim girls felt that the law deprived them of personal choice when they voluntarily wanted to wear the *hijâb*.

John R. Bowen, Professor of Anthropology at Washington University in St. Louis, makes the interesting case that “*laïcité* has become one of those ‘essentially contested concepts,’ such as ‘freedom’ and ‘equality,’ that provide resources for arguments, not starting points of agreement.” Furthermore, he argues, defense of *laïcité* makes more sense for policy makers than for social scientists. This may be true, although politicians make policy, and policy is the state’s manifestation of cultural interaction; therefore *laïcité* remains very germane to this study. Nonetheless, Bowen is probably correct in that *laïcité* is a sort of ideological looking glass that prevents French policy-makers from seeing ambient reality while they focus on the heavens of what ought to be. To employ another tortured analogy, the headscarf ban was like an attempt to accelerate the melting pot by dramatically raising the flame while inadvertently scalding the stew.

The *hijâb* controversy provided the CFCM with an opportunity to either take a stand in defense of Islamic religious prerogatives or to demonstrate republican bona fides by acquiescing to state momentum. Indeed, the government-appointed
commission that proposed the measure invited the CFCM to consultations. As with the riots a year later, the Council settled on a subdued response that essentially allowed Muslim students to follow their consciences without issuing an authoritative edict condemning the ban. A surprising turn of events then occurred far from metropolitan France which served to deflate the controversy. In August 2004, just a few weeks before the first day of school, two French journalists were taken hostage by terrorists in Iraq who demanded repeal of the hijâb ban as a condition of their captives’ release. On that day French Muslims closed ranks with their government and the CFCM offered its good offices, jetting off to Baghdad to negotiate the return of their countrymen. When the inevitable “showdown” first day of school arrived, it came and went with minimal fanfare, much to the disappointment of U.S. news crews ready to record the anticipated confrontation. In all of France, only 639 Muslim girls arrived at school wearing the hijâb, and by mid October, the number of hold-outs dropped to less than eighty.91

Cultural Negotiation Strategies and Priorities for Muslims in France

Judging from outcomes in the headscarf affair, the French government -- no doubt aided by serendipitous events abroad -- was able to nudge Muslims closer to assimilation with far less backlash than many, particularly in the United States, expected.92 For their part, the Muslims were much more ready to compromise, to use Donald Kraybill’s negotiation taxonomy, than the Amish who allowed themselves to be imprisoned rather than submit to consolidated schooling or payment of Social Security taxes. The Muslims of France were amenable to bargain away their public symbols of religiosity as long as the central government permitted a loose and local enforcement of laïcité that began to address their private religious needs. A significant point of contrast
between the Amish and the Muslims is their respective desire to be separate. For the Amish, this desire approaches the absolute, while for the Muslims of France it is much more compartmentalized in the religious realm. In fact, Muslims are more frustrated -- as evidenced by the 2005 riots -- by French society's slowly opening doors of social and economic opportunity than by the obstacles they face in practicing and expressing their faith.

**Conclusion: Multiculturalism Reconsidered**

An understanding of cultural assimilation is vitally important for national security professionals, both civilian policy-makers and the senior military officers who advise them. Immigration will continue to be a salient feature of ongoing globalization and its impacts are quintessentially strategic. Six of the ten emerging trends listed in the 2010 Joint Operating Environment are directly affected by large-scale human migration and will inevitably affect governments, economies, social structures, and security environments far into the future. By its very nature, immigration creates a challenge to the status quo, just as the introduction of any foreign element stresses the stasis of a living organism. The manner in which immigrant minorities and receiving majorities reconcile their differences is a profound determinant for enhancing the security and prosperity of an increasingly interconnected world. Twenty-first century strategic leaders will craft policies that positively shape these outcomes, or will be forced to deal with the potentially volatile consequences of inadequate cultural assimilation.

For harmonious reconciliation to occur, the identities and goals of both the immigrant and the receiving state must be established, understood and be mutually receptive to negotiation. It is by these metrics that the relative success of cultural
assimilation for both the Amish in America and the Muslims in France must be evaluated. For each foil there are differences and similarities. More importantly however, the triumphs and set-backs of each case suggest prescriptions for state policy-makers and immigrant communities. Herein lies the true value of the comparison.

First, the identities and goals of both the immigrant and the receiving state must be *established*. In simple terms, the immigrant group must decide who they are and what they want. The essential element is internal cohesion. The Amish have been very successful in this regard as they are instantly recognized and their demanding religious creed allows no fence-sitters. Moreover, the Amish have resolutely demonstrated their desire to live separate from “the world” in strict adherence to the teachings of Christ. The Muslims in France have been far more fragmented by nation-of-origin, ethnicity, and varying degrees of religious orthodoxy. Additionally, their goals have been more focused on their socio-economic status than on the living expression of their faith. This has been a handicap for Muslim interaction with the French government.

States are easily identified and their goals are most clearly manifested in their foundational political cultures. The United States cherishes individual freedoms while France values convergent republicanism. These state goals are not monolithic and immutable, but are prominent enough to serve as workable and recognizable starting points for negotiation. While minorities living in democratic states can gradually shape the identities and goals of their governments, it can be a long and challenging process. On the other hand, states may assist minorities to coalesce as evidenced by France’s attempts with the CFCM. For strategic leaders, this project will be worth watching
attentively. Ultimately, however, immigrant groups must establish and consolidate their own identities and goals in response to state prompting or on their own volition.

Second, the identities and goals of both the immigrant and the receiving state must be *understood* by both parties. Once the immigrant group settles on who they are and what they want, they must organize themselves to present their case to the state. In this respect the Amish are limited by their inherent aversion to hierarchy and reluctance to self-advocate. This handicap has been largely overcome by the proxy assistance of sympathetic outsiders. The Muslims in France, who unlike the Amish are not morally averse to political participation, have yet to truly consolidate their significant political potential and transform it into actual political influence. The establishment of the CFCM has given them a unified mouth piece to voice concerns about religious interaction with the state, but the unrest of 2005 demonstrated the ineffectiveness of their ability to legitimately communicate socio-economic grievances. Nonetheless, as dramatic and illicit as the riots were, they caused the government to redouble efforts to address immigrant issues.

The nature of government structures in the United States provides for multiple and well-known venues for minority negotiation with the state, albeit some have been more effective than others. The Amish have variously approached executive, legislative, and judicial officials at local, state, and federal levels to discuss their issues. In France, the primary state interlocutor has been the Ministry of Interior, although Muslims have worked through prayer space issues primarily at the local level. The lesson for policy makers is that public fora must be available as points of entry for minorities. In some instances, particularly in cases of first-wave immigration, the state
may have to create agencies or commissions to serve these functions. Additionally, civil society organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, can play an instrumental role as an intermediary between minorities and the state.

Third, the identities and goals of both the immigrant and the receiving state must be receptive to negotiation. Once the immigrant group establishes who they are and communicates what they want, the stage is set for negotiation. In large measure, the effectiveness of the first two steps determines the prospects for success in the final phase. Negotiation takes many forms, but typically requires give and take to be effective. Both parties must determine non-negotiables, seek common ground, and build space for compromise. Aside from the consultations of the principals, negotiation also plays out in the media and through public opinion. The Amish have been very successful negotiators with the state because of their advantages recounted previously, although they’ve also had to make concessions on the use of slow-moving vehicle markers. The Muslims in France have had less success mainly as a result of their weaknesses in consolidating identities and goals and their challenges in communicating with the state.

Typically states hold the negotiation trump cards because they determine the laws and usually have the preponderance of resources at their disposal. In some regards, the United States is more inclined to yield to calls for individual and religious freedom by nature of the American political culture. The Amish have benefitted from this proclivity. The French tradition of laïcité has been an obstacle to streamlined negotiation with any religious group, and republicanism serves as an inherent impediment to recognizing the claims of minorities. Although both concepts appear to
be evolving, *laïcité* and republicanism still resonate enough with the French people that they may be seen as negotiating advantages for the state. The outcome of the headscarf case certainly seems to support this claim. Most states have a vested interest to negotiate amicable settlements wherever possible in the interest of stability. Nonetheless, particularly as seen in the socio-economic plight of Muslims in France, states with free market systems may have limited abilities to dramatically or rapidly change economic conditions at the heart of minority grievances. What policy makers can do is create laws and practices that provide for equal opportunity. This doesn’t erase discrimination and bigotry overnight or overcome macro economic trends, but it does open the door for social mobility that allows for gradual change.

In the final analysis the perseverance of the Amish, a truly distinct and extremely cloistered sect, is a testament to the viability of separateness in America. There are certainly specific peculiarities in this case, but the overarching model of negotiation between the Old Order and the state contains many characteristics which may be replicated elsewhere. In spite of continuing socio-economic disparities between many Muslims and the French majority population, the republic has absorbed newcomers for centuries. Indeed, in striking contrast to the Amish, most Muslims in France fervently seek greater integration in most aspects of their lives. The French government continues to struggle with the balance between republicanism and multiculturalism as it simultaneously reaches out to the Islamic community while seeking to persuade them to become French Muslims. This formulation is noteworthy because it already implies a recognition that it is unrealistic and perhaps unnecessary to simply make them “French.”
The United States, the proverbial “nation of immigrants”, still has unfinished business in the assimilation of many minorities. Nonetheless, the circumstances of history have given America a head start in many respects in comparison with other parts of the developed world. National security professionals at the strategic level have a responsibility to protect their populations from both internal and external threats. A significant part of this challenge is to successfully assimilate newcomers and, in the words of Prime Minister David Cameron, “to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong.”

Multiculturalism can still work in Europe and notices of its death are premature. The keys to viable cultural pluralism must be based on the three points illustrated throughout this study and highlighted in its conclusion. Multiculturalism is not an invitation to radicalism nor is it an unobtainable ideal. The Amish case strongly supports this notion. As long as a state’s foundational political culture enshrines universal values that immigrants agree to uphold -- as those of the United States and France both do -- it can adhere very diverse fragments to the multicultural canvas. They don’t have to melt, they just have to stick.

Endnotes


8 Ibid., 4-5.


12 From its early presentation by the French-born writer and agriculturalist Crevecoeur in 1782, the concept of the “melting pot” and its relevance to immigrant assimilation in the United States has been challenged and modified by various scholars. The prevailing view has emerged that distinctive ethnic and religious identity traits of European immigrants are most evident in the initial generations after immigration, although this distinctiveness diminishes over time as subsequent generations intermarry. The empirical study of this phenomenon is further complicated by the fact that both the “sending” culture and the “receiving” culture are simultaneously being acted upon by numerous other cultural influences, external to the bilateral relationship in question, over the generational course of assimilation. In this manner, some groups assimilate to the point that their ethnic origins are unrecognizable, while others maintain both visibly and behaviorally distinct features although they are accepted by the dominant culture. J. Hector St. John Crevecoeur, Letters from an American Farmer (New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1925 - reprinted from the original edition from London in 1782), 54-55; Israel Zangwill, The Melting Pot (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1909), 37; Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins (New York:


14 Donald B. Kraybill, ed. The Amish and the State. 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 18-20.


17 Amish refusal to bear arms or commit violence against fellow human beings will be discussed by the author in greater detail later in the paper. Steven M. Nolt, A History of the Amish. 56, 87-88, 99-103.

18 Ibid., 49-51; English is also used by the Amish, although mainly for social and business transactions with their non-Amish neighbors. A comprehensive bibliography of published works related to the Pennsylvania German dialect may be found in, Werner Enninger, Language and Language Use of the Amish and of Mennonite Groups of Swiss-German Origin (Essen, Germany: LAUD Linguistic Agency, 2002); David L. Valuska and Christian B. Keller, Damn Dutch: Pennsylvania Germans at Gettysburg (Mechanichsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2004), 10; Steven M. Nolt, A History of the Amish. 226-228.

19 Steven M. Nolt and Thomas J. Meyers. Plain Diversity: Amish Cultures and Identities. 54; John A. Hostetler, Amish Society. 273-277.


21 John A. Hostetler, Amish Society. 138-144.

22 Donald B. Kraybill, The Amish of Lancaster County. 65-66; Donald B.Kraybill, The Riddle of Amish Culture. 82-85.

23 Kraybill only applied his cultural negotiation model to the Amish-State relations, although it may be easily extended to other cases of minority-state interaction. The author will later examine Muslim-French State relations through the same lens. Donald B. Kraybill, ed. The Amish and the State. 3-4, 12-15, 18-20; Paton Yoder, “The Amish View of the State,” in The Amish and the State, ed. Donald B. Kraybill (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 23-24.


28 Ibid., 254.


38 Ibid., 209.


45 Ibid., 131-137.

46 In spite of many early projections that the Old Order would not survive into the 21st century as a cohesive and distinct cultural entity, the Amish population in the United States doubles roughly every twenty years. This enduring trend, much higher than the overall rate of population growth in America, may be attributed to non-use of birth control, labor demands of a non-mechanized agrarian lifestyle, and the high rate of voluntary baptism among Amish teenagers. In spite of this regenerative success, the Amish population in 2011 still only accounts for less than 0.09% of the overall U.S. population. Young Center for Anabaptist and Pietist Studies, Elizabethtown College, “Amish Population Change 2009-2011.” http://www2.etown.edu/amishstudies/PDF/Statistics/Population_Change_2009_2011.pdf (accessed December 18, 2011).


50 Cook does not mention the Amish in his book, either casually for the sake of brevity or consciously because he restricted his concept of separation to the geographical dimension. To highlight separation as a strategy of the weaker group he uses examples of fugitive black slaves before and during the American Civil War, the Jews’ flight from Egypt, the Vietnamese “boat people,” the Choctaw Nation’s move from Mississippi to Arkansas, and the secessionist fragmentation of Yugoslavia. Terrence E. Cook, Separation, Assimilation, or Accommodation: Contrasting Ethnic Minority Policies. 3.

51 While a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2006 acknowledged that non-Muslim European attitudes about Muslims have slightly improved since 2002, 41% of


57 Ibid., 40-41.


60 Ibid., 187-191.
61 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity”.


63 Ibid., 195-203.


66 Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France. 175-176; The greater national purpose embodied in republicanism may be best expressed by the goals of the French Revolution: liberty, equality, and fraternity. Professor of French Studies at Loughborough University Alec Hargreaves further elaborates that its abiding requirements are universalism, unitarism, secularism, and assimilationism. Alec G. Hargreaves, Immigration, ‘Race’ and Ethnicity in Contemporary France. 160-164.


68 Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity”.

69 Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France. 140.


71 Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France. 83, 118.


74 Bat Ye’or, a controversial Egyptian-born British writer whose works have gained currency in right-wing European political circles, claims that the officially solicited influence of Middle-


77 Ibid., 148.


83 Alec Hargreaves, a Professor of French Studies at Florida State University, lays out the various lines of opinion regarding the cause of the riots in France in 2005. He notes that the French right consistently argues that Islam is antithetical to assimilation in anything other than a Muslim state. The Front National, out of power at the time of the riots, also criticized the government for violating the spirit of laïcité by allowing Muslim communalism to flourish by its active recognition of and dialogue with groups defined by faith. Hargreaves supports the third line -- arguing that economic conditions, not religious concerns, were at the heart of the conflict. Alec G. Hargreaves, “An Emperor with No Clothes?,” November 28, 2005, linked from *Social


89 Valérie Amiraux, “From Empire to Republic, the French Muslim Dilemma,” in Muslims in 21st Century Europe: Structural and Cultural Perspectives. 147.

90 John R. Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves. 2-3.

91 Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France. 166-172.

92 There is considerable evidence to suggest that the headscarf controversy was far more controversial abroad, particularly in the United States, than in France. This may be attributable to the foundational political culture differences (discussed earlier in the study) regarding the American and French concepts of the separation of church and state. A survey conducted by Le Parisien in 2004 asked self-professed Muslims in France whether they thought the headscarf affair was overblown or had not received enough attention. Over 70% of Muslim respondents felt that the controversy received too much attention. “Les Musulmans et la laïcité,” poll by CSA/Le Parisien/Aujourd’hui en France, January 21, 2004.


94 David Cameron, “Prime Minister’s Speech at the Munich Security Conference”.