Defeating the Narco-Insurgency Within the United States

A Monograph
by
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14. ABSTRACT
With the high U.S. domestic consumption of illicit drugs, a relationship has formed between transnational gangs and powerful Latin American drug cartels. The ineffectiveness of the war on drugs, along with the high cost of such a program, begs the question: should the U.S. Government continue the war against transnational crime, more specifically the war on drugs? If so, then how could the United States become more effective in its efforts to defeat this threat? This monograph asserts that the stability of the U.S. as well as its global status is extremely vulnerable to this transnational criminal organization (TCO) threat if is not addressed appropriately. Today’s approach is focused on attacking the supply side of the narcotics problem. It will be shown why this approach is failing. The current U.S. strategy to defeat the devastating effects of TCOs is too narrow in its approach. The U.S. may become more destabilized as this type of problem has a propensity to get worse, not better, over time. This monograph defines the types of organizations that make up the (TCO) and identifies the threat to the national security of the U.S. that these gangs pose because of their complexity. Secondly, the research analyzes the present supply side strategy, identifying possible shortcomings in the strategy to combat the threat from narcotics. Identification of a center of gravity (COG) for both threat and the U.S. using Joint Publication 5-0 and Dale Eikmeier’s method for COG analysis frames the current situation in the U.S. Using comparative analysis the author will determine if the U.S. strategy is effective in the fight against this insurgent threat. This monograph proposes an FM 3-24 based population-centered counterinsurgency as an additional line of effort.

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Abstract


With the U.S. high domestic consumption of illicit drugs, a relationship has formed between transnational gangs and powerful Latin American drug cartels. The ineffectiveness of the war on drugs, along with the high cost of such a program, begs the question: should the U.S. Government continue the war against transnational crime, more specifically the war on drugs? If so, then how could the United States become more effective in its efforts to defeat this threat?

This monograph asserts that the stability of the U.S. as well as its global status is extremely vulnerable to this transnational criminal organization (TCO) threat if it is not addressed appropriately. Today’s approach is focused on attacking the supply side of the narcotics problem. It will be shown why this approach is failing. The current U.S. strategy to defeat the devastating effects of TCOs is too narrow in its approach. The U.S. may become more destabilized as this type of problem has a propensity to get worse, not better, over time.

This monograph defines the types of organizations that make up the (TCO) and identifies the threat to the national security of the U.S. that these gangs pose because of their complexity. Secondly, the research analyzes the present supply side strategy, identifying possible shortcomings in the strategy to combat the threat from narcotics. Identification of a center of gravity (COG) for both threat and the U.S. using Joint Publication 5-0 and Dale Eikmeier’s method for COG analysis frames the current situation in the U.S. Using comparative analysis the author will determine if the U.S. strategy is effective in the fight against this insurgent threat. This monograph proposes an FM 3-24 based population-centered counterinsurgency as a additional line of effort.
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Introduction

The U.S. is spending billions of dollars and countless man-hours to defeat transnational crime on the American continent. Transnational crime, more specifically the importation, distribution, and sale of illicit narcotics, destabilizes the U.S. and threatens its national security. Although nearly every department of the U.S. Executive Branch is engaged in the effort to counter transnational crime, this effort seems to be ineffective and has not yielded the results demanded by national leaders, while losing the support of the American people. If the transnational narcotics problem is allowed to continue without being addressed using a comprehensive approach, it could be devastating to the U.S. The effort to defeat transnational crime that is affecting the U.S. in such a negative way has been unsuccessful because the U.S. has not identified the problem of transnational crime in the U.S. as the low-level insurgency that it is.

Gary Fields, Drug Czar in the Obama administration, has indicated a possible shift in the nation’s policy concerning its efforts to combat transnational crime, specifically the war on illicit drugs.¹ The potential shift in policy stems from a growing movement that questions the effectiveness of the current strategy, which treats the narcotics problem as a law enforcement issue that allows local, state, and federal agencies to operate independently, and often at odds with each other. The perception of ineffectiveness of the war on drugs, along with the high cost of such a program, begs the question: “should the U.S. Government continue the war against transnational crime, more specifically the war on drugs?” To answer this question, one must consider that transnational crime is a form of warfare as defined by William S. Lind, as fourth generation warfare (4GW).² Martin Van Creveld’s The Transformation of War has stated that this

method of war, more so than conventional war, will be the nature of warfare in the future. Van Creveld said that tactics will not change in this form of warfare; it is the fact that states will no longer have a monopoly on war. The militaries of national governments will find themselves fighting non-state opponents such as the Mexican Federation Drug Cartel, the Gulf Drug Cartel, Mara Salvatrucha Thirteen (MS-13), and the Barrio Azteca transnational gang.

Transnational narcotics crime already exists in the U.S., and its effects will continue to grow exponentially. There are already trends showing a proportionately increasing violent narcotics-related crime rate on the Mexican side of the border with an increased refugee like illegal immigration into the southwestern United States. In addition, the $364 billion in annual commerce that crosses the U.S. and Mexican border as well as the $84 billion in U.S. investment into Mexico will be severely affected if not destroyed by the rising political instability due to the Narco insurgency. The narcotics situation that is centered in Mexico is deteriorating and becoming more intense every day. There are indicators that show that these incidents are starting to migrate over the border to the United States. Americans are being affected by Mexican violence and corruption due to ties between Mexican drug cartels and U.S. organized crime groups. Such evidence occurred in San Diego, California where County sheriff's officials arrested two-hundred and eighty people in a crackdown on gang and illicit activity which included drug and human smuggling. San Diego Sheriff Bill Gore stated the twenty-four documented gang

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4 Max G. Manwaring, “A Contemporary Challenge to State” (Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 13. It is noteworthy that the word *mara* is a slang term for “gang” and is derived from the name of a type of ant known for its ferocity. Literally, *trucha* means “trout” and is also a slang term for “shrewd Salvadoran.” Thus, *Mara Salvatrucha* means a gang of shrewd Salvadorans.”

members were taken in following the two-day operation “Allied Shield”. John Rhett Miller of FOX News reported on April 7, 2010 that law enforcement officers in Texas was put on notice following an alert issued by the Department of Home Land Security, warning of retaliatory killings of U.S. law enforcement officers. This threat was issued by Mexican cartels following a recent U.S. crackdown on the Barrio Azteca transnational gang. U.S. law enforcement is predicting that transnational criminals in the Mexican narcotics industry will only become more aggressive in their cross border activities.

Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) have carried out murders in Phoenix, Arizona and other U.S. cities, and an individual linked to the Zetas, a powerful Mexican TCO, is currently wanted in the killing a police officer in Dallas, Texas. Enforcer groups like the Zetas are suspected in the increasing

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7“DHS: Mexican assassin teams targeting U.S. law enforcement,” Homeland Security Newswire, //homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dhs-mexican-assassin-teams-targeting-us-law-enforcement (accessed May 1, 2010). “Mexico is deteriorating into anarchy, and there is a spill-over effect. DHS issued an alert to law enforcement units in western Texas, warning that Mexican drug cartels-- specifically, the Barrio Azteca gang--are now targeting U.S. law enforcement personnel for assassination in retaliation for a recent crackdown on members of the gang: Mexican criminal gangs already routinely kill policemen, judges, and politicians (and their families, too)--often in the most gruesome manner in order to send a message to others--and they have now taken on the Mexican military as well.”

8Josh Meyer, “Sinaloa Cartel May Resort to Deadly Force In U.S.,” Los Angeles Times, May 6, 2009. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-mexico-chapo6-2009may06,0,5537420.story (accessed Dec 19, 2009). The reputed head of Mexico’s Sinaloa drug cartel is threatening a more aggressive stance against competitors and law enforcement north of the border, instructing associates to use deadly force, if needed, to protect increasingly contested trafficking operations, authorities said. Such a move by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, Mexico’s most-wanted fugitive, would mark a turn from the cartel’s previous position of largely avoiding violent confrontations in the U.S. either with law enforcement officers or rival traffickers. But near the Mexico-Arizona border, Robert W. Gilbert, chief patrol agent for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Tucson sector, said confrontations between law enforcement and suspected traffickers and among traffickers themselves had grown more violent.

number of armed raids across the Mexican border into the U.S. in order to protect drug shipments into the U.S.\textsuperscript{10}

The problem for the U.S. is not just in the border state region. Transnational Latin American gangs have been migrating from the U.S. border region into the American heartland since the 1980s. Kansas City, Missouri has approximately 5,000 documented Mexican transnational gang members along with affiliates of numerous Chicago- and California-style gangs in the metropolitan area.\textsuperscript{11} Acts of intimidation and control of populations by gangs such as MS-13 is also being seen in cities far from the Mexican border. One such city is Atlanta, Georgia.\textsuperscript{12} Another U.S. city that is feeling the effects of the transnational narcotics threat is Charlotte, North Carolina where a federal grand jury charged twenty-six members of the violent gang known as MS-13 with federal racketeering and related crimes occurring in the United States and El Salvador. The charges in this indictment span two countries, three states, four federal districts and several North Carolina cities. The charges stem from a long-term investigation initiated by the FBI “Safe Streets” Gang Task Force from North Carolina, which is composed of the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, U.S. Immigration and

\textsuperscript{10}Hal Brands, “Mexico's Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy” (Strategic Studies Institute, May 2009), 12.


\textsuperscript{12}“Twenty-Six MS-13 Gang Members Indicted on Racketeering Charges,” Department of Justice Press Release, http://atlanta.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/at030410.htm (accessed Apr 15, 2010). “RICO Indictment Alleges Numerous Violent Overt Acts, Including Seven Murders and 14 Attempted Murders, United States Attorney's Office Northern District of Georgia, March 4, 2010. “A federal indictment was unsealed today charging 26 members of the violent street gang called “Mara Salvatrucha”(“MS-13”) with federal racketeering and related crimes in metropolitan Atlanta. The 29-count indictment alleges that the defendants conspired to participate in the affairs of MS-13, an international violent criminal organization with approximately 10,000 members in various nations in North America, through a pattern of racketeering activity, which included multiple crimes of murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, and robbery in metropolitan Atlanta. It further alleges that the defendants conspired to preserve and enhance the power and reputation of the organization through acts of violence, to keep victims and community members in fear of the organization through acts and threats of violence, and to obstruct and prevent law enforcement officials from identifying, apprehending, and successfully prosecuting members of the gang for their violent criminal conduct.”
Customs Enforcement, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, and the Gastonia, N.C., Police Department.\textsuperscript{13} The problems associated with the Narco insurgency in Mexico is serious and is a threat to all North and Central American countries. It is a direct threat to the stability of the U.S. government.

The stability of the U.S. as well as its global status is extremely vulnerable to this threat if this threat is not addressed appropriately. The U.S. may become more destabilized as this type of problem has a propensity to get worse, not better, over time. Currently the effectiveness of the U.S. Government fighting this threat is not adequate, thus leading to the feeling of dismay and possible abandonment of this important struggle. The United States Government must not only continue in this fight against transnational crime, but must become more effective in defeating it. This can be done by treating this problem for what it is, which is an insurgency. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are attempting to destabilize American society, seeking to collaborate with the population and then to control that population through violence and intimidation in the areas that it operates within.\textsuperscript{14} This monograph seeks to determine why the U.S. must continue to fight the war on transnational crime and how the U.S could be more effective in its effort. This monograph will provide a rich description of the types of organizations that exist in the TCO system and their characteristics. It will offer an analysis of the factors critical for their success, as well those factors critical to the U.S. in order to defeat the effects of these criminal organizations.

TCOs that operate on the American continent use transnational gangs to accomplish collaboration and control of populations within different countries to include the U.S. However,


\textsuperscript{14}Stathis Kalyvas, \textit{The Logic of Violence in Civil War} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 104-11.
these gangs are only a part of a larger complex system of actors, and it is impossible to describe how these gangs function without talking about the TCO structure. An example of how global and complex this activity is demonstrated in the following account. On May 3, 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard seized a Belize-flagged fishing trawler 1,500 miles south of San Diego, California that contained twelve tons of Colombian cocaine. A Russian-Ukrainian crew manned the vessel, and the event represented the largest cocaine seizure in U.S. maritime history at the time. U.S. authorities maintain that the Ukrainian and Russian crime gang had the permission of the Tijuana Mexico drug cartel to ship that amount of cocaine to the West Coast of the United States. The San Diego-based U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) stated that nationalities of the crew indicated a direct association of Russian transnational gangs with Colombian and Mexican drug cartels. A seizure this large indicates that many operations of this nature and of similar sizes may go completely unnoticed to U.S. officials. This incident is an example of the operations of multi-tiered complex TCOs that is disruptive to the U.S. What is more telling is the environment that exists in the U.S. that would make transnational actors pursue endeavors with such high risk. It is this environment and how it is created that will be addressed in the following chapters.

This monograph will seek to uncover the root causes of this threat and prescribe an appropriate approach to counter and defeat the effects of this threat. First, in order to determine the propensity of transnational crime in the U.S., the structure of TCOs will be analyzed. The author will look at the three levels of TCOs, taking a more in-depth look at Tier 3 organizations such as third generation transnational gangs. The complexity and capability of these Tier 3 organizations to become Netwar capable will be described. In keeping in line with Carl Von


Clausewitz, quote “One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all of our energies should be directed. The first task in planning for war is to identify the enemy’s centers of gravity, and if possible, trace them back to a single one.” The center of gravity of both the TCOs and the United States government will be determined.

The current U.S. strategy to defeat transnational crime and its devastating effect is narrow in its approach. This monograph will show that the current U.S. approach to transnational crime addresses two lines of effort. The first line of effort used by the U.S. in this approach is interdiction, and the second being security. This approach is focused on attacking the supply side of the narcotics problem. It will be shown why this approach is failing. Although initially this strategy showed success in the country of Colombia, this approach yields short term results and is too narrow in scope. It will be shown that an additional line of effort should be added to two existing lines. This additional line addresses the population. The transnational crime problem and the narcotics trade in the U.S. is a low-level insurgency, and the center of gravity analysis conducted in this monograph will concur with U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 that in order to defeat this TCO threat, the population must become the point where the U.S. places its primary focus.

The Structure and Complexity of TCOs

In order for planners to develop an effective campaign to defeat the destabilizing affects of TCOs, the types and characteristics of the organizations that exist in this complex and adaptive system of transnational crime must be defined. Today, TCOs have evolved into three tiers over the past three decades. This chapter will discuss the structure of these three tiers. The author will look specifically at the concept of the distributed network diagram model as it relates to the TCO structure and complexity.
Tier 1 - TCOs

At the top level of the TCO system are the biggest and most powerful, Tier 1 organizations, also known as “The Big Six.”¹⁷ The Colombian drug cartel, the Mexican Federation cartel, Chinese Triad, Italian Crime Enterprise, Russian Mafia, and Japanese Yokuza make up this group. These organizations are powerful syndicates that act globally in a complex adaptive manner. Tier 1 TCOs are important nodes in the complex system of transnational crime, because of the number of interactions they have with all other nodes, also because of the amount of influence they possess in the overall system. These TCOs have relative freedom to move back and forth over international borders in order to conduct their illicit business. With that fact and the high domestic consumption of illicit drugs in the US, a relationship has been formed and is strengthening between transnational gangs and powerful transnational drug cartels that cater to the U.S. market.

Tier 1 TCOs operate in and near the U.S. affecting American national security. America’s southern neighbor, Mexico, has experienced a serious erosion of its internal security over the last decade due to a sharp increase in violence related to illicit drugs. Well-financed cartels battle each other and the Mexican government in order to gain or maintain control of lucrative drug corridors into the United States. Tier 1 TCOs have begun to employ private paramilitary forces that possess advanced weapons systems that in many cases exceed the capability of the Mexican government. These types of cartels are known for their brutality and, over the last two years, have caused thousands of deaths in Mexico. This has destabilized the internal order of the country. Corruption

is rampant because of this narcotics industry. The Mexican government has begun to lose control of large segments of its population. Mexico is at risk of becoming a failed state.\textsuperscript{18}

The lucrative narcotics mobility corridors are the primary sources of conflict along much of the American border with Mexico. Another source of chaos is the perceived successes of U.S. counterdrug policy. Due to U.S. interdiction successes in the Caribbean in the 1990s, Mexico has now become the single most important point of entry for cocaine and heroin produced in South America, and is a major producer of marijuana and methamphetamines.\textsuperscript{19} The ease at which the Mexican border can be penetrated allows for easy transit into the United States. The Mexican cartel share of the drug trade has grown steadily over the past fifteen years.\textsuperscript{20} More than ninety percent of the cocaine and seventy percent of the methamphetamines and heroin consumed in the United States now either originates in or passes through Mexico.\textsuperscript{21} Of the Mexican cartels, the first is headed by the Gulf Cartel, which has its center of operations in Nuevo Laredo, and includes the Tijuana Cartel as well as several smaller organizations. Opposing the Gulf Cartel, a Tier 1 organization, is a loose alliance with the Mexican Federation, a coalition led by the Sinaloa Cartel. The Sinaloa Cartel has forged pacts with several former rivals, the most

\textsuperscript{18}David Luhnow and José de Cordoba, "The Perilous State of Mexico," \textit{Wall Street Journal}, 21 February 2009. The parallels between Pakistan and Mexico are strong enough that the U.S. military singled them out recently as the two countries where there is a risk the government could suffer a swift and catastrophic collapse, becoming a failed state. Former U.S. antidrug czar Barry McCaffrey said Mexico risks becoming a "narco-state" within five years if things do not improve. Outgoing CIA director Michael Hayden listed Mexico alongside Iran as a possible top challenge for President Obama.

\textsuperscript{19}Brands, 14.

\textsuperscript{20}Adam Isacson, \textit{"The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs,"} in Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, eds., \textit{Drugs and Democracy in Latin America} (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005).

significant being the Juarez Cartel. Over the last decade, these cartels have competed among themselves as well as with the Mexican government for northern border cities such as Nuevo Laredo, Juarez, and Tijuana. They have also been vying for strategic southern ports like Acapulco and other interior transit points between. The Federation has launched a violent eradication campaign against its rivals, in order to dislodge them from strongholds like Nuevo Laredo and Tijuana. The Gulf and Tijuana cartels have responded with fierce counter attacks. Smaller cartels shift allegiances frequently, coalescing with, or balancing against the coalition that has the upper hand at the time. According to Hal Brands, because these alliances tend to be tenuous and impermanent, bloodshed occurs not simply between them, but within them as well. Power struggles within a single cartel are also common, as the arrest or assassination of a cartel leader often fosters violent leadership disputes. As a result, drug-related violence in Mexico occurs on several different planes, resulting in a multi-dimensional conflict.

22“La Federación,’ el cártel mas poderoso de México (The Federation’: Mexico’s Most Powerful Cartel),” *El Universal*, January 22, 2008.

23Brands, 20. “There were more than 5,000 drug-related murders in Mexico between January 2007 and October 2008, with 3,800 of these deaths occurring in the first 10 months of 2008 alone. This bloodshed has become more wanton as it becomes more common; in September 2008, unknown assailants threw grenades into a crowd in Morelia during an Independence Day celebration. Aside from inflicting a mounting toll in lives, the violence has occasioned something approaching mass psychological trauma. Another group linked to the Gulf Cartel recently advertised its expertise in such practices by lobbing five severed heads onto the floor of a crowded nightclub in Uruapan. Decapitated heads are often found with notes warning of the consequences of opposing the cartels. See. Hear. Shut up. If you want to stay alive, read one. The cartels have reacted viciously to the Calderon government’s anti-drug campaign, responding to arrests and drug seizures by launching a sustained, bloody war against those that seek to disrupt their activities.”

24Ibid, 28. “In early 2008, for instance, the Milenio Cartel defected from the Federation to ally with the Gulf Cartel, touching off a new round of bloodshed.” (These shifts occur so regularly that even Mexican government agencies have difficulty determining who is allied with whom at a given point.)
Tier 2 - TCOs

Tier 2 organizations are TCOs that are structured very similar to Tier 1 but act on a smaller scale and are considered to be the operational arm for Tier 1 TCOs. These Tier 2 organizations are powerful non-state actors. They may not have the global reach as Tier 1 TCOs, but they have the same effect within the countries in which they operate. These types of organizations operate in Russia, Africa (Nigeria and South Africa), and as cartels in Mexico that are smaller than the Mexican Federation. As TCOs become more complex over time, they tend to work together more. This relationship helps the Tier 1 and Tier 2 organizations as well as the TCO structure as a whole. This synergy allows TCOs to become stronger as each day passes. Tier 2 organizations may become Tier 1 in the future, much like the Tier 1 Mexican Federation has, which was a Tier 2 TCO less than a decade ago.

Well-trained paramilitary forces, such as some types of Tier 2 TCOs, are the chief combatants or the operational arm that support the bigger more powerful Tier 1 TCOs. Bloodshed in Mexico has been increased due to the rise of these heavily armed organizations as they struggle for control of the drug territory. Cartel leaders have recruited former military, police, and security guards as they raise their own private armies in order to outmaneuver and outgun their rivals as well as Mexican authorities. The Sinaloa Cartel formed an organization known as Los Pelones from a group of military deserters and police officer defectors. The Guzman now employs a similar group, the Fuerzas Especiales de Arturo (FEDA), composed of former security officials and gang members from Mexico and the United States.

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26 Richards, 4.
27 Ibid., 4.
The Los Zeta paramilitary remains the most notorious and effective force to be used by Mexican cartels and the group is linked directly to the Gulf Cartel. The Zetas initially originated from thirty-one deserters of a Mexican army’s elite counternarcotics Airborne Special Forces Group that switched sides in 1997.\(^{28}\) The Los Zetas has since grown to 100-200 men and women, and they are distinguished by their advanced training and proficiency. The elite original Zetas were experts in “rapid deployment, aerial assaults, marksmanship, ambushes, intelligence collection, counter-surveillance techniques, prisoner rescues, sophisticated communications, and the art of intimidation.” The Zetas have put these skills to use.\(^{29}\) Zeta recruits now come from more armature backgrounds. The Zetas have established training camps for new members and incorporated former counterinsurgency specialists from the Guatemalan army. The Zetas have evolved into a lethal and effective Tier 2 criminal organization. They have developed an efficient organization that involves individuals as diverse as electronic surveillance experts and information gathering prostitutes. Zetas often coordinate through informal contracts with third generation gangs to carry out much of their street work.

**Tier 3 – TCOs**

Tier 3 organizations are no doubt the most socially networked, complex, and adaptive of the three tiers of TCOs. This level of TCOs is made up of organizations such as terrorist groups, drug trafficking organizations, and transnational gangs. There are hundreds of these types of groups in the U.S. with tens of thousands of members.\(^{30}\) They are extremely complex and

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\(^{28}\)Brands, 27.


adaptive to actions taken by authorities to counter them. Transnational gangs are only one type of Tier 3 TCO. However, due to the proximity of transnational gang activity to the average U.S. citizen and because of their effect on the American population, these gangs will be discussed.

Some of the most destructive types of Tier 3 organizations are third generation transnational gangs such as MS-13 that operate within the U.S. These gangs have not only become more transnational, they have become multi-generational. 31 John P. Sullivan has described the evolution of gangs as first-generation gangs32, second-generation gangs33, and third-generation gangs. When the average American thinks of a gang of any type, they tend to think of a street thug who is out to get an old lady’s purse. At worst, they think of some misguided minority young male conducting a drive by shooting in some distant neighborhood. The average American might believe that they can avoid this threat by simply doing two things: live in the right community and avoid frequenting bad areas. Crime that is committed by these kinds of gangs is usually filed into the random and senseless category. The reality of this phenomenon is much more complex. Gangs have evolved over the years and are multi-generational. The more sophisticated of these non-state actors can and do operate at a very high level of complexity. They can function at the global level with tier 1 organizations. They intermingle with terrorist and other types of criminals that act as private armies such as the Zetas in Mexico, as they alter the


32Ibid. “First generation gangs are traditional street gangs with a turf orientation. Operating at the lower end of spectrum of crime, they have loose leadership and focus their attention on turf protection and gang loyalty within their immediate environs. When they engage in criminal enterprises, it is largely opportunistic and local in scope. These turf gangs are limited in political scope and sophistication.”

33Ibid. “Second generation gangs are engaged in business. They are entrepreneurial and are centered on illicit trade. They protect their markets and use violence to control their competition. They have a broader, market focused, sometimes overtly political agenda and operate in a broader spatial or geographic area. Their operations sometimes involve multi-state and even international areas. Their tendency for centralized leadership and sophisticated operations for market protection places them in the center of the range of politicization, internationalization, and sophistication.”
ontology of both crime and conflict. \(^{34}\) They can have all the tendencies of a Tier 1 TCO and can rival their sophistication. More and more these gangs have adopted the characteristics of domestic insurgencies within and outside the U.S. \(^{35}\)

Third generation gangs are transnational. They operate at the global end of the spectrum, using their sophistication to garner power, financial acquisition, and engage in mercenary-type activities. Most third-generation gangs have been primarily mercenary in orientation. However, in some cases they have sought to further their own political and social objectives. Martin van Creveld gave examples of these third generation gangs. Some are known by the names such as MS-13, 18th Street, and the D Street Gang. Gary I. Wilson\(^{36}\) and John P. Sullivan\(^{37}\) define transnational gangs as having the following characteristics. These gangs are mobile and can move in order to avoid threats, often to a different country. \(^{38}\) They are criminally active in more than one country. Lastly, the criminal activities of these gangs are often planned, directed, and controlled by leadership in other countries.

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\(^{37}\)Ibid, 1. “John P. Sullivan is a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. He is also a researcher focusing on terrorism, conflict disaster, intelligence studies, and urban operations. He is co-founder of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group and co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a global counter-terrorism network (Routledge, 2006).”

\(^{38}\)Ibid, 2.
The U.S. has seen a rise in third-generation gangs’ activity over the past two decades.\textsuperscript{39} Larger, more complex, and more powerful than street gangs, third generation gangs use violence and intimidation to weaken government institutions and corrode the authority of the state. These organizations dominate the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and the barrios of Central America, which now constitute zones that are not open for law enforcement and government officials to operate.\textsuperscript{40} This effect creates what Stathis Kalyvas called the hinterlands.\textsuperscript{41} Third-generation gangs have emerged as the chief threat to internal stability and security in Latin America. Their activities have given Latin America the highest homicide rates in the world, dampened economic activity, and dramatically lowered popular confidence in government. The smaller Mexican cartels and their paramilitary organizations fit firmly within this trend. Drug-related violence in Mexico has contributed markedly to what Vanda Felbab-Brown of the Brookings Institution calls “the hollowing out of the state.” Through their violence, the cartels exposed the limits and weaknesses of the Mexican Government. As criminal narcotics organizations wage conflict and gain more access to U.S. territory, this hollowing of the state effect becomes more evident in the U.S.\textsuperscript{42}

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\textsuperscript{40}Hal Brands, Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy, Strategic Studies Institute May 2009, 12.

\textsuperscript{41}Kalyvas, 104-11.

\textsuperscript{42}Felbab-Brown, 5. “Criminal organizations at both the production and smuggling segments of the trade seek to corrupt the state so that they can operate with ease and impunity. They bribe police and Customs officers and members of the judiciary, inevitably accompanying their financial inducements with threats of physical elimination of those who oppose them. Law enforcement, investigation, and prosecution of criminals collapse. The weaker the state, the more corrosive the effect of crime-related corruption. The public security apparatus can become paralyzed.”
Third-generation transnational gangs show tendencies of being Netwar capable.\textsuperscript{43} John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt of the Rand Corporation have developed a table to determine an organization’s Netwar capability (see figure 1).\textsuperscript{44} Organizations fall in the category of first-generation gangs being proto-netwarrior, second-generation gangs being emerging netwarrior or and third-generation gangs being fully netwarrior capable.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{networks_and_netwars.png}
\caption{Networks and Netwars}
\end{figure}


Max Manwaring has argued that special attention should be paid to the threat created by certain transnational gangs in fourth generation warfare. These transnational gangs are specialized in destabilizing governments and devastating communities with violence.\textsuperscript{45} These gangs often

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\textsuperscript{43}John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, \textit{Networks and Netwars [Electronic Resource]: The Future of Terror, Crime, And Militancy} (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, The, 2001), 99-128. Netwar is a term developed by RAND researchers John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt to describe an emergent form of low intensity conflict, crime, and activism waged by social networked actors. Typical Netwar actors might include transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, activist groups, and social movements that employ decentralized, flexible network structures.

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid.

operate in the realm of criminal anarchy, using narco-terrorism to create complex emergencies for governmental authorities. Gangs such Mara Salvatrucha Thirteen (MS-13) are different from terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda; however they do share several common characteristics. Each has a propensity to use indiscriminate violence, intimidation, and coercion, transcending borders and targeting nation states, in order to create the suitable environment for their activity. The emergent theme from the destabilizing threat of fourth generation warfare is not just how war is waged, it is also who chooses to fight war, as well as why conflict is waged. In this new age of conflict, non-state actors such as transnational gangs will become the primary actors to wage war. This type of conflict (fourth generation warfare) is a gray area created by non-state actors where war, crime, and peace blur.46 This phenomenon manifests itself as threats to the stability of nations by non-state actors such as gangs, terrorists, militias, cartels, clans, tribes, pirates, criminal enterprises, and non-governmental organizations.

These organizations pose a serious threat to the stability of nations that are in the proximity of their operations, under the effects of their illicit business, or to individuals and agencies who try to stop or hamper them in any way. Third-generation gangs are complex systems. They have proven to be extremely adaptive and resistive to efforts that attempt to put them out of business. This makes third generation gangs as well as all the other TCOs that function in the age of globalization wicked problems–solutions are not readily available.47 When

46William S Lind, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette (October 1989), 22-26. Lind describes the generations of war in the following way. “First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column. Second generation warfare was a response to revolutions in technology such as rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Third generation warfare is based on maneuver such as the “Blitzkrieg” rather than attrition

47Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemma in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4, no. 2 (June 1973): 155-69. Wicked problems have no stopping rule. Unlike solving a chess problem or a mathematical equation, the problem-solver knows when he has done his job. The planner terminates work on a wicked problem, not for reasons inherent in the "logic" of the problem. He stops for considerations that are external to the problem: he runs out of time, or money, or patience. He finally says, "That's good enough," Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad..”
solutions are found, their successes are fleeting. Though this is true of many transnational criminal organizations, it does not make this problem impossible to solve. Given the appropriate analysis and correct attention, these problems can be managed to an acceptable level if not reduced to levels that make this problem go away altogether.

**The Model of Complexity**

Thomas L. Friedman writes about complex problems that exist in today’s world, and often begin with the statements “since the fall of the Soviet Union” or “since the beginning of the information age.” There is something to be said about the fall of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the information age as it is related to the enormity of the set of problems that are related to the transnational problem that exist in the U.S. Globalization has contributed greatly to the complexities that are associated with transnational narcotics crime on the American continent. Agencies in the U.S. that attempt to address the challenge of transnational narcotics crime are faced with many difficulties that are inherent with complex adaptive problems. The level of complexity and the adaptive nature of these problems confound the most astute thinkers that deal with them. With the advent of the information age, more people than ever have control or play a role in greater issues than at any time before. Transnational crime organizations can now reach farther and quicker than at any time in the history of this world. This has changed the nature of the complexity of the narcotics problem in the U.S.

With globalization, problem solvers have to consider more types of actors today, including non-state actors. Non-state actors may be groups of individuals, they may be super-empowered individuals, or they can be transnational organizations. Oftentimes these non-state

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actors operate with little regard to national borders, and with even less regard to national or international policy or law. Drug cartels and drug trafficking organizations have become a major threat to the U.S. and as well as other countries in North and South America with their illicit businesses. Their actions present a serious problem and causes destabilization for many governments.

TCOs are more complex than ever before. Tier 3 organizations are extremely complex systems. These complex systems have moved from hierarchical ways of how groups organized and operated in the past. These complex systems have less formal structures and are less bounded by rules, which allow them to change and adjust to actions that threaten them. These systems can morph relationships without notice and they can replace key actors or nodes without warning. RAND researchers John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt have developed three models that most complex organization fit. They are centralized power structure, decentralized power structure, and distributed power structure models. The author will discuss the distributed power structure model and show how it relates to the complexity of TCOs.

51 Richards, 318.
53 The centralized model is the most simplistic of the three models and resembles the structure of criminal organizations of the past. This systems diagram most resembles the hierarchal systems that was more easily defeated. This type of system simply has one key node or actor at the center of all its activity and everything else has a direct relationship to it. This is how international drug cartels and crime organizations operated 20-30 years ago. December 2, 1993, Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria was killed in a gunfight on a Colombian rooftop. At the time, he was the most powerful person in all of the Colombian drug cartels. When Escobar died so did the Medellin Cartel. The cartel was an organized network of drug suppliers and smugglers that originating in Medellin, Colombia. Escobar built the drug cartel, specializing in cocaine production and trafficking, into an elaborate organization that generated more $60 billion per year. This organization was sophisticated and extremely powerful. The Medellin cartel was a transnational crime organization that had the reach to conduct its illicit business over the entire globe. However, unlike TCOs today, it lacked the complexity. Once the components of the Medellin Cartel were identified, it was relatively simple for the US government to capture or kill its members. The US in conjunction with the Colombian government was able to determine the actors in this organization and very systematically put it out of business. Once these actors were located and identified, old-fashioned police work took down this organization. The US government was able to locate, fix and then capture or destroy all the actors in this organization both inside and outside the country of Colombia thus destroying it. Another source of
The most complex system of Rand’s three systems models is the distributed power structure model. The key nodes, if any are identified, tend to be low-level average actors.

Figure 2.

In transnational crime, distributed model organizations blur the line between crime and warfare. They confound authorities that try to attack them, making the decision to use military force against what appears to be citizens committing crime undesirable and using law enforcement against these insurgent organizations in most cases unsuccessful. The power within competition to the Medellin cartel was other rival cartels. Unlike the organizations that exist today, that work seamlessly as a system, the Medellin and other cartel organizations would often compete against each other. Escobar was the key node located at the center of the entire systems network. One can easily see how the cartel was vulnerable and fail once he was removed. The decentralized model function as a system with its power structures more distributed than that in the previous diagram and from organizations of a few decades ago. Though they are more complex, they still have multiple but very well defined key nodes (located in the centers of each subsystem) that function as leadership nodes. These key nodes are vulnerable if they are properly identified. However, these systems are not subject to certain death if the key nodes are identified and attacked. In fact, they may recover rather quickly due to the redundant roles that key their nodes play.

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this type of system is more distributed as opposed to being centralized as in the centralized and decentralized systems. This makes it difficult to decapitate its leadership. This type of network is extremely difficult for most governments to deal with. There is no clearly defined central leadership. Yet these groups behave in a way as if they are very well led. They have no need for centralized decision-making; therefore, there is no delay in reaction and counteraction to intervention action by authorities. The outside appearance of these groups is that they are unorganized bands, but the effectiveness of these groups to act or to react in an organized and coordinated way is known all too well by authorities in western governments. It is as if this type of organization operates off instinct alone. They possess a culture that is understood among its members that allows them to function at such a high level of Netwar capability. This confounds governmental authorities and causes tremendous frustration to an affected state. Authorities could possibly apply the wrong tool to a problem simply because they do not understand the problem or not be able to identify the source of the problem(s) that these organizations present.

TCOs at Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 levels operate simultaneously. All three levels can interact in collusion with each other. They can also act completely exclusive from each other for a period if that is what best serves their needs at the time. Tier 1 organizations can operate along the entire spectrum of all three tiers. Tier 2 organizations can operate much like Tier 1 but on a much smaller scale while acting globally. Tier 3 organizations can be very sophisticated and transnational. Tier 3 TCOs can operate face to face with Tier 1 TCOs. Tier 3 organizations can also operate at the lowest level of criminal activity, acting as a local neighborhood crime syndicate. This makes the TCOs a complex system that is extremely effective. All three tiers make up this complex system and it takes all three tiers to make the system as effective as it is.

Over the last thirty years, Tier 1 organizations have outsourced many illicit tasks to Tier 2 and Tier 3 organizations. To add to the complexity of this system, Tier 3 organizations such as gangs have evolved into multi generation groups. TCOs have evolved from what is known as
centralized network systems to decentralized system and some are now emerging distributed power structure models that are Netwar capable.

Today, a more damaging effect of TCOs within the U.S. is the emerging behavior of first generation gangs. These gangs attempt to behave much the same way as second and even third generation gangs, but without the sophistication. The overall threat from first generation gangs is less than that of second and third generation gangs, but their effects on their communities can be equally devastating. These types of gangs (first generation gangs) create confusion for authorities at the local governmental level and law enforcement agencies. Authorities at the local level struggle to determine the actual threat that exists in their communities. One such example is illustrated in a *Time* article published September 2, 2009. In his article, Madison Gray argued that too often the news media, government authorities, and society in general blamed violence on gangs when it may not be the case. The article centered on a cookout in Baltimore, Maryland held late in the summer of 2009. The cookout honored the anniversary of the death of two gang members that were killed the year prior. At the cookout were gang members, their families and more than a few children. It was during the cookout that an unidentified gunman with a semi automatic weapon gunned down twelve people at a party to include a twenty-three year old pregnant woman and a two year old child. Later that evening in a related incident, a gunman shot six other people whom two died. Though one man was arrested for the shooting of the six people, it was unclear if he was the shooter of the first twelve. This example shows the difficulty that the Baltimore police have in discerning, at what level does this investigation start and what level does

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These types of first generation gangs are draining to local government resources and distract efforts of authorities to address organizations that are true transnational threats; it also provides a culture that supports the transnational narco-insurgency that operates within the U.S.

**Strategy**

The U.S. campaign strategy for defeating the Narco-insurgency suffers from the lack of a coherent strategy that ties U.S. national goals to effective objectives. This lack of an effective campaign causes the battles that are waged and even won at the tactical level, by the U.S. to be of little consequence to the overall achievement of defined national goals. The civilian authority of the U.S. national government has set policy, however U.S. planners have failed to develop an effective campaign to meet these national goals.  

**Current Strategy- Supply Focused**

President George W Bush signed the Merida Initiative into law on June 30, 2008. This law is a three year, $1.4 billion counterdrug assistance program for Mexico and Central America. The Mexican government is the primary beneficiary of the majority of this aid. This assistance funds counternarcotics operations against powerful Mexican Narco-cartels that have turned much Mexico into a war zone. Mexico has suffered thousands of drug related killings since 2006. There has been a dramatic deterioration in public security and an increase in severe psychological and social trauma. The Merida Initiative is to defeat this transnational insurgency by equipping the Mexican government in order to enable them to take the offensive in the fight against the cartels and their private armies that support them. The program will likely be extended in some form

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56 Ibid. Gray argued this point “The violence seems to have stemmed from a yearlong retribution pattern between two “gangs” that, while involved in selling drugs, were at each other's throats mainly because of the kidnapping of two younger brothers of a man who is linked with one of the groups. At least five homicides are believed to be part of the chain. Criminal-justice experts are beginning to believe that a majority of the violence does not result from directives from any formal gang hierarchy, but rather that it is the result of beefs between smaller neighborhood groups that can be started by anything from a kidnapping, as in the Baltimore case, to a simple look of disrespect on a rival's face.

57 Brands, 26.
when its original mandate expires. This will create a long-term U.S. commitment to counternarcotics in Mexico.

**Foreign Internal Defense Assistance**

Traditional Counternarcotics Operations (Security and Interdiction) has served the U.S. and its partner nations on the American continent for the last three decades. Under this strategy, security includes foreign internal defense (FID) assistance to partner nations. This would include joint exercises, capacity building, and technology transfer in order to foster interoperability.

Anti-Corruption and Human Rights in Mexico and other Latin American countries, the Narco insurgency has gained significant control within the governments through intimidation and bribery. Defeating this effect is a daunting challenge for legitimate governments. The U.S. must take the lead in efforts and assistance to enable these countries to defeat TCOs and allow officials and authorities to operate appropriately. This assistance should be provided to the populations in these countries in the form of human rights protection. Hal Brands think that any benefits reaped from such assistance will be ephemeral at best, if the forces of order in Mexico continue to be penetrated by cartel informants and perceived by the public as abusive. Brands charge that the current U.S. prohibition on training foreign military units implicated in human rights violations must be waived in this case. The U.S. must emphasize anti-corruption and human rights in Mexico and other nations presently in this case.

Government institutional development efforts from the U.S. to Mexico and other nations may help to strengthen weak judicial institutions. The U.S. must improve and expand on the issue government institutional development in Mexico and other Latin American nations. Hal Brands recommend that the United States offer to assist Mexico in developing specific anti-gang and anti-cartel laws. Various U.S. agencies with special expertise in fighting organized crime should provide aid in fashioning effective prosecution strategies. The United States should continue its professional exchanges that focus on these issues in place within Central American Anti-
Corruption and Human Rights in Mexico and other Latin American countries; the Narco insurgency has gained significant control within the governments through intimidation and bribery.

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**Interdiction**

Interdiction is simply the U.S. and its partner nations working together in order to intercept illicit drugs that are in transit within the American continent. As discussed earlier, interdiction forms a major component of the present U.S. counter-drug strategy. Interdiction is reactionary and a defensive measure that cedes the initiative to transnational narcotics organizations. Critics and supporters have argued about the success of this strategy. When it is all said and done, there is much utility in the use of this approach. The defeat of the Colombian cartels in the 1990s was a direct result of this policy. This strategy is very important to the U.S. counterdrug policy if it is intergraded into a more comprehensive JIIM approach.

**Why Supply Focused Strategy Fails**

The narcotics business in Mexico and the crime associated with it is no doubt an insurgency that threatens countries on the American continent. The cartels acknowledge this fact
with by employing thirty counter-insurgency specialists recruited from Nicaragua to work within the cartels. However, the U.S. continues to treat this threat as anything but an insurgency. The current strategy of supply-side approach for countering drugs has characterized the U.S. approach for the last three decades. It emphasizes interdiction, enforcement, and security measures. However, this strategy ignores the methods that are associated with counter-insurgency operations. It neglects the methods of domestic prevention programs, source-country economic development projects, and other alternative strategies. This strategy was very successful when used in Plan Colombia, a multi-billion dollar U.S. counternarcotics and counterinsurgency commitment to the country of Colombia. However, this approach to counter the narcotics industry of today is unlikely to achieve the desired results in the overall problem that is plaguing Mexico. Focusing largely on security, enforcement, and interdiction, the Merida Initiative does not meet the approach for conducting counterinsurgency operations as prescribed by Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24. Little attention is paid to the deeper structural problems within the populations of the different countries involved that fuel the drug trade, as well as drug-related violence. These problems range from corruption in Mexico to large-scale drug consumption in the United States.

The U.S. has reaffirmed its commitment to this approach with the Merida Initiative. This initiative was restated in the Bush administration’s 2008 National Drug Control Strategy. This policy focuses the greatest attention to disrupting the operations of major foreign cartels, rather using a JIIM approach to reduce domestic demand, promoting social and economic development in source countries, and to pursue alternative strategies for combating the drug trade. The five goals of the Merida Initiative strategy are: to reduce the flow of drugs into the United States, to disrupt and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations, focus on the nexus between the drug

trade and other potential transnational threats to the United States, including terrorism; to deny
drug traffickers, Narco-terrorists, and their criminal associates their illicit profits and money
laundering activities; and to assist foreign countries threatened by illegal drugs in strengthening
their governance and law enforcement institutions by the use of foreign internal defense
(FID) assistance. Hal Brands in his monograph, *Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counter
Drug Policy*, describes how this appeared to have succeeded in Colombia at first glance, but
ultimately failed.59

**Centers of Gravity**

The previous chapter described the complexity of the current illicit drug TCO structure
that is on the American continent.60 This chapter will define center of gravity (COG) of the TCO

59Connie Veillette, “Plan Colombia: A Progress Report,” CRS Report for Congress,
Plan Colombia has been touted by the Bush administration as a striking success, and damned by its critics
as an utter failure. In reality, its results were ambiguous, demonstrating both the strengths and weaknesses
of the current counternarcotics paradigm. Between 2000 and the announcement of the Merida Initiative in
late 2007, Plan Colombia dominated U.S. counterdrug policy. During this period, the Clinton and Bush
administrations poured more than $7 billion in foreign and military aid into Colombia in hopes of quelling
a drug-fueled insurgency and staunching the flow of cocaine and heroin to the United States. U.S.
contractors, civilian officials, and uniformed military were (and continue to be) deeply involved in
counterinsurgency and counternarcotics missions in Colombia, leading observers to refer to Plan Colombia
as America’s “number three war.” Plan Colombia originated in response to a dangerous synergy between
criminal activity and political violence. These are impressive statistics, but in many ways they conceal the
less successful reality of Plan Colombia. With respect to an overarching goal of the program--significantly
reducing the quantities of cocaine and heroin delivered into the United States--the picture is one of little
progress. Between 2000 and 2004, street prices for cocaine actually decreased, indicating a steady if not
expanding supply. Prices have increased somewhat since 2005, but on the whole supply is still more than
adequate to meet the continuing domestic demand for the drug. The Justice Department’s National Drug
Intelligence Center acknowledges that “there have been no sustained cocaine shortages or indications of
stretched supplies in domestic markets,” and shipments to the United States still overwhelmingly originate
in Colombia. The reason for this unsatisfying outcome is that Plan Colombia--and the counternarcotics
paradigm it represents--has suffered from a fundamental lack of balance. The United States has failed to
join the security and interdiction components of Plan Colombia with sufficiently bold efforts to reduce U.S.
domestic demand or alter the economic calculus that drives many Colombians to participate in the drug
trade.”

60Max G. Manwaring, *A Contemporary Challenge To State Sovereignty: Gangs And Other Illicit
Transnational Criminal Organizations In Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, And Brazil*,
(Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), December 2007), 1. Another kind of war (conflict) within the context of a
“clash of civilizations” is being waged in various parts of the Americas, Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle
East, and elsewhere around the world. Some of the main protagonists have been designated as first-, second-, and third-generation street gangs, as well as more traditional Transnational Criminal
structure by using the U.S. military’s Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. To determine COG, Colonel Dale Eikmeier’s model of COG determination will be used to properly conduct COG analysis using ends, ways, and means. Once the methodology for COG determination is established, analysis will be conducted to determine the actual ends (what it is that they are after), ways (how they plan to obtain that ends), and means (what they plan to use to reach their ends) of TCOs that threaten the U.S. In keeping with the Clausewitz dictum when conducting COG analysis, the dominant characteristics of both belligerents will be determined. The COG of the USG will be determined. This analysis will show that tier 3 organizations, primarily third generation transnational gangs, are the centers of gravity for TCOs. This analysis will also show that the TCOs’ critical capability is a destabilizing culture created by tier 3 organizations.

In JP 5-0, there are no clear rules or structure to the methodology. Recognizing this, Colonel Dale Eikmeier, developed a method that effectively and simply illustrates the COG analysis process as prescribed by JP 5-0 (see figure 3).

Eikmeier’s model requires that the ends be identified. This simply means to identify the goal or endstate that is desired. Once the goal is decided, the ways that these ends may be achieved has to be determined. This process is to list the primary or the most realistic ways that belligerents can achieve their goal. Finally, the means required to accomplish the ways. The one means that is determined to be critical to achieve the ends will become the critical capability or center of gravity. Eikmeier uses the example of the singer Madonna wanting to become president of the U.S. to explain his process of using ends, ways and means. Eikmeier describes how

Organizations (TCOs), such as Mafia families, illegal drug traffickers, warlords, terrorists, insurgents, and so on. These gangs, and their various possible TCO allies, are not sending conventional military units across national borders or building an industrial capability in an attempt to “filch some province” from some country. These illicit nonstate actors are more interested in commercial profit and controlling territory (turf) to allow maximum freedom of movement and action to achieve their longer-range objectives.”

62 Ibid. Eikmeier is a former Fellow at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS).
Madonna determines her critical capabilities and ultimately her center of gravity by first determining her ends or her goals, and then deciding what ways to appropriately attempt to accomplish her goals. Finally, she determines what means she possesses in order to conduct the ways she intends to accomplish her ways. The sole means that she possesses to conduct the ways are critical for her success, thus they are her critical capabilities.

![Strategy Framework and Center of Gravity Analysis](image)

Figure 3.

Eikmeier uses this simple example to illustrate the concept of using the ends, ways, and means analysis. The example, as simple as it was, still required some creative thinking (art versus science). The increased complexity of TCOs requires even more creative and flexible thinking (art). A planner demonstrates mastery of operational art by adapting frameworks and models to fit the situation, not by forcing a situation to fit a specific model.
Determining Centers of Gravity

Center of Gravity for TCOs

The ends for TCOs are to create an environment that is both a market within the U.S. for their illicit products and a culture that they can operate within that is unimpeded and has very little threat from the U.S. government. This environment is evidenced by many factors. Two examples of these factors are declining traditional social order in an area where this culture is rich, and second by no snitch culture, that has taken hold within the U.S.

Using Eikmeier’s example, determining the ways that TCOs can accomplish these ends within the U.S. TCOs may attempt to bribe authorities for freedom to operate and for leniency. Though these organizations may possess large amounts of cash this is option is highly unlikely in the U.S. TCOs may attempt to physically take over state levels governments inside the U.S. or even take over U.S. government with force. This endeavor is also very unlikely for TCOs, given the power and the make-up of governmental structure within the U.S. Lastly, TCOs can use gangs and gang activity to create a culture within the U.S. that neutralizes authorities. This is the most likely the way that TCOs will approach obtaining their ends. This fits the Eikmeier’s model. This is the critical capability of TCOs.

Of all the ways for TCOs to accomplish their ends within the US, using gangs and gang activity in order to create a culture that undermines the abilities of authorities within the US is the one that TCOs are most capable to accomplish. The means is the thing that TCOs use to create this environment are tier 3 organizations. Therefore, the ability to facilitate this gang culture is the critical capability for TCOs. Moreover, these gangs (tier 3) are the COG for TCOs. The next section of this chapter will take a closer look at this analysis.
Center of Gravity for the United States

The USG realizes that it is impossible to police every waterway for drug trafficking, every street for all drug transactions, and every neighborhood in order to capture perpetrators of illicit activity. The USG’s ends should be to create a culture that is more tolerant and supportive to the legitimate governmental authority, providing authorities support and information in order to prevent illicit activity and denying TCOs the environment to operate freely. The US should seek to create a culture that by its nature rejects illicit activity denying TCOs the viable market that makes it worth the risk to conduct the type of operations that they do. Lastly, the U.S. should seek to create an environment in which TCOs are less complex, where their key nodes (actors) are easily identified and can be isolated in order for authorities to act decisively against them.

Again using Eikmeier’s example, the author will now determine the ways the USG can accomplish these ends. USG could continue to focus on attempting to interdict as many crafts transporting illicit cargo as possible. It could also use overly aggressive tactics of law enforcement to coerce support from individual citizens within the environment that illicit activity thrives. Alternatively, the USG could develop and employ a focused national strategy in the form of a campaign to counter the subversive effects of TCOs within the US.

Of the ways listed that the USG could use to defeat the effects of TCOs, the one that the U.S. is most capable or have the means of implementing effectively and is most beneficial is to develop and employ a focused strategy to convince people to participate in resisting illicit activity and the gangs that conduct it. Therefore, the critical capability is the USG’s ability to counter

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63Department of the Army, *FM 3-24 Insurgency and Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Army, December 2006), 1-1. “Success in counter insurgency depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule not that of the insurgency. Achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible. This can include eliminating those extremists whose beliefs prevent them from ever reconciling with the government. Over time, counterinsurgents aim to enable a country or regime to provide the security and rule of law that allow establishment of social services and growth of economic activity. Counter insurgency thus involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and
the insurgent affect of third generation transnational gangs and gain support of the population to fight against illicit activity. The population is the COG for the USG. This population must often are can chose to support either side of this struggle. They can support the TCOs, or they can support the legitimate government authority. The USG can develop a strategy that will make its population supportive of its national goals or the U.S. could act in a way that would cause the population to support the actions of TCOs. This population can assume a third position. This population could chose not to support either side. As awkward as this option sounds, it is better than the second option.

**The Insurgency within the U.S. and How to Counter It**

An insurgency is an attempt to gain control of the population within communities through intimidation and then through cooperation. David Galula stated that the population is central to an insurgency and counterinsurgency alike. This attempt for insurgencies to gain control and governments to maintain control makes counterinsurgency operations political operations by nature. Transnational organizations that deal in illicit goods are attempting to go beyond profiting from their crime, as these organizations are attempting to pre-empt governments within Mexico and the U.S. through insurgent behavior. Therefore, this political problem demands a political solution that contains more political resources than it does military ones. Therefore counterinsurgencies should be population centered. The U.S. and its partners must adopt a more

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64 David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger,1964), 74. “The population is paramount. That is, the support of the people is the primary objective of an insurgency. Without the support of the population to an insurgency, it is possible for the counterinsurgency to root out all the insurgents and prevent further recruitment. Such support is most readily obtained from an active minority. Those willing to actively support a insurgency in their efforts to rally the relatively neutral majority and neutralize the hostile minority.”
holistic JIIM approach that is integrated into counterinsurgency operations in order to defeat this transnational narcotics threat.

The Community

In the war on transnational crime, the community is where the forces of this war meet. It is the environment or the place where the majority of the problems associated with destabilizing illicit activity take place. It is the place where the COGs for opposing sides in the battle against transnational narcotics crime most often exist together. It is where the population resides. There are different factors that make up the community. These factors interact in multiple complex ways and these interactions often cause friction. That is not to say that all frictions are of the negative type. However, frictions in the community are often negative. From these frictions, tensions may develop. These tensions are problematic and may become sources of disconnections between factors within the community.

The Factors that Make the Community

There are different factors that exist in the community. These factors play a part in any given community in the US. Five factors make up the community. These factors interact with each other and this is often times the source of friction within the community. These frictions are often derived by the actions taken by the actors within the community, and they are the reasons that people of the community may become marginalized.

65FM 3-24, 1-16. “Environment and geography, including cultural and demographic factors, affect all participants in a conflict. The manner in which insurgents and counterinsurgents adapt to these realities creates advantages and disadvantages for each. The effects of these factors are immediately visible at the tactical level. Insurgencies in urban environments present different planning considerations from insurgencies in rural environments. Border areas contiguous to states that may wittingly or unwittingly provide external support and sanctuary to insurgents create a distinct vulnerability for counterinsurgents.”
The first factor to be considered in the community is the population or the people.\textsuperscript{66} The population is often the most overlooked factor within the community. There are several reasons for this oversight. The population requires the basic needs that the community provides. Although, the population itself is a distinct factor in the community, portions of the population can also be actors in other factors. In the minds of some, this fact may trump the fact that this portion of the population still requires the basic needs that the community may provide. An example of this is in the case a woman in New Orleans may have been a police officer. In the case of a natural disaster such as Hurricane Katrina, many may forget the needs of this individual and place demands on her, as an officer within the government. Another reason population may be overlooked in the community is the fact that individual people within the government may sometimes be the source of the friction within the community and it may be difficult to separate the act from the person and see the person as part of the population. For example, an elected official may be the source of policy or an act that causes friction for the rest of the community. It is also the fact that people are often overlooked as a factor within the community for the simple reason that they are overlooked. It is also possible to see policy itself work counter to the very reason that the policy was designed. An example of this would a policy being created to increase liberties within a population, but may seek to do so by restricting the freedom of the very people it is designed to liberate. It is important to note that criminal actors are also part of this factor that makes up the community. What should not be lost, especially within the community is the fact that the lines may cross when identifying the different actors that make up the category of factors.

\textsuperscript{66}FM 3-24, B-4, “People refers to nonmilitary personnel encountered by military forces. The term includes all civilians within an AO (the populace) as well as those outside the AO whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect the mission. To display different aspects of the populace, analysts can use population support overlays and religion, race, and ethnicity overlays. (FMI 2-91.4 contains information about these overlays.) Perception is another significant people factor in COIN. The perception assessment matrix is a tool that compares the intent of friendly operations to the populace’s perception of those operations.”
called the population. The final thought is that the population must be kept front and central in thought during any consideration concerning the community.

The second factor in the community is that of the government. This factor is made up of different actors. There is the actor of the elected official. The elected official is a maker of policy and is held directly accountable to the community. The next actor is the appointed official, such as city managers. This actor may hold very similar authority as elected officials but may not be held directly accountable by the community. This fact could easily become a source of friction in some circumstances. Next to be described are the officers of the government. These actors are the non-policy wielding actors. They are neither policy creating nor are they held directly accountable to the community. Examples of these officers of the government are police officers, firefighters, schoolteachers, and other civil servants.

The third factor in the community is the church or faith. This factor is distinguished by the different religions and denominations of religion. The U.S. is a secular government, but by no means does it have a secular culture. In certain religions in the U.S., the Elders or ministers may have tremendous influence and are they may be significant actors within this factor.

The fourth factor in the community is that of institutions. The actors in this category are made up of schools, hospitals, newspapers, civil organizations and television stations. A trusted agent in any of the actors listed could be elevated to the status of an actor, such as a long time familiar news anchor or a local civil rights leader. In other systems these trusted agents may be considered as elders and be categorized as a factor within itself. The US as a society is too young and too homogeneous for that consideration in the context of this writing.

The fifth factor in the community is the criminal enterprise. There are many different types of actors within this factor. There are the local crime syndicates, where the span of crime as

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67FM 3-24, B-7, “Religion, race, and ethnicity issues often contribute to conflicts. Religious, race, and ethnicity overlays depict the current ethnic and religious make-up of an area of operation.”
well as the origins of the criminal is local. There are the external crime organizations, those that are not local. Then there are transnational crime organizations, these organizations make up the heart of the insurgent force within a community. In many cases the type of actors in this group are hard to detect and even sometimes hard to distinguish one from another. The most dangerous of this factor is the fact that most of this element can blend into the population much like any other insurgency and often times may be supported by the population.  

The U.S. should understand the dynamics of these communities and how it should act when countering the insurgent activities of transnational narcotics organization. That is, the response necessary to eliminate the insurgency is likely to be seen as excessive by the general population. Within the community, this is the main problem. When single actors may belong to multiple factors within the community, responses to legitimate insurgent actors may be seen in a negative way by other actors within the community.

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68FM 3-24, 1-11, “Though insurgencies take many forms, most share some common attributes. An insurgent organization normally consists of five elements:

- Movement leaders.
- Combatants (main, regional, and local forces [including militias]).
- Political cadre (also called militants or the party).
- Auxiliaries (active followers who provide important support services).
- Mass base (the bulk of the membership).

The proportion of each element relative to the larger movement depends on the strategic approach the insurgency adopts. A conspiratorial approach does not pay much attention to combatants or a mass base. Military-focused insurgencies downplay the importance of a political cadre and emphasize military action to generate popular support. The people’s war approach is the most complex: if the state presence has been eliminated, the elements exist openly; if the state remains a continuous or occasional presence, the elements maintain a clandestine existence.”

69Galula, 63. “As long as the insurgent's activities are legal and viewed as nonviolent, the insurgency is referred to as being a revolution in the cold. In this case the problem for the counterinsurgency is that the “actual danger will always appear to the government as out of proportion to the demands made by an adequate response.”
A Strategy Recommended

U.S. Government must first develop a grand strategy, from which planners can develop an effective campaign. Hal Brands described it as a whole of government strategy that addresses not just the symptoms of the disease, but its causes as well. For the Merida Initiative to have a chance to be fully successful, the United States must develop a JIIM approach that counters the insurgency at all levels. The strategy should partner current enforcement and interdiction programs with a wide range of counter-insurgency measures such as: anticorruption initiatives, social and economic development, institution building, and efforts to restrict U.S. domestic demand and illicit arms trafficking into Mexico. In an age of globalization, complexity, executing this strategy will not be easy. However, it is required and is central to improving the U.S. counternarcotics policy.

Those charged with making U.S. counternarcotics policy should use three lines of effort as they develop an effective operational approach that is more population centered (Figure 4-1). The first line of effort is that of security and foreign internal defense assistance, which is currently in use by the U.S. This line of effort would also include measures that would emphasize anti-corruption and human rights initiatives in countries such as Mexico. The second line of effort would be to continue the current practice of interdiction. The third and final line of effort would

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70B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Classic Book on Military Strategy*, 2nd ed. (London: Meridian, March 1991), 338-52. “Grand strategy comprises the purposeful employment of all instruments of power available to a security community. Military historian B. H. Liddell Hart says about grand strategy: The role of grand strategy--higher strategy--is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war--the goal defined by fundamental policy. Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources--for to foster the people's willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy--which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will. Furthermore, while the horizons of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace--for its security and prosperity.”

71Brands, 42.
be focused internal to the U.S. This line of effort would protect the population by emphasizing measures to reduce America’s contributions of illicit drug consumption and its capacity to provide firearms. It would also emphasize economic and social development within the American population.

Under the current strategy, these lines of effort may or may not be a part of what is being done. Many times if they are, they are relegated to a distinct secondary position. For the U.S. to have a chance to be successful in defeating the Narco-insurgency each of these three lines of effort must be an integral part of counterdrug policy with funding and official attention. A successful counterinsurgency to defeat the Narco-insurgency would contain the appropriate use of force seamlessly integrated into a larger scheme of diplomatic, information, military, and economic programs (DIME). Which all of would reinforce, rather than compete with or undermine one another. Greg Gardner and Robert Killebrew\textsuperscript{72} consider the American transnational criminals to be a domestic insurgency; therefore, it must be treated as such.\textsuperscript{73} The U.S. must partner with the legitimate governments on the American continent and conduct an effective counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72}Gardner and Killebrew. Colonel Greg Gardner, USA (Ret.), is Vice President for Government and Homeland Security Solutions at the Oracle Corporation. Colonel Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.), is a consultant in national defense issues.

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid. “Inside the United States, however, a growing body of evidence indicates that criminal gangs are taking on the characteristics of domestic insurgents.”

\textsuperscript{74}FM 3-24, chapter 1. Counterinsurgency defines COIN and establishes basic truths. “Insurgency is an organized movement to overthrow or neutralize a government. Counterinsurgency is actions by the government to defeat the insurgency. Success in COIN depends wholly on the population. Legitimacy is the objective: each side needs the people to accept its political power as legitimate. Insurgents aim to force political change, so political factors are primary and military action is secondary. Armed forces cannot succeed in COIN alone.”
Population Protection

The U.S. government must clear narcotics based transnational gangs from within communities, then hold these communities to prevent gangs from regaining their, and then build these communities to prevent the negative effects of transnational narcotics crime from returning. This can be done by isolating these gangs’ areas where they currently operate; preventing the spread of their effect, and then the U.S. must actively reduce the gangs’ effectiveness within the communities.

The U.S. must run an effective information operations campaign. The U.S. has shown the ability to defeat and change a deeply rooted cultural problem in the past that is similar to the narcotics problem, when it transferred itself from a nation designated as a smoking society to a

Figure. 4
non-smoking society in less than twenty years.\textsuperscript{75} This was done through a clever information campaign that mobilized the entire nation against the social acceptance of smoking. This information campaign must be expanded beyond the anti-drug message. It must be all encompassing of the entire effort to defeat this low level U.S. insurgency. The U.S. must communicate every part of its effort in its campaign to defeat the narcotics threat in order to gain the support of its population, thus denying support to the narcotics industry.

Measures to reduce America’s contributions (Drug Consumption and Firearms)

Homegrown contributions to the drug trade must be addressed domestically. Much political debate in the U.S. stirs the controversy that surrounds the issue of gun control and gun laws. In addition, there are different views on how to deal with the U.S. domestic demand for illicit drugs. As mentioned earlier in this monograph, the debate on this issue range from the choice between legalization of illicit drugs to more strict enforcement. The RAND Corporation reports from

\textsuperscript{75}“Florida's Anti-Tobacco 'Truth' Advertising Campaign Credited with Lowering Teen Smoking Rates” Business Wire, March 2001, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/marketing-advertising/marketing-techniques/6084407-1.html, (accessed Aug 28, 2009). “Public service advertising (PSA) in the 1980s, made by popular artists at the time in order to reach a younger audience, Thetruth.com created a TRUTH ad campaign that is geared toward a younger audience TRUTH ad campaigns present health facts about tobacco products that are meant to reach a young demographic. The ads have a younger actor as the main speaker. TRUTH ads are geared toward teenagers, and have become more than mildly successful. Since their launch in 2000, studies have shown that there has been a decline in the use of tobacco within the nation’s youth, which directly correlates to the introduction of the theTRUTH.com ads. “Seventy-five percent of all twelve to seventeen year-olds in the nation - 21 million - can accurately describe one or more of the TRUTH ads. Nearly ninety percent of youths aged twelve to seventeen - 25 million - said the ad they saw was convincing. Eighty-five percent - 24 million - said the ad gave them good reasons not to smoke”. Advertising is one of the most prominent factors that contribute to the tobacco control movement. It was the launch of the anti-smoking campaign under former President Jimmy Carter administration in the early 1960s that started the war against tobacco in a public sphere. Michael Pertschuck is the “co founder of the advocacy institute in Washington, D.C….is currently a leader in efforts to oppose market expansion into developing countries by the transnational tobacco industry”. Pertschuck confirms that the Tobacco Control movement is a combination of a threat to the environment and a threat to the health of others. It was the culmination of the two that brought about a movement. The tobacco control movement is different from other social movements because it developed through health concerns and scientific evidence, rather than political or social oppression in movements like the civil rights movement and the feminist movement. It was only when the communities across the country came together to oppose smoking, combined with the health concerns from medical groups that the tobacco control movement really became popular. This was in the early 1960s. The next step was advertising, which made the issue national and even international.”
studies that prevention strategies, if funded properly, such as anti-drug use advertising, to
education, and addict rehabilitation can have a significant impact in countering domestic drug use
and could lower demand. The Rand studies conclude that prevention and treatment are far more
efficient and economical than enforcement and interdiction. RAND calculates, one dollar spent
on prevention and treatment, carries the same effect as 7.3 dollars spent on enforcement and
interdiction. Brands also states that the Merida Initiative be expanded to a wide range of
treatment and prevention programs. This would have a positive impact on the demand problem
within the U.S., which is fueling this international crisis. It would also bring the U.S. counterdrug
efforts in line with counternarcotics programs abroad.

The U.S. must continue and improve economic and social development over the long
term. The effectiveness that leads to the success of counternarcotics from Mexico to communities
within the U.S. will hinge on the government’s ability to address the real or perceived economic
grievances and to alleviate social alienation that is a source of criminal activity. The security
threats that the United States confronts from the narcotics industry are symptoms of the deeper
problems of poverty and inequality both inside and outside of the U.S.

Lastly, the U.S. must continue to conduct appropriate kinetic operations in support of
local civil law enforcement security operations. Transnational gangs and other Tier 2
organizations are well armed and extremely dangerous. These organizations seek to control
communities through intimidation by violence and by threats of violence. In the proper context
the population will understand and accept when such force is used, provided they know why and
that it is perceived to be applied appropriately. However, many months if not years of positive
work and good relationships can be destroyed in one incident where the use of force is perceived
to have been misapplied. It does little good in the case of counter Narco insurgency for law
enforcement to be cleared of wrongdoing by a criminal or civil court if the court of population
opinion is lost.
Conclusion

As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the U.S. has spent and will continue to spend billions of dollars and countless man-hours in order to defeat the illicit Narco trade that is destabilizing the U.S. and is threatening its national security. The U.S. effort to defeat this Narco insurgency has failed. However, it does not have to continue to fail. The Narco insurgency is not a Mexican Narco insurgency or a Colombian Narco insurgency. It is a transnational insurgency, and it is operating at a very effective level within the U.S. However, if the U.S. focus its efforts on protecting its population as well as partner with its American neighbors and form an effective strategy that is joint, inter agency, intergovernmental, and multi-national in order to wage a campaign against this transnational threat, this problem can be brought under control, if not eradicated all together.

In the past, the U.S. has achieved moderate success in its efforts to defeat of the narcotics industry on the American continent. However, it is the lack of a coherent campaign plan that has prevented the U.S. from achieving full success. The limited successes that the U.S. experiences in its fight against the narcotics industry are much like successes experienced during the Vietnam War. There are many tactical gains and victorious battles, but success is fleeting and does not equate to total victory for U.S. policy. For example, the U.S. had victory in the early 1990s with the defeat of the Colombian drug cartels. There was much the same level of success for the U.S. with its efforts in the Caribbean. However, all that has done is move the drug trade to include more violence closer to the border with Mexico, with no indication of amount of narcotics that has come into the U.S. were ever reduced during that time.

The current U.S. strategy to defeat transnational crime and its devastating effect is too narrow in its approach. The current U.S. approach to defeat transnational crime only focuses on two lines of effort. The first line of effort used by the U.S. in this approach is interdiction, the second being of security. This approach is focused on attacking the supply side of this problem. Initially this strategy showed success in Colombia, however, this approach yields short termed
results, but was too narrow in scope. Additional lines of effort should be added that addresses protecting the population. The transnational crime problem and the narcotics trade in the U.S. is a low-level insurgency, and the center of gravity analysis conducted in this monograph will concur with U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 that the population is where the U.S. should shift its primary strategy focus.

This monograph looked at the root causes of the transnational crime threat to the U.S. An appropriate approach to counter and defeat effects this threat was prescribed. The U.S. should not end the war on transnational crime, though; members of the current administration have indicated just that. Critics have cited valid points for the case as to why the war on drugs should be ended. However, if this policy is abandoned or the problem left unattended, the propensity is that this problem could propel Mexico to the status of a failed state. Then a wave of refugees will spill over the Mexican border and bring chaos and anarchy of the Narco insurgency into the borders states and beyond within the U.S.
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