ARMY RESERVE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: TIME FOR CHANGE

BY

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by

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in the academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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This paper will consider the significant changes that make the current structure and operating/mobilizing for United States Army Reserve (USAR) Military Intelligence (MI) units obsolete and propose changes that may better address current and future requirements.

MI occupational specialties are unique to the military and the intelligence community. Because these unique skill sets depend on consistent practice to maintain the craft and remain up to date, the current USAR system is inadequate to produce deployment-ready Soldiers who are now part of an operational rather than strategic reserve for the United States. The current system also puts unnecessary burdens on Soldiers, Family Members, and Employers in terms of predictability, stabilization, medical and dental care, transition of benefits, and continuity of service for individual and collective training.

The Army should look to the reserve forces to provide an abundance of well-qualified Soldiers, provide them and their Families with options, predictability, quality of life, superior leadership, and expect them to provide, on a continual basis, the service required to meet the needs of the Army and the greater intelligence community.

This paper will propose an entirely new resourcing methodology for USAR MI forces, Soldiers and systems in the USAR, leading to increased manning, education, skill maintenance, and preparedness for long- or short-term contingencies and reduce or share costs for the program within the intelligence community. The new system will better meet Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) requirements in the Army as well.
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ARMY RESERVE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE: TIME FOR CHANGE

Introduction

*How do we know whether a change signals a strategic inflection point? The only way is through the process of clarification that comes from a broad and intensive debate.*

-- Andrew S. Grove, Chairman of the Board, Intel Corporation

The environment in which the Army now operates is vastly different from thirty, twenty, or even ten years ago. Thirty years ago, the Soviets were still the biggest threat in the world neighborhood. Twenty years ago, the Soviet Union had dissolved and the Army was in a massive coalition removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Ten years ago, terrorists were a threat, but their impact on daily life in the United States was minimal. Now, the environment is characterized as an era of persistent conflict. The United States Congress, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Department of the Army all recognize that the world has changed.

Since 9/11, Operation Noble Eagle and the later additions of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, United States Army Reserve (USAR) intelligence units have been engaged in supporting the Nation. Strategic intelligence units combined production during assembly periods at national agencies with volunteer augmentees who mobilized to support the national agencies and address the increased demand for intelligence at the national level. Tactical intelligence units received their largest call up for Operation Iraqi Freedom, where nearly all healthy or near-healthy units were deployed for the initial invasion.

The follow-on force requirements were shared among active and reserve components, but it sent the USAR into a cycle of cross-leveling Soldiers and equipment from across all formations to fill each additional rotation. As early as the second rotation, Soldiers were trained and ready on common and theater specific combat skills, but not necessarily on their specialty skills. Incremental improvements in skill training continue at a moderate pace, but lack of resources, including time, and a complex training and mobilization resourcing process makes progress difficult. The DoD and the Army are locked down to a very strict and obsolete set of rules to have access to reserve component
assets. Ultimately, the complexity and obsolescence of the current system, in terms of laws and policies, decrease the Army’s agility and flexibility to address threats.

Resourcing over the past several years addressed some gaps in intelligence technologies. These technologies continue to improve and change quickly. The speed of technology changes far outpaces the ability of the Army to resource the USAR. USAR intelligence Soldiers rarely have access to current technology until they are less than six months from deployment, or twelve days in reserve terms. Technology issues can and are being addressed, but the real challenge in readiness is intelligence skill training and experience.

Trained intelligence professionals are the key to giving the commanders an accurate picture of the situation. Intelligence professionals take time to build. Consider that a trained and experienced junior enlisted signal intelligence Soldier takes a minimum of two years to build, under perfect circumstances and with access to all required training and facilities. Human intelligence Soldiers require at least six months of training (without language) to just operate as part of a team. Ideally, at least one member of a team will have four years of experience with significant additional training to be capable of independent operations. Analysts take shorter time to build, but require experience with a large number of automated tools in a live environment to be highly effective. Technology, on the other hand, can now be produced and purchased fairly quickly to meet rotational needs.

Intelligence architecture is not co-located with every intelligence unit in the USAR, so access to tools for training and live environment experience are located at central training sites. Units must plan and resource Soldier and trainer movement to these sites to accomplish skill specific tasks. Resourcing is generally available once a unit-alert order is issued. Common and theater-specific training is now available at Regional Training Centers (RTCs) at Fort Hunter-Liggett, Fort McCoy, and Fort Dix. The USAR, in conjunction with First Army has provided trainers for those tasks at the training centers and the mobilization stations. That system now works fairly well.

The USAR intelligence units, after the second rotation of Operation Iraqi Freedom, institutionalized the process of building rotational units with cross-leveled Soldiers. Many challenges surfaced, including identification of qualified Soldiers, Soldier
individual readiness, linking Soldiers with their units and establishing connections between leaders and their Soldiers over time and distance constraints. The USAR also embraced the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model to move towards a more predictable cycle with rotations.

![Figure 1: Graphic Depiction of ARFORGEN Cycle](image)

The challenges in meeting the cycle requirements are causing significant challenges for the USAR Soldiers. Ultimately, the Soldiers, not the institution, have borne the burden of the readiness and mission challenges.

USAR intelligence specific needs have been resourced frequently through the Intelligence Community (IC), the Army G-2, or the Training And Doctrine Command (TRADOC), but not generally through the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC). Army War College Student COL Gregory Williams addressed a good study in the underfunding issue in 2008.³

The USAR ICIs at a strategic inflection point. The organization must move forward with dramatic changes in law, policy, resourcing, and most importantly, human
capital development and retention. Failure to move comprehensively and quickly will allow the inertia of stagnation and atrophy to remove any hope of keeping a skilled relevant force in the future.

**The Strategic Reserve**

The reserve components, and specifically the USAR’s IC, have, over the years, made many contributions to the national security of the United States. This is despite significant challenges in resourcing, rigid static policies, and timelines for fixes that never seem to materialize. The chasm between active component manning, equiping, and modernization and that of the reserve components has been significant. Fortunately, the reserve components intelligence units overcame some of those challenges by plugging into and supporting national agencies. Those organizations provided equipment and resourcing in return for reserve component manning. Strategic units benefited, but tactical units continued to struggle. Their readiness was poor. The units were managed under an Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) that did not meet true required strength.

Managing a unit at a lower ALO was a method to cut costs. The theory was to bring the unit up to its full required strength in time of war. This fit with the concept of strategic reserve that would have months to prepare to go into a conflict. Those months would prepare, man, equip, and train the unit to minimum readiness standards. Minimum annual requirements continued to grow and the 39 days\(^4\) a year allocated to meeting those requirements are inadequate at best. A mobile population, unit-stationing changes that increase distances to training facilities, full-time personnel shortages, and local economic and employment fluctuations all compound the problems, decreasing readiness and Soldier satisfaction with the performance of USAR leadership and support. Everything begins and ends with the Soldier. Resources and support were just not measuring up to the missions. Even when Soldiers had valid missions, they could not be placed on orders and practice their skills.

In the past, the United States prepared for two *major combat operations* (MCOs). The Army was much larger (active component) and planned on having time to react, alert and mobilize reserve components, bring them to deployable readiness standards and
achieve success. This Cold War strategy was deemed adequate, but was never tested. The continued cost-saving policy of “do more with less,”\(^5\) increased risk and drove readiness down to dangerous levels (largely unreported)\(^6\). When the reserves were called up for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, many subjective upgrades on unit-status reports indicated that the units called should be able to deploy with minimal mobilization training. Unfortunately, the best of these units required extensive training at the mobilization stations and at worst; some units were demobilized because their poor readiness status precluded deployment requirements for the conflict. This should have been a strategic indicator to the Army and to Congress.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the use of military power for international interventions expanded. The national military strategy was starting to morph, and the USAR, to stay relevant, had to prepare for frequent quick-reaction contingency operations. The vehicle for USAR participation in contingencies was the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC). This required a mobilization process and significant constraints on reservists’ service. The active component was glad for the help, but not structured well to meet the needs of the new pool of reservists on active duty.

Current plans, policies, and resourcing for the reserve components did not work effectively in the new environment, but enough “can do” spirit and lack of any major events to influence Congress, led to inaction. Over the next decade, contingency operations and reserve component requirements increased, but plans, policies, and resourcing remained status quo. Post 9/11, reserve components became even more involved in operations, securing the homeland, rotating in and out of previous operational commitments and entering into rotations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. For the most part, laws and policies have remained at status quo and resourcing has increased for units tied to Overseas Contingency Operations (OCOs)\(^7\) only.

To keep up with the world today, the reserve components need to increase their proficiency, agility, and support. The current transformation effort is on track to improve most of the USAR, but as always, some parts of the transformation plan will need modification to set conditions for success in military intelligence.
Where Things Stand

Army Reserve Critical Gaps

It took a barrage of relentless criticism to make me realize that something had changed—and that we needed to adapt to the new environment.  

---Andrew S. Grove, Chairman of the Board, Intel Corporation

The USAR shifted its posture following 9/11. The USAR of the past was a strategic reserve force that was to be mobilized in great numbers to meet requirements in a large conflict. Timelines were developed to prepare reserve units in the event of mobilization. These timelines were shattered in the recent past. The USAR met its requirements by transitioning into an operational role instead of a strategic one. No longer would the USAR be mobilized in large numbers only for major conflicts (i.e., nations in conflict); they would be mobilized for every operation involving armed forces commitments. In his book, Only the Paranoid Survive, Andrew Grove describes what he terms inflection points and frames them in the strategic context for business. “An inflection point occurs where the old strategic picture dissolves and gives way to the new, allowing the business to ascend to new heights”.  

This new paradigm required a different kind of USAR. In an era of persistent conflict, Intelligence assets in the USAR will be continuously engaged. It can also be argued that the events of 9/11 changed the environment in which the United States must operate and implied a requirement to expand and develop even more robust intelligence capabilities and communication between intelligence activities throughout government. In a recent Rand study entitled Rethinking the Reserve, the writer asserts that an operational reserve must be considered in terms of a rotational force. The USAR can be postured to provide support to this concept under the right conditions and with the right policy and resource support, but the cost will be considerably higher than it has previously been.  

USAR Intelligence, under the current system is not as predictable as we would all like to believe. The USARC has steadily closed the gap on many issues to make their ARFORGEN goals; however, Soldiers still do not have stability and predictability in the aspects of their lives that make a difference in quality of service, morale, and quality of
life. For its part, the USAR’s Headquarter echelons continue to be burdened with unpredictability in resourcing every pre-deployment plan, every year. These headquarters units have become very adept at the tasks that they have completed repetitively over the past nine years—assembling units, working on Soldier readiness issues, completing alert and mobilization orders, and providing Soldier/Cadre at Regional Training Sites and Mobilization Stations to assist in the processing of USAR units.

USAR Intelligence must fundamentally change to better contribute to the Army’s success, create predictability that successfully supports ARFORGEN, nest its missions with the National IC and tactical requirements, care for Soldiers and Families, and nurture a human-resource pool that is more stable, better trained, and more educated to meet future requirements, within reasonable budget constraints.

In the 2009 Posture Statement, the USAR described a strategic context that identifies a key challenge in the USAR’s function.

Since the September 2001 attacks on America, the Army Reserve continues to deliver on its Title 10 obligation by serving in a prolonged operational capacity for which it was originally neither designed nor equipped, but for which it is currently being transformed.11

The original design of the USAR was to be a strategic reserve to be called up in time of great need. The laws describing the various levels of mobilization were established for that operational context. The level of international military intervention that the United States continues to use in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, combined with significant draw downs of the active component forces, requires extensive use of the reserve components on a rotational basis. The laws and policies currently in place do not support the training and readiness requirements for the current operational context.

The following are excerpts from the USAR Posture statement and identify critical needs based on the current legacy system and the moderate changes proposed in the current transformation process.

- Sustaining recruiting and retention incentives for Army Reserve Soldiers, with specific emphasis on mid-grade commissioned and noncommissioned officers
• Developing and sustaining adequate full-time support (FTS) to train and administer a fully functioning, robust, and capable operational force, and to ensure Soldier and Family readiness

• Enhancing employer partnerships to optimize the development of human capital for the mutual benefit of industry and national security

• Continuing transformation of Army Reserve support command structure and the building of operational and functional commands, properly organizing Soldiers and units to develop capability for diverse national security missions

• Implementing the Army Reserve Training Strategy (ARTS) to develop Soldiers and build cohesive, capable, and effective units while maximizing Boots on the Ground and optimizing the Warrior-Citizens’ impact and contribution to mission success

• Implementation of the training strategy involves three primary elements:
  1. Army School System Training Centers—for developing individuals
  2. RTCs—for unit pre-mobilization training
  3. Combat Support Training Centers—for rigorous mission-focused training

• Support for training man-days to sustain the ARFORGEN process and maintain the USAR as a fully operational force

• Equipping Army Reserve units with the latest, fully integrated, modular force equipment to develop Soldier skills and unit equipment mastery through realistic training in years two and three of the ARFORGEN cycle

• Equipping Soldiers and units with all the latest required and authorized, fully integrated, modular force equipment to accomplish deployment and contingency standby missions in accordance with the ARFORGEN
construct and national security mission demands of the ARFORGEN employment cycle

- Resetting and reestablishing unit readiness, replacing lost, damaged, and committed (theater stay-behind) equipment expeditiously to ensure optimum training and mission readiness sustaining the world-class operational Army Reserve

- Developing, improving, and sustaining Soldier and Family programs to achieve comprehensive Soldier and Family well-being across relationship, spiritual, health, and fitness dimensions

- Sustain a robust and appropriately integrated secure communications and information technology to connect Army Reserve Soldiers and units across the Army enterprise ensuring the Army Reserve remains an effective, contributing operational component of the total force

- Providing the facilities to train and sustain the Army Reserve as an active, integrated, robust, and capable operational force

- The Army Reserve is managing facilities and infrastructure transformation through three main efforts:
  1. Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) to consolidate and modernize
  2. Accommodating “Grow the Army” and emerging mission set facility and training center requirements to optimize unit disposition, training, and readiness
  3. Improving maintenance facilities and storage capacity to ensure unit readiness and maximize equipment service life

---Critical Needs (USAR Posture Statement, 2009)

Caveat the entire list with resource shortages. Nine of fourteen key bullets (highlighted) emphasize shortcomings in human capital development and sustainment. The prelude implies that nothing is possible without full support and necessary authorities from Congress. The continuation of the USAR is dependent on Congress. The USAR has,
in the past, been a place to get significant savings for the investment. This assumption is still true, but to a lesser degree and only with a considerable minimum investment.

For the USAR intelligence forces, the problem is even greater. Why? Even with the critical needs met, USAR Intelligence forces will not be able to maintain skill qualifications unless Congress and the Army leadership make additional investments in reserve centers and training centers to address intelligence architecture and equipment requirements.

The rate of technological change and the pace with which the active component and ICIs updating deploying-equipment sets is cost prohibitive on the massive scale required in the USAR. The equipment would largely go unused due to training, maintenance and resource constraints. The military industrial complex in the United States, though sluggish at times, is still very responsive to the United States Military’s requirements for war. Investment in research and development for intelligence and fielding to active component units and the training base in the near term will provide a much more efficient usage model for the sustained operations that characterize today’s environment. In the event that the Army must expand its capabilities, building out units with the latest equipment will take a much shorter time than trying to create personnel with the requisite skills to man those units. For the USAR Intelligence Community, investment in human capital should be the priority. Recruiting and retention incentives should be built into the positions not held out as options. This makes contracting more transparent and will save countless dollars wasted on legal issues and investigations, as well as providing a more educated and capable Soldier-Citizen for the nation.

There are areas where the USAR has built significant expertise. Between transformation, parochial responsibilities, and political maneuvering, gaps still exist in military intelligence and other government intelligence activities as they pertain to the goals of the 9/11 Commission Report. The USAR created a Military Intelligence Readiness Command (MIRC) to be a functional and operational headquarters for the USAR intelligence community. The effort was under resourced and continues to struggle, although it has met its Title 10 mission requirements to provide units to the current operations. The MIRC has also provided significant mobilized support to civilian agencies over the past 8 years.
Areas the USAR has built expertise include the ability to muster a force from across the nation to build a unit for deployment, theater-specific task training at the mobilization station, and demobilization support. New Regional Training Sites (RTS) at Fort Hunter-Liggett, Fort Dix, and Fort McCoy, are poised to provide additional enhancement training for basic Soldier combat skills. All these apply to the broadest and most common requirements of the USAR, but do not address specific skill qualifications or enhancing skill qualifications for the Soldiers’ *military occupational specialty* (MOS).

MOS qualification percentages in the USAR are not good. Add stationing problems, structure that stunts career growth and civilian job inflexibility with problems in resourcing and scheduling qualification training, and many Soldiers cannot get trained in a timely manner. Some Soldiers get deployed under a secondary or tertiary MOS qualification, in which they may have never worked.

As long as the qualification training was documented in a personnel record, they are considered qualified to work overseas in that position, regardless of grade or experience. Military intelligence MOSs generally require significant training and experience to be immediately effective in an overseas contingency operation. The United States Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) has increased opportunities for training reserve components through a variety of means, including providing refresher courses for those Soldiers deploying in their secondary of tertiary skill specialty. USAICS has also developed and successfully trained intelligence staffs with their Joint Intelligence Combat Training Center (JI-CTC), which provides realistic training to the intelligence staffs of Brigade Combat Teams and Battalions. Unfortunately, Soldiers still deploy without training in their intelligence specialties.

A weakness at the Reserve installations, like Fort McCoy, Fort Hunter-Liggett and others, as well as at nearly all Reserve Component drilling sites, is the lack of access to any intelligence communications and architecture to train, gain situational awareness, and communicate with counterparts in a theater of operation. Essentially, the USAR intelligence Soldiers have a good chance of going into a theater of operation blind and cold.

There are exceptions. Project Foundry, a program that provides pre-deployment support to intelligence units and Soldiers, fills many of the gaps, but has not yet expanded
enough to meet all the demands and requirements of current operations. The projection for completion of the currently planned multi-disciplined USAR sites is 2013–15, but only if funding is available.¹³ Active duty sites are currently available, but are limited in their support to the Reserve Components and forced to prioritize based on imminent mobilizations and deployments. Reserve and Active Components in a pre-deployment status, then compete for the available scheduled opportunities. The Army G-2 and the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) work vigilantly to make sure Soldiers from military intelligence units are prepared.

So the question becomes, “With all these training opportunities, what is the problem?” The partial answer is: outdated laws and policies, which don’t recognize the current environment, inconsistent and poor resourcing, and problems with ARFORGEN synchronization.

**The Nature of Army Reserve Intelligence**

USAR intelligence is integrated into every level of the United States military and national agency intelligence community. Based on supplemental requests from 2007 and 2008, the USAR as a whole had between 33,000 and 34,000 Soldiers mobilized in support of contingency operations. These numbers included support both overseas and in the Continental United States, but specifically for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.¹⁴ On average, the USAR has mobilized at least two tactical battalions per year in support of those operations, and at least one company per year to support operations in Kosovo. The USAR intelligence force pool requirement is approximately 15,000 Soldiers;¹⁵ about half are in tactical units and have deployed one or more times in the past eight years. Many authorizations are still critically short, and the remaining Soldiers are either non-deployable or serve in an agency support role. Mobilizations have provided significant full time support to intelligence agencies with the USAR paying the cost of the support. Imminently qualified Soldiers are deployed repeatedly and of course there are cases of serious abuse of mobilization funding in the Continental United States.

The ICat large has become dependent on USAR manpower to support agencies. Unfortunately, the Soldiers who serve in support of agencies do not frequently deploy to
support contingencies. The bridges they build with the supported agency end up staying at that agency instead of expanding into contingency areas to enhance inter-agency operations. Agencies often suspect the field force in the USAR of not being competent enough or vigilant enough with their systems to allow access for training and production, except under very controlled environments. This changes once a unit deploys into a theater of operation, and then there is a short train up period during the relief in place and transition of authority, maybe two to three days, to gain access and learn to produce with systems they may or may not have seen before.

The Army has become very dependent on USAR intelligence units and Soldiers. The Army shifted its focus on technology in the late 90s and relegated Human Intelligence (HUMINT) structure to the USAR or got rid of it altogether. Unfortunately, the current conflicts required significant HUMINT production to succeed.

**Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities**

USAR components employment changed. It did not happen overnight, although the most visible changes occurred after 9/11 and were compounded by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The changes in employment leading up to the events of 9/11 were gradual, largely ignored, with the expectation that the nation could assume the ever-increasing risks associated with poor readiness in the reserve components.

The scramble to provide forces on a rotational basis since 9/11 has been painful for the Army. Use of the reserve components as an operational force from its traditional strategic posture was a shock and revealed many weaknesses that had accrued over time. The USAR was not equipped with comparable and interoperable equipment to function with the active component, serious problems with personnel readiness became apparent, training readiness was inadequate for immediate employment, military occupational specialty qualification (MOSQ) was far below standard as well as specific *additional skill identifiers* (ASI). Additional skills that show qualification in critical enhancement skills for some occupational specialties were nearly non-existent. The USAR worked hard with the assistance of the active component to bring units up to a minimum standard for deployment, but in many cases the units and or Soldiers were not employed in the theater
of operation in there designated functions, due to shortcomings in training and equipment.

The USAR components were most recently characterized in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report as an “operational force with strategic depth.” To achieve a level of readiness that would meet that requirement, laws and policies governing the employment and resourcing of the reserve components must be changed. It implies significant changes in all areas of the *doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and Education, personnel, and facilities* (DOTMLPF) model to achieve that doctrinal employment goal.

The military intelligence branch and structure in the Army is currently undergoing a rebalance review. Organizational changes proposed to increase modularity, push enablers to the lowest level and reduce support at the higher headquarters levels reflects the significant shift the Army is experiencing moving to a BCT-centric force. The current structure of military intelligence organizations in the USAR is split between strategic support and tactical support. The rebalance may not do much to influence this balance in the USAR, but it may move structure from active component to the USAR. Command and control improvements are in progress within the MIRC, the functional/operational intelligence command for the USAR. More is needed to fix the shortfalls in MOS qualifications, quality of life for reservists, Families, predictability, development and retention of human capital. All this must be accomplished while continuing to meet Title 10 requirements.

The success of USAR intelligence capabilities to support combatant commanders in the future will be require flexibility and a new look at the doctrine, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). Lack of agility and synchronization in these areas is currently the biggest inhibitor to Soldier readiness and predictability. All aspects of DOTMLPF will need to be addressed to posture the reserve components and more specifically USAR Intelligence to a more effective and responsive force.
Predictability

The USAR has a deliberate resourcing shortage for all units to meet required fills (ALO). Consequently, the USAR has institutionalized a cross-level process to move Soldiers to deploying units and provide forces to the Army and ultimately the Combatant Commands (COCOMS), like Central Command (CENTCOM) where the majority of forces have been mobilized and deployed for the past 8 years. These cross-levels are Soldiers, who due to membership in a home unit expect to plan for mobilization based on that home unit placement in the ARFORGEN cycle. Predictability disappears as soon as they get notification of the cross-level. Unfortunately, with high demand MOSs like those in intelligence, upon return to home station, the same Soldiers will be programmed to deploy with that home station unit as well. The train up is impaired and will either cost the organization travel and extra man days to send people from all over the country to a weekend battle assembly, taking extra time from employers, school or Family. On the other hand, if the Soldier trains at his home station, the sense of urgency with his home unit will not be as high and he will not have the added benefit of getting to know fellow Soldiers in the new unit; this is especially disturbing if the Soldier is a first line leader. Soldiers are generally organized and want to prepare for each mission. In the current system, they often do not get more than a few days lead time (actually receiving orders) to attend training, battle assemblies or other key events. Regardless of the sources of the problems in getting orders published, the bottom line for the Soldiers is unpredictability. This problem extends across the entire USAR. In the end, once Soldiers have been through key readiness gates, some are identified as non-deployable and others are brought into the unit at the last minute to fill those positions. Again, this is unpredictability for the Soldiers and the unit. If the new Soldier is a leader, two key challenges are immediately clear: the leader does not know the Soldiers and the Soldiers have likely trained without the benefit of leadership. This creates unpredictability in future operations within each unit.

Resourcing

USAR units have always been a place to put structure that may be needed in time of war, but could be in the reserve components to save on resourcing between wars. A
couple of things happened since 1908 when the USAR was created; the USAR has never been as cheap as what was envisioned and the nation assumed risk with the reserve components because of the length of time projected to activate a strategic reserve in time of war.

The result was a reserve that, as Lieutenant General Stultz put it in the 2009 Posture Statement to Congress, “continues to deliver on its Title 10 obligations by serving in a prolonged operational capacity for which it was originally neither designed nor equipped.” As early as 1978, Congress had to start considering the ever-increasing role and cost of the Army’s reserve components. At that time, the reserve components were estimated to be approximately five times cheaper than the active component in the Army. In a statement by Robert F. Hale, principal analyst from the Congressional Budget Office in February of 1978, Mr. Hale indicated that the increased demands on the USAR components meant that resourcing had to be increased and that in the future, the USAR components would no longer be as inexpensive as they once were. Even then, he identified that the use of reserve components to augment or compliment active forces at the beginning of an armed conflict would require increased readiness and, consequently, resources.

Resource management in the USAR is demanding. Laws and policies drive a myriad of fund sources, restrictions, and requirements for each source of funding. The most junior staff administrators are required to know and juggle a variety of these fund sources to accomplish unit missions, fund Soldier training, fund battle assemblies, fund travel, fund training support requirements, and more. In addition to all of the resource juggling, the unit administrators are also required to be experts on all the USAR education and incentive programs, Family programs, training management, personnel actions, current USAR communications technology, computers, and facility management.

The technician positions have a high vacancy rate due to the USAR membership requirements and the demands of the position balanced against responsibilities and leader vacancies or non-participation in many units. Some of the leader vacancies are driven by the cross-level process. In the absence of qualified and knowledgeable administrators and trainers, resource management is difficult at best. There is no simple answer with the current system, but it has a lot of room for improvement.
The USAR is also not resourced for all the requirements for unit readiness even in peacetime. As was discussed at the USAR Pre-Command Course in February 2008, Commanders have to prioritize what, out of all the annual requirements, is most important and train on those requirements to standard and assume risk in the current year with everything else. Some resourcing issues recently, come from unpredictability in the budget process, including the current budget and any supplemental budgets/appropriations that are projected. Major headquarters harbor the budget information until they know with certainty what is funded in supplemental budgets. This all hangs on congressional approvals and distributions through the services.

In his strategic research paper for the US Army War College, COL Gregory Williams also noted that despite increases in the Army Intelligence budget overall, the USAR Intelligence budget continues to decline. This decline is despite a significant rotational contribution of tactical units and strategic support to the intelligence community.²²

**Common and Theater Specific Training**

The continuous tactical unit rotations have vastly improved the ability of the USARC capability to mobilize and deploy units. The MIRC also has become very adept at creating, filling, training, and mobilizing units for deployment. The USARC in conjunction with First Army, focused on theater specific and common Soldier training at their mobilization stations and at their new RTSs. These RTSs consolidate equipment and are capable of processing large volumes of Soldiers and units on basic combat skills. They too are underfunded and still lack communications architectures and some more relevant equipment to improve USAR Soldier training.

**Intelligence Specific Training**

The USAR has five major training centers for intelligence, known as Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers (ARISC). These campuses support all components and services with facilities for both training and production but they are largely unfunded by the USAR and are required to seek funding from additional sources to continue to function. These centers need support and expansion to provide Army Reservists good facilities and to reduce the demands on active component facilities.
The Operational Environment

Unfortunately, the dangers and challenges of old have been joined by new forces of instability and conflict... A new and more malignant form of global terrorism rooted in extremist and violent jihadism; New manifestations of ethnic, tribal, and sectarian conflict all over the world; The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; Failed and failing states; States enriched with oil profits and discontented with the current international order; and Centrifugal forces in other countries that threaten national unity, stability, and international peace—but also with implications for regional and global security. World-wide, there are authoritarian regimes facing increasingly restive populations seeking political freedom as well as a better standard of living. And finally, we see both emergent and resurgent great powers whose future path is still unclear.

-- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
(D. o. Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations 2008)23

The world is fundamentally different today. The operational environment has become more dangerous than it has ever been in recent history. There are no significant state threats, though some are potentially emerging. The United States is forced to prepare for a host of unknown potential threats and numerous identified non-state threats that do not respect rule of law, international boundaries or humanitarian concerns. The current operational environment impacts military planning. The risks to national security must be mitigated protect the United States in the future.

The United States has a history of draw downs at the end of conflicts. These draw downs, though politically popular at the time, and done in the interest of saving money in the government, reduced military capabilities and options. History also shows one such risk was the reduction of intelligence capabilities at the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War brought calls for a peace dividend in personnel and resourcing. The reductions across the board in the IC slowed progress, reduced coverage, and released people who had extensive experience and education. Unfortunately, intelligence tradecrafts cannot be built on a contingency timeline.

Some important trends that will affect ground force operations in an era of persistent conflict include: Globalization, Technology, Demographic changes, Urbanization, Resource demand, Climate change and natural disasters, Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and effects, Failed or failing states.” “The operational environment will be interconnected, dynamic, and extremely volatile.” Areas of joint interdependence will become important and
focusing on Joint intelligence we will need processes that – “reduce unnecessary redundancies in collection asset tasking through integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; increase processing and analytic capability; facilitate collaborative analysis; provide global intelligence production and dissemination; provide intelligence products that enhance situational understanding by describing and assessing the operational environment. (D. o. Army, Field Manual 3-0: Operations 2008)

The operational environment will require constant study, collection, analysis, dissemination, and feedback to be relevant at the right time and right place for any future operations. This will require mission support from the USAR Intelligence forces on a rotational basis for the foreseeable future.

Evolving Threats at Home and Abroad

For years, foreign countries have been planting seeds in the United States. As a country of immigrants and soft hearts, the United States has a very permissive environment for foreign intelligence services and for terrorist recruiters to operate. The threat from within is as dangerous if not more dangerous than that from outside the borders. Homegrown recruited agents have the full freedoms and protections of the United States Constitution as well as the freedom to move within the country without raising inquiries that would normally be associated with foreign nationals. § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the Attorney General “to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution.” This opens the door for hundreds of immigrants from potential threat states to enter the United States, each week, pending a parole hearing. Since most have never been fingerprinted and carry no identification, criminal histories are difficult to verify and most are released on their own recognizance to return for a parole hearing. The majority never show for their hearing and are somewhere in the United States. These individuals, even if they attend the hearing, are generally released and covered under the following Code of Federal Regulations: §416.1618 “When you are considered permanently residing in the United States under color of law.”

This is a population that could easily be susceptible to the recruiting techniques of foreign intelligence services and terrorist groups. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) recently announced a series of arrests in an ongoing investigation of individuals and groups recruiting Somali Americans for terrorist operations\textsuperscript{25}. Another investigation yielded an arrest of an Islamic fundamentalist who worked in Denver and was linked to a potential terrorist operation in New York City\textsuperscript{26}. There is no shortage of cases that can be cited from open sources. Threats to the homeland are real. Foreign recruiters target Americans who are underprivileged, out of work, struggling, or experiencing too slow progress in their lives. News stories in the past decade are full of examples of terrorist plots that have been uncovered or successful.

An idle population of younger demographics poses the most significant threat in terms of extremist recruiting and influence to do harm, even though that intent may have never been resident in those individuals prior to contact with extremists. The United States, as economic times continue to hit the youngest population the hardest, is a treasure trove for any foreign intelligence service or transnational terrorist group. Young residents and citizens in the United States are intelligent, well-connected to the world, and eager to make a living. Many bear significant grudges against the United States government and the baby boomer generation. Most are also unsupervised\textsuperscript{27}.

Terrorists in the current world use a variety of time-honored methods for recruiting. Many of the methods are so subtle that the victim is not even aware they are being pulled in until it is too late to leave. They become reluctant members, but feel they have no place else to go. In *Journey of the Jihadist*\textsuperscript{28}, the author describes how he is pulled into an organization that first makes him comfortable, operates within the gray areas of the law, and then pushes him to do things outside the law as a part of the commitment to the group. There is a population of American youth who are ignored and are without hope and guidance. Terrorist group recruiters will fill that gap if no one else does. The threat is real and has been recognized by key agencies involved in the Department of Homeland Security. Terrorists and their sleeper cells are also working to steal secrets and technologies to give them an advantage against the United States Armed Forces and First Responders, both in the United States and abroad. The global nature of corporate America makes corporate espionage and terror related leverage more lucrative than ever before.
Active, Sustained, and Evolving Requirements

Sixteen distinct intelligence activities fall within the guidance and control of the Director of National Intelligence. The race to bring all of them to the same or similar standards within their specialized areas and to determine methods and processes to share the right intelligence at the right time to enable commanders and decision-makers to best support National Security and protect the country is a monumental task. It will rely on effective resourcing, sustained expert skills in a variety of key disciplines and an ability to keep pace with technology and maintain a productive footprint in a variety of areas throughout the world. The current threat environment requires a much deeper level of analysis and active intelligence measures than ever before, to protect the nation. The nation is threatened from subversive state actors and transnational groups. Past history bears out the extent to which the United States has been influenced in the past by foreign agents and interests²⁹.

The operationalization of USAR Intelligence assets can play a key role in the future success of all these agencies and the Army (reserve). Currently, many USAR units (detachments) serve in support of the combatant commands and selected agencies. Since 9/11, many of the Soldiers and their detachments have also been on sustained mobilization status to support these missions. Assuming there will be a requirement for USAR intelligence assets on a rotational basis and continually for both ARFORGEN requirements and for national intelligence support then the USAR should be resourced for the tactical units, and build a more permanent or lasting plan to support the national agencies in both a uniformed and non-uniformed status.

The assumption that many reserve intelligence professionals have regular employment is proven untrue by the high numbers of Soldiers who volunteer for mobilization duty. A significant number of Army Reservists, who feel comfortable with their skills and rise to the challenge of the current threat environment, are eager to stay on active duty to perform those functions. Operationalization provided opportunities to these professionals and they have become increasingly better at their tradecrafts and skills.

Operational Reserve with Strategic Depth

The challenges facing the United States today and in the future will require us to employ National Guard and Reserve forces as an operational reserve to fulfill
requirements for which they are well-suited in the United States and overseas. …At the same time, within this operational reserve, our nation must have a force generation model that provides sufficient strategic depth. As the operational environment allows, the Department will seek ways to rebalance its reliance on the Reserve Component to ensure the long-term viability of a force that has both strategic and operational capabilities.

---Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010

Military Intelligence Readiness Command

In 2004, the USAR activated a provisional functional and operational headquarters called the Military Intelligence Readiness Command. The primary purpose was to consolidate USAR intelligence units and the majority of the intelligence Soldiers to provide more focused training and resourcing and improve overall readiness.

It has provided support to National Intelligence and units to the Combatant Commands at unprecedented levels and with great success. The MIRC has an incredible pool of talented human resources. The MIRC strengths include mobilized support to the IC, support to the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP), and mobilized tactical intelligence units for deployment as well as finding creative ways to fund and contribute to intelligence requirements worldwide.

The USAR’s intelligence units have both live strategic missions and rotational tactical missions. Although the USAR was built on the Citizen-Soldier concept of the minuteman, its intelligence units have been producing products for the wider IC continuously. The tactical units started rotational deployments when requirements arose in Bosnia and Kosovo. Since then, missions and operational tempo (OPTEMPO) continued to increase. Units and Soldiers responded to the increased requirements and strategic detachments are now making live mission contributions at national agency facilities, as if they were assigned as part-time workers.

With only 39 days per year allocated to units to perform all tasks, the time must be split between annual briefings, common task training, annual battle drill training, ranges, Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT), and administrative tasks, leaving little of the duty time for intelligence skills and mission support.

Support to National Intelligence in the post 9/11 world has come primarily through extended tours on active duty. The IC has both benefited from this relationship
and grown to rely on the extra help. Funding for these extended tours has generally come from DoD Congressional Supplemental for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and OCOs. Since the Supplemental is outside the normal budget, this value to the national IC can drop dramatically at any time.

Support to the Combatant Commanders (COCOMS), such as US Central Command (CENTCOM) has come in the form of tactical units and piecemeal strategic intelligence support teams that have been mobilized specifically for that theater of operation. Once again, this support has been funded by supplemental funding.

**Resourcing Missions and Sustaining Perishable Intelligence Skills**

USAR Intelligence Soldiers are frequently unable to maintain intelligence skills, which generally require significant investments of time and resources. They do not have programmed resourcing to support current and future intelligence requirements at tactical through national levels. Recruiting for intelligence specialties, the stationing problems, additional screening problems, lack of appropriate same skill jobs in the civilian sector, repetitive mobilizations and deployments, has impacted the strength of the MIRC. The lack of resourcing for skill maintenance and requirement for new skill acquisition to keep pace with the latest intelligence operations means that Soldiers will deploy, having met all the theater specific combat requirements but not necessarily be qualified in their MOS specific skills to do their jobs in support of contingency operations. The USAR is also weak in depth of specific skills such as Human Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Signal Intelligence, all of which require a fairly lengthy training period to get to a minimum proficiency.

The MIRC headquarters is still a provisional unit. Since activation, it has relied on funding from a variety of sources, none of which are consistent in support of USAR Intelligence requirements. The 21st Century will see exponential growth in intelligence requirements. This growth will require consistent attention to keep the US safe. Resources must be established that are consistent and abundant enough to sustain the missions meet these requirements.

Recruiting, stationing, lack of intelligence aligned civilian jobs, and unpredictable mobilization requirements are serious problems impeding skill sustainment for USAR
intelligence Soldiers. Commanders make decisions and assume risk in training, based on upcoming missions, or the automated metrics of the day. Soldiers are cut short, but at the higher levels, if commanders guessed correctly, the unit appears successful.

Intelligence architecture is unavailable, with a few exceptions (ARISC and JRIPs), to most reserve intelligence professionals. Normal reserve centers are simply not manned or resourced to support the requirements. With that architecture unavailable, the reservists must always travel to conduct training or mission support. Additionally, with the exception of Fort Dix, which has the Northeastern Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center (NEARISC), USAR mobilization sites either do not have the architecture, or have limited access to facilities that are exceeding their normal capacity, such as Fort Lewis, Washington. Fort McCoy, Camp Atterbury, Camp Shelby, and other reserve component installations are not prepared to support intelligence training and live environment intelligence training.

Another threat is the chance that the USAR becomes incapable of supporting Military Intelligence missions in the future. The Reserve model from the Cold War is obsolete. The current OPTEMPO and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) is unsustainable and the Soldiers, Families, and sometimes employers are bearing excessive weight because of an USAR system that was not designed for current requirements in an age of persistent conflict.

**Time for Change**

> Every man takes care that his neighbor shall not cheat him. But a day comes when he begins to care that he does not cheat his neighbor. Then all goes well.

---Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Worship,” *The Conduct of Life* (1860)

**Recommendation 1: Change Laws and Policies**

> Too many rules get in the way of leadership. They just put you in a box… People set rules to keep from making decisions.

---Coach Mike Krzyzewski, Duke University

The current mobilization laws do not fit the current environment. If the Army is to function with periodically constrained resources, it must have flexibility and agility to move structure and personnel between the active and reserve components. Currently,
there are sixteen different duty statuses in the reserve components. Movement between reserve components and active component or vice versa is difficult. Mobilization processes are cumbersome and contribute to waste, fraud and abuse of Soldier and staff time and resources.

The current environment requires the reserve to be a rotational force as well as posture for strategic requirements. ARFORGEN is based on a construct of continuous rotations on a planned schedule. It seems appropriate to simply change duty status for rotations and retain the mobilization option for total mobilization only. An alternative could be to redefine support to ARFORGEN, eliminate PSRCs and partial mobilizations and use full or total mobilization to support MCOs that will require the entire force for the entire period of the operation plus six months. Establish two duty statuses, active duty and inactive duty, in lieu of the sixteen now in place.

Allow freedom of movement, in an active duty status, between components. Allow the equivalent of sabbaticals for active component to move into a reserve status to address issues in their lives that may preclude them from fulfilling active component requirements, with the intent of returning to active component service when the personal issues are resolved. This would allow more flexibility among those who serve, to be retained in the Army as an institutional body, take care of themselves and still meet their obligations of service.

Match active duty status to requirements, including rotational forces, strategic or national agency support, generating force requirements at training and mobilization stations, and include Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) as part of the active duty status count. Eliminate military technician positions and replace them with active duty status appointments, based on the needs of the unit and government civilian administrators to support the leadership or provide technical expertise where none exists in the unit or to manage facilities and rear detachment support activities.
Recommendation 2: Re-Frame Army Reserve Intelligence

A good leader has to look beyond what his team is doing now – or there could be serious consequences down the road. Whatever a leader does now sets up what he does later. And there is always a later.

---Coach Mike Krzyzewski, Duke University

Establish a reserve force in military intelligence that is focused and vested in human capital. The perception that the Reserve force must be in a set structure that mirrors the active force is limited. The Army needs a skill and knowledge rich Reserve Intelligence force that can stand up and function as a cohesive unit, but also contributes between mobilizations. This new way to look at the Reserve Intelligence forces reduces overhead, reinvests in the force, and contributes to the success of the mission.

Create pools of ready Soldiers from the start, at contracting time. If the Army can be modular, so can the contracts recruits sign. Make commitments on both sides to set time frames for where each Soldier will be in the ARFORGEN cycle at the outset. Reinforce the development of Soldiers with government intelligence agency employment partnerships, funded higher education opportunities, funded overseas internships and higher education opportunities in target languages and cultural regions, and offer opportunity windows for active duty service in their specialty.

Predictability will allow those who have employment outside of their military skill sets to plan and work with their employers more effectively. The balancing of modules at contracting time also provides the Army a better opportunity to predict shortages and offer options to currently serving Soldiers in the reserve components or in the active component to make swaps and bring the Army to an optimal posture, while taking care of Soldiers and Families.
Recommendation 3: Integrate Solutions

It’s important for a leader to focus on the technical details of his industry or business. But it’s vital to focus on details related specifically to people in the organization.

--Coach Mike Krzyzewski, Duke University

A recent interview series with CEO’s from around the United States, published in the November 23rd issue of the Wall Street Journal, and indicated the top four areas these CEO’s thought were important for the future of America, with education ranking among those. The investment in human capital is a key component for America to keep pace and maintain the economy. The capabilities of the USAR Intelligence professionals will link directly to the amount of experience and education they have. The economic benefits for the individuals, Families, Universities, government ICs, build a more flexible, adaptive, predictable, and competent force.

First and foremost, whatever the USAR IC does must benefit the nation. The solution should contribute to institutions of higher learning, stabilize Families, provide employment to competent and highly specialized, skilled workers and provide this labor force to the larger Army in a predictable manner to maximize planning and resource use. As with any decision, the leadership of the USAR and the USAR IC must assess the risks of a course of action and decide if the benefits outweigh the risks. Flexibility and agility allows the Army many variations to address current and future threats.

The Army is in the midst of the largest transformation in many years. The IC is reexamining requirements world-wide and Army intelligence is reviewing requirements with Combatant Commands (COCOM) and the Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) that serve the COCOMS. Emerging from this review and reexamination will be new structure and methods to address current and future requirements. This is the opportunity for the USAR and the MIRC to embark on a new course, offer increased investment in human capital to posture for both the operational rotation force and the strategic depth to offer trained assets in an unforeseen contingency.

To improve a strategic readiness posture, Soldiers will need to work in intelligence fields daily, expand their education, and increase depth of knowledge in key strategic regions, cultures and languages. Regions may be geographic or virtual. Cyber is
a growth area that could be a good fit in the USAR. As with most military intelligence skills, cyber skills are perishable and will require constant use and the right facilities and supervision.

Some of the best trained Soldiers and the brightest young people are ignored by United States citizens and institutions. These individuals make up some of the richest human capital ever produced in the United States. Their choices in life and in their futures will be dependent on the opportunities available to them as they move through high school and beyond. If the USAR offers tangible, quickly attainable opportunities with some measure of security in basic needs, these bright young people will stay in school and gravitate towards service in the USAR intelligence community.

A stronger USAR intelligence network throughout DoD, national agencies and throughout state and local structure will expeditiously move the IC to better cross communication and cooperation.

**Recommendation 4: Synchronize with ARFORGEN**

The USAR already started programs that allow initial stabilizations for students when they contract. Expand and synchronize that concept with ARFORGEN. The modules of opportunities could be presented based on projected force pool requirements, so the recruit is presented with the Army’s needs first and is then able to choose options that fit within that framework to fill the rest of the contract time. ARFORGEN sourcing could be predicted further out and the intelligence requirements in an era of persistent conflict will drive a consistent and steady resourcing state to assure vigilance against threats to the nation.
Figure 2: ARFORGEN with Module Options
Conclusion

In a world where the DoD will almost certainly be faced with difficult decisions; declining resources and escalating mission requirements, particularly in intelligence, and prioritization challenges, an environment of increased cooperation and efficiencies will increase the relevance and role of the USAR. Development of human capital is the most significant challenge for USAR intelligence. Additionally, the system by which the Army develops Soldiers and reaches in to use the reserve assets needs simplification, flexibility, and increased predictability to keep the Army agile enough in its force generation capacity to respond with the right people with the right skills and right equipment at the right time.

The macro level savings in cost and improvement in performance may not be measured for some time, but the immediate benefits will be realized by Soldiers and those in the community almost immediately. The opportunity this brings to young people is limitless and will encourage higher achievements in secondary education as well as garner the support of their Families. This should increase engagement, employment, scholastic achievement, and provide for succession management in the intelligence disciplines. It increases the pool of human capital for the various activities within the Director of National Intelligence’s sphere and thereby increases the effectiveness by which we prosecute intelligence requirements.

It should also help the nation decrease reliance on foreign work visas in highly skilled and technical areas by supporting critical skill training within the USAR ranks. By enriching the breadth and depth of USAR Intelligence professionals, the active component should be able to rely on a competent force for mobilizations, retain Soldiers by moving them from active to reserve status through the lucrative options of education and employment and reach into a deeper pool of experts when unknown threats emerge. Development of human capital is essential to the future success of the Army and the Intelligence Community. The National Intelligence Strategy of 2009 lists six mission objectives and seven enterprise objectives. Moving to this new construct could help achieve mission objectives such as:

- MO1: Combat Violent Extremism
• MO3: Provide Strategic Intelligence and Warning
• MO4: Integrate Counterintelligence
• MO5: Enhance Cybersecurity
• MO6: Support Current Operations\(^40\).

It would address these enterprise objectives:
• EO1: Enhance Community Mission Management
• EO2: Strengthen Partnerships
• EO3: Streamline Business Processes
• EO4: Improve Information Integration & Sharing
• EO6: Develop the Workforce\(^41\).

Change to a simpler modular construct with an emphasis on human capital development may be difficult initially, but strategically it will prove to be a necessity for survival.
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ENDNOTES

1 (Grove 1999), p. 99.

2 (USFORSCOM 2009).

3 (Williams 2008)

4 An average of 15 days annual training and 12 two-day battle assemblies (24 days).

5 This concept was promoted continually in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s.

6 Unit Status Reports were routinely selectively upgraded by commanders to prevent negative evaluations. Many options were available to rationalize the upgrades, like in lieu of (ILO) equipment, counting Soldiers completing training as already MOSQ, and using their subjective internal training rating to portray the unit at a much higher readiness level than it truly was. Using these mechanisms was not wrong or considered unethical during the 1980s.

7 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) was formerly known as Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) resourcing.

8 (Grove 1999), p. 22.

9 (Grove 1999), p. 32.

10 (Klerman 2008)

11 (Stultz and Caffie 2009), p. 4.

12 MG John Custer, Presentation at the 2009 Intelligence Warfighter Summit: Intelligence at the Edge – Setting Condition for Success, December 2009.

13 As briefed to me as an Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center Commander in 2008.


15 (Custer 2009).

16 (Defense 2010).

17 The Army Reserve approved establishment of fully staffed intermediate headquarters to alleviate excessive span of command and control by higher headquarters within the MIRC.

18 Personal observations from assignments in Readiness and MIRC back this assessment.

19 (Stultz and Caffie 2009), p. 4.

20 (Hale 1978).

21 Ibid.

22 (Williams 2008).

24 (Fox News 2008).

25 (Welch 2009).


28 (Gerges 2006)


30 (Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010), p.53

31 (Williams 2008).

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 I experienced this shortfall at Fort McCoy during mobilization with the 108th Division, where intelligence officers and non-commissioned officers were not allowed training opportunities, there was no intelligence architecture, and were not even allowed access to live SIPRNET for either situational awareness or mission readiness exercise (MRX). In theater, this produced several problems for both intelligence and non-intelligence Soldiers. There were several incidents of spills on classified networks, intelligence Soldiers requiring months of training after the relief in place and transition of authority (RIP/TOA) in theater and during peak operations 2006-2007. After an informal survey with other reservists and the contract mentor-trainers in theater, I concluded this was a common occurrence.

35 (Diestler, Becoming a Critical Thinker 1998) p. 50.


39 (Blair 2009).

40 (Blair 2009).

41 (Blair 2009).