<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 MAR 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>00-00-2012 to 00-00-2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of the DoD Establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. AUTHOR(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense Inspector General, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA, 22350-1500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15. SUBJECT TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</th>
<th>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
<th>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</th>
<th>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT</td>
<td>Same as Report (SAR)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ABSTRACT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. THIS PAGE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our mission is to provide assessment oversight that facilitates informed, timely decision-making by senior leaders of the DoD and the U.S. Congress, addressing priority national security objectives.

Special Plans & Operations
Deputy Inspector General for Special Plans & Operations
Department of Defense Inspector General
400 Army Navy Drive
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Forward questions or comments concerning this assessment and report and other activities conducted by the Office of Special Plans & Operations to spo@dodig.mil

Defense Hotline, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1900

make a difference

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

www.dodig.mil/hotline

Inspector General
United States Department of Defense

Vision

One professional team strengthening the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Department of Defense programs and operations.

Mission

Promote integrity, accountability, and improvement of Department of Defense personnel, programs and operations to support the Department’s mission and serve the public interest.

The Department of Defense Inspector General is an independent, objective agency within the U.S. Department of Defense that was created by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. DoD IG is dedicated to serving the warfighter and the taxpayer by conducting audits, investigations, inspections, and assessments that result in improvements to the Department. DoD IG provides guidance and recommendations to the Department of Defense and the Congress.
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
CHIEF, OFFICE OF SECURITY COOPERATION-IRAQ

SUBJECT: Assessment of the DoD Establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq
(Report No. DODIG-2012-063.)

We are providing this report for review and comment. We considered comments from United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and from the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) on a draft of this report when preparing the final report.

DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. USCENTCOM provided contextual comments, some of which we included in the final report; however the command did not provide comment to Recommendation 1.a. The comments provided by the Chief, OSC-I, were non-responsive to Recommendation 3.a. OSC-I comments to the remaining six recommendations were partially responsive. We request that USCENTCOM and Chief, OSC-I, provide additional comments to the recommendations as shown in the Recommendations Table on page ii of this report by April 16, 2012.

Please provide comments that conform to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3. If possible, please send a .pdf file containing your comments to spo@dodig.mil. Copies of the management comments must contain the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the assessment team from the Commander, U.S. Central Command; the Commander, United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I); the USF-I Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training; and their respective staffs. Their assistance and support were invaluable.

Please direct questions to Mr. Joe A. Baker at (703) 604-9170 (DSN 664-9170), joe.baker@dodig.mil or joe.baker@dodig.smil.mil.

[Signature]
Kenneth P. Moorefield
Deputy Inspector General
Special Plans and Operations
Results in Brief: Assessment of the DoD Establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq

What We Did

Our purpose was to determine whether DoD:

- met requirements to effectively execute the plan for transitioning authority, personnel, and equipment from DoD to Chief of Mission Baghdad, and
- provided the required support to meet initial operating capability to ensure that the OSC-I at full operating capability would be sufficient to accomplish the mission of supporting Iraq Security Forces capability development.

What We Found

The establishment of the OSC-I was on track and on schedule to meet its full operating capability target date of October 1, 2011 and to operate independently as an element of U.S. Mission to Iraq by January 1, 2012. However, we identified key areas that required management attention. We determined that U.S. Forces – Iraq Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training:

- was managing crucial security cooperation activities with incomplete theater and country-level plans and without the required planning capability
- had not clearly communicated information about the OSC-I enduring role regarding security cooperation programs with key Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior officials
- had not fully engaged and shared essential transition details with key personnel at prospective outlying OSC-I sites
- had not established detailed internal standard operating procedures for the OSC-I essential to adequately manage its major functions within the framework of the U.S. Mission to Iraq.

What We Recommend

Among other things, we recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command, promptly issue completed Iraq Country Plan details and that the Chief, Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq:

- improve information flow to site personnel to provide clarity and achieve unity of effort,
- communicate sufficient details about the OSC-I role and its operating processes with key Iraqi defense and interior ministry officials to enable their understanding of and confidence in the future of the program, and
- develop standard operating procedures for OSC-I administrative and operational processes and procedures that include interagency operations within the overall framework of U.S. Mission to Iraq authority and responsibility.

Management Comments and Our Response

USCENTCOM made several suggestions for updating information in the report, some of which we have accepted. USCENTCOM concurred but did not comment on Recommendation 1.a., specifying what actions it planned for implementing the recommendation. The comments provided by the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq to the remaining seven recommendations were either partially or not responsive. We request that USCENTCOM and OSC-I provide additional comments to the final report by April 16, 2012. Please see the table on the following page.
Recommendations Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client</th>
<th>Recommendations Requiring Comment</th>
<th>No Additional Comments Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Central Command</td>
<td>1.a.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq</td>
<td>1.b., 2.a., 2.b., 3.a., 3.b., 4.a., and 4.b.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In this final report we have made some recommendations to the Chief of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq in that the United States Forces-Iraq, Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training position was disestablished in December 2011.

# Table of Contents

Results in Brief i

Recommendations Table ii

Introduction 1

Observation 1. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Planning for Iraq 9

Observation 2. Communication with Key Iraqi Officials Concerning Future Security Cooperation and Assistance 17

Observation 3. Establishment of Outlying Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq Sites 21


APPENDIX A. Scope, Methodology, and Acronyms 33

APPENDIX B. Summary of Prior Coverage 35

APPENDIX C. Glossary 37


APPENDIX E. Organizations Contacted and Visited 57

APPENDIX F. Management Comments 59

APPENDIX G. Report Distribution 65
Introduction

Background
This is the second in a series of DoD Office of Inspector General, Special Plans and Operations reports regarding establishment of an Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I).

On August 25, 2011, the DoD Inspector General issued Report No. SPO-2011-008, “Assessment of Planning for Transitioning the Security Assistance Mission in Iraq from Department of Defense to Department of State Authority.” The report determined that, despite some shortcomings, detailed planning to accomplish the transition of the security assistance function to U.S. Mission to Iraq authority was sufficiently developed and operative.

This report is based on a subsequent review of efforts underway in 2011 to establish a fully functional OSC-I, to transition the security assistance mission to U.S. Mission to Iraq, and to ensure the sustained, successful operation of the security assistance mission in Iraq post-2011.

Objectives

Specific objectives for this assessment included determining whether:

- Requirements were being met to effectively execute the plan for transitioning authority, personnel, and equipment from U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) to the OSC-I and Chief of Mission in Baghdad; and,
- Required Department of Defense support had been provided to meet “initial operating capability” (IOC) and ensure sufficiency and capacity of the OSC-I at “full operating capability” (FOC) that would accomplish its mission of supporting Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) capability development post-2011.

Political-Military Context

Enduring Security Partnership
On February 27, 2009, in remarks delivered at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, President Obama made his intentions clear that all U.S. troops would depart Iraq by the end of 2011. In that address he outlined the United States approach to a responsible military

---

drawdown by pledging to remove all combat forces by August 2010 and to withdraw all U.S. troops by December 31, 2011. The President further indicated that, following 2011, the United States was committed to pursuing sustained diplomacy to build a lasting strategic relationship between the two countries. These words had far-reaching impact and set in motion several important actions, which included establishing the basis for a robust Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq.

**Planning the Drawdown and Enduring Mission**

United States Forces-Iraq, through its Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training (DCG [A&T]), has performed most of the detailed planning for establishing the OSC-I and transitioning the security assistance mission from DoD to Department of State (DoS) authority. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), the geographical combatant command which includes Iraq, otherwise retained responsibility for broader planning within their theater area of operations. Among other actions, this entailed developing an overarching Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) that would provide broad theater security cooperation guidance, as well as more detailed country related context and specifics in the form of an Iraq Country Plan (ICP).

By mid-2009, USF-I had developed a recommendation for a robust OSC-I consisting of 157 core members, capable of a broad range of security assistance and security cooperation activities.2 Potentially one of the largest such security cooperation offices ever, the National Security Council approved that recommendation in October 2009 for planning purposes only, as authority to establish an OSC-I ultimately hinged on a bilateral U.S. and Government of Iraq (GoI) agreement. Most of USF-I was primarily focused on executing the drawdown of U.S. forces and other operations.

Per Article 24 of the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, all U.S. Forces were to withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011. As this date became the “not-later-than” date for USF-I to disestablish and contingency operations to come to a close, USF-I had to identify and transfer or terminate responsibility for its critical functions. USF-I identified its major functions in early 2010, which included specific activities that would transfer to OSC-I under Department of State’s Chief of Mission authority.

**Transition Complexities**

Conducted within a non-permissive security environment,3 the mere scope and magnitude of U.S. transition activities was daunting.4 The overarching U.S. transition,

---

2 See Appendix D for more detailed information regarding OSC-I security assistance and security cooperation functions.
3 Joint Publication 1-02 defines permissive environment as: “Operational environment within which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.” This report uses this definition to explain a non-permissive environment as one in which some level of lawlessness or heightened risk is assumed due to a breakdown in host country military and law enforcement capability. (See Appendix C)
for instance, consisted of several separate, but related, macro-level activities which were occurring almost simultaneously in preparation for the complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces. Some of the more significant transitions included:

- reorganizing Multi-National Forces-Iraq and the two other major commands in Iraq as USF-I in early 2010
- transitioning functions from U.S. military to civilian responsibility
- transitioning from U.S. to Iraqi security lines of operation
- establishing the enduring security assistance mission
- establishing appropriate levels of support in the provinces, through the right-sizing of Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the Advise and Assist Brigades’ operations
- restructuring and establishing internal embassy organizations and processes, and
- ensuring the security of the GoI 2010 elections.

Functions frequently blurred across lines of authority and crossed multiple transitions. Aspects of establishing the OSC-I, for example, fell within the move from military to civilian responsibility, establishing the enduring security assistance mission, and restructuring within the embassy. That the United States and the GoI had not yet agreed to what, if any, functions the OSC-I might perform added to the uncertainty, along with other factors that also had an impact.

As transition workloads increased, USF-I manpower was ever-decreasing during the 2010-2011 period. Transition plans called for the new OSC-I to be drawn from elements of the USF-I Deputy Command General for Advising and Training. Within DCG (A&T), however, prospective OSC-I components were competing for the attention of personnel whose focus was divided between having to accomplish ongoing advise, equip, train, and assist duties or devote their energies toward instituting necessary new and enduring security assistance and cooperation capabilities and processes. This challenge of competing priorities increased as DoD unexpectedly expanded USF-I’s transitional role.

**DoD Support for Six Outlying Sites**

The DoD OSC-I transition workload significantly increased on short notice in the fall of 2010 when the Department of State did not secure full congressional funding for all of its post-2011 activities. DoD subsequently agreed to take responsibility for establishing, funding, managing, and maintaining six of the ten sites throughout Iraq from which OSC–I entities would operate. DoD taking over responsibility from DoS included

---

4 In 2010, planners had identified and adjudicated 1127 activities performed by U.S. Forces. By mid 2011, 696 of these were either already completed, already being accomplished by the Embassy, or already terminated: the remaining 431 were to transfer to either U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, USCENTCOM, the GoI, or the Department of State.


6 The outlying sites that DoD agreed to fully support were: Union III (Baghdad), Besmaya, Taji, Umm Qasr, Tikrit, and Kirkuk. DoS and DoD initially agreed, and DoD planned, to support four sites for
Figure 1 depicts the 10 sites, reflecting the projected OSC-I and security assistance team (SAT) presence at each site as well as the additional support personnel required to maintain the six DoD-sponsored sites.

As reported by USF-I officials, Congress authorized $129.1 million for military construction in its FY 2011 appropriation and another $75 million to cover DoD sustainment costs for the six OSC-I sites that it was to manage. DoD had additionally requested $524 million in FY 2012 to enable DoD to sustain operations of its six sites, as well as to cover OSC-I and SAT activities at the four other DoS-sponsored sites throughout that fiscal year.7

7 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Section 1215, entitled “Authority to support operations and activities of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq,” states that authorized types of support “…may include life support, transportation and personal security, and construction and renovation of facilities.” The provisions of Section 1215, sub-paragraph (e), “Coverage of Costs of OSC in Connection with Sales of Defense Articles or Defense Services to Iraq,” also require that future foreign...
In addition to providing complete resourcing for the six designated DoD OSC-I sites, the DoD also undertook other measures to ensure the success of the OSC-I by:

- Designating the Chief of Staff for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as the Office of the Secretary of Defense point of contact for Iraq transition, thus ensuring the Iraq effort received the primary point of coordination and also the focused attention required.
- Appointing a general officer as the Joint Staff point of contact for Iraq.
- USF-I providing to the DCG (A&T) increased U.S. Army Corps of Engineer and other senior staff support resources and personnel.
- USCENTCOM forming a dedicated Iraq Transition Operational Planning Team composed of cross-functional staff experts to serve as a single Command point of contact and central coordinator for all Iraq transition issues.

Delayed Security Cooperation Planning Guidance

While USF-I initiated development of new plans at the field command level, USCENTCOM delayed issuing updated Theater Campaign and Theater Security Cooperation Plans, to include related ICP details. Though recognizing the importance of an ICP as being integral to effectively implementing security cooperation activities, USCENTCOM decided to first develop and issue an Iraq Transition Plan in December 2010 to further the operational transition from combat to stability support operations. USCENTCOM eventually issued an updated Theater Campaign Plan in March 2011 but deferred issuing that plan’s security cooperation and ICP sections until later.

USCENTCOM issued major portions of its ICP on October 26, 2011, nearly a month after OSC-I reached full operating capability. This delay caused OSC-I to have incomplete theater level security cooperation guidance and limited regional planning context specific to Iraq that impacted its ability to perform the more detailed, longer-range security cooperation planning required to effect mutually reinforcing activities at its level. As of November 30, 2011, USCENTCOM was still coordinating key portions of its ICP, and it remained incomplete.

Ongoing Activities

During the course of this assessment, the team identified many factors that affected the establishment and transition of the OSC-I that were beyond USF-I and, in some cases, DoD control. Though not exhaustive, a brief listing includes:

- lack of full Department of State funding for post-2011 operations in Iraq
- uncertainty over the ultimate size of any potential U.S. post-2011 military presence
- lack of formal, bilateral approval of the OSC-I
- lack of approval of and resourcing for the OSC-I support structure

Military sales contracts with Iraq include “…charges sufficient to recover the costs of operations and activities of security assistance teams in Iraq in connection with such sale.”
- lack of approval of OSC-I presence at outlying foreign military sales (FMS) sites and associated land use agreements
- need for congressional approval of certain Title 10, United States Code (10 U.S.C.), Armed Forces, authorities for OSC-I support
- need for sufficient DoD funding for post-2011 OSC-I 10 U.S.C. activities
- lack of agreement over protections and immunities for DoD personnel performing security cooperation activities in post-2011 Iraq, and
- uncertainty of in-country air and ground movement capability for OSC-I and related security assistance and security cooperation personnel post-2011.

In general, all of these aspects were being addressed and, in some cases, resolved at the time of this report. But failure to progress or to resolve them satisfactorily on a timely basis had the potential to significantly impact the OSC-I stand-up and transition to post-2011 activities. In addition, the dangerous security environment in Iraq may limit OSC-I oversight execution of its security assistance and security cooperation responsibilities, and place personnel and the mission in an untenable situation, a point that will need to be incorporated into mission contingency planning.

**Requirements Being Met**

At full strength, the 157-person OSC-I will be expected to perform all of the major statutory security assistance and security cooperation functions. The USF-I plan called for initially transitioning all security assistance functions in mid-2011; and, then building to full capability over a subsequent four month period by incrementally transitioning responsibility for the remaining security cooperation activities.

On June 1, 2011, the OSC-I declared its organization to have attained initial operating capability. The USF-I Operations Order (OPORD) 11-01 defined IOC as a conditions-based milestone with the following broad conditions:

- All security assistance functions transitioned to the OSC-I.
- Establishment of a mechanism to coordinate personnel and function flow into OSC-I from IOC to full operational capability.
- Site construction and equipment and personnel flow synchronized via on-site Mayor Cells.
- OSC-I support functions established.

The OSC-I attained FOC on October 1, 2011. FOC was also described as a conditions-based milestone, as defined by:

---

8 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, stipulates legislated functions in Title XII, Section 515. (See Appendix D.)
9 Examples of major Security Assistance functions include: Foreign Military Finance Program, Foreign Military Sales, International Military Education and Training, and End-use Monitoring. Refer to Appendix D for additional security assistance functions and details.
• The OSC-I being fully resourced, authorized, and responsible for all security assistance and security cooperation activities.
• Operating at all approved sites (meeting this condition was waived for an interim period because site preparations were not completed by October 1, 2011).
• The OSC-I recognized as the DoD organization responsible for coordinating with DoS on security assistance and security cooperation projects and activities.

Despite the complexities and uncertainties still associated with establishing the OSC-I and transitioning security assistance and security cooperation activities from DoD to the Department of State authority, the DCG (A&T) and its OSC-I team were commendably moving ahead, while USF-I was concentrating on the challenges of drawing down its forces and preparing and transferring former U.S. operating bases to Iraqi authority. As USF-I personnel prepared and transferred bases, they were also preparing certain sites within larger Iraqi facilities to accommodate the continuing U.S. security assistance functions with the ISF.

Though on a positive trajectory, the situation in Iraq remains dynamic and will likely present unique challenges that demand continuing high levels of inter-departmental attention, coordination, and oversight to ensure success over the immediate future and beyond. The relationships between DoD and DoS in Iraq will differ considerably from how the two Departments interact within other countries and diplomatic postings. Because funding was mainly provided outside the President’s budget, Congress constructed unique authorities and constraints that put tight controls on how money can be used. OSC-I’s ability to directly oversee security cooperation activities throughout Iraq will likely also be more limited than related offices in other countries, due to the reduced number of U.S. personnel remaining after all U.S. military troops depart Iraq and the constraints related to moving those personnel within Iraq’s very dangerous security environment.

The combined impact of staffing reductions, the filling of remaining positions with individuals who might have little or no experience functioning under special authority arrangements and controls, and the security restrictions on mobility throughout Iraq could limit OSC-I oversight of security cooperation activities. Reduced oversight increases the risk of potential waste and mismanagement, particularly in regards to ensuring compliance with special congressional limitations and restrictions on funds expenditures.

Security cooperation can be difficult even under normal circumstances, but the non-standard inter-departmental arrangements, the magnitude of high value defense articles the United States is providing via the Foreign Military Sales Program and other security cooperation venues, and the variety of special funding sources and authorities will likely make security cooperation in Iraq especially complex. This combination of factors may necessitate a continuing need for robust oversight capabilities to ensure the effective use of DoD funds and other resources by OSC-I in Iraq. Close monitoring may be necessary to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of funding and other resources in order to ensure current and future mission success.
**Post-Transition Realities**

While meeting major milestones to effectively establish and transition the OSC-I from DoD to DoS authority by January 1, 2012, the inability of the U.S. and Iraq governments to reach key agreements has since impacted OSC-I ability to operate as planned within the dynamic post-2011 security environment in Iraq. In responding to a draft of this report, senior OSC-I officials indicated that the absence of a post 2011 Security Agreement or Status of Forces Agreement was affecting aspects of its operations. Among others, these included: land use agreements, force protection, passport/visa requirements, air and ground movement, and site stand-up. Unless these important matters can be resolved in a timely manner, an increasing risk is posed that the OSC-I will be unable to effectively accomplish its post-2011 security cooperation activities. In addition, accomplishment of its longer-term mission to enhance development of an effective security partnership with Iraq may be affected.
Observation 1. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Planning for Iraq

The Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq was managing activities crucial to initiating and sustaining its security assistance and cooperation mission without sufficient USCENTCOM guidance to enable its country-level implementation planning to proceed on a timely and effective basis and without the required planning personnel or capability that it was designed to have.

These planning limitations and delays primarily occurred because:

- USCENTCOM delayed issuing its theater campaign level security cooperation guidance and necessary Iraq Country Plan details.
- DCG (A&T) officials did not consolidate related security cooperation planning efforts before the OSC-I achieved initial operating capability on June 1, 2011.
- DoD assumed responsibilities from DoS that increased the OSC-I transition workload and inhibited DCG (A&T) and the OSC-I from standing-up the required planning capability on the timeline originally intended.

These limitations impeded OSC-I from effectively informing significant DoD, DoS, and GoI budgeting and resourcing decisions. Planning shortfalls inhibited OSC-I from effectively informing key Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials regarding the operational development of its security forces and contributed to USF-I providing U.S. Mission to Iraq with hastily prepared information that the respective departments required to develop their FY 13 budget request submissions. Further, DoD and DoS ability to secure critical resources and inform important GoI security decisions may be impeded post-2011.

Applicable Criteria


Discussion

Background

Even under normal circumstances, traditional security cooperation planning is complex due to the broad range of activities involved, the numerous programs and funding sources.

---

10 As used here, security cooperation is an umbrella term encompassing all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (See Appendix D for additional details).
for performing those activities, and the legal, regulatory, and fiscal constraints on various programs. The DoS is responsible for funding and executing certain programs through the authority of Title 22, United States Code (22 U.S.C.), Foreign Relations and Intercourse, while DoD is responsible for funding and executing a myriad of other security cooperation programs through the authority of Title 10 U.S.C., Armed Forces.

DoD assists in managing the full range of security cooperation activities, via security cooperation offices, in support of the Chief of Mission for the country and the Geographic Combatant Commander of the military region involved. Detailed country level security cooperation planning, based on theater/regional planning, must therefore support both DoS and DoD responsibilities, which includes implementation and compliance with each of the many Title 10 and Title 22 security cooperation programs.

This detailed planning is critically important for a number of reasons, among which are:

- to support theater and national security cooperation objectives,
- to relate how security cooperation activities undertaken on behalf of the host country support attaining these objectives, and
- to link key details for conducting those activities to lawfully authorized security cooperation programs.

Collectively, these required planning actions assist in ensuring that funding, personnel, and other resources necessary to implement the desired programmatic activities are obtained when required. Timely planning is also necessary to assist in complying with any governing security cooperation program implementation guidelines or constraints that may apply.

**Theater Security Cooperation Planning**

USCENTCOM issued an updated Theater Campaign Plan in March 2011, but deferred developing both the security cooperation and Iraq Country Plan sections of that plan until later. In the interim, the DCG (A&T) and OSC-I were increasingly affected by the broader USF-I personnel drawdown, became decisively engaged in the OSC-I transition, and could not divert personnel to address the lack of theater level security cooperation planning aspects that USCENTCOM was responsible for providing.

OSC-I was focused on Iraq and they depended on USCENTCOM experts to provide key theater-related security cooperation information and regional context to support its more detailed planning. The diagram in Figure 2 depicts the Security Cooperation Planning Hierarchy for Iraq. Within broader DoD and DoS planning processes, USCENTCOM serves a key function in translating national goals into theater level objectives and other aspects that pertain more directly to Iraq. This, in turn, enables the more detailed OSC-I planning necessary to support coordinating and synchronizing country-specific security cooperation activities for effective implementation. OSC-I planning also serves as the basis for providing DoD, DoS, and GoI coherent inputs to their respective budgeting and resourcing processes. USCENTCOM did not issue the Iraq Country Plan until October 26, 2011, but that issuance was incomplete because it did not contain many of the more
detailed sections essential for OSC-I to effectively implement important activities at its level. USCENTCOM was still coordinating those more detailed sections as of November 30, 2011. These delays impeded OSC-I planning and its ability to implement its operating objectives.  

**Figure 2. Security Cooperation Planning Hierarchy for Iraq**

**Concurrent Activities in Contingency Operations**

During the DoD IG visit in July 2011, the team observed that the DCG (A&T) was concurrently performing advising and training operations for the Iraqi Security Forces as well as transitioning the OSC-I from initial to full operating capability. Since Operation New Dawn (OND) had commenced in September 2010, the DCG (A&T) Iraq Training Assistance Missions had conducted advising and training operations mainly with their respective Iraqi Security Forces counterparts along lines that corresponded to the various U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force Military Departments. OSC-I planning reflected this Service-centric approach, which, under OND authorities, appeared appropriate.

---

11 Failure to publish an Iraq Country Plan was cited as a finding in DoD IG Report No. SPO-2011-008, “Assessment of Planning for Transitioning the Security Assistance Mission in Iraq from Department of Defense to Department of State Authority.”

In general, DCG (A&T) was already complying with many Title 22 provisions and OND provided a unified set of Title 10 contingency funding and governing authorities that applied to DCG (A&T) advising and training efforts. Throughout OND, DoD, not DoS, was responsible for key Title 22 security assistance programs in Iraq but adhered to existing provisions, restrictions, and processes where possible. OND otherwise offered a single, straightforward Title 10 funding source and operational resources to conduct a broad range of security cooperation related activities. Under OND authority, for example, DCG (A&T) personnel were able to do more than advise and train; they actually performed certain military functions for the ISF, something that most security cooperation programs strictly prohibit. This single set of Title 10 authorities afforded DCG (A&T) flexibility in executing its activities. But the post-2011 situation would have to be very different.

Although DCG (A&T) and OSC-I security cooperation activities were similar in some respects, authorities would change significantly by the end of 2011. As OND ended, and USF-I and DCG (A&T) disbanded, DoS would assume full responsibility, which included reasserting its normal responsibility over Title 22 security assistance programs. Broad ranging OND Title 10 authorities would also end. Though Congress had enacted special authorities and provisions for FY12, these dealt mainly with establishing and managing OSC-I sites and performing various support activities (e.g., construction, life support, and movement security). Performing post-2011 activities required OSC-I to utilize existing security cooperation program funding and resources, but also necessitated complying with the provisions and restrictions for each of the many lawfully authorized programs that might apply.13 During our visit, the DoD IG team observed that OSC-I planning had not accounted for these changes.

During the DoD IG team visit, OSC-I planning mainly focused on establishing the OSC-I and preparing and managing its various outlying sites. It had not yet accounted for the more varied mix of Title 10 and Title 22 program and other authorities that were expected to apply post 2011. According to DoD security cooperation planning experts, however, effective planning involved integrating across Service-centric planning lines and linking key details of ongoing and proposed activities for a three-to-five year period with the various lawfully authorized security assistance and cooperation programs. This was necessary in order to support successfully securing required funding and resources. Although the majority of DCG (A&T) officials interviewed were familiar with operating under OND guidelines, they had little experience with and knowledge of the many other security cooperation program funding procedures, legal constraints, or governing authorities. OSC-I planning had therefore progressed along Service-centric lines and had not linked security cooperation related activities with authorized security cooperation programs within a single, integrated plan. These shortcomings impaired OSC-I development and management.

13 Security cooperation programs included but were not limited to: Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing Program, Aviation Leadership Program, Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies, Developing Country Combined Exercise Program, Joint Combined Exercise Training, and Training and Doctrine Conferences and Working Groups. (See Appendix D for expanded information)
As an example, OSC-I officials expected to conduct a bilateral training exercise with Iraq as part of their 2012 security cooperation activities, but USCENTCOM officials were undecided on whether to support this effort because they had not received sufficient details about the training exercise or its objectives. As a result, USCENTCOM did not specifically reserve funds in any of its related security cooperation programs to support executing the event or any of its preparation activities. OSC-I officials cited similar planning difficulties as contributing to USF-I providing U.S. Embassy-Baghdad with hastily prepared FY13 budget inputs and to inhibiting implementation of key Iraqi Ministry of Defense force development initiatives. USF-I and USCENTCOM officials indicated that planning shortfalls might additionally continue to affect upcoming FY13 DoD budget submissions that were due to be submitted by the end of 2011.

Unexpected Workload Increase

In late December 2010, DoD agreed to assume the responsibility for establishing and managing OSC-I sites at various locations throughout Iraq when DoS was unable to do so. This added major complications to planning the transition of security cooperation. Before the agreement between DoD and DoS concerning OSC-I sites, the OSC-I standup entailed developing an OSC-I organizational structure, providing manning, and effecting a modular, largely administrative, transfer of personnel and functions from the DCG (A&T) organization to form the new OSC-I sections. After the new DoD support agreement was reached with DoS, USF-I became responsible for several additional major tasks related to standing-up and managing OSC-I sites, which involved coordinating details for and awarding numerous support and construction contracts. USF-I ultimately assigned DCG (A&T) as lead agent for many of these tasks, including:

- verifying OSC-I site requirements
- accounting for tenant units and personnel
- synchronizing security and construction details
- coordinating for basic life support and sustainment
- establishing command and control infrastructure and capabilities, and
- coordinating the necessary manpower resources and funding authorities.

USF-I shifted operational resources and staff personnel to bolster the DCG (A&T) and OSC-I transition efforts that were occurring within an insecure operational environment. Despite that initial added support, DCG (A&T) subsequently had to shift even more of its personnel to meet tight OSC-I site stand-up timetables. OSC-I officials cited a number of resulting complications, along with other factors, that impeded their planning, such as:

- conflicts over whether an individual’s DCG (A&T) or OSC-I duties took precedence
- diversion of personnel from their assigned OSC-I positions to fill other billets
- delays in contracting for an experienced cadre of OSC-I planner personnel
- a notable shortage of experienced foreign area officers, and
- difficulty coordinating travel within Iraq, primarily due to the security situation.
Besides these complications, other factors made establishing the required OSC-I planning capability more difficult, and potentially more urgent and imperative, than initiating other OSC-I sections. For instance, Iraq Training Assistance Missions were planning their Service-centric advising and training activities, but no one in DCG (A&T) was planning for the integration of those efforts and the linking of requirements with authorized programs that would carry into 2012 and beyond.

OSC-I had originally intended to establish the necessary planning capability but, because DCG (A&T) had not integrated its planning efforts, there was no existing integrated planning capability for the OSC-I to incorporate or to effectively build upon. Combined with the complications of standing up the outlying OSC-I sites, not having an existing integrated DCG (A&T) planning effort or capability made establishing that capability within OSC-I more difficult. Security cooperation planning efforts were therefore not supported by an organized OSC-I planning capability that consolidated the many tasks to be completed and that explicitly related those details to specific security cooperation programs within a single integrated plan.

Conclusion

DoD Directive 5132.03 states that security cooperation “shall be planned, programmed, budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and efficiency as other integral DoD activities.” This policy recognizes security cooperation as important to advancing U.S. goals and objectives with respect to enhancing bilateral relations with a host nation. Collective USCENTCOM, USF-I, and OSC-I planning for Iraq did not effectively comply with this policy. Along with developing mutually reinforcing plans at multiple echelons, one recognized planning approach is to develop a long-term country level plan that spans a three–to–five year period and integrates across functions and programs in order to consistently guide DoS, DoD and, in this case, GoI security sector strategic planning and budgeting efforts. USCENTCOM issued an Iraq Country Plan on October 26, 2011, but, as of November 30, 2011, detailed portions of that plan that USF-I and OSC-I were involved in providing were still uncompleted.

As a result, management of security cooperation efforts for Iraq, to include crucial DoS, DoD, and Iraqi budgeting and resourcing decisions, were impaired because USCENTCOM, USF-I, and OSC-I had not sufficiently developed the necessary planning capability needed to effectively initiate and sustain activities under the post-transition authorities. For this and other reasons cited they had not prepared plans that would enable the OSC-I to initiate and sustain its programmatic activities in the post-transition era.

Planning shortfalls that included delays in providing Iraq Country Plan details and a lack of requisite OSC-I planning capability limited OSC-I ability to effectively manage development efforts in support of the Iraqi Security Forces and contributed to hastily prepared FY13 budgeting inputs. Further, the ability of DoD and DoS to secure critical resources and inform important GoI security decisions could also be impeded. As a result, OSC-I mission implementation could be negatively impacted.
Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response


Management Comments
Responding for the Commander, USCENTCOM Inspector General concurred with Recommendation 1.a., without any additional comments specific to the recommendation.

Our Response
USCENTCOM comments are partially responsive. While concurring, USCENTCOM did not specify what actions it planned for implementing the recommendation. As of November 30, 2011, we noted the ICP that USCENTCOM issued in late October 2011 was incomplete because it lacked details essential for OSC-I to effectively implement important activities at its level. Specifically, Annex O, Security Cooperation, lacked the appendices with the details describing how the plan will be implemented. We request that USCENTCOM provide us a copy of the completed ICP, to include these appendices, and supporting documentation showing when and how it was distributed in response to the final report.

1.b. Chief, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, coordinate with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency to immediately request that a security cooperation management assistance team deploy to Iraq to support the accelerated stand-up of the required planning capability of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq.

Management Comments
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq J3 comments were forwarded to us in a letter from the USCENTCOM Inspector General. The OSC-I J3 neither concurred nor non-concurred with Recommendation 1.b., stating simply that action had been completed and that DSCA had visited the OSC-I.

Our Response
The OSC-I J3 comments are partially responsive. While noting the DSCA visit, the OSC-I J3 did not specify the extent of support provided, what actions were taken, and what is still planned to be accomplished in the future. In addition, the intent behind recommending DSCA assistance was to provide additional expert resources to aid in establishing critical OSC-I capabilities. OSC-I appeared in its response to tacitly agree with the recommendation, but more information is necessary to determine if appropriate action has been taken to address the identified deficiency. We request that the OSC-I provide a more detailed response to the final report, in accordance with DoD Directive 7650.3.
Observation 2. Communication with Key Iraqi Officials Concerning Future Security Cooperation and Assistance

Key Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior (MoI) officials shared a collective lack of understanding of fundamental security cooperation and security assistance program particulars, to include the organizational structure of the nascent OSC-I, plans for OSC-I operations at enduring sites, and specific details about proposed FMS cases.

This occurred because DCG (A&T) had not fully coordinated with key MoD and MoI officials concerning the U.S. intentions, the OSC-I’s enduring role, or its specific security cooperation and security assistance operating plans and processes.

As a result, key MoD and MoI leaders lacked sufficient clarity as to U.S. intentions for post-2011 security cooperation and security assistance programs, and Iraqi officials were left in a position of being unable to effectively plan for their partnership role.

The lack of mutual clarity and understanding about OSC-I roles and operations could negatively impact effective execution of important security cooperation and security assistance programs in 2012, and impede success in building an enduring defense cooperation relationship with Iraq.

Discussion

Government of Iraq Concerns – Security Cooperation and Security Assistance Program Processes

In meetings with our assessment team, MoD and MoI officials indicated that they had not been informed about many security cooperation and security assistance program particulars, to include the organizational structure of the nascent OSC-I, plans for OSC-I operations at enduring sites, and specific details about proposed FMS cases.

There was also confusion among MoD and MoI officials regarding whether current security cooperation and security assistance program processes would change the manner in which they presently functioned under the new OSC-I, post-2011. In this regard, key MoD and MoI officials stated that they did not know, but needed to know, how the OSC-I operating processes would impact continued coordination of security cooperation and security assistance programs. Iraqi officials did not evince confidence in their ability to manage those programs without additional support. They indicated they needed more time and training to become sufficiently experienced with their responsibilities in applying security cooperation and security assistance program concepts and processes, specifically, the continued coordination of the FMS program and effective interaction with certain specific aspects of the FMS program.
**Government of Iraq Concerns – Foreign Military Sales Program Processes**

The Iraqi MoD and MoI officials interviewed, all of whom were engaged in, and somewhat familiar with, FMS program execution – a primary role of the new OSC-I – expressed deep concern that USF-I officials had not adequately clarified what transitioning to an office of security cooperation entailed or how the transition from USF-I to Chief of Mission authority would affect the current FMS processes. They were also unaware of specific details regarding the disposition and functions of OSC-I personnel and security assistance teams at outlying sites where FMS activities would occur and what these implied for MoD and MoI responsibilities.

Further, Iraqi officials were apprehensive about access to and communication with U.S. Government officials, current and future FMS case processing and documentation, and whether the GoI would have to assume additional responsibilities and administrative program costs that the U.S. Government had been incurring on its behalf. For example, MoD officials were troubled about the possibility of having to pay the expense of translating FMS-related documentation. The USF-I had been providing these services, but quality translation services, especially those performed by individuals with knowledge of FMS technical terminology, would reportedly be very expensive for MoD to incur.

MoD and MoI officials stated they were accustomed to communicating all FMS-related matters directly through the Iraq Security Assistance Mission under USF-I. However, the Iraq Security Assistance Mission organization, as currently organized, would no longer exist within the new OSC-I that would be operating under the U.S. Mission to Iraq. Iraqi MoD representatives opined that they therefore might have to communicate security assistance matters through their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus adding another layer of bureaucracy to the already slow FMS procurement process. In any event, they did not have sufficient clarity as to how current and future FMS cases would be managed once the OSC-I was fully operational. In addition, MoD officials were frustrated, for example, in not understanding FMS transition details that might impact funds required by their ministries to support implementation of FMS cases.

**Communication with Key Iraqi Officials**

The DCG (A&T) command officials concurred that they had not yet fully communicated with key MoD and MoI officials regarding the OSC-I’s enduring role or its specific post-2011 security cooperation and security assistance operating processes. They stated that they had not sufficiently and completely conveyed detailed information about the OSC-I transition with senior levels of the MoD and MoI because the U.S. and Iraqi governments had not yet concluded certain bilateral decisions and arrangements that would determine the OSC-I organizational structure and operations after December 31, 2011.

The DCG (A&T) staff members we spoke to were unaware of any confusion on the part of Iraqi security officials regarding FMS since they believed they had informed them that the FMS program procedures would essentially be unchanged. Nevertheless, this...
discrepancy suggests that more attention was needed in communicating to appropriate Iraqi officials the particulars of the transition that was occurring.

**Conclusion**

Although USF-I officials believed key leader engagement efforts were well-coordinated and on track, discussions with MoD and MoI responsible senior officials indicated that USF-I communication and coordination efforts had not been sufficiently effective to meet their needs for information regarding the future operation of the security cooperation and assistance program.

Key MoD and MoI leaders said they lacked sufficient clarity as to U.S. intentions, adequate knowledge of security cooperation and assistance functions of the post-2011 OSC-I, and a clear vision of any expanded GoI responsibilities they might have to assume after December 31, 2011. These Iraqi officials did not believe they were able to effectively plan for their future security assistance partnership role.

The success of building an enduring strategic partnership between the two nations after December 31, 2011, depends on a clear mutual understanding of respective programmatic responsibilities. Lack of this clarity could negatively impact building an enduring security partnership.

**Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

2. Chief, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq:
   
   a. Communicate to key Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior officials sufficient details about the United States intentions and plans for security cooperation and the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq role and operating processes to ensure their understanding of and confidence in the future of the program.

**Management Comments**

Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq J3 comments were forwarded to us in a letter from the USCENTCOM Inspector General. The OSC-I J3 neither concurred nor non-concurred with Recommendation 2.a., but stated that, based on Key Leader Engagements (KLE) from Chief, OSC-I, to OSC-I Section Leads, to Senior Advisor Groups, this action was complete and that it continues to be refined.

**Our Response**

The OSC-I J3 comments are partially responsive. We understand the intent and value of continuing key leader, strategic, and senior level engagements, especially in a dynamic situation such as Iraq. But we also recognize that similar type engagements, ongoing at the time of our visit, had not successfully ensured that key MoD and MoI officials understood and were confident in the collective U.S. security cooperation efforts. The specific KLEs cited above would appear to have reinforced MoD and MoI officials’ overall understanding of the U.S. security cooperation programs. However, the OSC-I J3
did not specify the substance or extent of its current engagement plans, details regarding the specific engagements mentioned, or how they intend to gauge whether MoD and MoI understand and are confident in U.S. security cooperation efforts. We request that the OSC-I provide a more detailed response to the final report, in accordance with DoD Directive 7650.3.

Management Comments
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq J3 comments were forwarded to us in a letter from the USCENTCOM Inspector General. The OSC-I J3 neither concurred nor non-concurred with Recommendation 2.b., but stated that this has been shared with Iraqi leaders, such as the Prime Minister, and by the Chief, OSC-I addressing the Iraqi Council of Representatives in a recent session. Their comments further state that this issue continues to remain an ongoing action as they manage Iraqi leader expectations and the Letter of Request and Letter of Acceptance (LOR/LOA) process to ensure the GoI understands and acknowledges that all costs associated with OSC-I infrastructure and facilities must be funded.

Our Response
OSC-I J3 comments are partially responsive. While acknowledging the positive steps taken to clarify responsibilities of executing FMS and other relevant security cooperation efforts with certain key GoI officials, OSC-I J3 did not highlight the details of its recent exchanges or any resulting indications, to date, that their actions are having the intended effect. Nor did it state whether or not OSC-I provided that information to appropriate MoD and MoI officials or ensured that the Iraqi leaders distributed it themselves. As such, we still do not know what information was provided or whether Iraqi MoD and MoI mid-level officials have ever received it. We request that the OSC-I provide a more detailed response to the final report, in accordance with DoD Directive 7650.3.
Observation 3. Establishment of Outlying Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq Sites

OSC-I management cells at outlying OSC-I sites lacked essential details regarding transition plans.

This occurred because the priority of USF-I actions emphasized the need to prepare bases for turn over to the GoI and orchestrate unit withdrawals, while DCG (A&T) was concurrently standing up an enduring OSC-I structure, but without sufficient dedicated personnel to execute this mission.

As a consequence, forward operating base personnel due to be transitioned to OSC-I sites were unclear regarding essential planning details applicable to this transition, including the timely manning and future responsibilities of independent OSC-I management cells.14

Insufficient timely communication in establishing independent organizational structures at the OSC-I outlying sites increased the danger of OSC-I not being capable of assuming full management and support responsibilities in support of U.S. Mission to Iraq by January 1, 2012.

Applicable Criteria
USF-I Operation Order 11-01, Change 1, May 2011.

Discussion

Military Priorities
Transition to an OSC-I required establishing certain preconditions at multiple levels. Due to the uncertain security environment, USF-I made a determined effort to prioritize the establishment of basic life support and force protection programs at forward operating bases that would transition to become OSC-I sites (Figure 3).

14 OSC-I outlying sites are parts of existing forward operating bases within Iraq, outside the perimeter of the U.S. Embassy, that will be supported by the DoD, from which continuing security assistance and security cooperation programs, mainly FMS programs, will be conducted. These included: Besmaya, Kirkuk, Taji, Tikrit, Umm Qasr, and Union III. With the exception of Union III, each site is co-located within an operating Iraqi Security Forces base.
As a result of DoS funding shortfalls, DCG (A&T) faced unexpected operational challenges and incurred new requirements to support and manage OSC-I sites. For example, United States Army Corps of Engineers contracts with funded work orders were being used to adjust and fortify OSC-I site perimeter footprints, which included improved surveillance systems and interior T-walls. Some additional security improvement construction projects in support of the new OSC-I outlying sites were expected to continue well into 2012 – after the departure of USF-I.

---

15 A T-wall is a 12 to 15 foot-high, 4-foot wide, and 2 foot thick portable, steel-reinforced concrete wall used for protection from direct or indirect small arms fire, mortars, rockets and shrapnel.
Adequacy of OSC-I Structures and Timeline

Shaped by an uncertain political environment and partially influenced by broader than anticipated USF-I support to DoS sites, USF-I efforts and the planned DCG (A&T) transition activities for OSC-I installation management seeded an unintentional competitive tension for personnel resources and command priorities that became noticeable by our assessment team immediately after IOC. Existing installation commanders at forward operating bases that would transition to become OSC-I outlying sites reported they were still significantly engaged supporting USF-I operations, force drawdown, and base closure activities well into the transition period intended for standing-up the OSC-I sites. As operational commanders continued in charge of bases and maintained continuity with USF-I command priorities, prospective OSC-I site mayor cells that would soon assume management of all life support operations and other logistical matters evolved more slowly than planned.

In relation to what was outlined in USF-I plans, delays in OSC-I transition milestones began to appear as early as IOC on June 1, when OSC-I mayor cells were not adequately manned and USF-I personnel remained in charge of all installations. The IOC to FOC transition was now following, by default, a conditions-based timeline. As examples, OSC-I had not yet established outlying FMS site representatives as a single point of contact for security assistance, and the mayor cell at Tikrit had only one person assigned. USF-I and DCG (A&T) were primarily concerned with mitigating immediate risk to operations, drawdown, and base closure activities while accepting longer-term OSC-I mission risk because they considered sufficient time was still available to stand up the OSC-I mayor and Base Operating Support – Iraq (BOS-I) ‘cells.’ DCG (A&T) consequently accepted delays in establishing independent OSC-I management cells at outlying sites from that which was outlined in USF-I OPORD 11-01.

Sufficiency of Information Exchange

DCG (A&T) staff initially had limited information exchange with forward operating bases where the OSC-I sites were to be established. Reportedly, this was to avoid distracting USF-I personnel who were simultaneously engaged in conducting operations, troop draw-downs, and base closings. At the time of the assessment team visit in July 2011, a month after IOC, USF-I installation commanders and staff at forward operating bases that were intended to become future OSC-I sites still lacked sufficient clarity about essential transition management and support activities, such as:

- determining how OSC-I mayor cells would fund new installation requirements in 2012
- understanding the objective organizational structure of OSC-I at the Union III base headquarters, including appropriate contact information for newly assigned subject matter experts
- processing air and ground movement requests, using Chief of Mission aircraft, and related personal security detail support
- establishing which GoI entity would take responsibility for consolidating distributed equipment shipments for major FMS equipment delivered into the Taji
national depot, a critically important ‘service’ that U.S. military personnel scheduled to depart have been performing

- ensuring adequacy of medical evacuation resources for security assistance team personnel operating at multiple ranges at Besmaya
- identifying who would provide security for FMS land shipments from Umm Qasr port to the Taji and Besmaya intended OSC-I sites, and
- understanding the processing times for administrative, operations and logistics requests.

DCG (A&T) accepted certain aspects of the assessment team’s observation about limited information exchange with outlying sites. He directed his staff principals to address the establishment of management cells at the sites and to ensure that more detailed information about the site transitions was communicated to dedicated OSC-I personnel. The immediate DCG (A&T) staff response was to schedule a series of future dedicated visits to the outlying sites on an undetermined timeline and priority that were to take place after our departure.

**Conclusion**

The timely establishment of the OSC-I management organization and site security infrastructure remains critical for the overarching success of the U.S. Mission to Iraq security cooperation and security assistance mission. However, USF-I and DCG (A&T) implementation of priority requirements to conduct operational drawdown and base closure activities appeared to have led to delays in establishing OSC-I site infrastructure and management cells. While there were a number of factors that complicated the orderly transition and stand-up of the outlying OSC-I sites, the DCG (A&T) leadership was aware of these factors and intended to pursue solutions to mitigate their impact.

The following areas were at risk of not being completed according to the OSC-I stand-up timetable for 2011:

- development of an independently functioning management organization at outlying sites
- completion of security infrastructure at outlying sites
- dissemination of the concept of operations and specific details concerning the use of U.S. Mission to Iraq resources and procedures. (This will be discussed in greater detail in Observation 4).
- identification and establishment of the critical transportation activities for the delivery of FMS equipment to the Iraqi Security Forces.

USF-I OPORD timetables indicated that these actions must be completed by December 31, 2011, in order for OSC-I to be capable of assuming its full operational responsibilities.
Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

3. Chief, Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq:
   a. Accelerate, reinforce, and broadly disseminate the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq concept of operations for performing security cooperation and security assistance in a non-permissive environment.

Management Comments
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq J3 comments were forwarded to us in a letter from the USCENTCOM Inspector General. The OSC-I J3 neither concurred nor non-concurred with Recommendation 3.a., but simply stated that this was an unclear recommendation and that they did not understand its intent.

Our Response
OSC-I J3 comments are not responsive. During its visit, the DoD IG team found that the dissemination of essential USF-I/OSC-I management transition information from DCG (A&T) to outlying OSC-I sites was clearly insufficient. Senior DCG (A&T) and OSC-I officials that we interviewed verified this finding and agreed to address it. While at outlying OSC-I sites, the DoD IG team determined that BOS-I personnel were unprepared to operate within a new OSC-I structure under Chief of Mission authority without the support and resources previously provided by USF-I forces because they were not informed about specific procedures for operating within that new structure under non-permissive conditions (see “Sufficiency of Information Exchange” section of this observation’s narrative for specifics). Subsequent to those site visits, senior USF-I and OSC-I officials indisputably verified these communication shortfalls. During the DoD IG outbrief to the command, the USF-I Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training acknowledged the validity of this observation and directed his staff to develop a series of town hall meetings in order to clarify installation management procedures under Chief of Mission authority and to answer the litany of BOS-I questions. The DoD IG team was reasonably confident that such command-directed action would occur quickly and, due to the pressing events of transition and downsizing of U.S. resources, result in both better informed installation management cells and better posturing of outlying sites for the probable departure of USF-I forces.

Acknowledging the time that has elapsed between DoD IG outbrief and the command's written response to the draft report, the DoD IG concern remains that outlying sites still have a need for greater clarity regarding the OSC-I concept for operating in a non-permissive environment and the procedures for implementing that concept. To date, DoD IG has received no evidence OSC-I conducted the aforementioned visits or that it otherwise accelerated the dissemination of necessary information by alternate means. Lacking such evidence, we cannot determine whether the observed conditions persist. Now, two plus months after OSC-I replaced USF-I, our concern is that distributed OSC-I arrangements and associated processes may continue to be unsettled and ambiguous to those responsible for management at outlying sites. We request the OSC-I provide
additional information regarding its current concept for operating in Iraq, procedures for implementing that concept, how and when sites were informed of these details, and the extent to which sites are now able to comply with procedures.

**Management Comments**
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq J3 comments were forwarded to us in a letter from the USCENTCOM Inspector General. The OSC-I J3 neither concurred nor non-concurred with Recommendation 3.b., but stated that, in regards to construction, facilities, and operations and maintenance, processes were recently finalized through LOGCAP. The OSC-I J3 also stated that the OSC-I was working on quality control procedures and that there were procedures in place to ensure site leads understand the process and disseminate it to the Security Assistance Teams.

**Our Response**
OSC-I J3 comments are partially responsive. While acknowledging the positive steps taken to address this situation, the OSC-I J3 did not provide sufficient details regarding the LOGCAP arrangements, other procedures now in place for the site leads to follow, or the substance of its plans and milestones for developing quality control procedures for us to independently verify their assertions. We request that the OSC-I provide a more detailed response to the final report, in accordance with DoD Directive 7650.3.

The OSC-I had not established detailed sufficient standard operating procedures (SOPs)\textsuperscript{16} essential to managing its operational and administrative functions while operating from within the organizational framework of the U.S. Mission to Iraq.

This occurred because:

- USF-I had focused its priorities on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and had not yet initiated a concerted effort to develop the detailed procedures needed to establish an effective and enduring OSC-I.
- USF-I commanders, as well as future OSC-I staff (enduring sites and transition team personnel), lacked clarity about the concept of operations for performing security cooperation and security assistance in a non-permissive environment and needed specific details concerning the use of U.S. Mission to Iraq resources and procedures with respect to OSC-I operations.
- The OSC-I lacked key personnel required to perform necessary planning, management, and administrative roles and responsibilities.
- The division of responsibilities within the OSC-I and, in some cases, between the OSC-I and the Embassy had not been clearly defined.

As a result, OSC-I may not be able to effectively assume its mission post-2011 when it must be able to operate from within the organizational framework of the U.S. Mission to Iraq.

Applicable Criteria


Background

USF-I supported the establishment of OSC-I by issuing some plans and guidance and committing specialized functional support staff to meet the myriad requirements for establishing the new office. However, as of July 2011, the guidance and staff resources had focused on activities associated with standing up the OSC-I but had not developed

\textsuperscript{16} The use of SOPs provides: institutional knowledge of procedures, continuity of processes, instructions on the performance of routine or repetitive activity, and a quality assurance system for consistent quality integrity or desired end-result in both work performance and as evidence of compliance with prescribed policies and requirements. The use of SOPs also facilitates training of new personnel by providing written processes and procedures that reflect the continuity of operations and experiences gained.
the SOPs necessary for effective and sustainable management of the OSC-I after its establishment.

**Discussion**

*Development of Standard Operating Procedures*

As USF-I entered its final phase of transition prior to its projected December 31, 2011, end of mission, it was increasingly important to develop and implement all necessary management SOPs that the OSC-I would need to follow while operating from within the organizational framework of the U.S. Mission to Iraq in post-2011.

At the time of the assessment team visit, the OSC-I was operating under and with the support of a large, well-resourced, military umbrella organization – USF-I. But after USF-I departs, the OSC-I will fall under U.S. Mission to Iraq authority and operate under its organizational structure. By December 31, 2011, the OSC-I will not be able to borrow from USF-I resources to fill any shortfalls or gaps in manning or, in some cases, funding. It will need to have processes and procedures in place that ensure it can effectively accomplish its mission while operating from within the organizational framework of the U.S. Mission to Iraq.

Because of the unique complexity of the OSC-I mission (such as multi-site FMS case management and support in a non-permissive environment), standardized functional OSC-I procedures were needed that addressed both internal administrative (such as budgeting and contracting) and operational (a Joint Operations Center) requirements. In addition, SOPs were required to specify administrative and operational practices and procedures for functioning within the U.S. Mission to Iraq.

The OSC-I did not have SOPs that addressed crucial, mission-related administrative, logistical, and operational functions, such as:

- administrative responsibilities performed by OSC-I as an integral part of the U.S. Mission to Iraq management support staff
- budgeting for operational needs (e.g. identifying and collecting cost data, funding sources, any authorization needs, etc.)
- cost sharing for DoD and DoS sites and support services (such as the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program [LOGCAP] IV contract)\(^{17}\)
- procedures to ensure accomplishment of its resource oversight responsibilities (e.g., funding, equipping, facilities, contracts, etc.)
- operational processes and procedures for the OSC-I Joint Operations Center that would serve as its command and control hub for such activities as: remote site

---

\(^{17}\) LOGCAP is a program that provides worldwide logistics and base and life support services in contingency environments, and is currently providing most base and life support in Iraq. LOGCAP IV refers to a specific LOGCAP contract administered by DoS, with contract management assistance from DoD, that was negotiated to provide basic life support services, such as billeting, and possibly other security-related services, such as security guard personnel, which could involve cost sharing arrangements and agreements between DoD, DoS, and other agencies.
personnel accountability/tracking; mission movement coordination and monitoring; and, security assistance and cooperation mission status monitoring and reporting

- assistance with passport and visa processing for International Military Education and Training students
- procedures for processing air and ground movement requests between OSC-I specific sites using Chief of Mission aircraft and personal security details.

**Personnel Resources to Develop Standard Operating Procedures**

The OSC-I has received authorization for 157 DoD designated staff positions to perform the planning and management functions necessary to operate a fully functional security cooperation organization, to include overseeing FMS case implementation. In addition, the organization was expected to have a contingent of three contracting staff personnel to provide contracting expertise and to procure services and commodities for the OSC-I.

However, as of late July 2011, the OSC-I was not yet fully staffed with, in some cases, the personnel needed to perform key responsibilities (e.g., contracting).

Further, interaction between the OSC-I and the U.S. Mission to Iraq staff was mainly focused on standing up the OSC-I, especially the outlying OSC-I sites. Though U.S. Mission to Iraq would ultimately assume OSC-I mission responsibility, coordination between them regarding their respective post-2011 roles and responsibilities had not sufficiently taken place. For example, budgeting for DoD future costs required an understanding of expected cost sharing under the LOGCAP IV contract; however, there had been no communication between responsible DoD and DoS staff on this key issue, which could lead to shortfalls in either department’s resources.

Development of essential SOPs to support OSC-I operational and administrative duties had not been initiated. Further, the DCG (A&T) staff members responsible for coordinating administrative or operational issues did not indicate that they had a comprehensive plan, with a timetable, for developing these essential SOPs.

Limited OSC-I staffing had contributed to an inability to move forward with SOP preparation. Procedures for developing important budget submissions to U.S. Mission to Iraq had not been formally documented or recorded, for example.

During the final transition months leading to December 2011, there would have been increasingly fewer USF-I staff personnel supporting the OSC-I development under DCG (A&T) authority. USF-I staff already had begun to drawdown, a process which would continue at an increasing rate until USF-I ceased to exist by the end of 2011. None of the knowledgeable USF-I staff (e.g. J35), which had helped to stand up the OSC-I, will remain to assist in addressing future matters.

Additional temporary duty personnel resources may need to deploy from outside the country to provide the needed management expertise to assist in developing or
completing the necessary SOPs. However, such a team needs to be dispatched to Iraq promptly in order to complete its work as quickly as possible. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, for example, particularly in the form of its Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, routinely deploys mobile training teams into Iraq and has this personnel resource capability.

**Conclusion**

It is imperative to ensure that the respective DoD and DoS roles and responsibilities for performing administrative and operational functions be clearly defined given the complex challenges created by implementing the new OSC-I organizational context, including its relationship with the Embassy. Although FOC for the OSC-I was reached on October 1, 2011, USF-I reported that not all essential SOPs had been established by that date.

OSC-I may not be able to effectively accomplish its mission if processes and procedures are not in place through approved and issued SOPs. The lack of internal and external procedural guidance could result in ineffective coordination with the U.S. Mission to Iraq, security assistance and cooperation program implementation shortfalls, and a possible loss of oversight and control of funds and activities.18

**Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

4. Chief, Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq:
   a. Develop administrative and operational standard operating procedures for the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq that includes interagency operations within the overall framework of U.S. Mission to Iraq authority and responsibility.

**Management Comments**

Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq J3 comments were forwarded to us in a letter from the USCENTCOM Inspector General. While concurring with Recommendation 4.a., the OSC-I J3 simply stated that their efforts in this regard remain “a work in progress.”

**Our Response**

The OSC-I J3 comments are partially responsive. While management agreement with the recommendation was encouraging, we request OSC-I provide information on when they plan to issue complete SOPs; then, once they are completed, we request that they provide us copies of supporting documentation showing when and how they were distributed in order that we may determine if appropriate action has been taken to address the identified deficiency, in accordance with DoD Directive 7650.3.

---

b. Request that the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, deploy to Iraq an appropriately resourced team as soon as practicable to support accelerated development and completion of Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq standard operating procedures.

**Management Comments**

Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq J3 comments were forwarded to us in a letter from the USCENTCOM Inspector General. The OSC-I J3 neither concurred nor non-concurred with Recommendation 4.b., simply stating that DSCA had visited and that there was nothing to accelerate.

**Our Response**

The OSC-I J3 comments are partially responsive. While acknowledging the DSCA visit, the OSC-I J3 did not specify the extent of support provided, what actions were taken, and what is still planned to be accomplished in the future. In addition, the intent behind recommending DSCA assistance was to provide additional expert resources to aid in establishing critical OSC-I capabilities. We request that the OSC-I provide a more detailed response to the final report in order that we may determine if appropriate action has been taken to address the identified deficiency, in accordance with DoD Directive 7650.3.
Page Intentionally Blank
Appendix A. Scope, Methodology, and Acronyms

We conducted this assessment from April 2011 to November 2011 in accordance with the standards published in the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation. We planned and performed the assessment to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our observations and conclusions, based on our assessment objectives.

In the U.S. we met with personnel from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer; Joint Chiefs of Staff J1 and J5 Directorates; Security Cooperation Reform Task Force; and U.S. Central Command. In Iraq, we visited Victory Base Complex; Forward Operating Base Union III; the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad; and Contingency Operating Sites Besmaya, Kirkuk, and Taji. At these locations we met with U.S. and Iraqi leaders and managers at various levels, ranging from general officers, to staff officers, to senior Embassy personnel involved and responsible for training, planning, and implementation of security assistance and security cooperation transition activities in Iraq.

We reviewed documents such as Federal Laws and regulations, including the National Defense Authorization Act, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions, DoD directives and instructions, and appropriate USCENTCOM and USF-I guidance applicable to the assessment objectives. We also collected and reviewed supporting documentation.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this assessment.

Use of Technical Assistance

We did not use Technical Assistance to perform this assessment.

Acronyms Used in this Report

The following is a list of the acronyms used in this report.

- ACSA: Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement
- AECA: Arms Export Control Act
- CTFP: Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program
- DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- DoS: Department of State
- DCG (A&T): USF-I Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training
- DCCEP: Developing Country Combined Exercise Program
- DCS: Direct Commercial Sales
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUM</td>
<td>End-use Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-IMET</td>
<td>Extended-International Military and Education Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Foreign Assistance Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFP</td>
<td>Foreign Military Finance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOAA</td>
<td>Foreign Operations and Appropriations Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operating Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operating Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICP</td>
<td>Iraq Country Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J CET</td>
<td>Joint Combined Exchange Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOA</td>
<td>Letter of Offer and Acceptance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGCAP</td>
<td>Logistics Civil Augmentation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILDEF</td>
<td>Military Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MET</td>
<td>Mobile Education Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>Mobile Training Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Office of Defense Attache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSC-I</td>
<td>Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OND</td>
<td>Operation New Dawn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>Operations Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSI</td>
<td>Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMM</td>
<td>Security Assistance Management Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAT</td>
<td>Security Assistance Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>Theater Campaign Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USF-I</td>
<td>United States Forces – Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage

During the last three years, Congress, the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Government Accountability Office, the Department of Defense Inspector General, and the Department of State Inspector General issued reports discussing topics related to the transition of the security assistance mission from the DoD to the Department of State.


Some of the prior coverage we used in preparing this report included:

Congressionally Initiated Reports

Iraq: The Transition From a Military Mission to a Civilian-Led Effort, A Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, January, 2011.

Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan


GAO

GAO-11-774, “IRAQ DRAWDOWN: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DoD Role,” September 2011.


GAO-09-294SP, “IRAQ: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009
Department of Defense Inspector General

Department of State Inspector General
MERO-I-11-08, Middle East Regional Office, “Department of State Planning for the Transition to a Civilian-led Mission in Iraq,” May 2011.

Appendix C. Glossary

This appendix provides definitions of terms used in this report.

**Base Transitions to the Department of State (DoS) or the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) in Iraq.** According to the Final Edition of the USF-I Base Transition Smartbook, May 2011, all base transitions are coordinated with and accomplished through the Government of Iraq (GoI) Prime Minister’s Receivership Secretariat. The Receivership Secretariat is responsible for the disposition of the location after receiving it from U.S. Forces.

In a base transition to DoS or OSC-I, it is a type of base transition in which U.S. Forces relinquishes control of a base or portion of a base to DoS or OSC-I as part of the enduring U.S. Mission to Iraq. This type of transition will also take place through the Receivership Secretariat who will turn over the property to DoS or OSC-I based on land use agreements between the United States and the GoI. U.S. Forces property will not be turned over directly to the DoS or OSC-I.

**Foreign Military Sales Program.** The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program is that part of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and conducted using formal agreements between the U.S. Government and an authorized foreign purchaser or international organization.

Those agreements, called Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), are signed by both the U.S. Government and the purchasing government or international organization. The LOA provides for the sale of defense articles and/or defense services (to include training) usually from DoD stocks or through procurements under DoD-managed contracts. As with all security assistance, the FMS program supports U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.


**Non-permissive environment.** Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” Joint Pub 1-02, defines permissive environment as an: “Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.” This observation cites this definition to explain a non-permissive environment as one in which some level of lawlessness or heightened risk is assumed due to a breakdown in host country military and law enforcement capability.

**Security cooperation activity.** Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” Joint Pub 1-02, defines a security cooperation activity as “Military activity that involves other nations and is intended to
shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander’s theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan.”

Appendix D. Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Functions

Introduction
This Appendix is divided into three sections. The first distinguishes security assistance as a subset of the broader security cooperation activities. The second outlines the legislated functions that security cooperation organizations are authorized to perform. The final section lists and defines the specific security assistance and cooperation functions that the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq was designed to perform.

Security Assistance as a Subset of Security Cooperation
Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, specifically defines security assistance as a sub-set of the broader security cooperation activities:

Security Assistance — Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

Security Cooperation — All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

It also defines those DoD elements responsible for managing security assistance and security cooperation functions in a foreign country as:

Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) — All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance/cooperation management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation,

liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance/cooperation functions.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) outlines security assistance as the twelve major programs in Table C1.T1 of DoD 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM). While seven of these Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and Arms Export Control Act (AECA)-authorized programs are administered by DoD, specifically by DSCA, they remain under the general control of the Department of State as components of U.S. foreign assistance. The seven programs DoD has responsibility for administering are:

- Foreign Military Sales
- Foreign Military Construction Services
- Foreign Military Sales Credit
- Leases
- Military Assistance Program (MAP)
- International Military Education and Training (IMET)
- Drawdown

**Statutory Security Cooperation Office Functions**

The SCO operates within an environment that must take into account the political aspects of the U.S. national security and foreign policy goals and how they mesh with the host country goals and policies. It also has an obligation to share benefits of security cooperation for both the United States and host country within the highly competitive global environment. Most of its relationships are with the host country military where it is working to secure mutually supporting actions that support interoperability, modernization and sustainability to strengthen the host country defense capabilities. The overall goal of security cooperation activities is to tie these dissimilar issues together for the common purpose of meeting U.S. national security goals.

Title XII, Section 515, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, provides for the President to assign members of the U.S. Armed Forces to a foreign country. It is the governing legislation on what functions those military personnel are authorized to perform, which include:

1. equipment and services case management
2. training management
3. program monitoring

---

4. evaluation and planning of the host government’s military capabilities and requirements
5. administrative support
6. promoting rationalization, standardization, interoperability, and other defense cooperation measures, and
7. liaison functions exclusive of advisory and training assistance.

In performing the first function, equipment and services case management, the SCO serves as a transmission conduit between the case manager and the host nation. In this regard, the SCO assists the host nation to delineate its requirements in terms of equipment and services. After that, it serves as the facilitator between the United States and host nation to fill those requirements. Notably, the SCO is involved in case management, but its members are not case managers.

For the second function, training management, SCO personnel are only authorized to manage training, i.e. advise and assist in determining and coordinating host nation training requirements; bring in mobile training teams, Security Assistance Teams, etc.; and oversee the conduct of the training. Security assistance personnel do not have authority to actually conduct that training. In fact, Congress specifically limits the advisory and training assistance conducted by military personnel assigned under Section 515 authority to an absolute minimum. It is the sense of the Congress that such advising and training assistance activities shall be provided primarily by other personnel who are not assigned under Section 515 and who are detailed for limited periods to perform specific tasks, normally covered by Foreign Military Sales cases.

The SCO role in the third function, program monitoring, is a very important one that has several aspects. One of the most important aspects involves working with the host country to advise on the best way to integrate the equipment, services, and training they already possess with equipment they are buying and what they are contemplating buying to best meet that country’s defense objectives. In the process, SCO should promote interoperability of all systems to further host nation forces combined operations capabilities with U.S. forces. The SCO also supports U.S. defense industries’ marketing efforts.

End-use monitoring (EUM) of U.S. origin equipment is another key program monitoring aspect. EUM is not a specific requirement of the Foreign Assistance Act but came later as a provision in the Arms Export Control Act. In some cases EUM involves monitoring the use of critical technology or other selected items, which may require the SCO to conduct periodic inventories and inspections of specific items that the United States has sold, transferred, or leased.

Finally, program monitoring also entails providing advice and information on methods of disposal and/or transfer of the items at the end of the useful life of an item in the host nation’s inventory and overseeing U.S. leased equipment. The U.S. Navy, for example, leases many of its ships, which it prefers over “mothballing” them.
The fourth major SCO function is to evaluate host country military capabilities. First, in the role as advisor to the senior military and defense personnel in a country, the SCO has an opportunity to advise the host country personnel on developing strategies of engagement with the United States that will support mutual foreign policy objectives. Second, the SCO provides information to U.S. decision makers on host country desires and how they meet the foreign policy objectives in the U.S. national security strategy.

In regards to the fifth function, administrative support, the SCO is authorized to perform a range of administrative support functions. These may include, but are not limited to:

- Budget planning and execution
- Accountability for property
- Maintenance of vehicles
- Personnel actions (e.g., fitness reports, awards, pay)
- Housing and Quality of Life
- Country clearances and U.S. visitor support
- Managing communication and automation equipment
- Arranging for postal services and military support flights and cargo.

The SCO can provide this type of normal administrative support for personnel assigned in-country so long as that support does not reach a level that would require additional administrative personnel. Alternately, if the support for non-security assistance personnel requires additional administrative personnel, operations and maintenance or other funded billets must be provided.

The sixth function, Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI), is another major SCO function serving U.S. interests. Rationalization is any action that increases allied force effectiveness through more efficient or effective use of committed resources. It entails consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to higher alliance needs, standardization, specialization, mutual support or improved interoperability, and greater cooperation. It applies to both weapons and/or materiel resources and non-weapons military matters.

Standardization is the development and implementation of concepts, doctrines, procedures, and designs in order to achieve and maintain the compatibility, interchangeability or commonality which is necessary to attain the required level of interoperability, or to optimize the use of resources, in the fields of operations, materiel, and administration.

Interoperability is a property referring to the ability of diverse systems and organizations to work together (inter-operate). The term is often used in a technical systems engineering sense, or alternatively in a broad sense, taking into account social, political, and organizational factors that impact system to system performance.

SCOs play a key role in implementing U.S. RSI policy. This policy indicates interoperability with partner nations is in the best interests of the United States, but

42
recognizes the degree of international RSI that is subject to financial, legal, technical, and policy considerations. While acknowledging that achieving operational standardization on a worldwide basis so that U.S. forces may operate effectively as possible with forces of all allied, coalition, and friendly nations would be ideal, policy states that it should not take precedence over standardization on a regional level, unless doing so is clearly in the national interest.

Finally, to perform the functions just discussed the SCO serves a seventh liaison function between the U.S. Department of Defense and military department activities, the Secretary of Defense, the Combatant Commander to the U.S. ambassador and the host country defense forces. Though Sec 515 strictly limits advisory and training assistance activities by military personnel assigned under that section to an absolute minimum, the SCO may perform other duties assigned by Department of Defense, the combatant command or appropriate military department, and the ambassador. For instance, the SCO can play a very important role when the United States is requested or directed to assist in disaster relief in a country. Appropriate members of the SCO also have additional duties of search and rescue assigned in the case a U.S. aircraft, vessel, or person becomes lost or missing.

These SCO mandated functions are performed by working with the senior military and civilian defense personnel in the host country. While discouraging SCO personnel from providing operational advice or training, it does allow this to be done by special teams. Overall, the SCO impacts U.S. national security objectives by:

- providing a basis for U.S. access
- impacting host nation decision-makers
- strengthening host nation self-defense
- improving interoperability with U.S. forces
- strengthening host nation leadership and professional skills, and
- furthering U.S. economic interests.

With this legislative basis, OSC-I was designed to perform specific security assistance and security cooperation functions, which are listed in figure D-1 and defined in the next two sections.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OSC Activities</th>
<th>OPR</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Developing Country Combined Exercise Program</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Direct Commercial Sales</td>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Drawdowns</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Embedded and Mobile Training</td>
<td>DoD/DoS</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>End Use Monitoring</td>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Excess Defense Articles</td>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Exercise-Related Construction</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Foreign Military Construction Services</td>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing Program</td>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Intelligence Capacity Building</td>
<td>DoD/DoS</td>
<td>ODA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Intelligence Sharing</td>
<td>DoD/DoS</td>
<td>ODA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Leases</td>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Joint Combined Exercise Training</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Medical Team Deployments</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Military Academies</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Military and Professional Exchange Program</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Multi-lateral Interoperability Program</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Multi-lateral Planners Conference</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance Activities</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Senior War College</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Special Operations Support to Combat Terrorism</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Third Country Transfers</td>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Conferences and Working Groups</td>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>OSC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure D-1. OSC-I Designed Security Assistance and Cooperation Activities**

*OSC-I defers to the Office of the Defense Attaché in matters regarding intelligence sharing, intelligence capacity building, intelligence exercises, joint/combined operations and other intelligence activities that may be conducted by other agencies, services or departments. However, due to the sensitivity of the relationship between the GoI and the U.S. Government, collaboration and coordination between the Office of the Defense Attaché and OSC-I is maintained at the most robust level. [Note: These particular Intelligence Capacity Building and Intelligence Sharing activities are discussed in other publications and documents and are not defined within this Appendix.]

**OSC-I Design Security Assistance Functions**

Of the activities listed above, there are primary security assistance activities that are required to be conducted post-2011, as ongoing FMS cases will carry on through the

---

termination of the current security agreement. These will require continuing support for administration, management, training, fielding and other related security assistance tasks. In addition, the United States Forces – Iraq (USF-I) Operations Order 11-01, Annex V, Appendix 4 indicates that the OSC-I was to have assumed responsibility for performing all security assistance related functions by its initial operating capability (IOC) date of June 1, 2011. The following lists these primary Security Assistance activities.

**Foreign Military Sales**

Foreign Military Sales is a non-appropriated program administered by DSCA through which eligible foreign governments purchase defense articles, services, and training from the U.S. Government (USG). The purchasing government normally pays all costs associated with a sale. There is a signed government-to-government agreement, normally documented on a Letter of Offer and Acceptance between the USG and a foreign government. Each LOA is commonly referred to as a “case” and is assigned a unique case identifier for accounting purposes.

Under FMS, military articles and services, including training, may be provided from DoD stocks (Section 21, AECA) or from new procurement (Section 22, AECA). If the source of supply is new procurement, on the basis of having an LOA which has been accepted by the foreign government, the USG agency or Military Department (MILDEP) assigned cognizance for this case is authorized to enter into a subsequent contractual arrangement with U.S. industry in order to provide the article or service requested.

**Foreign Military Construction Services**

Foreign military construction services is a non-appropriated program administered by DSCA and authorized by Section 29, AECA, to include the sale of design and construction services by the USG to eligible purchasers. The construction sales agreement and sales procedures generally parallel those of FMS and are usually implemented by the MILDEP civil engineering agencies.

**Foreign Military Financing Program**

The Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) is an appropriated program administered by DSCA that has undergone a variety of substantive and terminological changes over the years. At present, the program consists of congressionally appropriated grants and loans which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase U.S. defense articles, services, and training through either FMS or direct commercial sales (DCS). Foreign military sales credit is authorized under the provisions of Sections 23 and 24, AECA, and originally served to provide credit (loans) as an effective means for easing the transition of foreign governments from grant aid, e.g., Military Assistance Program and International Military Education and Training (IMET), to cash purchases.

Prior to FY 1989, this financing program was variously identified as the Foreign Military Sales Credit Program or the Foreign Military Sales Financing Program. In the FY 1989 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (FOAA), Congress introduced a new title, the FMFP, and the forgiven loan/forgiven credit component of the program was identified as FMFP grants to distinguish them from repayable direct FMFP loans. Also, the terms
non-repayable loans or non-repayable credits are often used by various security assistance organizations (including DSCA) in place of the term “FMFP grants.”

In FY 1990, the Military Assistance Program was formally merged with the FMFP as Congress adopted an administration proposal for integrating all MAP grant funding into the appropriations account for the FMFP. This appropriated program was administered by DSCA. No MAP funds have been appropriated for subsequent FYs, and there is no interest in seeking any such funds for the future. This legislative change, therefore, had the dual effect of causing existing MAP-funded programs to lose their former identity and become FMFP-funded programs and establishing the FMFP as the major U.S. financing program for the acquisition of U.S. defense articles and services by foreign governments.

MAP continues to be identified as a current security assistance program because the MAP provided articles remain throughout the world with the continued requirements for EUM, return to the USG when no longer needed, and any proceeds from a sale to a third country or scrapping being returned to the USG.

Beginning in FY 1992, the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1992 (P.L. 101-508) changed the method of accounting and budgeting for all government loans, including FMFP loans issued under the AECA. This legislation provides a more accurate portrayal of the true cost of loans by providing new budget authority only for the subsidy element of the loan program and is the basis for the establishment of two new financial accounts:

- The first contains only the FMFP grant portion of the program administrative costs.
- The second account provides the budget authority needed to fund the subsidy element of the proposed loan programs.

While there are previously authorized FMFP loans still being repaid to the USG, this loan element is seldom used; the FMFP grant element (no repayment) is the norm.

**Leases**

Chapter 6, of the AECA, authorizes the president to lease defense articles to friendly governments or international organizations for up to five years (renewable). This non-appropriated program is administered by DSCA. The law allows the lease of defense articles only for compelling foreign policy or national security reasons, and stipulates that the full cost of the lease, with some exceptions, must be borne by the recipient. Furthermore, leased articles must not be needed for U.S. public use during the lease period, and the United States retains the right to terminate the lease at any time.

For the recipient country, leases may be cheaper than purchasing the article outright, and they provide a convenient vehicle for obtaining defense articles for temporary use. Leases are executed through a lease agreement, with an associated FMS case to cover repair, training, supply support and/or transportation, if required.
**International Military Education and Training**

The International Military Education and Training program provides grant financial assistance for training in the United States and, in some cases, in overseas facilities to selected foreign military and civilian personnel. In earlier years, grant aid training of foreign military personnel was funded as part of the MAP appropriation. Starting with FY 1976, a separate authorization for IMET was established in Section 541, FAA. This appropriated program is administered by DSCA. Although historically a relatively modest program in terms of cost, both the president and Congress attach significant importance to this program. The recipient countries, likewise, are heavily reliant on this grant program and, in many cases, this program serves as the only method to receive training from the U.S. military.

At a time of declining defense and foreign aid budgets, IMET advances U.S. objectives on a global scale at a relatively small cost. In many countries, having a core group of well-trained, professional leaders with firsthand knowledge of America will make a difference in winning access and influence for our diplomatic and military representatives. Thus, a relatively small amount of IMET funding will provide a return for U.S. policy goals, over the years, far greater than the original investment.

In 1980, Section 644(m)(5), FAA, was amended to authorize IMET tuition costing in terms of the additional costs that are incurred by the USG in furnishing such assistance. Section 21(a)(1)(C), AECA, was also amended to allow IMET recipients to purchase FMS training on an additional cost basis. The practical effects of these changes were to substantially reduce tuition costs for IMET funded students, and thereby increase the amount of training an eligible country can obtain with its IMET grant funds and through FMS purchases.

A new IMET initiative was introduced in the FY 1991 FOAA when Congress adopted a Senate proposed IMET earmark of $1 million to be used exclusively for expanding courses for foreign officers as well as for civilian managers and administrators of defense establishments. The focus of such training is on developing professional level management skills, with emphasis on military justice systems, codes of conduct, and the protection of human rights. Section 541, FAA, was amended to permit non-Ministry of Defense civilian government personnel to be eligible for this program, if such military education and training would:

- Contribute to responsible defense resource management.
- Foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military.
- Contribute to cooperation between military and law enforcement personnel with respect to counternarcotics law enforcement efforts.
- Improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.

This expanded IMET (E-IMET) program was further extended in FY 1993 to also include participation by national legislators who are responsible for oversight and
management of the military. The E-IMET program authority was again amended in 1996 by P.L.104-164 to also include nongovernmental organization personnel.

**Drawdowns**

During a crisis, Section 506, FAA, authorizes the president to provide USG articles, services, and training to friendly countries and international organizations at no cost, to include free transportation. There is a $100 million ceiling per FY on articles, services, and training provided for military purposes and another FY ceiling of $200 million for articles, services and training required for non-military purposes such as disaster relief, nonproliferation, antiterrorism, counternarcotics, refugee assistance, and Vietnam War-era missing in action/prisoners of war location and repatriation. When emergency support for peacekeeping operations is required, Section 552(c)(2), FAA, separately authorizes the President to drawdown up to $25 million per FY in USG articles and services from any agency. Special drawdown authorities are periodically legislated to include $30 million in support for the Yugoslav International Criminal Court. These non-appropriated authorities are administered by DSCA when defense articles, services, or training from DoD are to be drawn down.

**Direct Commercial Sales**

DCS are commercial exports of defense articles, services, and training licensed under the authority of Section 38, AECA, made by U.S. defense industry directly to a foreign government. Unlike the procedures employed for FMS, DCS transactions are not administered by DoD and do not normally include a government-to-government agreement. Rather, the required USG controls are implemented through licensing by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls in the DoS. The day-to-day rules and procedures for these types of sales are contained in the *International Traffic in Arms Regulations* [22 CFR 120-130].

Of note, not all license approvals will result in signed contracts and actual deliveries. Like FMS, DCS deliveries are likely to take place years after the commercial contract is signed and the export license is obtained by U.S. industry.

**Other Security Assistance Related Programs**

While these following programs are not identified by DSCA in the SAMM as one of the specific security assistance programs, they are very much related to the duties of the security assistance community, both in the United States and recipient foreign governments.

**Excess Defense Articles**

Excess defense articles (identified by the MILDEP or DoD agency are authorized for sale using the FMS authority in Section 21, AECA, and FMS processes identified within the SAMM for property belonging to the USG.) Prices range from 5 to 50 percent of original acquisition value, depending on the condition of the article. Additionally, Section 516, FAA, authorizes the president to transfer excess defense articles on a grant basis to eligible countries (justified in the annual Congressional Budget Justification). While
excess defense articles can be transferred at no-cost, the recipient must typically pay for any transportation or repair charges. Under certain circumstances, transportation charges may be waived, with the cost absorbed by DoD appropriated funds.

**Third-Country Transfers**

Section 3(d), AECA, authorizes the president to manage and approve the transfer of U.S.-origin defense articles from the original recipient country to a third country. Requests for third-country transfers are normally approved if the USG is willing to conduct a direct transfer to the third country. Third-country transfer authority to countries must be obtained in writing from the DoS in advance of the proposed transfer. This applies to all U.S.-origin defense articles regardless of the method of original transfer from the USG or U.S. industry.

**End-Use Monitoring**

This program is not a specific requirement of the Foreign Assistance Act, but came later as a provision in the Arms Export Control Act. It is a key monitoring responsibility for equipment of U.S. origin. In some cases EUM involves monitoring the use of critical technology or other selected items, which may require the SCO to conduct periodic inventories and inspections of specific items that the United States has sold, transferred, or leased.

**OSC-I Design Security Cooperation Functions**

Besides the core security assistance activities, other security cooperation activities were also identified that most likely would be required post-2011 to support a foundation of building a defense relationship, developing military capability, and providing access with the partner nation. Descriptions of activities that fall within the scope of OSC-I for management, coordination, or execution and most likely will be enduring are listed below. In addition to the security assistance functions discussed in the last section that the OSC-I was to assume by its IOC date of June 1, 2011, the OSC-I was supposed to have the capacity of performing these remaining security cooperation functions by its full operating capability (FOC) date of October 1, 2011. Though not delineated in any one source, the following categorizes DoD-authorized security cooperation programs the

---

22 Security Assistance program definitions derived from: The Management of Security Cooperation, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management “Greenbook”, 30th Edition, January 2010, pp. 1-6 – 1-16, except for those items annotated with an asterisk (*) in the title. [Note: Items annotated with an asterisk (*) in the title were derived from a USF-I Information Paper, USF-I Enduring Activities, dated January 24, 2010.] The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Greenbook indicates that other sources for identifying DoD security cooperation programs include the Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Activities Handbook used within the U.S. European theater of operations and the Army International Activities Plan published by the U.S. Army. The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Greenbook also states that another method of identifying the difference between security assistance and security cooperation is the source of authority within the United States Code for the program. The U.S.C. is the codification of the general and permanent U.S. laws divided into 50 titles by subject matter. 22 U.S.C., or Title 22, pertains to U.S. foreign relations to include FAA and AECA security assistance. 10 U.S.C., or Title 10, pertains to the U.S. armed forces to include DoD security cooperation. It should be noted however that certain DoD security cooperation program authorities also reside with 22 U.S.C.
OSC-I was designed to perform at FOC, with a brief description and references for each program. It should be reiterated that the previously described FAA and AECA-authorized security assistance programs administered by DoD in accordance with the SAMM also fall under the broad definition of security cooperation.

**Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements**

Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSA) are initiated and negotiated by a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) to allow U.S. logistics support of a military unit of another country. Lethal significant military equipment or support reasonably available from U.S. commercial sources may not be provided under an ACSA. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of State, to include a thirty day advance notification to Congress, must approve the proposal before the agreement is negotiated and concluded by the GCC.

The authority for an ACSA is 10 U.S.C., 2341-2350, with procedures provided in DODD 2010.9, and Section C11.1, SAMM. However, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2007, P.L.110-417, 109-364, 17 October 2006, Section 1202, as amended, authorizes the loan of certain categories of significant military equipment defense articles to countries participating in coalition operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, or for peacekeeping operations for up to one year. The authorization is extended through FY 2011. It must be determined by the secretaries of state and defense that it is in the U.S. national security interest to provide this loan and there are no unfilled U.S. in-theater requirements for the loaned articles.

**Aviation Leadership Program**

Section 544(c), FAA, authorizes the cooperative participation of foreign and U.S. military and defense civilian personnel in post-undergraduate flying training and tactical leadership programs at locations in Southwest Asia without charge to participating foreign countries. IMET funds are not to be used in support of the Aviation Leadership program. The United States participation is to be funded by the MILDEP. A presidential national interest waiver may be used to allow a country to participate on a no-cost basis with the U.S. MILDEP absorbing the charge.

**Building Partner Capacity of Foreign Militaries**

Beginning in FY 2006, up to $350 million in DoD funding may be used annually to equip, supply, and train foreign military forces (including maritime security forces) to conduct counterterrorism operations, or participate in or support military and stability operations in which U.S. forces are participating. Any country prohibited by law from receiving such assistance may not receive such assistance. This program is initially authorized by NDAA FY 2006, Section 1206, as amended, to currently expire at the end of FY 2011. This annual “1206” authority for individual programs is to be notified to Congress fifteen days prior to implementation, with the funds to be obligated prior to the end of the subject FY. This short time requirement places significant pressure on the MILDEP acquisition agencies for execution. Pseudo LOA case procedures are used for the implementation and management of this program. This program is managed by DSCA and the MILDEPs in support of Assistance Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and the GCC; requests are often initiated by the SCO. Both the secretaries of defense and state must concur with proposed programs prior to notifying Congress. Legislative proposals have regularly sought to raise the 1206 cap, with $500 million annually requested beginning in FY 2011.

**Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies**

Title 10 authorities and DoD appropriations funded the development of five regional centers for security studies. The centers serve as a mechanism for communicating U.S. foreign and defense policies to international students, a means for countries to provide feedback to the United States concerning these policies and communicating country policies to the United States. The regional centers’ activities include education, research, and outreach. They conduct multi-lateral courses in residence, seminars within their region, and conferences that address global and regional security challenges, such as terrorism and proliferation. Participants are drawn from the civilian and military leadership of allied and partner nations. Security assistance funding is not used to pay for the centers or the students attending them.

However, under certain circumstances, DoD funds may be used to fund foreign attendance at the centers. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in coordination with the relevant GCC provides oversight for the five centers. DODD 5200.41 provides policy and management guidance. Beginning in FY 2006, DSCA began administering the DoD centers under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The five centers are:

- **Africa Center for Strategic Studies**, located at the National Defense University in Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. was established in 1999.
- **Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies**, located in Honolulu, Hawaii, was established in 1995.
- **Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies**, located at the National Defense University in Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., was established in 1997.
- **George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies**, located in Garmisch, Germany, was established in 1993.
- **Near-East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies**, located at the National Defense University in Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., was established in 2000.

Section 904 of the NDAA for FY 2007 finally codified the authority for these regional centers with a new 10 U.S.C., 184.

**Developing Country Attendance at Bilateral & Multilateral Meetings**

10 U.S.C., 1051 authorizes the use of DoD funds to support the attendance of representatives from developing countries to attend bilateral and multilateral meetings, usually GCC sponsored. Attendance at these meetings provides the opportunity to continue to develop operational access that requires considerable precursor activity such as high-level visits and bilateral exercises to set the conditions for future security
cooperation. The SCO assists the partner nation in preparing for these meetings and may
even escort the partner nation members to the meetings if the need arises. This activity is
essential in the development of not only foundational security development but provides
advanced level support to building partnerships and cooperation.

**Developing Country Combined Exercise Program**

The Developing Country Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP) is authorized by
10 U.S.C. 2010 to use DoD funds to pay for incremental expenses for a developing
country to participate in a combined exercise with U.S. forces. Such expenses normally
include rations, fuel, training ammunition, and transportation. The Joint Staff in
coordination with the GCC manages DCCEP. This authority was further amended in FY
2009 with a new 10 U.S.C. 2010(d) authorizing funding for exercise expenses that begin
in one FY and extend into the following FY. This assists the partner nation to develop
operational capabilities, interoperability and also directly supports operational access
requirements that enable joint/combined operations and exercises and allows for
integration into regional security relationships and organizations.

**Embedded and Mobile Training Teams***

This program consists of U.S. military and civilian personnel assigned temporarily in
country to train/educate (Mobile Training Teams [MTT] or Mobile Education Teams,
[MET], respectively) foreign military personnel in the operation, maintenance, or other
support of weapon systems and support equipment, as well as training for general
military operations. MTTs may be funded from either FMS or IMET Programs.
MTTs/METs are authorized to conduct in-country training when the requirement is
beyond the capability of the SCO to provide advice and specific training. This activity is
almost always more effective to bring the training to the country vice transporting an
entire unit to the United States for the same training.

**Exercise-Related Construction**

The Exercise – related Construction Program is authorized by 10 U.S.C. 2805 with policy
guidance provided within *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 4600.01A* to
allow overseas construction by the U.S. military in locations where there is no permanent
U.S. presence. The construction is to enhance exercise effectiveness, enhance troop
quality of life, and increase operational readiness. The construction is typically used by
U.S. forces during an exercise but remains intact for host nation use after departure.
Projects may include new construction, conversion of existing facilities (e.g., warehouses
into exercise operations centers), and restoration of deteriorating facilities.

The United States. and/or the host nation engineer units and construction contracts may
be used to accomplish projects. When construction is accomplished with partner nation
engineers, interoperability benefits are also obtained. The Joint Staff logistics
engineering division manages the program through the engineer divisions of the area
GCCs.
**Joint Combined Exchange Training**

The Joint Combined Exchange Training Program (JCET) includes the deployment by U.S. special operations forces with the dual purpose of training themselves and foreign counterparts. 10 U.S.C. 2011 provides the authority for the use of DoD funding for JCET. This funding can be used for the training of the foreign counterpart, expenses for the U.S. deployment, and, for developing countries, the incremental expenses incurred by the country for the training. The JCET program is carefully followed by Congress because of concerns about inadequate civilian oversight and fears that such training might benefit units or individuals who have committed human rights violations. This program supports the developing country combined exercise program and is specifically targeted at special operations and related types of training to include special operations support to combat terrorism. It is also supported by a number of other programs to include information sharing and intelligence capacity building.

In addition to JCET, the NDAA, FY 2005, Section 1208, P.L. 108-375, 28 October 2004, as amended, provided for the Special Operations Support to Combat Terrorism program that originally authorized the Secretary of Defense to expend up to $25 million in DoD funding annually to support foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing operations by U.S. special operations forces in combating terrorism. This authority is not to be delegated below the Secretary of Defense and requires the concurrence of the relevant U.S. Chief of Mission. This annual “1208” authority is now $40 million through FY 2013 with a proposed increase of $50 million annually beginning in FY 2011.

**Medical Team Deployments**

These team deployments are traditionally a part of a larger exercise and are conducted on the most part by National Guard and Reserve medical personnel. The SCO coordinates with the partner nation and assists in preparing for the receipt of medical team staff to conduct their training and exercises. Additionally, military veterinarians can assist with industrial hygiene and other training for partner medical personnel. This activity specifically increases the health status of the partner nation and provides strengthening of friendship and medical capability of both nations.

**Military Academies and Senior War College**

**Military Academy Student Exchanges**

By international agreement, the MILDEP secretaries each may authorize up to 24 students annually to participate in the reciprocal exchange of cadets to attend the appropriate military academies. The authorities for this exchange program are:

- 10 U.S.C. 4345 for the U.S. Military Academy
- 10 U.S.C. 6957a for the U.S. Navy Academy
- 10 U.S.C. 9345 for the U.S. Air Force Academy
Senior War College

10 U.S.C. 2111 authorizes DoD and the MILDEPs to provide quotas to international students to attend the various senior officer war colleges. The MILDEP secretaries each may provide up to sixty quotas at any one time to foreign military students to attend the three military academies. The secretary of defense may waive all or any part of the requirement to reimburse any cost for attendance. The invitations to attend the academies are offered by the MILDEP secretaries usually through the Office of Defense Attaché. These programs are not considered security assistance; authorities for attending the military academies are:

- 10 U.S.C. 4344(a)(1) for the U.S. Military Academy
- 10 U.S.C. 6957(a)(1) for the U.S. Navy Academy
- 10 U.S.C. 9344(a)(1) for the U.S. Air Force Academy

Military and Professional Exchange Program

Professional Military Education Student Exchanges

Section 544(a), FAA, authorizes by international agreement no-cost, reciprocal professional military education (PME) student exchanges. PME usually includes attendance at the MILDEP leadership and management education institutions but not to include the service academies. The U.S. participant in this program will attend the equivalent institution in the foreign country and be administratively supported by either the local Office of Defense Attaché or SCO.

Defense Personnel Exchange Program

The NDAA for FY 1997, Section 1082, authorizes DoD and the MILDEPs to enter into international agreements for the reciprocal, no-cost exchange of qualified military or defense civilian personnel with allied or friendly countries. NDAA for FY 2008, Section 1201 amends 10 U.S.C. 168(c) authorizing the assignment of personnel on a non-reciprocal basis, rather than an exchange, if determined to be in the U.S. interests. This personnel exchange program is widely subscribed to throughout DoD to include the administrative, intelligence, acquisition, training and education, and operational and reserve unit and staff communities. A sample of these programs includes:

- Foreign counterpart visits for the service chiefs of the Army, Air Force, and Navy
- Personnel exchange programs managed by each of the four military services
- The Army’s reciprocal unit exchange program
- The DoD reserve officers foreign exchange program.

Multi-lateral Interoperability Program*

This program focuses on developing command and control, operational and technical capabilities; doctrine; and tactics, techniques and procedures with partner nations so that the United States and partner forces can operate effectively and interchangeably in designated combined operations. Particular focus is placed on air and missile defense and maritime security interoperability. Increasing partners’ ability to plan, train and operate with U.S. forces and allies, with an emphasis on communications interoperability.
The Office of Security Cooperation will provide advice and mentorship to the partner nation regarding activities and equipment applied to multilateral interoperability programs.

**Multi-lateral Planners Conferences**

This program serves as a mechanism for communicating U.S. foreign and defense policies to international partners and a means for countries to provide feedback to the United States concerning these policies and communicating country policies to the United States. These conferences assist participants in preparing their respective countries for participation in selected or serial exercises. The United States leads these conferences so that a leveling of information is achieved and further assistance or resourcing is able to be planned for.

**Security Force Assistance Activities**

These activities are an integral part of any security cooperation program and provide the added focused effort to ensure that a foreign military is trained to a standard that is far superior to most world wide security forces. By applying the capability imbedded in a unit capable of conducting Security Force Assistance that entire range of peace time and war time activities of military forces can be demonstrated and supported. This specific activity brings with it the requirement for additional congressional approval and acceptance or request by/for the government of Iraq to conduct. Additional Title 10 funding is required to support the force as it falls outside the scope of Title 22 funding. Agreements are normally required by both countries (the United States and the partner nation) to conduct this type of activity.

**Other Military-to-Military Contact and Security Cooperation Programs**

Though not specifically listed in the proposed OSC-I design functions, the following lists a number of other security cooperation related programs that it might be involved in supporting. Many of these programs have been around for a long time and continue today as a general program to establish and strengthen professional (and personal) relationships between two country counterparts.

**Traditional Combatant Commander Activities**

10 U.S.C. 168 authorizes DoD, normally the GCC, to conduct military-to-military contacts and comparable activities with allied and friendly countries to encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces. Some functions include:

- Traveling contact teams
- Military liaison teams
- Exchange of military and civilian personnel
- Seminars
- Conferences within the GCC area of responsibility.
Funding for the Traditional Combatant Commander Activities program is provided to the GCC by the MILDEPs will act as executive agents. Section 1202, P.L. 110-417, provided a new 10 U.S.C. 168(e)(5) authorizing the use of funds for such expenses that begin in one FY and extended into the following FY.

**Combatant Commander Initiative Fund**

The Combatant Commander Initiative Fund consists of GCC-nominated special interest programs authorized by 10 U.S.C. 166a to be funded at a rate of $25 million annually. The FY 2010 DoD appropriations act provides up to $50 million for Combatant Commander Initiative Fund with not more than $12.5 million to be used in Iraq or Afghanistan.

**Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program**

The Regional Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) was established in 2002 first with DoD funding, later with DoD authorizations, and now under 10 U.S.C. 2249c. The purpose of the program is to help key partner nations cooperate with the United States in the fight against international terrorism by providing education and training on a grant basis to foreign military and civilian personnel. The objective is to bolster the capacity of friends and allies to detect, monitor, interdict, and disrupt the activities of terrorist networks, ranging from weapons trafficking and terrorist-related financing to actual operational planning by terrorist groups. The Assistance Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict is the Office of the Secretary of Defense Manager of CTFP, in coordination with the GCCs. The day-to-day administration of the program is performed by DSCA. The $20 million was originally appropriated to DoD for CTFP. The management of quotas is very similar to that of IMET. Section 1204, P.L.109-364, amended the annual funding authority to $25 million. Later, Section 1214 of P.L. 110-417 amended the authorized annual funding level to $35 million.
Appendix E. Organizations Contacted and Visited

We visited, contacted, or conducted interviews with officials (or former officials) from the following U.S. and Iraqi organizations:

**Government of the United States**

**Iraqi National Security Council Advisor**

**Department of State**

**U.S. Embassy - Baghdad**
- Political Military Advisor
- Regional Security Officer
- Management Affairs
- International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
- Assistant Chief of Mission for Assistance Transition
- Knowledge Management

**Department of Defense**

**Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)**
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics – Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Maintenance Policy and Programs
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy – Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Middle East
- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financing Officer – Cost Assessment and Policy Evaluation

**Joint Staff**
- Chief, Personnel Readiness Division (J1)
- Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5)

**U.S. Central Command**
- Headquarters
  - CCJ1 – Manpower
  - CCJ3 – Operations Directorate
  - CCJ4 – Logistics Directorate
  - CCJ5 – Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate
  - CCJ7 – Exercises and Training
• CCJ8 – Resources and Analysis
• CCJA – Judge Advocate
• Historian
• NATO LNO

• U.S. Forces – Iraq
  • J1 (Personnel)
  • J35 (Operations)
  • J4 (Logistics)
  • J5 (Plans)
  • J7 (Engineering)
  • J8 (Finance)
  • J9 (Strategic Communications)
• Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training
  o Executive Director
  o ITAM Ministry of Defense
  o ITAM Ministry of Interior
  o ITAM Police
  o ITAM Army/OSC-I Army
  o ITAM Army Aviation/OSC-I Army Aviation
  o ITAM Navy/OSC-I Navy
  o ITAM Air Force/OSC-I Air Force
  o OSC-I Comptroller
  o OSC-I Contracting
  o OSC-I Engineering
  o OSC-I Operations/Plans/Training
  o OSC-I Personnel Management
  o OSC-I Strategic Logistics

Defense Agencies
• Defense Security Cooperation Agency

Government of Iraq

Ministry of Defense
• Director General for Acquisition and Sustainment
• Deputy Commander, Joint Headquarters

Ministry of Interior
• Director General for Contracting

58
Appendix F. Management Comments

USCENTCOM and OSC-I Comments

3 February 2012

TO: DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, SPECIAL PLANS AND OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL


2. USCENTCOM has reviewed and concurs with the coordinated responses to the recommendations from the OSC-I, J3 which is attached in a matrix for your review. Additionally, USCENTCOM concurs with the report with the following comments:

   a. Page 5 last paragraph: The statement that "this delay caused OSC-I to have incomplete theater level security cooperation guidance and little regional planning context..." is inaccurate. OSC-I, a sub component element of USF-I until 20 Dec 2011, did in fact have clear guidance. USF-I published OPORD 10-01.4 and subsequently 11-01. It referenced the Iraq Transition Plan and the Theater Campaign Plan. There was no delay in security cooperation planning guidance.

   b. Page 10 last paragraphs: "OSC-I was focused on Iraq and they depended on USCENTCOM experts to provide..." OSC-I was a sub component of USF-I, therefore, they received their guidance from USF-I. USCENTCOM J5 and the USF-I J5 were in constant contact. The regional discussions were in fact ongoing between the two staffs so as to inform OSC-I set up. With the Iraq Transition Plan published, and 10-01.4 and 11-01 published OSC-I had theater security cooperation planning guidance.

   c. Page 11: Figure 2 does not accurately portray the country level plans and planning. Bottom left of the chart should include the Iraq Transition Plan and 10.01.4 and 11.01. These documents captured guidance from both the CENTCOM and USF-I Commanders. Admin Note: Planners from USF-I, OSC-I, the original PSG-I was actively involved in the development of the Iraq Transition Plan and Country Plan. USF-I even requested the mission to write Annex O (security cooperation annex) and the associated appendices.
3. My Point of Contact regarding this matter is Robert Henderson,

[Signature]

DUANE T. RACKLEY
GS-15, DAFC
Executive Director Inspector General

Attachment:
TAB A: OSC-I Matrix
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page #</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>RECOMMENDATION</th>
<th>COMMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Overall: A lot has changed here since the JUL 11 DoD IG visit. The document does not address: how to operate in a sovereign nation without: a Security Agreement/ Status of Forces Agreement; a residual force that was supposed to be present post DEC 11; and, not having a Security Agreement/ Status of Forces Agreement. This in turn affects: Land Use Agreements, Implementing Agreement, Protections and Immunities, VCDR, passport/ visa, the Joint Manning Document, Communications, vehicles, Force Protection, movement (air &amp; ground), both inter &amp; intra country, and the stand-up of sites. Before an OSC is established, must have the following to do it properly: some sort of Security Agreement/ SOFA, which included keeping a military force greater than 157/ 763.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>OSC-I</td>
<td>B. Chief, Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, coordinate with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency to immediately request that a security cooperation management assistance team deploy to Iraq to support the accelerated stand-up of the required planning capability of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq.</td>
<td>Completed. DSCA has been to visit OSC-I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>OSC-I</td>
<td>A. Communicate to key Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior officials sufficient details about the United States intentions and plans for security cooperation and the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq role and operating processes to ensure their understanding of and confidence in the future of the program.</td>
<td>Based on Key Leader Engagements (KLE) from Chief, OSC-I, to OSC-I Section Leads, to Senior Advisor Groups, this action has been completed, and continues to be refined with each KLE.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 of 3
<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>OSC-I</td>
<td>B. Identify to appropriate Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior senior officials any additional responsibilities that the government of Iraq will have to undertake after December 31, 2011, with respect to the Foreign Military Sales program execution, or in any other relevant area of security assistance and security cooperation.</td>
<td>This has been shared with Iraqi leaders from the Prime Minister, and Chief, OSC-I addressing the Council of Representatives in a session on 25 DEC 11 on OSC-I. It continues to remain an ongoing action as we manage Iraqi leader expectations and the LOR/LOA process to ensure GOI understands and acknowledges all costs associated with OSC-I infrastructure and facilities must be funded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>OSC-I</td>
<td></td>
<td>The teams Initial Operating Capability (IOC) [1 JUL 11] and Full Operating Capability (FOC) [1 OCT 11]. IOC &amp; FOC are acquisition terms that should not have been used. This actually should have been conditions-based, not calendar-based.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>OSC-I</td>
<td>CONCLUSION.</td>
<td>Timetables were completed by 31 DEC 11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>OSC-I</td>
<td>A. Accelerate, reinforce, and broadly disseminate the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq concept of operations for performing security cooperation and security assistance in a non-permissive environment.</td>
<td>Unclear recommendation. Do not understand. There is nothing to accelerate, reinforce, and broadly disseminate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B. Provide specific details concerning procedures for the use of U.S. Mission to Iraq resources to support essential OSC-I activities after December 31, 2011, to include related procedures for supporting OSC-I site managers and Security Assistance Teams (SATS).</td>
<td>For construction, facilities and O&amp;M, processes through LOGCAP were recently finalized. We are currently working on our QC procedures that will allow us to see, prioritize and predict resource requirements in the future. There are procedures in place to ensure site leads understand the process, and disseminate it to the SATs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>OSC-I</td>
<td>A. Develop administrative and operational standard operating procedures for the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq that includes interagency operations within the overall framework of U.S. Mission to Iraq authority and responsibility.</td>
<td>Concur, remains a work in progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>OSC-I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>B. Request that the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, deploy to Iraq an appropriately resourced team as soon as practicable to support accelerated development and completion of Office of Security Cooperation - Iraq standard operating procedures.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DSCA has visited. Nothing to accelerate.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix G. Report Distribution

**Department of State**
Secretary of State
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs
Inspector General, Department of State

**Office of the Secretary of Defense**
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
Director, Joint Staff
Director, Operations (J-3)
Director, Logistics (J-4)
Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5)
Director, Joint Force Development (J-7)

**Department of the Army**
Secretary of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command
Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity
Commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
Commander/Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Commander, Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Auditor General, Department of the Army
Inspector General of the Army

**Department of the Navy**
Naval Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
Commander, Air Force Security Assistance Center
Inspector General of the Air Force

Combatant Commands
Commander, U.S. Central Command*
Commander, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan

Other Defense Organizations
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency
The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

Other Non-Defense Federal Organizations
Comptroller of the United States
Office of Management and Budget

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member
Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement
House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
House Committee on International Relations

*Recipient of the draft report.
Special Plans & Operations

Provide assessment oversight that addresses priority national security objectives to facilitate informed, timely decision-making by senior leaders of the DOD and the U.S. Congress.

General Information

Forward questions or comments concerning this assessment and report and other activities conducted by the Office of Special Plans & Operations to spo@dodig.mil

Deputy Inspector General for Special Plans & Operations
Department of Defense Inspector General
4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

Visit us at www.dodig.mil