Building Partner Logistics Capacity

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14. ABSTRACT
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ABSTRACT

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Since 11 September 2001, U.S. policy-makers have placed greater emphasis on the need to work closely with global partners and allies in today’s complex, challenging security environment. Many U.S. partner nations do not have the military capacity to effectively meet their security needs, and the United States mitigates this vulnerability by building partner capacity. In the course of building partner capacity, logistics capacity must be a key consideration, because logistics capacity sets the limits of what a nation can do militarily. Many U.S. partners around the world do not have suitable logistics capability and need assistance building it, but the United States does not focus on this aspect of security cooperation. Strategic leaders can help global partner nations become more self-reliant and self-sustaining by placing greater emphasis on building partner nation logistics capacity at the strategic and theater levels.
BUILDING PARTNER LOGISTICS CAPACITY

Well trained security forces are of limited utility, or indeed counterproductive, without the institutional systems and processes to sustain them…”¹

—2010 Quadrennial Defense Review

Since 11 September 2001, U.S. policy-makers have placed greater emphasis on the need to work closely with partners and allies—perhaps more than ever—to deal with today’s complex, challenging security environment. The 21st century operating environment is characterized by instability and globalization, which requires the United States to cooperate with other nations. In the 2010 National Security Strategy, President Barack Obama wrote:

We are focusing on assisting developing countries and their people to manage security threats, reap the benefits of global economic expansion, and set in place accountable and democratic institutions that serve basic human needs. Through an aggressive and affirmative development agenda and commensurate resources, we can strengthen the regional partners we need to help us stop conflicts and counter global criminal networks…and ultimately position ourselves to better address key global challenges…in the decades ahead.²

The United States must pursue its foreign policy objectives through global partnerships and alliances because it does not have the capability or capacity to single-handedly achieve its national military objectives. According to the Former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Gordon R. England, “the nation’s strategic objectives are unattainable without a unified approach among capable partners at home and with key friends and allies abroad.”³ One of the great challenges with global partnerships is that many partner nations do not have the military capacity to meet their own security needs or to participate in multinational operations. The United States attempts to mitigate this vulnerability by building partner capacity.
The United States Joint Staff defines building partner capacity as “a whole-of-government concept that…works toward strengthening the security of states at risk of conflict and violence by investing in improved capacities of strong and capable partners.” In other words, building partner capacity is a way to shore up those global partners that need assistance providing their own security, and it presupposes that stronger multinational partners and allies contribute to greater peace and international order, both of which are enduring U.S. national interests.

Building partner capacity falls under the larger strategic concept of security cooperation, which is defined as:

Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

Partner capacity building comes from the phrase “…develop allied and friendly military capabilities...” This particular type of U.S. security cooperation is not new. The U.S. military conducted similar activities during the eighteenth century in the Caribbean, Central America, and Asia—albeit not as clearly defined then as it is today.

As the United States strives to build partner capacity around the world, building partner nation logistics must be a key consideration. Logistics capacity is a strategic imperative for any nation trying to strengthen its national defense, because logistics sets the limits of what a nation can do militarily. In 2007, the congressionally-appointed Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq made a clear connection between logistics capacity and military capability in its report to Congress:

The lack of logistics experience and expertise within the Iraqi armed forces is substantial and hampers their readiness and capability. Renewed
emphasis on Coalition mentoring and technical support will be required to remedy this situation.  

Perhaps the Iraqi military leadership at the time could relate to a remark made by renowned U.S. Army General George S. Patton, who allegedly once said, “logistics, I don't know nothing about these logistics, but I want some.”

**Logistics: What it is and Why it is Important**

Logistics is defined as planning and executing the movement and support of military forces. Its core capabilities are: supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, health service support, engineering, logistic services, and operational contract support. It is debatable whether or not General Patton actually made the above quote, but he clearly understood the importance of logistics. In August 1944, after the Normandy landing while the allied offensive pushed through France toward Germany, General Patton’s 3rd Army literally ran out of fuel, and had to halt their advance. According to historian and author, Martin Van Creveld, several allied operations in the European Theater during World War II were initiated and subsequently cancelled for purely logistical reasons. This vividly highlights how logistics can constrain military operations, if not properly developed and managed. Military operations depend on logistics across all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategic logistics provides a nation with the ability to build, project and sustain military power over time through its industrial base. Operational logistics is the sum of those activities and resources required to sustain campaigns and major operations. Tactical logistics is the provision of resources at a point of need to enable execution of military tasks. Each level of logistics is important and inter-dependent on the other to provide the right resources, at the right place and at the right time to move and sustain a force.
Logistics should be an enabler for military success, not a proverbial *sword of Damocles* hanging over the head of military commanders. A stunning example of logistical success took place during the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom. Within three months after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, U.S. Task Force 58 (TF 58), commanded by then-Brigadier General James N. Mattis, launched an amphibious raid over 350 nautical miles from the sea into Southern Afghanistan. For nearly three months, TF 58 conducted a series of combat operations in austere, isolated areas that required very complex logistics support. Through detailed planning and the combined efforts of logisticians at every level, TF 58 was sustained, accomplished its mission, and helped unseat the Taliban Regime from power.\(^\text{12}\)

The success of TF 58 bears witness that logistics can enable military action and is one of the greatest strengths of U.S. military capability. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen said:

> Historically, the United States has derived its military superiority from a remarkable ability to translate technological innovation, industrial capacity and a robust logistical architecture into effective battlefield advantages. This exceptional logistical capability represents a potent force multiplier for our Nation.\(^\text{13}\)

Logistics capacity is equally important for both developed and developing nations, yet with its vast logistics capability at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, the United States has under-emphasized building this capacity of its partners. Logistics capacity building is critical to help partners and allies strengthen their security, overcome their military readiness challenges, and enable action to solve 21st century security challenges. Many U.S. partners around the world, beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, need assistance building their logistics capacity, but the United States does not focus on this aspect of security cooperation. The United States should improve
partner logistics capacity building efforts in three ways. First, strategic leaders should emphasize logistics capacity building in national strategic guidance documents, which will energize defense agencies, combatant commands, and other key regional stakeholders to focus on partner logistics. Second, combatant commands should make partner logistics capacity building a key task in theater strategy documents. Third, combatant commands should develop a logistics capacity building framework at the theater level that facilitates an integrated, synchronized approach toward building partner nation logistics.

National Strategic Guidance

In 2006, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) made a strategic shift. Policy-makers desired to emphasize building partner capacity as a key part of security cooperation, and for the first time, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) codified strategic direction to build partner capacity. It directed:

> Whenever advisable, the United States will work with or through others: enabling allied and partner capabilities, building their capacity and developing collaborative mechanisms to share the decisions, risks, and responsibilities of today’s complex challenges.\(^\text{14}\)

Furthermore, national strategic leaders believed that building partner capacity was so important that it needed even greater emphasis than what the standard QDR process could provide.\(^\text{15}\) As an addendum to the 2006 QDR, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed a document called *Quadrennial Defense Review: Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) Execution Roadmap*. This first-ever BPC execution roadmap provided amplified strategic direction to expand and improve U.S. efforts to assist partner nations with their security. While this ground-breaking strategic shift was necessary to pursue global security interests, U.S. policy-makers at the time missed the opportunity to address
logistics capacity building. One of the Roadmap’s objectives was to “reform foreign and security assistance programs,” but it did not provide any thought or focus on partner logistics. The word “logistics” does not appear in the Roadmap even once.

Since 2006, building partner capacity has remained an important part of U.S. defense strategy. Sustained focus on the effort has been driven by U.S. counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in which building the host nation military capacity has been critical. Lessons learned after ten years at war reveal that partner nation logistics constraints have continually hampered the attainment of strategic and operational goals. In 2002, shortly after Operation Enduring Freedom began, Colonel Patrick Dulin, former operations officer, I Marine Expeditionary Force, wrote that “the United States increasingly relies on coalitions in military operations. But not all coalition partners have the technology, funds, or logistics capabilities to work well with U.S. forces.” In 2006, U.S. Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team 2 (RCT-2) identified logistics as the greatest challenge for the Iraqi Security Forces. In 2009, a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report stated that “Coalition forces [in Iraq] provide advisory support to help the Ministry of Defense bolster acquisition, storage, maintenance, and distribution systems…however, progress in developing self-sustaining logistics and maintenance systems is slower than anticipated and remains problematic.” Finally, in December 2011, the DoD Deputy Inspector General reported that “it will take an intensive effort by the Coalition and the Afghan Ministry of Defense/General Staff (MoD/GS) to build an independent and sustainable ANA [Afghan National Army] logistics capability, a complex challenge made even more difficult given
that the country’s security forces are at war. To succeed in this endeavor will take time, sufficient resources, and strategic patience.”\(^{21}\)

Despite these stark assessments over a decade, U.S. strategic direction continues to overlook the imperative of building logistics capacity. The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) directs a concerted effort to build partner capacity, but does not include any logistics references; neither does the 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS). The 2010 QDR acknowledges that “well trained [partner] security forces are of limited utility, or indeed can even be counterproductive, without the institutional systems and processes to sustain them.”\(^{22}\) It stops there; however, and provides no direction to work toward fixing the problem, despite the necessity.

In 2010, the Joint Staff J-4 published the *Joint Logistics Strategic Plan 2010-2014*, which provides direction to shape multinational logistics and “increase interaction with our multinational partners...to build more defense and civilian capacity and capability.”\(^{23}\) This gets closer to addressing the issue of partner logistics capacity, but the *Joint Logistics Strategic Plan* does not have sufficient visibility or authority to influence theater strategic planning or security cooperation programs. For logistics capacity building to receive sorely needed emphasis, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) should designate partner logistics capacity building as a strategic objective in the next issuance of the National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Quadrennial Defense Review. The following paragraph is a proposal:

U.S. security is inextricably tied to the security and stability of our partners and allies. Partner logistics capacity building is an area in which we have traditionally under-invested. We have an enduring need to help our partners improve their operational readiness and build their defense
logistics capacity in order to become more self-reliant, self-sustaining, and prepared for the complex security challenges of the 21st century. Logistics capacity building is critical toward that end.

If the SECDEF and CJCS issue explicit guidance in authoritative strategic documents, it will stimulate the defense establishment to focus on logistics, and the emphasis will cascade downward into combatant command and defense agency strategies. By design, theater strategies and security cooperation plans are nested inside the concepts, guidance, and direction given from the strategic national level. With the emergence of new U.S. defense strategy in 2012, the time is right to promulgate updated strategic guidance and to shape theater strategy in regions of greatest U.S. interest.

The Shift toward Asia

As U.S. counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan wind down over the next half-decade, the United States is making a strategic pivot to re-focus on its interests in Asia and the Pacific. In January 2012, President Obama and Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, declared:

...while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. Our relationships with Asian allies and key partners are critical to the future stability and growth of the region. We will emphasize our existing alliances, which provide a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security. We will also expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests.

Developing allied and friendly military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region is essential—more than ever before—for three primary reasons. First, the United States has vital interests in the region and there is great potential for conflict. Second, U.S. defense capacity is going to shrink over the next ten years. As the United States cuts
its troop end-strength and defense budget, it will have fewer forces to deploy and fewer resources to share with other nations. Third, the development and proliferation of anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities by adversaries and nefarious non-state actors may make it more difficult for the U.S. military to enter an overseas operational theater and assist friendly military forces in a crisis. It is important to invest now in building stronger partners and allies in Asia, before conflict erupts.

Within the Asia-Pacific region, the United States has extensive political, economic, and societal interests in Southeast Asia. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the United States’ fourth largest overseas market. Within Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand are of special interest and receive the lion share of American foreign military financing and security assistance. The United States is the Philippines’ largest economic trading partner, with a gross trade volume (imports plus exports) of $11.8 billion. Thailand is a major non-NATO ally of the United States and has provided military troops to the U.S.-led coalitions in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In November 2011, President Obama reaffirmed a Comprehensive Partnership with Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation. Roughly half the world’s commercial shipping traffic and 13.6 million barrels of oil per day pass through the Strait of Malacca adjacent to Indonesia’s coastline.

The potential for conflict over territorial disputes in the South China Sea is another concern of U.S. policy-makers. Regimes in China and North Korea are expanding their offensive military capabilities. In 2010, Chinese officials warned the Obama Administration that China would not tolerate any U.S. interference in the South China Sea because it is a sovereign Chinese interest. This brazen statement did not
sit well with U.S. leadership, and tensions in the region have increased. Should the political tension evolve into military conflict, U.S. partners and allies in Southeast Asia will be on the front lines; therefore, the United States should continue to invest in building partner capacity in Southeast Asia, and must simultaneously energize key regional stakeholders, such as United States Pacific Command, to focus on partner logistics capability.

U.S. Pacific Command

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is responsible for U.S. military planning and operations in the Asia-Pacific region, which includes the ten member-nations of ASEAN. USPACOM has a robust theater security cooperation (TSC) program that aims to build relationships and partner capacity in the area of responsibility (AOR). In FY10, USPACOM conducted over a thousand TSC events across the Asia Pacific Theater—almost double the number conducted in United States European Command. In the same year, USPACOM conducted more than 500 TSC events in Southeast Asia alone. An example is Cobra Gold, the world’s largest combined military exercise hosted by Thailand. Additionally, in FY10 the United States provided the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand more than $150 million worth of security assistance through financing, equipment, and training. In spite of a massive investment of resources, time, and effort to build partner capacity in Southeast Asia, partner nations continue to have military readiness challenges, some of which pre-date 2001. The following are recent examples:

- Over the last three years, the Philippine Air Force’s aircraft fleet has experienced a series of crashes, and some air frames had to be retired due to lack of spare parts.
• In June 2011, the Indonesian Ministry of Defense estimated that only 30-35% of equipment owned by its armed services was operational to a satisfactory level.42

• In July 2011, Thailand had three helicopters crash within nine days. After the crashes, Suranand Vejjajiva, former Thai government minister, indicated problems with their military aircraft maintenance capacity when he said, “various analyses questioned the military's procurement policies, equipment maintenance measures and the utilization of the military's expenditure budget. The military’s plans to purchase new helicopters, need to be coupled with proper long-term budgeting for their maintenance.”43

Providing these partners with money, weapons, and tactical training may be important, but those things are not the answer to solving logistical problems. They need assistance to build their logistics capacity. Without it, these nations will continue to have operational challenges, and the United States will not get the best return on its security assistance investment.

Theater Strategy

As the regional arm of U.S. defense activity, USPACOM provides unity of effort and military resources to achieve U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific. The USPACOM commander, Admiral Robert F. Willard, translates strategic guidance from the President, SECDEF, and CJCS into his own vision and strategy, which are promulgated by theater strategy documents: the Pacific Theater Strategy, the theater campaign plan, and the theater security cooperation plan. Detailed analysis of these theater strategy documents reveals that logistics capacity building is not a specified task or line
The theater strategy documents thoroughly cover security cooperation, building partner capacity, and logistics support; however, the concept of building partner logistics is not specified. One could make the argument that building logistics capacity of partners and allies is already implied and does not need to be specified, but evidence suggests that partner logistics capacity in Southeast Asia is not adequate and U.S. theater efforts are not focused on addressing the problem. In January 2012, the U.S. Deputy Defense Attaché in the Philippines stated:

The AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] is hampered with an antiquated logistics management system that isn't computerized, and limited funds prevents them from budgeting and keeping required replacement parts on hand. Therefore, they often forego scheduled maintenance due to lack of, or misappropriation of, sustainment funds. An important step toward focusing effort and resources on the issue is to make logistics capacity building a part of theater strategy—a specified task for component commands and supporting organizations in the theater campaign plan, and the theater security cooperation plan.

**Logistics Capacity Building Framework**

The Asia-Pacific region is very diverse, and the security capacity needs of partners and allies vary greatly from one nation to another. Some nations are more developed, and have industrial capability, such as Australia. Whereas developing nations, such as East Timor, do not have an industrial base. Each nation also has its own unique interests, resources, and threats. The United States tailors security
assistance to each client government, based on need. The approach to building partner logistics capacity should follow suit; it should be uniquely-tailored based on need. Furthermore, logistics capacity building should be based on a common framework at the theater level in a way that promotes unity of effort, prioritization of resources, and integration among the stakeholders involved in the process—military, diplomatic, and industrial.

Figure 1 shows a conceptual framework for logistics capacity building that could be implemented at the theater level by a geographic combatant command, such as USPACOM. The end state, or goal, of logistics capacity building should be to facilitate self-reliant and self-sustaining partners that have sufficient logistics capacity and operational readiness that promote greater regional capability. The foundation, or backdrop, of the framework is relationship-driven and assessment-based, because security cooperation will only be as strong as the relationships involved, and capacity building must be based on an assessment of need.

The core capability areas of the framework are the ways to build logistics capacity, that is the logistics capabilities toward which capacity building efforts and resources should be applied. The core capabilities in this framework were adopted from the functional areas listed in the Joint Concept for Logistics, with some additional areas added to address long-term capacity, such as policy, doctrine, training, and education.47

The three primary lines of effort in the framework are: foreign military sales, education and training, and theater security cooperation events. These are the means through which a combatant command can build partner logistics capacity. It would be
very simple to implement logistics capacity building through these tools because combatant commands already use them as part of theater security cooperation strategy.

Foreign Military Sales

Between the U.S. Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) there are a myriad of partner capacity building programs. Some of these programs, such as foreign military sales (FMS), require both agencies to function. In the case of FMS, DoS provides funding and DoD provides program management. There is an entire defense agency—the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)—dedicated to managing this aspect of DoD security cooperation. DSCA oversees the provision of equipment, financial aid, training, and education from the United States.
Government to foreign governments. DCSA works closely with the DoS, the military services, diplomatic country teams, and GCC staffs to support the combatant commanders’ requirements. FMS is the process of selling defense material and services to a foreign government under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. From FY01 to FY10, the United States provided more than $116 billion worth of security assistance worldwide through FMS, twenty six percent of which went to partners and allies in the Asia-Pacific region. One of the great benefits of FMS is that other governments pay for the items and services provided.

FMS is more than just weapon sales. DSCA uses a “total package approach” that includes logistics support for equipment provided. For example, when the United States sells C-130 cargo aircraft to Indonesia or small unit riverine craft (SURC) to the Philippines, the purchase normally includes a two or three year sustainment block of repair parts, training, and manuals to maintain the equipment. One of the challenges with FMS is that the client government decides how much they are going to spend on logistics support, and often seek to save money by cutting the sustainment packages for purchased systems. The other challenge is that FMS logistics support is often short term, with a tactical focus, but according to Lieutenant General James Dubik, former commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, “America cannot hope to build the capacity of potential partners by aiming at only short-term, tactical improvement.” The United States should strive to give logistics support a larger role in FMS, and encourage foreign governments to leverage FMS to build their logistics systems and resources. Despite the challenges, FMS is an important part of capacity building, and should be leveraged to build partner logistics.
Logistics Training and Education

Training and education are powerful tools in security cooperation. According to Beth McCormick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs and former Deputy DSCA Director, “given the increased focus on ‘building the capacity’ of partner nations, the foundational importance of training and education takes on a whole new significance.” Education and training provide the enduring intellectual capacity, practical skills, and experience needed to think critically and improve a logistics enterprise. The United States relies heavily on education and training in its own military logistics community, where schools and training centers across the nation provide a full range of logistics training—from entry-level technical skills to graduate-level education. Many partner nations do not have a developed logistics training continuum like the United States, but they need training and education immediately to improve and sustain their defense organizations. The United States provides partners and allies with seats in U.S. schools and training courses, both in CONUS and overseas, through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program; however, the logistics training opportunities through IMET are very limited.

IMET covers resident professional military education (PME) programs, mobile training teams (MTT), and post-graduate education. An example is the sixty-five international military officers who attended the U.S. Army War College in academic year 2012 through IMET funding. IMET is funded by the DoS, but managed by DSCA, who ensures that IMET funding supports the combatant commanders’ theater campaign plans. IMET spending in USPACOM has increased significantly since 2001. From FY01 to FY10, there was more than a $3 million increase, of which the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand received more than half (54%).
The four objectives of the IMET program are to develop rapport, understanding, and communication links; develop host country training self-sufficiency; improve host country ability to manage its defense establishment; and develop skills to operate and maintain U.S.-origin equipment. Three of the four objectives apply directly to logistics capacity building, yet IMET funding in Southeast Asia is sparsely used for logistics education and training.

- In FY10, the United States provided 329 different courses to military students from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand; less than a quarter were logistics courses.

- From FY07 to FY10, the U.S. Marine Corps Logistics Officers’ Course in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina hosted only one officer from Southeast Asia. During the same period, no officers from the Philippines, Indonesia, or Thailand attended the Marine Corps Supply School or the School of MAGTF Logistics.

- From FY07 to FY10, the Army Logistics University (ALU) hosted thirty-seven students from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, but that represents a very small percentage of the total student population. For example, in FY10 only 1.9% of the ALU foreign students were from Southeast Asia.

- The Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) is a DoD academic institute in Hawaii that directly supports USPACOM. It provides executive education and workshops for military and civilian representatives of the United States and the Asia-Pacific Nations. From 1995-2010, the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies hosted 682 students from the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Thailand; however, during the fifteen year period no logistics courses or workshops were offered.\textsuperscript{61}

As shown in Figure 2, logistics education and training is under-utilized. From FY08 to FY10, the United States provided training and education for nearly 6,549 international students from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand through IMET and fourteen other programs. Only 4.9\% of the students, fewer than five for every hundred, attended logistics-focused courses.\textsuperscript{62}

Lewis Stern, visiting research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, recently said “The Thai have recognized the need for some “modernization” of their national military education system…Senior Thai military officers have expressed interest in future partnerships regarding military education.”\textsuperscript{63} The Philippines and Indonesia are also showing an increased appetite for IMET opportunities.\textsuperscript{64} According to Joint Publication 4-0, \textit{Joint Logistics}, “one of the most critical considerations for the development…of logistics is the process that trains, educates and develops…logisticians.”\textsuperscript{65} With the United States’ vast capacity for logistics education and training, and the willingness of partners and allies to expand educational opportunities, the time is right to make logistics education and training a much greater part of the IMET program and partner capacity building overall.
Theater Security Cooperation Engagements

The final line of effort of the logistics capacity building framework covers theater security cooperation (TSC) engagements, in which U.S. combatant commands and component commands work alongside their counterparts in partner nations. TSC engagements are very important toward building trust, and trust is vital toward building cooperative relationships that allow like-minded partners to solve the complex, transnational security challenges in the 21st century. According to Admiral James Stavridis, former supreme allied commander, Europe, “trust comes from years of cooperative experience, listening, success, and failure, and is held together by a common vision…” TSC events are a means to build partner capacity, and they can also be used to develop logistics capacity.
The executors of TSC engagements in USPACOM are the GCC headquarters, the component commands, and the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). Each of these elements has a role in building partner capacity. From FY08 through FY10, USPACOM conducted over 3,000 TSC events. This represents a significant investment of time and effort by the command and regional stakeholders. TSC is recognized as an effective program, but the number of logistics TSC events the United States conducts with partners and allies pales in comparison to other activities. For example, in FY11 USPACOM conducted 439 TSC events in Southeast Asia—events ranging from subject matter expert (SME) exchanges to bi-lateral exercises. Only fourteen TSC events, or 3.1%, aimed at logistics capacity building.

As shown in Figure 3, the U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) conducted one logistics TSC event in FY11; U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) conducted six; and the U.S. Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) conducted seven logistics events. The USPACOM headquarters, APCSS, and U.S. Pacific Air Force (PACAF) conducted no logistics-focused TSC events.

Perhaps the best example of logistics-focused capacity building in Southeast Asia is MARFORPAC’s “Logistics Assessment and Development Plan.” Through an organized program, MARFORPAC assists partner Marine forces (e.g., Royal Thai Marine Corps and Philippine Marine Corps) in assessing their logistics capabilities and works with their counter-parts to develop a measureable and sustainable logistics program. MARFORPAC’s logistics capacity building program assesses and targets equipment readiness, logistics processes, training, facilities, and institutions. This
initiative is an important step forward in building partner logistics, and should inform the implementation of logistics capacity building at the theater level.

**Conclusion**

The United States will continue to rely on global partners and allies in the future when facing the complex security challenges of the 21st century. Many U.S. partners around the world—including the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand—need assistance building logistics capacity in order to strengthen their security and improve their readiness, but U.S. security cooperation does not focus on improving partner logistics. The United States cannot afford to rely on building partner capacity with financial assistance, equipment sales, and tactical training. This is clearly evident in Afghanistan. Nearly ten years into Operation Enduring Freedom, former International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander, General David Petraeus, told the Senate Armed Services Committee:
for a long time we were basically training and equipping infantry battalions. But of course, a force, an infantry battalion, is only as good as the...logistics support, the transportation, the maintenance, and all these other...enablers.73

As the U.S. defense budget shrinks and force levels decline, allies and partner nations will need to become more self-reliant and self-sustaining. Logistics capacity building can make it possible. Strategic leaders can energize logistics capacity building within security cooperation strategy in three ways. First, emphasize logistics capacity building in national strategic guidance documents. If the SECDEF and CJCS articulate building partner logistics capacity as a strategic objective, then the U.S. defense establishment and regional stakeholders will be mobilized toward that effort. Second, combatant commands, such as USPACOM, should identify building partner logistics capacity as a specified task in theater strategy documents. Finally, combatant commands should implement a logistics capacity building framework at the theater level that leverages foreign military sales, education and training, and TSC engagements to build long-term capacity.

On April 12, 2011, Admiral Willard told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Southeast Asia presents significant security challenges to the United States, and obtaining support from allies and partners to address these challenges is becoming more important. He said:

To build regional capacity to respond to these challenges, the establishment of foundational information, logistics, and technology exchange agreements with...Allies and partners is important.74

Admiral Willard’s comments highlight the importance of other nations’ logistics capabilities to U.S. security interests. As the United States shifts its strategic focus toward Asia, it should seize the opportunity to invest in the logistics capabilities of
ASEAN nations. By doing so, the United States can strengthen its strategic relationships, help partner nations overcome their operational readiness challenges, and increase regional security capability before the next conflict erupts.

Endnotes


9 Ibid., x.


11 Ibid., 211.


13 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Logistics*, i.

Ibid., cover letter.

Ibid., 18.


Ibid., 7.


Ernest Z. Bower and Murray Hiebert, Developing an Enduring Strategy for ASEAN (Washington, DC: CSIS, January 2012), XI.


40 Richard Sokolsky, et al., The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 49-52.


42 Ibid., 32.


44 Lieutenant Colonel Mark Riley, USPACOM Strategy Branch Chief, telephone interview with the author January 26, 2012.

Anonymous responses to a survey distributed by the author via email to military personnel working at U.S. Pacific Command and Joint U.S. Military Assistance Groups in South East Asia.


U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 130.


Sara Troch, Army Logistics University Registrar, email message to author, January 31, 2012.


Ibid., 21.


Figure 2 compares the total number of students trained/educated from the nations indicated during fiscal years FY08 through FY10 by the following DoD and DoS programs: Aviation Leadership Program (ALP), Counter Drug Training Support (CDTS), Department of Homeland Security & United States Coast Guard Activities, DoD Regional Centers for Strategic/Security Studies; Foreign Military Financing (FMF); Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI); Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Programs; International Military Education and Training (IMET); International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL); Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET); Mine Action (MA)Programs; Professional Military Education (PME) Exchanges; Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP); Service Academies; Section 1206 Authority (Building Partnership Capacity). Logistics-focused courses are those courses dedicated to professionally developing logistics personnel in strategic, operational, or tactical skills in supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and acquisitions. Examples are the U.S. Navy’s International Supply Course held at the Navy Supply Corps School or the Theater Logistics Studies Program offered at the U.S. Army Logistics University. For the purposes of this paper, the statistics do not include medical courses, or those exercises, engagements, and courses in which logistics is superficially discussed incidentally to primary subject matter. The data was compiled by reviewing multiple volumes of Defense Security Cooperation Agency historical data for three fiscal years. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Foreign Military Training, Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009 Joint Report to Congress*, Vol. I (Washington, DC: DSCA, October 1, 2008), I-IV-II-21-34. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Foreign Military Training, Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 Joint Report to Congress*, Vol. I (Washington, DC: DSCA, October 1, 2009), I-IV-II-8-40. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Foreign Military Training, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 Joint Report to Congress*, Vols. I and II (Washington, DC: DSCA, October 1, 2010), I-IV-II-6-44 and II-II-3-59.


Ibid.
Ibid.


