U.S. HAITI POLICY: AN EVOLVING COMPREHENSIVE, MULTILATERAL APPROACH

BY

COLONEL RICHARD A. WILSON
United States Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2011

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
The United States has been a caring, responsible international partner for Haiti through its collaboration in United Nations interventions for over 16 years. The international community’s initiatives in the Organization of American States (OAS) have endorsed the promotion of good governance in Haiti and economic aid for this failing state. The Clinton Administration initiated our nation’s change in policy for managing complex contingency operations by balancing the use of the military in multilateral peace operations with other alternatives. Two administrations since Clinton – Bush-43’s and Obama’s – have continued to employ our national instruments of power in Haiti with a more comprehensive role for our federal agencies and international partners. The Department of State refocused policy in 2010 while maintaining an enduring military soft-power application through Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in USOUTHCOM. This SRP examines the employment of our national instruments of power to rebuild Haiti throughout this 16-year period. Based on this analysis, it recommends the Obama administration to continue evolving this emerging policy and strategy.
U.S. HAITI POLICY:
AN EVOLVING COMPREHENSIVE, MULTILATERAL APPROACH

by

Colonel Richard A. Wilson
United States Army

Mr. Mark J. Eshelman
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
The United States has been a caring, responsible international partner for Haiti through its collaboration in United Nations interventions for over 16 years. The international community’s initiatives in the Organization of American States (OAS) have endorsed the promotion of good governance in Haiti and economic aid for this failing state. The Clinton Administration initiated our nation’s change in policy for managing complex contingency operations by balancing the use of the military in multilateral peace operations with other alternatives. Two administrations since Clinton – Bush-43’s and Obama’s – have continued to employ our national instruments of power in Haiti with a more comprehensive role for our federal agencies and international partners. The Department of State refocused policy in 2010 while maintaining an enduring military soft-power application through Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in USSOUTHCOM. This SRP examines the employment of our national instruments of power to rebuild Haiti throughout this 16-year period. Based on this analysis, it recommends the Obama administration to continue evolving this emerging policy and strategy.
The United States has been a caring, responsible international partner for Haiti in its support of U.N. interventions for over 16 years. Our nation’s engagement has supported a developing and comprehensive, multilateral policy since the Clinton Administration. Some analysts may regard our engagement in Haiti as more evidence of U.S. strategic failure in the Americas. In reality, our nation has progressively developed international relationships and developed a greater balance of interagency activities throughout this period. However, the Clinton and Bush-43 Administrations employed our national instruments of power in Haiti without benefit of a clear and comprehensive interagency plan.\(^1\) Prior to the Obama Administration, our nation used both diplomacy and developmental assistance, but appeared to act only reactively to natural disasters and political instability. Further, these efforts lacked a unity of effort. We must glean lessons from our history of international relations and continuously re-assess our engagement in Haiti in response to Congressional recommendations to mitigate any perceptions of strategic failure.

Our nation’s evolving long-term policy must be defined in time and commitments, must be embedded in an international network of partners and organizations, and must be embraced by an accountable Government of Haiti (GoH). In 2010 alone, in our response to the Haitian earthquake, we have continued our interventions in this island country without any plans to address problematic trends such as an unstable political system, poverty, and widespread corruption. The Obama Administration has an opportunity to develop a more effective bi-partisan policy for Haiti, especially in accord
with the September 2010 Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) on Global Development. This Strategic Research Project (SRP) makes such a recommendation as a complement to the Department of State’s (DoS) Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). Secretary of State Clinton declared that “we must use what has been called smart power – the full range of tools at our disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural – picking the right tool, or combination of tools for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy.”

Recent natural and political disasters in Haiti have created an opportunity to effect lasting change. This country has arrived at a historic crossroads: devastated by an earthquake; its government ministries destroyed; many federal workers (some of them corrupt) killed by the JAN 10 disaster; a cholera-stricken capital region; and an unresolved NOV 10 national election. Haiti can start anew, building on the current ravages. Former Prime Minister Michele Pierre-Louis has declared that in order for Haiti to build back better, the process must start within Haiti itself. Her pronouncement was recently made at the U.S. Institute of Peace U.S.-Haiti relations forum “Is Haiti Building Back Better” held on October 29, 2010. This forum addressed Haiti’s ongoing challenges. Pierre-Louis advised that, to build good governance, the action plan of the Haitian Government should essentially hone in on 4 focus areas: territorial, economic, social, and institutional. Similarly, President Rene Preval projects that within 30 years Haiti will be an emerging democracy. The Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have urged promotion of good governance in Haiti and increased economic aid for this failing state. Obviously, to strengthen
democracy in this hemisphere, U.S. leaders must make a long-term commitment to Haiti in collaboration with international stakeholders.

DoD has been engaged in Haiti since September 1994. A U.N. military force intervened when Haiti’s military regime resisted international demands to restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to presidential office after the first free and fair elections in Haiti’s 186-year history. This military intervention was unopposed; it resulted in returning Aristide to office, disbanding the Haitian army, and creating a civilian police force to promote security and stability. Since the 1990s, the ongoing U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has tried to improve security conditions.

Haiti, the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, remains unstable today due to its lack of effective governance compounded by its poor economy – but not due to lack of security. Our sustained military footprint throughout this period has been reduced as Haiti’s civilian security force has become stronger. But USSOUTHCOM remains engaged through theater security cooperative engagements to deliver Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). In effect, U.S. military engagement in Haiti is a soft-power initiative. Although the United States has delivered critical humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters and has contributed to Haiti’s short-term stability, Haiti has made little progress towards effective self-governance or economic viability.

A key component of today’s evolving policy is a change in the role of the U.S. military instrument of power, which was initiated in the Clinton Administration. The U.S. has reconsidered the nation’s approach to Haiti throughout the spectrum of multilateral peace operations and contingency operations since the mid-1990s. The Clinton
Administration’s strategy was essentially the evolutionary beginning of today’s emerging policy for Haiti. President Clinton relied on a DoD-led policy out of necessity: U.S. interventions responded to short-term security conditions. But the United States had no policy to harness the energies of diplomacy, information, and economics. The U.S. approach today in Haiti has evolved into an enduring military soft-power engagement which has filled capability gaps in our interagency relationships and international networks.

This SRP reviews some Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) during the Clinton Administration since it appears the current administration may rely heavily on former President Clinton’s initiatives to complement Secretary Clinton’s emerging QDDR and DoS policies. The U.S. Department of State announced the appointment of Haiti Special Coordinator Thomas C. Adams on 27 Sep 2010; Adams previously focused on managing foreign assistance for the U.S. Government. He will also execute the Obama administration’s policies set forth in the PDD on Global Development. Previous United States Army War College (USAWC) analyses of U.S. policy for Haiti provide a working background for this SRP: Two of them were written immediately following the Clinton administration; the other two were written immediately following the Bush-43 administration. These analyses offer pre- and post-9/11 DoD perspectives on U.S. policy in Haiti. During our current global engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. foreign policy has evolved to become more joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational. As these USAWC analyses advise, our leaders must not rely exclusively on our military to secure and stabilize failing nations. The USAWC analyses further
touch on emerging roles of diplomacy and development, rather than civil-military operations, to support the current evolving comprehensive U.S. policy for Haiti.

**Recently Stated Policy**

In 2009, the Congressional Research Service compiled U.S. legislative concerns regarding Haiti. U.S. strategy calls for fostering democratic development, stability, security; for cost-effective U.S. aid; for protecting human rights; for combating narcotics trafficking; for addressing Haitian migration; and for alleviating poverty. Although there was bipartisan support in the 110th Congress to assist the Preval government, the 111th Congress may consider not only the balance of these legislative concerns but also the scope of assistance. Congress passed trade preferences legislation through the HOPE Act of 2006 (Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement) to address Haiti’s priorities to build institutions and establish conditions for private investment. Another issue of immediate concern to Congress is the ongoing effort to ensure that free, fair, and safe elections are conducted to select members of the National Assembly of Haiti and to elect a president in light of political party tensions. These initiatives indicate several strategic ways the U.S. seeks to support Haiti. The 12 January 2010 earthquake disaster then prompted a renewal of our national concern for rebuilding Haiti. Our military remains more deeply entrenched in our nation’s effort to support Haiti and to a lesser degree to provide stability. In the current global environment of full-spectrum operations, we have sustained limited military engagements to respond to threats emanating in Venezuela, Mexico, and throughout the Americas as drug cartels and human trafficking encroach our domestic borders. The Americas, not the U.S., must remain focused on balancing MINUSTAH concerns to counter criminal gangs transiting through Haiti and the Americas.
The Clinton Administration: The Beginning of Policy Evolution

The Clinton Administration (1993-2001) implemented two policies which established the foundation for the emerging policy of the Obama Administration. The first policy reformed the use of military power in multilateral peace operations. The second policy then fostered interagency collaboration in managing complex contingency operations. Both of these policies were designed to promote US interests by improving the ability to effectively manage or resolve inter- and intra-state conflict in conjunction with a new State Department program to train civilian police for international peacekeeping missions around the world. President Obama’s Global Development Policy states the U.S. will tailor development strategies in stabilization and post-crisis situations to the context of the challenges. His Administration encourages an application of lessons from prior experiences to balance our civilian and military power as we respond to conflicts, instability, and humanitarian crises.

The first policy, Presidential Decision Directive – 25, U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, was issued in May 94 when President Clinton signed the first comprehensive U.S. Policy on multilateral peace operations suited to the post-Cold War era. Clinton’s National Security Advisor Tony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans and Policy General Wesley Clark conducted a press briefing to announce that the U.S. would use peacekeeping selectively and more effectively than had been done in the past. Lake set the stage before they addressed the policy’s six major points by describing the changing operating environment:

The post-Cold War era is, as we see it every day, a very dangerous time. Its defining characteristic is that conflicts in this era take place now more within societies within nations than among them. And this makes it a particularly difficult time, both conceptually and practically, for us all in the international community to come to grips with questions of when and how
and where we will use force….Some of these internal conflicts challenge our interests, and some of them do not....The further problem here is that these kinds of conflicts are particularly hard to come to grips with and to have an effect on from outside because, basically, of course, their origins are in political turmoil within these nations. And that political turmoil may not be susceptible to the efforts of the international community. So neither we nor the international community have either the mandate, nor the resources, nor the possibility of resolving every conflict of this kind.¹⁰

We can learn something about Haiti by examining the current environment in Africa, where the U.S. is limiting military interventions in response to political instability and civil unrest of foreign nations. The current U.S. focus on Security Force Assistance doctrine to assist in building partner capacity is applied globally; Haiti will be no exception in the Americas as well. Key points addressed throughout PDD-25 have – limited our role in Haiti today – and rightfully so. When peace operations were employed, they were limited to providing sufficient security to allow Haiti to best utilize the interim for transition. These operations should not be open-ended or provide enduring solutions. So we must remain selective in our engagements to protect both U.S. and global interests.

Both Lake and Clark noted that the burdens of peacekeeping must be shared; they noted that in the mid-1990s the United States was paying less than 1/3 of the costs and providing less than 1% of total peacekeeping forces.¹¹ Lake further emphasized that the primary purpose of our military forces is to fight and win wars. To effectively do this, he noted that we must address the following 6 points stipulated in PDD-25: we must support the right operations; we must reduce the costs of peacekeeping operations; we must improve U.N. peacekeeping capabilities; we must ensure effective command and control; we must improve the way the U.S. government manages the issue of peacekeeping; and we must assure that peacekeeping operations are
cooperative endeavors of the Congress and the Executive Branch. This PDD essentially initiated “shared interagency responsibility” as we see it today in Secretary Clinton’s (DoS) and Secretary Gates’ (DoD) attempts to pave the way for burden-sharing in U.N. Chapter VI (non-combat peacekeeping operations) and Chapter VII (peace enforcement operations) operations. The strategic challenge is to assure that the U.N. will complement a more collaborative U.S foreign policy that is buttressed by Regional Combatant Command’s Phase Zero operations, especially in USSOUTHCOM.

In the mid-1990s, the U.S. employment of military forces in Haiti was limited in duration; these operations relied on the GoH ownership of security; they were monitored by the regional international community through economic means within the Americas. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre did a country background report on Haiti from a broader perspective throughout the Clinton Administration (1993-2001). Aleisha Arnusch’s analysis essentially affirmed that Haiti has been in a cycle of conflicts which led to deeply entrenched international interventions in both the 90s and once again in the first decade of this century. The first cycle of recent interventions essentially began in 1992. In particular, the OAS failed to generate enough support to impose a broad hemispheric-wide embargo in 1991 to pressure Haiti’s military regime to stand down. For the longer term, these embargos could have restored democratic governance and reinstated the country’s first elected leader. In Oct 91, the OAS states eventually voted in favor of imposing an embargo against Haiti to promote government stability, to end human rights abuses, and to reduce migration to the U.S. by strengthening the local security forces.
Arnusch highlighted some limited positive results in her post-intervention analysis. As the international community addresses challenges such as Haiti or Africa, should we essentially focus on the short-term objectives or the long-term international regional commitment? Her observations follow:

The intervention efforts in Haiti between 1992 and 2001 were successful on a number of counts. First, democratic rule was restored in Haiti and the first transfer of power between democratically-elected leaders took place. In addition, the first President in Haitian history completed an entire term. Second, the creation of a national police force was a step in the right direction of creating a sustainable security in Haiti. Third, the security situation has stabilized in Haiti, up until the period surrounding the 2000 elections. In addition, the human rights situation had improved markedly, particularly following the restoration of democratic rule. Finally, important ties to civil society in foreign countries were made, and there was an improvement in human development, economic, and health indicators at this time...Lessons from Haiti suggest that sufficient levels of security need to be in place before development can take root. However, in order for security to be sustainable, institutions need to have the capacity of maintaining law, order, and good governance, and armed groups need to be disarmed. It is these areas that should be the focus of future interventions in Haiti that are sustained over the long-term.14

These results seem to have been achieved because the Clinton Administration had changed its focus from security to effective governance in Haiti. Its objective was to enable the GoH to promote its own democratic ideals and create institutions to enforce law and order.

Similarly today, as the hemispheric leader, the U.S. must very prudently commit military force in Haiti, especially when MINUSTAH, CARICOM, and the OAS are conducting multilateral regional operations in Haiti and throughout the Americas. The attrition of the Haitian police force over the past 15+ years, unsuccessful disarmament and ineffective weapons regulation, continued perceptions of an ineffective judicial system to enforce laws that support police operations, and an enduring instability of democratic elections are not amenable to short-term solutions. Neither the U.S. nor the
U.N. can make dramatic changes until Haiti itself becomes more accountable and the proximate international community demands incremental change in Haiti in its long-term commitments to security and regional stability.

The second policy document, Presidential Decision Directive – 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, represents another evolutionary change in policy for the use of military force. This PDD was issued in May 1997 by the Clinton Administration to facilitate government officials' interagency planning for future operations following operations in Bosnia (peace accord implementation – 1995), central Africa (1994 – foreign humanitarian assistance operations), and Haiti (OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY - 1994) during Clinton’s first term in office. Rowan Scarborough, *Washington Times* reporter, summarized the rationale of this policy:

President Clinton signed PDD 56 in 97 as an order for the Pentagon, State Dept, CIA and other agencies to create a cohesive program for educating and training personnel for peacekeeping missions. But two years later, the A.B. Technologies consulting firm found little has been done.¹⁵

The use of force, when warranted, would set conditions for non-lethal activities led by the Haitian democratic government. GoH ownership is critical for supporting efforts by the U.S., NGOs, private donor sponsors, and CARICOM. PDD 56 provided a framework for conduct of complex contingency operations. It stated that in the wake of the Cold War, the global strategic environment has included a rising number of territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars. These events pose threats to regional and international peace; they portend disasters that may amplify human suffering. The U.S. has learned that effective responses to those situations may require multi-dimensional operations consisting of several components: political/diplomatic,
humanitarian, intelligence, economic development and security. The Clinton Administration used this opportunity to refocus the military in a soft-power role through civil-military operations (CMO) and stability operations. Along with this refocusing effort, the U.S. now had to realign international diplomacy agendas with developmental efforts in a unified interagency direction.

This PDD critically acknowledged that we must also strike a balance between military and civilian agencies to achieve our national objectives. It also noted that in future operations, the appropriate U.S. government response may employ only non-military assets. However, it acknowledges that DoD forces may be needed to make significant progress in resolving regional conflicts. However, the level of U.S. interests at stake in complex operations may not require an indefinite deployment of U.S. forces to effectively address a diverse set of emergencies. These future operations will be conducted by coalitions operating under an international or regional organization, or a temporary coalition of like-minded countries. Clinton re-emphasized uses of non-military means and diplomacy. The U.S. partnered with international donors to withhold election assistance. The Administration refused to send observers to the NOV 2000 elections as a visible message about the importance of democratic development and governance.

The overall intent of this PDD is to collectively harness U.S. agency planning, execution, post-execution capabilities to ensure a more coordinated and accountable national effort. Essentially, this policy directs centralized planning and decentralized execution under direction of a Deputies Committee charged with developing the pol-mil plan and assigning specific responsibilities through Executive Committees (ExCom).
Full implementation of this PDD requires institutional training throughout several agencies to be delivered by a new interagency training program. To increase the expertise of government officials in this matter in 2003, the National Defense University issued the *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations*.

The PDD requires a Political-Military implementation plan (or pol-mil plan) to be developed as an integrated planning tool to coordinate U.S. government actions in a complex contingency operation. The requirement for the pol-mil plan includes a detailed situation assessment, mission statement, agency objectives, desired endstate, and milestones with measures of success. To further advance supported and supporting agency roles, the ExCom remains focused on delineating agency responsibilities, reinforcing agency accountability, ensuring interagency coordination, and developing policy options for consideration.

**USAWC Clinton Years Analyses**

As our nation transitioned from contingency operations to stability and support operations in Haiti, USAWC analyses identified an emerging trend regarding diplomacy, information, and development. These analyses projected a long-term non-lethal commitment, but did not link those to CMO or DoD. The change in strategy still failed to garner international donor support and cooperation throughout the Bush-43 Administration. While MINUSTAH continued operations, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) remained involved, in conjunction with CMO assessments. Additional non-lethal enablers throughout the emerging policy were applications of the informational instrument of power to both inform and influence the international community while transitioning military operations to diplomatic roles in
support of the GoH. Throughout the Bush-43 Administration, the Army updated doctrinal guidance for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) to Stability and Support Operations (SASO) and CMO to Stability Operations in October 2008. This change in doctrine over time has acknowledged the spectrum of engagement from conflict to peace; it validates a need for collaboration, coordination, and cooperation among military, state, commercial, and non-government organizations in nation-building efforts.\(^{20}\) The evolving application of the Army doctrine also led to the military’s deep involvements in diplomacy, information, and development, mostly because the interagency could not provide this range of support.

Jonathan E. Loesch’s (2001) paper on “Averting Continuation of Failed U.S. Policy with Haiti” proposed a long-term U.S. commitment to gradually develop Haiti in multiple areas that would lead to a self-sufficient and responsible member of the regional community. He noted that our policy has varied from the goal of controlling access to shipping lanes through the Panama Canal, to the goal of containing communism, to the goal of preventing illegal migration, to the goal of delivering Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR), to the goal of improving public health and eliminating infectious diseases in Haiti.\(^{21}\) Loesch identified a need to develop long-term policy and strategy that was less costly by eliminating the necessity of periodic military involvements in Haiti. He advised against granting aid directly to the Haitian government in order to reduce corruption and to avoid the appearance of supporting a despotic regime.\(^{22}\) In retrospect, this analysis of the Clinton years traces a refocusing of evolving Haiti policy from military lethal force to a spectrum of legitimate governance, diplomacy and development in a post-Cold War era.
However, military deployments to Haiti throughout the 1992-95 period were more costly to the U.S. government than the FY01 U.S. AID package. Recent developments in Haiti now include the formation of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) in March 2010. This joint commission – co-chaired by former U.S. President Clinton, the U.N. special envoy for Haiti, and by Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive – will determine which reconstruction projects will receive backing from multibillion-dollar funding pledged by foreign donors. The current plan is to transition the committee to GoH control approximately one year after the recent national election in NOV 2010.\textsuperscript{23} Loesch noted the lack of a strong international donor commitment to Haiti or any complementary activities to USAID initiatives.

Loesch recommended that the U.S. should lobby the Paris Club and the London Club to supplement the World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Program to provide more financial assistance for Haiti. Loesch supported USAID development efforts in Haiti. He identified agriculture as another potential growth area for Haitian self-sufficiency. Since 2000, Haiti has witnessed a continuing rapid decline of local agriculture. But Haitian agriculture can be revived through supporting USAID initiatives to support farmer’s access to credit and expanding the growth of subsistence farming throughout the country. Host-nation infrastructure funding should not focus on baseline restoration within the capitol but should extend to secondary cities and throughout the nation. These are fundamental efforts of nation-building and reconstruction operations in Iraq since 2003. Loesch also recommended foreign investment incentives, rather than embargoes, to achieve positive effects. Embargo sanctions had been
implemented to prevent further unfair elections and to weaken military-led factions who hindered democratic gains and full implementation of a national constitution.

Raymond Duncan Jr.’s (2002) paper on “Achieving U.S. National Interests in Haiti” recommended a long-term commitment through a U.S. interagency approach without designating DoD as the supported/supporting agency. Duncan supported DoD involvement in Haiti to assist in the continued development of civic administration functions, to execute the war on terrorism, and to support the U.S. counter-narcotics strategy. DoD should operate along the same glide path as DoS and other agencies. This analysis supports current Army Stability Operations doctrine (2008) and the DoS QDDR (2010). He did make a parallel recommendation for Regional Combatant Commands to focus on terrorism and to essentially link our policy in Haiti with our comprehensive counterterrorist efforts. He emphasized that we should not discount the huge role of Civil Affairs (CA) Ministerial Advisory Teams (MAT) to support the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti by working with the GoH in specialized areas. MATs are quite similar to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating today in Iraq and Afghanistan. Duncan also recommended a State Partnership Program (SPP) with Haiti to build a habitual relationship between National Guard units and civilian leaders of a host state to engage and exchange professional practices on U.S. soil or in Haiti.

Regarding Peace Keeping, Duncan cited a need for an enduring commitment through the UN, OAS, and CARICOM to train and enhance the Haitian National Police (HNP). A proactive regional commitment also supports the U.S. shift to building partner capacity through international organizations such as the U.N.. The U.S. engagement in Haiti will
be a long-term commitment that will continue to evolve from CMO to DoS-led foreign policy initiatives to build accountable GoH self-sufficient institutions.

The Bush Administration: Another Era of Policy Evolution

The Bush Administration (2001-2008) applied our evolving multilateral policy highlighted in the Clinton PDDs (use of military when appropriate) and the USAWC analyses of the Clinton Administration’s policies (shift to informational, diplomatic and development). President Bush focused on a self-sustained GoH. The international community has become more engaged to promote Haiti’s democratic progress. International donors have endorsed proposals to hold Haiti more accountable for its use of funds to solidify its legitimacy in both OAS and CARICOM. MINUSTAH support of U.S. military intervention unveiled increasing multilateral demands for an accountable government. The neighboring countries are willing to assist GoH strategies to build a stable democracy and to revitalize regional economic growth.

The Congressional Research Service has maintained periodic summaries of Haiti’s developments and U.S. Policy since 1991. It has documented Congressional concerns extending beyond the Clinton Administration into the Bush #43 administration. From 2006 to 2009, boycotts for Haitian Senate seat elections, barring political parties from participating in elections, public violence and killing of poll officials sustained concerns for a free, fair, and inclusive electoral process. Throughout this period, the CRS has charged that Haiti is unable to hold independent fair national elections. The legitimacy of Haiti’s executive branch has been, at best, dubious, resulting in periods of interim governments. Haiti’s progress toward democracy has been halting and excruciatingly slow.
Essentially, throughout this period of fragile Haitian self-reliance, the U.S. has continued to focus on Haiti’s ongoing transition to democracy. Following an initial decrease in U.S. aid during the Bush #43 first term, U.S. aid to Haiti has steadily increased. Through bipartisan support in both the 109th and the 110th Congress, U.S. legislation has set a number of conditions on U.S. aid in an effort to make Haiti’s governmental officials more responsive and accountable.26 Throughout the first decade of the 21st Century, U.S. policy has emerged into a deliberate mix of short-term objectives and long-term commitment. The most recent CRS Report on Haiti cited highlights of U.S. policy and Congressional concerns:

The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti during the 110th Congress are to continue to improve security, promote sustainable economic development, and strengthen fragile democratic processes now that an elected government is in place. The Haitian government and the international donor community are implementing an interim assistance strategy that addresses Haiti’s many needs simultaneously. The current challenge is to accomplish short-term projects that will boost public and investor confidence, while at the same time pursuing long-term development plans that will improve living conditions for Haiti’s vast poor population and construct government institutions capable of providing services and stability.27

While the U.S. has sustained its commitments, the OAS and the U.N. have also begun to assume more significant roles in supporting the Haitian electoral process. International groups have supported voter registration, observed polling site operations, monitored polling sites and balloting, and certified election results. Additionally, CARICOM has supported efforts to secure Aristide’s agreement to disarm political gangs, to appoint a new prime minister, and to form an advisory council.28 An armed rebellion essentially forced the resignation of President Aristide in 2004, followed by another U.S.-led international intervention to help restore order.
The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) then assumed authority as the interim government provided governance until presidential and legislative elections were conducted in 2006 after several months of delays. President Rene Preval is currently serving his 2\textsuperscript{nd} non-consecutive 5-year term - his first (1996-2001) came during the Clinton Administration. President Preval has leveraged relations with the U.S to focus on two main missions for his government: to build institutions and to establish conditions for private investment in order to create jobs.\textsuperscript{29} He introduced the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (2007-2009) to meet requirements for debt relief and identified national priorities as infrastructure, energy, education, health, and security.

To provide needed security, he asked the U.N. mission to remain in Haiti to train a more effective police force while he advanced proposals to dissolve the Haitian Army. He claimed that his country’s financial resources would be better invested in Haitian infrastructure and education.\textsuperscript{30} Throughout this 2\textsuperscript{nd} Preval Presidency, the U.S. has increased its financial aid to Haiti. Also, the Bush-43 Administration increased civilian and military assistance to MINUSTAH. The State Department has also endorsed the U.N.’s recommendation that MINUSTAH be restructured to execute two concurrent missions focused on disarmament and electoral security. Once again, U.S. intervention in Haiti continues to include DoD and civilian security forces in a short-term capacity to complement other support. In the meantime, economic support to Haiti has significantly increased as a long-term commitment.

Berthony Ladoceur’s (2008) “Snatched from the Jaws of Success – United States Policy and Strategic Failure” essentially supports a long-term commitment which integrates security, stability, transition, reconstruction, and then redeployment. His
analysis is consistent with the fundamental cornerstone for our range of military full spectrum operations: offense, defense, stability and support to civil authorities.

Ladoceur noted that our limited military intervention in the Clinton years was repeated during the Bush Administration after the UN passed Security Council Resolutions 1529 and 1542, which authorized multinational forces in Haiti and the MINUSTAH.\textsuperscript{31}

Aristide’s leadership notwithstanding, we must note that despite short-term U.S. engagements (twice in 94 and 04), Haiti’s security remains uncertain. Ladoceur additionally noted the long-term potential for the U.S. to assist Haiti in developing education reforms, in building leadership and enacting reforms, in reestablishing judicial processes, and in creating an environment for sustained investment to enhance economic growth. The challenge remained for the U.S.: Would the U.S. adopt a whole-of-government approach? Or would U.S. support be spearheaded by DoD CMO with USAID assistance, since the DoS lacked capacity to maintain a whole-of-government approach?

Michael Duhamel’s (2009) “Haiti: The Need for a Stronger Approach” used a broad analysis to support his recommendation for a long-term engagement which essentially requires incorporation of several new enabling multilateral and interagency requirements. He described U.N. strategy to stabilize Haiti and then proposed changes to enable greater international involvement with the GoH to create a stable and secure Haiti. He noted that the U.N. needs to set long-term objectives and approve multi-year mandates to reach them, instead of UNSC’s implementation of 12-month mission sets.\textsuperscript{32} He additionally identified a need for a stronger UN mandate which sets better conditions for proactive international engagement to intervene if GoH corruption persists.
Furthermore, he cited a need for better collaboration from multiple donors to ensure an appropriately resourced U.N.-approved strategic plan for the entire period of a given mandate. To effectively synchronize this effort, a coordination center of some sort would complement MINUSTAH efforts through a direct reporting mechanism to the special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) for developmental initiatives. To achieve complementary effects, daily broadcasts of UN messages to the local nationals should both inform the public and influence activities.

Similar to Loesch, Duhamel recommended urban development based on a unique plan formulated during his recent deployment to Haiti. He recommended a relocation of the population center Citi Soleil in order to strengthen security and reduce corruption. This port city’s relocation to the Northeast of Port Au Prince would provide a two-fold benefit of a new residential infrastructure to enhance the quality of life and a new site for international industrial facilities with immediate access to air, land, and sea. This project would require critical tools of both diplomacy and development acting cooperatively.

The U.S. continued to refine application of the informational instrument of power in Haiti policy from contingency operations of the 1990s to stability operations in the 21st century. The USAWC analyses provided a non-lethal framework for long-term engagement that was mutually supported by information operations and strategic communication to both inform and influence our foreign audiences in Haiti and throughout the Americas. Presidential Decision Directive – 68, International Public Information (IPI) was issued in April 1999 to address problems identified during military operations in Kosovo and Haiti, in which no single U.S. agency was empowered to
coordinate U.S. efforts to promote its policies and counteract bad press abroad. This PDD was designed to replace provisions of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 77 “Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security” issued by President Reagan in 1983. PDD 68 directs a similar training methodology to that of PDD 56. It directs integration of training exercises into the curriculum at the National Defense University, National Foreign Affairs Training Center, the Service War Colleges, and other institutions.

This new IPI system was designed to “influence foreign audiences” in a much broader context than the JPOTF did for Joint Task Forces. IPI is designed to enhance U.S. security, to bolster U.S. prosperity, and to promote democracy abroad. U.S. leaders will encourage the U.N. and other international organizations to integrate the IPI system in support of multilateral peacekeeping operations. In the 1990s, U.S. agencies and departments conducted engagements with Haiti and the international community in the Americas in a very independent and uncoordinated manner. The PDD incorporates recommendations from the Duhamel and Ladoceur papers regarding a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) to promote civil order and reduce Haitian-on-Haitian violence by broadcasting local GoH messages of peace and reconciliation in order to discourage acts of revenge or retribution. Current collaborations of federal agencies have contributed to a more unified approach since the IPI system was initiated. Today, the U.S. Embassy in Port-Au-Prince provides visible regional security through DoD country teams. These teams also have access to the status of ongoing developmental projects by multiple NGOs.
Since 2008, Haiti’s strategy for growth and poverty reduction has been derailed by responses to disasters that have required rapid international interventions and re-assessments of some foreign policy. In August and September 2008, four major hurricanes or tropical storms in the vicinity of Haiti caused floods, destroyed locally grown crops prior to harvest, and worsened the ongoing food crisis. One key concern which has evolved throughout the change from the Bush #43 Administration to the Obama Administration is U.S. grants of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to illegal Haitian migrants who fled Haiti during this period of devastating storms. The Bush-43 Administration denied a request from President Preval to delay the deportation of 30,000 illegal Haitian immigrants. In April 2009, Secretary of State Clinton announced that the Obama Administration had considered granting TPS to Haitians already in the U.S. before Obama’s election. However, U.S. interdictions of Haitian migrants on the ocean and their return to Haiti would continue. The June 2009 CRS further identified U.S. policy objectives for Haiti:

The main priorities for U.S. policy regarding Haiti are to strengthen fragile democratic processes, continue to improve security, and promote economic development. Other concerns include the cost and effectiveness of U.S. aid; protecting human rights; combating narcotics, arms, and human trafficking; addressing Haitian migration; and alleviating poverty. Some members expressed concern about the Bush Administration’s October 2006 decision to lift partially the 15-year-old arms embargo against Haiti in order to allow arms and equipment to be provided to Haitian security units. The Obama Administration has said that Haiti is an important issue, deserving support, and has called for a full review of policy toward the country.

Similar to the transition from the Clinton Administration to the Bush Administration, the transition from the Bush Administration to the Obama Administration has illustrated once again a change of policy prompted by focus on democratic institutions and natural disasters. The end to an outdated arms embargo further illustrates U.S. evolving policy
and re-assessment of uses of national instruments of power. The natural disasters have been a significant hindrance in Haiti’s progress for economic development. They have also increased Haitian migration to U.S. borders and exacerbated Haitian poverty. Haiti is ready for a change – but it will be slow.

The Obama Administration: Where do we go from here?

There is no doubt that the Obama Administration’s Foreign Policy Strategy complements President Clinton’s Haitian policy: In May 2009, President Obama endorsed President Clinton’s appointment as U.N. Special Envoy for Haiti. This appointment essentially builds on Clinton’s previous engagement with this Caribbean country. The ability to use diplomatic efforts through Clinton’s engagement with the Haitian authorities will no doubt help to jump-start sustainable social and economic development. President Obama will seek to promote new partnerships among the private sector, civil society, and donors while strengthening the local capacity to create a more stable and prosperous Haitian future. To strengthen U.S. diplomatic focus on Haiti, Thomas C. Adams was appointed Special Coordinator for Haiti in September 2010 by Secretary of State Clinton. His office has been responsible for overseeing the U.S. government’s engagement with Haiti, including diplomatic relations and the implementation of a reconstruction strategy in partnership with the government of Haiti and international donors.

As the Obama Administration has focused on Haiti, there is a perception that President Clinton’s legacy and influence has been incorporated into the Secretary of State’s operations. President Clinton’s prior Deputy White House Counsel, Cheryl Mills, who defended the President during his historic 1999 impeachment trial, has been
serving as Counselor and Chief of Staff for Secretary Clinton since Jan 09. Her role enhances situational awareness because she has shaped the recently published DoS Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) which will influence the PPD on Global Development - Feed the Future Program. The DoS briefing which provided an overview of the 2010 QDDR and an introduction to the concept of Leading through Civilian Power attempts to show how military and civilian missions are continuing to overlap in our international commitments. This dual relationship signals a new approach to interagency collaboration. Chiefs of mission are now empowered and held accountable as CEOs of multi-agency missions that draw on the skills and expertise of other agencies before turning to contractors. To further accomplish the emerging challenges outlined in the QDDR, a reorganization of the State Department will address the full spectrum of transnational issues under a new Office of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and the Office of the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and Environmental Affairs.

The QDDR changes the way we have previously operated. It increases USAID capacity to become the world’s premier development agency through focused partnerships and other collaboration. To effectively support the enduring efforts identified in the QDDR, the State Department must embrace conflict prevention and response as a core mission set to avoid future costly military interventions. This emerging policy will be shaped by the growth of the civilian surge capability through the Civilian Response Corps, trained to engage in the spectrum of political, security, and humanitarian crises. This initiative requires a rebalancing of the workforce throughout all departments of the federal government. It will require recruiting, training, and
retaining experts who can complement and in some cases lead DoD efforts in the future.

The QDDR process initiated by Secretary Clinton will require an ongoing interagency commitment that is supported by presidential policy and sustained diplomatic engagement. This QDDR concept is designed to provide diplomats with appropriate capabilities while bridging other gaps by fostering private sector partnerships in international affairs with the U.S. government. The QDDR incorporates the Obama Administration’s 22 September 2010 PPD on Global Development, which directs U.S. agencies to focus on investments in areas such as sustainable economic growth, democracy and governance, food security, global health, climate change and humanitarian assistance. It has taken over a decade to institutionalize Clinton Administration PDDs on managing complex contingency operations by balancing the use of the military in multilateral peace operations with other alternatives.

This PPD on Global Development is focused on the following sustainable development outcomes: foster the next generation of emerging markets by enhancing our focus on broad-based economic growth and democratic governance; invest in game-changing innovations with the potential to solve long-standing development challenges; place greater emphasis on building sustainable capacity in the public sectors of our partners and at their national and community levels to provide basic services over the long-term; tailor development strategies in stabilization and post-crisis situations to the context of the challenges; and hold all recipients of U.S. assistance accountable for achieving development results.

The road ahead for a 21st century development mindset will no doubt continue to evolve as our nation implements President Obama’s PPD. One thing will not change as this policy applies to Haiti: that is holding the GoH accountable as a condition for receiving further U.S. assistance. This is where diplomacy will be the vanguard of evolving policy.
Conclusion

The U.S. commitment to Haiti over the past 16 plus years has resulted in a developing and comprehensive, multilateral policy from the Clinton Administration to the current administration. Haiti has been challenged to build democratic institutions and develop its economy throughout this period. However, this island country has become more accountable in the midst of recent natural disasters. The Clinton Administration initiated our nation's change in policy for managing complex contingency operations by balancing the use of the military in multilateral peace operations with other alternatives. The Bush-43 Administration expanded the employment of our national instruments of power in Haiti with a more comprehensive role for our federal agencies and international partners. The Obama Administration now builds on and formalizes diplomacy and development concepts from the Clinton and Bush-43 Administrations. This policy must continue to evolve throughout the first quarter of this century into an effective whole-of-government approach. DoD and DoS have made the first steps toward a more unified interagency solution in Haiti. The U.S. should now look ahead to transition GoH accountability during a long-term commitment. The rational is simple. It will require prolonged execution of a conditions-based, not an events-driven, policy for change to become institutionalized. This is where a diplomatic hard-line approach to Haitian foreign policy must not waiver.

The following recommendations will improve the effectiveness of our long-term commitment in Haiti. These proposed recommendations are:

1) Use the DoS QDDR to reform our national efforts in building an effective GoH.
2) Use a hard-line diplomatic approach.

3) Support Haiti’s efforts to eliminate ineffective governance, to make economic progress, and to provide its own security.

4) Reform Haiti’s long-term strategy to develop a police force.

5) Consider restructuring USSOUTHCOM into a Joint Inter-Agency Command.

These recommendations conform to tenets of diplomacy and development in U.S. foreign policy. They support our commitment with MINUSTAH, OAS, and CARICOM. Additionally, DoD and DoS, along with other agencies, will consider efficiencies to reduce current capability gaps in a more comprehensive manner. The impacts of evolving policy will be amplified through sustained commitment of regional players and GoH accountability for Haiti’s uses of funds and other resources.

*Use the DoS QDDR to reform our national efforts in building an effective GoH:*

The U.S. must insist on the Haitian government’s establishment of effective electoral laws. The recently published DoS QDDR must refocus our national efforts on building an effective government in Haiti. The GoH must foster a civil environment in which undisputed elections can be held without any international assistance. By itself, this action will regain trust and confidence from a majority of the Haitian people; it will foster self-governance and forward movement in nation-rebuilding during the next decade and throughout the 21st century. On 28 November 2010, the world observed Haiti’s internal dissension once again as its government failed to hold a free, fair, and inclusive presidential and legislative election. This election has been postponed for 10 months due to the natural disaster in January 10. The U.N. reported conditions had existed for credible elections, which included a pool of 19 presidential candidates, participation of
66 political parties, and over 4 million registered voters. A run-off was originally scheduled for 16 January 11 because no candidate received 50 percent of the votes cast. That run-off was postponed until 20 March 2011 as election officials said they could not hold the runoff while awaiting results from re-polling. GoH legitimacy remains in question. It must resolve the national elections to build a better Haiti.

*Use a hard-line diplomatic approach:* U.S. diplomacy should employ a hard-line approach to eliminate corruption and misuse of public funding, which seemed rampant during Aristide’s second term in office (2001-2004). Haiti’s constitution denies President Preval’s re-election after two terms of office (1996-2001 and 2006-current). Many have criticized our use of the military in a soft power role, claiming we should place a heavier diplomatic hand on the Haitian government, which has repeatedly failed to build a cooperative relationship among the nation’s democratic factions. The GoH has previously failed to consult internally within its legislative framework; it is perceived to remain a corrupt government today. The cornerstone of U.S. policy should leverage OAS, CARICOM, and USAID support of Haiti’s development, in collaboration with international partners.

*Support Haiti’s efforts to eliminate ineffective governance, to make economic progress, and to provide its own security:* Our nation must stand firm and not project a perception of a “compassion-driven” nation that is employing all of our national instruments of power to support a disaster-crippled nation in economic disarray, without regard for regional security and effective governance. We must reconsider then-Secretary of State Powell’s 2004 initiatives during the period just prior to last year’s disaster. He recommended a U.S. advisory role on Haiti’s internal security issues, a 3-
year employment generation program to improve local infrastructure and to create jobs, and a U.S. technical team to advise the Haitian Finance Ministry in its efforts to recover assets diverted due to corruption. Secretary Powell’s recommendations once again support a whole-of-government approach in U.S. foreign policy. Additionally, the U.S. currently endorses the OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti through public education programs, public opinion polling, training to enable political parties to develop candidates, and other democracy-building activities. Our international partners must do the heavy lifting in these areas as international donors continue to pledge financial support to help Haiti rebuild its infrastructure, strengthen its institutions, and improve its essential services. In fact, international donors have remained engaged in sustaining Haiti’s Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, which was built on the Interim Cooperation Framework established during President Preval’s Presidency from 2004 to 2007. U.S. Haitian strategy must be reassessed by the current Obama Administration immediately after the next Haitian administration is installed. This reassessment must report Haitian progress (or lack thereof) in the following areas: infrastructure, energy, education, health, and security.

Reform Haiti’s long-term strategy to develop a police force: A long-term development strategy should include development of a self-sufficient civilian police force, unassisted by DoD personnel. If we employ forces in future Haiti operations, they should be used only to strengthen security for local and federal elections and only for transitioning the Haitian government throughout this nation-rebuilding era. Furthermore, the U.S. must remain focused on enhancing Haiti’s capability to sustain free, fair, safe and inclusive elections which support effective self-governance. Haiti must develop
sufficiently strong governance to thwart defiant parties, subversive factions, and anarchical despots. The GoH should continue to build on relationships with Canada, Brazil, and African countries for assistance in establishing a national law enforcement jurisdiction and responsibility which will complement the evolving civilian police force. As MINUSTAH’s charter is reassessed for extension, Haiti’s regional partners in the Americas and the Caribbean should also invest their resources in the future civilian police force as a proactive measure to maintain regional stability.

Consider restructuring USSOUTHCOM into a Joint Inter-Agency Command: To further complement efforts for a more balanced multilateral comprehensive approach, the U.S. may consider restructuring of USSOUTHCOM into a Joint Inter-Agency Command (JIAC). Under this concept, DoD may leverage best practices from both AFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM counterdrug Joint Inter-Agency Task Force – South (JIATF-S). A JIAC will support a long-term commitment which best suits Haiti’s ongoing defense, diplomacy, and development priorities. This reorganization must also reduce U.S. military engagement along with increased DoS focus on diplomacy and internationally funded development. As we have seen in 2010 alone, dramatic poverty is the primary cause of instability in Haiti. U.S. foreign assistance to Haiti has evolved from 1990s peacekeeping and security operations and dependence on embargos to HADR. Our nation has effectively redirected U.S. humanitarian assistance through Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), rather than through the Haitian government. DoD resources should be committed to other regional countries to marginalize corrupt activities that contribute to contraband and human trafficking in the USSOUTHCOM.
region. We must remain vigilant to interdict border incursions from the Americas, which remain vulnerable to terrorist and international criminal activities.

*Final summary:* We must remain mindful that any U.S. long-term commitment will not achieve immediate effects through implementation of the above 5 recommendations alone. We must pursue other alternatives and consider hardline diplomatic approaches while projecting DoD assets elsewhere within the USSOUTHCOM region. Those alternatives may change as the Haitian situation changes. So U.S. policy must remain flexible. The recently appointed Haiti Special Coordinator Thomas C. Adams should consider these recommendations in his 2011 agenda. We must continue to merge department capabilities where necessary to set conditions for an evolving comprehensive multilateral policy. Foreign policy and military doctrine have both adapted to our security environment for over 16 years. It is time to make further advances through a change in our organizations that will interface with strategic problem sets such as Haiti. A newly formed JIAC will employ military force when needed by MINUSTAH; it will inform and influence foreign audiences through diplomatic engagements, media, and information technology; and it will work through regional stakeholders (OAS and CARICOM) and NGOs/private donors to promote economic growth and development. This paradigm shift will complement the DoS QDDR concepts and set conditions for democratic stability to maintain law, order, and domestic security for this island-country and hemispheric neighbor.

**Endnotes**


Ibid., 12.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., 27-28.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Mr. Jonathan E. Loesch, Averting Continuation of Failed U.S. Policy with Haiti, (Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, April 05, 2001), 08.

Ibid., 16.


Maureen Taft-Morales, Haiti: Current Conditions and Congressional Concerns, CRS Report for Congress, 03.

Ibid., 12.


Ibid., CRS-07.

Ibid., CRS-17.

Ibid., CRS-18.


Ibid.

Ibid.


41 Ibid.