Building Partner Capacity at Best Value

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The United States has a new defense strategy. The global strategic environment is changing and defense resources are declining. This has caused the U.S. military to increase emphasis on building partner capacity as a way to achieve strategic security objectives with fewer resources and a smaller force. The new strategy demands that the Army seek strategy alternatives that achieve best value for the resources available. The Army must preserve the capability to conduct decisive operations to win the nations wars. At the same time it must conduct missions to build partner capacity to shape the environment to prevent future conflict. Executing both missions is a requirement of the defense strategy and a dilemma for the Army. The Army must develop solutions that achieve the most toward these two requirements for the resources available. This paper evaluates emerging Army initiatives for building partner capacity in terms of best value. Employing the reserve component as the primary source for BPC missions while focusing active component forces on decisive operations is a solution that allows the Army to effectively meet both the readiness and engagement requirements of the new defense strategy at best value while mitigating strategic risk.
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The United States has a new defense strategy. The global strategic environment is changing and defense resources are declining. This has caused the U.S. military to increase emphasis on building partner capacity as a way to achieve strategic security objectives with fewer resources and a smaller force. The new strategy demands that the Army seek strategy alternatives that achieve best value for the resources available. The Army must preserve the capability to conduct decisive operations to win the nations wars. At the same time it must conduct missions to build partner capacity to shape the environment to prevent future conflict. Executing both missions is a requirement of the defense strategy and a dilemma for the Army. The Army must develop solutions that achieve the most toward these two requirements for the resources available. This paper evaluates emerging Army initiatives for building partner capacity in terms of best value. Employing the reserve component as the primary source for BPC missions while focusing active component forces on decisive operations is a solution that allows the Army to effectively meet both the readiness and engagement requirements of the new defense strategy at best value while mitigating strategic risk.
A reduction in resources will require innovative and creative solutions to maintain our support for allied and partner interoperability and building partner capacity.

—Barack Obama

American national security strategists are now confronted with profound strategy dilemmas. The confluence of increasingly complex and dangerous emerging security threats and decreasing economic means present an immense challenge in developing a security strategy that effectively balances ends, ways, means, and risk. Many factors affect this challenge and must be addressed in the strategy equation. Developing a strategy approach while navigating the turbulent waters of dramatic change in the global security environment is necessary and daunting. For the U.S. Army, this challenge is most pronounced in the balance between the need for force readiness to deter and defeat aggression and the strategic concept of engagement within a resource constrained environment. The Army must be ready to win the nation's wars and build partner capacity (BPC) through engagement with global partners to foster security and stability. These two axes – readiness and engagement – comprise the central focus of the Army's landpower role in National Security Strategy (NSS). Determining the right balance or combination of the requirements of both axes is a critical strategic question. Both must be done! With the increased emphasis on BPC as a major focus of the new U.S. Defense Strategy, how can the Army effectively meet these emerging requirements at best value while mitigating strategic risk? Just where does the fulcrum lie between readiness and engagement? Can one be leveraged to support the other? What risks are involved and what is acceptable and unacceptable risk? Given an era of
dramatically decreasing resources, how can the Army as a force provider meet both requirements—where does best value lie? This study answers these questions and concludes that routinely employing Reserve Component (RC) capabilities as the primary source of forces to meet Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) peacetime military engagement BPC requirements is the best value solution for the Army and the Joint Force. Employing the RC as part of an integrated total force as the primary source for BPC missions while focusing Active Component (AC) forces primarily on readiness for decisive operations is a solution that allows the Army to effectively meet both readiness and engagement requirements at best value while mitigating strategic risk.

Strategic Context for BPC

The nature of the global security environment continues to become more complex and dangerous, driven in large part by the technological advancements of the information age. The resulting diffusion of power and relative easy access to modern instruments of power (i.e. internet, satellite imagery, mobile communications, access to information, etc.) has created an environment where previous strategy approaches are either ineffective, unaffordable, or outright obsolete. As the United States and its allies work through conflict resolution and transition in both Iraq and Afghanistan, new security threats continue to emerge. These threats to U.S. interests include things like widespread social unrest, organized criminal activity, weapons and nuclear proliferation, rapidly growing cyber threats, critical resource scarcity, collapsing economic systems, and political crises, often resulting in a fluid shifting of power among and between states and non-state actors alike. The NSS characterizes this latter phenomenon in this way: “This changing distribution of power indicates a ‘multi-nodal’ world characterized more by shifting, interest-driven coalitions based on diplomatic, military, and economic power
than by rigid security competition between opposing blocs."³ A strategy that relies preponderantly on readiness to deter and defeat aggression is far less suitable against the emerging range of security threats. This, of course, is not to suggest that readiness or large scale military force will necessarily be irrelevant.

There is broad recognition that the ends, ways, means, and risk of U.S. strategy are becoming increasingly out of balance. The changing global security environment, technological developments, lessons learned from a decade of conflict, and most notably, projected decreases in defense resources are among the major factors driving a sea change in U.S. national security. The 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS) directs a shifting of emphasis: "Instead of ‘prevailing’ against all of the enemies who threaten American interests, the 2011 NMS promises that the military will ‘counter’ them via expanded deterrence and expanded partnerships."⁴ More specifically the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) directs specific Security Cooperation objectives and a requirement for Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) to develop Theater Campaign Plans to align security cooperation efforts with strategic objectives.⁵ These key strategic guidance documents have recalibrated America’s national security strategy approach from a readiness-centric strategy (i.e. be prepared to conduct two major regional conflicts) to an engagement-centric strategy that emphasizes alliances and partnerships across the range of Department of Defense missions. In other words, the strategic objectives (ends) have been adjusted to be more relevant to the changing nature of the global security environment in an era of declining resources. The Department of Defense, GCCs, and the Services have started to shift in the direction of this new azimuth.
Framing the Problem: A Strategy Out of Balance

The seismic shifts in the global security environment and the global economic crisis are causing the pillars of national security strategy—objectives (ends), concepts (ways), and resources (means) to tilt out of balance. The “ends” are affected by the nature of the emerging threats, the lessons from a decade of conflict, and the migration toward a deter/prevent-centric strategy. The U.S. strategic ends for use of the military instrument of power as set out in strategic guidance and the new Defense Strategy focus on the new security challenges of the 21st century. The “means” are affected by the ongoing global economic crisis, staggering national debt, and the necessary prioritization of resources in favor of domestic programs. The gap created between shifting ends and decreasing means must be filled by an appropriate combination of ways and acceptable risk in order to achieve the necessary balance. Acceptable risk will ultimately be determined by political leadership, but the “ways” (strategic concepts) will largely be determined by the Defense Department through the Service’s Title 10 responsibilities as force providers. Developing innovative ways that optimize the available means and mitigate risks in achieving strategic ends is the key issue to be resolved. For the Army’s force building strategy, providing force capabilities and concepts (ways) that produce the greatest value within the resource constraints is essential for success.

Any assessment of an issue as vast as U.S. National Security Strategy must be effectively scoped if it is to have any realistic value. With greater emphasis now placed on shaping mission sets as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan draw to a close, the Army plays a central role in the new strategy. While the Asia-Pacific focus of the defense strategy suggests a rebalancing to air and maritime power, the Army’s challenges
remain daunting. Most conflict is land based and the Army plays a major role in capacity building. Because most countries rely on land forces for defense, the Army receives the lion’s share of responsibility for building military to military relationships. Fortunately, the Army currently has capabilities throughout the Total Army that can be leveraged toward solutions. This capacity includes Active, Reserve and Guard capabilities in the Institutional Army/Generating Force and the Operating Force.

What’s at Stake. Security challenges facing the United States leave little room for error. Securing the homeland and protecting vital U.S. interests around the world are at stake. Declining resources in the face of an uncertain and dangerous future mean that strategy alternatives must be carefully thought out in order to avoid unacceptable risks. The overall readiness of the force is also on the line. Solutions that are not carefully thought out risk causing harm to the overall and long-term effectiveness of the force. For example, modernization imbalances, key capability gaps, manning issues, and other potential calamities associated with reduced resources and changes in strategic missions risk the effectiveness of the current and future force. Such issues present unacceptable risk in the Army’s ability to meet the primary mission of the armed forces—fight and win the nation’s wars. Force readiness reinforces the need to be innovative and optimize all of the Army’s capacity to develop solutions with the greatest “value”.

Finding Value

Before evaluating current U.S. Army initiatives and other potential solutions for BPC, it is important to identify what might represent value. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stressed the need to maximize value in a press briefing on the Fiscal Year 2013 Defense Budget saying, “As we build this leaner and more agile joint force, we also
need to redouble efforts to maximize value across the defense enterprise. A broad range of things constitute value in regard to the new defense strategy. Certainly, cost savings and avoidance represent value. If the same or increased capability can be achieved at lower cost or if a solution can achieve the strategic objective while negating or avoiding the need for a current or new capability, it represents value.

Leveraging capabilities and capacity of the Total Army to optimize resources is one source of value. Value is derived from the skills and experience of the force—a part of total capacity. This can be seen in the operational experience of the force over the past decade, especially in the mobilization of the Army Reserve (AR) and Army National Guard (ARNG). On the other hand, value can also be lost. The lack of high intensity combat experience and training in the Army over the past decade has caused this capability to atrophy and diminished the Army’s total capacity. Likewise, there is a risk of operational experience gained by the Reserve and Guard over the past decade to atrophy if they are not routinely employed in the future as part of the operational force.

The relevancy of Army capabilities for meeting the requirements of a supported GCC is another example of value. This value is greatest when the Army can provide capabilities of the right type, the right size, and on the right timeline that can meet the specific needs of the GCC. This is especially the case if it can be done effectively at the lowest cost. The major challenge for the Army is that sufficient resources are not available to maintain capabilities to meet every potential scenario. There are, however, predictable force capability requirements that GCCs need for BPC missions. What is most important in this scenario is striking an appropriate balance between readiness (for unforeseen high intensity combat) and engagement (sustained BPC).
There is inherent value in institutional adaptability and flexibility to generate required capabilities. Such value can serve to hedge against unanticipated requirements as well as provide surge capacity when required. Force generation as a value is expressed in the new Defense Strategy: “DoD will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force.”

Tapping into additive and transferrable skills and experience of the Reserve Components (RC) can generate capabilities for BPC missions. These additive skills and experience include things like civilian acquired skills (skills from civilian careers: law enforcement, education, business development, etc.), cultural/language affiliations, state missions (e.g. border security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief), regional environmental experience (urban, agricultural, coastal, etc.), and more. Such skills and experience currently reside in the RC at virtually no cost to the Army, but can be identified and leveraged toward meeting BPC mission requirements.

Investments that produce a high return also represent greater value. This refers to the old adage, “bang for the buck”. Strategy alternatives that maximize resources increase the value of those resources. It is important to note that using cost as a singular criterion for evaluating strategy alternatives is shortsighted and neglects opportunities for best value. A higher cost alternative may provide exponentially more value for the resources spent. This value may be able to offset costs elsewhere in the Army budget. Therefore, strategy alternatives should be weighed in terms of their total return on investment.
Retaining current operational experience and skills throughout the Total Army represents crucial value. In order to hedge against the risk of a reduced Army force structure, the Army will need the ability to rapidly generate capabilities to meet uncertain future threats. The new defense strategy characterizes this concept as “reversibility” that includes the vectors on which we place our industrial base, our people, our active-reserve component balance, our posture, and our partnership emphasis.10 Operational experience in the RC represents value both in terms of how it can contribute to the concept of reversibility and how it can be used as low cost capability to meet Army requirements. Secretary Panetta highlighted “a National Guard and Reserve component that is ready and prepared for operations – all networked into a highly capable joint force”11 in his description of the future smaller, leaner, but flexible and agile force.

The concept of building partnerships is inherently based on relationships of trust. Trust is established and cultivated through sustained engagement over time. There is value in BPC solutions that build trust through sustained engagement. Conversely, attempts to conduct BPC in the absence of established trusting relationships are likely to be much less effective and therefore actually reduce value.

While BPC is an increasingly important mission set, it is not independent nor the only task the Army is responsible for. As a result, the Army’s approach to BPC must be developed within the larger context of capability and directed mission requirements as the Nation’s primary land component force. Therefore, there is value in a BPC approach that adds strategic and operational depth to overall Army requirements. Likewise, an approach to BPC that detracts from this depth can reduce value.
Institutional and Doctrinal Definitions

Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) is the Army’s institutional process for building trained and ready capabilities to meet GCC requirements. *The Army Strategic Planning Guidance in 2011* characterizes ARFORGEN as “an enduring core process enabling the Army to achieve progressive levels of readiness with predictable recurring periods of availability.” The Army developed ARFORGEN in order to be institutionally responsive as a Title 10 force provider in meeting GCC force rotation requirements. ARFORGEN aligns supporting institutional processes for manning, equipping, training, and mobilizing. Using the ARFORGEN process allows the Army to manage limited institutional resources focused on prioritized force requirements. Flexibility and adaptability in ARFORGEN allows the Army’s institutions to be responsive to changing force readiness requirements. In terms of this study, ARFORGEN is used to describe the full range of supporting institutional processes to generate force capabilities.

Total Army refers to all three Army components as an integral force – Active, Reserve, and Guard. There are certainly unique differences among the components, but together they represent the full range of Army capabilities and capacity. The Department of Defense made a conscious decision to balance capabilities between Active and Reserve Components as a means to sustain required capabilities during a period of massive defense budget cuts following the Vietnam War. The concept of a Total Army remains relevant in today’s comparable environment of dwindling resources.

Operational Reserve is a concept that involves employing the RC through the ARFORGEN process to meet Army force requirements. While there are varying definitions of “operational reserve”, the concept is generally understood as the reserve components moving away from the Cold War construct of seldom used strategic
reserve with lengthy mobilization timelines to a more operationally ready force employed more routinely on a shorter mobilization timeline as part of a Total Army capability.¹⁴

Based on strategic guidance the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) developed and published new Army doctrine for unified land operations, a doctrinal concept for BPC, and completed a capabilities-based assessment for BPC. The Army published Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 *Unified Land Operations* in October 2011 that defines the Army’s principle operational concept of Unified Land Operations this way:

*Unified land operations* describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.¹⁵

This doctrine incorporates stability operations as an integrated component of land operations. More importantly for BPC, it recognizes that, “strategic success requires fully integrating U.S. military operations with the efforts of interagency and multinational partners.”¹⁶ This doctrine rightfully positions stability operations (including BPC) as a central component of Army operations. It further defines two core competencies for the Army: Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security. ADP 3-0 defines Wide Area Security as, “The application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative.”¹⁷ BPC is doctrinally nested within the Wide Area Security core competency and is defined in ADP 3-0 as, “… the outcome of comprehensive inter-organizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic
development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions.”

The unified land operations doctrine establishes a good foundation for BPC missions that is consistent with current strategic guidance.

Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07 defines peacetime military engagement as: “All military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime.” Peacetime engagements are planned and prioritized within the GCC Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP). Each Service then provides supporting plans that describe how they plan to provide Title 10 support to the TSCP for each GCC. An important aspect of BPC is Security Force Assistance (SFA). FM 3-07 defines SFA as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.”

Army Training and Doctrine Pamphlet 525-8-4, the Army Concept for Building Partner Capacity, states that the goal of BPC is to prevent and deter armed conflict altogether and as a result BPC efforts yield the greatest return on investment in Phase 0. The Army concept further describes three key tenets of BPC: a comprehensive approach, sustained engagement, and partner creation and maintenance. Based on current Army doctrine, BPC is central to Army operations and is primarily focused on peacetime shaping operations to deter and prevent conflict.

Evaluation of Army BPC Programs and Initiatives

The Army continues to work toward developing concepts and capabilities to fulfill the requirements prescribed by strategic guidance documents. There are a number of concepts emerging in response to the new azimuth heading toward increased emphasis on BPC. The Army has a long history of international activities aimed at security cooperation and BPC and continues to develop new ways to fulfill these mission sets.
These activities range from small scale, administrative engagements to more robust concepts that have more significant structure, process, authority, and funding impacts.

The small-scale engagements include things like senior leader engagements and military officer exchanges (including international students attending U.S. military courses under the International Military Education and Training program or IMET). Because the value of return on investment of these types of programs is proven, they are not addressed in this analysis. They could be grown with additional resources, but are already optimized in structure, processes, authorities, and funding at this point. However, it is important to mention that even these small-scale programs are valuable to the overall BPC objective and should be further developed within the context of the broader BPC approach. All efforts to build partner capacity should be nested and aligned appropriately with U. S. strategic objectives.

The more robust efforts by the Army toward organizing capabilities to fulfill BPC include a concept for Regionally Aligned Brigade Combat Teams (RAB), expanding the National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP), and expanding the operational employment of Army Reserve (AR) capabilities for security cooperation and BPC missions. These three major initiatives represent the current azimuth heading in the Army’s approach to fulfilling BPC strategic objectives. Whether or not these concepts represent the best value for achieving BPC objectives in an era of constrained resources is open to debate. To ensure proper context, evaluation of these concepts should not be done independently from other major Army mission requirements – in particular the requirement to respond to a high intensity ground combat crisis situation. With increasingly limited resources – and, as a result, limited available capacity and
capabilities – the approach to meeting BPC objectives must be developed within the broader context of Army requirements.

Just how does the Army develop its structure and capabilities for the future to meet the competing requirements of high intensity combat (readiness) and BPC (engagement)? There is a long running debate on this question. One argument, advocated by Gian P. Gentile and Douglas A. MacGregor, calls for the Army to build robust Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) focused on the capability to fight and decisively defeat an adversary in the full range of operations. The counter-argument, advocated by Andrew Krepenevich, John Nagle, and others, advances the concept of a bifurcated Army with separate dedicated capabilities to achieve both types of mission sets – high intensity combat and BPC. Both arguments have their merits, but the impact of significant defense resource reductions increases the imperative to develop a solution that best meets the most mission requirements for the resources available. The Army’s current approaches, therefore, deserve a closer look in this regard.

Regionally Aligned Brigades (RAB). The Army is in the process of implementing the RAB concept as a way to meet BPC requirements as directed in strategic guidance documents. The Department of the Army defines RAB as: “…a tailored Army General Purpose Force usually organized as a modular brigade sourced by the ARFORGEN process to meet Geographic Combatant Commander validated requirements for Security Cooperation missions.” This concept involves a designated BCT that provides capabilities to a specific GCC. Despite this alignment, however, the RAB must still be available for global mission requirements. The RAB concept seeks to leverage capabilities for dual purpose mission sets – conduct regionally oriented BPC
(engagement) and, when required, responds to global contingency mission demands (readiness). According to the Army concept, RABs can be either AC or RC brigades. AC RABs can be augmented with RC capabilities as required. The alignment to the GCC not only allows the RAB to conduct regionally specific training (e.g. language, culture, etc.), it also allows the GCC to have a known set of capabilities that can be leveraged for BPC. The RAB can be employed based on the BPC needs of the GCC. That is, they can be employed as an entire brigade (in an exercise for example) or in smaller elements tailored to the specific BPC task required. The RAB concept is largely based on the prospect that the transition of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will result in more Army BCTs being available for regional alignment to conduct BPC. In other words – mission the BCTs. However, The Army EXORD for the RAB concept specifically states that the current operational environment precludes enduring RAB-GCC relationships and that the RABs must attain decisive action competency while in the Train/Ready pool of ARFORGEN.26

The prospect of using the same capability for both high intensity combat contingencies and BPC would essentially require that risk be balanced within that BCT. The RAB concept requires the unit to be prepared for both mission sets and associated tasks such as rapid deployment and other readiness requirements. It is implausible for a brigade sized element to be proficient in both mission sets simultaneously or for the unit to become proficient in its warfighting tasks while executing a regionally focused BPC mission. Therefore, the RAB would have to assume continuous risk in some area of training and readiness. When the RAB conducts BPC missions, even if only selected elements of the RAB deploy, it degrades their ability to collectively train for high intensity
combat. From a force management and force readiness standpoint, this puts a heavy burden on the unit. Further, it potentially diminishes operational depth within the Army in crisis situations with units fragmented conducting BPC missions. Categorizing the BCT as globally available for its primary warfighting mission while it is executing BPC engagement missions is a fallacy. With the reduction of BCTs in the Army, the impact on operational depth will become more pronounced. Assigning multiple simultaneous mission sets to a unit that it cannot realistically be trained and ready for, particularly in an era of diminishing resources, does not produce value for the Army. Rather, it assumes risk within the unit itself and actually reduces capabilities and capacity by stretching units too thin over required mission sets. In other words, the resources required to maintain the AC RAB risks a unit that may not be able to adequately achieve either mission when required because it is stretched too thin and confronted with competing demands in a resourced constrained environment.

In terms of leveraging the value of the Total Army (RC integration), the RAB concept EXORD does little more than mention that the RAB could be AC or RC and that RC elements could augment the RAB as necessary. There is potential for increased value in the RAB concept if RC capabilities are integrated. However, since the concept is oriented primarily on AC brigades, this analysis focuses on the RAB mission filled by an AC BCT.

The relevancy of RAB capabilities to GCC requirements certainly depends on the type of modular brigade serving as the RAB. There is potential for the RAB concept to produce value if the capabilities match requirements. However, in the case of a BCT RAB, there are limited organic capabilities that are relevant to BPC missions as defined
in Army doctrine. Certainly, the BCT could fulfill tactical level SFA requirements and to a much more limited respect, institutional level SFA. In addition, some functional elements of the BCT could provide capacity building in areas like intelligence, logistics, communications, etc., but these too are tactical level capabilities. Of course, the concept includes provisions for augmentation by other capabilities, whether AC or RC. The issue then is if the preponderance of the BPC requirements for the RAB are either above the tactical level or outside the organic capabilities of the assigned RAB, the capabilities of the brigade itself would then be less relevant to the requirements. The Army has employed BCTs in Iraq and Afghanistan for several years now specifically to build the capacity of the Iraqi and Afghani security forces. As a result, there is considerable experience in the SFA area. This experience can provide value if the RAB has that experience that can be leveraged toward SFA tasks in other countries/regions. The issue is that many of the BPC requirements involve building capacity at the institutional level and not necessarily at the tactical level. In fact, General Carter Ham, Commander, U.S. Africa Command, in describing potential BPC requirements for Libya recently noted that, "The Libyans are good fighters – they don’t need a lot of training at the tactical level. I think our best effort is at the institutional level." This often involves more non-traditional skills including governance, economic development, etc as described in Army doctrine on BPC. So, the relevancy of the RAB capabilities to the GCC BPC requirements is likely to be very limited.

Employing only organic RAB capabilities does not require much in terms of institutional force generation. The RAB itself would have the capacity with minimal institutional support to deploy small scale BPC capability packages to meet GCC
requirements. Of course, if the entire RAB deploys, requirements for higher level institutional support increases. In cases where augmentation capabilities, especially RC capabilities, are needed to support the BPC mission of the RAB, support of the institutional Army is more likely required to generate those capabilities. The value of routinely exercising the institutional Army in force generation lies primarily in developing the adaptability and flexibility needed to achieve the broader mobilization and expansion of capabilities to meet uncertain future threats. Conversely, by not routinely exercising force generation, that institutional capability will atrophy over time, increasing the risk to achieving the “reversibility” prescribed in the new defense strategy. So while the RAB concept has some potential for producing value in the adaptability and flexibility of force generation, it is limited and contingent upon the exercising of those institutional processes.

Many BPC requirements, other than SFA, rely more on non-traditional skills and experiences gained outside of the military. If the RAB is augmented with the requisite RC capabilities with these types of non-traditional skills, there can be value drawn from this important source of additive, transferable skills. If, on the other hand, the RAB relies only on organic traditional military skills, not only will the capabilities likely be less relevant to the requirement, but will not leverage the additive non-traditional skills resident in the RC. Once again, here we have a source of value, but only in cases where the RAB is augmented with RC capabilities that possess these additive skills and experience.

Evaluating return on investment is always a good idea, especially in a resource constrained environment. This is particularly important for a nation facing difficult
choices regarding government spending. It is fair to say that effectiveness of the military is not always synonymous with efficiency. In some cases, being effective may not be efficient and that may be necessary. That said, it is only prudent to consider cost and return on investment in developing solutions to military requirements. Assigning an AC brigade to the RAB mission for BPC should be evaluated for return on investment. Considering the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the RAB would likely be spread too thin across multiple mission requirements, it would be fair to say that costs could be lower (if no crisis situation arises) by using a single unit to cover multiple missions. However, the return on that investment would be a capability less likely to be ready for either mission because of competing requirements and detractors. In this case, it seems that the efficiency of assigning multiple missions to a single unit would degrade its effectiveness. As a result, it would also increase risk and associated costs. The return on investment, then, for a predominantly AC RAB is a unit spread thin against multiple competing training and readiness requirements with increased and potentially unacceptable risk in readiness to respond to unanticipated crises.

Maintaining operational experience – in particular the individual and collective experience of conducting current operations – is valuable in enhancing the Army’s ability to achieve increased readiness and responsiveness. The RAB concept can achieve this objective for those capabilities it leverages in support of the BPC mission. The AC RAB has the benefit of being able to execute training – individual and collective – in an active status. This training as a unit, even under simulated conditions and environments, can serve to sustain operational experience. The predominantly AC RAB does not provide the opportunities for the Army to maintain operational experience in
the RC through routine employment. An argument can be made that it is more important for maintaining operational experience in the Total Army for RC capabilities to be employed routinely. Relying predominantly on the AC to execute the RAB mission will result in diminished overall retention of operational experience across the Total Army force, unless the RC is routinely employed for other than RAB type missions.

The effectiveness of BPC is directly related to building lasting trusting relationships with partners through sustained engagement over long time periods. This is particularly true for institutional capacity development. It is less significant for tactical level SFA. The RAB concept has good potential for improving the capacity for partner tactical level units and tasks, but would still be hindered somewhat by the absence of longer term relationship building. There are a number of factors that reduce the value of RABs executing sustained engagements over time. These include the temporary nature of RAB assignments to a GCC, the pace of personnel turnover in AC units, the short-term “in and out” BPC missions, and the shifting focus of the RAB between competing training and readiness requirements. The RAB concept falls considerably short of achieving a sustained engagement over long time periods.

The last area of value to be considered is the RAB concept’s effect on operational and strategic depth within the Army. The Army achieves depth by having the ability to increase capability and capacity of Army forces as required to meet national security requirements. Having operational and strategic depth increases in importance when resources are constrained or even reduced. This is a major challenge for the Army in the effort to build the Army of 2020. The Army clearly cannot afford to maintain all forces that may be required in a contingency on active duty and at sufficient
readiness levels. As a result, tradeoffs must be made to balance readiness, engagement, and risk. The RAB concept, as discussed earlier, incurs risks in both readiness and engagement. Additionally, if the RAB is predominantly AC, there is less opportunity to build depth in RC capabilities by maintaining operational experience if they are not employed routinely. Employing an AC RAB does little to enhance operational or strategic depth in Army forces. In fact, it can have the opposite effect if the RAB is stretched too thin and RC capabilities are not routinely employed.

Expanding the State Partnership Program. The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) was initiated in the early 1990’s as an effort to partner with Eastern European nations in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union. The program involves partnering U.S. states with countries within GCC areas of responsibility for the purpose of military to military engagements. The purpose of the program is to strengthen relationships to facilitate “cooperation, access, and interoperability; improving cultural awareness and skills among U.S. military personnel; and fostering the integration of reserve and active component forces into a ‘total force’.”28 The National Guard Bureau (NGB) manages the program and coordinates with GCCs and the Department of State to conduct activities that include military to military familiarization and training events, homeland defense/security, border security, and disaster relief/preparation, among others. The program is not a formal statutory program by itself, but is funded and executed under authorities in Title 10 U.S.C., Title 32 U.S.C., and National Defense Authorization Act authorities. As of July, 2011 there were 63 state partnerships established across six GCCs. That is roughly one third of all countries in the world that are engaged in this program. The program represents a significant effort toward
achieving U.S. national security objectives. There are some efforts underway to expand the program to more countries, regionally focus it, and potentially even increase in civilian engagements to support key aspects of the new defense strategy in BPC. There have been concerns expressed by Congress regarding the programs compliance with statutory requirements/restrictions, encroachment on Department of State responsibilities, and appropriate oversight of global engagements under this program. Notwithstanding these concerns, the program has a nearly twenty year record of performance in contributing to GCC security cooperation requirements. The program deserves a closer look in terms of the value it provides to meeting BPC requirements relative to its costs.

Employing capabilities from the ARNG for BPC in the SPP can be a cost effective approach to meeting Army BPC mission requirements. While the ARNG is employed, the Army would incur costs in pay and allowances for those Soldiers on active duty status. However, in comparison to AC Soldiers, those costs are only incurred when the ARNG Soldiers are on active duty. The deployment and operational costs of employment would be comparable for ARNG and AC capabilities. When ARNG Soldiers are not on active duty status, the costs are significantly reduced, not only for their pay and allowances, but also for other costs like family housing, medical, and the difference in the full range of benefits and services between AC and ARNG. In a non-active duty (i.e. only serving 2 days per month and 2 week annual training period) status the ARNG provides 32 percent of Army capabilities at only eleven percent of the base budget in FY’12. As a result, employing ARNG for BPC can be a very cost effective approach.
Using ARNG capabilities for BPC can reduce demands for AC capabilities and provide value by allowing AC units to focus more exclusively on training and readiness for contingencies and any crisis requiring a decisive operations response. Similar to using AC BCTs for the RAB mission, the ARNG also has dual mission requirements. They have both state mission requirements and Title 10 federal mission requirements. State governors have expectations that their ARNG will be ready and available to meet unexpected state requirements such as disaster response and homeland defense. These requirements must be balanced with federal missions like BPC and contingency deployments. While there may be some competing requirements for ARNG capabilities, the training and readiness requirements for state missions and BPC missions are more closely aligned than those competing missions between BPC and decisive operations.

Using the SPP to meet BPC requirements leverages the capabilities of the Total Army. Routine employment of the ARNG provides value in enhancing the integration of the Total Army. Routine employment improves readiness, not only within the units being employed, but also at the institutional level through the exercising of force generation and deployment processes. The Army has exercised the force generation and deployment of ARNG capabilities for employment in Iraq and Afghanistan which produced recognized value. This value however, would dissipate if the capabilities were no longer routinely employed and they reverted back to a seldom used strategic reserve. Despite this value, there are some drawbacks to the SPP that detract from Total Army integration. First, the SPP is based on individual state partnerships. This creates a natural competition for resources and missions between States, resulting in an incentive for State ARNG interests outweighing national, Army, or GCC interests and
priorities for BPC. Secondly, the SPP program is currently managed by the National Guard Bureau (NGB), a joint force organization, and falls outside of the normal processes for ARFORGEN and Global Force Management (GFM) used by the Army to execute its Title 10 force provider role. As a result, the current management of employing the ARNG in the SPP program actually detracts from Total Army integration. This creates inherent limitations and constraints in the Army’s ability to leverage the capabilities and capacity of the Total Army.

Unique aspects of the ARNG can be leveraged to provide value to specific types of BPC missions. The relevancy of ARNG state mission to BPC missions can be exploited to the benefit of the Army. Each state ARNG has unique characteristics. The geography, demographics, types of capabilities, etc. are unique to each State. These types of characteristics include things like agriculture, border security, urban disaster response, ethnic communities, coastal environment, earthquakes, etc. ARNG units from specific regions in the U.S. can be leveraged to conduct BPC in countries or regions with similar characteristics, thereby leveraging this more intangible value for the Army in meeting BPC requirements. Illinois, for example, is partnered with Poland. Illinois has a large Polish ethnic community, so there are cultural ties between the two. The SPP also provides relevancy to BPC in terms of state level institutions and governance. By its nature, the ARNG is an institution within the state government with a myriad of connections to state governing institutions. The missions and functions of these state institutions are very relevant with regard to the institutional capacity building as part of BPC. Leveraging these unique characteristics of the ARNG provides value at essentially no cost to the Army.
Leveraging the SPP for BPC missions can serve to enhance the adaptability and flexibility of the ARFORGEN process, primarily by exercising the institutional processes through mobilization and routine employment. Integrating ARNG capabilities into the ARFORGEN process for BPC missions requires institutional understanding and alignment of authorities, funding mechanisms, and mission priorities. Understanding and exercising these can reduce or eliminate institutional barriers and increase the options for the Army in providing Army capabilities for the full range of operations, even beyond BPC. Currently, the SPP is not fully integrated into the ARFORGEN process. It is managed by the NGB with direct coordination for missions and funding with the GCCs. This method of management provides only limited value to the adaptability and flexibility of the ARFORGEN process. Further, because SPP involves Army forces managed outside of Army processes, it can create conflict with the Army’s force provider role under Title 10.

In addition to the unique characteristics of ARNG units from specific regions as described earlier, ARNG Soldiers have skill sets from their civilian occupations or professions. General Gordon Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff, characterized these skills as augmenting their military capabilities that results in: “…rendering them a cost-effective and highly talented force well suited for operations that the U.S. military will likely perform over the next 20 years.” These skills represent additive value for the Army because they come at no cost to the Army and in many cases are transferable to Army BPC missions. These transferrable skills have been employed in Iraq and Afghanistan in a BPC capacity. Specific civilian skill sets have been leveraged to support Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and other capacity building efforts.
CENTCOM is currently capitalizing on specific agriculture expertise of Kansas ARNG personnel by employing them in Afghanistan as members of National Guard Agri-Business Development Teams.31

In terms of return on investment, employing ARNG capabilities for BPC missions provides considerable return. First, the Army can capitalize on civilian skills at no cost. The ARNG can leverage state institutions in support of BPC missions. The readiness of the ARNG unit is increased when routinely employed, providing operational and strategic depth for other missions as required. This can reduce the demand for higher cost AC capabilities. The overall cost of maintaining ARNG capabilities is significantly lower than maintaining the same capability in active status. In an era of declining defense resources, getting the most for each dollar spent is critical to meeting national security requirements. Leveraging value, including intangible value, should be a key objective in developing a strategy approach to Army BPC mission requirements.

The SPP has a decades long record of providing sustained engagement for BPC. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) recognizes the value of the sustained engagement provided by the SPP in its 2012 Posture Statement. “The true value of this program is the enduring relationships that have been built over time, as many of EUCOMs State partnerships are approaching their twenty-year anniversaries.”32 Building institutional capacity in partner nations requires long term effort supported by trusted relationships. These relationships take time to build. The SPP provides opportunities for ARNG personnel to remain engaged in the partnership throughout their careers in the ARNG. This represents a value that is simply not possible when AC units are employed in BPC missions. This long term engagement not only benefits the trusted
relationships between ARNG personnel and partner nations personnel, but it also builds and retains regional and cultural experience in the ARNG personnel. Through this sustained engagement, this experience is maintained in the ARNG for the long term. The Army can draw on this experience, not only for BPC missions, but also for any future contingencies where the experience would benefit the Army.

Routinely employing ARNG capabilities to conduct BPC builds and sustains their readiness and enhances capabilities and capacity across the Total Army. This readiness provides value in increasing the operational and strategic depth of the Army. The broader the base of operationally ready forces that the Army can draw upon in times of crisis the better the responsiveness and chances for successful resolution of the crisis. On the other hand, if ARNG capabilities revert back to seldom used strategic reserve forces, their readiness will atrophy and their responsiveness delayed, thereby increasing strategic risk for the Army.

Operational Employment of the Army Reserve for BPC. The Chief, Army Reserve published the Army Reserve Vision and Strategy 2020 in February, 2011. This document is a blueprint for how the AR could be leveraged to provide value to the Total Army of 2020. One of the main elements of the vision is an enduring operational Army Reserve that is routinely employed to conduct Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and BPC missions. The AR is a federal force consisting of roughly eighteen percent of the Army’s capabilities. The majority of these capabilities are “enablers”, that is, capabilities that support and enable major Army combat formations. The AR initiative for employing these capabilities for BPC is part of the broader objective of sustaining the AR as part of the Army’s operational force, which is widely recognized as an imperative for the
Army.\textsuperscript{33} Much like the National Guard SPP, the AR vision involves routine employment of capabilities in support of GCC BPC requirements. The initiative involves employing AR capabilities for periods longer than their traditional two weeks of Annual Training in an involuntary mobilization status for roughly 90 to 120 days. At the institutional support level, the Army Reserve is orienting its operational and functional commands (i.e. Theater Sustainment Command, Theater Signal Command, etc.) on supporting the employment of capabilities for TSC and BPC missions. This not only engages individual unit capabilities, but also higher level institutional support within the functional area. One key difference in this initiative is that, unlike SPP, AR capabilities are not necessarily aligned with a particular partner nation. This provides some flexibility to the GCC in meeting their BPC priorities with AR capabilities without the burden of competing interests as in the competition between States for SPP missions and resources. As a federal force, the AR incorporated this initiative into the Army Campaign Plan “…to continue its institutional adaptation and transformation to an enduring operational force.”\textsuperscript{34} Just like the RAB concept and the SPP, this AR initiative deserves a closer look to assess best value for the Army.

Like the ARNG, the AR provides cost effective capabilities for the Army. The AR provides eighteen percent of Army capabilities for just 3.8 percent of the FY12 Army budget.\textsuperscript{35} The Army senior leadership clearly recognized this value and the benefits associated with leveraging this value as part of the Army of the future in their Congressional testimony on the 2011 Army Posture Statement. “Transforming the reserve component into an enduring operational force provides a historic opportunity to achieve the most cost effective use of the entire force.”\textsuperscript{36} As a federal force consisting
mostly of enabling capabilities, the AR does not face the same challenges of dual missioning with associated competing requirements as the ARNG or the AC RAB. The AR has no state mission requirements nor do they have the combat formations with complex collective training requirements required to respond quickly to decisive operations contingency missions.

Employing AR capabilities for BPC achieves much of the same benefits of leveraging Total Army capabilities previously described for the ARNG. In addition, as a Title 10 federal force, the AR is more closely aligned with the AC and the transformation of the AR to the Army of 2020 is incorporated into the Army Campaign Plan (ACP). Therefore, there is a greater degree of integration possible between the AR and the AC. The value in this is that it presents the Army with greater operational flexibility and increased options when the force is more closely integrated. And like the ARNG, routine employment of the AR builds readiness and capacity for the Army.

The AR currently has capabilities that are compatible and very relevant to BPC missions. One hundred percent of the Army’s Theater Engineer Commands, Civil Affairs Commands, and Training Divisions are in the AR. More than two thirds of the Army’s Civil Affairs Brigades, Medical Brigades, and Expeditionary Sustainment Brigades are in the AR. These are just representative examples of the types of enabling capabilities in the AR. These types of capabilities are not only suitable for tactical level BPC, but they are also relevant for institutional level BPC. For example, Training Divisions can both train foreign troops on individual tasks as well as help build institutional level training capability. Not only does this build partner capacity, but also sustains the readiness of U.S. Army Training Divisions – a critical Army capability required to execute the concept
of expansibility and reversibility. In addition to these capabilities, the AR has a range of unique capabilities like Information Operations Teams, Legal Support Organizations, etc. that can fill specific GCC BPC requirements that are not suitable for BCT type units. Because of the mission compatibility, when these units are employed for BPC, the operational experience gained is easily transferrable to the full range of operations. The capability requirements for these types of units are not exclusive, nor do they compete between different missions sets like a RAB BCT or an ARNG unit with both federal and state mission requirements.

Exercising the AR through routine BPC missions can enhance the adaptability and flexibility of the ARFORGEN process much the same as it does for employing the ARNG. Unlike the National Guard SPP, however, mobilization and employment of the AR is managed through the ARFORGEN process. As a result, the employment of the AR is exercised without direct coordination with the GCC and separate funding mechanisms like SPP managed by the NGB. The more homogenous characteristics of AR employment with Army institutional processes make it more suitable for enhancing the adaptability and flexibility of the ARFORGEN process, increasing options for the Army.

The AR can also provide additive civilian skills toward BPC missions much the same as the ARNG. The AR is not an organization of state government and does not provide the same degree of state-level institutional skills that the ARNG can provide. However, based on the enabler capabilities in the AR, there are a whole range of professional skills that are shared between the Army and the Reserve Soldier’s employer. Many of these are highly skilled workers including personnel with
qualifications in medical, engineering, legal, law enforcement, etc. This provides value to the Army because these personnel acquire civilian skills that can be leveraged at no cost for Army BPC missions.

The return on investment for employing AR capabilities for BPC is, again, much the same as discussed earlier for the ARNG. Not only a very cost effective approach, but also one that provides a whole range of value for the Army, both tangible and intangible. Like the ARNG, the value reaped from using the AR is directly linked to the routine employment and the investments made in these capabilities. If the Army foregoes investing in and routinely employing the AR, it can have the opposite effect on value. This is something neither the Army nor the nation can afford when shrinking resources must provide for national security in a period of uncertainty.

Recent studies have shown that the operational experience of the AR gained over the past decade of combat operations is a value worthy of retaining. The studies have further shown that the best way to retain that experience is through routine operational employment. This is true for both the AR and the ARNG. Once again, a modest investment in employing these capabilities can produce value that the Army can leverage against unpredictable mission requirements where rapid response is necessary and can be provided by an operationally ready AR. This operational and strategic depth and responsiveness provides value to the Army, but should not be taken for granted and not resourced, otherwise it will atrophy and dissipate resulting in increased strategic risk.

Unlike the National Guard SPP, the AR is not aligned with specific partner countries. This makes it more challenging to build long term relationships with specific
partners. On the other hand, there are ways to achieve conditions for long term relationship building with AR personnel. For example, an AR Operational and Functional Command like a Theater Signal Command can be aligned with a major TSC/BPC exercise like Combined Endeavor in EUCOM that aims to enhance communications interoperability between many partners in EUCOM AOR. By using the same AR units to support this annual exercise, relationships among participants can grow over time. The AR is more stable in terms of personnel turnover than the AC. Consequently, an AC RAB would not be able to achieve the same degree of long term relationship building as a more stable Army Reserve command.

Conclusion

Recent strategic guidance documents place a greater emphasis on BPC as a means to reduce the likelihood of conflict in the future that would require involvement of land forces in decisive operations. Shaping operations can have a positive impact on relationships and access to critical regions, but cannot guarantee that decisive operations capabilities will not be required in the future. Therefore, the best approach is to maximize and balance the capabilities and capacity in the Total Army to achieve both missions with the least risk. This necessarily requires an approach that generates the most value for the resources available. Employing the RC as part of an integrated total force as the primary source for BPC missions while focusing AC forces primarily on decisive operations is a solution that allows the Army to effectively meet both readiness and engagement requirements at best value while mitigating strategic risk.

The Army’s current concept for RAB falls short of generating value and mitigating strategic risk in comparison to concepts for employing RC capabilities to conduct BPC missions. The ARNG SPP has a long track record of effectiveness in BPC and is a cost
effective option for the Army, however, there are some challenges and limitations that should be addressed. Nevertheless, expanding the SPP can contribute to an effective best value solution for the Army. Employing AR capabilities for BPC is also cost effective for the Army and can contribute to the best value solution for BPC. These conclusions are based on five key points from the analysis. The first is optimizing the capabilities and capacity of the Total Army. Second, is applying the right capabilities to meet the BPC requirement. Next, is retaining operational experience and building operational depth. Fourth, is enhancing the Army’s institutional capacity for force generation. And fifth, achieving long term sustained engagement with security partners.

The concept of getting the most of what you can afford seems simple and straightforward. In the case of the Army’s current dilemma in developing an effective BPC concept, it means that the capabilities and unique characteristics of all Army components should be evaluated from a value perspective. RC capabilities are cost effective for the Army and therefore should be leveraged wherever possible and appropriate. Not all missions are appropriate for RC capabilities. In this regard, the AC is a force that can be maintained at readiness levels that can respond very quickly to an emergent crisis – a non-negotiable readiness requirement for the Army. As an active force, they have more opportunity to train for the complex collective missions that are required for high intensity decisive operations. BPC missions are generally predictable and more compatible with longer range planning and thus, more suitable for RC capabilities to perform. Again, if a more cost effective RC capability can be leveraged, it should. The RAB concept essentially foregoes this value by focusing AC capabilities on BPC missions. Further, the RAB concept risks relegating RC capabilities to a seldom
employed strategic reserve, thereby increasing the gaps between the Army components and degrading the value of a more integrated AC/RC force. Using AC capabilities for BPC is a more expensive option where a more cost effective option is possible. Effective optimization involves employing the right capability for suitable missions that can produce value at reduced cost while limiting the use of more costly options that don’t produce as much value. Employing RC capabilities as part of an integrated Total Army force as the primary source of forces for BPC missions optimizes Army capabilities.

Applying the right capabilities to BPC goes beyond cost effectiveness and optimization. There are benefits, limitations, and risks associated with employing different Army capabilities for BPC. There is value in leveraging unique characteristics and civilian acquired skills in the ARNG and AR toward BPC missions. An AC unit by contrast, has a mix of Soldiers from across the country without similar civilian skills. These civilian skills are often more compatible to BPC than those military ones found in an AC BCT. Additionally, there are some significant limitations in using either AC or ARNG capabilities for BPC. In both cases there are competing requirements for training and readiness. For the AC, a BCT required to conduct BPC on one hand and be trained and ready for full spectrum decisive operations on the other is a conundrum. For the ARNG, units often must balance state and federal mission requirements. ARNG dual missions are typically more compatible for BPC than the dual missions of the AC BCT RAB because of the type of capabilities and the fact that ARNG units are not required to be trained and ready for immediate employment in full spectrum decisive operations missions. AR capabilities are less susceptible to this dual mission dilemma, and in most
cases are not affected at all. This is largely because the types of capabilities in the AR are compatible with both BPC and their full spectrum mission requirements, creating a mutually supporting relationship between missions as opposed to competing requirements as in the case with AC and ARNG.

Routine employment of RC capabilities for BPC enhances their operational readiness by sustaining their experience in conducting operational missions. This readiness and experience can be leveraged not only for additional BPC missions, but more importantly for full spectrum operations should the Army need to surge and expand forces to meet an emergent crisis. An RC force with current operational experience improves overall strategic responsiveness and provides the Army with an operational depth that otherwise would not exist. This is a critical contribution to the new defense strategy as a hedge against the risks associated with a smaller AC force.

Given that the defense strategy has reversibility and expansibility as a significant component meant to hedge against risks associated with a smaller AC force and an uncertain future, institutional force generation capacity is critical for the Army. Exercising Army institutional processes, especially mobilization processes, enhances institutional readiness to meet the requirements of the defense strategy. Routine employment of RC capabilities exercises institutional processes, authorities, and funding sources. The RAB concept does little to exercise institutional Army processes and would likely result in atrophy of that capacity over time. This presents significant risks to the Army’s ability to respond effectively to the potential emergent crises of an uncertain future. Reduced institutional capacity and readiness combined with reduced operational experience and depth in the RC has a compounding negative effect on the Army’s ability to meet the
requirements of the defense strategy – arguably creating unacceptable strategic risk. On the other hand, routine employment of the RC for BPC provides significant value in that it can overcome both of these negative effects.

Effective BPC is a long-term effort built on trusting relationships. In this regard, the National Guard SPP provides the greatest value to the Army by fostering effective long-term relationship building, albeit limited to specific partnerships between States and their partner country. The RAB concept on the other hand has little to no value in long-term relationship building. The short-term nature of RAB engagements and the high personnel turnover rates in AC units make the RAB much less suitable for long-term BPC. The effectiveness of the RAB concept is inhibited by this important limitation. BPC engagements by AR units typically have more stability than a RAB, but generally do not have the same long-term effect that the SPP has. The value of sustained long-term engagement can only be achieved by employing RC capabilities for BPC.

The analysis above offers insight into the questions posed in the introduction. Where the fulcrum lies between readiness and engagement can determine the effectiveness of the Army in meeting the requirements of the new defense strategy. The Army should not use AC BCTs to do both missions as a RAB, with limited exceptions. Nor should an AC BCT be used as the primary source of Army forces to conduct BPC. Rather, the Army should leverage the capabilities and capacity of the Total Army and use the RC as the primary source for engagement missions. Taking this strategy approach, the engagements of the RC can be leveraged to support readiness for full spectrum requirements by building an operationally ready RC. By not taking this approach and consequently under-investing in and not routinely employing the RC, the
Army risks atrophy in key capabilities – readiness in RC units and the institutional force generating capabilities – that could lead to unacceptable risks to the Army’s ability to meet the requirements of the new defense strategy. The Army can do both missions effectively by rebalancing missions and capabilities between the AC and the RC. The best value for the Army is to use AC capabilities primarily for meeting the most important demands in readiness to deter and defeat aggression (win the Nation’s wars), while RC capabilities are exercised and strengthened by peacetime BPC engagements. Leveraging value to ensure the success of the new defense strategy while mitigating strategic risk given the prospects of continued reductions in defense resources is the strategic way forward for the Army. In light of this strategic truth, in executing BPC missions to support U.S. national security strategy the Army should:

- Routinely employ the RC as the primary source of capabilities to conduct required BPC missions
- Make the necessary investments in the required readiness levels for RC capabilities to execute BPC – if necessary, reduce AC force structure to generate savings that can be shifted to lower cost RC capabilities
- Complete measures to achieve greater institutional integration of the Total Army to increase the flexibility of the force in order to generate increased options for both conducting BPC missions and responding to unpredictable threats

Endnotes


10 Ibid., 7.


16 Ibid., 1.

17 Ibid., Glossary 1.

18 Ibid., 3.


20 Ibid., Glossary-9.

Ibid., 18.


Ibid.


Ibid.


