Operational Implications of the NATO Strategic Concept 2010 for European Countries in NATO and the EU

A Monograph
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### ABSTRACT

Multinational operations under the direction of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) have become the norm rather than the exception. In the light of an emerging partnership between both organizations, the paper analyzes the NATO Strategic Concept 2010 and assesses its consequences for the operational level of war and effective operational art in multinational operations.

In the light of changed fiscal realities in Europe, the paper identifies a widening strategic military capability gap between the United States and European countries and an increasing divergence between multinational ambitions and the reality of national military capability planning. The most significant outcomes for effective operational art in multinational operations are the following. First, the operational level of war needs to integrate civilian planning in campaign design, which requires an adaptation of NATO’s command structure and NATO’s operational level doctrine with the aim to bridge to and take advantage of EU civilian competencies in this field. Second, the study argues for an adaptation of existing NATO standardization agreement provisions for efficient operational logistics in multinational operations and enhanced tactical military training among European countries. This will require, third, a high effort in armament cooperation to make military equipment more interoperable. In this field, the European Defense Agency has great potential to become key actor.

### SUBJECT TERMS

NATO, EU, CSDP, France, Germany, United Kingdom, NATO Strategic Concept, CSDP Missions, Armament Cooperation, EDA
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Abstract

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Introduction

NATO has the experience, the institutions, and the means to eventually become the hub of a globe-spanning web of various regional cooperative-security undertakings among states with the growing power to act.\(^1\)

— Former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski

If we want to enhance the Alliance's ability to anticipate the emerging security challenges, if we want to adapt its capabilities accordingly, we need to do this by making more effective and efficient use of the resources we currently have.\(^2\)

— NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen

Operational art in multinational operations has become the norm, rather than the exception. This paper explores the strategic context for three major European countries conducting such operations and seeks to determine the operational implications of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Strategic Concept 2010 for the military cooperation of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom as the major European members of NATO and the European Union (EU).\(^3\)

The paper identifies a widening strategic military capability gap between the United States and European countries as the consequence of changed fiscal realities in Europe, which leads to an increasing divergence between multinational security strategy and the reality of national military capability planning. Then, in view of an emerging security and defense capability in the EU, the paper points at important consequences for the planning and execution of multinational operations at the operational level. These findings highlight a high interdependency of both NATO and the EU for military capability development and emphasize


\(^{3}\) The terms "European" and European Union are not synonymous, although a large number of European countries are member of the EU. For an overview of NATO and EU members see Appendix A.
the need to adapt military doctrine and training as a prerequisite for effective operational art in multinational operations.\footnote{The author defines operational art as the translation of strategic goals into appropriate military tactical actions and their arrangement in time, space, and purpose. This includes, but is not limited to, the planning and execution of campaigns, the deployment of forces, their tactical employment, the conduct of battle, and the arrangements of operations to achieve the objectives of military missions and military strategy goals. This explanation of operational art does not limit its application to the operational level. The operational level of war ensures proper and appropriate application of military force within a political framework and it links military tactical actions to limited political and military strategy goals. At the operational level, the military command translates the limited political and military strategy goals into objectives of military missions by designing, organizing, and conducting campaigns and major operations.}

NATO, as the primary actor in international military operations, has been the cornerstone for European security for more than sixty years and remains a vital component of the global security framework for both the United States (US) and the European countries.\footnote{NATO, \textit{Letter from President Obama} (January 20, 2009), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2009/s090120a.html (accessed April 26, 2011).} Economically and politically, European countries have also integrated within the European Union (EU), and have enhanced their cooperation into the field of security and defense since 1998. In today’s changed security environment, both NATO and the EU have emerged as important global actors in international crisis management, which has opened a debate over a strategic partnership between both organizations. The implications of the current financial and economic crisis for the military budgets of most European countries and new threats to international security, such as international terrorism and missile threats, have further fueled this debate, particularly for the merit of combining civilian and military means in operations of lower intensity. In the midst of this debate, NATO has issued its new strategy.

Following a brief historical background, the paper reviews the national security strategies of all three countries as a basis of the strategic context for multinational operations within NATO and the EU. The strategic and operational tendencies in the EU are briefly surveyed to reveal key issues and current achievements in defense cooperation under the head of the EU. Then, the new
NATO strategy is analyzed to provide a comprehensive picture of the strategic context and to determine strategic implications for NATO’s member states. This is necessary to determine implications for the application of military operational art within NATO and the EU.

**Background**

**The North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

Since its foundation in 1949, NATO’s condition has often been inaccurately portrayed by critics and they have miscalculated the Alliance’s death in view of various credibility crises, such as the Suez crisis of 1956, the French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966, or the stationing of Pershing II missiles in Europe in the early 1980s. However, the Alliance has repeatedly proven its ability to overcome internal crisis and diplomatic challenges by successful dispute resolution and effective adaptation. The Balkan Wars became yet another NATO crisis, which caused the Alliance to transform into an active provider of security outside its territories for crisis management. The member states agreed on a new Strategic Concept in 1999, which defined wider security tasks for NATO and adapted the organization to meet security challenges more globally. In order to meet new threats where they occur, it became necessary to

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7 “Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by
adapt NATO members’ large and conventionally focused units into agile and deployable expeditionary forces. Consequently, the political leaders endorsed the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) during the 1999 Washington Summit to “ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces.”

Promoting security and stability in Europe, the Alliance also reached out to the east. Twelve new member states joined NATO, which almost doubled the number of members in barely ten years.

In 2001, the magnitude of the 9/11 events demonstrated the vulnerability of the modern state to international terrorism. NATO invoked collective defense under Article 5 for the first time in its history, which proved yet again its ability to adapt. However, the member states had also to acknowledge that they had not yet transformed their forces sufficiently to close the gap between US and European military capabilities. Therefore, the Alliance refined its Defense Capabilities Initiative during the 2002 Prague Summit and agreed to improve military capabilities in eight specified areas under the Prague Capability Commitment (PCC).

The Prague Summit
also introduced the NATO Response Force. This high-readiness force would serve as a catalyst for focusing and promoting improvements in all eight areas and would equip the Alliance with a high quality expeditionary capability to respond to any crisis. As a third important result of the Prague Summit, NATO revised its command structure.\textsuperscript{11}

Initiated in 2002, this transformation process is still ongoing. NATO remains heavily dependent on United States’ forces and capabilities today and European countries have not yet aligned their efforts and resources within the Alliance sufficiently.\textsuperscript{12} Given the changing environment and the emergence of new threats and new challenges, NATO members agreed to a new Strategic Concept in November 2010 with the aim to develop new capabilities and new partnerships. However, the ongoing transformation in NATO is not the only challenge for European countries. Currently, twenty-one of NATO’s twenty-eight members have also pushed

\begin{itemize}
\item Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary for Defense in 2002, had proposed a NATO rapid reaction force, which NATO member states adopted during the Prague Summit the same year. The NATO Response Force is not a permanent force, but composed of units designated by the member states. Members assign units “in rotation, for set periods, and trained and certified together.” Self-sustainable for at least thirty days, the response force is build around a brigade-sized land component, based on three Battle Groups and their supporting elements. It also has a maritime, an air, and a Special Forces component. NATO, \textit{Prague Summit Declaration}, 177. NATO, \textit{The NATO Response Force – At the Centre of NATO Transformation} (November 16, 2010), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm (accessed July 12, 2011).
\end{itemize}
forward their integration in security and defense within the European Union in an equally dynamic and comprehensive political transformation process.\textsuperscript{13}

**European Integration in Security and Defense**

During the Cold War, the primary focus of European integration lay on economic integration and economic cooperation through a common European market within the European Communities.\textsuperscript{14} In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht merged these Communities into the European Union and expanded the level of cooperation among the members, including the establishment of a Common Foreign Security Policy.\textsuperscript{15} Given the ongoing NATO transformation process triggered by the Balkan Wars, the EU also chose to rethink its approach towards crisis management. This led to revived interest in the idea of a European Common Defense concept.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13} Currently, twenty-one countries are members of both NATO (twenty-eight member states) and the European Union (twenty-seven member states). Appendix A – NATO and EU member states graphically depicts this. Furthermore, Croatia is expected to become a member of the EU in 2013. On the other hand, whether Turkey’s application to accede to the EU will be granted is not sure. The membership bid has sparked a major controversy among EU members about the utility of further enlargement.


\textsuperscript{15} From 1992 until 2009, the “three pillar model” explained best the functioning of the EU. Supranational treaties (the original European Communities) characterized the first and strongest pillar. The second and third pillars represented the Common Foreign Security Policy and the Justice and Home Affairs (transferred into Police and Judicial Co-operation on Criminal Matters by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997).

\textsuperscript{16} The forming of the Western European Union was the “first attempt at a common European defense alliance.” This was the first attempt to integrate Europe in the security and defense area, but the organization was soon marginalized due to the founding of NATO. The Western European Union nevertheless existed until 30 June 2011. The second attempt to integrate in the field of security and defense was the French proposal of a European Defense Community. The community was to include West Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux countries, but failed to come into effect in 1954, mainly because of France’s fears that such an agreement would threaten its national sovereignty. Margarita Mathiopoulos and István Gyarmati, “Saint Malo and Beyond–Toward European Defense,” *Washington Quarterly* 22, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 65. GlobalSecurity.org, *European Defence Community (EDC)* (July 09, 2011), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/edc.htm (accessed August 17, 2011).
NATO’s intervention in Bosnia revealed a significant imbalance between European and US military capabilities and led to the creation of a European pillar within the NATO framework, known as European Security Defense Initiative (ESDI). This approach, favored by US President Bill Clinton’s administration, implied that any political decision on European defense cooperation would always require de facto US approval. The initially hesitant US attitude towards an engagement in the Kosovo conflict in 1998 again demonstrated the inability of European countries to provide security in Europe and convinced European powers to create a European Defense within the EU rather than through ESDI. Consequently, the British-French Saint Malo initiative of 1998 proposed that the EU should handle Europe’s joint defense and that European countries should correct imbalances in Euro-American security cooperation. The initiative is often referred to as the “birth certificate” of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

This development raised serious questions among non-EU NATO members, particularly because of fears that CSDP would duplicate NATO assets, discriminate against non-EU NATO members, and decouple the United States from Europe. Hence, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK), Tony Blair, reaffirmed CSDP’s limitation to peacekeeping missions, particularly “where NATO as a whole chooses not to be engaged.”

17 The Kosovo conflict was one major contributing factor to the British shift in attitude towards European Defense within the EU rather than ESDI within NATO (the St. Malo initiative), particularly if the US does not want to be engaged. Europa, European Security Defense Identity (2010), http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/european_security_defence_identity_en.htm (accessed April 26, 2011).


19 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spelled out the US concerns and the US policy towards CSDP using the “three Ds” (Duplicate, Discriminate, Decouple) and Donald Rumsfeld repeated this warning addressing the Munich Conference on Security in 2001, expressing US policy-makers' and
referred to the Petersberg Tasks that the EU had adopted in 1997. The Union later extended these
tasks to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention,
and post-conflict stabilization. To fulfill the Petersberg Tasks, the EU member states needed to
achieve two things. First, the Petersberg Tasks required expeditionary forces, which called for a
transformation of their militaries. Second, with the integration of most of the EU member states
in NATO, the EU needed access to NATO forces and planning capabilities, particularly NATO’s
command structure. This would avoid unnecessary duplications. To meet these two requirements,

The Helsinki Headline Goal, later transferred into the Headline Goal 2010, set out a general


20 Initially, the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union introduced the Petersberg
Tasks in June 1992, which comprised humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions, and tasks
for combat forces in crisis management (including peacemaking). The EU adopted these tasks from the
Western European Union by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, amending the Maastricht Treaty. The
extension of the Petersberg Tasks goes back to a report of Michael Barnier, who suggested creating a
European Civil Protection Force in 2002. The EU adopted the extended Petersberg Tasks by the Lisbon

21 Berlin Plus has its roots in the “Berlin Agreement” that allowed European countries already
limited access to NATO planning capabilities as part of ESDI – the attempt to strengthen the “European
pillar” within NATO. The arrangements needed to be adapted when CSDP became part of the EU. NATO,
*Final Communiqué* (June 03, 1996), http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm (accessed April 30,
2011). Javier Solana, “Remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy following the agreement on the establishment of EU-NATO permanent arrangements,”
2011).
capability requirement with the objective to have a corps size force of 50,000-60,000 available that would be deployable within 60 days and sustainable for at least one year. Subsequent analysis identified five key shortfalls in European military capabilities: strategic and tactical airlift, sustainability and logistics (including air-to-air refueling), effective engagement technologies including precision weapons, rescue helicopters, and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.\textsuperscript{22} The Berlin Plus agreements granted the EU access to NATO's command structure and enabled the EU to plan and lead military missions.\textsuperscript{23} With Berlin Plus, the EU avoided duplicating NATO's command structure – a major concern particularly in non-EU NATO members, such as the United States and Turkey.

Despite the rapid progression in CSDP, the EU did not have a strategic framework for its cooperation in defense yet. Thus, the member states agreed to the EU Security Strategy by 2003, which gave CSDP a policy framework and identified the need to refine the Helsinki Headline Goal. This led to the adoption of the Headline Goal 2010, which introduced the European Battle Group (EUBG) concept. The creation of a high-readiness force under the head of the EU would


\textsuperscript{23} The agreement of 2002 set, consequently, the EU-NATO framework for permanent relations. Operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina was the first mission in which the EU accessed NATO command structures under Berlin Plus. Before the EU could take over the mission from NATO, the member states had to agree on the terms, which proved to be difficult due to the Turkish-Greek conflict on Cyprus. This dispute resulted in three years of difficulty negotiations before Berlin Plus became eventually effective on 17 March 2003. Solana, I. Reichard, 284, 286-287. Council of the European Union. “Presidency Conclusions,” Institute of European Integration and Policy, (October 24-25, 2002), 17, http://ecep.pspu.uzo.gr/cn-Brussels%20Octob%202002.pdf (accessed April 30, 2011).
enable the EU to contribute more visibly to external security and to transform European forces more rapidly.  

The Lisbon Treaty, which went into force in December 2009, marked the latest step in European integration and introduced remarkable changes for the EU’s CSDP. On the political and institutional level, the organization assumed the functions of the Western European Union, adopted the extended Petersberg Tasks, enhanced the post of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy to an EU “foreign minister,” and created a diplomatic service for the EU. The Union also developed a new procedure for security and defense

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24 A EUBG is a combined arms battalion of approximately 1,500 troops, reinforced with combat support elements, and associated with a Force Headquarters as well as pre-identified transport and logistics elements. EUBGs are deployable within fifteen days of a political decision to use military force and sustainable for 120 days. To date, EU member states have made initial commitments to form thirteen EU Battle Groups of which the EU holds two as high-readiness forces. Introducing the EUBG concept, the Headline Goal 2010 focused primarily on a higher interoperability of military forces among European members. The EUBG concept allowed identifying and tackling interoperability issues (including including civilian and civil-military aspects in military operations) more rapidly and enabled the EU to deploy the EUBGs as high-readiness force packages in response to a crisis. To meet these ambitions, the Headline Goal 2010 identified specific milestones to be met by 2010. European Union, “The EU Battlegroups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell,” 1. European Council, “Headline Goal 2010,” Consilium (June 17-18, 2004): 3, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf (accessed April 30, 2011).

25 The EU renamed the post to “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.” For background information about the EU’s main decision making bodies see the sources below. The main bodies of the EU in 2006 were the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the European Court. “The Council of the EU represents one of two halves (besides the European Parliament as a second but less powerful supranational organ) of the Union’s legislative body. Its presidency rotates every six months among the member states. The Council is responsible for decision making and coordination of the actions of the Member States and broad economic policies, it passes laws, constitutes the budgetary authority (together with the Parliament), concludes international agreements with other states or international organizations, and it defines and implements the EU’s CSDP based on the guidelines set by the European Council. […] The Council of the EU is also often referred to as the ‘Council of Ministers’ or just as the ‘Council.’” With the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council, which consists of the heads of the member states’ governments, became an official institution. The European Council constitutes the “supreme political authority” within the EU, provides “general guidelines and strategic lines” for the Council of the EU. The Council then frames the Common Foreign and Security Policy and takes the necessary decisions to define the CSDP and to implement the European Council’s guidelines. A long term and full time President chairs the Council. European Union, “Treaty of Lisbon—Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community,” Consilium Europa (December 3, 2007), TL/en 23, 25, 35, 42, 135-139. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf (accessed April 19, 2011). David
cooperation — the Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense — and tied the already operational
European Defense Agency (EDA) in the EU. The Lisbon Treaty’s impact on CSDP made the
three-pillar model obsolete, which had described the functioning of the EU until 2009, and
increased the need to improve the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU.26

The Emerging Strategic Partnership between NATO and the EU

NATO strives to make improvements in its relationship with the EU using the following
four premises: closer cooperation, higher transparency, greater efficiency, and continual
autonomy to avoid unnecessary duplication of European efforts in military capability
development and a competition between NATO and the EU in operations abroad.27 Both
organizations continue to adapt to meet the challenges in international security and their member

Harrison, “Time to Shake up the European Council,” CER Bulletin no. 52 (Centre for European Reform,
2007). MAJ (GS) Andreas Winter, “The Lisbon Treaty and its Implications for the CSDP in the Light of
the Emerging Strategic Partnership Between NATO and the EU” (Master’s Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Command and General Staff College, 2010), 36-38.

26 The Lisbon Treaty has a significant impact on the European Union. Particularly, the treaty
increased the possibilities of European countries to increase effectiveness and efficiency of national
military capability development. Elevating the EDA on treaty level, the Union is now capable of
synchronizing the effort of EU members in three areas: harmonizing, specializing, and pooling of European
forces; overcoming the fragmentation of the European defense market towards more competitiveness; and
increasing multinational cooperation in military capability development. Western European
Union, Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU (March 31, 2010), 1,

27 In 2005, the crisis in Dafur led to an French-US argument about the question of whether NATO
or the EU was supposed to lead management of the crisis. This resulted in “beauty contests” between both
NATO and the EU, and, at the end both conducted an airlift concurrently and duplicated efforts in
managing the crisis. NATO, Riga Summit Declaration (Brussels, November 29, 2006), paragraph 41.
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm (accessed 05 April 2011). NATO, Bucharest Summit
Declaration (Brussels: April 03, 2008), paragraph 14,
Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration (Brussels: April 04, 2009), paragraph 20,
Stephen F. Larrabee, “The United States and the Evolution of ESDP,” in What Ambitions for European
states agree that a strategic partnership between NATO and the EU is the key to achieve this. A true strategic partnership would provide both organizations with significant advantages, mainly in applying civilian and military means in a “comprehensive approach” in crisis management operations. Designing a true strategic partnership also means overcoming major political obstacles, such as the Turkish-Greek conflict on Cyprus, which resulted in three years of difficult negotiations before the Berlin Plus agreements were reached. This conflict still hinders effective cooperation and the alignment of NATO military and EU civilian efforts during crises. Furthermore, both NATO and the EU face the same global security threats, share similar interests, and aspire to engage in a wide spectrum of crises. The European countries also draw from the same “single set of forces” to meet commitments within both organizations. However, neither NATO nor the EU meets their commitment in military resource and capability planning. This clearly contributed to an unhealthy and unproductive relationship between both organizations, in which two events in particular have damaged the NATO-EU relationship.

Firstly, in the wake of the 2003 Iraq crisis, the Belgian-French-German-Luxembourgian proposal to create autonomous military command structures in Tervuren, Belgium for the planning and

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28 The need to address conflicts utilizing a comprehensive approach in crisis management operations would require effective cooperation between the strongest military alliance and the most powerful civilian player in the world. However, the European Union still depends on the Berlin Plus agreements of 2002, which foster competing interests among key players of both organizations. Furthermore, NATO is not able to access civilian means of the EU for crisis management operations either. Winter, 89.

29 Turkey, as a non-EU NATO member, feared that an autonomous EU force (without US control, but with automatic access to NATO assets) would endanger its own security interests. In particular, Turkey’s concerns were that potential EU-member Cyprus (which eventually became a member in May 2004) could use NATO resources against Turkish forces who have occupied the northern part of the island since 1974. Finally, Turkey agreed on the terms of Berlin Plus, after the EU Presidency interpreted the EU Treaty’s Article 17.1 in its conclusions of 24-25 October 2002, which stated, “under no circumstances, nor in any crisis, will ESDP be used against an Ally.” European Council, Presidency Conclusions (Brussels, October 24-25, 2002), Annex II, I, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/02/14&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed May 08, 2010). Furthermore, non-EU Members (again aimed at Turkey) were now allowed to participate in ESDP in wide areas, including the preparation, planning and management of an EU-led operation. Reichard, 284, 286, 287.
leading of military operations under the head of the EU caused irritation in the United States and boosted internal division of European countries in NATO. Secondly, the creation of two rapid response forces has received some criticism, although the concepts for the EUBG and the NATO Response Force differ significantly and serve different purposes. However, decreasing defense budgets and increasing costs for defense equipment make multinational defense cooperation today more important and underline the need to overcome obstacles that undermine the effectiveness of multinational security under the head of both the EU and NATO.

The National Security and Defense Strategies

The national security and defense strategies best reflect the political interests of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in NATO and the EU and suggest how the countries intend to shape the relationship with other nations within these frameworks. A good indicator for the

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Franco Del Favero discussed the question of whether these two forces are comparable and competing in resources against each other. He reasoned that the NATO Response Force and the EUBG are comparable forces with regard to their operational concept, despite significant differences in size, composition, and capabilities. However, he also concluded that the EUGBs "cannot be considered as a mere duplication of the NATO Response Force." CPT Franco Del Favero, "The European Battle Groups: Operational and Strategic Implications for NATO" (Master’s Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2009), 30-31, 43-44. Christian Mölling, EU-Battlegroups–Stand und Probleme der Umsetzung in Deutschland und für die EU (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik–German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2007), 5-7. Christian Mölling, "NATO and EU Rapid Response: Contradictory or Complementary?" CSS Analyses in Security Policy (No. 22, October 2007), 1-3. The meeting in Tervuren, Belgium, became known as Pralinengipfel or "Chocolate Summit." Volker Heise, The ESDP and the Transatlantic Relationship. (SWP Research Paper, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik–German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2007), 17. Johannes Varwick, "NATO and EU: Partnerschaft oder Konkurrenz?" Der Mittler-Brief: Informationsdienst zur Sicherheitspolitik, (2007): 1-8.

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different national intentions in this regard is the St. Malo initiative. Although both France and the
United Kingdom aimed at increasing Europe’s military capacity “linked to imbalances in Euro-
American security cooperation,” the initiative sparked a debate among NATO partners whether
this actually meant creating a more or less autonomous CSDP as a substitute to the Alliance.32
Furthermore, France and the United Kingdom are the only EU countries continuously seeking a
military capability to act autonomously.33 It is, thus, helpful to review the current national
security strategies of France and the United Kingdom first and the national strategy of Germany
second.

France

Historically, President Charles de Gaulle’s policy of an independent nuclear France
countering American influence in Europe has shaped the country’s relationship with NATO
decisively. In March 1966, France withdrew from NATO’s military structure and required the
removal of all NATO commands from French territory.34 When President Jacques Chirac signed
the St. Malo initiative in 1998, this Gaullist legacy sought a more autonomous CSDP as a
reassurance ready in case the United States or other non-EU NATO members would not approve
actions by the Alliance. Some scholars see “tactical adaptations” to this tradition in light of

32 Toje, 11.
33 Heise, The ESDP and the Transatlantic Relationship, 20. The French Livre Blanc determines
this necessary if “a clear and imminent threat of armed aggression affecting national security [should] be
identified.” In this case, “France must also be able to plan, conduct and execute pre-emptive military action
either alone or in coalition. This will call for appropriate and autonomous intelligence, targeting and deep-
strike capabilities by land, air and sea. The organization of planning must offer political and military
decision-makers an adequate range of options.” Présidence de la République Française, The French White
The United Kingdom “will maintain [its] ability to act alone where [they] cannot expect others to help.”
Her Majesty’s Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defense and Security
France’s full return to NATO in 2009 and a different attitude towards the NATO-EU relationship. French politics today emphasize a more pragmatic approach to NATO seeking a close complementary partnership between the two organizations. However, the “Gaullist tradition” has not yet completely disappeared in France and the country still seems to strive to transform the EU under French leadership into a viable political and military alternative to a US-led NATO.35

Reviewing France’s Livre Blanc published in 2008 confirms this perspective.36 The paper acknowledges the changing security environment, the country’s new vulnerabilities to threats such as terrorism, missile proliferation, and cyber attacks, and the blurring distinction between external and internal security. The paper subsequently emphasizes the need to apply civil and military means in all phases of an operation and operational tendencies for its military towards international stabilization and peacekeeping operations in urban environments.37 For crisis management, the paper defines multilateralism as a founding principle and the most legitimate,

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37 Diplomatic, financial, social, cultural, and military means. Regionally, North Africa is of special importance for France. Ibid., 45, 47-53, 55-56.
promising, and strengthening approach to overcome shortcomings in terms of both legitimacy and efficacy.\textsuperscript{38}

Given France’s longstanding ambition for Europe, the paper stresses the unique capability of the EU and its CSDP to mobilize from its own resources all the means necessary for the resolution of crises. France wants the EU to play a more independent and more effective role in enhancing international security as well as the country’s own security. The contemporary French government “believes that the Union needs a permanent and autonomous strategic planning capability,” and thinks that the EU should unify operational planning and conduct under strategic leadership in Brussels.\textsuperscript{39} The White Paper also calls for a streamlined and competitive European industry and seeks to accomplish this by “European interdependence” in the majority of defense and security procurements through multinational research and development underpinned

\textsuperscript{38} The paper does not exclude unilateral action but emphasizes multilateralism as France’s priority in crisis management (legitimacy and effectiveness must be reconciled whatever the difficulties) and acknowledges the central role of the United Nations. Ibid., 106, 108.

\textsuperscript{39} The paper reflects on the development from Helsinki Headline Goal to Headline Goal 2010 and calls for expanding available capabilities in the fields of command intelligence, communications, projection, and air mobility. It also calls for a European ability to maintain two to three peacekeeping operations simultaneously and a better coordination of European military reserve forces. Furthermore, the strategy emphasizes the need of pooling strategic and tactical assets for improved interoperability among European and allied forces, such as transport aircraft within the EU (based on the A400M under the European Military Air Transport Command); in-flight refueling (British-French means); air mobility capabilities (based on British-French, French-German projects); aero-naval capabilities (British-French aircraft carrier); intelligence means; and supporting activities (jointly built weapon systems). Additionally, the paper underlines the need of reforming procedures for the funding of external operations. With a view on the EU, the strategy also calls for a revision of the EU Security Strategy to rationalize EU’s missions. Ibid., 76, 82-84, 91.
by effective (aligned) procurement procedures. The country sees the European framework as the most promising opportunity to achieve this and the EDA as the “spearhead of this ambition.”

Besides France’s ambitions for a strong European rather than national defense market, a new element in France’s national security strategy is the country’s goal to renovate its transatlantic relationship. Although the Gaullist tradition continues to apply, France has rethought its practical implication. The country opposes any form of subordination of French forces to a foreign authority, rejects any foreign military presence on French territory, and remains determined that an independent nuclear deterrence capability is an “essential function” of French security. However, France now sees NATO as essential for the country’s and Europe’s security, and emphasizes NATO and the EU as two sides of the same coin. The cooperation between both organizations under Berlin Plus is, from a French perspective, merely impeded by institutional and political difficulties. France’s aims in NATO follow three lines: a review of NATO’s missions in view of the prime mission of collective defense; a better sharing of responsibilities between Americans and Europeans; and an improvement of planning procedures in streamlined command structures in order to adapt them to NATO’s missions. To achieve this, France wants to

40 “France will retain national proficiency in the technologies and capabilities needed to design, manufacture, and maintain the military equipment essential to areas of sovereign prerogative where, in view of our political choices, sharing or pooling resources is not an option. For the majority of defence and security procurement our strategy will tend towards European interdependence.” France seeks achieving this interdependence by free consent in terms of reciprocity, security of supply, and an overall balance. Ibid., 86-87, 254.

41 France intends to develop a new partnership between the defense industry and the state for more efficient procurement procedures and for a modern maintenance of operational serviceability. The White Paper’s term “European framework” seems not necessarily to limit such cooperation to EU members, because EDA, after becoming an official EU institution with the Lisbon Treaty, has also worked closely with non-EU members in the past, namely Iceland, Norway, and Turkey. Ibid., 260, 261-268.

42 Ibid., 102, 104, 303.

43 France’s imperatives for a successful NATO-EU relationship include that an a priori division of labor between the both organizations as well as a geographical division of labor is not feasible, because of the impracticability of “reserving” high intensity operations of potential areas for NATO or the EU. Consequently, the paper calls for a case-by-case coordination between both organizations. Ibid., 93, 95.
attain "a greater presence in all of the Allied structures" and contribute significantly to operations within the framework of NATO.\textsuperscript{44}

France's ambitions for NATO come with a significant modification of France's military force structure and its funding. The French Armed Forces continue to focus on expeditionary forces to pursue French interests, which are premised in the unlikely event of conducting military operations on France's territory in the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{45} Therefore, the French Armed Forces focus on achieving the following goals. The first goal is to protect national territory at home by making 10,000 soldiers available in a matter of days. The second goal is to deploy 30,000 troops in six months for a period of one year as part of a multinational land operation in a theater up to 8,000 km away. Third, the French military maintains a permanent and autonomous action and reaction capability of 5,000 soldiers for deployment within a very short timeframe. Furthermore, France acknowledges that military operations will always require simultaneous deployment of civilian crisis management capabilities.\textsuperscript{46} Implementing these force goals, France will reduce its Armed Forces' strength from 271,000 civilian and military personnel in 2008 to 225,000 in 2014/2015. According to France's national security and defense strategy of 2008, the overall size of the French military will decline, while a moderate increase in spending should achieve better-funded and better-equipped Armed Forces. However, given the implications of the world

\textsuperscript{44} The paper also highlights France's significant participation in NATO Response Force with more than 7,000 troops. Ibid., 100-102.

\textsuperscript{45} "There is no likelihood of strictly military operations on the national territory in the foreseeable future, apart from providing support to crisis management operations in the wake of terrorist attacks or a natural or technological disaster." Ibid., 121.

\textsuperscript{46} The Navy remains responsible for France's nuclear deterrence role and holds deployable a carrier battle group within a 7,000 to 8,000 km distance. The Air Force will consist of three-hundred modern combat aircraft including Navy aircraft, four AWACS, and a fleet of refueling tanker and transport aircraft (fourteen MRTT, seventy transport aircraft). Ibid., 123, 213-217.
The United Kingdom

When the United Kingdom initiated CSDP in 1998, the government believed that the positive long-term effects of CSDP for NATO capability development would eventually outweigh US short-term concerns regarding a replication or undermining of NATO’s role and the decoupling of the EU from NATO. Its relationship with the United States remains a vital interest for the United Kingdom. Consequently, Europeanization of British Defense Policy for the United Kingdom primarily means promoting a closer transatlantic relationship between Europeans and the United States. The United Kingdom seeks using CSDP to remedy European military deficiencies and to encourage EU countries to take on a greater share of Europe’s security burden. From the British perspective, NATO must remain the primary forum for military capability planning. This ensures that the United States could compensate European deficiencies with equipment and capabilities.

47 The services will have the following strengths: Army: 131,000; Navy: 44,000; Air Force: 50,000. The main burden of troop reduction falls on support personnel. With the financial crisis, the French leadership acknowledged that it could not afford an increase in defense spending and struggled to maintain the level of spending. Ibid., 218. Mölling, Brune, and Dickow, 16, 18.


49 For France’s and the United Kingdom’s different national interests in CSDP in relation to NATO see e.g. the analysis by Alyson Bailes (Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and former British Ambassador to Finland), Kenneth Payne (NATO Research Fellow), and Robert Dover (Senior Lecturer in international relations Director of Taught Postgraduate Programmes at Loughborough University, UK). These references provide a very good overview of the British intents in CSDP, what initial and current interests in CSDP are, and an convincing argument that the British government’s preference for transatlantic defense solutions go along with the integration of European countries. Bailes, 2. Payne, 21.

50 Dover, 21-38.
In the British National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defense and Security Review, both published in 2010, the United Kingdom seems to uphold its attitude towards both NATO and the EU. The United Kingdom acknowledges – as does France – new vulnerabilities due to “wider security risks” in a globalized world.\(^{51}\) However, the National Security Strategy also states that the United Kingdom currently does not face a major existential threat. The country will try to prevent crises if possible in a “seamless cooperation between the military and civilian agencies” by stabilizing fragile states applying a “whole of government approach.”\(^{52}\)

Although the United Kingdom seeks to maintain the capability to act independently well beyond British shores if necessary, the strategy acknowledges the importance of the country’s “unique network of alliances and relationships” to have a strategic presence wherever needed. The country divides its alliances and partnerships into five priorities: a pre-eminent defense and security partnership with the US; bilateral defense and security cooperation with a range of allies and partners; an effective and reformed UN; NATO as “the bedrock” of defense; and an outward-facing EU that promotes security and prosperity. Here it is noteworthy that the United Kingdom, in contrast to France, stresses a bilateral rather than multilateral approach in defense cooperation – particularly “with those countries whose defense and security posture is closest to our own or with whom we cooperate in multinational operations.” Bilateral sharing of capabilities,

\(^{51}\) The most pressing threat for the United Kingdom as a vital link in the global network are terrorist groups, like Al Qaeda. The defense review identifies “wider security risks” with the following priority: terrorism, instability and conflict overseas, cyber security, civil emergencies, energy security, organized crime, border security, counter proliferation and arms control. With a view on unilateral operations, the strategy points out that Sierra Leone in 2000 is the only significant operation that the UK conducted alone since the Falklands in 1982. Her Majesty’s Government, SDSR, 41.

\(^{52}\) Her Majesty’s Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy* (London: The Stationery Office, 2010), 3-5, 10-11, 13-16, 28, 34. In regard to the cooperation between the military and civilian agencies, one can see the whole of government approach and the comprehensive approach (not necessarily applied by a single government) as (largely) synonymous. This is, given the different attitude towards multilateralism of the United Kingdom on the one side and France and Germany on the other side, a small but mighty distinction.
technologies, and programs are, from a British perspective, more productive and straightforward than complex multilateral agreements.\textsuperscript{53}

Along with the change towards increasing bilateral cooperation with emerging powers, such as China and India, and traditional allies, the United Kingdom intends to transform its force structure with the aim to deliver “the type of equipment our forces actually need to fight modern wars.”\textsuperscript{54} The main priorities for resources include operational counter-terrorism capabilities in intelligence, policing, and the necessary technologies to support them, a program for cyber security, and cross-government means to deal with natural hazards and to prevent international military crises. In case such crises should nevertheless occur, the United Kingdom intends to retain the ability to respond militarily.\textsuperscript{55} Following this approach, the British Armed Forces will be sized and shaped to conduct one enduring joint stabilization operation at brigade level (about 6,500 troops) and two (depending on the circumstances three) non-enduring joint intervention operations with up-to 2,000 troops each. With sufficient warning, the country will be able to commit all of its military effort to an intervention of up to three brigades supported by naval and air assets (about 30,000 troops), which is equivalent to two thirds of the forces deployed in Iraq 2003.\textsuperscript{56} With this, the United Kingdom accepts in the next years some risks and vulnerabilities in capabilities, particularly by withdrawing “one capability in advance of its successor’s entry into

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{53} Her Majesty’s Government, NSS, 4, 17. Her Majesty’s Government, SDSR, 59-60.
\item \textsuperscript{54} The country’s focus is “particularly on building new models of practical bilateral cooperation with those countries whose defence and security posture is closest to our own or with whom we cooperate in multinational operations.” Her Majesty’s Government, SDSR, 59. Her Majesty’s Government, NSS, 5, 15-16.
\item \textsuperscript{55} The papers point out that the equipment of its Armed Forces is still rooted in a Cold War mindset; with “main battle tanks aplenty but not enough protected vehicles to move our forces on the insurgency battlefield, [and] two massive aircraft carriers on order but unable to operate with the aircraft of our closest Allies.” Her Majesty’s Government, NSS, 5, 34.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 5, 34. Her Majesty’s Government, SDSR, 19.
\end{itemize}
service."\textsuperscript{57} For the most part, the United Kingdom will mitigate these risks by maintaining sufficient strategic intelligence and deepening partnerships, which focus on operational benefits or real cost savings—"not on cooperation for its own sake."\textsuperscript{58} The country will reduce its Armed Forces across all services, some 17,000 personnel, by 2015, while attempting to retain global reach and the ability "to operate across the spectrum from high-intensity intervention to enduring stabilization activity."\textsuperscript{59} To achieve this goal, the United Kingdom anticipates smaller reductions for the security and defense budget than that of other departments. However, the country is heavily engaged in restructuring governmental spending to bring the deficit under control, which will probably lead to a further declining defense budget over the next decade.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 33.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid. The United Kingdom focuses on its national defense market, but acknowledges a "legacy of unaffordability" and "over-commitment in the defense program" for new equipment and programs. Consequently, the United Kingdom seeks to extend "bilateral cooperation on the acquisition of equipment and technologies, for example in the areas of complex weapons, and increasing significantly our investment in joint projects, including unmanned aerial systems." Ibid., 16, 31, 33-34, 61.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 17.

\textsuperscript{60} The Royal Navy will decrease by around 5,000 to 30,000; the Army by around 7,000 to 95,000; the Royal Air Force by around 5,000 personnel to 33,000. The Royal Navy will complete the construction of its two new large aircraft carriers. In the long term, however, the Navy will just keep one aircraft carrier operational. This carrier will be interoperable with US and French aircraft. The Navy will retain its amphibious capability (the Royal Marine Brigade) and embark on a new program procuring less expensive, modern frigates. The number of submarines will be reduced (from twelve to eight), but the nuclear capability retained and renewed (forty-eight warheads to forty). The Army’s capabilities include five multi-role brigades (one brigade at high-readiness) and one air-assault brigade (high-readiness). The Army will focus on procuring protected support vehicles and reduce the number of tanks and heavily armored vehicles significantly. New procurement programs will focus on enhanced communications equipment and a balanced helicopter fleet for a more mobile and more flexible Army. Accelerating the withdrawal of its 22,000 troops from Germany, the Army also retains the Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) to command multinational forces across a theater of operations, a fully deployable divisional headquarters with a second capable of preparing and training subordinate forces which could "with suitable warning" be augmented to deploy in operational role on an enduring operation. The backbone of the Royal Air Force will be its modern combat aircraft Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighter. The Air Force will also acquire a growing fleet of Unmanned Air Vehicles in combat and reconnaissance roles, and enhance its strategic air transport capability by introducing the A400M aircraft (twenty-two A400M, seven C-17, up to fourteen A330 for strategic transport and in-flight refueling). Her Majesty’s Government, SDSR, 5, 24-25, 32. According to Mölling, Brune, and Dickow, the United Kingdom might have to cut nine Billion GBP out of its thirty-six Billion GBP defense budget for 2011. Furthermore, the defense sector must save up to
Germany

The German agenda for CSDP opposes neither British nor French views; Germany wants to make CSDP more active, more capable of acting, and more coherent. The country sees CSDP as the central point for the EU's foreign policy and the most promising area for further European integration. However, the historical burden still lies heavily on Germany and reveals itself in a deeply rooted anti-militarist culture and a self-identity as “civilian power” – relying predominantly on political, cultural, and economic means to pursue its interests.61 With Germany’s reluctance to employ military means, it is no surprise that Chancellor Angela Merkel proposed, as a visionary aim for CSDP, a European Armed Force.62 The country’s main problem lies in its lack of vitality in the area of security policy when it comes to strategic action, which probably constitutes Germany’s greatest challenge to promote the EU’s CSDP as a tool to preserve peace in Europe and peace beyond its borders.63 Under the current circumstances, it remains difficult for German politicians to justify military action, particularly to meet threats thirty-six Billion GBP within the next decade due to overspending in recent years. Mölling, Brune, and Dickow, 13-14.


without immediate impact on the country. Thus, it is not surprising that Germany receives criticism of “stepping away from European unity” while simultaneously getting credit for its “high reputation in Europe” and the potential of being a possible future mediator between France and the United Kingdom. However, with its high economic weight in the European Union, Germany still provides an important link to the United States and remains a key partner in European defense cooperation.

The German 2006 White Paper, the *Weißbuch*, emphasizes the importance of both NATO and the EU as the Euro-Atlantic security structures that “have created a singular area of stability –

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65 Daniela Schwarzer and Nicolai von Ondarza, “Drei Zylinder für einen neuen Integrationsmotor?” *Discussion Paper* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik–German Institute for International and Security Affairs, September 2007): 31. The major factors that limit Germany’s taking more responsibility are their unwillingness to commit troops in missions abroad and their low defense spending. Larrabee, 47.
a development from which Germany benefits directly.\textsuperscript{66} For the most part, the paper’s threat analysis matches that of France and the United Kingdom. Besides international terrorism, state and non-state actors, and cyber attacks, the strategy highlights particularly weapons of mass destruction and its proliferation as a vital threat for national and international security.\textsuperscript{67} With an increasing overlap of internal and external security, the paper calls for taking precautions to meet those challenges and to counter them where they occur. In this regard, Germany’s security policy has – and will undoubtedly continue to have – a multilateral character.\textsuperscript{68}

Germany is politically committed to multilateralism embedded in NATO and the EU and convinced that “no state in the world nowadays is able to ensure its security on its own.” NATO and the transatlantic link to the United States remain “the bedrock of common security for

\textsuperscript{66} Written as a ministerial rather than a governmental paper, the \textit{Weißbuch} presents the institutional lack for a coherent discussion of strategic questions, including the definition of its national interests, and the use of its military means in a globalized world. Most of all, Germany has an “interest in peaceful competition of thoughts and views, an open world trade system and unrestricted transportation routes.” Furthermore, the \textit{Weißbuch} states six national interests: (1) Germany seeks to preserve justice and freedom, democracy, security and prosperity for the German citizens and protecting them from dangers. (2) Germany needs to ensure the sovereignty and integrity of its territory. (3) The country wants to prevent regional crises and conflicts that may affect Germany’s security, wherever possible, and to help control crises. (4) It wants to confront global challenges, above all the threat posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (5) Germany is determined to help uphold human rights and strengthen the international order based on international law. (6) The country promotes free and unhindered world trade as a basis for its prosperity and wants to help overcome the divide between poor and rich regions of the world. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the \textit{Weißbuch} follows the publication of the \textit{Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien} for the Bundeswehr, which explains the principles of how the Minister of Defense intends to implement German security and defense policy and determines missions, tasks and key capabilities of the Bundeswehr. Federal Ministry of Defense, \textit{Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien für den Geschäftsbereich des Bundesministers der Verteidigung} (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2003). Federal Ministry of Defense, \textit{White Paper 2006 - On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr} (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2006), 6, 14, 17, 21.


\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 17, 22.
Germany and Europe" and the cornerstone of German security and defense policy.\(^69\) Besides
NATO, Germany seeks to strengthen the EU and to carry forward European integration,
particularly in the field of security and defense. This aims at enabling the EU to contribute to its
own security to a greater extent. From a German perspective, CSDP should provide an
autonomous capacity to launch and conduct military operations in response to international crisis,
"where NATO as a whole is not engaged." To strengthen the EU, Germany seeks to promote
European armament cooperation, to improve the effectiveness of European defense research and
development, to strengthen the European industrial and technology base, and to create a
competitive European defense market.\(^70\) The Weißbuch also points out that NATO and the EU are
not competing organizations but rather make complementary contributions to national and
international security, particularly in the field of civil-military cooperation in crisis management.
However, Germany seeks to enable the EU to plan and lead operations autonomously under the
framework of CSDP, which requires the Union to draw to a limited extent on own force
structures.\(^71\)

Given the framework of NATO and the EU, the Weißbuch also determines operational
requirements for the size and structure of the German Armed Forces. In 2006, Germany’s
international commitments amounted to some 15,000 high-readiness troops for the participation
in NATO Response Force, some 18,000 troops participating in the EUBGs, and some 1,000

\(^{69}\) In this regard, it is noteworthy that Germany rather reluctantly continues to contribute to nuclear
deterrence through “nuclear participation” and at the same time pursues “the goal of worldwide abolition of
all weapons of mass destruction.” Ibid., 22, 24, 26, 42.

\(^{70}\) However, Germany also strives “to maintain a capable and competitive [national] industrial base
in core technological and armaments areas as a prerequisite for future [cooperation and interoperability].”
To achieve this, Germany campaigns “for a more efficient coordination of NATO and EU activities. This
will benefit the efficiency of both organizations and conserve resources, which are scarce in all the member
states of both organizations.” Ibid., 33, 39-40.

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 40, 42.
troops for the United Nations Standby Arrangement System. Based on these commitments, Germany’s national ambition was to have around 35,000 service personnel available for high intensity operations, around 70,000 for stability operations (up to 14,000 troops in up to five enduring joint stabilization operations) and 147,000 support personnel. However, in the light of the financial crisis and its implications for Europe and in particular for Germany, the country decided to reshape its Armed Forces. In 2011, the German government suspended conscription. This marks the end of an era for Germany, which has decided to reduce the size of its Armed Forces to 185,000 troops and to cut the defense budget significantly. However, the new Bundeswehr will increase the number of deployable forces and enhance international cooperation within the framework of NATO and the EU to equip and deploy its Armed Forces.

**Strategic and Operational Tendencies in the EU and its CSDP**

This chapter addresses three facets of the European Union’s emerging security and defense policy. First, it reviews the strategic framework that the EU Security Strategy provides to apply military means under the head of the EU. Second, it provides an overview of European efforts to develop their military capabilities. This includes a review of the defense cooperation within the framework of the EDA and the prospects for multinational procurement and multinational equipment projects. Finally, the chapter reviews lessons learned from implementing the EUBG concept and provides an account of missions launched within the framework of CSDP. This sets the stage for the analysis of the NATO Strategic Concept 2010 and suggests

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72 Ibid, 66.

implications for the application of operational art in future combat operations under the head of both organizations.

The Strategic Frame

In 2003, the EU gave its CSDP a security strategy, which integrated civil and military means in crisis management. By the early twenty-first century, there was a consensus within the EU to play a more active role in international relations, and the EU Security Strategy would guide the EU to become a producer and no longer just a consumer of security. This marked a significant step for the EU. While the strategy has its strengths, given the bottom-up nature of CSDP there are significant weaknesses as well. Strength is certainly that the EU Security Strategy provides a common threat analysis, which constitutes a shared understanding among the EU member states. In respect to the question how to deal with common threats, the EU member states had to make compromises, particularly with respect to their bilateral US relations.


75 The Union’s aim was to “reach an agreement sufficiently broad to include widely varying strategic traditions but precise enough to become a motor of international action; to maintain credibility in the eyes of other major international actors, above all the US; and to address the new threats without renouncing the Union’s particular acquis and identity.” Nicole Gnesotto, ed., *European Defence—A Proposal for a White Paper* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, May 2004), 26, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/wp2004.pdf (accessed 20 June 2010). Favero, 90-91.

76 Far from being a European Army, nation states determine which capabilities they want to provide the EU under the Helsinki Headline Goal and the Headline Goal 2010 and which capabilities they want develop. Thus, “capability-building in ESDP is a fundamental bottom-up process.” Sven Biscop, “A ‘European Army’ for the EU and NATO?” *Egmont Paper* (Brussels: Egmont–Royal Institute for International Relations, 3 March 2007), 3, 12.


78 As pointed out earlier, CSDP (and subsequently the development of the EU Security Strategy) emerged as a direct result of international crises (Kosovo, 9/11, Iraq). Thus, the strategy reflects the different viewpoints of its member states on how the EU would carry forward CSDP while simultaneously maintaining the transatlantic link to the United States (via NATO). From Sibylle Lang’s point of view, the EU Security Strategy lacks therefore practical value with regard to conflict management, purposeful...
Therefore, the strategy does not logically develop strategic ends, ways, and means to achieve the strategic goals, particularly regarding the use of military force.

The EU Security Strategy further “provides the EU with a set of principles, such as effective multilateralism and a secure neighborhood,” but lacks clearly defined priorities and convergence of EU member states around key objectives. Although the strategy is supposedly a key instrument in identifying strategic challenges and threats, the EU will have to develop sub-strategies, such as a military strategy for CSDP, and action-plans in order to be more prescriptive and less descriptive.  

This is the reason why some scholars tend to deny the EU Security Strategy the true character of a security strategy, because the EU depends on the ability and willingness of its member states to implement the strategy. Without coherence among the EU member states, the EU Security Strategy will continue to have great external and internal symbolic merit, but will lack practical value.  


Due to this vague definition, it is hard to determine whether the EU can achieve its goal to become a provider of security with the EU Security Strategy. Following a report from the EU Institute for Security Studies, it was first necessary to initiate strategic thinking in Europe in order to identify common interests and to implement them effectively. This is certainly a strength of the EU Security Strategy. Álvaro de Vasconcelos, The European Security Strategy 2003-2008 – Building on Common Interests, EU ISS Report no. 05 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010), 32, 45, 53, 57.

Multilateral Armament Cooperation and the European Defense Agency

European countries face a dilemma regarding multilateral cooperation in armament. On the one hand, costs for research, experimentation, and development of high technology equipment increases significantly. Low defense budgets and fragmented national defense programs, compared to the United States, lead to disproportional costs for the development of military capabilities and to the necessity of multilateral cooperation in this field.\(^1\) On the other hand, despite multilateral security cooperation in NATO and the EU, European countries pursue their own national economic and security interests. This affects particularly the field of defense economy, because of its direct impact on national security. National protectionism of the defense markets, however, works into the hands of an even higher fragmented and less competitive European industrial base, which again increases costs in research, experimentation, and development.\(^2\) This disproportion – the relatively high costs European countries must incur – is a major reason for the increasing capability gap between European and US forces and for diminishing military interoperability. Consequently, European countries are increasingly unable to conduct military operations within the framework of CSDP and within the Alliance, especially


\(^{82}\) Both goals focus on improving the capabilities for strategic and tactical airlift, sustainability and logistics including air-to-air refueling, precision guided munitions, and C4ISR. Ibid., 89. Jean-Pierre Darnis et. Al., Lessons Learned from European Defence Equipment Programmes, Occasional Paper (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2007), 18. Ibid., 89.
if the United States decides not to get actively involved. A vital prerequisite for the functioning of an independent CSDP is that Europe retains a technological and industrial base and that EU members spend their resources more efficiently. Possible steps are through pooling of research technology and forces, in particular by aligning the development and procurement processes and activities, and the systematic reorganization of the European industrial base towards transnational work sharing and specialization. Binding rules in this regard would allow the European countries to close the capability gap qualitatively and, to a certain extent, quantitatively. This is necessary to make CSDP more active and capable and to ensure interoperability among the European partners. These positive effects for CSDP would benefit NATO as well.


84 Rohde analyzes constraints and opportunities for the optimization of European armaments processes. In the second source, he and Andrew A. James provide another view on the future of armament cooperation. They discuss two different models to close the capability gap between the US and European countries: a balanced transatlantic partnership, or a strong US dominance. The article underlines the urgent need to broaden and deepen armament cooperation in Europe and to remove obstacles between the US and European defense markets. Joachim Rohde, Armament in Europe (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik–German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2004), 5. Joachim Rohde and Andrew D. James, The Future of Transatlantic Armament Co-operation (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik–German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July 2004).

85 Lower costs for capability development would enable the European partners to close the capability gap and to increase interoperability within the Alliance. Within NATO, US armament cooperation is mainly limited to the UK (and Turkey). A true transatlantic cooperation, however, requires a closer cooperation between the US and the other NATO (and EU) members. Thus, streamlining the defense market legislation in Europe is necessary to reform transatlantic rules and to ensure interoperability among NATO Allies. There are good reasons for a closer US-EU cooperation in defense – continuously low defense budgets and likely future cuts in spending are just two. Another is that the transatlantic defense market already matters for the industry (joint ventures between European and US firms, e.g. for the Joint Strike Fighter or the Medium Extended Air Defense System), which leads to increasing competition on the market and subsequently to a lower price for the taxpayers. Binding rules among EU members for armament cooperation and an adaption of the export control system for defense technology would allow the US to consider the EU as one (defense) market and lead to increasing cooperation. Aalto, Keohane, Mölling, and Vaucorbeil discuss principles of European defense cooperation, chances and limitations of the
The EU coordinates multilateral cooperation through the EDA. The agency supports the EU Member States and the Council of the EU in the field of crisis management, particularly in the following four functions: promoting capability development, facilitating armament cooperation, creating a competitive European defense market and a strong European industrial base, and promoting research and technology. All EU member states are eligible to take part in EDA, which acts under the authority of the Council. The head of the EDA is the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who also serves as chair of the Agency’s main decision-making body. With the EDA, the EU created a political institution to promote coherence among member states attempting to achieve a more comprehensive and systematic approach for the definition and the development of European defense capabilities.

To enhance military capability development under the EDA, the EU’s Lisbon Treaty officially introduced the concept of Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense, which provides a framework for defense cooperation within the EU. An initiative launched under this concept avoids the need for a consensus of all twenty-seven members, but remains open for any EDA, the transatlantic defense market and the importance to change international regulations. Aalto, Keohane, Mölling, and de Vaucorbeil, 10-12, 90-94.

86 For background information to the EDA see: Winter, 72-73, 94.

EU member state who wants to join. This allows countries to set higher goals for participation and contribution to multinational forces, for European equipment programs, and for their cooperation within EDA. To participate in a Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense, the military capabilities of countries must fulfill specific criteria: they must have the capacity to supply or to participate in the EUBGs, and must commit to five measures, which focus on the alignment of defense programs, the strengthening of multinational approaches, and the increase of EDA’s role in procurement processes. The EU also agreed on measures to ensure that cooperating members, which no longer fulfill the criteria or no longer meet the commitments necessary to participate in a cooperation can be suspended by the Council. However, the EU has not yet defined how to suspend a country from cooperation, and it remains uncertain whether the organization can achieve this in practice.

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88 The EU member states can establish cooperation by qualified majority, and, once established, only participating members are eligible to vote and to determine the realm of their cooperation. Only here, decisions and recommendations must be taken unanimously. The EU defines qualified majority as a minimum of fifteen EU member states representing a minimum of sixty-five percent of EU’s population. EU Members proposed the implementation of Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense actually as early as 2004 with the European Constitution. The protocol eventually came effective with the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. European Union, “Treaty of Lisbon—Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community,” TL/P/en 12, TL/en 48-49.

89 The EU does not provide a limit in quantities for Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense, but countries must commit to the following five measures. (1) To agree on objectives for the level of investment in defense equipment and to review these regularly. (2) To align their defense apparatus by harmonization, pooling and, where appropriate, by specialization of military needs, means and capabilities—including higher cooperation in the fields of training and logistics. (3) To identify common objectives regarding the commitment of forces, including a possible review of their national decision-making processes with a view to enhance availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their forces (4) To strengthen multinational approaches, without prejudice to NATO, and to address the shortfalls identified by the Capability Development Mechanism. (5) To intensify the development of equipment in the framework of EDA, where appropriate, and to strengthen EDA’s role in the assessment of Member States contributions. Ibid., TL/P/en 12, 13.

90 EDA “shall report thereon at least once a year” to assess “particular contributions made in accordance with the criteria to be established.” Ibid., TL/en 49, TL/P/en 12, 13.

91 Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense is not the “silver bullet” that solves all the problems for defense cooperation within the EU and between the Union and NATO. However, implementing the concept with the Lisbon Treaty is a great step for the EU, which will probably increase future armament cooperation in Europe and contribute to overcoming the self-blockade of European
As a political institution, EDA does not conduct procurement on its own. In 1996, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom established the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement (OCCAR) as a management organization for existing and future bilateral or multilateral armament programs. Currently, EDA and OCCAR are negotiating an administrative arrangement to formally institutionalize their cooperation. This could utilize EDA’s increasing potential to generate cooperative projects and programs and OCCAR’s capacity to manage such cooperation. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have been working hard, but have been unsuccessful in achieving such an agreement. The main obstacle is the Turkey-Cyprus-Greece political problem, which prevents Cyprus, and subsequently EDA, to sign a security agreement with NATO. Unless NATO and the EU remove this political obstacle, cooperation between EDA and OCCAR will not be successful.


OCCAR’s major bi- and multilateral procurement projects are the tactical and strategic airlifter A400M, the counter battery radar COBRA, and the attack helicopter Tiger. All three initiatives show that European countries have made important steps towards successful multilateral armament cooperation, although the experiences with the A400M and the Tiger programs also reveal significant weaknesses. A poor political framework and project management led to sharply increasing production costs of the ambitious A400M project, which forced nations to alter tactical demands and disillusioned political leaders who hoped the cooperation would reduce procurement costs. The French-German Tiger/Tigre initiative aimed at closing an important capability gap in the French and the German Armed Forces. However, technical problems, recurrently altering national military demands, and decreasing military budgets delayed delivery several times. As a result, four different versions of the helicopter were developed. This raised criticism from scholars because of already existing interoperability issues and ensuing inefficiencies in the fielding phase. The COBRA project, in contrast to the A400M and the

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94 France, Germany, and/or the United Kingdom participate in each of these programs. Besides these, OCCAR also manages other challenging projects, like the French-Italian multirole frigate (FREMM) initiative. For a full account see: OCCAR – Programs: http://www.occar-ea.org/2.


96 The project aimed at reducing costs by developing all versions of the helicopter from a common airframe, basic avionics, and communications. The project has a long history, and was initially started as joint venture of French Aerospatiale and German Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm in 1984. Temporarily cancelled, the countries re-launched it with the newly formed Eurocopter, a division of EADS. OCCAR placed the production contract for the first batch of 160 aircraft in 1999; each country ordering eighty Tiger
Tiger, has met all milestones to date. The trilateral cooperation between France, Germany, and Great Britain appears very successful and all three nations have fielded the system since 2004. Once fully introduced, OCCAR will continue managing the system in its fielding phase.\(^97\)

The three examples illustrate that the political framework for effective defense spending within Europe is not yet set. The nations’ differing military demands deny developing and operating defense products more efficiently.\(^98\) However, in the light of the global economic and

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\(^97\) To manufacture the highly mobile location radar, the countries commissioned the Euro-Art Consortium. The shareholders of Euro Art are EADS Deutschland GmbH, Munich, Germany; Thales Air Defence S.A., Bagneux, France; Thales Defence Ltd, Crawley, United Kingdom; and Lockheed Martin Corp., Moorestown, USA. The consortium developed the first multifunctional counter battery radar in the world with a fully active phased array antenna, which allows locating hostile battery positions with high accuracy location and predicting impact points within very short transmission periods. This capability is well appreciated in operations across the spectrum, because of its great ability to accurately locate mortar attacks. British, French, and German forces have deployed COBRA systems in several out-of-area missions, such as Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Besides the three manufacturing countries, Turkey will introduce COBRA in their Armed Forces. Cassidian, COBRA - Counter Battery Radar.

\(^98\) The current OCCAR programs also reveal areas in which France, Germany, and the United Kingdom do not cooperate: the development of naval vessels, such as frigates and submarines, and armored combat vehicles such as main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. This indicates areas in which EDA can launch initiatives. Besides the three OCCAR projects, Germany and the United Kingdom cooperate—managed by the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency— together with Austria, Italy, Saudi Arabia, and Spain, in the development of the Eurofighter Typhoon. Requiring a carrier-capable version,
financial crisis, France and the United Kingdom announced a new Treaty on Defense and Security Cooperation. The Treaty pledges unprecedented cooperation in the defense sector, and which retains fidelity to their long-term agendas for the development of CSDP with regard to NATO. This agreement has the potential to be a new engine for European defense, but also to divide European efforts for a more coherent approach in defense cooperation. ⁹⁹

**Lessons Learned from the EUBG Concept and EU Missions under CSDP**

The need to introduce a concept of "smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high-readiness" became apparent with the European mission *Artemis* in 2003. ¹⁰⁰ France and the United Kingdom pressed the European countries to develop crisis management forces to strengthen the EU’s ability to react to a crisis, particularly on the lower spectrum of conflict. In 2004, together with Germany, they made the proposal to develop crisis reaction forces under the EU’s Headline Goal 2010. France’s and the United Kingdom’s primary goal establishing the EUBGs was to generate more forces within the EU that would actually relief French and British troops in current operations. For the other EU members, the Battlegroups

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¹⁰⁰ *Artemis* was the first EU military mission outside Europe and independent from NATO. Kees, Homann, "Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo," in *Faster and More United?: The Debate About Europe’s Crisis Response Capacities* (Brussels: European Commission, 2007), 151-155.
provided merely a great possibility to transform their Cold War oriented Armed forces into more agile and deployable troops and to have a multinational capability available in case a crisis would threaten vital interests of the EU. However, all member states agreed that the EUBGs would ensure closer cooperation, increase the interoperability of European Armed forces, and, eventually, generate more deployable troops for expeditionary operations and share the burden among European nations more equally.101

A Battlegroup can generally fulfill all tasks within the extended Petersberg spectrum.102 However, because of its design around a combined arms battalion of approximately 1,500 troops, a single EUBG is not suited to conduct an autonomous mission in a hostile environment. Thus, the EU will more likely deploy single Battlegroups in conflicts that fit the lower end of the extended Petersberg tasks.103 This is an important distinction to the NATO Response Force, which, as an integrated unit with land, sea, and air components, can perform forced-entry operations. Another important difference to the NATO Response Force is the way the EU trains and plans to deploy a EUBG. While units that participate in a NATO Response Force need to train and certify together, the EU intends to form the Battlegroup out of earmarked units ad hoc


102 The extended Petersberg Tasks include comprise humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping missions, tasks for combat forces in crisis management (including peacemaking), joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention, and post-conflict stabilization.

103 Ibid., 19.
while deploying. Thus, to ensure the operability of EUBGs, nations and their militaries agreed on similar standards and procedures, similar to the NATO Response Force.\(^{104}\)

The greatest challenges to implementing the EUBGs are the diverging political decision making processes to initiate the deployment of a Battlegroup, the fragmented command and planning structure for military missions within the EU, and the aligning of military concepts and procedures among nations. Regarding differences in political decision-making processes among European countries, Germany’s parliamentary decision-making process, for instance, requires comprehensive consultation throughout the planning of an operation. This is a dilemma for Germany: participating in multinational units is very attractive because it increases the political legitimacy of military missions and carries forward the military transformation of the Bundeswehr.\(^{105}\) However, the international commitment cannot mean an “automatism” for the deployment of German military forces if the Council of the EU decides. The German constitution does not allow such an “automatism” but requires previous national parliamentary approval on a case-by-case basis. France and the United Kingdom do not face this problem: respectively, the head of state or the government make the decision to deploy military forces.\(^{106}\)

Besides the national decision-making processes, the EU also faces serious problems to plan and lead a military operation. Without standing command structure, the EU creates the operational command for a potential mission on an ad hoc basis using existing national

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\(^{105}\) Major and Mölling, 11-13.

\(^{106}\) Partners in a Battlegroup need to align their decision-making processes and some EU member states have already adapted procedures in this regard. Ibid., 15-16. Mölling, EU-Battlegroups, 10-11. Christian Mölling and Jörg Schlickmann, “Schnelle militärische Krisenreaktion in der EU: Battlegroups und wie weiter?” in Algieri, Militärische Aspekte der ESVP, 67-68.
Operational Headquarters (OHQ) as a nucleus.\textsuperscript{107} In order to enable coherent strategic planning and decision making, the EU would have to develop contingency plans before a crisis occurs. The ad hoc nature of its operational command structures does not allow doing this and purely national contingency planning would be insufficient for such a task. Beyond that, the desire not to duplicate NATO’s command structure and the principle of a “single set of forces” keep the EU from establishing an operational contingency planning capability and standing European forces for the EUBGs. This avoids further competition between NATO and the EU, particularly if a member state decided to commit its military forces with the EU in a long-term, but constitutes the major weakness for operational planning of EU missions.\textsuperscript{108}

For the military forces, the greatest challenge to implementing the Battlegroups is the alignment of military concepts and procedures among nations. This issue arises from a multinational approach on a very low tactical level by establishing EUBGs with units from three or more nations. This has led to a debate about an appropriate balance between effectiveness and multinational cooperation. France and the United Kingdom emphasize above all that EUBGs have to be combat effective and, thus, they favor national EUBGs, which is partly founded in the expeditionary nature of the British and French militaries. Germany, in contrast, underlines the importance of the Battlegroups to carry forward the transformation of European forces, including its own. Thus, it favors a two-plus-one concept, in which a bigger country would cooperate with

\textsuperscript{107} Five countries have designated national commands for providing a nucleus for an OHQ: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom. These national headquarters, augmented with multinational personnel, can form an OHQ on an ad hoc basis, once a crisis occurs and the EU decides to manage it. Additionally, the EU military staff also provides a nucleus of an OHQ, which can grow into a full EU headquarters. Theoretically, the EU has also the possibility to lead a EUBG using the military structures of NATO under the Berlin Plus agreements, but the EU members have not yet agreed to make use of this possibility. Major and Mölling, 16-17.

\textsuperscript{108} Nevertheless, with the United Kingdom having the only EUBG established out of purely national forces, multinational EUBGs seem to be the rule rather than the exception. Ibid., 18-19. Mölling, \textit{EU-Battlegroups}, 5-8.
two smaller in one EUBG. Despite the differences between the three countries, the EU members determined not to establish multinational combat units below battalion level and multinational combat support units below the company level.\textsuperscript{109} This is an enormous difference to the situation during the Cold War, where national divisions cooperated at corps-level. Thus, it is no surprise that the EUBGs represent just a first, small step towards common operations concepts, training, and equipment.\textsuperscript{110} This is not only required for interoperability within a Battlegroup but also for the employment of other Battlegroups as operational or strategic reserves.\textsuperscript{111} Currently, the biggest challenges in tactical multinational cooperation are agreeing on common procedures accessing national classified information and intelligence sources, aligning national doctrines, and agreeing on technical specifications for equipment and logistical task sharing.\textsuperscript{112} However, the experiences from implementing the EUBG concept have not yet initiated the development of new equipment and common standards for military concepts and procedures – maybe because no Battlegroups has been deployed in an EU mission under CSDP yet.\textsuperscript{113}

The EU’s number of military and civilian missions is substantial. As of April 2011, the Union has undertaken sixteen civilian, seven military, and one civil-military operation with a total of over 20,000 soldiers and civilian experts deployed outside the EU.\textsuperscript{114} These missions reflect


\textsuperscript{111} Mölling, \textit{EU-Battlegroups}, 8.

\textsuperscript{112} Major and Mölling, 17.

\textsuperscript{113} Although the EU member states have agreed on using NATO standards, these standards allow nations significant leeway for the actual adaptation of national standards. Major and Mölling, 18-19, 22.

\textsuperscript{114} Thirteen of these operations are still ongoing; eleven are successfully accomplished. For an overview of CSDP missions, see Appendix B. Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont. \textit{A Strategy for CSDP– Europe’s Ambitions as a Global Security Provider} Egmont Paper no. 37 (Brussels: Egmont–Royal Institute for International Relations, 2010), 8. Fischer, 26, 52-53.
the EU’s unique capability of mobilizing the full range of crisis management tools—military, humanitarian, diplomatic and financial—and the growing contribution of the EU for both military and civilian crisis management. The following review of the EU’s military missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) and in operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR RD Congo) rounds off the operational tendencies in CSDP and reveals several important lessons learned for European countries with implications for the cooperation of European countries within NATO.\textsuperscript{115}

Operation Althea, implementing the terms of the Dayton Agreement as the successor of NATO’s Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), is the biggest military EU operation so far and shows considerable success in several respects. First, although NATO still has some troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Althea has proven that NATO and the EU can effectively cooperate under Berlin Plus and can complement each other. The EU OHQ is co-located at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium

\textsuperscript{115} A more active CSDP also raises the question of how to accomplish an effective cooperation between NATO and the EU in the field of military and civilian crisis management. Answering this question goes beyond the focus of this paper. However, given the strategic interests of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in CSDP, a classical division of responsibilities between NATO and the EU for military and civilian crisis management is unlikely and both organizations will probably have to coordinate their actions in each case. Such a “classical division of responsibilities” (in which NATO conducts the military part of an operation and the EU the civilian part) does not meet the interests of EU countries, particularly France and Germany. Christopher Chivis provides a comprehensive account on the EU’s civilian crisis management. He concludes that the development of civilian capabilities under CSDP should not become a substitute for the development of military capabilities, and that the US should not encourage a mere development of civilian capabilities under CSDP. NATO and the EU should also not divide responsibilities geographically. It is also unlikely that the EU is willing and capable of undertaking major combat operations in the future—a classical NATO task. For background see: Stephanie Hofmann and Christopher Reynolds, “Die NATO-EU-Beziehungen: Zeit für ‘Taulwetter,’” SWP aktuell no 37 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik–German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2007): 6-8. Varwick, “NATO and EU: Partnerschaft oder Konkurrenz?,” 8. Christopher S. Chivvis, EU Civilian Crisis Management - The Record So Far, Report to the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense (Santa Monica: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010), x, xi, 48.
and the EU's command element located at the Allied Joint Force Command at Naples.\textsuperscript{116} Second, the operation has achieved significant progress stabilizing the country and the EU is determined to set Bosnia and Herzegovina irreversibly on the track towards EU membership. This resulted in a significant drawdown of military forces and enabled NATO to commit capabilities elsewhere.

Third, far from being a solely military mission, the EU has committed civil and military means under a Comprehensive Policy and applied them successfully in Althea. Far from being ideal initially, this provided valuable lessons learned, and improved the civil-military approach to a certain extent.\textsuperscript{117}

In contrast to EUFOR Althea, the EU did not take over from NATO when launching operation \textit{Artemis} in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a military operation outside the EU and independent from NATO. The EU launched the operation as part of its long-term commitment to accompany the political process in the country to support the presidential and parliamentary elections from June to November 2006.\textsuperscript{118} Although the mission achieved its political aim, one


\textsuperscript{118} EUFOR RD Congo is, after EUFOR Artemis in 2003, the second military mission the EU undertakes in the country. Besides its (timely limited) military engagement in 2003 and 2006, the EU has
has to point out two important lessons the EU learned from this undertaking. First, the Union struggled to designate the operational level headquarters to lead and conduct the mission, because of the EU’s principle of “costs lie were they fall” for such missions. Second, Germany agreed to commission the Einsatzführungskommando of the Bundeswehr in Potsdam as the operational headquarters for the operation. Besides this, the EU deployed a Force Headquarters to Kinshasa as the lead element. The ad hoc establishment of these headquarters delayed the planning and executing process of the operation and, due to a lack of operational planning expertise, hampered the political-strategic planning. Furthermore, after accomplishing the mission, the ad hoc nature of the EU headquarters resulted in loss of the institutional memory. Given the different national military concepts and procedures, this has caused serious problems for the planning and conducts of missions under the CSDP framework. In addition to the lessons in command and control, the EU learned about the importance of strategic and operational logistics. With the European shortfalls in airlift capability, the operation’s contracted support and outsourcing often failed to meet EU’s demands, particularly because of delays and a lack of quality. The ad hoc nature of Artemis indicates a fundamental issue of CSDP. Without a standing command structure and the

civilian experts under a police mission and an advisory and assistance mission for security reform (EUPOL RD Congo and EUSEC RD Congo) in the country since 2005. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1671, the EU deployed a standby force for the four months following the first round of presidential and parliamentary elections. The EU force consisted of about 2,000 French and German troops, operating under a robust United Nations (UN) Chapter VII mandate, and should assist the UN stabilization mission MONUC in Congo.


120 The EU drew upon the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) and flights were coordinated by the Strategic Airlift Coordination Center in Eindhoven, Netherlands. Claudia Major, EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management - The Experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, Occasional Paper (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2008), 30-33.
ability to train, organize, and structure EU member states’ military forces, the EU’s ability to plan, lead, and conduct operations hinges significantly on NATO. This is an important finding and points at serious operational implications for the militaries of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

The two EU military missions epitomize operational tendencies of CSDP. First, the EU has grown in its role as security provider deploying civil experts and military forces more globally. Besides political and economic means, the EU supports countries in the area of security sector reform and in the lower spectrum of the extended Petersberg Tasks, namely with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Second, the EU successfully applies a civil-military approach in crisis management and is about to develop important coordinating measures to ensure an effective application of a comprehensive approach in crisis management. Lastly, the EU has identified the limitations for a more active CSDP: the lack of strategic and operational logistics and shortcomings in operational command and control. This prevents that the EU steps up to its global responsibilities in an environment that has significantly changed since the official foundation of CSDP during the EU Cologne summit in 1999.

The NATO Strategic Concept 2010

Given the dramatic political developments of the last decade, marked by the terrorist attacks on the twin towers in New York, the suicide attacks in London, and the Madrid and Bombay bombings, an adaptation of the 1999 Strategic Concept has been long overdue. Consequently, the Alliance decided to develop a new strategy that defined NATO’s longer-term

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role in the changed environment when the members met at Strasbourg/Kehl in April 2009. Understandably, the expectations in a new Strategic Concept were high. After more than a decade, the Alliance needed a new common vision and had to clarify “both what NATO should be doing for each Ally and what each Ally should be doing for NATO.” Within the literature on the Strategic Concept, one can group the raised questions in the following four areas.

First, the Alliance should determine how it defines “collective defense” in the twenty-first century and how it wants to balance mutual security commitments made under Article V with its new role of providing security, particularly through expeditionary operations far beyond NATO’s borders. This is critical for the Alliance to maintain credibility and plausibility of its core principle, which requires the ability to conduct major combat operations. Here, NATO had to clarify how it wants to carry forward the transformation of European forces under the Prague Capability Commitment and how it wants to use the NATO Response Force in the future. 124

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124 The following literature discusses what a new NATO Strategic Concept needs to provide for the Alliance and how the Alliance should define its role and purpose for the next decade. Usually, the authors use the terms “Strategic Concept” and “strategy” synonymously and both terms will be used synonymously in this thesis as well, although the NATO Strategic Concept is not a true strategy in the sense of a NATO Security Strategy. Albright, et. al., NATO 2020: Assured Security: Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and Recomendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2010), 6, 8-12. Kamp, “Towards a New Strategy for NATO,” 22-27.


129 Berdal and Ucko, 57-59, 66.
Furthermore, NATO had to define how Article V is supposed to apply when threats materialize without warning, such as missile and cyber attacks conducted by terrorists.125

Second, the Alliance should determine how it intends to shape its relationship with Russia, which is closely connected to collective defense under Article V. On the one hand, NATO and Russia are engaged in the NATO-Russia Council and numerous European countries seek strengthening the unique partnership, particularly in view of energy security for Europe. On the other hand, the Baltic States viewed Article V primarily as directed against Russia, especially after the 2008 war in Georgia. With regard to its relationship with Russia, the Alliance also needed to define whether the Alliance continues its “open door” policy for future enlargement.126

Third, the NATO strategy should define the future role of nuclear weapons for the Alliance’s security. With countries like Iran pursuing nuclear weapons and long-range missile capability, NATO needed to clarify whether it wants to remain a nuclear Alliance and how it wants to carry out deterrence. In view of anti-nuclear movements in European countries, particularly Germany and France, a unilateral withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany would have had the potential to damage the credibility of NATO’s deterrence and could have caused countries like Turkey to pursue an autonomous nuclear capability for effective deterrence. Such a spread of nuclear weapons technology was certainly not in the Alliance’s best interests.127

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125 Kamp argues that the Alliance needs to establish a hierarchy of functions so that demands can be brought in line with resources. Given the fundamentally different historical background and geographical settings of its twenty-eight members, the views on NATO’s future role and strategic orientation differ widely. In this regard, particularly the eastern European countries perceive Russia as main threat for their security. Since the 2008 Georgia-Russia war, those concerns have increased sharply. Kamp, “Towards a New Strategy for NATO,” 22-24. Goldgeier, 4, 6. Albright, 11.


Lastly, the new Strategic Concept should emphasize NATO’s role as a forum for consultation, particularly in view of its partnership with the EU, and its relationship with non-European countries. Given the importance of conducting future military operations within a wider realm of diplomatic, cultural, and economic activities, the EU can provide invaluable means to enable NATO to utilize a comprehensive approach in operations. Here, the new strategy had to provide initial guidelines on how NATO members want to implement a true strategic partnership between both organizations. In view of the Alliance’s role in the world, the strategy was also expected to determine how to carry forward its cooperation with countries like Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Korea, and how to pursue vital interests in international security in the Middle East. The new NATO strategy should strengthen NATO as a forum for consultation, contributing to “winning the battles of narratives” against potential Allied enemies.128

The following analysis of NATO’s first Strategic Concept of the twenty-first century reveals that the Alliance addresses all four previously discussed areas. However, given the political and multinational character of the strategy, the analysis also shows that the Strategic Concept lacks effective mechanisms to reach the goals that guide “the next phase in NATO’s evolution.”129 After a brief overview of the Strategic Concept, the analysis focuses on three areas of concern: how NATO intends to resolve the tension between collective defense and crisis


management operations, how the Alliance intends to deal with new threats, and how NATO intends to shape its cooperation with other organizations, namely the EU.

**Adapted Core Tasks and Principles in the NATO Strategic Concept 2010**

The NATO Strategic Concept 2010 clearly defines NATO’s core tasks and principles in their relationship to the changed security environment. The paper acknowledges that the threat “of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low,” but also points out that the Alliance cannot simply ignore such a threat. In this regard, the strategy points particularly at the proliferation of ballistic missiles, “which poses a real and growing threat” to the Alliance. It also highlights that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and terrorists using such weapons pose a direct threat to the security of NATO. With a focus on terrorism and other forms of extremism, the strategy acknowledges that instability and conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security. Furthermore, the paper underlines the growing threats of cyber attacks against critical government and economic infrastructure and the simultaneously increasing vulnerabilities of vital communication, transport, and transit routes for international trade, energy security, and prosperity.¹³⁰

The “broad and evolving set of challenges” that accompanies the changed security environment requires that the Alliance continues to fulfill effectively three essential tasks to ensure that “the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security, and shared values.”¹³¹ These tasks are conducting collective defense in accordance to NATO’s

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¹³¹ Ibid., 1-3.
Article V, providing security through crisis management operations, and promoting international security through cooperation “with relevant countries and other international organizations.”

With a view on collective defense, the strategy highlights that this is “the greatest responsibility of the Alliance” and underlines NATO’s resolve to protect and defend its territory “against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges [that] threaten the fundamental security of Allies or the Alliance as a whole.”

To achieve this, the Alliance will “maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces [with] the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defense and crisis response, including at strategic distance.” NATO’s focus will be to develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable forces that are capable of conducting both the Alliance’s Article V responsibilities and expeditionary operations. Particularly, this includes maintaining its NATO Response Force concept and the necessary training, exercises, and contingency planning against a full range of security challenges. Furthermore, the Alliance will develop a ballistic missile defense capability in cooperation with Russia and other partners, further develop and coordinate national cyber-defense capabilities, and develop the capacity to contribute to energy security. The strategy also points out that the member states will “sustain the necessary levels of defense spending” to ensure sufficient resources for its armed forces and that the Alliance will continuously review its overall posture to deter and defend against the full range of threats.

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133 In this regard, the strategy also points out that the “Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary.” Ibid., 2, 4.

134 Nuclear forces remain a core element for NATO and its overall strategy. Although circumstances for the use of nuclear forces are extremely remote, the Alliance will retain a nuclear capability as long as nuclear weapons exist. Ibid., 4-5.

135 For a full account of collective defense initiatives see: ibid., 5-6.
In addition to deterrence and defense, the Strategic Concept underlines that "crises and conflicts beyond NATO’s borders can pose a direct threat" to the Alliance’s security and that NATO will prevent and manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations, and support reconstruction efforts.\footnote{NATO, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence,” 6.}

The strategy underlines that this requires a comprehensive political, civilian, and military approach "to maximize coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort."\footnote{Ibid.} To increase its effectiveness, the strategy points out that NATO will enhance intelligence sharing within the Alliance and focus on the development of appropriate doctrine and military capabilities to conduct expeditionary, counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction operations. To manage crises in this spectrum successfully, NATO will develop its capability to establish and train local security forces in crisis zones to set the conditions for a withdrawal of international security forces. Additionally, the Alliance intends to form "an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners [and] to plan, employ, and coordinate civilian activities" until the transfer of those activities to other actors.\footnote{Ibid., 7.} Along with this, NATO will enhance integrated civilian-military planning and its ability to deploy civilian specialists from member states to manage crises throughout the full spectrum.\footnote{Ibid.}

NATO seeks to promote international security through cooperation by pursuing four initiatives: reinforcing arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts; continuing its "open door" policy of enlargement; enhancing partnerships; and pushing forward the reform and transformation of military forces.\footnote{Ibid., 7-11.} With the first initiative, the Alliance will continue to
reinforce arms control and to promote disarmament efforts of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. This aims to reduce the overall number of weapons, to increase transparency on Russian nuclear weapons, and to strengthen conventional arms control. Particularly, the strategy emphasizes the need to continue the fight against proliferation and to increase predictability and transparency through conventional arms control in order “to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons” and a safer world.141

The second initiative aims at contributing to security by continuing the enlargement process of the Alliance by integrating “all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures.”142 With this, NATO will keep the door fully open to European democracies that share the Alliance’s values and are willing and capable of contributing to common security and stability by assuming membership responsibilities and obligations.

NATO’s third initiative, to enhance its partnerships, sees the United Nations, the EU, Russia, and NATO’s partners of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council as the most important international players for the Alliance. Regarding the United Nations, the Alliance emphasizes its aim to “deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation [...] as set out in the UN-NATO Declaration signed in 2008.”143 With a view on the EU, the strategy reinforces the Alliance’s determination to strengthen a mutually open, transparent, and complementary strategic partnership with the EU with respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organizations. Particularly, NATO intends to “enhance practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field, [...] to share assessments and perspectives, [and to] cooperate more fully in capability development”

142 Ibid., 8.
with the aim to maximize cost-effectiveness and to minimize duplications. The statement reflects the Alliance's long-term goal to promote Euro-Atlantic security by improving the already existing institutions and instruments. However, the strategic concept does not recognize the impact of CSDP on NATO's future and neglects to determine how the Alliance wants to bridge to CSDP. In its cooperation with Russia, the strategy underlines the importance of cooperation in the areas of "missile defense, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy, and the promotion of wider international security." Lastly, the strategy focuses on the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace Program. Cooperation in this area aims at promoting lasting peace and stability in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and the Gulf region.

With its fourth initiative, NATO underlines the importance of continuing the transformation process to maximize the deployability of the Alliance’s military forces and their capacity to sustain operations in the field. The member states are determined to ensure coherence in defense planning, to develop and operate military capabilities jointly, and to preserve and strengthen common capabilities, standards, structures, and funding in order to maximize efficiency. This shall prepare the Alliance to deal with the level of uncertainty in the twenty-first century and the resulting security challenges for its member states.

**Strategic Consequences**

The NATO Strategic Concept 2010 is a political compromise between the Alliance’s twenty-eight member states and clearly reflects their different threat perceptions. Consequently, the economic and military developments in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom will likely

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145 Kashmeri, vi-vii.
147 Ibid., 11.
lead to a widening strategic military capability gap within the Alliance, which makes unilateral action of those nations increasingly unlikely. On the one hand, the paper emphasizes the political will of its member states to carry out collective defense under Article V and to maintain an appropriate level of conventional forces, although the member states consider the territorial threat as low. On the other hand, the paper highlights the continuous need to meet threats, including terrorism, beyond NATO’s borders at strategic distance. Such expeditionary crisis management across the spectrum of conflict requires deployable, high-readiness, and well-equipped military forces. Crisis management also requires more enhanced logistical capabilities and capacities, particularly air and naval transport, to deploy forces and sustain operations over time. In addition to collective defense and crisis management, NATO intends to meet new threats like cyber attacks, the proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction, and threats to energy security. The political answer to resolve the conflict of priorities is to develop expeditionary forces capable of conducting collective defense, to initiate the development of new capabilities, such as cyber security and missile defense, and to create civilian crisis management capabilities for a comprehensive approach in operations. The reality of falling military budgets in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the relatively high fixed costs due to inflexible staffing and long-term equipment projects such as A400M and Tiger, will again decrease the amount for research and development. More importantly, without effective mechanisms to ensure NATO’s benchmark of spending two percent of GDP on defense and to monitor the progress in capability development, this will probably lead to a widening of the existing European strategic military capability gap, as laid out in the Defense Capabilities Initiative and the Prague Capability

148 This emphasis clearly reflects the Baltic State’s anxieties – strengthened by the Georgia crisis in 2008 – about a potential Russian invasion. It is also unclear whether the member states have achieved a common understanding of what “appropriate level of conventional forces” actually mean.

149 The operational implications of these political decisions will be discussed in the next section.
Commitment. Decreasing national force strengths and temporarily abandoning certain military capabilities are the logical consequence and a reality in France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. This makes unilateral action, mainly for the former two countries, increasingly difficult. The recent bilateral cooperation between France and the United Kingdom and the potential of financial and economic destabilization when acting alone will likely bind the two powers together and limit unilateral action to meet vital threats. In such a case, however, NATO’s Article V is likely to come into force anyway and makes unilateral action for both countries obsolete. Hence, multinational operations of two or more European countries, under the direction of NATO, the EU, or a ‘coalition of the willing’ in either organization will be the norm, rather than the exception.

**Operational Implications**

Any form of multinational operation requires effective translation of political guidance into tactical military action – in other words effective operational art. The widening strategic capability gap in NATO has serious consequences for the military operational level and the conduct of operational art. In crisis management operations, the political desire to ensure a high multinational participation has posed a new challenge for European militaries. This resulted in a deeper integration of multinational military units in NATO and EU operations. During the Cold War, the highest national unit was the corps, which operated under a multinational army command. After the Cold War, NATO decided to conduct collective defense with multinational corps, based on national divisions. In crisis management operations, NATO initially deployed

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Historically, this development goes along with the increasing terrain a military unit occupies and the higher mission a unit assumes. Brown mentions the corps as an example, which in the late twentieth century had the logistical attributes of the World War II Army Group. John S. Brown, “The Maturation of Operational Art,” in *Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art*, by Michael D. Krause and Cody R. Phillips (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2007), 444. The level of multinational integration in operations increased in a similar manner.
national brigades, which the Alliance later restructured into multinational brigades.\footnote{Netherlands Institute of Military History, Dutch Participation in KFOR (November 01, 2009), http://www.defensie.nl/english/nimh/history/international_operations/mission_overview/48178816/kosovo_force_1999_2000_%28kfor%29/dutchcontribution/ (accessed June 03, 2011)} Meanwhile, in view of the NATO Response Force and the EUBG as the engines of military transformation, the level of multinational integration has changed again and remains currently at the battalion and company level. This has significantly decreased military effectiveness.\footnote{Mölling, EU-Battlegroups, 9.} Although some scholars claim that the "dichotomy between expeditionary and territorial defense capabilities has been overstated," one must acknowledge that the development of expeditionary capabilities as a priority for both collective defense and crisis response contingencies and the widening strategic capability gap have serious consequences for the conduct of operational art.\footnote{U.S. military expert David Yost, cited in: McNamara, 4.} This is particularly true in the following three areas: the planning and execution of operations, including the deployment and sustainment of forces at both strategic and theater distance; the development of combined and joint military doctrines, including the planning procedures at higher level; and the multinational training of personnel and tactical units.

**Planning and Execution of Operations**

Effective operational art in future multinational crisis management operations requires the integration of civilian planning capabilities at the operational level, relies heavily on a standing multinational command structure, and depends on agreed concepts to deploy, sustain, and reinforce military forces in a theater of operation. The early integration of civilian planning capabilities for a successful comprehensive approach, particularly in crisis management operations at the lower spectrum of conflict, is an important lesson learned of the EUBG.
concept. The Alliance does not yet have the ability to integrate such means as part of a comprehensive approach, but agrees with the conclusion that success in crisis management operations hinges on the ability to align military and civilian efforts. The development of limited civilian planning capabilities under the head of NATO is just a logical consequence. However, in view of the existing EU civilian (planning) structures and capabilities, this seems to be an unnecessary duplication of effort. In a strategic partnership, EU integrated planning cells at the strategic and operational NATO-HQs could support with civilian expertise for NATO missions.

This requires an adaptation of NATO’s command structure, which could also benefit the planning and execution of operations under the direction of the EU. The experiences of EU missions reveal that the ad hoc nature of the operational level command structure hampers effective operational art significantly and can threaten the accomplishment of strategic goals. Effective planning and execution of military operations require the proper consultation with the strategic level leaders, the continuous monitoring of potential crises as well as the adjustments of existing military campaign plans, and the early designation and notification of subordinate troops. An ad hoc command structure appears inappropriate to achieve this. The NATO-EU cooperation in EUFOR Althea shows that the EU can successfully gain access to NATO’s standing command structure. However, as the EU mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo has shown, Berlin Plus seems inadequate in providing the EU the capability to launch operations “where NATO as a whole is not engaged.” A solution might be the development of standing EU operational planning structures, which would duplicate unnecessarily the NATO command structure to a certain extent. Another approach could be to designate a NATO HQ, augmented with an EU civil-military cell, as a standing operational Headquarters for the EU. However, such an approach would require agreements on the use of satellite communications and on common procedures regarding the

154 Mölling, EU-Battlegroups, 9.
exchange of classified information and intelligence sources, which remain unsolved problems in NATO-EU relations.

Successful planning and execution of military operations also rely on agreed concepts to deploy, sustain, and reinforce military forces in a theater of operation. In crisis management operations, effective operational art hinges on efficient multinational logistics. Although the deployment of forces in multinational operations remains primarily a national responsibility, logistical task sharing to deploy and sustain small contingents over strategic distances becomes increasingly important, particularly in times of scarce financial resources. However, the relatively broad existing NATO standards appear inadequate for effective multinational logistics. To deploy and sustain multinational brigades in a theater of operation, NATO needs to narrow its standards for procedures, systems, and equipment components.\footnote{155 NATO Standardization Agreements for procedures and systems and equipment components: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/stanag.htm. Major and Mölling, 17-19.} This requires an adaptation of existing NATO standardization agreement provisions. Standardization becomes even more important, if operational and strategic reserves shall reinforce already deployed NATO or EU contingents, which require extensive cooperation in air, sea, and land transportation. In this regard, the European Air Transportation Command is certainly a first step in the right direction. However, effective operational planning requires the integration of land, sea, and air transportation for the effective deployment, sustainment, and reinforcement of NATO and/or EU operations – a European Joint Transportation Command.\footnote{156 The European Air Transportation Command coordinates Belgian, Dutch, French, and German air transportation assets. For effective NATO-EU cooperation, a Joint Transportation Command needs to expand cooperation to NATO organizations like NATO’s multinational airlift consortium SALIS (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution) and NAMSA (NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency). Winter, 90. Mölling, EU-Battlegroups, 4. Dickow, 4. Jochen Rehrl, “Mehrheitsentscheidungen, Europäische Armee, Gemeinsame Verteidigung: Entwicklungstendenzen der ESVP,” Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ) (2007): 659.}
Military Doctrines and Training

Effective operational art in operations in the twenty-first century hinges predominantly on commonly trained operational artists, which requires effective multinational military doctrine. Multinational doctrine must integrate civilian planning at the operational level, provide nations a narrower framework for the development of national tactical doctrine, and enable them to conduct crisis management operations and collective defense with the same single set of forces. The integration of civilian planning capabilities at the operational level will require a change in NATO’s Guidelines for Operational Planning and its Operational Planning Process. These procedures provide the framework for international cooperation at the operational level and can provide the basis in which national doctrine can be nested. If multinational expeditionary forces shall assume the tasks of collective defense, an effective multinational combined-joint doctrine and interlocking national doctrines are necessary as tools to speak the same “military language” in operations. With the transformation of NATO’s command structure in 2003, the Alliance has already created the Allied Command Transformation that assumes responsibility for such critical tasks. To implement the vision of the new NATO Strategic Concept 2010, the Allies need to recognize the importance of this institution as a driver for Allied transformation. This indicates what an important role the United States, heading the Allied Command of Transformation, can play for the development of European forces and the European contribution to international security in both NATO and the EU.

Conclusive military doctrine for effective operational art is essential, but irrelevant unless adopted by nations and reinforced by multinational training. Training and certification of tactical units at lower levels of command have revealed significant challenges in interoperability due to different equipment and language. Without mutual training, these challenges materialize in combat, which will hamper effective operational art. The ad hoc nature of the EUBG concept, which plans to form a Battlegroup out of earmarked units while deploying, is, thus, doomed for
failure. This does not mean that Europe needs to establish a European Army, as envisioned by Chancellor Merkel in 2007.\footnote{See: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1560631.ece} However, if the EU political leaders are serious about the deployment of a EUBG, the units must train and certify together, similar to the NATO Response Force.

To make European military equipment more interoperable, a high effort in armament cooperation is necessary. To coordinate such efforts at the strategic level, the EU has successfully introduced EDA as the key facilitator to harmonize, specialize, and pool military forces of EU member states. Multinational armament cooperation can be effective, if proactively framed by participating members. To boost capability development of countries willing to cooperate more actively, the EU has introduced Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defense as a tool to enable member states to overcome political obstacles. However, the lessons learned from managing multinational armament cooperation shows that there is still great room for improvement, particularly when the number of nations participating in a project is high. In view of the implications of the financial crisis, continuously falling military budgets, and decreasing force strengths, effective multinational armament cooperation and the overcoming of the fragmented European defense market appear to be without alternative.

**Conclusion**

The NATO Strategic Concept 2010 is a political compromise based on different threat perceptions within the Alliance and implies serious consequences for multinational operations on the militaries of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Considering the developments in force strengths and military budgets, this compromise seems to widen NATO's existing strategic capability gap. Although France and the United Kingdom seek to maintain the ability for
unilateral action, the realities seem to make multinational operations a norm, rather than an exception. The development of NATO’s expeditionary capabilities as a priority for both collective defense and crisis response contingencies implies multinational cooperation on a low tactical level, which suffers from significant interoperability issues. This decreases the effectiveness of tactical actions and hampers operational planners to achieve strategic goals in multinational operations.

Effective operational art in future multinational crisis management operations under NATO command requires three initiatives. Firstly, NATO needs to adapt its command structure to integrate civilian planning capabilities at the operational level. In a view of the emerging strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, this initiative should make use of existing EU civilian capabilities and planning structures. Secondly, NATO needs to adapt its standardization agreement provisions with the aim to provide much narrower standards for procedures, systems, and equipment components. This should enable the Alliance to conduct multinational logistics more efficiently. Thirdly, NATO needs to adapt its operational doctrine. This aims at integrating civilian planning and providing a much narrower framework for the development of national doctrine to ensure interoperability of military leaders at the tactical level. Both NATO and the EU rely on those three initiatives to apply effective operational art.

For future EU operations, the ad hoc nature for the planning and execution of operations is the biggest obstacle for the effective use of military means. The current Berlin Plus agreements as the framework to access NATO planning capabilities appear insufficient to launch EU operations and the idea to form a Battlegroup out of earmarked units while deploying is doomed for failure. For effective operational art, units must train and certify together, similar to the NATO Response Force. To deploy and sustain military forces in crisis management operations, European countries should enhance their strategic planning for air, sea, and land transportation. The EU also has the necessary strategic institutions and procedures to overcome military interoperability issues in both NATO and the EU. With the EDA and Permanent Structured
Cooperation in Defense, EU countries have the right tools to enhance multinational armament cooperation and to bridge the EU-NATO relationship more effectively.

Effective multinational operations under both NATO and the EU require a true strategic partnership between the two organizations. To date, the main obstacle achieving this remains the Turkey-Greece-Cyprus conflict. The resulting stalemate in NATO-EU relations causes significant problems for the effective and efficient use of military means integrated in a comprehensive approach in crisis management. Success or failure in future crisis management operations will depend significantly on the ability of the leading European powers, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, to cooperate and coordinate their actions within both NATO and the EU.
Appendix A – EU and NATO Member States

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Source: Author, data of April 2011.\(^{158}\)

Appendix B – Civilian and Military Missions under CSDP

Source: Author, data of April 2011.

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