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- **Authors**: Fires, Building 652, Room 203, McNair Road, Fort Sill, OK, 73503
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1LT Christian McGinnis, attached to 1314 Civil Affairs Company, 17th Fires Brigade, stops during a combat patrol to collect information on the needs of the local tribes through Najhiyah, Iraq, Sept. 7, 2009. (Photo by SPC Samantha R. Ciaramitaro, U.S. Army)

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George W. Casey Jr.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Joyce E. Morrow
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, 1013002

David D. Halverson
Major General, United States Army
Commanding General
Fort Sill, Okla.

Editor-in-Chief: Sharon McBride
Managing Editor: Jennifer M. McFadden
Art Director: Jason Kelly
Assistant Editor: Paul Jiron
GEN Creighton Williams Abrams Jr. once said, “Everyone deserves great leadership.” Despite nine years of war our Army is establishing a break-through concept with our newly released leadership strategy. It’s a strategy that talks of decentralization and versatility over a strict centralized command and control structure; but what does that mean to the Fires Center of Excellence’s mission of growing leaders?

At its core, decentralization means taking decision making power and assignment of accountability for results and pushing those responsibilities down to the individual leader and his or her unit at lower echelons. There’s less emphasis on command and control and more emphasis on ‘mission command.’ Mission command in this multifaceted world full of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partners requires leaders who understand, respect and trust each other. Although this is already happening on the battlefield on a daily basis, lessons learned show that tactical battlefield problems tend to be viewed differently by junior leaders as opposed to senior leaders.

Junior leaders often regard tactical problems as puzzles that have ‘school book’ solutions, while more experienced officers view them in a more challenging light, acknowledging the possibility that the enemy may not succumb so readily to a predictable course of action. Textbook-derived solutions, checklists and processes continue to limit knowledge growth of our junior leaders and their ability to be adaptive when critical decisions are needed in dealing with complex problems.

So here at the FCoE we are not only developing leaders but people as a whole. We are concentrating on providing training and education that develops critical thinking in leaders at all levels, not just at the senior level. As a people-based organization, the FCoE has ensured as we move away from the doctrinal approach of ‘what to think’ to an emphasis on ‘how to think,’ we are investing in technologies and cutting edge curriculum. A critical transformation in education and training has taken place across the board in the FCoE as we have found that critical thinking and decentralization go hand in hand as we change the culture and leadership in the profession of Fires.

I’m proud to say that the FCoE is on target and ahead of schedule in facilitating TRADOC’s number one priority of growing leaders with critical thinking skills and who are competent in their core competencies yet broad enough to succeed at operations across the spectrum of conflict.

In order to grow the type of leaders needed in today’s operations, the FCoE began to develop an education concept that included creating a Joint and Combined Fires University, JCFU, a ground-breaking learning organization, provides training and education through a mix of delivery methods as outlined by both A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army and the draft release of The United States Army Learning Concept for 2015. With its inception JCFU has incorporated a lot of firsts, both through technology and through outside partnerships.

We are on track with transforming and eliminating boring PowerPoint lectures throughout the FCoE, and we are using a blended learning model that includes virtual gaming, mock computer applications and technology enabled instruction that centers on interaction and facilitated learning. Through incorporating these types of learning initiatives students are able to immerse themselves in true-to-life situations and simulations in order to broaden their experience base and intuitive decision

By MG David D. Halverson
Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Okla.

“WHAT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CLEAR OVER TIME IS THAT LEADERS MUST HAVE A MUCH BROADER UNDERSTANDING OF MISSION COMMAND VERSUS COMMAND AND CONTROL. MISSION COMMAND IN THIS INCREASINGLY COMPLEX WORLD FULL OF JOINT, INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND MULTINATIONAL PARTNERS REQUIRES LEADERS WHO UNDERSTAND, RESPECT, AND TRUST EACH OTHER.”

GEN Martin E. Dempsey, Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, March 1, 2010
making abilities. This will ensure that our Fires leaders are fit to fight, as we must train for war.

We are ahead of schedule in introducing ‘design’ (FM 5-0: The Operations Process) into our Fires doctrine. Our staff and faculty at Fort Sill are currently using Socratic teaching methods, which is a student-centered philosophy that turns all classrooms into collaborative problem-solving labs led by facilitators, not instructors. This type of learning environment challenges learners to develop their critical thinking skills and engage in critical and analytical discussion. Ultimately, our FCoE instructors will use cutting edge instructional methods coupled with technical and tactical expertise to raise the understanding of all leaders, both junior and senior, so they can exploit opportunities, identify vulnerabilities and anticipate transitions during a campaign.

I am proud to report that the FCoE has also formed learning partnerships with local universities to participate in civilian training and college education which creates other avenues of self-development and experience for our Fires leaders. Proactive leaders today should be able to think through complex issues, to be able to get outside their comfort zones and outside the traditional mindset to seek solutions. Gaining and experiencing civilian education is one way a leader can gain insight and the wisdom to know and apply the proper outcomes for training and strengthen civil-military relationships.

One such partnership, that serves as an example of how we are using innovation to keep our learning relevant is our partnership with the journalism department within the University of Oklahoma’s Gaylord College. Officers attending the Field Artillery and the Air Defense Artillery Captain’s Career Course get much needed media experience by participating in mock-imbed opportunities and mock-news conferences during the CCC’s end of course tactical field exercise with OU journalism graduate students. It serves two purposes; first civilian journalism students learn about the cost of freedom and are exposed to our element of national power — our military. Second, our Fires students get a chance to interact with world-class media to work through complex issues in simple terms which is an important skill to practice – especially in a time of war.

The FCoE is also ahead of schedule in developing a network with our joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational teammates as outlined by the leader development strategy. The strategy outlines the need for leaders to operate within a JIIM environment as a matter of routine and lead across international boundaries to advance national interests.

Here at the FCoE, for the past few years we have regularly been hosting training opportunities with ally nations such as Canada, U.K., Singapore, Jordan, Taiwan, Germany, Korea, Japan, Iraq, Argentina and Israel — to name a few. These exercises give our Fires professionals valuable training experience in working in a combined operation. Fort Sill has 29,000 square miles of joint military-controlled airspace and 47,000 acres of maneuver space to rehearse joint fight tactics. The FCoE actively looks for opportunities to bring joint and combined training here because it exposes our Soldiers, and the leaders we are growing, to the operational environment they will be exposed to in the real fight.

Our Fires professionals deserve the best possible leadership development process to enable them to effectively lead Soldiers. The expectations for what leaders should do are captured in the Army’s core leader competencies, but a new leadership style is emerging, with skills uniquely tailored for success in today’s battle field environment. Fires leaders must know how to lead, develop others and themselves, and sometimes achieve success under the most complex environment in an era of persistent conflict. That’s no easy task, so here at the FCoE we are increasing our efforts not only to grow leaders with these new criteria, but ensure that our most talented leaders have what they need to be a force within the Fires profession.

We are in the business of ‘growing strategic leaders,’ which also is the theme of the September-October 2010 Fires Bulletin. This edition is full of articles demonstrating the FCoE is ahead of the curve in providing a competitive learning environment and making sure that our most important core competency — leader development — is on time and on task in producing confident, competent, versatile leaders of the 21st century Army.

Fit to Fight! Fires Strong!

PFC Beau Pendleton and PVT Valeriano Lopez partner up to hit at a virtual target inside the Joint Fires Multipurpose Dome at the Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Okla., July 15 as part of their training to become air and missile defense crew members. For more information on the Joint Fires Multipurpose Dome, see page 32. (Photo by Marie Berberea, Fort Sill Cannoneer)
Breaking out of the ‘brick and mortar’ schoolhouse: U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery schools on course for creating a competitive learning environment for growing strategic leaders

By BG Roger F. Mathews, Chief of the Air Defense Artillery

The Training and Doctrine Command has recently circulated a draft of the U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015. This learning concept outlines the Army’s visualization on how we will train and educate Soldiers and leaders in individual skills, attributes and abilities to execute full-spectrum operations.

Here at the Fires Center of Excellence, we are proud to say we are ahead of the pack in developing the capacities as outlined in this strategic document for our Fires Soldiers and leaders to participate in accelerated learning in order to gain the knowledge, skills and abilities that they will be tested in the most unforgiving environments.

Lessons learned have shown that our Fires professionals need relevant, tailored, engaging learning experiences through a career-long continuum of learning that is not place dependent, but accessed at the point of need.

Here at the FCoE and within the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery and Field Artillery branches, we have started the process ahead of schedule by being open to inventiveness and advances in learning technologies and methods to assure we are providing the best education for our Fires professionals at all levels from advanced individual training all the way through our officer and warrant officer curriculum.

Embracing technology is a must in order to prevail in the competitive learning environment and we are on task in shedding outmoded processes and models with more adaptive learning systems.

The FCoE trains and educates more than a thousand individuals per year through resident courses, distance learning and other avenues. Of those we teach Millennials are the largest population of students. These Soldiers use computers, mobile devices and the Internet to learn, and as outlined by the Army learning concept we are closing the gap to attract and retain a generation of young people who know how to use technology to learn both formally and informally to learn.

We are also challenging and meeting the needs of seasoned Fires professionals who have repeated deployments and bring a wealth of experience to our schools. We have incorporated a learning environment that advances Fires professionals from a range of generations that takes into consideration what each individual brings to the table.

Air Defense Artillery. The ADA branch is currently and will in the future incorporate a lot of firsts into ADA curriculum, both through technology and through cementing outside partnerships with civilian enterprises.

Beyond weapon system hardware and software upgrades, 21st century interactive computer driven training devices and software packages are in development and also being fielded for training use.

For example, the reconfigurable tabletop trainer, which was recently procured by the ADA through a partnership with Raytheon, is making PATRIOT operator training more realistic, capable and affordable. It is a state-of-the-art interactive workstation that allows standalone or netted training to replicate PATRIOT operations in a operational environment. It is hoped that the trainer will be available for ADA units by next year.

Also currently in development is a virtual game, called “Launcher Dogs.” It is an interactive, self-remediating program that is designed to help ADA Soldiers learn how to emplace the major end items of a PATRIOT Missile Defense System. It can be used on many hand held devices, like an iPod or cell phone. It can also be used on a laptop computer and interface via the Internet. It allows Soldiers to study anywhere, anytime and complements traditional training methods and allows for individual development needs. It incorporates state-of-the-art graphics comparable to those seen in the science fiction video game “Halo.” Like “Halo,” “Launcher Dogs” is in the first person perspective; i.e., the player experiences the action through the eyes of his ‘avatar.’ The end result is a detailed, lifelike simulation with text and audio instructions that guides the students through the tutorial. 6th ADA Brigade has already...
conducted two, limited double-blind tests and a formal pilot program testing for the gaming solution is currently under way.

Currently in use at Fort Sill, Okla., is the Joint Fires Multipurpose Dome. It’s the newest and largest engagement trainer for gunners giving each Soldier 16 hours of training on the Man Portable Air Defense System. The $3.6 million dome was designed after a simulator located at Fort Bliss, Texas. It has 84 projectors, seven computer units, three catwalks and four subwoofers – all geared to provide life-like training scenarios. Beyond learning how to shoot Stinger missiles, once additional software is developed, the dome will be used to provide other types of instruction and simulation for the entire Fires force.

These are just a few examples of how the ADA schoolhouse is leveraging technology and adapting training methodologies to replicate complexity and hybrid threats in the classroom, at home station and while deployed. More is yet to come.

Field Artillery. The FA branch is also hard at work incorporating a lot of firsts into FA schoolhouse curriculum, both through technology and through fortifying outside civilian partnerships.

For example, when teaching Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield to FA officer and warrant officer students the FA branch now incorporates an Internet application called “Google Earth.”

“Google Earth” is a virtual globe, map and geographic information program that super-imposes images obtained from satellite imagery and aerial 3D photography. Incorporating this particular technology is particularly useful in situations where geography is important – like Afghanistan. Mountainous terrain can severely affect shooters’ ability to see the targets they are engaging. “Google Earth” also allows FA soldiers to overlay weather effects and opposing forces’ doctrine on top of geography and can give commanders a good idea of what is possible, impossible and likely. By teaching how to use “Google Earth,” IPB has evolved into an increasingly useful and sophisticated analytic method.

The FA also recognizes the role gaming can play in the capability of units and Soldiers to train and learn. One specific initiative currently under analysis and development is the Army Artillery Ballistics Concepts Trainer, which was created in order to address the need for junior officers to develop and master ballistics concepts and visualize the effects of inputs on munitions’ accuracy.

The FCoE Directorate of Training and Doctrine is working with Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager Gaming to develop a gaming technology that will address this requirement. When fully developed, this technology would be available for distribution to FA users at the schoolhouse and in the field.

Another example of forward thinking is the FA’s partnership with the journalism department within the University of Oklahoma’s Gaylord College. Through this partnership, journalism and strategic communication graduate students, and officers attending the FA Captains’ Career Course both get much needed media experience by participating in mock imbed opportunities and mock news conferences during the CCC’s end of course tactical field exercise.

This “Media on the Battlefield” training is designed to get leaders comfortable talking with journalists and other media entities while keeping operational security in mind.

Continuously adapting. Both the ADA and FA branches are constantly assessing and identifying what our Fires professionals need to learn and listening to requirements from units at all levels currently engaged in tactical environments. The refinement to this concept will be ongoing, but we are on time and on target in developing our Fires force while encouraging life-long learning and development. We want to grow leaders who are competent in their core competencies yet broad enough to succeed at operations across the spectrum of conflict.

Fit to Fight! Fires Strong!
Growing strategic leaders for future conflict

By Barak A. Salmoni, Jessica Hart, Renny McPherson and Aidan Kirby Winn

Global operations since 2001 highlight certain characteristics of the U.S. military’s emerging operating environment. Future operations will likely take place “amongst the people” in a wide range of unpredictable environments (See Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 5-6, 280-91.) Managing these conflicts will require extensive collaboration between military and civilian agencies representing a range of governments, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. Likewise, general-purpose forces will make larger contributions to tasks previously reserved to special-operations forces. These two components will experience greater intermixing and burden sharing. These operating environment characteristics and functional implications have been referred to as “irregular warfare,” “hybrid war,” and “full-spectrum operations.”

In ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, effective senior leaders are those able to grapple successfully with the dynamic emerging environment and its functional implications. Along the way, leaders have developed important insight regarding the characteristics of successful commanders and the measures required to ensure future leaders possess these characteristics. As the Department of Defense seeks to develop a cadre of senior joint-force leaders for operational and strategic command in “multi-modal conflicts,” these views are worthy of serious consideration. (See Michael Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar: Military Theory and the Future of War,” Naval War College Review).

To illuminate and begin to codify attitudes toward strategic-level leadership development, the authors selected a group of SOF and GPF leaders who have commanded at the colonel or Navy captain level and higher in recent irregular and hybrid warfare environments. (The sample included 37 interviewees. A third were at the three- or four-star level; more than 40 percent were at the one- or two-star level; while 25 percent were colonels or Navy captains. Roughly 60 percent of this pool represented SOF, while the remainders were GPF leaders. As for service, nearly 60 percent were Soldiers and 25 percent Marines. Eleven percent were Navy sea, air and land special forces, and the remaining two interviewees were Air Force special operations senior leaders.

In terms of assignments, general officers included combatant commanders and deputy combatant commanders, theater special operations commanders, and component commanders for U.S. Special Operations Command. Interviewees at this level also included corps- and division-level commanders and senior service educators. At the colonel or Navy captain level, in addition to serving for former Special Forces group and battalion commanders, the authors interviewed leaders of combined joint special operations task forces, SEAL teams, and special-mission units, as well as Army brigade combat team and Marine regimental combat team commanders. Interviewees had recent operational experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, U.S. Pacific Command, Southern Command, and European Command. In terms of criteria for selection, 25 were selected by senior policy-makers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the remainder was selected based on interviewee recommendations.

In extensive interviews, they reflected on the characteristics required for effective senior-level leadership and provided recommendations for leader development. Their responses highlighted the characteristics, educational experiences, and assignments this cohort considered relevant to success in the unpredictable operating environments of today and tomorrow.

Characteristics of strategic leadership. The interviewees’ reflections on necessary strategic leader characteristics fall into three broad categories: cognitive, interpersonal and managerial styles. Each style comprises a cluster of qualities, skills, and cultivable traits that the officers associated with each other. With respect to the first style, interviewees focused on cognitive processes aiding in problem-solving. Most prominently, interviewees distinguished between “how-to-think” and “what-to-think” approaches, with the former embracing flexibility of mind and diverse intellectual disciplines. How-to-think approaches emphasize the importance of understanding the parts of a problem in relationship to each other, as well as the different perspectives and needs that problem-solving partners contribute. Such approaches entail developing problem-solving methodologies that serve to reconcile competing viewpoints while remaining focused on the goal.

A how-to-think framework also accounts for consequences of decisions, over time and across multiple levels and lines of operations, while tolerating iterative problem-solving in the absence of perfect solutions. (For further exploration, see John F. Schmitt, “A Systemic Concept for Operational Design”).
As one GPF officer said, “It’s being able to look at a problem, think about the influences associated with the problem, think about potential solutions to the problem, and go deeper into the second- and third-order effects.” Officers considered the how-to-think method essential for cultivating other important cognitive qualities, particularly the ability to think analogically from one case to another. Interviewees spoke of stepping outside events and intellectual processes to observe in real time how they and others proceed and learn. One corps-level commander referred to this method as “going up onto the balcony,” with one SOF leader similarly emphasizing the ability to turn observations into course corrections in dynamic time. These comments suggest the need for leaders at this level to “see inside their own thought processes” through “meta-cognition,” or “thinking about thinking.” (See Gary A. Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decision.)

Interviewees valued such approaches not solely because they helped officers make the switch to operational from tactical, and to strategic from operational. They praised the ability to harmonize tactical actions with operational objectives and strategic goals, beginning with recognizing a decision’s implications at each level. Harmonization requires coordinating actions in an attempt to reinforce one another and influence multiple target audiences, while maintaining the necessary strategic long view.

Build relationships one at a time. A second cluster of characteristics frequently referenced by interviewees focuses on interpersonal styles. Among them, sociability and a preference for relationship building are regarded as absolutely critical to every aspect of planning, leading, and managing complex operations. In fact, interviewees frequently associated terms such as “communicator,” “facilitator,” “consultant,” and “collaborative space maker” with the term “commander.”

In many cases, commanders in combat and other contexts also preferred to “command through influence.” In this respect, a fundamental responsibility of strategic leadership entails building bridges across institutional divides through cultivating sincere personal relationships. One senior Marine put it this way: “This is a people business. Success in this comes from relationships.”

Interviewees at every level reinforced the need for cross-cultural capabilities and affirmed the utility of language and foreign culture skills, with special-operations forces leaders acknowledging critical shortfalls in this area. (For additional emphasis on challenges of language and culture skills, see Eric T. Olson, Underlining the critical importance of multiculturalism and relationship focus include a fusion of confidence and humility, which produces openness to different ideas, even from other organizations or subordinates. Humility is also expressed through approachability and humor. Interviewees noted humor as a defining characteristic of their successful seniors, with one combatant commander seeing humor as helping leaders to embrace an “output orientation through a spirit of collaboration” driven by “social energy.” According to a former Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force commander and senior service civil affairs leader, this social energy permits “staff guerrilla warfare” or, in the words of a GPF division-level commander, “maneuver warfare in the gaps and seams” of bureaucracies, based on personal relationships and the avoidance of explicit confrontation.

Writing skills are a critical asset. A final set of characteristics considered critical to irregular warfare leadership relates directly to a leader’s managerial style. Respondents noted three characteristics in particular: communication skills, an understanding of organizations, and mentorship. Articulating thoughts logically and clearly were viewed as basic to successful leadership. “The number-one skill at the senior level, even at field-grade level, is to write.” SOF and GPF educators lamented the absence of this skill among many mid-level officers. Interviewees
underscored the importance of tailoring communication to different audiences, inspiring the acceptance of ideas requiring collaboration among diverse partners. Interviewees considered communication a core function of highest-level leadership, involving the generation of a compelling idea; conveying it effectively and continually to stakeholders; ensuring it is appropriately communicated by subordinates to institutional implementers; and reinforcing the idea through action. As one senior GPF leader said, “True strategic leadership is about trying to get the big ideas right, and it is then about communicating those big ideas effectively to your subordinate leadership.”

Understanding the dynamics of culture. Regarding organizational skills, officers at every level spoke of coordinating the activities of task-oriented staffs whose members represented multiple organizational interests. This task necessitated understanding organizational dynamics and cultures at the conceptual and applied levels. In fact, some interviewees pointed to a form of strategic leadership that was purely organizational in focus, distinct from but required for combat leadership. They regretted the absence in their professional military education of a domain of specific expertise. (See Lynn Scott, Steve Drezner, Rachel Rue, and Jesse Reyes, Compensating for Incomplete Domain.)

Yet, at least one theater commander felt these characteristics “highly important, particularly in preparation for being an irregular warfare leader” in environments characterized by kinetic limitations, diverse partners, and different kinds of conflict occurring simultaneously. Furthermore, most respondents felt it possible to cultivate these styles throughout a career. Interviewees asserted it was the duty of individuals to develop these leadership characteristics throughout their career, with military organizations providing the appropriate opportunities and incentives.

Key experiences. In explaining the significance of the leadership characteristics they highlighted, interviewees made frequent reference to the paths their own careers had taken. Their collective experiences present a number of important commonalities in the domains of education and developmental assignments. First, a variety of broad educational experiences is found among most senior officers’ careers, including early joint schooling as well as civilian education. Second, most interviewees served in joint billets, not simply once or as a senior field-grade officer, but at various career stages in operational and staff capacities. Third, many officers cited holding a senior-level staff, aide, or assistant position as being significant to the remainder of their career. Along with gaining perspective on organizational dynamics at the macro-level, interviewees felt that being a military secretary to a senior Department of Defense civilian, or an aide to a service chief, provided insight into how senior leaders think, plan, and interact, as well as an opportunity for one-on-one mentorship.

As one interviewee said, “Being an aide is an opportunity no one else gets to see the man behind the mask and the inner workings of the Army.” Fourth, for many SOF interviewees, a position permitting GPF exposure was significant. One theater-level commander with a SOF background considered an assignment to conventional forces as “highly important” to his development. Finally, substantive international exposure through education or assignments is beneficial. Collectively, these experiences appeared crucial to cultivating characteristics that permit the joint force to counter hybrid and irregular threats.

Civilian education is a must. The range of education proving useful to interviewees featured educational experiences beyond traditional military schooling, to include civilian education.

Graduate school admission test preparation books sit on a shelf at the resource library in the Base Education Center at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, N.C., July 7. (Photo by Cpl Jo Jones, U.S. Marine Corps)
While most officers believed service instruction was valuable, many suggested a need for improvement. One SOF colonel spoke to deficiencies in the military education system, primarily at the senior leadership level, when he said, “We don’t educate to be generals.” While not all career tracks demonstrated extensive educational opportunities outside the military, specific types of military courses were integral to leadership development, particularly when it was available with another service or some other more flexible version of military schooling. These settings include the College of Naval Command and Staff, School of Advanced Military Studies, and Naval Post-graduate School. In these experiences, schooling reinforces jointness and how-to-think cognitively in a military context.

Though commanders’ courses, war colleges, and general officer capstone courses aid in this effort, many interviewees recommended that officers constantly seek ways to broaden horizons beyond the tactical and operational levels, so the services do not “start having generals who want to think like battalion commanders.”

While not all interviewees experienced an education at civilian institutions, those who did found it of the greatest value in their evolution to strategic-level leadership positions. Presenting ideas to nonmilitary students and learning to accommodate for civilian approaches to national security contributed dramatically to thinking, communicating, and relationship-building skills. Civilian education permitted an understanding of the relationship between the legislative and executive branches in the formation of national security strategy and the authorization of military operations. One senior SOF leader felt his civilian experience “was massively valuable because I learned that the military is not the center of the universe. It showed me how much else was out there.”

Joint and interagency experience is a must. Exposure to joint and interagency environments throughout a career facilitated interpersonal and managerial growth for the interviewees and aided in the transition from the tactical to strategic. Referring to his own experiences with a special-mission unit, one officer articulated a consensus in saying that he would have preferred to understand better the interagency process prior to a combat deployment as a commander. That knowledge would have permitted greater leverage and synchronization. A recently deployed theater commander spoke of the value of interagency exposure: “You have to learn to interact with those who have totally different backgrounds and value sets, like [the Department of] State. They have a different value set that they celebrate. SOF should increase its interface in every part of the interagency, to include mid-grade leaders.”

Others spoke of joint billets as important to providing a perspective that embraces diverse military options of equal value. Rather than limitation to the minimum number of mandatory assignments for promotion to general officer, interviewees opined that joint exposure should be frequent. A senior SOF educator said, “You need to get joint as fast as you can. Get in to other units, other opportunities. You are at a disadvantage if you think there is only one way to do things.” While one combatant commander felt jointness should grow from a foundation of service and functional competency, other respondents considered joint exposure equal in importance to service competency, the former necessary for the
latter: Do you wait, and get service competency first? I disagree. Joint and service are part and parcel; how can you be competent in one without seeing the other? We are going to always fight joint at every level. It needs to be the whole career, [and] it strikes me as odd that there is anything but that. It’s all joint.

Senior staff roles give perspective. A large portion of the interviewees agreed that Pentagon assignments or staff jobs at combatant commands are “essential to gain senior command perspective.” Nearly every three- and four-star interviewee advocated staff time at the Pentagon or a combatant command. Such tours are significant to giving a mid-career officer an understanding of how to coordinate and resource theater-level operations, leverage interagency capabilities, and harmonize the functions of a large organization’s disparate elements. As one former combined joint special operations task force commander said, “It would have made me a better tactical leader if I had understood the strategic side better.”

For many SOF members, a GPF billet during their field-grade years was instrumental to understanding how large organizations function. Because SOF officers typically lead small, elite teams, this exposure to a large organization is valuable for future leadership assignments. Special operations interviewees also felt increased intermixing and cross-socialization permit better GPF understanding of SOF. A former CJSOTF commander indicated, one “need[s] to be able to explain to GPF leaders-how what you are seeing and proposing helps them and their tactical, operational, and strategic goals-synching all of this with a theater-level strategy.” As they rise to the theater and global level, SOF leaders will need to coordinate with, and even command, GPF formations, while general-purpose leaders will find special-operations elements under their command or in their battle space. One special-mission unit commander emphasized this point, noting that “there needs to be a hybrid military.”

Individual SOF leaders should pursue GPF billets, and officers in both components should seek to work together in supporting and supported roles. A general-purpose force combatant commander and his special-operations force deputy concurred, “We absolutely recommend GPF billets for SOF and SOF billets for GPF.” (See “Strategic Plan for Transforming DoD Training”).

International exposure. The majority of interviewees placed a special premium on acquiring international exposure in order to foster skills important to the uncertain battlefields of irregular warfare. Interviewees particularly cited recurring training experiences while deployed with foreign militaries as ideal for understanding diverse national security cultures, the United States’ status in regional calculations, and the art of the locally possible. This expertise allows one- and two-star generals or admirals to manage regional security relationships at the DoD level. Equally as significant for theater-level IW, training experiences facilitate first name-basis relationships with local military leaders that
prove crucial to multinational operations. While coordinating multinational special operations, one interviewee said, “I knew these guys, from Germany [and the] UK.” Another indicated that his Jordanian SOF liaison had been a classmate. Individuals should seek international exposure at various points during their career, whether with NATO partners, through foreign education, hosting of international officers at U.S. schools, or in more autonomous “Foreign Area Officer-like” contexts.

Some officers also highlighted the utility of pre-accession experiences, such as backpacking in the Arabian Peninsula or extended travel through South Asia. They credited these experiences with making them comfortable in foreign areas and introducing them to those very regions in which they later operated as senior commanders. One SOF interviewee reflected that in operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan after traveling there as a youth, “I was coming home.” Another SOF commander related, “I have been immersed in foreign cultures for extended periods of time. That puts you outside your comfort zone and forces you to adapt.” These experiences teach officers how to interact with other cultures, cultivating patience, humility, and curiosity. For those without pre-accession multicultural experiences, time in uniform interacting with foreign civilians proved equally valuable. One senior Marine leader commented, “My United Nations Palestine tour prepared me for my leadership post. It was ‘immersion training.’”

Concerns and cautions. The interviewees agreed on much of what is required to shape IW leaders—both characteristics as well as essential formative experiences. Yet, more than three-quarters expressed the belief that the career paths preparing them to lead effectively had been anomalous, diverging from service norms. Likewise, many felt their progression to senior command billets relied on happenstance. According to one deputy combatant commander, “My career has been an aberration. I am surprised I have achieved up to this level.” These views emerge from interviewees’ sentiments and perceptions of service institutional preferences, rather than from statistical assessment of the officers’ careers. (See Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management).

More significantly, however, these senior leaders acknowledged the underlying value of their particular experiences to career progression, and also expressed the desire for their services to value such experiences institutionally. This concern is significant, as interviewees shared their views at a critical juncture in the life of the organizations they represent. Operationally, the U.S. military is engaged in sustained, complex multi-theater operations. Organizationally, both SOF and GPF are experiencing structural growth. The confluence of these operational and organizational trends renders the recommendations of today’s leaders quite relevant to the future.

Kinetic emphasis. Operationally, today’s company- and field-grade officers have experienced a great amount and diversity of combat experience far exceeding that of their predecessors, which grants them an unprecedented degree of tactical prowess and operational ability. A former CJSOC commander said, “In my career [prior to 2001], you’d be lucky if you had one or two live missions in a career. We now have kids [captains and majors] that do four to five missions a night.” The latter’s ability to think and adapt to changing tactical circumstances is much more honed. Likewise, the extended performance of conventional U.S. forces in increasingly diverse roles has ensured that GPF junior leaders are skilled in core IW competencies.

Yet, combat exposure entails an opportunity cost. Summing up the operational implications of repeated deployments, one theater special operations command leader stated, “We’re paying a price. We have accepted that as the price for defending our country, even if we don’t realize it. I believe, hope, and pray that we can restore some balance to our deployments and our operational tempo. I hope that group [a Special Forces group] can go back to what really matters; building partner capacity so that those we train can do things for themselves. I look at that now as a transition because we are at war.” (See Sean D. Naylor, “Special Ops ‘Surge’ Sparks Debate,” Army Times, 23 December 2008).

Beyond the operational implications of kinetic operations are those events related to developing required leadership characteristics.
In discussing the latter, interviewees often referred to noncombat experiences, considering them instrumental in developing necessary senior-level leadership skills. Due to continuing commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, today’s captains through Navy commanders or lieutenant colonels may not be able to take part in these developmental experiences. One might argue that it is today’s senior leaders who missed out-on combat. Yet, if noncombat and nonmilitary assignments were contributing factors in the mid-career preparation of today’s senior leaders for theater- and global-level success, it would only seem logical that it is equally important to ensure that tomorrow’s senior leaders receive similar developmental opportunities.

While operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demand diverse capabilities, a sustained focus on a single operational mode (counterinsurgency tinged with counterterrorism) and geographic area (Muslim eastern Middle East and South Asia) can narrow perspectives, at the very stage in a career when they need to be broadened. As one combatant commander put it, “War can be a narrowing education . . . It’s the dramatic instance fallacy,” whereby younger officers come away from an experience feeling “I went to Iraq; I now understand all war.” A deputy combatant commander and career special operator agreed, opining, “We’re so focused on the war that we have people only doing that, and not getting the broader experience . . . . Sure, we want guys with that war experience, but . . . we need broader [perspectives].” An early operational career dominated by combat might influence an individual’s understanding of what it means to be a leader in future environments. According to a SOF component commander, “It is easy to be wooed by the siren of the kinetic,” and as the latter becomes the dominant operational mode for both SOF and GPF, it can influence values and career preferences. The very breadth of their careers and the diversity of their noncombat experiences have taught today’s senior leaders, however, that “nothing that direct action forces do is decisive,” and that “victory is not in the killing.”(See Carlo Munoz, “SOCOM Chief Advocates ‘Balanced Warfare’ Approach for Future,” Inside the Pentagon, 12 February 2009.)

**Organizational growth.** Beyond the influence of current operations on senior leader development are the implications associated with organizational expansion. In response to the diverse security challenges facing the United States, both GPF and SOF are growing in size. The Army has programmed overall growth of more than 74,000 soldiers by 2013, while Congress has recently approved a temporary increase of 30,000 soldiers in the active component (See figure 1 Number of Active component Soldiers). This expansion will permit SOF and GPF to maintain operational tempo and gain the time and space for the developmental opportunities the interviewees recommended. This balance is critical, especially as it relates to the socialization process of newly minted special operators. It will permit them to understand important relationships: kinetic versus non-kinetic means, direct action versus “by, through, and with,” and SOF specificity versus integration with GPF.

The growth in special-operations forces will be of tremendous benefit to the future joint force if it avoids the systematization and bureaucratization that discourages the diverse experiences responsible for producing today’s senior IW leaders. Some SOF interviewees articulated this concern as an instinctual disquiet that “big is the enemy of SOF.” More pointedly, a current U.S. Special Operations Command strategist suggested that the growth of his component might result in “Big Army-like” practices, where specific and narrow command and staff billets might be preferred over broadening assignments.

A final organizational concern relates to the impact of more than a generation of SOF cultures. Over time, different SOF components have come to understand and work effectively with one another, but it was a major concern to at least four respondents, with experience as combatant command, corps, Joint Special Operations Command, and CJSGTF commanders, that there was a real possibility of attitudinal self-insulation of SOF from GPF. One suggested that while today’s SOF leaders were “born joint,” their younger counterparts might have a more narrow view of what joint means: “I think sometimes in the SOF community, we think of joint as joint with other SOF . . . . It’s not the broader joint.” Likewise, commanders who have led both “black” and “white” SOF units decried the channelization of special operators into one or the other track, so that, particularly for “black SOF,” leaders who are colonels or Navy captains and higher are “myopic” in perspective. As one corps-level commander with a short time in SOF put it, a one-star admiral or general who has spent his whole career in “black SOF” will “be very, very good at running operations. If we want him to run SOCOM as a four-star we would have done him a disservice, [because] he won’t know how to command a large organization.” Along with other organizational changes and the complexity of current operations, narrow career paths in the developmental phase may be precursors of even narrower career preferences at the senior levels, with implications for strategic perspective.

**Institutional changes.** To achieve a strategic perspective equal to their tactical and operational prowess, today’s officers need to pursue the developmental opportunities interviewees highlighted. The joint force and DoD should institutionally support and leverage such choices. The experiences and reflections of interviewees suggest four central institutional recommendations. First, service and DoD leadership should create more “opportunity space” for the educational and developmental assignments that foster the cognitive, interpersonal,
and managerial skills previously discussed. Such opportunities will contribute directly to the ability of these officers to succeed in the joint and interagency communities at the highest operational and strategic levels. Second, the DoD needs to institutionally encourage the type of interaction among its subcomponents and the interagency and international partners that are likely to be of strategic value. Third, DoD should implement service-appropriate methods for systematically identifying prospective leaders at the mid-grade point in their careers, thus enabling them to take advantage of developmental opportunity experiences. Fourth, branches, services, and the DoD as a whole should establish institutional policies to support the “out-of-the-mainstream” preferences by officers that support the development of leadership characteristics. This process may require a shift in organizational culture, in terms of consideration for promotion, staff assignments, and command. Ultimately, the objective is for mid-career officers to gain a conviction that far from imperiling their careers, these nonstandard assignments will help them advance.

Opportunity space. In order to effectively create opportunity space, it is critical to provide the right educational opportunities, both inside and outside the military. A common thread among interviewees there weren’t enough opportunities for an adequately broad, liberal education. An Army senior leader opined, “A broad educational base is a necessity . . . . It is something that is in most cases the most beneficial to conceptualizing strategy.” Despite the criticality of senior military education to developing a broad background and strategic level leadership, most interviewees did not believe their military education alone was adequate to accomplishing that objective.

Interviewees’ suggestions to address education shortfalls centered on “out-of-the-comfort-zone experiences.” The services will need to implement the opportunities for civilian education recently allowed by DoD policy. (For policy on broadened civilian educational opportunities, see Department of Defense Instruction 1322.10, “Policy on Graduate Education for Military Officers”).

The interviews highlighted the need for institutional support of a series of sustained interactions: between general-purpose and special-operations components, “white” and “black” SOF, and the military with the interagency and NGO communities. While these interactions do occur, they often take place during in-theater operations. Interviewees felt it would be much more useful for such interactions to commence prior to deployment. The services and DoD could contribute markedly to leader development by ensuring that this cross-pollination occurs early, possibly through assignments, internships, and training. Many interviewees felt that SOCOM and DoD should diversify the nonkinetic experiences associated with the “black SOF world.”

“In order to effectively create opportunity space, it is critical to provide the right educational opportunities, both inside and outside the military.”
“...services and branches should use both the stick and the carrot by requiring a combination of educational and developmental experiences and honoring nonmainstream assignments through promotion and consideration for command.”

Beyond interactions between contributors to theater- and global-level irregular warfare, interviewees felt U.S. personnel needed to increase their interaction with a broad array of foreign militaries. Reflecting on international opportunities and the gains they provide to cross-cultural understanding.

“We need to maximize experiences with foreign officers. We have to get more of them here and more of U.S. over there . . . . We have very few U.S. officers overseas (at foreign military schools). That’s a problem . . . . We should fund visits to foreign countries for those officers who became close with foreign officers who came to the United States.” one interviewee remarked.

Requiring and incentivizing these exchanges at the individual and unit level will pay dividends in operational capability and military-to-military diplomacy. Diverse career paths. The skills and experiences that the majority of interviewees viewed as critical for leadership development were generally outside standard career paths as officers understood them. Many considered themselves lucky to return to the service mainstream in order to contribute their experience-won skills. To eliminate this paradox, services and branches should use both the stick and the carrot by requiring a combination of educational and developmental experiences and honoring nonmainstream assignments through promotion and consideration for command. According to a combatant commander, “The system—has to tolerate non-standardness. We should celebrate it.” A fellow combatant commander concurred, asserting “you want people who specifically come from different career paths.” Though some respondents suggested formalizing the consideration process for advancement based on nonstandard merits, most felt “it would be very difficult to do so. You can’t create committees. You do it by taking steps to ensure that these individuals are promoted and progress and that there are opportunities for these people.” Interviewees affirmed that this “honor[ing]-through-consideration” of nonstandard career paths should also be applied to officers who have developed a regional focus, as well as to noncombat arms leaders whose planning, leadership, and management skills ensure overall IW effectiveness. Officers for mentorship. Identifying exceptionally talented leaders remains a challenge. Most interviewees felt “we generally get it right” with respect to identifying prospective future leaders. Some, however, were uncomfortable regarding the lack of rigor in identifying those officers at mid-career with the skill-sets, abilities, and background to excel at leading in hybrid environments. According to one SOCOM component commander, “Sometimes guys who are eye-wateringly good just don’t get noticed.” Again, while interviewees rejected a formal process, several did advocate a means to identify subordinates with an aptitude for these developmental experiences. For a number of respondents, this would entail services inculcating in senior leaders and understanding of mentorship that is predisposed toward guiding subordinates who are deemed deserving.

Though not addressed by interviewees, identification and mentorship are also significant from the perspective of the tradeoffs that the developmental and broadening experiences highlighted in this article entail. Such tradeoffs present themselves in terms of increasing specific domain competency and familiarity with one’s own service. In confronting the constraints of time—both in terms of career progression and operational tempo—it is doubly important to develop programs and policies capable of identifying the right officers, at the appropriate stages in their careers, for mentorship and experiential broadening, if they are to develop the skills and abilities required to fill senior leadership positions in the joint force. Additionally, any approach to identifying and mentoring a cadre of joint force senior leaders will need to ensure that it provides opportunities for broadening exposure that are balanced against the requirement to focus on specific expertise.

Clusters of characteristics. Interviewees highlighted three clusters of characteristics necessary for successful IW leadership: cognitive, interpersonal, and managerial styles. These characteristics permitted them to understand their operating environment and plan successfully at the theater and strategic level. These same characteristics prepared them to marshal human and organizational resources while also equipping them to lead and inspire subordinates. While indicating a preference for career breadth, interviewees valued similar types of education, developmental assignments, and life experiences that cultivated the characteristics they deemed so important. In particular, they recommended diverse educational exposure, to include civilian institutions; recurrent joint assignments and exposure to the interagency processes and norms; assignments on theater- and strategic-level staffs in proximity to senior military and civilian leaders; substantive mixing between SOF and GPF forces; and repeated exposure to foreign cultures and their militaries.

In order to ensure that current operational tempos and institutional growth permit availability for these experiences, interviewees suggested modifications to institutional measures and policies. These recommendations involved creating billets for emerging leaders that permit them to take advantage of nontraditional developmental opportunities, and institutionally rewarding them for doing so. Interviewees affirmed the need for rigorous and sustained mentoring at the individual level, as well as development of institutional measures supporting mentorship. In sum, interviewees’ insight focused on ensuring that individual officers’ choices and institutional measures increase the likelihood that the characteristics and experiences identified here are found among the joint force’s future leaders, who will grapple with the challenges of diverse global operations in the midst of organizational change.

Dr. Barak A. Salmoni is a political scientist, Jessica Hart is a research assistant, Renny McPherson is an adjunct staff member and former project associate, and Aidan Kirby Winn is a project associate, all at the RAND Corporation.
Article subjects. *Fires* strives to be “forward-looking.” We’re at the dawn of a new Army transformation. Many exciting things are taking place in the field and air defense artillery fields of expertise. Article subjects should therefore be current and relevant. Writers may share good ideas and lessons learned with their fellow Soldiers, as exploring better ways of doing things remains a high emphasis with *Fires*.

If an article subject is significant and pertains to field artillery or air defense artillery and its diverse activities, as a rule of thumb we’ll consider it appropriate for publication. Article subjects include (but aren’t limited to) technical developments, tactics, techniques and procedures; how-to pieces, practical exercises, training methods and historical perspectives (Army Regulation 25-30, Paragraph 2-3, b).

We are actively seeking lessons-learned articles which will enhance understanding of current field and air defense artillery operations. The magazine’s heart is material dealing with doctrinal, technical or operational concepts. We especially solicit progressive, forward-thinking and challenging subject matter for publication. In addition to conceptual and doctrinal materials, we encourage manuscripts dealing with maintenance, training or operational techniques.

Good ideas or lessons-learned articles should have two closely related themes: one, what did you learn from what you did? The second theme is: what is most important for others to know, or what will you do differently in the future? Include only the pertinent information on how you did it so someone else can repeat what you did. Don’t include a blow-by-blow of your whole deployment. The article’s emphasis should be that your unit has a good idea or some lessons-learned to share.

Steps involved in submitting an article to *Fires* are outlined following.

All articles should have the bottom line up front; however, to better ensure your chances of publication, we recommend that you read all the criteria contained in this article as well as apply the guidance contained in the *Fires* style manual at sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/style.asp for more details. We do not pay for articles or illustrations other than providing contributors with complimentary copies of the magazine.

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If you get permission to use someone else’s graphic or photo, especially from the private sector, we need proof of that in writing.

Getting started. Select a relevant topic of interest to the U.S. Army field and air defense artillery community. The topic must professionally develop members of these fields. Write an outline to organize your work. Put the bottom line up front and write clear, concise introduction and conclusion paragraphs. Follow the writing standard established in Army Regulation 25-50, Preparing and Managing Correspondence, Section IV (the Army writing style), and Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders, especially Paragraphs 3-1 and 3-2.

The Army standard is writing you can understand in a single rapid reading and is generally free of errors in grammar, mechanics and usage. Also see *Fires*’ style manual. Maintain the active voice as much as possible. Write “Congress cut the budget” rather than “the budget was cut by Congress.” (Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-67, Paragraph 3-2, b[1]).

Write as if you were telling someone face-to-face about your subject: use conversational tone; ‘I,’ ‘you’ and ‘we’ personal pronouns; short sentences and short paragraphs. Articles should be double-spaced, typed, unpublished manuscript, between 3,000 and 3,500 (or less), but no more than 5,000 words, including inline citations as appropriate.

Authors should check their articles’ contents with unit commanders or organization directors or S2s/G2s to ensure the articles have no classified or operations security information in them. Clearance requirements are outlined in Army Regulation 360-1, Chapter 5, Paragraph 5-3. Headquarters Department of the Army/Office of the Secretary of Defense clearance is required if your article meets any of the criteria listed there. Article clearance is further covered in Paragraph 6-6, with procedures on how to do so outlined in Paragraph 6-9. The bottom line on most article clearance is discussed in Paragraph 6-6. While you certainly may ask your local Public Affairs Office’s advice, it is the “author’s responsibility to ensure security is not compromised. Information that appears in open sources does not constitute declassification. The combination of several open-source documents may result in a classified document.”

So while the *Fires* staff may question the sensitivity of an article we receive, it is not our responsibility to officially clear articles, however if we do see something within an article that might cause concern, we reserve the right to withhold publication of such an article until it is thoroughly vetted with the proper subject matter expert or Army authority. But it still remains the author’s responsibility, as outlined in Army Regulation 360-1, not to compromise national security or U.S. Army operational security matters.

We reserve the right to edit an article, so the *Fires* staff will edit all manuscripts and put them in the magazine’s style and format. The author of an article or interviewee will receive a courtesy copy of the edited version for review before publication, however, if the author does not get back to the *Fires* staff with any questions or concerns within a specified suspense date (typically five to seven working days) it will be assumed the author concurs with all edits and the article will run as is.

Except in the case of Armywide news items, authors should not submit a manuscript to *Fires* while it is being considered elsewhere. A comprehensive biography, highlighting experience, education and training relevant to the article’s subject and credentialing the author as the writer of the article also is required. Include e-mail and mailing addresses and telephone, cell and fax numbers. Please keep this information current with *Fires* for as long as we’re considering the manuscript.

Photographs and graphics. For the photographer’s guide, visit sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/submissionguide.html.

Send the article. E-mail the editor at firesbulletin@conus.army.mil.
The ability to understand, inform and influence key audiences is critical to success in today’s battle space. The unprecedented flow of information, facilitated by modern technology and media distribution methods, demands a robust and multi-faceted approach to strategic communication. For some time, U.S. forces have recognized what public affairs and information operations can bring to the fight. But as I-Corps (formerly Multi-National Corps Iraq) learned during our year in Iraq, key leader engagement is not only just as important; it is absolutely critical to accomplishing the mission.

Recognizing the need to synchronize KLE with a full range of lethal and non-lethal effects, the commander gave the KLE mission to the joint fires and effects cell. With no ‘KLE’ billets on the joint targeting document, I-Corps formed, out of hide, a full-time team of six officers, with backgrounds in information operations, intelligence and targeting. This cell reported to the effects coordinator, and received guidance from him as well as the deputy commanding general for operations.

At first, the KLE cell struggled to find a niche. We knew that the I-Corps would engage a wide range of leaders: some military and some civilian, some foreign and some domestic. Examining the effects we were after helped us draw a game plan. We defined ‘key leaders’ as foreign leaders (Iraqi Security Forces or Government of Iraq) we sought to influence; as opposed to U.S. or coalition leaders (visiting general officers, elected representatives or political appointees) we sought to inform. And while we knew engagements would occur at every echelon, we focused our efforts on those involving the corps commander and his deputies.

With this in mind, our mission became clear. The KLE cell would support the engagement of key Iraqi military and civilian leaders in order to communicate information, build trust and confidence, garner support for operations, and influence decision-making, so that they acted in our collective interests.

Adapting the joint targeting cycle. In traditional targeting, the joint targeting cycle is used to describe the iterative process to nominate, plan, prepare, execute and assess targets, in support of the commander’s stated objectives and intent. Although our intended effects were obviously different from those on which this cycle was based, we found the process to be a good fit for KLE.

Step 1: Commander’s objectives. Understanding the commander’s intent, objectives, desired effects and end state developed during operational planning provides the impetus for the conventional targeting process, according to Joint Publication 3-60 (Joint Targeting), Joint Staff (2007), p. II-3. We found the same to be true for KLE: selecting engagement targets, crafting themes and messages, and developing schemes of engagement, all began with an understanding of the commander’s intent and desired effects, in the context of the broader plan or order.

Step 2: Engagement target development. Target development involves the systematic examination of target systems to determine the type of action that must be exerted on each to create the desired effects (see JP 3-60, p. 11-4). For KLE, this meant uncovering what people thought, how they perceived the operating environment, and why. It required analysis of the informational and cognitive dimensions that permeated political, military, economic, social and informational networks, according to Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication, U.S. Joint Forces Command (2009), p. I-4. This involved extensive (and continually refined) background research and analysis, and meant combining a range of biographical and demographic information, such as religious, political and tribal affiliations, personal history, and key relationships, with a synopsis...
of recent interactions with other key players in the battle space, to form an elaborate target profile.

**Step 3: Capabilities analysis.** Evaluating available capabilities against desired effects to determine the options available to the commander is the third step in the joint targeting cycle (see JP 3-60, p.11-10). For KLE, it was the most rigorous. It involved crafting themes and messages, integrating them with those delivered via public affairs and information operations, and synchronizing them with those delivered by our higher headquarters and the U.S. Embassy.

We looked carefully at timing, to maximize synergy with other activity or events occurring in the battle space; and at tempo, to maximize receptivity of the engagement target. The U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communications Strategy has a good discussion on timing and tempo. It points out that timing of the message is important for myriad reasons, including synergy with other messages/events, receptivity of the audience, momentum, audience motivation/expectations, and stimulus response patterns. Tempo of message delivery can directly affect how the audience decides to take action. A single attempt to reach an audience will likely be ineffective just as a continual drum beat of a specific message or type of message can result in the receiving audience over time treating it as noise. However, a well-timed message at the optimum tempo can have significantly increased effect (see Commander’s Handbook, p. IV-17). This step also entailed pairing senior U.S. leaders with specific engagement targets. Although difficult at first, this became easier as the command group established habitual relationships with their Iraqi partners.

The commander’s handbook also has a good discussion of delivery vehicles, noting that construction of the message must include considerations for resonance with the intended audience, but the delivery vehicle can also significantly distort, impede, or facilitate reception by the audience (see Commander’s Handbook, p. IV-16).

**Step 4: Commander’s decision and force assignment.** The fourth step in the joint targeting cycle involves the preparation and release of tasking orders to executing forces. For KLE, this step included the commander’s validation of desired effects and a fine-tuning of themes and messages. It culminated with his approval of a proposed ‘scheme of engagement,’ which specified who was engaging whom on a given topic, in what sequence, during what time period. This all occurred during a weekly ‘KLE Synchronization Board,’ which was chaired by the I-Corps commander, facilitated by the KLE cell, and attended by all deputy commanders and I-Corps primary staff.

**Step 5: Mission planning and execution.** In mission planning and execution, capability providers conduct tactical-level planning to support target execution. This includes target validation, where planners conduct an analysis of the situation to determine if planned targets still contribute to the commander’s objectives, and how planned actions will impact other friendly operations (see JP 3-60, p. II-12). For KLE, this involved preparing the commanding general and his deputy commanders for their individual engagements. This preparation included a review of the engagement target’s profile and analysis of related activity in the operating and information environments.

**Step 6: Assessment.** The last step in the joint targeting cycle consists of the collection and analysis of information about the engagement to determine whether or not it was successful in achieving the desired effects. For KLE, this meant the collection and analysis of post-engagement executive summaries, as well as an examination of the information and operating environments in the days and weeks following the engagement.

Because KLE, like public affairs and information operations, attempts to create outcomes primarily in the cognitive dimension, it was a challenge to quantify effectiveness. We relied on the engager’s individual assessment, captured in the engagement executive summaries, and on the command group’s collective assessment, made during the weekly KLE synchronization board.

To be clear, KLE is not about engaging key leaders when a crisis arises; by then, it is almost always too late. Rather, it is about building relationships over time with enough strength and depth, so that they can then support our interests whether in a crisis or not. And it’s about having a process – like the one used by I-Corps during our year in Iraq – to nominate, plan, execute and assess engagement targets, in support of the commander’s objectives and intent.

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Lieutenant Colonel Chad Jones was the chief of the Key Leader Engagement Cell for Multi-National Corps – Iraq, from January 2009 to February 2010. Prior to his tour in Iraq, he served in information operations positions at U.S. Space Command in Colorado Springs, Colo., and U.S. Strategic Command, in Omaha, Neb. He received a Master of Science in Information Operations from the Naval Postgraduate School in December 2006.
Joint and Combined Fires University concept a year later: Providing leaders and experts in the art and science of Fires

By Alvin Peterson, chief of Training Development, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Fires Center of Excellence, and Sharon McBride, Editor-in-Chief, Fires Bulletin

“(OUR) ENVIRONMENT DEMANDS THAT WE DEVELOP LEADERS WHO UNDERSTAND THE CONTEXT OF THE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE MILITARY SITUATION, ACT WITHIN THAT UNDERSTANDING, CONTINUALLY ASSESS AND ADAPT THOSE ACTIONS BASED ON THE INTERACTIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ENEMY AND ENVIRONMENT, CONSOLIDATE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES INTO STRATEGIC AIMS, AND BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY TRANSITION FROM ONE FORM OF OPERATIONS TO ANOTHER. WE SEEK TO DEVELOP LEADERS WHO WILL THRIVE IN THIS ENVIRONMENT.”

A LEADER DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR A 21ST CENTURY ARMY, NOVEMBER 25, 2009

Recognizing the need for a transformation in training and education, the Fires Center of Excellence began to develop a concept for the Joint and Combined Fires University in 2008. Although, the university’s concept pre-dates the November 2009 release of A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army, and the May 2010 release of The United States Army Learning Concept for 2015, the FCoE is on target and ahead of schedule in providing a path to achieving TRADOC’s number one priority of developing leaders and providing Fires professionals a variety of avenues for learning.

The concept of the JCFU, is that of an innovative learning organization, and it will provide training and education through a mix of delivery methods as outlined by both of these critical concepts, as well as a blend of institutional, operational, and self-development domains. Access to JCFU, is located behind the AKO firewall on the Fires Knowledge Network, log onto https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/586282. JCFU is scheduled to be at initial operational capability by summer 2011.

On the JCFU website is a multitude of online courses, distance learning classes, virtual reality learning opportunities and links to obtaining traditional classroom instruction, most of which are available upon request now.

Students can also currently access JCFU resources from the Field Artillery or Air Defense Artillery branch schoolhouses as a part of the FCoE, through civilian universities that have partnerships with JCFU, other sister service schoolhouses or from their home station. JCFU will provide blended learning and the highest quality training, education, and development opportunities for Army, joint, interagency, and coalition partners in the art and science of lethal and non-lethal Fires.

JCFU was born out of necessity. Critical decision making is no longer exclusive to senior leaders in the operational environment. Junior officers, junior NCOs and Soldiers – all must make critical decisions on today’s battlefield. MG David Halverson’s Fires Functional Concept, which is nested with the Army Operating Concept and the Army Capstone Concept, describes a future characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change and persistent conflict.

These concepts also dictate the necessity of developing leaders who understand the context of factors influencing the military situation, who can act within that understanding, continually access and adopt those actions based on the interactions and circumstance of the enemy and environment, consolidate tactical and operational opportunities into strategic aims, and be able to effectively transition from one form of operations to another.
These Army leaders also must have the knowledge and skills necessary to train and employ modular force units, be culturally aware and astute, be capable of executing mission-type orders and the commander’s intent, and finally, be leaders of character.

So, how do we make sure all these knowledge requirements are met, knowing Soldiers and leaders typically do not have enough time between deployments and missions to attend traditional Army schools? The FCoE answered this challenge by standing up the JCFU to deliver vital knowledge directly to those who need it the most and in formats that are easily understood.

From a Fires perspective, through developing the JCFU concept, Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, Sailors, allied nations, coalition partners and interagency personnel are being trained with the necessary skills it takes to be a leader on the battlefield today. The JCFU concept provides the individual learner a ‘one stop portal’ in which they will be able to manage and access their career progression and operational training and education needs.

The JCFU concept is quickly becoming the model for all of TRADOC to follow to facilitate life-long learning with a 24-hours, seven-days-a-week, reach-back capability. Since 2008, JCFU concept has been continuously evolving and expanding to add more courses, instructors and resources for Fires professionals.

Technology at your fingertips. The JCFU concept is on the cutting edge of leveraging emerging technology to bring live, virtual, and constructive training and education to the Fires professional. Several gaming and simulation applications are currently in development or are now in use which enables students to immerse themselves in true-to-life scenarios in order to broaden their experience base and intuitive decision making abilities at the touch of a keystroke.

For example, currently in use by the FCoENON commissioned Officer Academy is a virtual interactive training experience called “Danger Close.” The Senior Leader Course and Advanced Leader Course for both Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery at Fort Sill have included “Danger Close” in a 10-hour and four-hour blocks of instruction. The platform uses state-of-the-art graphics and scenes using Soldiers filmed on location at Fort Sill. Students in the classroom experience the action through the eyes of an avatar, in this case they can choose between an officer or an NCO, in order to explore NCO and officer interaction in a variety of situations from garrison to a deployment.

Through lessons learned and experiencing consequences from decision making, the role-players make life-and-death decisions and learn the outcome of those decisions – it is personalized training at its best. Currently, small group leaders use it as a tool for developing young leaders and as a refresher for seasoned Soldiers.

Another example, although still in the development stage is “Virtual Platoon.” This interactive game concept focuses more on the role of officer. This game exercises a lieutenant’s decision making abilities and overall knowledge of Army programs and support systems by immersing him in a variety of complex scenarios from pre-deployment to post deployment, in garrison as well as during deployment. The officer receives feedback about his decisions from avatar mentors or JCFU instructors. In many cases, the young officer will be forced to deal with the consequences of his decisions and reflect how he could have done better.

Yet another example of how the JCFU concept is setting the example by embracing technology and scenario based curriculum is the newly developed “Collateral Damage Decision-making Tool” or CDDT. The platform uses graphics comparable to those seen in the science fiction video game “Halo.”

“Development for CDDT has been completed, and it is going through the validation process now,” said Christin Pena, an instructional systems specialist with the

Collateral Damage Decision-making Tool allows users to make decisions in a simulated operational environment where they can safely observe the outcomes of their choices.
FCoE Education Technology Branch.

With the constantly changing operational environment, the JCFU required a responsive capability to deliver immersive, virtual decision games and simulations, Pena said.

So, the FCoE responded by developing a semi-immersive, student-centered, virtual-decision gaming capability, she said. The capability utilizes Virtual Battlespace 2 or VBS2 to develop realistic, virtual scenarios that are deliverable outside of the actual game to provide facilitated or distributed instruction. The capability will be integrated into the JCFU’s institutional, self-development and operational domains by delivering training, education and experience anywhere at any time.

“Leveraging this gaming technology has allowed the FCoE to create a scenario-based game immersing the Soldier in a simulated operational environment where they can safely observe the outcomes of their decisions,” Pena said. “The focus of this training is to minimize or eliminate collateral damage. The Soldier observes a virtual scenario and then determines his/her course of action.

“After the decision is made, the Soldier can observe how that decision impacts not only the current situation but also second and third-order effects. CDDT will be delivered on CD’s, facilitated in classrooms as well as posted online through FKN,” she said.

Cultural immersion. The Army Culture and Foreign Language Program’s arsenal includes a Cultural Awareness and Language Training Package developed by Ibrahimov, which is a portable training option for Soldiers that includes several foreign language CD’s, a cultural awareness scenario-based game called “Army 360,” language flashcards, and field expedient language smart books allocated from the Defense Language Institute for our troops’ use.

Ibrahimov also established a Culture and Foreign Language Resource Center in the Morris Swett Technical library, where students have access to computers for self-paced training, various cultural awareness books and numerous other applicable digital and traditional learning resources.

He also worked tirelessly to establish formal partnerships with civilian universities and other subject matter experts from across the nation to conduct culture and foreign language seminars here at Fort Sill.

Ibrahimov also made available on the FKN website (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/21617522), a dedicated FCoE Cultural & Foreign Language Program resource page, which contains cultural awareness and foreign language knowledge, information on past seminars, information on the program, media coverage of the events, foreign languages guides, links to the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center resources, as well as the CIA Fact Book—the list and site are constantly being updated.

No more death by PowerPoint. Beyond revamping training, the JCFU concept has also overhauled the way its instructors teach. Rather than using old standard Army techniques of lecture peppered with PowerPoint slides, adult learning theories are now being incorporated into all the JCFU’s curriculum at both the
Despite growing awareness among Army leaders to include foreign cultural education as part of training and operational planning, the roles that culture and religion play in successful missions and deployments are often overlooked.

Battlefield lessons learned have confirmed that language skills and understanding of foreign cultures are crucial for success in full-spectrum operations. Often, cultural understanding is necessary both to defeat adversaries and to work successfully with allies.

The Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy, which was released in 2009, highlighted operational experiences in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq with having critical gaps in the Army capability to influence and operate effectively within different cultures for extended periods of time.

In an effort to develop adaptive, agile and culturally astute leaders with the right blend of culture and foreign language capabilities, the Fires Center of Excellence’s Joint and Combined Fires University is leading the way with its implementation of a Cultural and Foreign Language Program.

Dr. Mahir Ibrahimov, who is fluent in five languages and versed in many cultures, was hired as the first TRADOC Cultural and Foreign Language Advisor, and is the head of the CFLP here at Fort Sill, Okla.

Changing our current teaching paradigms required new ideas and the ability to go beyond providing Soldiers and leaders a rudimentary foundation in foreign culture and language familiarization. Traditionally, cultural training tended to be overly simplistic and lacked a context for cultural understanding, Ibrahimov explained.

The curriculum developed by CFLP helps Soldiers and leaders develop critical thinking skills needed to understand how culture might influence the outcome of an operation. Ibrahimov has created a holistic approach to cultural training that is now being looked at closely by TRADOC for other installations to emulate.

The future is now. When the Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army was released it articulated the characteristics the Army desires in its leaders as they progress through their careers. Even though this doctrine is new, some of the factors that make a great leader haven’t really changed. For example, the ability to be innovative, execute and be a strong role model for Soldiers is always essential, but in addition to these qualities, a new leadership style is emerging, with skills uniquely tailored for success in today’s battle field environment.

The JCFU concept is at the heart of these changes and is quickly setting the standard for the rest of the Army to follow. The JCFU concept is serving as the catalyst for the transformation of training and education not only here at Fort Sill but for the rest of the Army. The JCFU concept is a learning organization that will, through the process of reflection and analysis, continuously strive to determine the training and education needs of today and tomorrow’s Soldiers and leaders.

Fit to Fight! Fires Strong!

Haji Abdul Manaf, Nawa district governor, makes opening remarks during a regional stability shura at Forward Operating Base Geronimo, Afghanistan, July 26. The shura provides a way for leadership throughout the province to address challenges. (Photo by Sgt Mark Fayloga, U.S. Marine Corps)
According to Ibrahimov, becoming aware of cultural dynamics is a difficult task because culture is based on experiences, values, behaviors, beliefs and norms. In many cases, Soldiers may experience a foreign culture for the first time during a deployment, and as a result may inadvertently be disrespectful.

For example, in Iraq, the left hand is not used for contact with others, eating or gestures; it is considered unclean. When talking with an Iraqi, especially during key leader engagements, close personal interaction is customary and distance is considered rude. Try all food and drink offered, and it’s important to appear relaxed and friendly; social interaction is critical in building trust. Cultural awareness training would help overcome the ‘culture shock,’ and give Soldiers the ability to adjust to an indigenous culture as quickly as possible to get the mission done.

It should also build on the foundation of an individual’s existing leader attributes which in turn reinforces the core leader competencies of leading others, developing oneself and achieving results. Cross-cultural training should focus, in particular on character, presence and intellect. (See figure 1.1 Cultural Awareness Objectives).

Some programs define cultural immersion as simply ‘being there,’ asserting that physically being in another country is an immersion in itself and that knowledge of another culture and language will follow naturally.

“That isn’t always the case,” Ibrahimov said. When developing a comprehensive program, Ibrahimov determined that three cultural competency levels (cultural awareness, understanding and expertise) must be included. These competency levels are now included in all courses taught by the JCFU, the FCoE Noncommissioned Officers Academy and in other leadership courses attended by officers and warrant officers to overcome cultural ignorance (See figure 1.2 Cultural Competency Levels).

The Basic Officer Leader Course, the NCO Warrior Leader Course, the NCO Advanced Leader Course, the Captain’s Career Course, the Warrant Officer Basic Course, the Warrant Officer Advanced Course and the NCO Senior Leader Course have all been revised to contain specific approaches appropriate to each level in order for leaders to attain specific knowledge on culture and foreign language expectations. It is important to note, as designed the training places more emphasis on attaining cultural knowledge (big C), with some emphasis on learning foreign languages (little L).

“Our Soldiers and leaders really need to understand the cultural nuances of other countries,” Ibrahimov said. “The decisions our younger Soldiers and leaders are making often have strategic importance.” Cultural knowledge and understanding can open eyes so Soldiers can be more effective when dealing with a local populace. Having a rudimentary knowledge of a native language can be helpful in a variety situations, he added.

**Partnerships and cooperation.** Ibrahimov also designed the CFLP program to have ongoing partnerships and cooperation with local universities and other military institutions. Cameron University, Oklahoma University and Oklahoma State University faculties conduct regular seminars for Fires professionals on topics of operational importance.

Past topics have included: *Central Asia: Modernity and Geopolitics in the Stans, The Cultural and Linguistic Patterns in the Middle East and Projections for Iraq, Who Will Lead? The United States, the European Union, China, and the Global Diffusion of Power, The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, U.S. Strategic Options in Afghanistan, Iran and U.S. Strategy, Russia: A Declining Superpower Reclaiming its Throne?* Future strategic topics are related to Russia, Iran and the Middle East.

“These seminars have led to an increased understanding by our students of cultural aspects and geopolitical trends, their impacts on the contemporary operational environment,” said Ibrahimov. “We are...
Partnerships to enhance training have also been formed with TRADOC Culture Center and Military Intelligence Center, both located at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., the Marine Corps University at Quantico, Va., the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center at the Presidio in Monterey, Calif., and the East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

Ibrahimov himself also regularly conducts seminars with students attending the Fires Support Coordinator Course, Warrant Officer Instructional Branch, Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery Captains Career Course. He also conducts specific or generalized predeployment training upon request. He has also been conducting train the trainer sessions for small group leaders, new cultural awareness instructors and new TRADOC cultural advisors. He has also made arrangements for allied international students and FCoE liaison officers to conduct regular briefs on their respective countries for additional knowledge.

Cultural simulation. Items in FCoE Cultural & Foreign Language Program’s arsenal include a ‘Cultural Awareness and Language Training Package,’ which is a portable training option for Soldiers that includes several foreign language CDs, a cultural awareness scenario-based game called “Army 360,” language flash cards and field-expedient smart books allocated from the Defense Language Institute for troops’ use (See figure 1.3). “Army 360” is a virtual simulation application that enables students to immerse themselves in true-to-life scenarios in order to broaden their experience in dealing with other cultures. They get to practice intuitive decision making abilities in a mock environment before facing the real – life culture dilemmas.

Ibrahimov also established a Culture and Foreign Language Resource Center in the Morris Swett Technical library, where students have access to computers for self-paced training, various cultural awareness books and numerous other applicable digital (to include Rosetta Stone) and traditional learning resources. These resources are available to captains, BOLC B attendees, NCOES and warrant officer students to prepare cultural research papers which are now a mandatory requirement in each of their respective training. BOLC B students are now eligible to receive certificates after completing four to eight hours of language training. The FCoE CFLP identified five operationally important languages for training: Dari, Pashto (Afghanistan), Iraqi Arabic, Korean and Russian. Not sure where to start? A comprehensive reading list is also available at the resource center that includes books on areas that are currently strategically/operationally important to Army operations.

A dedicated FCoE Cultural and Foreign Language Program resource page is also available by logging onto FKN. The site contains an abundance of cultural awareness and foreign language knowledge, information on past seminars, information on the program, media coverage of the events, foreign languages guides, links to the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center resources, as well as the CIA Fact Book. The list and site are

Figure 1.3: Cultural Awareness and Language Training Package

- Iraqi Basic Language Survival Guide
- Tactical Dari Language and Culture
- Multi-Platform Tactical Language Kit – Dari
- Pashto Headstart & LSK
- Tactical Pashto: Language and Culture
- Multi-Platform Tactical Language Kit – Iraqi Arabic
- Pocket cards – for use in the field
- Army 360
- Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (Presidio of Monterey, Calif.)
The first session was attended by 46 volunteer students from FA/ADA CCC and WOES.

FCoE CFLP is currently in the process of identifying a Dari or Pashto instructor (Afghanistan) to launch a similar 12-week program in the future.

"Sometimes troops have more success learning a foreign language by listening and practicing with a person rather than just listening to a CD," Ibrahimov said.

The Army Capstone Concept Operational Adaptability—Operation under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict, the Army is going to continue to send large numbers of Soldiers into a region about which they have little knowledge and almost no cultural connection. We then ask them to interact safely and efficiently with military and civilian natives.

These interactions require varying levels of linguistic, cultural, and interpersonal backgrounds. Providing Soldiers with these backgrounds is critical. The FCoE CFLP is on target in providing an avenue of learning for leaders and Soldiers to achieve at least an elemental language proficiency (Level 0+/1 – See figure 1.4 Speaking Language Proficiency Levels) prior to deployment. FCoE CFLP hopes that by providing evolitional training, it will make all Fires professionals successful – no matter what corner of the globe they happen to deploy.


**Figure 1.4 Speaking Language Proficiency Levels**

- Speaking 0: No proficiency
- Speaking 0+: Memorized proficiency
- Speaking 1: Elementary proficiency
- Speaking 1+: Elementary proficiency, plus
- Speaking 2/2+: Limited working proficiency
- Speaking 3/3+: General professional proficiency
- Speaking 4/4+: Advanced professional proficiency
- Speaking 5: Functionally native proficiency

Dr. Mahir J. Ibrahimov completed his Ph.D. at the Academy of Social Sciences in Moscow in 1991 and has attended several post graduate programs at Johns Hopkins University and other U.S. institutions. He also served in the Soviet Army and witnessed the break-up of the Soviet Union. As a former high-ranking diplomat, he helped open the first embassy of Azerbaijan in Washington, D.C. While working for the U.S. Department of State, he instructed U.S. diplomats in languages and cultures. He also provided vital assistance as a multi-lingual cultural adviser to U.S. forces during OIF II and became the subject of a Defense Department newsreel, “Jack of All Languages.” Dr. Ibrahimov specializes in the cultural issues of the former Soviet Republics and the Middle East. He is the author of “Invitation to Rain: a Story of the Road Taken Toward Freedom” and numerous publications on the Middle East and the former Soviet Union.
I imagine you are a new lieutenant assigned to a battery. You want to make a good first impression but are not sure where and what are you supposed to be doing. To whom do you turn? Now imagine you are a seasoned staff sergeant or sergeant first class, doing the job of the platoon sergeant and the platoon leader when you get a fresh second lieutenant who has little or no operational experience. How do you interact? How do you, as a platoon sergeant or platoon leader find your place and your role in your unit without over stepping or disrespecting your counterparts or the chain of command?

There are many challenges that come from developing a noncommissioned officer-officer relationship making getting off to a good start imperative. Finding a balance between teaching and respect is a challenge many leaders face. Showing strength, knowledge and unity can be difficult but is necessary to create a functioning, precise and cohesive unit and developing a good officer/NCO command team.

Often tough leadership lessons are taught in the school of life and sometimes the outcomes are good but detrimental. This is where a new virtual experience immersive learning simulation program called “Danger Close,” can give NCOs and officers an opportunity to practice reacting to real-world challenges, from garrison to combat missions, in a mock reality before they happen in real life. In this new gaming application leaders can make mistakes and learn in a safe environment without risking lives, a mission outcome or breaking down the chain of command. Reminiscent of old chapter books where you choose your path for the story, this program allows the user to see the outcome of their choices and decisions. The game, however, when choices end up having detrimental consequences will allow the user to go back and review the scenario again and choose a better answer.

Contrary to prior learning tools of the Army this is no ordinary point-and-click program. “Danger Close” has graphics and a realism that rivals civilian games such as “Soldier of Fortune” or “Halo.” It has also won the 2010 Software and Information Industry Association CODiE award for best workforce training application.

There were many man hours involved in the making of “Danger Close” to make it a reality. With the help of the entire Fort Sill community and the support of the Training and Doctrine Command, “Danger Close” has become a template for other virtual training programs. Filming for it only took three weeks but it took months of team effort from Fort Sill and the Lawton community to pull it all together. Organizations such as the Fort Sill Moral Welfare and Recreation Program, the Fires Center of Excellence NCO Academy and the Department of Public Works were instrumental in making it happen.

“We were so lucky. The crew filmed at the NCO Academy, the Impact Zone and out in the (Lawton) community,” said CSM Dean J. Keveles, commandant of the FCoE NCO Academy. “We even had one of the community hospitals shut down for us to create a more realistic scenario.”

NCO/Officer relationship challenges are a fact in the Army. That is why the Fort Sill Directorate of Training and Doctrine and the FCoE NCO Academy came together to create this new and state-of-the-art training tool for use by troops here at Fort Sill.

“This program is cutting edge,”
said Sandra Velasquez Pokorny, branch chief of design and evaluation at DoTD. “We have worked to make every detail as realistic as possible.”

Pokorny also spearheaded the campaign for a better training tool along with W. Joe Kirby, chief of the Enlisted Development Branch, DoTD. Former commanding general of the FCoE and Fort Sill, MG Peter M. Vangjel, and now with the support of MG David D. Halverson, the current commanding general of the FCoE and Fort Sill and GEN Martin Dempsey, the commander of U.S. Army TRADOC, “Danger Close” is now being used as a part of the curriculum taught at the FCoE NCO Academy.

It has become a valuable training tool for both NCOs of the Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery branches, as well as for all officers.

“The program is not one sided,” said Keveles, “You can play the role of a senior NCO or a new lieutenant.”

Besides covering the nuances of the NCO/officer relationship, the game also allows players to virtually experience leadership challenges such as a suicide in the ranks, fraternization, and what to do about disrespect to an officer or NCO. Each scenario carries the role players from first interactions, garrison operations, pre-deployment training, combat situations and through redeployment.

“We strived for realism with this program,” said Pokorny. “We (the DoTD staff, the NCO Academy staff) combed over every detail of the script to make it as real and believable as we could. We talked to young lieutenants and we talked to senior NCOs across the Army asking for the reality of these situations.”

Small group leaders and instructors from the NCO Academy have seen good results and many requests for additional copies of the game.

“Using this has created a multitude of discussion in our classes,” said SFC Michael Canedo, an instructor at the FCoE NCO Academy. “We continually get requests from NCOs to take this back to their units. This is not re-teaching our senior leaders, this is just polishing what they already know.”

“Danger Close” has become very popular for its effect on the Soldier, the overall learning experience and provoking out of the box thinking it generates, he said. “‘Danger Close’ has a real emotional impact. When the Soldiers participate in this program they are completely in control and invested in what is happening,” Keveles said. “We want to get their attention and get them to really think and experience and know how to react to something besides the norm.”

Further development of this new interactive software is in the works to build and improve upon the “Danger Close,” experience.

To get more information on obtaining a copy of “Danger Close” contact Sandra Velasquez Pokorny, branch chief of Design and Evaluation DoTD, Fort Sill, Okla., at 580-558-0355, or e-mail her at pokornys@conus.army.mil.
The lion, the starfish and the spider: Hitting terrorists where it hurts

By CW3 Bruce E. DeFeyter

You can’t always get what you want, but if you try sometime, you just might find you get what you need,” states the 1969 song by the Rolling Stones.

Today policy-makers, law-enforcement officials and military leaders struggle to come up with innovative ideas for neutralizing terrorist organizations and their activities. One such idea, not given much thought until after 9/11, is attacking terrorist financing structures, methods and sources, according to Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, editors of “Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective.”

Attempting to destroy terrorists by denying them financing or interrupting their money stream is unlikely to succeed as a sole point of effort for at least three reasons. First, organizationally, terrorists are structured to slip behind, around and underneath centralized organizations, rules and bureaucracies.

Second, terrorist organizations can conduct operations for literally pennies on the dollar, and any serious effort to interrupt these financially insignificant activities will have serious second and third-order effects on the larger financial community. Third, even with the thousands of laws enacted and the historically unprecedented cooperation between partner nations, terrorism continues to escalate by nearly every conceivable measure, according to a 2008 report by the U.S. State Department. Bluntly put, counterterrorism financing reform simply doesn’t work.

This is not to say that the United States and the larger worldwide community should ignore terrorist financing — instead, it should take a different approach, using the lion, the African predator, as a model. In order to understand the predator model, we need to define who our enemy actually is and understand the three reasons given above for the failure of financing reform. Only then will we be able to structure a more effective mechanism for interdicting terrorist organizations through their financing rather than by trying to starve them out of existence.

Define the enemy. In any conflict, it is imperative to understand exactly who the enemy is. It is generally understood that terrorism is a tactic and not an organization or group. Consequently, if we do not further define the enemy beyond a tactic, we risk fighting this war alongside other ill-defined wars declared on poverty, drugs, cancer and obesity.

Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, a terrorist is better defined as a nonstate actor, someone who acts on the international stage outside the knowledge or permission of the state to which he or she owes allegiance.

The quintessential nonstate actors are Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. The nonstate actor is the ultimate persona non grata, operating across country lines and boundaries, restricted by nothing but conscience.

By definition, nonstate actors do not have a state (or legitimate authority) to report to and can be involved in criminal activities, such as selling drugs, smuggling weapons or, of course, terrorism. Primarily, nonstate actors remain behind the scenes and out of sight of the state, emerging only to make demands, threats or attacks.

Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom, authors of the book, “The Starfish and the Spider,” also define and classify most nonstate actors as decentralized organizations. It is this organizational definition that will illuminate a significant difficulty in attempting to attack a nonstate actor.

Current game. Brafman and Beckstrom note several interesting “rules” about decentralized organizations, which they call “starfish.” First, “When attacked, a decentralized organization tends to become even more open and decentralized.” In plain language, an already dark and secretive organization, when attacked, becomes more dispersed and darker; meaning that it becomes exponentially harder to find.

Furthermore, the increased decentralization does not affect the organization’s performance — in some scenarios, performance actually improves.

Granted, there might be some “trophies” captured in the attack, but the larger organization continues to exist in a more nebulous fashion. Furthermore, the starfish, operating in a more open environment, are more capable of mutating, state Brafman and Beckstrom. That mutation allows starfish to adapt and change more quickly than centralized organizations can react by passing laws or effective legislation. Finally, and more ominously, smaller, autonomous, decentralized organizations have a habit of sneaking up on centralized organizations, or spiders.

That effect has been noted separately by Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, who observe, “A decentralized, networked al-Qaeda composed of self-funded cells is more flexible and less vulnerable to attack.”

The second major reason that financing reform will not work is that there has never been a single case of a terrorist organization that ceased to exist as a direct result of financing problems. This
is due, in no small part, to the fact that nonstate actors conduct operations for literally pennies on the dollar.

Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert note several high-profile terrorist operations and their associated costs, such as the 2002 Bali bombings ($20,000-$35,000); the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in Africa ($50,000); the 1993 World Trade Center bombing ($18,000); and more recently, the 2004 Madrid attack, estimated to have cost less than $10,000 (See figure 1 Cost in dollars to fund terror attacks).

Simply put, the cost of any single one of these operations could have been bankrolled by an average middleclass American family. Imagine the difficulty, complexity and absurdity of attempting to pass legislative and financial laws that can distinguish between a nonstate actor bent on terrorism and an American family taking out a loan to purchase a recreational vehicle or a home. Giraldo and Trinkunas deal with the issue squarely: “The truth is that such small amounts cannot be stopped,” no matter how badly we wish otherwise.

Finally, the third reason for change is obvious — the 2007 report from the National Counterterrorism Center noted a steady increase in terrorist events, even excluding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This increase is in stark contrast to the decrease in the number of terrorists’ assets being frozen. “In the 16 weeks after the 9/11 attacks, 157 suspected terrorism fundraisers were identified, and assets valued at $68 million were frozen. The numbers fell after the initial rush by authorities. The totals for 2005 — $4.9 million frozen in the accounts of 32 suspects or organizations — suggest the effort is losing intensity,” according to a 2006 USA Today article by Kevin Johnson “U.S. Freezes Fewer Terror Assets.”

As stated above, counterterrorism financial reform has been and is failing. These statements are consistent with the theory described and articulated by Brafman and Beckstrom. Therefore, armed with theory and facts, why do we insist on pursuing a method that is clearly failing?

**Predator mode.** Since it is difficult, if not impossible, to pass financial or legislative laws that will starve nonstate actors into inactivity is there another way?

As stated earlier in the paper, the African predator model might be a better choice and strategy for dealing with terrorists and their money. The African male lion, with his pride, patrols an area of more than 100 square miles. Often, the pride will stake out a watering hole in the knowledge that sooner or later, dinner will have to come for a drink. As the prey drinks water, the lions position themselves along the exit route and “cherry pick” dinner off the trail. Could we not use money the same way to lure nonstate actors into our sights?

The predator model would have several advantages. First, it would use money to our advantage by illuminating and possibly destroying a dark network, without disrupting average American families. Second, money can serve as a means of centralizing starfish and thus making them more vulnerable to attack by traditional law-enforcement mechanisms. Third, it would overcome the problems noted earlier with attempting to “starve” nonstate actors into nonexistence.

Less than two weeks after 9/11, President George W. Bush noted, “Money is the lifeblood of terrorist operations,” and a few days later, Gordon Brown, then-finance minister for Great Britain, echoed that sentiment: “If fanaticism is the heart of modern terrorism, then finance is its lifeblood.”

So if money acts as the lifeblood of terrorists, why can’t we use that to our advantage by taking the analogy further?

Imagine that a terrorist organization is like a human body, with its different elements acting as the heart, brains, legs and arms. Most dark networks will employ a series of cutouts and security measures to isolate and protect the organization from penetration. The only common thread throughout the organization is money.

It flows from the collectors to the brains and outward to the limbs and it identifies people associated with the organization by their very contact with it. Instead of automatically shutting down financial ties when they reach arbitrary thresholds of $10,000, why not monitor, investigate and infiltrate the organization through its money stream? Instead of making modern banking methods risky for terrorists, we should make the banking systems of the U.S. and partner nations attractive and encourage terrorists to come to our “watering hole.”

That technique would have several advantages. First and foremost, we would control the playing field and rules, as opposed to Third World havallas (debt transfers) and other traditional financial methods. The rules that we control do not have to be made public, and we could institute random measures that would vary on a daily or weekly basis, requiring banks to submit names, accounts and activities to a central database for further investigation.

Second, we should not disrupt terrorist financial networks when we discover them. Instead, we should use our system of banking to trace the money as it comes into accounts and to see where it is transferred and who is accessing it, thus using money to illuminate a potentially dark network. This illumination would then give military and police forces the surgical precision to remove “cancerous lesions” instead of randomly seizing property and accounts by arbitrary activity and associations.

Third, this illumination would generally provide intelligence
agents with access points for penetrating the organization through distributors, suppliers and trainers in order to gain access to the network’s plans and intentions.

Another significant reason for encouraging nonstate actors to use our financial networks would be that it would give us the ability not only to monitor financial activity but also to set up financial deception operations designed to degrade terrorist networks. Joel Garreau, author of the article “Disconnect the Dots,” suggests that there are different ways of fighting terrorist networks.

Garreau makes the first point by recognizing that networks are not built along the lines of physical infrastructure. Instead, “they are political and emotional connections among people who must trust each other in order to function.”

Trust is the key point of attack in a network — not the leadership, and certainly not the finances. “There’s no reason organizational glitches, screw-ups, jealousies and distrust that slow and degrade performance can’t be intentionally introduced,” states Garreau.

Money might be one of the easiest ways to do just that. Accounts that are suddenly flush with money — or conversely, empty — could and will cause friction, as individuals attempt to explain unusual activity. Tensions would gradually build until the unity that was previously taken for granted would be ineffectual, as the group would have to sort out issues of trust and betrayal, thus turning the network in on itself.

Caveats. Clearly, there would be some stipulations with regard to encouraging nonstate actors to use our financial networks. First, if the organization we are investigating knows that it is being monitored through its financing, the game is up, and we will need to send in police, lawyers and bankers to arrest, collect and seize what they can before the terrorists disappear. Secondly, and more challenging, the network would have to be exposed when it is ready to commit catastrophic operations that would result in the loss of life and or property. The trick would be to determine what money was introduced into terrorists’ accounts in the attempt to destabilize the network, as Joel Garreau suggests, the average citizen might not be so understanding, especially if the terrorists seem to have a preference for using our financial networks, why can’t we use that weakness to our advantage by centralizing them through the predator model outlined here?

The predator model allows terrorists to use our financial systems, like prey at a watering hole. The only difference is that we need to enact a series of random checks and triggers to identify suspicious movement. Once that movement has been identified, it can be turned over to investigative services who will try to trace the organization rather than arrest individuals for prosecution. Since we control the banking rules and methods, we might even be able to insert a question of trust into the network by inserting funds into various accounts or deleting them. That course of action would carry some caveats and some risks. In the end, it would be better to take that new course of action than to continue spending disproportionate sums of money on a method that has been proven to fail.

Risks. The current practice of freezing assets is virtually without real peril. Freezing assets, as well as legal and financial reforms, reward politicians and law-enforcement officials with the illusion of success — it provides headlines, figures and what appear to be results. Yet, as noted earlier, the very organizations that are supposedly the target of the reforms continue to exist and even flourish. The predator model is not without risks. It would be an extraordinary politician who would publically admit that a terrorist group that was being monitored had committed an act of violence on their watch.

The public backlash could unseat all but the most stable or successful politicians. Next, much of what goes on would be done in secret, and accolades would have to be given anonymously as “tips” that brought down the terrorists. Again, very few political establishments are willing to take on that kind of risk without some political recognition for their actions when things go right. Finally, if money was introduced into terrorists’ accounts in the attempt to destabilize the network, as Joel Garreau suggests, the average citizen might not be so understanding, especially if the terrorists were able to carry out a successful operation under the eyes of the very people who put it there. However, it might be prudent to remember the adage, “With great risk comes a great reward,” and realize that the current game, with little to no risk, carries no reward at all.

Conclusion. According to a National Counterterrorism Center 2007 report, terrorism is increasing. In spite of a plethora of legal and financial efforts enacted to control it, states a 2008 Washington Post article, “Al-Qa’ida Masters Terrorism on the Cheap.” This is due, in no small part, to the relatively tiny amounts of money it takes to launch spectacular attacks.

According to the authors of The Starfish and the Spider, our very efforts to attack decentralized networks might be contributing to their proliferation and success. Because current methods are failing, it is only prudent that we change strategies in an attempt to thwart nonstate actors and their intentions. Because terrorists seem to have a preference for using our financial networks, why can’t we use that weakness to our advantage by centralizing them through the predator model outlined here?

The predator model allows terrorists to use our financial systems, like prey at a watering hole. The only difference is that we need to enact a series of random checks and triggers to identify suspicious movement. Once that movement has been identified, it can be turned over to investigative services who will try to trace the organization rather than arrest individuals for prosecution. Since we control the banking rules and methods, we might even be able to insert a question of trust into the network by inserting funds into various accounts or deleting them. That course of action would carry some caveats and some risks. In the end, it would be better to take that new course of action than to continue spending disproportionate sums of money on a method that has been proven to fail.
With a point of a finger the air and missile defense crew member team-in-training spotted simulated aircraft in the digital terrain of the Joint Fires Multipurpose Dome. The rumble of the plane was heard and felt on July 15, as Soldiers from Avenger class number 10-10 stepped onto the platform with a Stinger missile in hand.

In Building 2765, the new training equipment sits like a giant bubble of simulation. The $3.5 million dome was designed after the original simulator in Fort Bliss, Texas, but includes major upgrades like 84 projectors, seven computer units, three catwalks for maintenance, four subwoofers and a partridge in a pear tree. OK, not the last part, but the list is impressive and that fact is not lost on the Soldiers.

"When they walk in here they have a 'wow' reaction. This age of Soldiers is used to computers so when they see this game room type of simulator they're excited. Once they pick up the Stinger weapon and see that they have to know their job to successfully engage aircraft reality sets in. So it's a great tool," said Alvin Kennedy, electronic technician.

Jim Dawson, the director of Training Instruction, said it's the newest and largest target engagement trainer for gunners giving each Soldier 16 hours of training on the Man Portable Air Defense System. Fort Sill was lucky enough to house it as the Air Defense Artillery transitioned onto post.

Two bunkers sit in the middle of the firing platform enabling up to four Soldiers to train simultaneously. With a few clicks of the mouse, the technician chooses a scenario from the operator station and the Soldiers stand ready and waiting. Rotating a full 360 degrees, they searched the projected skies for the 100 possible simulated aircraft. Anything from cargo planes, helicopters and jets, friendly or otherwise, zoomed across the screens. Some aircraft appearing only as far away silhouettes, the Soldiers were expected to correctly perform the steps in their training: detect the target, identify friend or foe, activate, tone, uncage the seeker, super elevate and fire.

With the proper technique and a squeeze of the trigger the Stinger missile shoots a virtual round onto the screen leaving a trail of smoke and hitting the aircraft.

"It doesn't beat the real thing of actually going out and firing a live Stinger missile but this training device is the next best thing," commented Dawson.

While the teams trained, eight Soldiers sat patiently waiting their turn. They watched on a television screen nearby which showed the gunner's view helping them learn from their peers victories and mistakes.

"I think it's a great piece of equipment and it's nice to actually use it for training," said PFC Beau Pendleton.

From desert terrain to the Arctic mountains, different sceneries and weather conditions keep the Soldiers on their toes. The technicians said they frequently change not only the scenario, but the visibility level to test Soldiers' skills and to make the training as realistic as possible.

"Wherever Soldiers have a mission going on we can take a photo and incorporate it as the background. It gives the Soldiers a better sense of the environment," said Kennedy.

He said if the Soldiers have a current mission in Afghanistan for example, the mountainous terrain helps them hit the ground running or rather standing and looking to the sky for possible enemy targets. The JFMD has been used to train the last three classes of Avenger Soldiers despite some minor glitches in the software which Dawson expected to have fixed by August.

In the future, Kennedy also explained the dome will be used to train different jobs on the force.

Editor's note: This article was originally published in the Fort Sill "Cannoneer."
CLOCKWISE: A large virtual aircraft plummets down the screen after a hit from Soldiers using a simulated Man Portable Air Defense System inside the Joint Fires Multipurpose Dome, July 15. Soldiers point toward simulated aircraft as they aim to shoot and hit enemy targets inside the Joint Fires Multipurpose Dome, July 15. Soldiers pair up to train inside the Joint Fires Multipurpose Dome July 15 using the Stinger weapon as they learn their future positions as air and missile defense crew members. (Photos by Marie Berberea, Fort Sill Cannoneer)
Leader development:
Preparing Soldiers for now and the future fight

By Jason Kelly
Art Director

Dale A. Ormond, deputy to the commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., echoed GEN Casey’s words during Ormond’s brief on leader development at this year’s Fires Seminar at the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Okla., May 18. Leader development is a priority at the Combined Arms Center, according to Ormond. “It is leadership that closes the gap and provides us the edge,” said Ormond in regards to an uncertain future operational environment.

That prediction of an uncertain future is emphasized in the Army Capstone Concept – Operational Adaptability: Operating under conditions of uncertainty and complexity in an era of persistent conflict 2016–2028, which calls for leaders with a flexible mindset “at all levels who are comfortable with collaborative planning and decentralized execution, have a tolerance for ambiguity, and possess the ability and willingness to make rapid adjustments according to the situation.” The Army Capstone Concept is part of the framework for the Army Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army, which was mostly drafted at the Combined Arms Center’s Center for Army Leadership. The strategy spells out imperatives in Army leaders as they advance through their careers and provides guidance for developing those leaders through education, training and experience. Those imperatives include: Encourage an equal commitment by the institution, by leaders and by individual members of the profession to life-long learning and development; balance our commitment to the training, education and experience pillars of development; prepare leaders for hybrid threats and full-spectrum operations through outcomes-based training and education; achieve balance and predictability in personnel policies and professional military education in support of Army Force Generation; manage the Army’s military and civilian talent to benefit both the institution and the individual; prepare our leaders by replicating the complexity of the operational environment in the classroom and at home station; produce leaders who are mentors and who are committed to developing their subordinates; and prepare select leaders for responsibility at the national level.

Sea stories. Ormond, a 1985 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., and a former Navy submarine officer, used sea stories as metaphors as he discussed leader development. To start, he referred to the rapid expansion of America’s submarine force in the 1970s and 1980s during the Cold War. “We were building submarines in this country as fast as we could get them out of shipyards,” said Ormond.

However, while the military was able to rapidly build those ships, it lacked the same ability to produce qualified leaders to man them, he added. Ormond pointed to the loss of the USS Thresher during deep-diving tests off the coast of Boston, Mass., in April 1963. The accident claimed all lives on board: 16 officers, 96 enlisted men and 17 civilian technicians. An investigation determined the ship sunk due to engineering errors, which allowed water to flood the engine room. The flooding, according to Navy records, likely caused electrical failures, which probably shut down the ship’s nuclear reactor and caused the ship’s subsequent loss.

The accident prompted Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the “father of the nuclear fleet,” to keep all nuclear power officers in the
nuclear power community. “So, as a result, you end up with a very technically competent force whose leadership skills were often somewhat suspect, whose broadening experiences were nil, and whose ability to operate at the Pentagon, Capitol Hill or in any sort of environment were fairly negligible,” Ormond explained.

He warned the Army could be headed in the same direction if leaders continue to believe it is necessary to stay in the fight and avoid broadening experiences to get ahead. The Combined Arms Center is working to counter that mentality. It is incorporating interagency personnel into the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth to give its students insight into the culture at various agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, State Department and Treasury Department.

Interagency support also is the focus of a new facility at Fort Leavenworth. Entrepreneur, philanthropist and former presidential candidate Ross Perot donated $3.2 million dollars to fund the Colonel Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation, which celebrated its grand opening April 21. According to the Command and General Staff College Foundation’s website, part of the center’s mission is “to foster and develop an interagency body of knowledge to enhance education at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College while facilitating broader and more effective cooperation within the United States Government at the operational and tactical levels through study, research, analysis, publication and outreach.” The center concentrates on four function areas: research, publications, public affairs and engagements.

Engagements also are happening at combat training centers. Provincial reconstruction teams have been incorporated into the training to expose leaders to the teams. The end state is allowing leaders to develop relationships with the teams and learn how they work before they head downrange.

On the international front, engagements are occurring through the Combined Arms Center’s international program, which, as of Ormond’s brief at the Fires Seminar, was up to 127 students from 81 different countries. “The benefits of that program are frankly immeasurable. It is probably the greatest international outreach program in the United States Government,” Ormond said.


decentralization. Ormond concluded his brief with decentralization and the risk involved. “We, as an Army, cannot afford to become risk adverse. If we become risk adverse, we will definitely lose the edge.”

So, how do military leaders balance the challenges of a complex and uncertain future operating environment with the risks of confronting those challenges? According to Ormond, that balancing act needs to be part of a discussion about trust and risk between junior and senior leaders. Like previous topics, Ormond reflected upon his own experience in the submarine community, which he called “the best example of decentralized operations” for its heavy dependence on mission command. Communication amongst senior leaders facilitated those operations in mission command, said Ormond. He added, leaders need to be trained to acknowledge when they have reached the point where they can no longer make the necessary decision and they need to have the confidence to approach senior leaders for help, guidance and counseling.

For additional coverage of the 2010 Fires Seminar, visit http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/2010seminar.html for articles and links to Defense Connect Online videos of the seminar’s sessions.
For most Soldiers transformation is not completely unexpected or unwelcomed but can be challenging. The evolution the Air Defense Artillery in specific is continuing and many of those challenges are being met.

One example of this challenging overhaul is the changes associated with military occupational specialty 14J or Air Defense Tactical Operations Center Operator. As the name suggests this is a field requiring an abundance of technical know-how and managing its career path comes with a wealth of challenges.

Achieving the ongoing mission. The Army must ensure its Soldiers are trained properly to accomplish today’s missions, but hopefully without overstressing or inundating them with too many tasks. Lessons learned have shown that too many tasks equate to additional risk.

By reviewing ADA documentation and making changes where needed, the staff and faculty of the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School are taking the first steps by identifying the current posture of their MOSs, 14Js in particular, and evaluating how they align with future systems in order to achieve balance.

To do that more effectively, it was found that 14Js must be aligned to handle not only today’s systems more effectively, but also future capabilities and growth. Realigning the task loads by MOS today will help the leaders of tomorrow designate the right MOS for the right job.

The challenge. The overall concern for the 14J program is the individual Soldier is over tasked. Today, 14J Soldiers are assigned to many different and unrelated types of systems, making it challenging for Soldiers to become proficient in all aspects of their extensive MOS.

‘Use them or lose them,’ is a phrase tethered to the skills of the 14J. As the career field stands now, 14J Soldiers are responsible for more than seven different equipment systems, in many different unit assignment settings. In 2007, the Career Management Field Personnel Quarterly Report provided by the Human Resources Command, reflected an above average attrition rate for the MOS 14J Soldiers. Senior leaders also reported Soldiers often arrived at their unit without the required training for that particular unit’s mission. An additional training and effectiveness analysis determined the number of critical tasks for MOS 14J was too...
high for Soldiers to execute competently without overtaxing them.

Growing pain. It was found the 14J MOS had grown well beyond its intended scope, and the load Soldiers are faced with had created a knowledge burden they could not carry with precision. An ADA school review team determined that the MOS 14J Soldier’s task load directly contributed to their low morale and high attrition.

Currently, MOS 14J Soldiers are required to be proficient in 191 career-critical tasks; that number does not include those tasks associated with the Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar System; Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System; or Forward-Based X-Band Transportable Radar System. It was found this overload of operator information is ‘stretching the limit’ of each Soldier’s proficiency.

Big changes. However, ADA school house personnel have been working a fix to these challenges and there are big changes in the works. The answer is to split MOS 14J into two distinctly separate MOS career fields: MOS 14G, air defense battle management system operator, and the 14H, air defense enhanced early warning operator.

“The split will add focus to each career field,” said MSG Kevin M. Seeley, the chief of the ADA Personnel Development Division, and the CMF 14 series senior career manager. “This will give Soldiers the opportunity to build on their skills, and not try to play catch up when they reach a unit that has a system that they haven’t used or seen since AIT.”

Although it will take time to create a complete split of the 14J MOS, the scheduled conversion date is set for October 1, 2011. The transformation will generate two very distinct career paths, complete with promotion pyramids more in line with Army regulations, bringing the idea that Soldiers will arrive at their new assignments with promotion pyramids more in line with Army regulations, bringing the idea that Soldiers will arrive at their new assignments with

Air defense battle management system operator (14G). Of the two new MOSs, the 14G will have the largest population and will be assigned the active and reserve components. They will be assigned at levels from the Army Service Component Command all the way down to brigade combat teams. Within those assignments they will be responsible for ADAM cell operations and will be key to the combatant commander’s situational awareness. Soldiers assigned with the 14G MOS will also be assigned to air defense formations ranging from the Army air and missile defense commands, Air Defense Artillery brigades, maneuver battalions and all Sentinel sections. The equipment in these organizations will be reduced to the Air Defense System Integrators workstation, the Tactical Airspace Integration System, Forward Area Air Defense-Engagement Operations workstation, the Air and Missile Defense Work Station, communications and the Sentinel Radar.

Air defense enhanced early warning operator (14H). The 14H Soldiers will be in the Active Component only and be assigned to PATRIOT battalions and batteries, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense batteries, and the Space and Missile Defense Command. Soldiers assigned to the Space and Missile Defense Command can expect assignments with Joint Tactical Ground Station, Ground-based Midcourse Defense, and the Forward Based X Band Radar. The equipment in the air defense formations will be narrowed down to the PATRIOT Battery Command Post, PATRIOT Tactical Control Station, Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence -Engagement Operations Workstation, and the Air Defense Warning System. Soldiers who receive such assignments will have to undergo further training in Colorado Springs, Colo., where they prepare for their assignment and awarded an additional skill identifier.

“This allows our senior enlisted leaders to build their skills, as well as coach, teach and mentor their subordinate Soldiers,” said Hess. “There will not be as much catch-up work and NCOs can grow into better leaders.”

Concerns about the restructuring of 14J. Many questions have been asked by Soldiers who are affected by the 14J transformation; for example, will there be additional training? How will it be decided and which MOS will I fall under?

There is a current phrase being repeated for these concerns ‘split where you sit.’ Using staffing needs and current skill sets, Soldiers will be assigned to their new MOS by the position they currently hold at the time of the transformation. For example, if a staff sergeant has been working with a FAAD-EO workstation in a PATRIOT battery and has not been reassigned, that Soldier will be awarded 14H. The current number of Soldiers being assigned to each of the new MOSs is still under review; however, the goal is to have 65 percent assigned to 14G and 35 percent to 14H.

Although the training for the 14J program will continue for the next year, the last class to encompass the full 14J training will graduate in September 2011. The first 14G class will begin June 13, 2011, and the first 14H class will begin July 18, 2011. Both these courses will graduate the first week of fiscal year 2012.

Those Soldiers who hold MOS 14J and possess an additional skill identifier of Q3 will not require any additional training. New Soldiers assigned to MOS 14G will attend a 16-week and three-day AIT course. This will allow them to learn and master the equipment they will be responsible for operating when assigned to a unit. Soldiers assigned to 14H will attend an 11-week and three-day AIT course.

In an attempt to keep Soldiers in the loop and to relieve their anxieties about the 14J split, some Soldiers are being offered the opportunity to PCS to their desired position; thereby, having some control over which MOS they are transitioned into. However, these movements will be dictated by staffing needs, deployment schedules and available positions. Over the next year career advisors and human resource specialists will be working hard not only to meet the needs of the Army, but also of the Soldiers affected.

When the process is complete, units will be able to receive Soldiers who have both initial training and mission-oriented skills. The intent of producing a more highly-trained and competitive Soldier will have been achieved.
“THE CHARACTER OF OUR SENIOR LEADERS WITHSTANDS PUBLIC SCRUTINY AND THE ENORMOUS PRESSURES BROUGHT TO BEAR BY THE SCOPE OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND THE IMPACT OF THEIR DECISIONS.”

A LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR A 21ST CENTURY ARMY

No doubt you’ve heard the expression, “Soldiers are the centerpiece of our Army.” It is an oft-stated assertion by our senior leaders in recognition of your importance to this nation in the global war on terrorism.

You also are aware that the media and the general public see you as the best spokesperson for the best-trained, best-equipped and most powerful military in the world.

Without the support of a well-informed American public, our military couldn’t accomplish its mission. We must all make every effort to inform the public — commanders and career field experts alike.

That’s where you come in. You tell the Army story best.

Your success during an interview is tied to the quality of your preparation and the level of control you exercise. Although you will probably be asked about your job, don’t think an interview is a casual conversation you can just ‘wing.’

For the unprepared, being questioned by the media can be stressful and embarrassing. But if you’re prepared, the interview will be an opportunity to make a presentation reflecting professionalism, knowledge and enthusiasm.

Prepare to succeed. Preparation is the key to any interview, especially one in front of a camera. You’ll have just seconds to professionally state your position while the cameras are rolling.

It isn’t the time to formulate quick answers to serious questions. Public affairs can help you anticipate questions and develop messages.

Before the interview, work with your PAO to know everything possible about the interview, what you want to say and how to say it.

Know about the interview. Get the answer to the who, what, when, where, why and how from public affairs. Who will interview you? What is their background? Do they often interrupt? Do they have prior military service? Do they know much about the military? Who is the audience? Who are the other guests? Who is your point of contact?

What is the subject of the interview? What type of program are you appearing on? What is expected of you? What should you do specifically?

When is the interview? When will it air? When should you arrive?

Where will the interview take place? Where will you sit? Where should you look? Where will the interview air?

Why do they want you? Why are they interested in the subject?

How will the interview be conducted? How will it end? How should you dress?

Know what you want to say. You may know the subject well, the topic...
may even be your job, but don’t assume every question you’re asked will be easy to answer.

The public wants answers to the hard questions, so it’s the reporter’s job to ask them. With public affairs assistance, anticipate the hard questions and plan your answers.

Make a list of all the questions you could possibly be asked. Then attempt to answer the questions using messages—short sound-bites of key information you feel the public needs to know.

You need to practice. Have your public affairs office set up a mock interview or press conference. At least have someone play the role of interviewer so you can rehearse your delivery.

Know how to say it. Never give simple yes or no answers. If you do, you’re missing your opportunity to deliver a positive message about the Army.

Be personable. Answer questions and deliver messages with interest, passion and conviction.

If you don’t sound interested, the audience won’t be, either.

Get your message across. Once again, before doing any interview, you should know what you want to say. In addition to being knowledgeable about Army issues and messages, you should also be prepared with a few messages of your own. Public affairs can help you with both.

Messages are your “commercials” for use throughout an interview. They can be about the interview subject or other issues.

Know the definitions. Here are the definitions of terms you’ll hear often when working with the media:

On the record. The reporter can use everything you say and attribute it to you by name and title.

Off the record. The reporter can’t use anything you say. Go ‘off the record’ only if the information is vital to the reporter’s full understanding of an issue.

Understand that nothing is off the record unless both parties agree to it before the thing is said. If you are giving an interview and need to tell the reporter something off the record, stop and ask his permission to go off the record. If he agrees, proceed.

There also has to be agreement as to when you are back on the record. If you encounter a problem during the interview, let the PAO stop it and ask both parties if they want to go off the record.

Background. The reporter will use the information but won’t directly attribute it to you. ‘An Army spokesperson’ might be used—you and the reporter agree what is the best term.

It’s best to always consider yourself ‘on the record.’ Don’t say anything you wouldn’t want to see on the evening news. Make certain the reporter understands the information is ‘background’ or ‘off the record’ before you give him the information.

In the presence of a reporter, it’s best to never say anything you don’t want on the air or in print. Use common sense.

Ground rules. An interview with the news media can be polite and conversational if you follow a few basic rules of engagement. Set the ground rules.

First, agree on the ground rules before the interview. Your public affairs adviser should talk to the reporter about the agenda and explain your area of expertise and interview parameters. If you can’t talk about an issue because it is classified (truly classified, not just embarrassing), tell the reporter.

You may still be asked about the issue on the air, but at least now the reporter is prepared not to do an entire show on something you cannot discuss.

If you’re asked a question on the air that you earlier told the reporter you couldn’t talk about, don’t get upset. Don’t say “You said you wouldn’t ask me about that.” You will sound like you’re hiding something. Instead, answer by saying “I’m not prepared to talk about details of the subject, because they’re classified (or whatever), but I can discuss...”

Speak their language. Avoid Army acronyms, jargon and technical terms. Use analogies to explain technical information in a way we can all understand. Your messages should be clear and understandable to every member of your audience.

Honesty is the best policy. Always answer honestly. If you don’t know the answer to a question, if the answer is classified, or would invade someone’s privacy, say so. Then, bridge to your message. Never say ‘no comment.’ To the public, ‘no comment’ means you are hiding something.

Editor’s Note: Information adapted from U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Pocket Guide to Meeting the Media.
The contemporary media environment continues to change at an ever-accelerating pace, faster than most could have imagined just 10 years ago. This acceleration has significant implications for today’s media outlets and the military. New media is a case in point. It has been described as a “combustible mix of 24/7 cable news, call-in radio and television programs, Internet bloggers and online websites, cell phones and iPods,” according to Marvin Kalb and Carol Saivetz, in “The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict,” New media’s meteoric rise and increasing pervasiveness dictate fresh terms for the culture of media engagement.
With easy access, enormous reach, and breadth, this upstart has flexed sufficient muscle during recent conflicts to alter or transform our traditional view of information and its impact on populations and military operations. Simple to use, new media leapfrogs ordinary rules and conventions. At the same time, its very user-friendliness encourages unconventional adversaries to manipulate a growing number of related technologies to generate favorable publicity and recruit supporters. For these reasons and more, civilian and military leaders can ill-afford to ignore it. Perhaps more importantly, they must not fail to understand and use the new form of information dissemination, as it possesses serious implications for military operations.

Focusing on the current litany of new media capabilities can inhibit understanding because present developments may fail to account for anticipated technological advances. A more enduring description of new media would recognize its embrace of any emergent technological capability. Such emergent capabilities can empower a broad range of actors—individuals through nation-states—to create and spread timely information that can unify a vast audience via global standardized communications. Impact and urgency assume such a sufficiently high profile that the currently “new” media might better be referred to as the “now” media. At the same time, there is an overarching dynamism that springs from the exponential increases in capability that seem to occur weekly. “Now media” is attributed to Matt Armstrong. Armstrong is a strategist on public diplomacy and strategic communication and developed and runs the blog “mountainrunner.us.” Indeed, a key enabler for new media is “digital multi-modality”: content produced in one form can be easily and rapidly edited and repackaged, then transmitted in real time across many different forms of media.

The potential for engagement is staggering—with the ability of new media to mimic comparable—albeit much slower—developments in the television industry. Thirty years ago, cable television was in its infancy, with three networks ruling the airwaves. Today, cable channels offer multitudes of options, and scores of satellite channels vie for viewers, fragmenting the broadcast audience. Similarly, over the last decade, the rise of the Internet and easy-to-use technology has fueled an explosion of the blogosphere. By August 2008, some 184 million blogs had proliferated worldwide, according to a Technorati report, State of the Blogosphere. Three of the top five most visited sites in the United States were social networking or video sharing sites, including Facebook, MySpace, and YouTube. According to The State of the News Media 2009 report from the Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism, the 50 most popular news sites registered a 27 percent increase in traffic over 2008.

Proliferation and accessibility have played havoc with old rules of the media game in at least two important areas, gate keeping and agenda-setting. Before the widespread advent of the new media, traditional editors and producers served as “gatekeepers,” determining what stories and features to publish in accordance with varied criteria. In effect, key individuals and organizations controlled access to information. (D.M. White, “The Gate Keeper: A case study in the selection of news,” Journalism Quarterly, 27, 383-90.) Their decisions consciously or unconsciously set the agenda for coverage of news stories. Some issues received attention over others, and the media told the public not what to think but what to think about. Selection processes enabled media custodians to frame issues of importance for public consciousness. According to a 1977 pioneering study by Max McCombs and Donald Shaw, “complex social processes determine not only how to report but, even more important, what to report,” in “Structuring the Unseen Environment,” Journal of Communication. The conclusion was that
As the new media story continues to unfold, combat experience produces a stream of implications for theory and practice in pursuing doctrinal development. Two case studies recount the role of new media in recent conflicts waged by Israel. There are marked differences in the way the Israeli Defense Forces handled the media in the Hezbollah conflict during the summer of 2006 and in the Gaza incursion at the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009. The two instances suggest “best practices” that the U.S. military could adopt when dealing with new media and its role on the battlefield. A discussion of each follows.

The Second Lebanon War: Information as a warfighting function? On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers just inside Israel across the Lebanese border. After a botched rescue attempt in which eight Israeli Defense Force soldiers were killed, Israel launched a massive air campaign, targeting both Hezbollah and much of Lebanon. There ensued an Israeli ground invasion of southern Lebanon and a kinetic fight that the Israelis subsequently dubbed the “Second Lebanon War” according to “Hizballah at War, A Military Assessment,” by Andrew Exum. Although various militaries have sifted the resulting combat experience for lessons learned, little attention has been devoted to Hezbollah’s exploitation of information as a kind of “warfighting function,” with new media as the weapon of choice. Among the many reports available, Anthony Cordesman’s 2006 “Preliminary “Lessons” of the Israeli-Hezbollah War,” Alastair Crooke’s and Mark Perry’s October 2006 three-part series “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel” in the Asia Times and Matt Matthews interview with Brigadier General (retired).

Hezbollah has characteristics that, in the view of some observers, make the organization a paradigm for future U.S. adversaries in a Quadrennial Defense Review Report by the U.S. Department of Defense. Hezbollah is neither a regular armed force nor a guerilla force in the traditional sense. It is a hybrid—something in between. As a political entity with a military wing, Hezbollah plays an important role in providing services to broad segments of the Lebanese population found in the “Hezbollah as a Case Study for the Battle of Hearts and Minds,” by Reuven Erlich and Y ouram Kahati, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

During the summer of 2006, the military wing demonstrated an impressive warfighting capability with an important information dimension: its fighters expertly leveraged new media capabilities while defending against their employment by the Israelis and while maintaining excellent operations security.

The conflict itself revealed many of the characteristics to which Webster and Tumbler had earlier referred. In a Harvard study on the media aspects of the 2006 war, the veteran journalist Marvin Kalb noted:

To do their jobs, journalists employed both the camera and the computer, and, with the help of portable satellite dishes and video phones “streamed” or broadcast their reports . . . as they covered the movement of troops and the rocketing of villages—often, (unintentionally, one assumes) revealing sensitive information to the enemy. Once upon a time, such information was the stuff of military intelligence acquired with considerable effort and risk; now it has become the stuff of everyday journalism. The camera and the computer have become weapons of war.

Kalb’s observations emphasized a new transparency for war and military operations inherent in the ubiquity and power of new media. New technology and techniques—including digital photography, videos, cellular networks, and the Internet—were used by all parties: the press, Israeli and Lebanese civilians, the Israeli Defense Forces, and Hezbollah. The ease and speed of data transmission, coupled with the manipulation of images, affected the way participants and spectators viewed the war. Israeli soldiers sent cell phone text messages home, both sides actively used videos of the fighting, and civilians posted still and video imagery on blogs and websites, most notably YouTube. The author, along with Dr. Ral fal Rohozinski developed, planned and executed a workshop on the topic of “new media and the warfighter” at the U.S. Army War College. The workshop used the Second Lebanon War as a case study and the comments here reflect both the case study research and attendee input.

Still, Hezbollah emerged as the master of the new media message. Playing David to Israel’s Goliath, Hezbollah manipulated and controlled information within the operational environment to its advantage, using (at times staged and altered) photographs and videos to garner regional and worldwide support as shown in Sarah E. Kreps’ “The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned.” Additionally, Hezbollah maintained absolute control over where journalists went and what they saw, thus framing the story on Hezbollah’s terms and affecting agendas for the international media. The widely reported use of Katushya rockets against Israel became both a tactical kinetic weapon and a strategic psychological one. But less is written about the fact that Hezbollah employed near-real-time Internet press accounts as open-source intelligence to determine where the rockets landed. Post-conflict reporting indicates that non-affiliated organizations used Google Earth to plot the location of the rocket attacks.

While there is no firm evidence that Hezbollah used this capability to attain greater accuracy of fire, the fact remains that this new media capability could have been used to increase accuracy and multiply the strategic information effect, according to a case study on Leveraging New Media, for the “New Media and the Warfighter” workshop by Rafal Rohozinski.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah used its own satellite television station, Al Manar, to extend its information reach to some 200 million viewers within the region.

As a direct link between Hezbollah’s military activities and these viewers, Al Manar timed coverage of spectacular tactical actions for maximum strategic effect, according to Andrew Exum’s “Illegal Attack or Legitimate Target? Al Manar, International Law, and the Israeli War in Lebanon.” For example, within minutes of the Israeli naval destroyer Hanit being hit by missiles, Hezbollah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, called in “live” to Al Manar to announce the strike, and Al Manar obligingly provided footage of the missile launch for distribution by other regional media and subsequently by YouTube. It took
Israel 24 hours to respond with its own account of the incident. The use of information as a strategic weapon did not end with the kinetic fight. Hezbollah continued to use self-justifying and self-congratulatory information to affect perceptions of blame, responsibility, and victory. Hezbollah leaders even went so far as to place billboards on the rubble of buildings in southern Lebanon that said “Made in the USA” (in English) immediately following the cease fire, taken from Kevin Peraino’s, “Winning Hearts and Minds.”

Interestingly and importantly, Nasrallah did not appear to expect the full onslaught that characterized the Israeli response to the Second Lebanon War’s triggering events as shown in Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry’s, “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel, Part 1.”

Nevertheless, the way Hezbollah extensively enlisted information as a weapon of choice implies that this penchant is second-nature. That is, the emphasis on information is embedded in planning at all levels and inculcated in the culture of the military arm of Hezbollah. In strategic perspective, Hezbollah used information to reduce Israel’s strategic options (and therefore its depth) in terms of time. An important focus was on proportionality, with Hezbollah exploiting the new media for information effects. Thus, Hezbollah portrayed Israeli Defense Forces military operations as a disproportionate use of force against the Lebanese civilian population, especially in light of the initial kidnapping incident that had spurred Israel to action. Not surprisingly, only 33 days after the onset of hostilities, a ceasefire was declared. And, again not surprisingly, after a David-and-Goliath struggle in which winning meant not losing, Hezbollah unilaterally declared victory according to “Nasrallah Declares Victory for Hezbollah,” by Lauren Thayer.

All this is not to say that Israel neglected various forms of information, including the new media, to support its war aims, but Tel Aviv’s focus was on the traditional use of information in support of psychological operations against the enemy. Leaflets were dropped, Al Manar broadcasts were jammed, and cell phone text messages were pushed to Hezbollah combatants and Lebanese noncombatants. These activities amounted to traditional attempts at turning the public against the adversary and instilling fear in the adversary himself. However, attempts at all levels to garner popular support from broader audiences through trust and sympathy were lacking.

In contrast, Hezbollah information efforts focused directly on gaining trust and sympathy for its cause at all levels. Israel provided no countervailing view, allowing Hezbollah to drive perceptions that could become universally accepted as truth. Consequently, as Dr. Pierre Pahlavi of the Canadian Forces College notes, “the Jewish state forfeited the psychological upper hand on all fronts: domestic, regional, and international.” Thus, Hezbollah was able to create a “perception of failure” for the Israelis, with consequences more important than the actual kinetic outcome, according to Pierre Pahlavi’s “The 33-Day War: An Example of Psychological Warfare in the Information Age.”

The Hezbollah experience presents lessons for potential adversaries of the United States. At the same time, the United States and its military must consider whether the strategy and tactics of Hezbollah might represent those of the next adversary and prepare accordingly. Meanwhile, Israel, only two and a half years after the events in Lebanon, appears to have taken the experience to heart in conducting recent operations against Hamas in Gaza.

**Operation Cast Lead.** During lunchtime on 27 December 2008, Israel unleashed a furious air attack that in mere minutes struck 50 targets in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. The daylight raid took Gazans by surprise and marked the beginning of a 24-day offensive designed to stop Gaza-based missiles from raining down on southern Israel. A fragile ceasefire between Hamas and Israel had ended just eight days earlier. Israel, determined to avoid mistakes from the “Second Lebanon War,” embarked on a massive public relations campaign that employed new media extensively. In fact, one newspaper featured the headline: “On the front line of Gaza’s war 2.0,” by Mary Fitzgerald. A war in cyberspace unfolded simultaneously with ground and air operations, and both sides employed various web 2.0 applications—including blogs, YouTube, and Facebook—to tell their differing versions of events.

To learn from the Second Lebanon War, the Israelis created a special study group, the “Winograd Commission.” The recommendation that followed was to organize an information and propaganda unit to coordinate public relations across a wide spectrum of activities, including traditional media, new media, and diplomacy, as reported in Rachel Shabi’s, “Winning the media war.” The function of the resulting body, the National Information Directorate, was to deal with hasbara, or “explanation.” One news source held that, “The hasbara directive also liaises over core messages with bodies such as friendship leagues, Jewish communities, bloggers and backers using online networks,” shown in an article in the Guardian. By Shabi, “Special spin body gets Israel on message, says Israel.” According to a press release from the Israeli Prime Minister’s office,

The information directorate will not replace the activity of any Government information body. Its role will be to direct and coordinate in the information sphere so that the relevant bodies present a unified, clear, and consistent message and so that the various government spokespersons speak with a single voice. The directorate will initiate information campaigns and programs, host events, etc.

With the National Information Directorate providing unity of message from the Prime Minister’s office, the Israeli version of a strategic communication machine was ready to engage multiple media channels to win the war of ideas.

Two days after the airstrikes commenced, the Israeli Defense Forces launched its own YouTube channel, the “IDF Spokesperson’s Unit.” Within days, the channel became a sensation around the world. During early January 2009, the channel became the second most subscribed channel and ninth most watched worldwide, garnering more than two million channel views. The 46 videos posted to the
"As in 2006, Israel knew it was fighting a war not just against Hamas, but against time... Therefore, Israel used all the informational tools it possessed to buy time."

channel have attracted more than 6.5 million views. These numbers are based on research conducted in early February and may have since changed. The videos depicted precision airstrikes on Hamas rocket-launching facilities, humanitarian assistance, video logs (“vlogs”) by IDF spokespeople, and Israeli tanks moving into position to attack. Hamas, not to be outdone, joined in the cyber-fracas with its own YouTube channels.

What was Israel’s strategy for the use of new media during the Gaza incursion? The answer to this question lies partly in a study of contrasts. During the 2006 Lebanon War, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said: “My government is determined to continue doing whatever is necessary in order to achieve our goals. Nothing will deter us, whatever far-reaching ramifications regarding our relations on the northern border and in the region there may be.”

He had also spoken about “destroying” Hezbollah.

In contrast, during the Gaza incursion, the Israeli leadership was far less definitive in its aims. It refused to place a timeline on operations and made noş statements about completely neutralizing Hamas. Emanuel Sakal, former head of Israeli Defense ground forces, said, “Nobody declared that there will never be any rockets anymore, and nobody said that in five, six, or seven days we will destroy Hamas. They have learned a lot from Lebanon in 2006,” as described in an article by Nathan Jeffay, “Learning from Lebanon, Israel Sets Up Press Operation.” As in 2006, Israel knew it was fighting a war not just against Hamas, but against time. In virtually every conflict since 1948, the United Nations has passed resolutions to stop various Arab-Israeli conflicts. This military action was no exception. On January 8, 2009, UN Security Council Resolution 1860 called for an immediate cease fire in Gaza. In addition, Israel had less than a month to complete operations in order to confront a new U.S. presidential administration with a fait accompli. Therefore, Israel used all the informational tools it possessed to buy time. The longer the incursion might be framed in a positive or neutral light, the longer the IDF could continue its actions without undue concern for world opinion. In contrast with 2006, the Israelis would use the media to provide the strategic depth their country lacks. In fact, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni admitted much in an e-mail: “Intensive diplomatic activity in recent days is aimed at deflecting the pressure for a cease-fire to allow enough time for the operation to achieve its goals,” according to Gwen Ackerman and Saud Abu, Ramadan, in the “Israel Seeks Heavier Blow to Hamas Armed Wing in Gaza.”

Many of the YouTube channels supporting Hamas are no longer viewable. They appear to have fallen casualty to an information war in which both Palestinians and Israelis mobilized fellow countrymen to engage in a cyber battle for control of the social media sphere. Because new media abrogates the traditional gatekeeper’s role, those who generate content in new media are their own gatekeepers. As information is added to new media, the process itself snowballs to become an agenda-setter. Both the Israelis and Palestinians understood this dynamic; therefore, both parties sought to control new media through coordinated efforts at creating supportive online communities that might act as force multipliers in cyberspace. The Christian Science Monitor reports—

The online war over Gaza was relentless. Hackers on both sides worked to deface websites with one attack successfully redirecting traffic from several high-profile Israeli websites to a page featuring anti-Israel messages. Facebook groups supporting the opposing sides were quickly created and soon had hundreds of thousands of members, according to Yigal Schliefer’s, “Blogs, YouTube: the new battleground of Gaza conflict,” Christian Science Monitor.

The Jewish Internet Defense Force rallied to the cause. On its web site, the defense force has guides to Facebook, YouTube, Wikipedia, Blogger, and WordPress. This organization boasts that it has helped shut down dozens of extremist YouTube sites, taken from the Jewish Internet Defense Force. The Palestinians have retaliated by posting pro-Palestinian and pro-Hamas videos on Paltube.com, a site that is generally supportive of Hamas and its military wing, Al-Qassam. The Jerusalem Post even ran an article by David Shamah, “Digital World: How to beat anti-Israel hackers at their own game,” that described the exact steps necessary to safeguard web sites from hacker attacks.

In the midst of the electronic war for public opinion, traditional media were denied access to the battlefield. The Israeli Defense Forces began limiting access to the potential battlefield several months before combat operations actually commenced in an effort to control the flow of information, according to Mary Fitzgerald’s, “On the front line of Gaza’s war 2.0.”

The Israelis also sought to limit the images of civilian casualties that had so eroded support during the Gaza dominated by a context-free stream of images of the wounded, disseminated by people with unknown agendas. Claims from Palestinian officials of more than 900 people killed and a humanitarian crisis underway have been left to stand unverified, as have Israeli reports that Hamas militants are deliberately drawing fire to hospitals and schools shown in Jonathan Finer’s, “Israel’s losing media strategy.”

Even as Israel generated its own content on YouTube and Twitter, and even as Israel catered to influential bloggers, Gazans sent out tweets, updated blogs, and used cell phones to transmit...
photos of carnage to the outside world. Al Jazeera reporters, who were stationed in Gaza prior to the restrictions levied on entering journalists, provided riveting accounts of the war to the Arab world.

Despite reports that the National Information Directorate began planning the information element of Operation Cast Lead nearly six months prior to execution, IDF spokesperson Major Avital Leibovich admitted that the YouTube channel was the “brainchild of a couple of soldiers,” according to Jim Michaels’, “Cellphones Put to ‘Unnerving’ Use in Gaza.” Wired blogger Noah Schachtman likewise reports that “the online piece was no strategy either. I met the kid who ran Israel’s YouTube site…He thought it’d be kinda cool to share some videos online. So up went the site.” Schachtman goes on to assert that Israel’s new media strategy collapsed as soon as mass casualty stories began to emerge from Gaza. However, Israel had bought the time it needed to conclude the operation.

Looking forward as the media-scape continues to fragment. Israel’s experiences as gleaned from these two recent military actions illustrate the complex manner in which traditional and new media interact on the battlefield. In a 2006 Military Review article, Donald Shaw termed traditional media as “vertical” and alternate media (including new media) as “horizontal.” Vertical media does indeed have a top-down agenda-setting power. However, “vertical media’s reach has declined while that of the alternative media-horizontal media that primarily interpret details-has increased,” according to Bradley J. Hamm, Donald L. Shaw, and Thomas C. Terry’s, “Vertical Versus Horizontal Media.” The upshot is that the military is forced to understand the complex interaction between traditional and new media, while appreciating the limits of each.

By limiting the access of international media to the battlefield during Operation Cast Lead, the Israelis ensured no voice would refute Palestinian claims of atrocities and civilian targeting. Conversely, in 2006 the presence of outside media contributed to possible tactical and operational successes by Hezbollah. This observation gains more significance when one considers media reports in combination with the capabilities of Google Earth and other spatial applications.

As the media environment continues to fragment in the future, engaging ever-diversifying platforms and channels will become more difficult for the military. But, as General Creighton Abrams reputedly once said, “If you don’t blow your own horn, someone will turn it into a funnel.” Under conditions of the current new media blitz, his possibly apocryphal words might be paraphrased to say, “If you don’t engage, someone else will fill the void.” Surrendering the information environment to the adversary is not a practical option. Therefore, the military must seriously consider where information and the new media lie in relationship to conventional warfighting functions. One thing seems sure: we must elevate information in doctrinal importance, and adequately fund and staff organizations dealing with information.

The “era of persistent conflict” that characterizes today’s operational environment is likely to endure for the foreseeable future, “with threats and opportunities ranging from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones to sustained engagement in the global commons.” We must prepare thoroughly for the roles that new and traditional media are so certain to play in a less-than-stable future. Only by fostering a culture of engagement where the military proactively tells its own story in an open, transparent manner can we successfully navigate the many challenges of the media environment now and in the future.

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, serves as the commander, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan and Commander, Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan.

Dennis M. Murphy is a professor of information operations and information in warfare at the U.S. Army War College. He served in a variety of command and staff positions during his 27 years of U.S. Army service.

Mr. Anton Menning is the media strategist at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. He holds a B.A. from the University of Kansas and an M.S. from the William Allen White School of Journalism and Mass Communications also at KU.
GROWING STRATEGIC LEADERS: engage new media

Social media best practices

Tactics, techniques, procedures
The Internet has changed the way we communicate. Increasingly, individuals are looking to the web as their primary source of news and information. As an Army, we have an obligation to tell our story in the spaces and places where our community is already engaging. The following pages outline basic best practices guidelines to consider when choosing to implement social media strategies and represent information from various Department of the Army publications.

What is the policy?

On February 26, the Department of Defense released Directive Type Memorandum 09-026. It was the result of a several month social media review conducted by the Department of Defense, and stated that access to social media must be provided across the military’s non-classified network. Restrictions to social media sites can still be put in place, due to bandwidth or security issues, but must be temporary and commensurate with the risk.

Notably, it also stated that official social media presences should be brought to the awareness of public affairs offices, but noted that other organizations and entities may use social media in an official capacity (spouse’s clubs, family readiness groups, etc).

It is important for Soldiers as well as public affairs professionals to remember the two guiding documents that apply to all public communication: Operations Security and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. As regulation is written, Soldiers must maintain professional conduct and good order and discipline in the virtual world in the same ways they would in the real world. Special care should be taken to ensure that public facing profiles, to include Facebook pages and sites, present an appropriate picture of Army life.

AR 530-1 (Operations Security) states that Soldiers who blog and identify their affiliation with the Army must let their commanders know they’re blogging.

What do I need to know before I get started?

Planning/strategy: Have a plan, and think strategically. Think about each platform before you decide to establish a profile and ensure it meets the needs of your organization. Just because the sites are out there doesn’t mean your organization needs to be on all of them.

Manpower: Will you have the resources to manage and maintain the sites? If you can’t commit to updating your social media sites at least once per week, or providing enough new content to keep users coming back, that platform is probably not a good idea for your organization.

Messaging: Social media is all about taking your identity or messaging and turning over control to your community. A Facebook wall and a Flickr comments stream are places for negative comments, as well as positive ones. If you’re not willing to lose control of the message, and give some of the power to your community, social media is not for you.

Once you get started

Engage your community through posts and content that solicits feedback. A blog without a comments section isn’t a blog: it’s a message board. A YouTube channel without any views isn’t an effective outreach platform. Once you begin engaging, evaluate what works and what doesn’t, and don’t hesitate to adjust fire and change course.
Social networks sites such as Facebook, Blogger and Twitter are an ever increasing way to communicate. The military is not exempt from their impact. Soldiers, Army civilians and contractors are using social media to connect with each other during work and during combat deployments. While their reach is great, they do present an increased risk that sensitive information will be released that puts our Soldiers in danger. These risks are not unique to social media, but they do require that users remember certain ‘rules of engagement’ before they decide to become a part of the social media culture.

Personal decision. It is an individual’s personal decision whether he or she wants to participate in social computing; Soldiers maintain their First Amendment rights and do have the right to express themselves in a public forum. However, Soldiers must remember that rules apply on the Internet – just like the physical world. If a Soldier uses a social networking site where he or she is or may be identified or associated with the U.S. Army, they must remember how they appear to represent their organization and the United States of America. UCMJ and other guidelines and regulations still apply.

Rules and regulations. Soldiers must be aware of all pertinent rules and regulations including UCMJ, AR 25-1 (Army Knowledge Management and Information Technology) and AR 530-1 (Operations Security).

Transparency. Anyone making statements on a public forum should identify himself or herself and their affiliation with the U.S. Army if they are commenting on the U.S. Army. Be transparent. If you are not a public affairs officer speaking on behalf of the U.S. Army, you should make it clear that your statements are your own and do not represent an official U.S. Army position (Example: This statement is my own and does not constitute an endorsement or opinion of the U.S. Army or Department of Defense.).

Stay in your lane. It applies in public forums as much as it applies to interviews with the media. If you are not the best person to comment on a subject, you should not do so in an official capacity.

OPSEC. Operations security is critical. Any information that may compromise OPSEC should not be discussed. If in doubt, consult with your immediate supervisor or operations officer.

Think first, then post. Be aware of how you represent yourself in personal social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter. If you are posting information on those sites that would reflect poorly on the U.S. Army, reconsider. Even information posted to personal profiles lives in the public domain. You never know who might see it. It is often said that nothing truly disappears from the Internet.

If you refer to the U.S. Army in your personal social network profile, you are identifying yourself as a part of a large network that includes both your colleagues and your chain of command. The information you post there should be consistent with your role as a Soldier and representative of the U.S. Army.

Security risks. Some security concerns such as OPSEC, propriety, firewall breaches and social engineering are legitimate issues, but we mitigate those risks through education. Most risks are not unique to social media. Some level of risk must be taken if we want to engage the battlespace.
Facebook (www.facebook.com) is a website, which allows individuals to post profiles (photos and information) about themselves and connect and share with friends and family.

Facebook statistics
According to Facebook's website, there are more than 500 million active Facebook users; half of them access the website on a daily basis. The average user has 130 friends. Collectively, people spend over 700 billion minutes per month on Facebook.

371,475 people were following the U.S. Army's Facebook page as of August 11, according to the Army's website. 3,047 users were following the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence’s Facebook page as of the same date.

Signing up for Facebook
When you decide your organization needs a Facebook page, understand the differences between a personal profile, a fan page and a group site.

Personal profile: A personal profile serves as the individual user’s profile and is limited to certain capabilities. Do not use personal profiles for your unit, organization or as a commander operating in a professional capacity. A personal profile should be limited to connecting with family and friends and sharing personal information, and should not be used in an official capacity. All friends must be approved by you before they can see your profile. Individuals should host their own profile page in order to be familiar with the site.

Fan page: Fan pages are for organizations and public figures. They are the preferred account for your organization. They are stand-alone pages where the administrator can post videos, photos and news updates. Fans who like the page can post on the wall, and the administrator cannot view the fan's profile. Use fan pages for your unit, organization or as a commander. Fans can like the site or view it without an administrator's approval.

Groups: These are stand-alone pages that allow people with the same interests to join. They are created by pre-existing users and are generally narrower in scope. Groups are ideal for family readiness groups, students who attended the same schools or clubs. They also allow the administrator to approve all those who join the group, and are more secure than a fan page.

Managing your page
Comments: Be clear about your comment policy. It is alright to screen comments for profanity, abusive language and ‘spam;’ however, visitors are entitled to their own opinion. Don’t delete a comment simply because it is negative.

OPSEC and UCMJ: Exercise the same caution as you would when writing a story or posting anything to your organization’s website. Ensure content posted is appropriate for good order and discipline in your Soldiers’ ranks.

Posting content: Incorporate video, audio, images and print pieces into your content. A good Facebook page has a vibrant wall with frequent status updates, photos and video postings.

Editor's Note: Information adapted from U.S. Army, Online and Social Media Division’s “Social Media Best Practices.”
Blogging best practices: Tactics, techniques, procedures

What is a blog? A blog is a conversational website, which typically offers news or opinion on a certain topic. It often invites interaction through comments. It can be more editorial than informative, and appeals to a targeted population.

Who blogs? The government, military, companies, corporations and individuals all blog for various reasons.

What information should be posted to a blog? Existing information such as internal e-mails or messages which are useful for a larger audience (commander’s messages or safety updates) and press releases are good examples. Often, comments can occasionally generate their own posts. New content can include guest posts from other Army officials and Soldiers. Official commentary on a topic of interest is another example of relevant content.

Guidelines. Any content on your official blog should be just that, official. Remember UCMJ and OPSEC. Whenever possible, host your blog on a.mil domain. When not possible, look for ways to make your content stand-out as an official information source for your installation or unit. All blogs should include a comments policy, which outlines which comments will be removed.

All official blogs should include a comments policy banning profanity, malicious comments and off-topic comments. It also is recommended that all comments be moderated and reviewed by an administrator before posting. Blogs should be written conversationally and should be short. Think op-ed length and e-mail tone.

Blogging within your office. Engage your employees to interact; they are our best spokespeople. Make sure they are aware of the risks and benefits of blogging before they begin. Unofficial blogs written by Soldiers or representatives of your organization should include a disclaimer stating that the blog does not represent the official opinion of the Army. Per AR 530-1, all blogs written by the individuals identifying themselves as employees of the U.S. Army must identify themselves to their commander.

OPSEC still applies to personally written blog sites; the UCMJ applies to military personnel.

What is Twitter? Twitter is a micro-blogging site. Micro-blogging is blogging in 140 characters or less. You can also think of it as ‘hyper’ text-messaging. When you send a message on Twitter, it will go to all of the users who have decided to ‘follow’ you, enabling you to send messages to a large number of users at one time. Many people link Twitter to their cell phones in order to update on the go.

Who uses Twitter? Organizations, offices, commands and commanders all use Twitter.

Before you join Twitter. Join Twitter for yourself. Find people you know and follow organizations. Update your Twitter. The best way to know what works is through personal experience. Have an idea of what you want to do with Twitter. What do you want to accomplish?

What should you tweet about? If tweeting as a commander, keep your tone professional, but be personable. Be interesting and provide real updates. When posting as the organization, avoid using personal pronouns, but do engage in the conversations about your organization and be a value-added member of the comment.

Content. New stories, changes to policy and links to multimedia are highly encouraged. Get creative; photos from the latest FRG meeting or the commander’s safety message can all go on your Twitter.

OPSEC and UCMJ. Exercise the same caution as you would when writing a story or posting anything to your organization’s website. Ensure content posted is appropriate to good order and discipline in your Soldiers’ ranks.

When to tweet? Spread out your tweets through the day. Posting several tweets in rapid succession clogs up your reader’s window. There isn’t a prescribed number of tweets you need to send per day or week. Simply post regularly enough that you retain the interest of your followers, and can keep up with the conversations taken place about your organization.

How to treat followers? You can respond to followers who are asking generic questions, but direct messages are preferred for more specific matters. Follow people who are following you. Twitter is a conversation, and you can learn a lot about your audience by reading their posts. Ask for your followers’ input on an issue or suggestions on how you can make things better for your organization. If someone is abusing your Twitter site, you can block them.

Tweeting about events. When you’re tweeting about an event, it is easier to label those tweets using hashtags, a number sign (#) with your label without spaces. For example, #training.

Promoting your site. The best way to promote your account is to follow key individuals and send value-added information. In addition, cross-promote across your various social networking platforms. For example, advertise your Twitter account on your Facebook page, blog, etc. Some units add a plug for their social media sites at the end of the news stories they place online.

Editor’s Note: Information for blogging and Twitter articles adapted from U.S. Army, Online and Social Media Division’s “Social Media Best Practices.”
The Fires community is online 24/7.

Point. Click. Connect.

Social media websites

Fires Center of Excellence
http://www.facebook.com/FiresCenterOfExcellence
http://twitter.com/FCoE_TeamSill

Commanding general’s blog

Fires Forum

U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School
http://www.facebook.com/AirDefenseArtillerySchool

U.S. Army Field Artillery School
http://www.facebook.com/FieldArtilleryRedLegLive
http://twitter.com/RedLegLive
http://www.flickr.com/photos/RedLegLive

Fires Bulletin
http://www.facebook.com/FiresBulletin
the new interactive edition online @