The Impact of Racial Integration on the Combat Effectiveness of Eighth (US) Army during the Korean War

A Monograph
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**Author:** Major Richard T. Cranford

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Abstract


This monograph studies the racial integration of Army ground combat units in Eighth (US) Army during the Korean War. The purpose of the monograph is to determine how this change in the utilization of African-American combat soldiers impacted the effectiveness of a US Army organization engaged in fighting a war. This monograph utilizes several methods to accomplish this purpose: study of pertinent records and Army doctrine, primary and secondary source historical analysis, and an inter-disciplinary study of military effectiveness. To answer the primary research question, this monograph also explores in broad terms the origins of the Cold War and US national policy after World War II, the use of Korean soldiers in US Army units during the Korean War, and the Army’s segregation policies. This monograph comes to two major findings. First, the integration of African-Americans in Army combat units during the Korean War resulted in improvements in cohesion, leadership and command, fighting spirit, personnel resources and sustainment that increased the combat effectiveness of Eighth (US) Army. Second, contrary to the prevailing Army view, leaders in the Eighth (US) Army held a positive opinion of the ability of African-American soldiers to fight in combat. Both of these findings are evidence of Eighth (US) Army’s adaptability.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction

Overview

African-American soldiers have made significant contributions to the United States (US) Army in every major conflict that the nation has fought.¹ For most of the 235 year existence of the US Army, African-American soldiers served in racially segregated units. The Army upheld this separation of races based on commonly held beliefs that African-Americans and whites were not social equals, African-Americans were not capable of performing to the same standards as whites, and the mixing of races in a military organization would decrease the effectiveness of that organization.

In the aftermath of World War II, the US Army, pressured by President Truman’s 1948 decision to desegregate the Armed Forces, slowly moved towards increased integration between African-Americans and white soldiers, but balked at the suggestion that African-American and white soldiers work side by side in the same units. Army leadership, much as it had during World War II, felt that social experimentation was detrimental to the mission of the Army and full integration in the Army should follow implementation of full integration in American society.

In June 1950, less than five years after the surrender of Japan ended World War II, the United States found itself fighting the first military conflict of the Cold War in Korea. The Army had undergone an extensive drawdown and reduction in resources following World War II. During the three years of the Korean War, the Army would undergo additional change, one of which was the full integration of African-American soldiers in 1951. Remarkably, despite the prevailing belief that integration would impair the effectiveness of Army forces, integration in many of the units fighting in Korea began in 1950. Commanders, ignoring the official policy of the Army, integrated units at every echelon from company to division while engaged in combat.

operations. An examination of the US ground combat forces in Korea and the changes brought about by implementation of racial integration provides an opportunity to assess the validity of the Army’s belief that integration would hamper the effectiveness of military forces in combat. The development and application of criteria for the effectiveness of military forces provide a lens through which to conduct this assessment.

**Background**

In 1775, the Continental Congress prohibited African-Americans from serving as members of the Continental Army, despite more than a century of service in colonial militias. Often ignored in practice, this prohibition was lifted in 1776 due to manpower needs. The United States followed this same pattern of behavior as it fought the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War and the Civil War, enacting barriers to prevent African-Americans from serving in the Army and lifting those barriers as manpower resources became scarce. Following the Civil War, Congress mandated that the Army establish and maintain four units composed of African-American soldiers: the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments and the 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments. These units were the nation’s first commitment to a permanent place in the military for African-Americans.

From 1866 to 1945, the United States Army’s policies and practices for utilizing African-Americans soldiers did not substantially change. During this time, the Army restricted the peacetime service of African-Americans to the number of soldiers required to man the four African-American regiments mandated by Congress. During the Spanish-American War, World

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3 Krewasky A. Salter, *Combat Multipliers: African-American Soldiers in Four Wars* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 51. Law passed by Congress in 1866 established the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 41st Infantry Regiments. In 1868, the 39th and 40th Infantry Regiments were consolidated into the 25th Infantry Regiment. In 1869, the 38th and 41st Infantry Regiments were consolidated into the 24th Infantry Regiment.
War I, and World War II, the United States continued the practice of increasing African-American participation in order to satisfy manpower requirements caused by war and in reaction to political pressure applied by a growing community of activists, led by A. Phillip Randolph and Walter White, exerting political pressure for increased military participation for African Americans.4

At the end of World War II, there were more than 650,000 African-American soldiers, two African-American divisions, four African-American separate infantry regiments and hundreds of battalion and company-sized units in every branch of the Army.5 After the war, though, the Army faced the dilemma of determining African-American participation in the peacetime force. Truman K. Gibson, the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of Defense, noted in a memorandum to Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, a growing belief among Army leaders that the Army had not gained the most efficient use of African-American soldiers. This same memorandum also noted that political reality dictated that African-Americans would have a significant presence in the post-war Army.6 Army leadership also felt that African-Americans presented a significant drop-off in capability and performance in comparison to white soldiers.

Beginning in 1946, the Army instituted policies designed to create greater cooperation between African-American and white soldiers. However, it remained committed to segregation, believing that the nation and therefore the Army were generations away from African-American and white soldiers working, living and eating together. The pressure on the Army to abandon the practice of segregation continued after World War II, yet the Army obstinately resisted,

4 Booker, African Americans in the United States Army in World War II, 6.
envisioning massive outbreaks of rebellion from white soldiers. Chief of Staff of the Army General Omar Bradley argued that the use of segregation was necessary to prevent an adverse effect on the efficiency of the Army. Thus, the Army entered the summer of 1950 with a racially segregated force.

On June 25, 1950, military forces of Communist North Korea People’s Army (KPA) invaded South Korea. By June 28, 1950, the KPA, enjoying success against overmatched Republic of Korea (ROK) forces, entered the South Korean capital of Seoul. By this time, the United Nations (UN) Security Council had passed several resolutions, demanding a halt to hostilities, withdrawal of KPA forces to the 38th Parallel that served as the boundary between North and South Korea, and asking UN member nations to provide military assistance to South Korea. President Truman authorized General Douglas MacArthur, commander of US Far East Command (FECOM), to commit military forces in the defense of South Korea. The first US Army ground combat force, Task Force Smith, engaged KPA forces on July 5, 1950 in the Battle of Osan. The Korean War would last for thirty-seven months, until the signing of an armistice on July 27, 1953. The US Army suffered more than 100,000 casualties, including 27,731 soldiers killed in action.

In the summer of 1951, General Matthew Ridgway, the new commander of FECOM, gained Department of the Army approval to integrate throughout his command. However, commanders at the division, regiment and battalion levels had already begun unofficially integrating their formations months earlier. The commander of the 2nd Infantry Division ignored

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8 Ibid., 220.
9 Ibid., 220-223.
10 Ibid., 246.
the order of his superior officer to re-segregate his units. Based on the Army’s assessment that racial integration would degrade military effectiveness and efficiency, these commanders leading units in combat should have been the last group in favor of integration, but this was not the case. By the end of the Korean War in 1953, every Army unit in Korea had integrated. In October 1954, the Army completed integration of every unit in the Regular Army.

Despite less than altruistic motives, the Army rightfully received accolades for its revolutionary change in race relations policies and practices. To place this in context, the Army officially adopted integration on a large scale three years before the Supreme Court overturned the doctrine of separate but equal that served as the legal foundation for racial segregation and ten years before the Johnson administration enacted the groundbreaking Civil Rights Act of 1964.

While racial integration in the US Army during the Korean War had an undeniably positive social impact, the question that has been neither typically asked nor answered by historians is “what was the military impact of that change?” Were the fears of a decrease in combat effectiveness voiced by General Bradley in 1949 accurate or unfounded?

Research Questions and Methodology

This monograph focuses on the study of one primary and three secondary research questions. The primary research question is: What impact did the integration of African-Americans in Army combat units during the Korean War have on the effectiveness of Eighth (US) Army? This in turn led to three secondary research questions. Why did US Army units in Korea begin to integrate during the Korean War? What is the definition of military effectiveness?

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Did the integration of Korean soldiers into Army units impact the integration of African-Americans?

The methodology used for answering these questions was the study of primary and secondary sources in three topic areas. These topic areas are the history of the Korean War, the history of African-American soldiers in the Korean War, and the study of military effectiveness. Primary sources included government documents, publications, and first-hand accounts of personnel who served during the Korean War. Secondary sources consisted of the works of historians, journalists and social scientists. The objective of the methodology selected was to provide a foundation of views of those who participated in events balanced by the more objective view of those who are able to exercise hindsight.

**Thesis**

The integration of African Americans in combat units during the Korean War improved the military effectiveness of Eighth (US) Army during combat operations. Integration resulted in improvements in cohesion, personnel resourcing, sustainment, leadership and command, and fighting spirit. Eighth (US) Army’s assessment of the ability of African-Americans to fight was better than the prevailing opinion in the Army. This difference contributed substantially to the implementation of racial integration and improved the ability of Eighth (US) Army ground forces in Korea to accomplish their mission at the tactical and operational levels.

**Purpose and Organization of Study**

The primary focus of this monograph is to conduct an assessment of the impact of the integration of African Americans into ground combat units fighting in the Korean War on the capabilities of those forces to conduct combat operations. The goal of this research is to fill a gap in the historiography of racial integration of the Armed Forces and the Korean War. This study
seeks to provide insights into how the implementation of a radical change to a fighting force impacted the combat effectiveness of that force.

This monograph is not intended to serve as a history of the process of racial integration in the US Armed Forces or of African-Americans in combat during the Korean War. While it does address both of these topics to some extent, several topics that are critical to any study of either topic are excluded because they fell outside of the scope of this monograph. This monograph addresses only African-American ground combat units, leading to the exclusion of Army and Marine Corps service and support units. In addition, this monograph also excludes any examination of the Air Force and Navy. This exclusion is due to the fact that the process by which these services executed integration was far different than the Army. The combat formation assessed in this monograph is the Eighth (US) Army, the primary US command responsible for conducting ground operations during the Korean War. This monograph does not attempt to assess the impact of integration on the X (US) Corps, which served as a separate ground combat command in Korea during 1950, or the US Far East Command, the higher headquarters for both units and the US command overall responsible for the conduct of the Korean War.

This monograph is structured into five chapters. Chapter 1 serves as the introduction. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are described below. Chapter 5 sums up key findings and provides the author’s perspective on what today’s Army may gain by considering the points discussed in this study.

Chapter 2 explores the theme of military effectiveness. The objective of this chapter is to establish criteria of military effectiveness with which to assess the military impact of integration on the major US ground combat units in Korea. This chapter conducts a multi-disciplinary survey of scholarly works dealing with military or combat effectiveness. Finally, this chapter examines Army doctrine from the Korean War era to identify the roles and functions of both of these organizations as part of the process of determining appropriate criteria.
Chapter 3 examines the Eighth (US) Army in the context of the strategic setting of the Korean War. The chapter’s objective is to establish a general sense of the effectiveness of the Eighth (US) Army at the start of the Korean War. This chapter uses historical analysis to examine the impacts of the defense policies of the US after World War II and how those policies impacted the composition of the Eighth (US) Army. This chapter establishes context for the assessment of the impact of racial integration on Eighth (US) Army.

Chapter 4 assesses the impact of racial integration on Eighth (US) Army by using the criteria developed in chapter 2. The objective of this chapter is to answer the primary research question. This chapter does not seek to assess the performance of African-American soldiers during the Korean War. Through the use of primary and secondary sources, this chapter examines the basis for segregation, the process of racial integration, and the impacts of the racial integration of African-American soldiers.

**Review of Major Literature**

The literature used in researching this monograph falls into three subject areas: the Korean War, African-Americans in the military, and studies in the effectiveness of military forces. The history of African-American soldiers in the military is a topic that has been extensively studied by both historians and social scientists for the past sixty-five years. There is also an extensive amount of scholarly works published by historians, political scientists, journalists, and veterans about the Korean War. However, the study of African-Americans soldiers serving in the Korean War has received comparatively little attention in this historiography. The study of this topic occurs primarily as part of broader studies of the Korean War or African-American participation in the US Armed Forces. Historians and social scientists have also devoted considerable effort to the study of the effectiveness of military forces. These works fall under the themes of military effectiveness or combat effectiveness.
Accounts of the Korean War, at least from a US Army perspective, begin with the US Army in the Korean War collection published by the Army’s Center of Military History. Four volumes in particular, published over a thirty year span from 1961 to 1990, illustrate the role of the Army from the summer of 1950 to the summer of 1953. These volumes are interpretations of the events of the war conducted by military officers that served during World War II or the Korean War and who also served as military historians in the theater of operations during the Korean War.

The collection begins with Roy Appleman’s *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*. Published in 1961, Appleman’s work sought to develop an indepth narrative of the tactical combat action during the tumultuous first six months of US involvement in the Korean War. Appleman relies on military records and personal accounts from a large number of soldiers who fought in the Korean War.\(^\text{14}\)

Billy Mossman’s *Ebb and Flow*, not published until 1990, serves as the next volume in this collection. Mossman picks up the chronology of the Korean War from where Appleman leaves off in November 1950 and describes corps and field army operations until the stalemate period of July 1951.\(^\text{15}\) Mossman’s account, based primarily on military records, covers the period of combat between Communist Chinese forces and United Nations forces that set the conditions for the rest of the Korean War and continue even today.

The third volume of the U.S. Army in the Korean War collection is James F. Schnabel’s *Policy and Direction: The First Year*. Schnabel’s work, published in 1972, describes US policy during the first year of the Korean War and analyzes the evolution of strategy used to carry out

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this policy. Schnabel contends that the limited war strategy that evolved during this initial year went unchanged during the remaining two years of the war.16

_Truce Tent and Fighting Front_ by Walter Hermes is the fourth volume of this collection, and final volume used in this monograph. Published in 1966, Hermes focuses on the history of the last two years of the Korean War. This period is referred to by Korean War historians as the stalemate period, characterized by armistice negotiations punctuated by small unit battles over territory along the 38th parallel. Hermes explores the relationship between the political negotiations and combat action that occurred during these two years, from the perspective of US Far East Command, the agency responsible for implementing all elements of national power in Korea on behalf of the US and the UN.17

The works of two other authors remain the standard-bearers in the field of historical study of the Korean War. First, T.R. Fehrenbach’s _This Kind of War_, published in 1963, is a staple of Korean War history. Written by a former US Army officer who served in the Korean War, Fehrenbach presents a detailed account of tactical combat in Korea. His underlying theme is a discussion of the how the US Army was unprepared for the war that it fought in Korea, both from a readiness standpoint and the constraints placed upon it by the limited war strategy adopted by the US.

The other work that is a staple of the study of the history of the Korean War is _The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953_ by Clay Blair, a World War II Navy veteran and journalist who served as a Pentagon correspondent during the Korean War.18 Blair’s work is a


comprehensive and meticulously researched study of the first year of the war. Blair focuses primarily on the ground campaigns at the division, corps, and army echelons.

The second major subject area of this monograph is the history of African-Americans in the US Army, particularly during the Korean War. Four disparate works serve as representative of the works available in this subject area. First, Morris J. MacGregor’s Integration in the Armed Forces, 1940-1965 is a comprehensive history of how the interaction of political, social, and military pressures led to integration in each branch of the US Armed Forces.19 Published in 1981 as part of the Center of Military History’s Defense Historical Studies Program, MacGregor offers an incredibly detailed assessment of the decision-making and implementation of integration in the Army.

Gerald Astor’s The Right to Fight is representative of a number of historical surveys of the service of African-Americans in the US military. Astor, a prolific military historian, conducts an in-depth survey of African-American participation in the US Armed Forces from the Revolutionary War through Vietnam. The Right to Fight uses historical records in the National Archives and a thorough search for previously undiscovered personal narratives to tell this story.20

The third work about the history of African-Americans in the US Army is a primary source document. In 1951, the Army directed the Operations Research Office to conduct a study, called Project Clear, to recommend the best utilization of African-Americans soldiers. Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army, published in 1969, presents findings and supporting surveys from Project Clear. This volume, edited by a member of the Project Clear

19 MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965, ix.

team, sociologist Dr. Leo Bogart, reveals a great deal about the perceptions about integration held by soldiers fighting the Korean War.

Finally, the fourth work on the history of African-Americans in the Army is *Black Soldier, White Army*, published in 1996 by the Center of Military History. This book reexamines the performance of the largest African-American combat unit to serve in Korea, the 24th Infantry Regiment. The original Korean War narrative identified the 24th Infantry Regiment as a unit that performed so poorly in comparison to other infantry regiments that it was disbanded, and served as a catalyst for the ending of the practice of segregation in Korea. Many veterans of the unit, however, dispute this characterization. *Black Soldier, White Army* represents the Army’s attempt to reassess this narrative in a time removed from the racial prejudice and stereotypes that the Army accepted as true during the Korea War.21

The third and final major subject area examined by this monograph is the study of the effectiveness of military forces. An area studied both by historians and political scientists, a large body of work exists examining what makes military forces effective in combat. Historians Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray and political scientist Kenneth Watman developed a model listing characteristics of effective military forces at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels.22 Millett and Murray served as editors for the three volume project titled *Military Effectiveness*, in which a group of historians utilize guidelines developed from this model of effective military forces to assess the effectiveness of the military forces of seven nations (US, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, and Japan) during three distinct time periods (World War I, the interwar period, and World War II).23

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Study of the effectiveness of military forces would be incomplete without considering the work of Trevor N. Dupuy. A retired Army officer, World War II veteran, military historian, and prolific author, Dupuy was one of the pioneers of the use of statistical analysis in studying the historical performance of military units.\textsuperscript{24} He developed the Quantified Judgment Model (QJM) and applied it to the analysis of the relative effectiveness of German and US Army forces in World War II. In 1980, Dupuy co-authored \textit{Historical Combat Data and Analysis} as part of the US Army’s Soldier Capability – Army Combat Effectiveness study. In this study, Dupuy discusses the development of a combat effectiveness value from the application of the QJM and components of this combat effectiveness value.\textsuperscript{25}

Finally, Stephen Biddle’s \textit{Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle}, published in 2004, represents a political scientist’s approach to topic of military effectiveness. Biddle has extensive experience in defense policy and military strategic assessment.\textsuperscript{26} In \textit{Military Power}, he uses historiography and formal theory to develop a model of what he describes as “the modern system of force employment” for fire and maneuver employed by victorious militaries throughout the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Chapter 2 – Effectiveness of Military Forces}

\textbf{Overview}

This chapter proposes a set of criteria for use in the evaluation of the effectiveness of the Eighth (US) Army. To do this, it first lays out a review of ten theories of the effectiveness of

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military forces developed by historians, political scientists, operations research analysts, and the US Army. Next, the chapter examines US Army doctrine to determine the role of a field army in the Korean War era. Finally, synthesizing this role with the examination of effectiveness yields a set of appropriate criteria.

**Theories of Combat or Military Effectiveness**

Academics as well as practitioners in multiple fields have studied the effectiveness of military forces. For military historians, this area of study represents part of the process of examining the past and explaining occurrences such as how Zulu warriors armed with spears performed so well when pitted against a technologically superior British force in the Anglo-Zulu Wars. For political scientists, military power represents one of the most significant factors governing relations in the international political arena. For behavioral scientists, the process of melding groups of people into forces that can effectively kill and risk death on the battlefield presents numerous insights into the human psyche. Members of all of these fields have presented theories on what makes a military force effective.

**Current US Army Doctrine**

An examination of four current US Army capstone doctrinal manuals for definitions or measures of the effectiveness of military forces will most likely leave the examiner unsatisfied with the results of his work. US Army Field Manuals (FM) 3-0, 5-0, 6-0, and 7-0 provide service doctrine for operations, the operations process, mission command, and training respectively. *FM 6-0, Mission Command*, is the only manual that offers a definition of effectiveness which it equates simply to mission accomplishment. Strangely, this definition is buried in a discussion of proper resource allocation as a responsibility of a commander attempting to exercise skilled
judgment. FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, states that assessment is a process of comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events in order to determine the effectiveness of force employment, strengthening the Army view of effectiveness tied to mission accomplishment. FM 3-0, *Operations* offers a laundry list of items that can enhance, increase, maximize, multiply, and amplify effectiveness. This list of items includes cultural awareness, training, utilization of combined arms, staff performance, synchronization of operations, and doctrine. FM 3-0 also identifies fear and fatigue as things that can reduce effectiveness. Its description of measures of effectiveness, as a specific term of reference with particular meaning to the US Armed Forces, FM 3-0 further links effectiveness to success and progress toward mission accomplishment. FM 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations* emphasizes training as a key measure in improving effectiveness, cautioning that even experience does not necessarily improve effectiveness.

**Historians**

Prolific military historian Martin Van Creveld presents a hypothesis about the effectiveness of military forces in his 1982 work, *Fighting Power*. Van Creveld examined the German and US armies during World War II and concluded that the German Army represented the most effective fighting force of the twentieth century, despite its losses in both World Wars I

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31 Ibid., 5-10.
32 Ibid., 6-4.
and II. 34 The German Army developed this level of effectiveness by addressing the social and psychological needs of the individual combat soldier while the US Army’s failure to do the same resulted in a less effective force. 35

Van Creveld terms the sum of all of the mental qualities that make armies fight as fighting power. Fighting power serves as a multiplier to military resources, namely manpower and equipment. 36 The components of fighting power encompass both individual and organizational qualities. These components are discipline, cohesion, morale, initiative, courage and toughness, the willingness to fight, and the readiness to die. 37

Van Creveld cites the German Army’s victories in World War II and its ability to wage war for an extended period of time against the superior resources of the Allied and Soviet forces without disintegrating or turning on itself as proof of the effectiveness of the force. 38 However, he fails to place this into any context by addressing the battles that the German Army lost during World War II. Van Creveld identifies the US Army’s individual replacement system as the largest factor that undermined attempts to maximize its fighting power. Specifically, he points to the fact that because it took the replacement system two years to increase the number of infantry replacement soldiers it produced in response to larger than anticipated requirements, commanders reassigned service troops to infantry, dealing a “double blow” to morale. 39 This argument is inconsistent with his criticism of US commanders who he characterized as inefficient for not

34 Martin Van Creveld, Fighting Power (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 163.
35 Ibid., 165.
36 Ibid., 3.
37 Ibid., 170.
38 Ibid., 4-5.
39 Ibid., 78-79.
using specialists or line of communications troops for other missions outside of their intended purpose, resulting in a large amount of available manpower standing idle many times. 40

Military historian and former US Army officer, Peter Mansoor, provides a different hypothesis in *The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions 1941-1945*. In this work, Mansoor examines the manning, training, and employment of US divisions in the European theater of operations during World War II. He conducts an assessment of the how the US Army generate forces with a high level of combat effectiveness. Mansoor defined combat effectiveness as the ability of a military organization to achieve its assigned mission in the shortest amount of time and with the smallest amount of expenditure of human and materiel resources. Combat effectiveness is made up of human, organizational and technical factors. Human factors consist of leadership, discipline, morale and cohesion. Organizational factors encompass doctrine, command and control, adaptability, and inter-service cooperation. Technical factors include weapons, intelligence, and fire support. 41 Mansoor identifies leadership, adaptability, cohesion, and manning and replacement systems as the key factors, stating these “made outstanding divisions what they were.” 42

Historian Roger R. Reese uses the Soviet Army during the 1939 and 1940 Winter War with Finland to present his hypothesis of military effectiveness. Reese argues that those who consider the Soviet Army’s performance as ineffective due to the large disparity in casualty rates (534,000 Soviet casualties vice 66,000 Finnish casualties) conflate military efficiency with military effectiveness. 43 He states that the strategy of attrition pursued by the Soviets play a large

40 Ibid., 46.


42 Ibid., 265.

role in this mischaracterization of the Soviet Army’s performance as ineffective.\textsuperscript{44} Reese defines military effectiveness as “willingness and ability of small units and soldiers to fight.”\textsuperscript{45} He identifies the key components of military effectiveness as morale, motivation, unit integrity, and discipline.\textsuperscript{46} Reese cites the willingness of Russian soldiers to fight, evidenced by low numbers of surrendered soldiers, in the face of training and equipment shortfalls, poor tactical and operational employment, poor leadership, and severe shortages of food, water, and medical supplies.\textsuperscript{47} His approach to effectiveness centers much more on the willingness to fight rather than the ability to fight.

Reese’s distinction of military capability, defined as tactical performance, as a separate element from military effectiveness lies at the heart of his argument.\textsuperscript{48} Reese’s assessment of an effective force is based primarily upon the fact that the Soviet Army did not suffer large scale disintegration in the face of severe adversity and the eventual Soviet victory over Finland. He acknowledges but places far less weight on the facts that the Soviet Union is forced to make political, strategic, and operational changes to achieve this victory.\textsuperscript{49} He even acknowledges that improved training, leadership, and organization were necessary for the Soviet Army to successfully prosecute future wars. However, he criticizes Soviet leaders for allowing these shortfalls to cloud their assessment of the Soviet Army’s effectiveness in Finland.\textsuperscript{50} Ultimately, this distinction appears forced and his case for separating battlefield performance from effectiveness is unconvincing.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 830.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 850-851.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 831.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 833-834.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 850.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 849.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 851.
Under the auspices of the US Army, Trevor Depuy and Gay Hammerman offer a hypothesis of what constitutes an effective military force. As part of an Army study of combat effectiveness conducted in the late 1970s, Depuy and Hammerman conducted historical analysis to determine any relationships between troop quality, troop capability, and combat effectiveness. This analysis integrated an extensive literature review, analytical comparisons of seventeen armies that engaged in combat during the thirty years between World War II and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and Dupuy’s Quantified Judgment Model. Dupuy and Hammerman sought to identify any national characteristics that served as reliable indicators of troop quality or combat effectiveness.

DuPuy and Hammerman defined combat effectiveness as the capability of units. They also identified the components of combat effectiveness as troop quality, leadership, discipline, training or combat experience, and tactics. The authors cited leadership and training as the most critical components, observing that superior leadership and training could compensate for low troop quality in developing combat effective units. They also identified interdependence between troop quality, leadership, and training that resulted in improvement in any one area improving the other two areas.

Renowned military historians Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray joined forces with political scientist Kenneth Watman to conduct a sweeping assessment of military effectiveness. They defined military effectiveness as the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power. More specifically, they characterize military effectiveness as a measure of a military force’s ability to use physically and politically available resources to derive maximum

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51 Dupuy and Hammerman, “Historical Combat and Data Analysis”, 1.
52 Ibid., 11-12.
53 Ibid., 1.
54 Ibid., 14.
55 Ibid., 8.
ability to inflict damage while limiting the damage that the enemy can inflict in return.\(^{56}\) Millett, Murray, and Watman established a framework of indicators of effectiveness at each of what they term as the levels of military activity: political, strategic, operational, and tactical.\(^{57}\)

Millett, Murray, and Watman’s proposed indicators of effectiveness at the operational and tactical level are most appropriate for application to Eighth (US) Army. Some of these indicators are common to both levels of activity. These include the extent to which operations or tactical actions are nested with strategic objectives, the level of combined arms integration, integration of warfighting functions, and the extent to which friendly strengths are used to exploit enemy weaknesses.\(^{58}\) In addition to these four common indicators, Millett, Murray, and Watman developed three additional indicators of operational effectiveness and four additional indicators of tactical effectiveness. These additional indicators of operational effectiveness are: development of a professional military ethos and integrity, level of physical mobility and intellectual flexibility in the organization, and the extent that the operational concepts and decisions are consistent with available technology. The four additional indicators of tactical effectiveness include the levels of morale, unit cohesion, and relationship amongst officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted soldiers, the extent to which tactical units utilize surprise and exploitation, level of training, and the level of consistency between tactical concepts and operational capabilities.\(^{59}\)

Millett, Murray, and Watman, however, caution against assuming effectiveness at any one level as equivalent to effectiveness of the military force at every level, stating that analysts must assess each level of military activity separately. Indeed, they even acknowledge that in some


\(^{57}\) Ibid., 38.

\(^{58}\) Millett, Murray, and Watman make a distinction between operations and what they describe as supporting activities, specifically intelligence, supply, communications, medical, and transportation. These are most analogous to the current Army construct of warfighting functions of mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, sustainment, fires, and protection as delineated in chapter 4 of US Army FM 3-0, Change 1, Operations (22 February 2011).

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 50-69.
instances, a military force may have to sacrifice effectiveness at one level of military activity in order to enable effectiveness at another level. However, this methodology provides unsatisfactory answers to two aspects of its use as an assessment tool. First, many of its indicators are broad as to invite almost any interpretation. While specificity may constrain the applicability of a criteria, overly broad or ambiguous language (i.e. equipment needed) make it more likely that the criteria becomes a means of supporting an opinion already formed as opposed to generating critical thinking that leads to an informed assessment. Secondly, this model fails to adequately address the interdependent nature of many of its indicators of effectiveness.

**Political Scientists**

In a paper prepared for the 2003 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Eugene Gholz sought to establish the distinction between military efficiency and military effectiveness. Gholz, a political scientist with expertise in national security and defense policy and experience serving the Department of Defense’s Office of Industrial Policy, stated that the conflation of military efficiency with military effectiveness increases the difficulty of defense analysis by not differentiating between the ability to accomplish a combat mission from the amount of resources required to accomplish a combat mission. He defined military effectiveness as the measure of the how well a military force performs with the resources that it has available to it at a given point of time. Conversely, military efficiency represents the cost of converting potential power to military power (i.e. mobilization). Gholz identified technical quality of equipment, suitability of equipment for the mission, morale and unit cohesion, employment of combined arms, ability to conduct operational planning, and level of logistical support as factors

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60 Ibid., 38 and 70.  
62 Ibid., 8.  
63 Ibid., 6-7.
of effectiveness. These factors provide a method of capturing the ability of a military force to execute its doctrine with a given set of resources. His concept of military effectiveness is a more useful tool at the operational and tactical levels of war, while military efficiency fits more appropriately as a measure of strategic performance.

Stephen Biddle, a political scientist with extensive experience conducting strategic assessment for the Department of Defense, focuses on military effectiveness at the tactical and operational level in *Military Power*. Analyzing warfare in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Biddle concludes that the overarching concern of a military force is how to conduct military operations in the face of great firepower. He theorized that a military force’s effectiveness in addressing this concern lies in its ability to employ methods of reducing friendly exposure to hostile fire and enabling friendly maneuver while slowing enemy maneuver. Biddle terms these methods the modern system. Effective employment of the modern system differs for the military force conducting offensive operations vice a force conducting defensive operations. Biddle defines the measure of effectiveness of a force conducting offensive operations as its capacity to destroy the largest possible defensive force over the largest possible territory with the lowest amount of friendly casualties in the least amount of time. Conversely, the effectiveness of a force conducting defensive operations is its capacity to preserve the largest possible number of friendly forces over the largest amount of territory while inflicting the most enemy casualties for the longest possible amount of time.

Biddle’s components for the effective tactical employment of the modern system are the use of cover and concealment, dispersion, small unit independent maneuver, combined arms

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64 Ibid., 10.
66 Ibid., 6.
integration and suppression of the enemy. At the tactical level, these components are the same for offensive and defensive missions, though application differs. Biddle identifies use of limited aim attacks and breakthrough and exploitation operations as indicators of effective employment of the modern system for conducting offensives at the operational level of war. The use of defense in depth, reserves, and counterattack operations are indicators of effective employment of the modern system in defensive operations.

Biddle bounds the development and application of his model by focusing specifically on conventional warfare between regional or world powers intent on controlling territory. He focuses on this scenario both because of its frequent occurrence in the past and its continuing relevance today and in the future. Biddle presents a convincing argument to show why use of the modern system will produce an effective military force that can defeat an opponent possessing a numerical or technological advantage. He also argues that numeric or technological superiority will not help a non-modern system force to defeat a force employing the modern system. Problematically, Biddle falls into the group described by Gholz that defines effectiveness in terms of efficiency. Unspoken but prominently embedded in his definitions of offensive and defensive capability is the assumption that trading terrain for opportunities to inflict enemy casualties is critical to success. The Israelis or the Spartans at Thermopylae may disagree with this contention.

Kenneth Pollack is another prominent political scientist with extensive government experience. In *Arabs at War*, Pollack examines the military campaigns of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria from 1948 to 1991. He seeks to answer why these six Arab

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67 Ibid., 35.  
68 Ibid., 44.  
69 Ibid., 40.  
70 Ibid., 46.  
71 Ibid., 6.  
72 Ibid., 191.
nations have consistently struggled in military conflicts despite holding significant advantages in conventional measures of military power, such as firepower, manpower, or modern equipment. His does not hide his dissatisfaction with these conventional resource-based metrics for military power. Pollack defines military effectiveness as the ability of an armed service to prosecute military operations and employ weaponry in military operations. He asserts that measuring the quality of personnel rather than the amount of resources is a more accurate metric for determining the ability of a military force to perform on the battlefield and accomplish the military missions and strategy adopted by political and military leaders. The critical components of Pollack’s model of military effectiveness are unit cohesion, generalship, tactical leadership, information management, technical skills and weapons handling, logistics, maintenance, morale, training, and cowardice. The final component of Pollack’s theory of military effectiveness is his caution that effectiveness is relative to the opponent. An analyst must consider the performance of a military force in a variety of settings and missions in order to gain a true assessment of that force’s effectiveness. As a historical or reflective tool this is certainly sound methodology; however, it constrains its use as a forecasting tool.

Dr. Risa Brooks provides a fourth political science-based view of military effectiveness. Like the political scientists examined thus far, Brooks also feels that the reliance on resources as the key indicator of military power is less than accurate or useful. As a co-editor of Creating Military Power Brooks posits that resources indicates only potential military power and a different set of metrics is required to assess the actual military power generated from this

74 Ibid., 4.
75 Ibid., 4-8.
76 Ibid., 10-11.
potential.\textsuperscript{77} While this seems more appropriate to a strategic or national assessment, Brooks argues that effectiveness is a measure of what a military force can actually accomplish on the battlefield vice what its resources suggest it could accomplish.\textsuperscript{78}

Brooks defines military effectiveness as the capacity of create military power from resources in wealth, technology, population size, and human capital.\textsuperscript{79} In this theory, the effectiveness of a military force is measured through four attributes. The first attribute, integration, represents the extent to which strategic, operational, and tactical actions are nested and consistent with each other.\textsuperscript{80} Responsiveness, the second attribute, is the ability to tailor and adjust military activities to reflect friendly and enemy capabilities and external constraints.\textsuperscript{81} The third attribute is skill, which Brooks defines as the ability of personnel and units to achieve particular tasks and follow orders, also encompasses motivation, cohesion.\textsuperscript{82} Quality is the fourth and final attribute. It represents the ability of the force to supply itself with superior weapons and equipment. Under Brooks’ model, these four attributes are essential to military effectiveness.\textsuperscript{83}

While primarily intended to inform national strategic level assessment, Brooks’ criteria for effectiveness are sufficiently broad to use to assess tactical and operational military forces, with the possible exception of quality. This attribute is unclear, especially considering that Brooks lists weapons and equipment procurement as a supporting activity, along with things such as command and control and training.\textsuperscript{84} Also, perhaps because the focus of Creating Military


\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 9.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 10.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 11.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 12.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 13.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 20-22.
Power is assessing the effect of potential casual variables on effectiveness, Brooks did not acknowledge or discuss the difficulty of assessing four attributes that are largely interrelated and can conflict.

Others

The assessment of combat effectiveness has attracted significant effort from other disciplines besides history and political science. In 1981, the US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences sponsored a study of combat effectiveness and integrity conducted by business and organizational development firm Arthur Young and Company. The authors conducted this study during the post-Vietnam era in support of Army plans to transition from an individual rotation system to a unit cohort rotation system.85 The study sought to provide the US Army with decision-making tools for use in personnel management and units with tools to develop and maintain combat effectiveness.86

The consultants from Arthur Young and Company identified three general dimensions of combat effectiveness: personnel, equipment, and training. They describe an interrelationship in which training transforms the resources embodied by personnel and equipment into an effective combat unit.87 The study authors further specify that the personnel dimension actually consists of five subcomponents. These subcomponents are personnel strength, job qualification, psychological readiness, cohesion, and leadership. In this model, job qualification referred to the ability of unit personnel to perform duties in their military occupational specialties, which psychological readiness refers to their mental preparedness to fight. Cohesion represented the bonding of unit members to accomplish the unit’s mission, while leadership encompassed any

86 Ibid., ii and I-2.
87 Ibid., II-3.
action intended to assist the unit in setting and achieving goals, building cohesion, or obtaining resources. The lack of an explicit definition for combat effectiveness, the lack of level of specification for the equipment and training dimensions that was applied to the personnel dimension, and the interrelationships of most of the subcomponents of the personnel dimension all weaken the usefulness of this model.

Finally, Philip Hayward’s 1968 article “Measurement of Combat Effectiveness” represents a discipline created within the Army specifically to improve combat effectiveness, operations research. Reminiscent of the approach of Robert McNamara and the Whiz Kids in the Department of Defense during that same time period, Hayward seeks to use a mathematical construct to describe combat effectiveness. Hayward defined combat effectiveness as the probability of success in combat operations. Territory gained or held, time, and an acceptable level of casualties made up his components of success. Hayward further identified three categories of factors that determine combat effectiveness: capabilities, environment and mission. Capabilities consisted of both friendly and enemy personnel strength, training and experience, material, doctrine and its application, morale, leadership, and temperament. Weather, climate, and terrain represented environment, and mission represented the competing objectives of the both friendly and enemy.

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88 Ibid., II-4 – II-5.
89 In the late 1940s and 1950s, a group of ten former Army officers, including McNamara, implemented modern organizational management practices at Ford Motor Company, earning the title The Whiz Kids. In 1960, President Kennedy named McNamara as Secretary of Defense. McNamara, utilizing some of the same personnel and practices from Ford, instituted systems analysis and planning processes in the Department of Defense in the 1960s.
91 Ibid., 317-318.
Effectiveness

Context

Context is a key determinant to defining and evaluating combat effectiveness. As demonstrated by this examination of various theories of combat effectiveness, the level of war that the military organization in question is designed to operate at often serves to provide that context. Developing the appropriate definition and criteria for combat effectiveness requires a brief examination of the role and responsibilities of the Eighth (US) Army. The 1949 edition of *FM 100-5 Field Service Regulations-Operations* lists three types of troop organizations in the Army: command, combat (tactical), and administrative. The term administrative applied only to those troop units that performed all of the administrative functions for its components. Army doctrine designated the field army as a combat (tactical) and administrative unit. The 1950 version of *FM 100-15 Field Service Regulations –Large Units* identifies the field army as the ground unit of maneuver and the basis for executing strategic and tactical ground operations. This doctrine charged the field army commander with several key responsibilities: managing the current operation, simultaneously planning the next operation, organizing the force, and providing logistical support to its subordinate components. The field army commander influenced the outcome of the battle through leadership, assignment of missions and areas of operations to subordinate units, use of fires, providing adequate logistical support, and coordinating with supporting Air Force. Army doctrine from this era also identified leadership, training, discipline, cohesion, and the will to fight as critical in determining the combat value of a unit.

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Definition

For the purposes of this study, effectiveness is defined as the ability of a military organization to execute required actions necessary to accomplish a given mission. When this mission comes in the context of conflict, this effectiveness is referred to as combat effectiveness. Those who attempt to define effectiveness as equivalent to mission accomplishment do not provide a useful construct. It certainly makes assessment much easier, as such a definition permits only a binary response. If a military force accomplishes the mission, it is effective; conversely, if it does not accomplish the mission, it is not effective. This begs the question of whether or not effectiveness equates to winning. Strategist Everett Carl Dolman contends that at the strategic level, winning is an inappropriate term and even at the tactical level is not always essential.\(^95\) History is replete with examples of military defeats parleyed into achievement of political goals, such as Egypt after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.\(^96\) Victory in battle or war is impacted by factors outside of the military forces involved to equate effectiveness with winning or success. Indeed, the German Army after World War I presents an example of a military force that blamed defeat on the unwillingness of politicians to continue to fight versus any inability on the part of the military to continue to fight effectively.

Another question raised here is the relationship between effectiveness and efficiency. There are those that argue that efficiency is an essential component of effectiveness. Others argue that they are two separate variables. Conceding that mission accomplishment is a substantial part though not the sum total of effectiveness, it seems that subsuming efficiency as another component of effectiveness unnecessarily constrains the application of this definition. Leaving


\(^{96}\) Anwar Sadat leveraged the effects of the unexpected initial success of Egypt’s military forces into political gains. Though the Israeli Defense Forces soundly defeated Egypt’s military, the fact that Egypt was able to gain initial success in penetrating Israeli defenses at the Suez Canal had political ramifications. For more information on this subject see George Gawrych’s *The 1973 Arab-Israeli War*.
this is a separate variable allows one to consider context when deciding on how strong to make
the interrelationship between effectiveness and efficiency. At the tactical level, there may indeed
be instances in which success at all costs is required. But at the operational and strategic level,
which often requires multiple battles to accomplish objectives, preserving the force may take on a
much greater level of significance.

For instance, Reese presents a strong argument that, based on the vast disparity of
resources between the Soviet Union and Finland, a Soviet Army gutted by Stalin’s purges, and
the choice of an attritional strategy, the Soviet Army performed effectively in the Winter War by
performing those actions necessary to accomplish the mission despite suffering a nine to one
disadvantage in casualties. Again, Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War presents an example
of a military force whose political leadership gladly accepted the tradeoff in large amounts of
military force expended to gain small, short-lived tactical gains. However, the German Army
during Operation Barbarossa during World War II presents an example of a military force that
could not afford the amount of military resources it expended to inflict tactical defeat after
tactical defeat on the Soviets.

Criteria

A synthesis of the presented theories of combat effectiveness yields eight components of
effectiveness. These components are: adaptability, cohesion, combined arms integration,
leadership and command, fighting spirit, resources, sustainment, and training. Adaptability is the
ability of a military organization to draw context from the variables of its operating environment
and direct action that it estimates presents the best opportunity of accomplishing its mission or


Cohesion is the extent to which a military force demonstrates the collective willingness of its members to work together to accomplish a common goal. Combined arms integration measures the extent to which a military force is creating synergy with its available combat forces. Leadership and command is the extent to which commanders establish attainable objectives that assist in achieving the goals of their higher headquarters and direct their units to accomplishing those objectives. Fighting spirit is the extent to which a military force exhibits the discipline and mental and physical qualities to withstand the rigors of military operations. Resources represent having an adequate number and type of personnel and equipment to enable units to execute their assigned missions and tasks. Sustainment is the extent to which an organization can ensure its forces are able to continue operations for the period of time required to complete the mission. Training is the extent to which a military force can execute doctrine governing its assigned mission.

Conclusion

Current US Army doctrine does not provide a useful model for evaluating the effectiveness of a military force. Professionals and academics from multiple disciplines have studied this topic extensively and, unsurprisingly, have not come to a commonly shared model to describe an effective military force. An analysis of some of these theories reveals many commonalities. When applied to the context of the specific military force, these commonalities provide a definition and criteria for use in evaluating the impact of racial integration on the effectiveness of the Eighth (US) Army during the Korean War. The next step in this analysis is to review the context of the Korean War and how that context shaped the Eighth (US) Army that entered the Korean War in July 1950.
Chapter 3 – The Context of the Korean War

Overview

Historians characterize the Korean War as unique because it represents the first military conflict of the Cold War and the US’s first foray into limited war during the nuclear age. This chapter establishes the context for the Korean War. It examines the strategic origins of the Cold War and how they led the US to fight a war, limited or not, in Korea. This chapter also examines the impact of the post-World War II political environment on the US Army and subsequently on the effectiveness of the Eighth (US) Army in the summer of 1950. Finally, this chapter completes the context by briefly examining the enemy that Eighth (US) Army fought in Korea.

The Origins of the Cold War

Like most of the wars of the twentieth century, the origins of the Korean War lie in the ending of the war that preceded it, World War II. As World War II wound down in 1945, the alliance built around the US, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to defeat fascism and Nazism around the world began to crumble. In looking past the war, the US envisioned the emergence of a peaceful and democratic Europe to continue as a major US trade partner. However, Joseph Stalin intended to emerge from World War II with security from internal and external threats for his regime, the Soviet Union, and Communism. His way of achieving this end was to establish a sphere of influence over states on the Soviet border to serve as a buffer against any external threat. In the summer of 1945, the Soviet Union began to spread its influence through Eastern Europe as Communists took control of the governments in Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania. Communism enjoyed great popularity in nations in which Communists led the

resistance to Nazism and fascism during World War II. This popularity resulted in significant political inroads for Communists in western European nations such as Italy and France.\textsuperscript{101}

As the Soviet Union sought to execute its national security strategy, the US found itself at a crossroads in its national security strategy. For the first time, the US was going to maintain a significant role in international affairs during peacetime. In addition to maintaining the US in this unfamiliar role, President Truman also focused on leading the transition of America from wartime to peacetime.\textsuperscript{102} His priority was to ensuring the viability of the American economy in the post-war era. One aspect that Truman considered essential to this was moving away from the deficit spending that Franklin Delano Roosevelt used to lead the recovery from the Great Depression and finance World War II.\textsuperscript{103} While the Truman administration initially sought to continue its cooperation with the Soviet Union, contradictory signs quickly developed. In 1945, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, William Averell Harriman warned the Truman administration that the potential existed for an ideological battle with Communism that would equal the just-concluded fight against fascism and Nazism. In March 1946, during a speech delivered in Missouri, Winston Churchill coined the term ‘Iron Curtain’ in describing the advance of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, describing the struggle as a fight between Communism and Christian civilization.\textsuperscript{104}

Events in the spring and summer finished setting the stage for the Cold War, with the Soviet Union leading one side and the US leading the other. In February 1947, George Kennan, a Foreign Service officer serving as the US embassy in Moscow, sent his infamous Long Telegram. Kennan assessed that Soviet hostility towards non-Communist nations was necessary for Stalin to

\textsuperscript{101} Gaddis, \textit{The Cold War}, 10; Walker, \textit{The Cold War: A History}, 33-34.

\textsuperscript{102} Adrian Lewis, \textit{The American Culture of War} (New York: Routledge, 2007), 66.

\textsuperscript{103} Gaddis, \textit{The Cold War}, 36.

\textsuperscript{104} Walker. \textit{The Cold War: A History}, 18 and 46.
maintain his totalitarian government and would not change until the Soviet Union suffered a series of diplomatic defeats that convinced it that such behavior ran counter to its interests. Based on this assessment, he recommended that the best policy was not war with the Soviet Union but adoption of a "long-term, patient, but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."\textsuperscript{105} In March 1947, the United Kingdom, severely constrained by two years of post-war economic crisis in Europe, requested that the US assume provision of aid to the governments of Greece and Turkey to aid in resisting Communist takeovers of those nations. In seeking support from Congress, President Truman, in what would become termed as the Truman Doctrine, pledged US support to any regime resisting attempts to seize control by armed minorities or outside agencies. In June 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced the US intent to establish the European Economic Recovery Plan, better known as the Marshall Plan, to aid in the economic recovery of Europe. The Truman administration felt that the best way to create the political and social conditions for democracy by conducting economic revival to control hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.\textsuperscript{106}

The unusual nature of conflict in the Cold War became apparent in the last years of the 1940s. Following announcement of the Marshall Plan, the Soviet Union orchestrated the refusal of Eastern European nations to participate. In addition, the Soviet Union used its influence with the Communist parties in Italy and France to provoke violence, demonstrations, and worker strikes in opposition to the implementation of the Marshall Plan.\textsuperscript{107} In June 1948, the Communist leader of Yugoslavia, Joseph Tito, broke from Stalin and the ensuing economic blockade imposed by the Soviet Union led Yugoslavia to become the only Eastern European nation to accept economic assistance from the US. In late 1948, the Soviet Union enacted the Berlin Blockade,

\textsuperscript{105} Gaddis, \textit{The Cold War}, 29.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid, 54.
cutting off road and rail access to Berlin from Western Europe in attempt to become the sole supplier of subsistence to Berlin. The successful execution of the Berlin Airlift foiled the Soviet intent to win more influence in Berlin, creating the same effect for the US. However, the events of 1949 seemed to turn the tide in the favor of Communism as the Soviet Union announced in August that it had successfully tested its own atomic bomb, several years faster than the US anticipated, followed by Mao-Zedong’s announcement of the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in October.108

As 1949 ended, the US found itself trying to choose upon which threat to focus more attention, the spread of Communism in Asia or the spread of Soviet influence in Europe. At the end of 1948, the US withdrew its remaining occupation forces from South Korea, leaving only a small advisory group to assist the Republic of Korea government.109 While the Truman administration feared that political, social, and economic upheaval in Asia created vulnerabilities to hostile takeover by Communist elements, the strategic priority was the defense of Europe.110 The US pursued a strategy of defending island strongpoints, specifically, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. The perception that the US was limiting the areas of Asia that it was willing to defend from Communist influence increased when Secretary of State Dean Acheson did not mention Korea or Formosa during a statement outlining what the US considered its defensive perimeter in the Pacific.111

In April 1950, the State Department championed the assessment provided in National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68) as justification to conduct an in depth examination of the US national security policy. NSC 68 argued that an imbalance of power was developing between

110 Thomas E. Hanson, *Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 16.
the US and the Soviet Union that favored the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{112} Essentially discarding the previous policy of relying on the US atomic monopoly to offset the growing deficit to the Soviet Union in conventional military forces as no longer adequate, NSC 68 assessed that a significant increase in the US standing military force structure was required to reassure its allies and deter Soviet aggression. While not rejecting the policy of containing the spread of Soviet influence, NSC 68 made a case for increased priority on conventional military forces as a means of executing the policy as opposed to diplomatic and economic efforts that consumed much of the US resources in the three years prior.\textsuperscript{113} President Truman remained unconvinced after receiving the first briefing on the contents of NSC 68 and ordered further review by the National Security Council. However, the establishment of the Sino-Soviet Treaty between Communist China and the Soviet Union, increased Communist support to the Vietminh combatting French forces in French Indochina (Vietnam), and on the June 25, 1950 invasion of South Korea by Communist North Korea removed any further time for deliberation by the Truman administration.

The Post-World War II Army

While the US national security strategy and foreign policy underwent rapid evolution in the short time period between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Korean War, the changes underwent by the US Armed Forces, particularly the Army, were just as drastic. At the end of World War II, the United States Army faced the daunting task of demobilizing a force of nearly eight million soldiers and eighty-nine divisions.\textsuperscript{114} Politicians, the public and soldiers stationed overseas demanded that demobilization proceed as quickly as possible. Within the first twelve months of demobilization, the active Army shed seventy-three divisions and by the


\textsuperscript{113} Gaddis, The Cold War, 35; Walker, The Cold War: A History, 73.

\textsuperscript{114} Stewart, The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2003, 211.
completion of demobilization in early 1947, the Army counted only twelve active duty divisions with an additional fifty-two divisions in the Organized Reserve Corps and the National Guard. The quick pace of demobilization caused the Army to struggle to maintain the combat experience and technical expertise required in the active-duty and reserve force.\textsuperscript{115}

The question of how should the US wage war in the age of atomic weapons caused a great deal of debate and interservice rivalry over the roles of each service. In 1947, President Truman appointed an Air Power Commission to study this question. The Commission’s report described a vision of future warfare in which bombers and guided missiles armed with atomic bombs and warheads with accompanying fighter support struck at America’s enemies while radar and air defense networks protected the homeland from opposing air strikes. The Commission recommended focusing military spending on research and development of technologies applicable to improving aircraft performance and capability, effectiveness of long-range missiles, and air defense networks. It cautioned against investing money in World War II technology. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal addressed the Senate Armed Services Committee in the spring of 1948 and described a similar vision of how the US would fight its next war. Forrestal detailed how the Air Force would defend the American homeland and its protective bases positioned around the world from attack while seeking out and destroying enemy forces from these bases. The Army would support this effort by seizing the bases required for the Air Force, protecting existing air bases, and providing anti-aircraft protection.\textsuperscript{116}

The Army attempted to combat this view of the limited utility of the Army in an air-centric future war. In his final report as Chief of Staff of the Army in February 1948, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower urged the Truman administration not to forget that the Army remained the only branch of service that could hold a defensive position, seize a major offensive


\textsuperscript{116} Lewis, \textit{The American Culture of War}, 70-72.
base for friendly use and control population. He also warned that the continued focus of the Army
on primarily occupation duty was creating a level of unreadiness that invited war. His
replacement as Chief of Staff of the Army, General Omar Bradley, addressed the House Armed
Services Committee in April 1948, advocating a balanced force and emphasizing the Army’s
ability to seize and hold terrain and combat guerilla forces that air power and atomic bombs
would not neutralize.\footnote{Ibid., 73 and 79.} Despite these attempts, by September 1949, Bradley described the US
strategy for fighting Communist forces in Europe as the US forces providing strategic bombing
with the ability to deliver atomic bombs and use of the Navy to control Atlantic sea lanes between
the US and Europe. The core of the ground force would come from western European militaries
with some reinforcement by US divisions.\footnote{Ibid., 68.}

The Truman administration imposed strict budget restrictions on the Army and the entire
Department of Defense. President Truman’s determination to avoid deficit spending resulted in
the administration allocating funding to domestic programs and then allocating the remaining
funds to the military. Congress, and even members of the Department of Defense, supported the
shoestring budget provided to the military. In February 1950, Stuart Symington, serving as the
Chairman of the National Security Resource Board and ending his tenure as the first Secretary of
the Air Force, told an audience at Baylor University that attempting to maintain a sizeable
peacetime military force would prove disastrous to the nation’s economy. When allocating funds
for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1950, Congress allocated only thirteen billion
dollars, over a billion dollars less than the Truman administration requested. With the costs of the
occupation missions in Germany and Japan costing more than two billion dollars by themselves
and its low priority in the Department of the Defense, the Army lived on a shoestring budget

\footnote{Ibid., 73 and 79.}
\footnote{Ibid., 68.}
during the initial years of the Cold War.\footnote{Ibid., 73-80.} To place this funding into perspective, NSC 68 recommended an increase in military spending to fifty billion dollars a year to achieve the force levels and readiness levels that would prove effective in deterring the Soviet Union.\footnote{Donnelly, “‘The Best Army that Can Be Put in the Field in the Circumstances’: The US Army July 1951 – July 1953,” 811.}

These funding constraints drastically impaired the readiness of the Army. By 1947, demobilization reduced the Army to 684,000 soldiers using poorly maintained equipment due to losses of maintenance specialists across the force.\footnote{Stewart, \textit{The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2003}, 201.} By the summer of 1950, the Army consisted of 591,000 soldiers and ten combat divisions. Four of these divisions were stationed overseas in Japan, one division was stationed in Europe while the other five remained in the United States to form the General Reserve. Budget constraints meant that all of these divisions suffered from shortages of personnel and equipment. Infantry regiments only received enough personnel to man two of their three battalions; artillery battalions could only man two of their three batteries. Every division lacked its full complement of weapons.\footnote{Ibid., 213.} Divisional anti-aircraft artillery battalion also only manned two of three batteries and divisional tank battalions had only one of the four authorized tank companies. Regiments were unable to fill the regimental tank companies and instead of the authorized heavy tanks, the division tank companies used the same platform as the regimental reconnaissance companies, the M24 Chaffee light tank which had proved vulnerable to German medium tanks in World War II.\footnote{Kelly C. Jordan, “Three Armies in Korea: The Effectiveness of the United States Eighth Army in Korea, July 1950 – June 1952,” (PhD Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1997), 53; Hanson, \textit{Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War}, 14.} These problems also extended to the Army’s
reserve forces as the Operational Reserve and National Guard units hovered at fifty percent personnel strength and less than fifty percent of authorized equipment.124

The Eighth (US) Army that entered the Korean War reflected the Army’s struggle to define its role, establish suitable force structure, and resource that structure appropriately.

**Eighth (US) Army**

In July 1950, the Eighth (US) Army epitomized all of the positives and negatives of the US’s fledgling Cold War Army. Eighth (US) Army was better trained than is given credit by many historians. However, severe resource shortfalls undermined both its training and its ability to execute the combined arms doctrine that emerged from World War II. Personnel uncertainty as the nation attempted to demobilize its wartime force while maintaining an operational core degraded cohesion and leadership and command within Eighth (US) Army. The US committed this force to fight in Korea mere months after the Truman administration concluded that Korea was not worth a war.

Eighth (US) Army’s primary purpose from 1945 to 1949 was to support the occupation of Japan. Severely understrength (at its low point in April 1948, it had fifty-two percent of its authorized personnel), Eighth (US) Army dispersed its subordinate units across the Japanese islands to conduct personnel control and civil administration. With the conclusion of World War II, combat became a distant memory or an afterthought for most of the organization.125 General Douglas MacArthur reoriented the focus of the US forces in Japan from internal control to defense from an external attack, namely the Soviet Union or its North Korean proxy. The newly assigned commander of Eighth (US) Army, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, instituted a long-term training program based upon threat estimated from the FECOM Intelligence Office and

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124 Lewis, *The American Culture of War*, 78.

scenarios focused on defeating Soviet military forces invading northern Japan. Walker published a training directive with specific training milestones and required completion dates. All units had until December 1949 to complete individual career-field specific training as well as small-unit collective training from squad to company by December 1949. The next milestone was the completion of battalion collective training and tactical evaluations by May 1950, followed by regimental training and evaluation by July 1950, and divisions completed in December 1950.¹²⁶

The constraints imposed upon the Army often served to undermine the efficacy of Eighth (US) Army’s training program. The quality of training suffered from funding shortfalls, lack of large maneuver areas in Japan, and cost-cutting measures that restricted all Army forces to a forty-hour training week. The Army provided thirteen weeks of basic training to all new enlistees but no career-field specific training before sending them to their duty stations. Regiments had to establish basic training programs to train new soldiers on career-field specific individual and small-unit tasks. Even as units progressed through the training milestones set by Eighth (US) Army, they had to conduct constant iterations of individual training and only a portion of assigned personnel had progressed through the training milestones with the unit.¹²⁷ Eighth (US) Army went to war in Korea in the summer of 1950 with most of its units having progressed only to battalion-level training. Chief of the Staff of the Army, J. Lawton Collins, on a visit to Eighth (US) Army shortly before the Korean War began, observed that few of the twenty-seven infantry battalions in Japan had satisfactorily completed battalion tactical evaluations.¹²⁸

Personnel and equipment resource shortfalls also severely characterized Eighth (US) Army and affected all of its operations and training. Much like its inter-war period predecessor, the post-World War II Army served as a skeleton organization, designed to expand rapidly

¹²⁷ Ibid., 19, 26-27, 31 and 115.
around a core cadre when the nation mobilized for war. Application of this concept to a military force in being resulted in Eighth (US) Army suffering from crippling personnel shortages. Eighth (US) Army’s subordinate divisions operated under a peacetime authorization of only two-thirds of the soldiers it would require in wartime (12,500 vice 18,900). In June 1950, the four divisions in Japan had only 70 percent of their wartime requirements. Equipment shortfalls encompassed vehicles, weapons, repair parts, and uniforms and boots. In fact, Eighth (US) Army had received very little new equipment since the conclusion of World War II. As a result, FECOM instituted a program termed Operation Round-up in which all of the equipment abandoned at World War II outposts across the Pacific was gathered and then restored to working conditions using Japanese workers. In 1949, Operation Round-up provided more than 200,000 tons of equipment and supplies to US forces. Ninety percent of Eighth (US) Army’s weapons and seventy-five percent of its vehicles came from Operation Round-up.

These resource shortfalls were not just a result of the outbreak of an unforeseen military conflict. Systemic issues affected Eighth (US) Army’s ability to sustain military operations during combat. Personnel shortages during the occupation of Japan had resulted in Eighth (US) Army’s employment of thousands of Japanese workers. While many Japanese workers performed menial tasks, some performed highly technical functions. The rapid turnover of personnel in Japan precluded developing these skills in soldiers. These Japanese workers did not follow the Eighth (US) Army to Korea. In addition, Korea’s limited rail network and the rapid advance of North Korean units denied the use of many airfields to the Air Force which made road

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130 Lewis, *The American Culture of War*, 92.
transportation the key avenue for sustainment. However, shortages in funds and parts resulted in only 12,000 serviceable vehicles, while 19,000 more vehicles were unserviceable.\textsuperscript{132}

One of the tolls of occupation duty on Eighth (US) Army was a lack of toughness in the force. Even those that had arrived after the focus had shifted away from occupation duty lacked the psychological and physical fitness and determination required for combat. Soldiers that enlisted in the Army following World War II often did so lured by benefits established under the umbrella of the GI Bill to reward the service of World War II veterans. Those looking for adventure and the experience of living in a foreign land found it in Japan as their military salaries far exceeded what the average Japanese civilian earned. Japanese civilians employed as servants attended to young enlisted soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers while they attended weekly or monthly formal dress events hosted by the Army club system. Parades and ceremonies were a constant part of the administrative duties of occupation and the skills required to maintain a sharp appearance became more useful than tactical proficiency.\textsuperscript{133} In addition, the Eighth (US) Army soldiers that deployed to Korea had no idea of what lay ahead of them and their leaders did little to prepare them psychologically. Convinced that US forces would experience little difficulty in defeating the North Koreans, commanders fostered a sense of overconfidence in their soldiers. A battalion commander in the first regiment deployed to Korea told his soldiers that the North Koreans were poorly trained, poorly equipped, and had not made much progress in their invasion. The boasts of soldiers that the mere sight of US Army uniforms would rout the opposition is evidence of this overconfidence. This overconfidence did not instill the fighting spirit that American soldiers would need on the battlefields of Korea.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{132} Schnabel, \textit{Policy and Direction}, 59.

\textsuperscript{133} Charles M. Province, \textit{General Walton H. Walker: The Man Who Saved Korea} (Charleston, SC: CreateSpace, 2008), 52.

The circumstances under which Eighth (US) Army deployed to Korea undermined unit cohesion throughout its subordinate units. As stated earlier, personnel turnover plagued Walker’s attempts to build and train units through a regimented collective training program. In 1949, personnel turnover in Eighth (US) Army averaged more than 3,000 soldiers every month due to a reduction in the length of overseas tours. Some infantry squads experienced turnover as high as fifty percent every ninety days due to departures of personnel and internal rotations to balance the trained soldiers with the newly arriving untrained soldiers.\footnote{Hanson, \textit{Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War}, 26 and 115.} Once Eighth (US) Army was alerted to prepare divisions for deployment to Korea to stop the North Korean invasion, Eighth (US) Army plundered the ranks of 7th Infantry Division (stationed in northern Japan, the furthest away from Korea) to provide additional personnel to 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions. This resulted in the reception and integration of thousands of unfamiliar soldiers as these divisions prepared their personnel for movement and combat. President Truman authorized the mobilization of portions of the National Guard and Reserves as another method to provide additional personnel to Eighth (US) Army to reach its authorized wartime strength. However, the Army staff found itself tasked with supporting the field army that would fight in Korea, building a field army in Germany to fight a potential Soviet attack into Western Europe, and increasing the size of the General Reserve stationed in the United States.\footnote{Donnelly, “‘The Best Army that Can Be Put in the Field in the Circumstances,’” 810.} These tasks all competed for the same pool of personnel resources. The Army staff chose to retain the majority of active Reservists and National Guard soldiers for assignment to the General Reserve, sending Eighth (US) Army a large number of soldiers mobilized from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). These IRR lacked the inherent small group cohesion that would come from receiving cohorts of active Reservists that participated in unit activities together. Instead, Eighth (US) Army received soldiers that were significantly older than the young men who enlisted after World War II and many of the IRR
soldiers were disgruntled at mobilization, feeling that they had done their military duty during World War II.¹³⁷

Like any military organization, the commanders in Eighth (US) Army possessed positive and negative traits. However, the personnel management policies of the Army placed additional pressure on these commanders by setting the conditions for the assignment of a large number of inexperienced and sometimes poorly qualified leaders at every echelon from squad to regiment. First, Walton Walker seemed to fit his assignment as Eighth (US) Army commander perfectly. His military background reveals expertise in three areas: combat, command, and training. He commanded at the company and battalion levels in World War I and at the Corps level in World War II. During the early portions of World War II, he commanded the Desert Training Center in California and Arizona and developed it from an armored training area under General George S. Patton to a comprehensive training area designed to replicate a theater of operations.¹³⁸ Walker was able to utilize his expertise in mobile warfare to guide his subordinate commanders. However, his inability to form a suitable relationship with MacArthur and the enmity between himself and MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Edward Almond, reduced his ability to nest his objectives and plans with those of his higher HQs and obtain the resources that he required. These relationships also colored how he viewed his own subordinates.¹³⁹ During the initial month of combat in Korea, three of his subordinate divisions deployed to Korea. Major Generals Hobart Gay, William Dean, and William Kean commanded the 1st Cavalry, 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions respectively. Of these three commanders, only William Dean had any experience commanding in combat in either World Wars I or II. Gay and Kean both served in staff positions in North African and Europe, respectively, during World War II while Dean served

¹³⁷ Jordan, “Three Armies in Korea,” 188; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 56.
¹³⁸ Province, General Walton H. Walker, 199-207.
as a division commander in Europe. The average age of these three commanders was fifty-four years old when the Korean War began, seven years older than division commanders in World War II.\textsuperscript{140} The terrain of North Africa, France, and Germany did not offer any similarities to the terrain they would fight their divisions on in Korea.

The Army’s personnel management policies set the conditions for placing a number of inexperienced officers and non-commissioned officers in command and leadership positions. In the post-World War II force, the Army’s officer management policies sought to provide capable officers with wider experiences. The Army assigned officers with no previous command experience to company, battalion, and regimental commands. Some historians have characterized these assignments as rewards for World War II staff officers, noting that the impact was older officers with less qualifications and experiences commanding units in a severely constrained Army that desperately needed leaders with experience.\textsuperscript{141} Similarly, the Army’s Career Guidance Program for non-commissioned officers sought to produce non-commissioned officers with a wide variety of skills and experiences. While this program instituted a number of initiatives aimed at creating a merit-based promotion system, it also resulted in the constant rotation of non-commissioned officers as they all sought to gain experience in a number of different positions. Often non-commissioned officers assigned to troop-leading positions were actually serving in staff positions, contributing to a shortage of leaders at the squad and platoon level. Regiments attempted to fill these shortages by selecting talented junior enlisted soldiers and training them in leadership schools that attempted to make up for a lack of experience with additional training.\textsuperscript{142}

The fundamental task of leaders is to guide a group of people in the accomplishment of a common goal. In the Korean War, this often entailed leaders repeatedly exposing themselves to

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 181-182.

\textsuperscript{141} Hanson, \textit{Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War}, 36; Schnabel, \textit{Policy and Direction}, 59.

\textsuperscript{142} Hanson, \textit{Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War}, 34, 60-61.
hostile fire in order to maintain control of their soldiers and lead them to accomplishing their given task. In many cases, some leaders in Eighth (US) Army were not prepared for this. The Army assignment policies resulted in newly commissioned officers selecting assignments based upon performance. Those who performed better in commissioning program chose first. Duty in the US or Germany was considered more desirable than duty in Japan so those junior officers who ranked at the bottom of their commissioning programs often ended up serving in Eighth (US) Army. Many brave but inexperienced junior leaders led as required but ended up as casualties, replaced by leaders who were not eager to suffer the same fate. 143

Finally, the conditions of the post-World War II force challenged Eighth (US) Army’s ability to integrate the combat arms and execute combined arms operations. In 1946, the Army concluded that one of the enduring lessons of World War II was the importance of combined arms operations. With this came the decision to assign combat capabilities to divisions that the World War II pooled at the Army level. This included armor, artillery, and anti-aircraft artillery. The 1947 design of the US Army’s triangular division added authorizations for these units to the division organization.144 However, resource shortfalls resulted in partial fill of these authorizations as described earlier in this chapter. These shortfalls resulted in Eighth (US) Army’s divisions possessing only sixty-two percent of authorized infantry firepower, sixty-nine percent of authorized artillery firepower, and fourteen percent of authorized armor firepower.145 This presented the following challenges to executing combined arms operations: shortage of artillery batteries meant that divisions did not have artillery assets to use in general support to its regiments unless it withheld assets intended for direct support to the regiments. The Army also


felt that World War II revealed that tanks were the primary anti-tank weapon that could protect infantry units from enemy armored attack. The severe shortage of tanks in July 1950 meant that commanders would have to divert other sources of firepower to anti-tank tasks. The shortage of a battalion in every regiment meant that regimental commanders could not maintain a battalion in reserve to exploit opportunities or shore up weaknesses during a battle.\textsuperscript{146} In the words of military historian Jonathan House, “US Army force structure did not fit its doctrine.”\textsuperscript{147}

Eighth (US) Army, seemingly ill-prepared for the Korean War in terms of doctrine, force structure, and resources, would face a diverse Communist force whose preparation exceeded all expectations and estimates.

The Enemy

Like much of the Korean War, the enemy went through several stages of evolution that resulted in US forces fighting an opposing force that changed significantly over time. These stages of evolution fall into three periods. First, from July to November 1950, Communist forces were composed primarily of elements of the North Korea People’s Army (NKPA). The United Nations Command’s campaign to pursue the NKPA north to the Yalu River resulted in the decisive defeat and near destruction of the NKPA, triggering significant change to the enemy force. From November 1950 to July 1951, Communist Chinese forces entered the Korean War, in the form of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV). The CPV exhibited significant differences from the NKPA in terms of organization, equipment, and doctrine. Finally, the successful reconstitution of portions of the NKPA coupled with the transition of the Korean War to a war of attrition during the stalemate phase of the war resulted in the final evolution of the enemy. From July 1951 to July 1953, United Nations Command faced an opposing coalition force, as the


\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 149.
NKPA and CPV operated side-by-side in Korea, utilizing a combined headquarters to coordinate and synchronize operations.

In February 1948, two years before Communist North Korea invaded its democratic southern neighbor it formed the North Korea People’s Army. By June 1950, the NKPA totaled 135,000 troops, most of it dedicated to infantry, armor and reconnaissance forces for use in offensive operations. The NKPA totaled ten infantry division, eight manned with their full complements of 11,000 soldiers with two reserve divisions manned at approximately half strength. A motorcycle reconnaissance regiment, an armored brigade, and a separate infantry regiment augmented the capabilities of these infantry divisions. I Corps and II Corps headquarters provided command and control in the field and five border constabulary brigades designed for internal security rounded out the forces of the NKPA.\textsuperscript{148}

The structure and equipping of the NKPA revealed its close association with the Soviet Union. NKPA divisions resembled World War II-era Soviet Divisions, with each consisting of three organic infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and battalion and company-sized anti-tank, engineer, signal, medical, reconnaissance, and transportation units. NKPA infantry and artillery regiments had a great deal of modern firepower provided by the Soviet Union. The artillery regiments employed towed 122-mm and 76-mm artillery systems and self-propelled 76-mm guns mounted on tank chassis. Infantry regiments possessed organic indirect fire systems in the form of 122-mm mortars and 76-mm artillery systems, while infantry battalions were equipped with 82-mm mortars and infantry companies with 61-mm mortars. In addition, every echelon from division to battalion also possessed 45-mm anti-tank guns and 14.5mm anti-tank rifles. The 105th Armored Brigade contained all of the North Korean armored assets. It also followed the triangular organization, consisting of three tank regiments, each with three tank battalions of thirteen tanks each that it would task organize as directed in support of infantry divisions. Again,

\textsuperscript{148} Appleman, \textit{South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu}, 8-9.
Soviet sponsorship resulted in North Korea equipping the 105th Armored Brigade with 120 Soviet T-34 medium tanks, a tank that proved itself as effective during World War II.149

While North Korea filled the ranks of the NKPA with conscripts, as many as one-third of its soldiers were seasoned veterans of the Chinese Civil War. Three of the NKPA’s divisions consisted entirely of units that served in the Communist Chinese People’s Liberation Army until 1950. Two other divisions had at least one regiment formed of veteran units of Korean Communists serving in the People’s Liberation Army. This veteran core and a large number of Soviet advisors/trainers assisted in the speedy training of this conscript force.150

Finally, the tactics and operations of the NKPA reflected its modern organization and equipment as well as its familiarity with the terrain on which it fought. Its preferred method of tactical engagement while on the offensive was to use its armored force or firepower to conduct frontal attacks intended to fix opposing forces while infantry maneuvered around both flanks and enveloped UN forces. The NKPA utilized operational maneuver, attempting both broad front attacks and encirclement to synchronize the actions of divisions originating from separate bases of operations in North Korea.151

By November 1950, the NKPA expanded to eight Corps headquarters and thirty divisions (twenty-nine infantry and one armored). This was misleading as only two Corps with five divisions were engaged in fighting UN forces at that point and most of those forces were conducting guerilla operations in South Korea. The NKPA split the remainder of its forces between China and Kanggye, a North Korean city approximately forty kilometers from the Chinese border. The NKPA sought to reconstitute these forces after suffering heavy losses during

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149 Ibid., 10-12.
150 Ibid., 8-10.
151 Robert M. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, 120-121.
its campaign into South Korea. As UN forces advanced towards the Yalu River, marking the boundary between China and North Korea, Chinese Communist forces took over the fighting of the Korean War. However, the Chinese People’s Volunteers that assumed the fight from the NKPA in November 1950 was a different force than its North Korean partner.

The Chinese government designated the contingent from the People’s Liberation Army that fought in the Korean War as the Chinese People’s Volunteers in order to maintain its political stance that it had not intervened in the Korean War and that the Chinese citizens fighting in Korea were volunteers assisting their Communist brethren. In fact, the CPV contained some of the PLA’s best units. Numbering more than 300,000 troops, the CPV consisted of the IX and XIII Army Groups, positioned in eastern and western portions of North Korea, respectively. The IX Army Group had four subordinate armies and sixteen infantry divisions. The more robust XIII Army Group consisted of six subordinate armies, eighteen infantry divisions, two artillery divisions, a cavalry regiment, and two truck regiments. Both army groups came from the first-echelon field armies in the PLA, as opposed to the less proficient garrison armies and militia that made up seventy percent of the PLA.

The CPV also utilized a triangular structure with each army consisting of three divisions and each division having three regiments. However, the IX Army Group reinforced each of its armies with an additional infantry division. An overwhelmingly light infantry force, Chinese forces had no supporting armored forces and the divisions had no organic artillery beyond light mortars. Unlike, the NKPA, the CPV were poorly equipped, utilizing small-arms and crew-served weapons from various sources and some estimates reflect more than 60 percent of the infantry lacked weapons. The CPV had no air support to compensate for its lack of organic direct and

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153 Ibid., 55-56.
154 Ibid., 53-54.
indirect firepower as the Chinese People’s Air Force confined its air operations to northwest Korea. The small number of transportation assets for a force of this size demonstrates the lack of logistical capability in the CPV. The CPV had less than 300 trucks to support logistical operations in Korea.\textsuperscript{155}

Manpower and experience, however, were strengths of the CPV. Its soldiers consisted of veterans of the recently concluded Chinese Civil War and many of its leaders at regimental-level and above fought against the Japanese during World War II. Effective Communist indoctrination and the feeling of triumph from the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War resulted in a force with high morale as it continued the fight for Communism. The discipline of the force showed as the CPV divisions moved hundreds of miles from the Chinese coast to the border with North Korea and then infiltrated hundreds of thousands of soldiers and equipment across the Yalu River. The CPV conducted all of this movement at night to escape detection.\textsuperscript{156}

Finally, the CPV utilized different tactics than the NKPA. As a light infantry force, during offensive operations, the CPV used reconnaissance and darkness to identify seams in the defensive positions of UN forces and utilized those seams to infiltrate into the rear of these positions. At daylight, the Chinese forces conducted large-scale frontal attacks against these units, massing its forces to force the withdrawal of UN units from its defensive positions and then using the forces that had infiltrated the night prior to block withdrawal routes, catching UN forces between these two elements.\textsuperscript{157} When conducting defensive operations, the CPV utilized a mobile defense, in which it established a light screening force to its front and massed divisions ten to fifteen miles behind the screen line. Chinese forces used this battlefield alignment to entice an

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{157} Citino, \textit{Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm}, 139.
attacker to conduct a deep penetration through the screen line and into its depth, and then use its massed forces to counterattack the dispersed units of the opposing force. Operationally, the CPV’s lack of logistics structure and transportation assets rendered it incapable of reinforcing success or conducting consecutive operations without a lengthy operational pause to resupply and reorganize. CPV operations were limited to the five days of supplies carried into battle by its forces.

By January 1951, the logistical shortfalls of the CPV caused it to reach its culmination point offensively. During the spring of 1951, Eighth (US) Army successfully executed a series of offensive operations that drove CPV forces to north of the 38th Parallel where both sides established defensive lines. As the Korean War transitioned to the war of outposts along these defensive lines that characterized the remaining two years of the war, Communist forces in Korea totaled more 459,000 as the reconstituted NKPA joined forces with the CPV. By July 1951, this Communist coalition force consisted of seven NKPA Corps headquarters and twenty-three divisions with the CPV contributing five Army Group headquarters, fourteen army headquarters, and forty infantry divisions at reduced strength. The CPV also increased the firepower of its force, adding man-portable 12.7mm anti-aircraft machine guns, 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars, 70mm artillery guns, rocket launchers and 57mm recoilless rifles. The NKPA’s twenty-three divisions included the 105th Armored Division (reconstituted and expanded from the 105th Armored Brigade with which it begun the war with), however the North Korean government retained this division near Pyongyang.

The NKPA positioned the rest of its forces on the front line flanking the seven CPV armies that occupied the defensive line in central Korea. The additional CPV armies served as the

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159 Citino, *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm*, 147.
The Communist forces operated under a combined NKPA and CPV headquarters located in Kangyye and answered to the North Korean government. However, the real military command and control for North Korean and Chinese forces came from the CPV headquarters located in China. NKPA forces tended to focus on retention of terrain while CPV forces favored inflicting casualties to attrit UN forces. This most likely reflected not only a difference in military philosophy but in the objectives of the North Korean government vice the Communist Chinese government. North Korea’s objective of maintaining and expanding its territory required retention of terrain while the political objectives of the People’s Republic of China were served by inflicting tactical defeats upon the United Nations forces.

Eighth (US) Army’s ability to execute those actions required to successfully accomplish its mission was impacted by the enemy forces that it faced. The Communist forces possessed strengths that exploited the weaknesses of Eighth (US) Army. North Korean forces possessed Soviet military technology that directly attacked material gaps in Eighth (US) Army’s equipment. The 300,000-man CPV force possessed an advantage in size over the personnel-constrained Eighth (US) Army. A large portion of both the North Korean and Chinese forces were seasoned veterans of the Chinese Civil War while many of the Army’s World War II veterans had left the force. Lastly, Communist indoctrination resulted in a high level of fighting spirit in Communist forces as they entered battle. On the other hand, the soldiers of the Eighth (US) Army were suddenly entering into an unexpected conflict and possessed an unrealistic expectation of what lay before them.

161 Ibid., 79.
162 Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 56-57.
163 Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, 79.
Conclusion

The Korean War came during a time in which the US was grappling with a change in its role in global politics and the resultant change in its military instrument of power. US policies and the Army reflected this turmoil. These conditions created great challenges for Eighth (US) Army as it deployed to combat in Korea. Yet over the next twelve months, Eighth (US) Army instituted racial integration of its forces despite, or perhaps as one of the responses to, these challenges. The next chapter will examine how Eighth (US) Army implemented racial integration and the resulting impact on its combat effectiveness.

Chapter 4 – Assessment of Integration

Overview

Following World Wars I and II, the Army’s assessment of its wartime experiences led it to support the segregation of African-American soldiers. The Army based segregation on the beliefs that African-American soldiers were incapable of performing satisfactorily in combat and that close interaction between African-Americans and whites would result in racial tension that would decrease combat effectiveness. In less than twelve months between July 1950 and May 1950, Army forces in Korea moved from segregation to unofficial integration to enacting an Army-approved policy of integration. Integration improved 8th Army combat effectiveness by improving cohesion, leadership and command, resourcing, sustainment, and toughness.

Background

Justification for Segregation

The Army’s justification for the use of racial segregation lay, at least in part, in its low assessment of the prowess of African Americans on the battlefield. During the first half of the
twentieth century, the Army’s view of the capabilities of African Americans to serve in combat remained consistent. Following World War I, two of the highest ranking officers of the American Expeditionary Force to command African American soldiers offered poor assessments of their performance. Major General Charles Clarendon Ballou, Commanding General of the 92nd Infantry Division, submitted a report to the War Department in which he stated that “the average negro is a rank coward in the dark and I subsequently realized to the full how worthless this trait renders him in the service of Security and Information.” Lieutenant General Robert L. Bullard, Commanding General of the 2nd US Army, which served as the 92nd Infantry Division’s higher headquarters during World War I, characterized black soldiers as “cowards and rapists, hopelessly inferior as fighting men.”

In 1939, the United States began executing plans to expand the Army as World War II unfolded in Europe. The expansion of the Army eventually included an increase in the number of African-American soldiers, though not immediately. In August 1939, the number of African-American soldiers in the Regular Army consisted of less than five thousand enlisted and five officers. As manpower requirements increased, the Army began to access an increasing amount of African-Americans, with the number of African-Americans in the force reaching its peak strength of just over 700,000 in September 1944. During this time period, the civilian and military leadership of the Army retained negative beliefs about African-Americans. They believed that “hereditary biological attributes determined the subordinate status of African-American soldiers.”

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165 Ibid., 24.
168 Lee, The Utilization of Negro Troops, 416.
“Americans” and “mutual hostility precluded whites and African-Americans from cooperating as equals.”\textsuperscript{169} The Army’s leadership also believed that the majority of African-American soldiers proved to be cowardly, inferior to white soldiers, and unwilling to fight under enemy fire.\textsuperscript{170} This led the Army to continue its policy of segregating African-Americans and whites into separate units and limiting the utilization of African-Americans primarily to service support roles despite some discussion of alternatives.\textsuperscript{171}

The Army did conduct one experiment in racial integration worthy of closer examination. During World War II, a shortfall in infantry replacement soldiers for the European Theater of Operations (ETO) became increasingly acute. By July 1944, the disparity between casualties and replacement resulted in a projected shortage of 29,000 infantrymen or the equivalent of all of the rifle companies in two infantry divisions.\textsuperscript{172} Officials in the ETO executed every option to generate additional replacements. First, the Personnel Division reassigned infantry from newly arriving divisions to divisions with shortages. Second, Ground Forces Reinforcement Command and the Communication Zone of the ETO retrained 20,000 soldiers from service and support units as infantry.\textsuperscript{173} Finally, Lieutenant General John C.H Lee, commanding general of the Communication Zone of the ETO, proposed additionally soliciting volunteers from his African-American service and support units as well. Lee gained the concurrence of Generals Eisenhower and Bradley and then published a call to troops on December 26, 1944, expressing the intent to assign any volunteers to units requiring personnel with no restrictions due to color or race.\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{169} Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, \textit{Foxholes and Color Lines} (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 78.


\textsuperscript{171} MacGregor, \textit{Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965}, 31-32.

\textsuperscript{172} Booker, \textit{African Americans in the United States Army in World War II}, 274.

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid., 275.

\textsuperscript{174} Lee, \textit{The Utilization of Negro Troops}, 689.
While necessity created the opportunity, Lee seized it because he was morally opposed to the practice of segregation. He admitted as much when Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, confronted him with concerns that the wording in the call for troops ran counter to the War Department’s policy on maintaining segregation of African-American soldiers. Smith took his concerns to Eisenhower, resulting in Eisenhower personally rewriting the call to troops to omit any specific mention of African-American troops and ordering the African-American infantrymen organized into platoons for assignment to divisions, rather than individual replacements. 175

In early 1945, the Army trained two thousand African-American volunteers and assigned them in platoons to the two US Army groups in Europe. Many of these volunteers were non-commissioned officers who accepted demotion to the lowest enlisted rank of private in order to gain the opportunity to serve as an infantryman in combat. On March 1, 1945, twenty-five platoons went to 12th Army Group and twelve platoons went to 6th Army Group. In late March 1945, each Army group received a second group of volunteer African-American infantrymen, with twelve platoons assigned to the 12th Army Group and four platoons assigned to 6th Army Group.176 Both Army groups used the African-American infantry replacements for the same missions as white infantrymen. The main difference lay in method of employment. 6th Army Group assigned its sixteen African-American infantry platoons to 7th Army which further organized these platoons into four provisional companies and assigned each to a division, though none of these platoons received training in planning or executing operations at the company level.177

175 Ibid., 390.
The 12th Army Group assigned three African-American infantry platoons to each of their divisions. In turn, each division typically assigned a platoon to each of their regiments and the regimental commanders would attach their African-American infantry platoon to one of their infantry companies. These divisions and regiments immediately took measures to inculcate esprit de corps into these soldiers. Either the division commanding general or his assistant division commander personally welcomed the platoon to the division; they also indoctrinated the newcomers with the division history, provided division patches and insignia to the new soldiers and the regiments conducted additional combat training if time permitted.

The African-American volunteer infantrymen served primarily in the Allies’ final campaign in the ETO of World War II. In three months, they proved their courage and aggressiveness. The African-American infantry replacements received praise from their division commanders. The 104th Infantry Division commander, Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen, commented that his African-American infantrymen’s “...combat record has been outstanding. They have without exception proven themselves to be good soldiers.” Both Generals Bradley and Hodges expressed satisfaction with the African-American infantry soldiers. The 78th Infantry Division commanding general, Major General Edwin Parker, wished for additional African-American infantrymen. The 99th Infantry Division commanding general, Major General Walter E. Lauer, stated that his African-American infantrymen “performed in an excellent manner at all times while in combat. These men were courageous fighters and never once did they fail to accomplish their assigned mission.”

178 Ibid., 695.
179 Booker, African Americans in the United States Army in World War II, 278.
180 Lee, The Utilization of Negro Troops, 696.
181 Ibid., 698.
Immediately following the end of the war with Germany, the Headquarters, European Theater of Operations conducted a survey of white commissioned and non-commissioned officers in seven of the divisions in which the black infantry platoons served. The purpose of the survey was to determine what they thought of “the combat performance of Negro rifle platoons, which were attached to their companies in March and April and fought side by side with white platoons through VE day.”\(^{182}\) The survey group encompassed 250 soldiers, consisting primarily of company grade officers and platoon sergeants that served with these platoons.

The results of this survey represented an indictment against those who claimed segregation was the only way to avoid the racial conflict that would result from close contact between white and African-American soldiers. Overall, the survey showed a dramatic improvement in the attitudes of white soldiers towards serving in the same company as African-American soldiers. Sixty-four percent of the white officers and non-commissioned officers were initially opposed to serving in a unit with African American and white platoons intermixed. However, after serving with the black infantry platoons, 77 percent of the white officers and non-commissioned officers reported that their feelings on serving in a mixed unit had become more favorable. Remarkably, not one respondent stated that his experience serving with African-American soldiers made him less willing to serve in a mixed unit in the future.\(^{183}\)

The survey also demonstrated that white soldiers working in close proximity to African-American soldiers developed an increased appreciation of their capabilities and performance. More than 80 percent of those surveyed responded that African-American soldiers performed very well in combat while the remainder stated that they performed fairly well. No officers and


\(^{183}\) Ibid., 2.
only 1 percent of noncommissioned officers felt that African-Americans had not performed well in combat. In direct contradiction of the stereotypes of African-American soldiers prevalent in the Army, these company grade leaders often cited aggressiveness, use of fire and maneuver and teamwork as the strengths of the African-American infantry soldiers while identifying a tendency to take overly aggressive action as their main weakness. A significant majority (69 percent of officers and 83 percent of noncommissioned officers) felt that African-Americans would perform just as well as whites as infantrymen given the same training and experience. Seventeen percent of officers and 9 percent of noncommissioned officers felt that African-American soldiers made better infantrymen than white soldiers.184 These responses stand in stark contrast to the stereotypes of African-American soldiers that described them as not capable of absorbing Army training and too scared to stand and fight.

Another critical point came from the work of this survey group. Only fifteen percent of the white soldiers interviewed by the survey group served in a division, regiment or company that received an African-American infantry platoon. The responses of these soldiers compared to the responses of the soldiers who had not served in such a unit indicated that those who served in some proximity to the African-American infantry soldiers were much less opposed to serving in a company with both black and white platoons. Less than twenty-five percent of those soldiers that served in the same division or regiment as the African-American infantrymen expressed an unwillingness to serve in a unit in the future with white and African-American infantry platoons while sixty-two percent of the soldiers outside of the armies that received African-American infantrymen felt that they would dislike serving in such a company. Two thirds of the soldiers interviewed that served in the same company or regiment as a African-American infantrymen also felt it was a good idea to assign African-American and white infantry platoons to the same

184 Ibid., 3.
company while less than one-fifth of soldiers interviewed from units that did not have African-American infantrymen were in favor of such an idea.\textsuperscript{185}

Despite the results of the African American infantry platoon initiative, World War II did not change the Army’s prevailing negative assessment of the suitability of African American to serve as soldiers. As part of a comprehensive review of the performance of African Americans, the Army Service Forces reported that African Americans performed at 60 to 75 percent of what white soldiers were capable and rated the overall efficiency and leadership ability of African Americans soldiers well below that of white soldiers.\textsuperscript{186} The Army Ground Forces’ post-war assessment added that African American soldiers did not display any sense of responsibility, showed a tendency to excessive malingering, and were undependable. African American officers suffered from a lack of any sense of responsibility, initiative, and self-confidence while African American noncommissioned officers lacked initiative and force due to a natural deficit of leadership ability.\textsuperscript{187} Analysis of the reports submitted by both organizations reveal a heavy reliance on the reports of the 92nd Infantry Division for evidence, and findings that ignored many of the accomplishments and actions of black soldiers during World War II.\textsuperscript{188} Most importantly,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 6-7.
  \item \textsuperscript{188} The 92nd Infantry Division was one of two African-American combat divisions utilized in combat during World War II. 92nd Infantry fought as a division in the Italian Campaign of 1944-1945 while the 93rd Infantry Division fought dispersed in the Pacific Theater of Operations. Generally, the Army assessed the performance of the 92nd Infantry Division as sub-par and reorganized it during World War II, replacing two of its African-American infantry regiments with a white regiment and Japanese-American regiment. The Army then converted the two African-American regiments into service units. The commander of the 92nd Infantry Division, Major General Edward M. Almond, has received a great deal of criticism by historians and those that served in the division for placing the blame for the Division’s performance completely upon the African-American soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and junior officers and absolving the white commanders and staff at battalion and higher levels of any responsibility. For one, this runs counter to the Army practice of senior leaders accepting responsibility for the actions and
\end{itemize}
neither study discussed the organizational constraints imposed by segregation much less the corrosive effects it had on morale and the will to fight.

Despite this negative assessment, some Army leaders, such as the General Staff G1, realized that African-American soldiers would remain a significant part of the peacetime force.189 From 1945 to 1948, the Truman administration, the Department of Defense, and the Army conducted separate reviews to determine how to utilize African-Americans in the military.

The Road to Integration

In late 1945, the War Department appointed Lieutenant General Alvan Gillem, Jr., Major General Lewis Pick, and Brigadier Generals Winslow Morse and Aln Warnock to “prepare a broad policy for the utilization of Negro manpower in the military establishment.”190 This group, referred to as the Gillem Board, recommended the establishment of an initial and ultimate objective for the Army on the issue of segregation. The initial objective was “the utilization of the proportionate ratio of the manpower available to the military establishment during the postwar period.”191 The ultimate objective was “the effective use of all manpower made available to the military establishment in the event of a major mobilization at some unknown date against an undetermined aggressor. The manpower to be utilized, in the event of another major war, in the Army without regard to antecedents or race.”192 The board recommended a series of actions

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191 Ibid, 12.
192 Ibid., 12.
designed to move the Army closer to the initial objective. The Gillem Board concluded that the Army would have to establish enough black units to provide trained cadres and leaders in the event that the nation went through another mobilization. In addition, the Gillem Board also recommended providing all officers, black and white, with equal opportunities for promotion and professional development, assigning blacks with specialized skill sets to overhead units as individuals, continuation of the policy of establishing composite organizations consisting of black and white units, and use of education and experience to resolve friction points that would occur in these composite units.193

On July 26, 1948 President Truman issued Executive Order 9981, establishing the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, commonly referred to as the Fahy Committee. Executive Order 9981 “declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.”194 Several days later President Truman made it clear during a press conference that the objective of Executive Order 9981 was to end segregation in the Armed Forces. He charged the Fahy Committee with developing the methods for achieving this.195

Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall and Chief of Staff of the Army General Omar Bradley launched a vigorous defense of the Army’s use of segregation. Bradley pointed out that while volunteers could choose whether to enter an integrated force, any use of Selective Service to conscript citizens in the future would bring soldiers into the Army who did not get to make that choice. To force draftees into an integrated force before they accepted integration in the civilian

193 Ibid., 9-11. Overhead and installation units referred to organization designed specifically to manage the running of a post, installation or institution such as a training center or school.


195 McCoy and Ruetten, Quest and Response, 222.
communities would only have a negative impact on morale and the Army’s combat
effectiveness. 196 Royall argued that the heavy population of soldiers from the South would result
in low morale if the Army integrated. 197 Royall also defended the continued use of a quota
limiting African Americans to no more than 10 percent of the total Army force as a quality
control measure. 198

In the five years between the end of World War II and the start of the Korean War, the
Army implemented three initiatives that moved it closer to integration. The first initiative was the
establishment of composite units in 1947 and 1948. This consisted of assigning African American
units as a subordinate unit of a larger white unit. The Army formed four such composite units. In
1947, the Army assigned the 24th Infantry Regiment as one of the three regiments of the 25th
Infantry Division in Japan. 199 Later that year, the African-American 555th Parachute Infantry
Battalion was redesignated as 3rd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Battalion and assigned to
the 82nd Airborne Division along with two other African-American combat units, the 503rd
Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion and the 758th Tank Battalion. 200 In 1948, an African-American
infantry battalion was assigned to the 9th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division and the
African-American 508th Armored Field Artillery Battalion joined the 2nd Armored Division. 201

196 Omar Bradley to President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the
Armed Forces, 28 March 1949, Desegregation of the Armed Forces collection, Harry S. Truman Library,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/desegregation/large/documents/pdf/10-
1.pdf#zoom=100 (accessed 14 November 2010), 6.
197 Kenneth Royall to President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the
Armed Forces, 28 March 1949, Desegregation of the Armed Forces collection, Harry S. Truman Library,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/desegregation/large/documents/pdf/4-
17.pdf#zoom=100 (accessed 14 November 2010), 2
198 Ibid., 4.
vol. 8 of Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents, 727.
200 Ibid, 713.
201 Ibid, 728.
The second initiative occurred in January 1950, when the Army announced that it would utilize blacks possessing appropriate skills and qualifications in any unit requiring a soldier with those skills and qualifications, regardless of race. Commanders were authorized to fill any other vacancies in white units with black soldiers possessing the appropriate skills.202 The third initiative came in March 1950 when then Secretary of the Army, Gordon Gray, sent a letter to President Truman stating his desire to suspend use of a racial quota for enlisting personnel into the Army.203 April 1950 was the first month that the Army did not issue a specific recruiting mission for African American soldiers.204 All three of these initiatives would prove significant over the next year.

Integration of African Americans in Korea

The outbreak of the Korean War prompted the Truman administration to accelerate the expansion of the Army called for by the strategic realignment triggered by NSC 68. In September 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed an expansion of the Armed Forces that included growing the active-duty Army from just under 600,000 soldiers to more than 1.5 million soldiers over the next two years. However, the Army would reach the 1.5 million-soldier benchmark by July 1951. While the total percentage of Army personnel assigned to Far East Command during this period remained steady at 14 percent, the total number increased to 217,000 soldiers.205 African-Americans, no longer constrained by a quota, constituted an


205 Donnelly, “’The Best Army that Can Be Put in the Field in the Circumstances,’” 812, 815-816.
increasing number of the enlistees and draftees feeding this growth of the Army.\textsuperscript{206} The African-American demographic in the Army rose from 10 percent of the force in April 1950 to 11 percent by August 1950, 12 percent by January 1951, and more than 13 percent by December 1952.\textsuperscript{207} The sharp growth in the number of African-Americans entering the Army, coupled with the decision not to establish additional African-American units, meant that personnel strength in existing African-American units exceeded authorized manning levels. In addition, combat losses in Korea required an increasing supply of replacement soldiers. African-American soldiers composed 20 percent of the replacements sent to Korea.\textsuperscript{208} This meant that Eighth (US) Army received African-American soldiers to replace losses suffered in white units. Commanders in Korea took advantage of the new Army policy that allowed commanders to assign qualified African-American soldiers to fill vacant positions. These commanders sent African-American replacements to white units and cross-leveled soldiers from over strength African-American units to undermanned white units.

The performance and treatment of the 24th Infantry Regiment during the Korean War has served as a lightning rod for the topic of integration. As the largest African-American unit in the Army and the only African-American infantry regiment, the 24th Infantry Regiment received a great deal of scrutiny during the Korean War. Like most of the other regiments in Eighth (US) Army, the 24th Infantry Regiment performed unevenly in the initial months of the war, with some battlefield successes marred by widespread withdrawals and panic in the face of enemy attacks. In late September 1950, the commanding general of the 25th Infantry Division, Major General William B. Kean, requested permission to disband the 24th Infantry Regiment due to its poor performance in combat, stating that the 24th Infantry Regiment represented a danger to the rest of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{207} MacGregor, \textit{Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965}, 430.
\item \textsuperscript{208} Collins, \textit{Lightning Joe}, 356.
\end{itemize}
the division. 24th Infantry Regiment, however, was afflicted by the same lack of resources and training that plagued all of Eighth (US) Army and carried the additional burden of racism and segregation. Lack of leadership by senior officers within the regiment contributed to a breakdown in morale in the regiment. The senior leaders in the 24th Infantry Regiment attributed the regiment’s shortcomings to the inability of African-American soldiers to fight rather than critically examine the tactical orders that they issued. Despite concurrence with Kean’s recommendation from the Eighth (US) Army Inspector General, Walker opted not to disband the 24th Infantry Regiment. Assignment of leaders willing to exercise positive leadership resulted in improvements in the performance of the regiment over the next three months. 24th Infantry Regiment’s performance was not as poor as stated by Kean or demonstrably worse than some of the other regiments in Eighth (US) Army. Generally, performance across the force was poor in the initial months of the war. Many units displayed a tendency to withdraw quickly and out of control on the battlefield. In October 1951, Eighth (US) Army disbanded the 24th Infantry Regiment; however, this move came as part of the process of integrating the entire force. It is only fair to point out that the treatment of the 24th Infantry Regiment was not unique. In September 1950, Eighth (US) Army disbanded the 34th Infantry Regiment due to concerns with its combat performance.

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212 Blair, *The Forgotten War*, 107-111, 128-129, 141, 222. While there is clear evidence that race entered into the decisions and assessments of the 24th Infantry Regiment, the comparison to the treatment of the 34th Infantry Regiment only shows that Eighth (US) Army was willing to deactivate white combat units as well. The 34th was one of the first regiments to arrive in Korea. Catastrophic defeats on the battlefield and widespread panic and retreat from the enemy marked the 34th’s performance during July and August 1950. The 34th Infantry Regiment also suffered from the questionable leadership of senior officers who often derided the dedication and actions of the soldiers rather than question the tactical decisions and plans of the regiment or its higher headquarters. In early September 1950, Eighth (US) Army deactivated the 34th Infantry Regiment due to Walker’s conclusion that the regiment could not adequately regain the will to fight.
Integration also gained key support during the early period of the Korean War. Unlike his predecessor, General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, concluded in August of 1950 that the outlook of young Americans favored integration and the Army needed to change its policies. Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, termed by some as the Army’s expert on the efficient conduct of infantry operations, went to Korea in November 1950 and observed integrated units in combat. Marshall’s assessment of the performance of integrated units was positive and Walton Walker asked Marshall to discuss his assessment with the media. Despite Marshall’s now dubious academic record, the publicity he generated at the time with his findings was undoubtedly part of the swell of support generated for integration.

General Matthew Ridgway assumed command of Eighth (US) Army in late December 1950, following the death of Walton Walker in a vehicle accident. Ridgway believed that segregation was un-American and un-Christian. He consulted with Kean and decided to request permission from MacArthur to integrate the Eighth (US) Army. Ridgway postponed pursuing this issue with MacArthur due to the preparation for and execution of offensive operations against the CPV in spring of 1951. In a shocking turn of events, Ridgway replaced MacArthur as the commanding general of Far East Command in April 1951 following MacArthur’s removal by President Truman. In May 1951, Ridgway requested and received authorization from the Department of the Army to integrate Far East Command.

213 Collins, Lightning Joe, 357.
214 McCoy and Ruetten, Quest and Response, 234-235.
215 S. L. A. Marshall’s writings on the effects of combat on the individual soldier are amongst the most influential and widely read historical works in military history. However, examination has revealed that his claims that he based his analysis on interviews conducted with units engaged in combat during World War II are most likely false. While many historians still accept his conclusions, the scholarly basis of his work is generally considered poorly.
World War II experiences, the post-World War II assessments, and personnel policy changes forced by the provisions of Executive Order 9948 set the conditions under which Army leaders in Korea viewed and managed African-American soldiers. Shortly after the Korean War began, Far East Command implemented an initiative to alleviate manning concerns in its combat units by utilizing Korean soldiers to fill the gaps in Eighth (US) Army’s ranks. This initiative significantly influenced the integration of African-American soldiers.

**Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) Program**

In what many viewed as a struggle for life and death, Koreans found several ways besides serving in the ROK Army to contribute directly to fighting the Communist forces. The Korean National Police formed battalions that assisted Army divisions in conducting refugee control and anti-guerilla operations. High school and university students, including many that returned from Japan, formed the Korean Student Volunteer Force.218 The Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA) program was another way in which Koreans served during the war. Combat losses inflicted in the initial month of fighting and the time and competition for replacement personnel from the Department of the Army exacerbated the manpower concerns that Eighth (US) Army brought into the war. This led to the formulation of plan between Far East Command, Eighth (US) Army, the South Korean government, and the US Military Assistance Group in Korea to place Korean nationals into US units. FECOM and Eighth (US) Army set the initial objective of the program as increasing the combat effectiveness of US units by providing trained personnel versed in the Korean language and knowledgeable of the terrain in Korea.219 Widely viewed as a


failure, the program gained new life during the stalemate period of the war, one in which it received much more positive reviews.

The execution of the KATUSA program was problematic to say the least. The final approval for KATUSA force levels lay with the Department of the Army as a matter of personnel policy. The ROK Army and Eighth (US) Army split the roles and responsibilities for executing the program. South Korea conducted recruiting to meet the initial objective of 40,000 KATUSAs and maintained responsibility for pay, discipline, and legal jurisdiction. The ROK Army, with assistance from the US Military Advisory Group in Korea, operated training centers that conducted a ten-day training program for all KATUSA. Eighth (US) Army took on the role of equipping, transporting, and of course, utilizing the KATUSA. In mid-August 1950, the ROK Army began to send five hundred KATUSA to Eighth (US) Army every day. Eighth (US) Army distributed these KATUSA among the US divisions in Korea and sent more than 8,000 KATUSA to Japan to fill out the ranks of the 7th Infantry Division, which FECOM had reassigned from Eighth (US) Army to the newly formed X (US) Corps. Unfortunately, it quickly became evident that in the haste to begin the program and dealing with the reconstitution of its own forces, the South Korean government filled the vast majority of the KATUSA requirement by indiscriminately impressing young South Korean men off of the streets or from their villages. These recruits arrived at the training centers with little to no military background and often with no idea of the situation in which they found themselves.

Commanders of the US Army units receiving KATUSAs tried various methods of integrating these new personnel into their organizations. 1st Cavalry Division integrated the KATUSAs directly into its infantry squads where they served as riflemen, assistant machine gunners, and ammunition bearers. As part of this integration, 1st Cavalry Division also

221 Skaggs, “The KATUSA Experiment,” 53.
implemented a buddy system in which each KATUSA was paired with a US soldier responsible for providing instruction and supervision. 2nd, 3rd and 7th Infantry Divisions also implemented the buddy system in integrating their assigned KATUSAs. At the other end of the spectrum, regiments in 3rd, 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions formed platoons and companies from the KATUSAs, led by US officers and non-commissioned officers. While divisions sought to provide a couple of weeks of integration and training before committing KATUSA to battle, in some instances this did not happen. 2nd Infantry Division assigned its first complement of 250 KATUSAs to a regiment engaged in fighting off a KPA attack on the Pusan Perimeter.222

The enthusiasm with which shorthanded US combat units greeted the arrival of KATUSAs quickly cooled. Thirty days after receiving its initial allocation of KATUSAs, 24th Infantry Division requested that Eighth (US) Army stop any unsolicited assignment of KATUSA to the division. Other divisions soon requested the same. At that point, the 18,000 KATUSAs in the Eighth (US) Army made up more than twenty percent of these divisions’ personnel. By mid-October 1950, approximately sixty days into the KATUSA program, the number of KATUSAs assigned to Eighth (US) Army reached 26,000. US commanders felt that the KATUSAs assigned to their units were inadequately trained, unsuitable for combat, and US commanders lacked any real control over them since all disciplinary and legal jurisdiction remained with the ROK Army. Rather than increasing combat effectiveness, commanders cited the language barrier and cultural differences between Koreans and America as negatively impacted unit cohesion. Their initial observations indicated that US soldiers did not trust a group that they could not communicate with, did not identify with, and did not know what to do in combat.223 Of course, the perspectives of US commanders were most likely skewed by experiences such as one regiment whose first


KATUSA was a fifteen-year old boy and other units who found KATUSAs sickened by eating US Army rations too rich for Koreans who had been living in hardship conditions since the war started.  

By the late October 1950, FECOM assessed that the KATUSA program had failed to meet the objective of providing combat effective soldiers to depleted US units. Eighth (US) Army began to transfer KATUSAs to newly-formed ROK Army divisions, with commanders taking advantage of this opportunity to rid their units of those KATUSAs that they considered the worst performers. The entry of the Chinese People’s Volunteers into the war caused Eighth (US) Army to suspend the release of further KATUSAs from Eighth (US) Army and kept the program alive albeit at a reduced level. The performance of KATUSAs during the withdrawal to the 38th Parallel after the CPV initiated its First Phase Offensive did not change the mind of US commanders. Of course, the account of one US soldier demonstrates the different circumstances of Korean and American soldiers in the Korean War. This soldier related how the CPV captured him along with two KATUSAs from his unit. The CPV summarily executed the two KATUSAs while sparing the American soldier, releasing him as propaganda against US forces.  

Undoubtedly, most KATUSAs were also aware of the treatment that most likely awaited them at the hands of the Chinese or North Koreans. In spring 1951, most commanders expressed disapproval of Koreans serving in a military capacity and a 1951 report by the Operations Research Office concluded that US units should not integrate indigenous personnel.  

As the Korean War entered the stalemate period, the KATUSA program received new life. After reaching its low point of 9,000 in March 1952, General Mark Clark assumed command

225 T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2008), 208-209.
226 Skaggs, “The KATUSA Experiment,” 54; Hausrath et al., Integration of ROK Soldiers into US Army Units (KATUSA), 10.
of FECOM in May 1952 with a different viewpoint of the KATUSA program than his predecessor. General Van Fleet, commanding general of Eighth (US) Army advocated expansion of the KATUSA program and Clark agreed, intent on using the KATUSA program to build cadre to help in the expansion of the ROK Army. US personnel policies set the conditions for a much better reception of the KATUSA program in its second life. The personnel rotation policy resulted in the departure of many of the leaders that had negative experiences with KATUSA in the first year of the war. The rotation policy also meant that at this point in the war, KATUSAs were often among the seasoned combat veterans in US units. Their prolonged time in US units also resulted in most of these KATUSAs developing proficiency in the English language, removing the language barrier which had been cited as a major problem. As the stalemate period extended and US soldiers began to question the impact of their actions on the outcome of the war, commanders found that KATUSAs still viewed the war as a fight for themselves, their families, and their nation.227

By the last year of the war, American soldiers viewed the KATUSA program in a much more favorable light. The Operations Research Office conducted another evaluation of the KATUSA program, interviewing a number of soldiers, both American and KATUSAs. This evaluation revealed that most American soldiers voiced a favorable opinion of the integration of Koreans into US units. Almost half of the American soldiers interviewed rated the KATUSAs as equal to US soldiers, though they felt that the KATUSA were least proficient in fighting and performing effectively in combat. Only ten percent of American soldiers expressed opposition to the continued use of KATUSAs.228

The KATUSA program represented an innovative solution to one of the many pressing problems that Eighth (US) Army faced in the initial months of the Korean War. However, it

228 Hausrath, Integration of ROK Soldiers into US Army Units, 2, 13, and 32.
suffered in equal parts from poor execution and unrealistic expectations. In the first weeks that KATUSA arrived in US units, divisions submitted weekly assessments of the effectiveness of their KATUSAs. The assessments expressed the commanders’ view of the KATUSAs capability as a percentage. The assessments submitted by the division commanders in Eighth (US) Army ranged from 10 percent to 75 percent effectiveness and fluctuated dramatically in a matter of days. These fluctuations may have resulted from the rapid growth in number of KATUSAs assigned to a division, an adjustment of expectations, evolving methodologies for assessment of KATUSAs, responses to setbacks in a combat engagement, or all of these.

In his seminal study of racial integration in the US Armed Forces, Morris MacGregor mentions the KATUSA program only in passing, cautioning that the integration of Koreans and African Americans were substantially different programs in terms of authorization and management. The only linkage he makes between the two programs is that both were responses to severe personnel shortages. Likewise, the authors of *Black Soldier, White Army* provide only a brief description of the KATUSA program and make no mention of KATUSAs serving in the 24th Infantry Regiment or any potential effects of the program on decisions to integrate. While the Army may not have intended for linkage between these initiatives and historians may not acknowledge any such linkage, there is some evidence that the KATUSA program directly and indirectly affected decisions to fully integrate African-American and white soldiers.

An assessment provided in an account of 7th Infantry Division during the last months of the Korean War is illustrative of this linkage. This account describes the typical infantry squad in the division by that period of the war as manned predominantly by white soldiers, but complemented with two KATUSAs, one Hispanic soldier, and one African-American soldier. In

229 Ibid., 8.
addition, 7th Infantry Division also had battalions from Colombia and Ethiopia attached to it as part of the United Nations forces. This account characterizes the integration of KATUSAs, Hispanic and African-American, white, Colombian, and Ethiopian soldiers as creating language and cultural barriers that became irritants to combat effectiveness. This account concludes by crediting language training for KATUSAs and placement of interpreters and liaison officers for the Colombians and Ethiopians for mitigating problems caused by the language and cultural barriers with these nations. Recognition of common danger and common mission provided the same mitigation to the cultural barriers between white, Hispanic, and African-American soldiers. 

Another piece of evidence of the linkage between the KATUSA program and the integration of African-Americans is the reasoning of Colonel John G. Hill, commander of 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division. Hill was one of the first commanders who decided to integrate African-American soldiers into white combat units in contradiction of Army personnel policies. Hill cited the use of “untrained South Korean contingents” as one of the factors in his decision. 

The assessments of KATUSAs are strikingly similar to the assessments of African-American soldiers in World War II and Korea. Officers and non-commissioned officers in charge of KATUSAs complained that they had to expose themselves to hostile fire during combat engagements more often than reasonable in order to keep inexperienced KATUSAs from abandoning their positions. Senior ranking officers in Eighth (US) Army used this same reasoning in September 1950 to explain the number of casualties among leaders in the 24th

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234 Hausrath et al., *Integration of ROK Soldiers into US Army Units*, 8.
Infantry Regiment. The results of the Army’s World War II experiment in training and assigning African-American infantrymen to white divisions in Europe reveal the same lessons learned from the examination of KATUSAs at the end of the Korean War. Namely, proper training and integration time greatly increases the effectiveness of the force and the exposure gained from integration will break down cultural and societal barriers to cohesion amongst individual soldiers.

**Impact of Integration on Eighth (US) Army**

Integration in the Eighth (US) Army occurred in two phases. The first phase, unofficial integration, is characterized by commanders from the battalion to division-level integrating African-American soldiers despite Army policies that still called for segregation. This phase took place from August 1950 to May 1951. The second phase, official integration, began in May 1951 when Eighth (US) Army began to integrate its entire force with Department of the Army approval. Both phases improved the combat effectiveness of Eighth (US) Army. Specifically, integration resulted in improvements in five areas that contributed to overall combat effectiveness: cohesion, leadership and command, resources, sustainment, and fighting spirit.

Cohesion is the extent to which a military force demonstrates the collective willingness of its members to work together to accomplish a common goal. FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*, states that effective operations require organizations to work together for common task and mission objectives. Integration increased cohesion by reinforcing the commitment of all of the soldiers in Eighth (US) Army to each other its military objectives. First, integration alleviated a growing feeling among many African-American soldiers that higher headquarters treated African-American units differently. Members of African-American units felt that the accomplishments of

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their units received little recognition while white units and higher headquarters attributed a poor performance by one African-American unit to every African-American unit. 237 Members of the 24th Infantry Regiment felt that the unit received very little credit for seizing the town of Yechon in July 1950; other veterans of the unit cited a battle in March 1951 when the regiment conducted several attacks over a three-day period to seize key terrain overlooking the Han’tan River. 24th Infantry Regiment managed to clear the enemy forces from the high ground; however, its depleted strength due to combat losses led the 25th Infantry Division to direct the 27th Infantry Regiment to pass through the 24th Regiment and occupy the key terrain. Members of the 24th Regiment complained of the newspaper reports that cited the 27th Infantry Regiment’s success without mentioning the efforts of the 24th Infantry Regiment. 238 African-American soldiers serving in integrated units no longer experienced this feeling of discrimination. 239 They expected to share in the success of their organizations and were more committed to the success of those units.

Integration also improved the cohesion of Eighth (US) Army by creating a sense of unity among white and African-American soldiers. This process began in basic training. The rapid increase of African-Americans entering the Army coupled with the need to maintain the greatest rate of throughput in the training base created an opportunity to integrate those training bases. This process began at Fort Ord, California in 1949, spread to Fort Jackson, South Carolina in January 1950, and by the end of 1950, the Army integrated all ten of its training bases. 240 An African-American soldier from South Carolina who served in an integrated basic training unit at Fort Breckinridge, Kentucky, stated that the intense pace of training and the realization that most

240 Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front, 98-100; MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965, 434-436.
of the soldiers would serve in Korea together relieved any racial tension that might have existed. In Korea, soldiers serving in integrated units also realized that their survival depended on reliance on their fellow soldiers, no matter their race. This improvement in cohesion was not limited to African-American soldiers. In several instances, white soldiers integrated into African-American units refused reassignment at a later time. White soldiers in integrated units felt that integration reaffirmed the fact that the US was fighting the Korea War for democracy.

Finally, integration increased cohesion by breaking down racial barriers between African-American and white soldiers. In March 1951, the Army contracted the Operations Research Office of John Hopkins University to conduct a study to determine the most efficient use of African-American soldiers. While the object of this study, named Project Clear, was not to compare segregation with integration as policies, any study of the utilization of African-American personnel would do just that. The extensive soldier interviews and surveys conducted by the Operations Research Office team of social scientists revealed that exposure of African-American and white soldiers to each other in integrated units quickly broke down many of the preconceptions and prejudices on both sides. Of those interviewed, 54 percent of white infantrymen favored integration and 52 percent felt that African-Americans were at least equal to white soldiers in fighting ability. Many Army officials worried that integration would lead to open conflict among African-American and white soldiers forced to live together in close proximity. Project Clear concluded that integration actually decreased racial tension.

244 Ibid., 20.
245 Ibid., 67,77, 114, and 137-40.
The next facet of Eighth (US) Army impacted by integration is leadership and command. Leadership and command is the extent to which military commanders are able to establish attainable objectives that assist in the success of their higher headquarters and direct their subordinates to accomplishing those objectives. Integration improved leadership and command at every echelon in Eighth (US) Army. Integration resulted in application of positive leadership that improved the commitment and performance of African-American enlisted soldiers and officers. Integration also assisted the Eighth (US) Army, Far East Command, and the Department of State in combatting Communist propaganda seeking to undermine the Korean War effort.

Integration resulted in the application of positive leadership that improved the commitment and performance of African-American enlisted soldiers and officers. During the Korean War, officers who commanded in African-American combat units often accepted poor performance because racial stereotyping led these commanders to believe that African-American soldiers were genetically incapable of performing adequately. While commanders in white units sought to shore up the shortcomings in training and discipline revealed by the initial engagements of the war, commanders in African-American units patronizingly blamed the soldiers for poor performance but did nothing to improve the performance because they expected African-Americans to perform poorly. By integrating African-Americans with white soldiers, commanders no longer exhibited an inclination to accept poor performance from their units.

Straggling, commonly referred to during the Korean War as bugging out, serves as the primary example of this negatively reinforcing cycle. While many units, African-American and white alike, exhibited a tendency to panic and execute an uncontrolled withdrawal in the face of unexpected or sustained enemy attack, commanders in some African-American units made no attempts to exercise positive leadership to correct this. In many instances, leaders in African-

American units simply waited until they could gather its soldiers back together and then placed them back into their original position or into a new position. This did very little to curb this behavior. This made bugging out a greater problem as even those soldiers inclined to hold their positions and fight as directed felt that they could not trust others to hold the positions with them. As soldiers would begin to panic and withdraw, those capable of staying withdrew lest they find themselves isolated in small pockets. \(^{247}\) This even extended to unit levels, as units positioned next to African-American combat units altered their tactics in anticipation that the African-American unit would vacate its position without warning and leave it vulnerable to an enemy penetration.\(^{248}\)

This alteration in tactics meant that these units did not focus all of its combat power on the enemy. Lieutenant General Julius Becton, an African-American officer who served in the Korean War as a lieutenant, noted that soldiers running away in combat required leaders to assert themselves. His experiences indicated that assertion of firm, positive leadership was critical to fostering a beneficial relationship between leaders and subordinates.\(^{249}\) Integration of African-American and white soldiers resulted in removal of this mental barrier to the application of positive leadership to a portion of the force. Commanders may have retained their beliefs in the stereotypes of the poor capabilities of the African-American in combat; however, with fewer units consisting entirely of African-American units, those commanders could not use that belief as a rationalization for their own inaction.

Integration also resulted in changes that increased the commitment of African-American and some white officers to the mission. General Roscoe Robinson, Jr., an African-American officer who served in the Korean War as a company commander, felt that integration made African-American officers more personally responsible for their behavior due to the belief that


\(^{248}\) Bogart, et. al., *Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army*, 67.

future opportunities were available for them in the Army. Segregation and personnel policies limited African-American officers in Eighth (US) Army to mostly company-grade officer assignments. Even in the 24th Infantry Regiment, white officers filled more than half of the field-grade officer billets. Many African-American officers demonstrated inclination to do little more than survive the war due to serving in an organization in which any skill or proficiency they possessed held little value. In contrast, many white officers dreaded assignments to African-American units. Even if the officer did not hold personal prejudices, the officer corps did not view an assignment to an African-American unit as advantageous to a military career. Often those receiving such an assignment would not report or would find the first reason to force a transfer out of the assignment. Integration removed these assignment and opportunity stigmas for white and African-American officers, improving their commitment and effectiveness as leaders.

Finally, integration proved valuable in helping the Eighth (US) Army, Far East Command, and the State Department in combatting Communist propaganda seeking to undermine support for the Korean War. From the inception of the Cold War, the Soviet Union attempted to use the state of race relations in the United States to undermine international trust. This line of propaganda proved particularly effective in Asia, where anti-colonialism and a sense of shared identity as peoples of color created strong interest in American race relations. The July 31, 1950 edition of Time magazine included an article highlighting the attempt by Communists to paint the Korean War as a war against all of Asia. This article stated that the capture of the town of Yechon by African-American soldiers in the 24th Infantry Regiment “…provided an answer to the Communist charge that Americans were warring against the ‘colored’ races of Asia.” Integration in the military served as a positive sign of race relations, particularly integration in those forcing

251 Astor, The Right to Fight, 348.
fighting the Korean War. Additionally, when Ridgway assumed command of Eighth (US) Army he sought to reframe the war from the protection of the Republic of Korea to the defense of freedom provided by democracy from the tyranny of Communism. Racial integration refuted the Communist message that the freedom that democracy offered only applied to whites.

Resources represent having an adequate number and type of personnel and equipment to enable units to execute their assigned missions and tasks. Integration of African-Americans in Eighth (US) Army contributed additional Army-trained combat arms personnel to units that sorely needed them. This contribution increased the combat effectiveness of Eighth (US) Army and its subordinate units. As discussed previously in this study, Eighth (US) Army began the Korean War with its authorized personnel levels set at lower levels than its wartime personnel requirements. To fill this gap of 6,000 – 7,000 soldiers in each division, Eighth (US) Army internally cross-leveled personnel from 1st Cavalry Division and 7th Infantry Division to fill the ranks of the first two divisions it deployed to Korea. Selective Service began to induct personnel in September 1950; however, these draftees were not available until after completion of initial training, scheduled for December 1950. In addition, Reserve and National Guard units mobilized to fill out the General Reserve required many of the personnel inducted by Selective Service. Combat units from the twenty nations besides the ROK and US that formed the UN Command began to arrive as early as August 1950. By November 1950, Allied combat units provided another 8,000 personnel. However, this Allied manpower did not fill the empty spaces in the ranks of Eighth (US) Army.

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253 Lewis, *The American Culture of War*, 111.


As early as the second month of the war, commanders in white combat units began to fill these empty spaces with African-American soldiers. Unofficial integration began with commanders familiar with African-American soldiers. Colonel John G. Hill, the commander of 9th Infantry Regiment, received 150 African-American soldiers in August 1950. Instead of assigning these soldiers to his African-American 3rd Battalion, Hill assigned these soldiers to his white 1st and 2nd Battalions, both of which were manned at less than 50 percent strength. The commander of one of these white battalions, Lieutenant Colonel Cesidio Barberis, stated that he would gladly accept African-American soldiers into his battalion because he felt they would fight. Barberis drew upon his experience as a commander of an African-American battalion in the 24th Infantry Regiment. Unofficial integration spread at an increasing rate when the Eighth (US) Army Adjutant General issued instructions to assign African-American soldiers to white units on September 5, 1950. While contemporary accounts, as well as historiography, claims that these actions were driven entirely by the acute need for personnel in Eighth (US) Army combat units and the fact that African-American units were over strength, on August 31, 1950, 24th Infantry Regiment reported a shortage of 700 soldiers due to 39 percent attrition during the first six weeks of combat. The KATUSA program demonstrated that Korean War commanders were reluctant to accept personnel fill that would not help their units fight more effectively. The personnel shortage that existed in Eighth (US) Army’s largest African-American combat unit shows that there were available billets for African-American combat soldiers if the consensus was that African-American soldiers did not provide a positive addition to a white unit. However, this did not occur. By the time integration transitioned to the official phase in May 1951, 18 percent of African-American soldiers in Eighth (US) Army served in integrated units. 61 percent of Eighth

256 MacGregor, Integration of Armed Forces 1940-1965, 434; Astor, The Right to Fight, 376.
258 Ibid., 159.
(US) Army’s infantry companies were integrated to some degree.\textsuperscript{259} In the end, integration provided personnel resources to a great deal of the Eighth (US) Army, improving their ability to conduct their mission. Not only did integration increase the ability for Eighth (US) Army to provide personnel resources to its units, it also contributed to its ability to sustain manning levels for the duration of the war.

Integration improved Eighth (US) Army’s capability to conduct sustainment for its forces. Sustainment is the extent to which an organization can ensure its forces are able to continue functioning for the period required to complete its operation. Integration provided an additional means for Eighth (US) Army to provide its units with much needed soldiers to replace casualties lost during battle. Addition of shortfalls in replacements to already existing personnel shortages could have proven disastrous. Eighth (US) Army in Korea, Seventh (US) Army in Germany, and the General Reserve in the US remained in competition for personnel throughout the Korean War. In the first nine months of the war, Far East Command received more than 100,000 replacement soldiers. Less than 50 percent of these personnel were combat arms qualified.\textsuperscript{260} As the percentage of African-American soldiers in the stream of replacement soldiers assigned to Korea grew, integration provided an avenue in which to fill combat units to the greatest extent possible.

The importance of flexibility in the replacement system became more important after the first year of the war. After the summer of 1951, the Army instituted an individual rotation policy for soldiers serving in Korea. The Army felt that unlike World War I and World War II it could not hold soldiers in the theater of war until the conclusion of hostilities. As a war fought with deliberately constrained resources, rotating soldiers into and out of the theater of war allowed the Army to share the burden of the war efforts amongst the entire force rather than only 14 percent

\textsuperscript{259} MacGregor, \textit{Integration in the Armed Forces, 1940-1965}, 434.

\textsuperscript{260} Millett, \textit{The War in Korea, 1950-1951}, 246.
assigned to Korea. So in effect, the rotation policy became critical to the efforts to maintain Korea as a limited war. Eighth (US) Army’s rotation plan assigned points each month to each soldier serving in Korea. The number of points received corresponded to the soldier’s proximity to the front. Eighth (US) Army typically set the rotation threshold at thirty-six points, equivalent to nine months in the front lines. While Eighth (US) Army envisioned adjusting the rotation threshold every month to ensure that losses equaled the number of replacements that the Army would provide, many soldiers viewed any failure to rotate a soldier who reached thirty-six points as a sign that the Army and the administration did not care about those fighting the war. On one occasion, Far East Command raised the rotation point threshold but the outcry amongst soldiers who engaged their Congressmen and created a political backlash that forced the Secretary of the Army to direct Far East Command to restore the thirty-six point threshold. By the summer of 1952, personnel replacements were projected fill less than half of Eighth (US) Army’s requirements. Integration provided the flexibility that Eighth (US) Army required to distribute a small pool of personnel resources most effectively.

Fighting spirit is the final area improved by the integration of African-American soldiers. Fighting spirit is the extent to which a military force exhibits the discipline and mental and physical qualities to withstand the rigors of military operations. Integration improved the fighting spirit of Eighth (US) Army by increasing mental commitment and discipline among African-American and white soldiers and countering enemy propaganda intended to weaken the commitment of African-American soldiers. Similar to African-Americans soldiers in World War II, African-American soldiers in Korea recognized the irony of fighting to save democracy in

263 Donnelly, “‘The Best Army that Can Be Put in the Field in the Circumstances,’” 817-820.
Korea while they lacked equality of treatment in America.\textsuperscript{264} This often led to sentiment such as that expressed by one African-American soldier when he cautioned another African-American soldier not to “get yourself killed here (Korea) while the folks at home are having trouble voting.”\textsuperscript{265} Integration combatted this cognitive dissonance, creating a sense of equality and pride in many African-American soldiers. Many found themselves motivated by the thought of fighting as representatives of their race. Integration also sparked better performance from white soldiers in integrated units as many white soldiers did not want their performance surpassed by a group of people that they considered inferior to them.\textsuperscript{266} Commanders that received the experimental African-American infantry replacements in World War II noted this same challenge and response effect on combat performance.

Integration also combatted attempts by the KPA and CPV to conduct psychological warfare against Eighth (US) Army units intended to lower soldiers’ morale and induce surrender. Communist forces demonstrated their awareness of the racial composition and divide in US forces. Communists produced propaganda leaflets in English and Spanish (targeting Puerto Rican soldiers that spoke little English), actively sought information from US prisoners of war about the location of African-American units, and developed themes targeted at African-Americans. One such theme, used in January 1951, cited racial discrimination and the history of slavery in the US to call upon African-American soldiers to defect to North Korea. A similar propaganda leaflet attempted to entice African-American defections with promises of women, cars, and social status in North Korea. Some scholars contend that psychological warfare directed against US soldiers


\textsuperscript{265} Harper, \textit{Life of a Soldier}, 66.

\textsuperscript{266} Nichols, \textit{Breakthrough on the Color Front}, 109-110.
by the enemy was largely ineffective.\textsuperscript{267} On the other hand, Roscoe Robinson, Jr., noted the CPV’s extensive use of psychological operations on the battlefield, characterizing the Communist Chinese forces as masters of psychological warfare.\textsuperscript{268} Of the twenty-one US Prisoners of War that refused repatriation to the US following the armistice, at least one, Corporal Clarence Adams was African-American. Adams cited racial discrimination and the desire for a better life as the reasons for his decision.\textsuperscript{269} Integration directly weakened the racial divide that Communist propaganda sought to exploit.

\textbf{Conclusion}

In July 1950, Eighth (US) Army practiced segregation of African-American soldiers from white soldiers based on prevailing Army attitudes about the capability of African-Americans in combat and concerns over the effects of forcing these racial groups to work in close proximity. Over the next ten months Eighth (US) Army progressed from segregation to unofficial, partial integration to official integration throughout the force. While historians attribute this rapid change to the necessity of Eighth (US) Army’s manpower shortages, the KATUSA program demonstrated that division and regimental commanders were not willing to solve the manpower problem with untrained personnel. Integration improved Eighth (US) Army’s combat effectiveness by improving its cohesion and leadership and command, personnel resources, ability to sustain operations, and fighting spirit of the force.

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\textsuperscript{267} Mark R. Jacobson, “‘Minds Over Hearts:’ US Political and Psychological Warfare During the Korean War,” (PhD Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 2005), 192-196.

\textsuperscript{268} Haley, \textit{The Quiet One}, 79-80.

Chapter 5 – Conclusion

Integration and the Combat Effectiveness of Eighth (US) Army

Dr. Andrew Billingsley, preeminent sociologist and scholar in African-American studies, wrote that no institution has had a greater impact on African-American families than the military because it provided opportunities that the civilian world did not. Historians universally acknowledge the importance of racial integration during the Korean War to breaking down of barricades in the military. This monograph focused on another aspect of that process, the impact of integration in Army ground combat units on the effectiveness of Eighth (US) Army. Pressure from the Truman administration, members of Congress, and civil rights leaders certainly played roles in the Army’s decision to integrate. Ultimately, Eighth (US) Army instituted a policy that enabled it to utilize available personnel most effectively during war. The integration of African-Americans in Army combat units during the Korean War resulted in improvements in cohesion, leadership and command, fighting spirit, personnel resources and sustainment that increased the combat effectiveness of Eighth (US) Army as an organization.

In 1954, former Army officer and historian S. L. A. Marshall wrote that while the shortage of white infantrymen during the Korean War created the opportunity for integration, commanders would not have sustained or grown the initiative without success and goodwill. Marshall’s remarks capture the more subtle but equally remarkable change that played an equal part to necessity in Eighth (US) Army’s decision to integrate. During the Korean War, leaders in Eighth (US) Army began to view African-Americans as capable fighting soldiers and explicitly acknowledge that in many areas, African-Americans acted just as whites would. They also began to attribute any performance issues of African-American units to organizational problems. These

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270 Andrew Billingsley, Climbing Jacob’s Ladder (New York: Touchstone, 1992), 183-185.
are contradictory to the prevailing view following World Wars I and II when the Army clearly expressed its assessment that racial characteristics impeded African-Americans ability to perform in direct contact with the enemy. This change in attitude towards African-Americans was not universal. Evidence from Project Clear suggests that leaders and soldiers in Eighth (US) Army split almost evenly on both sides of the question. However, enough of the right people broke from the Army’s prevailing view to enact this change.

**Current Applicability**

The implementation of racial integration during the Korean War did not signal the resolution of racial tension or problems within the Army. Indeed, among the negative aspects of the Army during the Vietnam War is the outright racial conflict between African-American soldiers and white soldiers, reflecting the racial conflict of American society during the 1960s and 1970s. Even today, racial integration and its implications have meaning for the Army. In 2008, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, stated that although the United States has overcome slavery and Jim Crowism, it is not where it needs to be in the area of equality and the military has a role in leading the opening of opportunity in the nation. Colonel Irving Smith, Army officer and sociologist, states that African-Americans continue to fail to achieve adequate representation in the general officer ranks of the Army. Smith cites 2008 statistics showing that African-Americans compose 20 percent of the Army force, twelve percent

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of the Army officer corps, but less than 7 percent of the general officers.\footnote{Irving Smith III, “Why Black Officers Still Fail,” \textit{Parameters} 40 (Autumn 2010): 34-35.} In addition, recent studies of diversity in the military have looked to racial integration for lessons. During its study of the repeal of the \textit{Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell} policy governing homosexuality in the military, the Department of Defense acknowledges the differences between matters of race and sexual orientation but finds applicable lessons in the military’s implementation with racial integration.\footnote{Department of Defense, “Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with a Repeal of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ November 30, 2010,” \url{http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_dadt/DADTReport_FINAL_20101130%28secure-hires%29.pdf} (accessed April 21, 2011), 81.} Similarly, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, charged by Congress to study diversity in the US military, cites Executive Order 9981 and the racial integration of the Armed Forces in its discussion of racial, ethnic, and gender diversity.\footnote{Military Leadership Diversity Commission, “From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-century Military: Executive Summary,” \url{http://mldc.whs.mil/download/documents/Final%20Report/MLDC Executive Summary.pdf} (accessed September 18, 2011), 5.} However, racial integration during the Korean War holds relevance for today’s Army outside of these two issues.

The process of integration highlighted two important leadership actions within Eighth (US) Army that have relevance today. First, lower-echelon leaders (battalion and regimental commanders), with at least tacit support from their superiors, enacted significant change that drove change at the Army-level. While many of the superior officers of these lower-echelon leaders provided at least tacit support of their subordinates’ actions, there were cases when leaders implemented integration despite the opposition of upper-echelon leadership. Secondly, racial integration occurred because of the confluence of opportunity and changes in attitudes towards African-American soldiers. Both of these organizational changes showed the Army’s capability to learn and adapt.
The US Army found itself engaged in an unforeseen war enacting the emerging strategy of an American presidential administration forging the United States’ role in a world undergoing dramatic shifts in international politics, and ideologies. The Army fighting this war was also undergoing organizational turbulence due to requirements to adjust to its changing role as an instrument of American national power in a resource-constrained environment due to significant budget reductions. This description of the Army in 1950 could apply just as accurately to the post-Desert Storm Army of 1993 and perhaps to the Army of the very near future. The environment that the Army will operate in for the foreseeable future is as complex as the environment of the Army following World War II. Maintaining or improving the military efficiency of the Army may require changes that seem every bit as radical now as racial integration did in 1950. Adaptation offers a way to deal with such complexity. A complementary mix of top-down and bottom-up methods, such as that demonstrated by Eighth (US) Army, is often the most effective way to change organizational culture.\(^{277}\) Today’s Army leaders can find many worse places to look for lessons on adaptation than Eighth (US) Army’s process of implementing racial integration during the Korean War.

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