U.S.-Egypt Security Cooperation after Egypt’s January 2011 Revolution

A Monograph
by
Susan S. Vogelsang
U.S. Department of State

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**5. AUTHOR(S)**
Susan S. Vogelsang, U.S. Department of State

**7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)
250 Gibbon Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134

**9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**
Command and General Staff College
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350

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Could the leadership changes resulting from Egypt’s January 2011 Revolution uproot thirty years of security cooperation between the United States and Egypt? This monograph examines how the security cooperation, rooted in the Camp David Accords, supports both the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and other key strategic interests of the United States and Egypt. The United States gains strategic access to the Middle East region through the security cooperation, and Egypt's military protects its economic power. The monograph investigates whether new political parties and leaders, including the Muslim Brotherhood, plan to maintain or cancel the Peace Treaty. In the short-term, U.S.-Egypt security cooperation will continue as Egypt's new leaders plan to adhere to the Peace Treaty, despite the cold peace with Israel.

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**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**
Thomas C. Graves
COL, U.S. Army

**19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER** (include area code)
913-758-3302
Title of Monograph: U.S.-Egypt Security Cooperation after Egypt’s January 2011 Revolution

Approved by:

______________________________  Monograph Director
Scott Gorman, Ph.D.

______________________________  Director,
Thomas C. Graves, COL, IN  School of Advanced Military Studies

______________________________  Director,
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.  Graduate Degree Programs

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Section One: Introduction

Egypt is the most important country.
— Napoleon, *The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century*

The January 2011 revolution that toppled the Mubarak regime is changing the leadership of the Egyptian Government, but is it changing U.S.-Egypt security cooperation? The hypothesis of this monograph is that politics on both the Egyptian and U.S. sides will cause security cooperation to change at the margins, but that only if Egypt abrogates the Camp David Accords can the Revolution damage the deep roots of security cooperation between the two countries.

The decades long U.S.-Egypt security cooperation satisfies political and strategic interests on both sides. Egypt is important to the United States as a gateway country to the Middle East. This moderate Islamic partner is critical to the United States policy that encourages moderates and isolates radicals to counter Islamic terrorism. For Egypt, the security cooperation modernizes military infrastructure, freeing its budget from expenditures for weapons and equipment. Security cooperation supports the military’s special position in Egypt. The military has a firm hold on the economy and wields considerable political power. The military remains a stabilizing force in Egypt, which supports both U.S. and centrist Egyptian interests.

Israel and Egypt are the two largest recipients of U.S. security assistance, the promised reward for making peace after their war in 1973. In 1979, following the Accords, Egypt received a letter from Defense Secretary Harold Brown offering substantial security assistance. The United States used security cooperation as a carrot to induce an Egypt looking for U.S. assistance

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2 Jeremy Sharp, *Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations*, (Congressional Research Service, 2011) 6. Quoting from Sharp, “In his letter to Egypt, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown wrote that ‘the United States is prepared to enter into an expanded security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of military equipment and services and the financing of, at least a portion of those sales.’ Ultimately,
to step out alone from its anti-Israel Middle Eastern neighbors to sign the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty resulting from the Camp David Accords.³

Egypt saw the U.S. relationship as a means of funding military reconstruction in the wake of the 1973 war with Israel. U.S. aid would also prop up Egypt’s socialist economy. William Quandt, a respected expert on Egypt, wrote that during the final negotiations for Camp David, Egyptian President Sadat asked President Carter for a Marshall Plan organized from the United States.⁴ While Egypt did not get a Marshall Plan, Quandt explains that the President and the U.S. Congress understood that security assistance was the “price” of Egypt’s continued support for peace with Israel.⁵ The U.S. military benefits from important preferred access to the Suez Canal, as well as from landing and overflight rights in Egypt. Access provided by Egypt has proven crucial to supplying forces in Iraq. For the United States losing that relationship and access “would be a strategic disaster,” says James Phillips, senior Middle East researcher at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, “not only because it would damage our capability to mobilize naval and other forces to help contain Iran, but also because it would weaken our whole defense strategy and network in the Middle East.”⁶

The United States has also built a military-to-military relationship which allowed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Admiral Mullen, to contact his counterpart in Egypt the United States provided a total of $7.3 billion to both parties in 1979. The Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-35) provided both military and economic grants to Israel and Egypt at a ratio of 3 to 2, respectively, though this ratio was not enshrined in the treaty as Egypt would later claim.

³ David W. Lesch, 1979: The Year That Shaped the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), Appendix B, 136-139. The Egypt-Israel Treaty states positively that the parties are at peace and further affirms about the parties: “They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.’


⁵Ibid., 144.

during the January Revolution. The JCS maintained communication during that critical period, gauging events from the Egyptian military perspective. Security cooperation builds relationships not only at Admiral Mullen’s level, but also throughout lower levels of the military. Arranging weapons delivery, setting up exercises, and organizing training tasks engages officers from both sides.

Critics say that the United States has not attained its stated objective for security cooperation, which is ensuring interoperability with U.S. forces and building a force able to serve as a counterterrorism and border control force in the region. Whether the security cooperation has done its job through creating access and developing an extraordinary military-to-military relationship or whether the relationship should have led to a leaner meaner Egyptian military remains a matter of debate. The current Acting Chief of Security Cooperation at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the command responsible for Egypt’s region, emphasizes the criticality, reliability, and durability of the military-to-military relationship between the United States and Egypt. Although U.S. and Egyptian official publications tout achievements in interoperability, achieving access and maintaining a working dialogue on larger issues may carry more weight than shaping the force and achieving interoperability. Egypt has not seized upon its opportunity to fully retire obsolete Soviet-supplied armaments and equipment because it needs jobs. Keeping old equipment means keeping the labor to manage it, so the Egyptian military can fulfill one of its domestic roles, as an employer in a jobs-starved economy.

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For Egypt, U.S. security assistance helps to protect the military’s overarching industrial and economic role in the domestic economy. Under Mubarak, the military became a dominant economic force, which manages industries ranging from weapons production to housing to agriculture. The military’s ability to generate production and wealth protects the lifetime jobs and prosperity of its upper ranks. Through its enterprises, the military touches many aspects of life in Egypt. While the apparent role of security assistance is political and military-strategic, the actual role in Egypt is also economic. U.S. security assistance has multi-faceted effects.

The security assistance in place today has weathered forty years of hard blows to peace in the region. Among these are Israeli incursions into Lebanon, the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and the “cold peace” between Israel and Egypt, as well as Egypt’s exile by its Arab neighbors after Camp David and the region’s opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. For Egypt, U.S. security assistance allowed the military to acquire elite combat systems of weapons, planes and transport vehicles to supplant Soviet equipment. U.S. assistance has allowed Egypt to regain some military preeminence as a regional leader, its historic role in the Middle East.

New parties and candidates who proclaim a shift in foreign policy to an “Arab-first” approach will distance Egypt from the United States, but only violation of the Camp David Accord’s Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty could abruptly end security cooperation. Egyptian hostilities with Israel would push Congress to cut off security assistance to Egypt. Less radically, at the margins, billion dollar annual security assistance can shrink if Congress decides that post-January Revolution Egypt needs less military and more economic assistance or if U.S. budget concerns dictate a reduction in aid across-the-board.

If the Peace Treaty holds, the U.S.-Egypt relationship will evolve, but its core will remain for the immediate term of four to five years. The security cooperation serves political and military-strategic goals for both countries, as well as protecting economic objectives of the Egyptian military. Security cooperation and security assistance incentivize peace and provide
access for the U.S. military to the Middle East. For Egypt, the security cooperation modernizes the military and frees its leaders from spending on equipment and weapons, so that they can manage and pay for an industrial operation reaching throughout Egypt’s domestic economy. This monograph explains the interests served by U.S.-Egypt security cooperation and presents influences that affect the relationship at the time of writing, in August 2011. The chapters provide the “deep roots”--strategic interests of both parties--and explain how these roots are too deep to be pulled unless there is a dramatic shift like Egyptian retaliation for an Israeli attack on Gaza. In a ratio of about 3:2 of security assistance to Israel, the United States provides about $1.3 billion annually in security assistance to Egypt as it has for the past thirty years.¹⁰

To date, neither U.S. budget constraints nor the January Revolution has altered this assistance as President Obama has added $2 billion in debt forgiveness for Egypt to the traditional $1.3 package making its way through the budget process for FY2012. The support is steadfast though the changing political scene in Egypt already affects the security relationship. The U.S. Government has postponed ‘Bright Star’, CENTCOM’s largest military exercise, a joint U.S.-Egypt exercise with participating nations from both Europe and the Middle East. The Egyptian Government’s new leaders, while largely affirming the Camp David Accords, include new actors with less well-known political agendas. New political parties including the Muslim Brotherhood, now aligned with the liberal Waf’d Party, will win election to Parliament, and a new President will be elected to power. New voices in Government will join with or replace the current military leadership. Already, the Egyptian Government welcomed Palestinian representatives of Hamas and Fatah to Cairo to negotiate a unified Palestine, a harbinger of

change. In May, 2011, the Egyptian Government opened borders between Egypt’s Sinai and Gaza, although they quickly shut them again.

The Egyptian Government formed in 2011 and 2012 will shape the future of the U.S.-Egypt security relationship. Three decades of security cooperation, peace and strategic access based on canal and landing rights, close military-to-military relationships and U.S. contributions in military sales, training and exercises, among other areas, will continue or change, based on whether Egypt’s new leaders perceive their national security requirements as aligned with the Peace Treaty and in turn, how the U.S. perceives its interests in the Middle East. Understanding the views of these emerging leaders and the actions the United States is taking in response to their new directions informs realistic conclusions about the future prospects for the security ties.

This Introduction—Section One sets the stage for the monograph and gives the methodology. Sections Two and Three cover the purposes of U.S. security cooperation generally, especially security assistance, and the specific means of security cooperation in Egypt, with the interests served on both sides; new and continuing leadership perspectives on the benefits and challenges of U.S. security cooperation. Section Four, the Conclusion, integrates U.S. and Egyptian views and the new parameters of the security relationship.

Specifically, Section Two defines security cooperation and security assistance, drawing upon the extensive literature on the history and purposes of security cooperation. Section Two also covers the implementation and operational objectives of U.S.-Egypt security cooperation in Egypt. The U.S. strategic goals may have expanded since 9/11, but the importance of the Camp David Accords as the foundation of the security relationship has not changed across U.S. Presidential administrations. Similarly, Egyptian objectives may have deepened but appear to have been well served across time.

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In presenting security cooperation, Section Two quantifies U.S. support to the Egyptian military and explains the means of U.S. cooperation—weapons sales, financing and joint manufacturing arrangements, military training and exercises. These tangible operational inputs, weapons trade and education, are the tools of security used to pursue goals of modernization and interoperability. These tools provide for the exercise of operational art in building military-to-military ties. Quantifying U.S. support in this Section provides a baseline understanding of the strength and nature of the assistance to Egypt over the past three decades.

In light of the strategic interests and issues, Section Three of the paper looks at the emerging Egyptian leaders and their stated or reported posture towards security cooperation with the U.S. Comments by a cross-section of leaders from Egyptian society and politics, including spokespersons for the political parties appear along with the views of the Presidential candidates, leavened by comment from Middle East analysts. This Section will discuss the role of the military—Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), as well as the doctrine of the long-standing Waf’d Party, now aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood and new political parties and the Revolutionary Youth Council. Salaf’ism, the expressed radical arm of Islam, is included. Leading Presidential candidates appear within their political and social group.

The Conclusion, Section Four, relates the views of Egyptian and U.S. political leaders to the objectives of security cooperation in order to look ahead to possible directions for the security relationship. The January 2011 Revolution planted seeds of change that may alter the nature and level of security cooperation. If the military control remains in place, the seeds of change will not affect the security relationship. Then the bedrock cooperation will stay in place for the immediate term. If the U.S-Egypt security relationship weathers this revolutionary change in Egyptian leadership, it provides lessons regarding the stability of international relationships in the face of dramatic internal political upheaval. Even Muslim Brotherhood engagement in government could emerge and still leave the military in place. If the military dominates the President’s circle or the
economy, or both, what appeared as a major change on the outside, was really just surface turbulence that left the deep political structure in place.

Changes in Egyptian foreign policy are necessary but not sufficient to uproot the cooperation. That would require hostilities between Egypt and Israel. The U.S. Congress will respond to any Egyptian threat to the stability of the Egypt-Israel Treaty and the military will not be able to plead its strategic benefits to counter that response. To date, shifting U.S. priorities and budget constraints have not reduced the President’s request to Congress for military aid to Egypt in FY 2012, which remains at its historical level of $1.3 billion. Congressional Research Service notes, however, that in the Middle East, “lawmakers and Administration officials are likely to focus in the coming months on how country-specific circumstances will affect aid policy and allocations.”

Methodology: Events in History

The methodology for this monograph allows for a “mode of narration” called “mentalite” which details a particular event or short period . . . based on the accounts of eyewitnesses and participant observers. As historian David Lesch notes, “Historiographically, events have again been identified as significant and influential elements of history.” In 1979, his book about the pivotal year in the Middle East including the Camp David Accords, Lesch quotes Zevid Maoz on national change by saying that particular events have wider significance: “National change, especially that which is revolutionary or transformational, begets regional change, which frequently begets systemic change, particularly when it involves geostrategic or political

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13Lesch, 25.
14Ibid., 23.
matters.”\textsuperscript{15} Single historical events have the power to alter strategic military and political relationships. Maoz explains that a single event has not only national but international implications and therefore, single events in recent history are valid subjects for research.

While the January revolution is a single event in time, it represents the outcome of international and national domestic systems of interests and influences. Looking at the changing interest groups in Egypt through a complex systems lens also helps in assessing which direction the system might move. Each political group is a system spinning within a wider set of spinning systems, like a set of turning plates balancing on sticks. The boundaries of the plates tilt, shift, and rebalance constantly like the alliances among Egyptian political organizations. A complex systems metaphor suits the dynamism of the changing political interest groups discussed in Section Three and allows the onlooker to see how they interact with each other. Such interactions affect the place where each interest group locates its position on the continuum of foreign policy and security cooperation.\textsuperscript{16} Rotating spheres of influence also serves as a metaphor for the political systems interacting between the United States and Egypt, and the regional and international systems touched on here.

U.S. experts on security cooperation at CENTCOM and individuals interviewed for attribution resident in Washington, D.C. and at the Naval Postgraduate School appear in the Bibliography. Section Two pulls from the considerable literature on the history and uses of security cooperation and assistance. It relies upon U.S. Government data regarding the valuation of U.S. military sales and training provided to Egypt. Section Three on the new Egyptian leadership reflects a reliance on contemporary sources--interviews, internet and news reports--


\textsuperscript{16}Complex systems approaches are taught as part of SAMS Army Design Methodology, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.
since accounts of the roles and ambitions of these emergent political figures are only now being written. The conclusion rests on the prior three sections.

**Section Two: Security Cooperation**

This Section defines and describes the purposes and origin of security cooperation and security assistance, explains its value for the United States and Egypt, sets out the ways and means of the assistance to the Mubarak regime and quantifies it. Understanding what the United States and Egypt each contribute to the relationship and what each receives in return provides a backdrop to assessments of how each country may rebalance the security relationship.

**Origins and Definitions for Security Cooperation**

Security cooperation covers transfers of military resources between nations and a range of noncombat activities. Security cooperation is first, a foreign policy instrument to satisfy foreign policy objectives, sometimes different objectives, for both countries involved. For the United States, security cooperation provides a means of spurring military transformation with key allies, strengthening partner countries to provide for their own defense, and encouraging improved interoperability with the U.S. military in order that partner militaries may operate in coalition.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the State Department use complementary definitions of security cooperation. The DoD defines Security Cooperation (SC) as those activities conducted with allies and friendly nations to:

> Build relationships that promote specified U.S. interest

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17 Security assistance refers to both police assistance and military assistance; this paper deals with military assistance. Security assistance also includes advisory services by U.S. experts to encompass force development, training in the use of equipment and even the development of military strategy. Advisory contracts through U.S. contractors outside of FMS did not show up in the literature for this monograph, but could be a topic for further study.
Build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations
Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.18

The U.S. DoD distinguishes between security cooperation, a mutual exchange, and specific security assistance under which the United States provides security resources to another military on a concessionary basis. Security assistance is the arrangement by which one country receives updated equipment and training from another. Through its Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the United States defines security assistance:

Security Assistance (SA) encompasses a group of programs, authorized by law, through which the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) or commercial contractors provide defense articles and services in support of national policies and objectives.

Security assistance also supports the development of niche capabilities to complement U.S. forces and improve operations tempo for the U.S. military.19 It may also serve to cement partnerships and offset the cleavages created by policy disagreements in other areas. Security assistance is one mode of security cooperation often, but not always, involving the granting of aid. While security cooperation is a noncombat function of the military, security cooperation enhances the warfighting capabilities of both nations by strengthening their infrastructures.

U.S. Government security cooperation is part of military doctrine and has military objectives, but also derives from foreign policy processes. Even though security cooperation began as a Cold War policy tool, it has evolved to address current day concerns. The formal process of authorizing and implementing security cooperation sheds light on the programs, procedures, and future of decision-making for Egypt specifically.

Security assistance began with the Cold War in 1947 to buttress a defeated Europe against the aims of Soviet expansionism. In *Guns & Butter: The Political Economy of International Security*, Hook and Rothstein’s article on rationales for security assistance explains,

Then, as now, one of the purposes of security assistance was to enable partners and allies to defend themselves but the number of recipients has dramatically shrunk in the post-Cold War period. As programs have evolved and each successive administration has pursued its particular foreign policy, over time security assistance has lost much of its original coherent packaging. It has been at the forefront of U.S. international affairs and then pushed aside, only to emerge again as a significant instrument of U.S. security strategy.20

Congress passed the authorizing legislation in 1949, to support NATO members of the time and Greece and Turkey, “as well as Iran, Korea the Philippines and Taiwan. This same act provided the legal basis for the grant military assistance and foreign military sales programs.”21

Hook and Rothstein also point out that security assistance benefits both sides, through “mutual dependency” that generates “relationships between sources and recipients of arms.” Their article illustrates the benefit to assistance providers by showing that source countries project military power, stimulate economic production, support their own future arms production capability, and obtain basing rights and diplomatic cooperation and often open markets for their own goods and services. “Each of these provides some element of leverage to potential recipients of arms transfers, suggesting a relationship of mutual, rather than unitary dependence.”22 In addition, both countries gain information about the state of military planning and equipment of the other from the exchange. The United States benefits also from information about the region and regional militaries through these relationships.

20Ibid, 2.


22Dombrowski, 166.
Since security cooperation with Egypt builds relationships and strengthens friendly nation capabilities for defense, while providing the United States with military access to the Middle East, security cooperation with Egypt demonstrates mutual dependence and meets the DoD definition. At the strategic level, U.S.-Egypt security cooperation serves as a cornerstone supporting Egypt’s adherence to the Treaty, maintaining peace with Israel and strengthening regional stability. Security cooperation has built the U.S.-Egypt relationship particularly with the military, brought Egyptian participation as a member of the Gulf War coalition in Desert Storm and provided U.S. forces with important regional access by air and sea. Accelerated, safe access to the Suez Canal facilitates U.S. naval access to the Mediterranean, as well as access to exercises in the Indian Ocean. Naval transit of Suez, as well as air landing and overflight rights provided critical access for both the Iraq and Afghan wars.\textsuperscript{23} Further, the United States has gained a military presence and influence in the Middle Eastern country that places itself at the forefront of the Islamic world, through its universities, culture and history. If the United States cancels security assistance to Egypt’s military, others are willing to step in as weapons suppliers, as the Soviet Union did prior to 1974, or as advisors. China’s Minister of Defense visited Egypt’s military commander in 2010. The evidence is that security assistance to Egypt brings many of the benefits for which the process was designed. However, it is an imperfect relationship. The United States does not have basing rights in Egypt. U.S. leaders discussed their interest in basing rights at the airbase of Ras Banas with President Sadat, but these were never enacted.\textsuperscript{24}

For the U.S. Department of State, explicit objectives behind security assistance include “promoting coalition efforts in regional conflicts and the global war on terrorism; improving capabilities of friendly foreign militaries to assist in international crisis response operations;

\textsuperscript{23}Wood.
\textsuperscript{24}Quandt, 144.
contributing to the professionalism of military forces; enhancing rationalization, standardization, and interoperability of friendly foreign military forces; maintaining support for democratically elected governments; and supporting the U.S. industrial base by promoting the export of U.S. defense-related goods and services.” The relationship is again not perfect, allowing for disagreement on a wide range of issues. Approximately eighty percent of Egypt’s votes in the United Nations oppose the U.S. position.

The State Department position is that security assistance to Egypt contributes to the objective of achieving a stable Middle East. The major strategic objective, peace between Egypt and Israel, remains in place. The Mubarak regime moved away from democratic reforms by choking off free parliamentary elections in November, 2010, thwarting State’s objective of supporting democratically-elected governments. However, Egypt’s participation in security assistance programming supported other U.S. purposes. For a 2006 Government Accounting Office (GAO) assessment of security cooperation and assistance, Egyptian and U.S. officials cited several examples: “1) Egypt deployed about 800 military personnel to the Darfur region of the Sudan in 2004; 2) Egypt trained 250 Iraqi police and 25 Iraqi diplomats in 2004; 3) Egypt deployed a military hospital and medical staff to Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, where nearly 100,000 patients received treatment; 4) Egypt provided over-flight permission to 36,553 U.S. military aircraft through Egyptian airspace from 2001 to 2005; and 5) Egypt

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27 U.S. Government Accounting Office. GAO also states, “Broader security cooperation and assistance goals found in DOD’s regional Theater Security Cooperation Plan also apply to Egypt’s FMF program, which we found to be consistent with State’s goals for the program. Egyptian and U.S. officials cited several examples of Egypt’s support for U.S. goals.”
granted expedited transit of 861 U.S. naval ships through the Suez Canal during the same period and provided all security support for those ship transits.”

In addition to these benefits, like many foreign policy tools, security cooperation carries risks. The risks of security cooperation include accelerated weapons proliferation, heightened regional instability linked with dependency relationships and opportunity costs. These risks result when private businesses outside the cooperating countries pick up the technology, when dependency relationships with military suppliers skew diplomatic relations with recipient states, and when recipient regimes collapse leaving arsenals intact. These concerns affect the U.S.-Egypt relationship. The Mubarak regime dealt with its dependence on U.S. security cooperation by constantly reiterating its support for Palestine while supporting Israel’s best ally, the United States. Egypt’s established military cooperation has arguably limited Egypt’s opportunity to liberalize an economy where key sectors are under military control. Notwithstanding the challenges of Egyptian dependency, Admiral Mullen credits steady security cooperation as a contributing factor in moderating the military response to the protesters in Tahrir Square in the January Revolution.

Decisionmakers and Mechanisms for Security Cooperation

U.S. security cooperation originates in the executive branch and is funded by the Congress, State, and DoD make the case for security assistance exports and funding to the U.S. Congress.

Through its appropriations powers, Congress can shape the direction, volume and terms of U.S. security assistance. The Foreign Operations bill and the Foreign Operations

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28 Ibid., 16.
29 Dombrowski, 166.
30 Ibid.
31 Pessin.
Appropriations Act, give legislators their “most visible and important mechanism for affecting foreign policy.”

Support for Israel in Congress is widespread, reflecting a major U.S. constituency. U.S. security cooperation with Egypt reflects the power of this constituency. In the early years after Camp David, Egyptians complained that rather than the direct bilateral relationship with the U.S. that they sought, Egypt got a triangular relationship, whereby Israel and its Congressional allies serve as the filter for U.S. security assistance to Egypt.

While Congress funds security cooperation, security cooperation programs originate in the Executive Branch.

As in other foreign policy areas, the president has a variety of advantages in governing arms exports: direct ties to foreign governments, an ability to set the agenda, and a presumed disposition to be “above politics” and speak for the national interest rather than parochial concerns.

Under the President, three Cabinet-level Departments, State, Defense and Commerce, govern arms export policy to ensure its strategic use. The State Department’s gatekeeper functions include negotiating Foreign Military Financing (FMF) packages with foreign governments and examining export-license applications. State’s annual human rights reviews of other countries factor into U.S. determinations of their fitness for arms sales or concessional transfer. Defense manages weapons production contracts and conducts a wide range of training programs on transferred weapons. Under the executive branch, the Department of Defense

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32 Ibid. In addition, Dombrowski’s book, cited earlier, notes the role of interest groups, such as the Israel lobby in the U.S., as well as the impact of arms deals such as Iran-Contra on perceptions of security assistance.

33 Aaron Wildavsky, quoted in Dombrowski, 164.

34 Commerce promotes arms exports through its officers at U.S. Embassies and at international trade shows. Dombrowski, cited above, notes tensions between the three Cabinet-level agencies on security assistance programs and the pace of export license reviews.

35 Dombrowski, 168-169.
expands on the wide-ranging functions carried out under the U.S. definition of security cooperation in its Joint doctrine on Operations (Joint Publication 5.0):

As noted in doctrine, there are six categories of security cooperation activity: military contacts, including senior official visits, counterpart visits, conferences, staff talks, and personnel and unit exchange programs; nation assistance, including foreign internal defense, security assistance programs, and planned humanitarian and civic assistance activities; multinational training; multinational exercises, multinational education; and arms control and treaty monitoring activities.36

DoD’s definition demonstrates the broader role that security cooperation plays in developing military-to-military relationships through visits, training, conferences, exercises and assistance among other activities.

U.S. security assistance to Egypt flows down from the U.S. Department of State, to the Department of Defense to be administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). DSCA in turn implements its programs by working with the DoD’s geographic combatant commands (COCOMs). “DSCA is the central agency that synchronizes global security cooperation programs, funding and efforts across OSD, Joint Staff, State Department, COCOMS, the services, and U.S. industry.”37 The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which is militarily responsible for the countries of the Near East, including Egypt, plays a key role in implementing country plans for security assistance through its offices within the U.S. Embassy.38 Central Command operates the Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.

37Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Also within the broad purview of security cooperation are the military’s humanitarian assistance activities, disaster relief, mine action, combined exercises, and military counternarcotics programs.
38Globalsecurity.org, “Military: Exercise Central Command,” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/ex.htm (accessed 7 June 2011). U.S. Central Command normally deploys about 20,000 personnel in the Gulf region, including about 10,000 Navy sailors and Marines, 6,000 Air Force airmen, and 4,000 Army soldiers. The actual number can fluctuate substantially, with temporary rotation of forces participating in various exercises. In contrast to exercise activities in other theaters, many CENTCOM exercises receive limited or no publicity, reflecting the political sensitivity of the US military presence in the region.
OMC articulates their COCOM country-level plans. The Embassy works with OMC representatives in-country to integrate COCOM with State plans, specifically, the State Department Mission Strategic Resource Plan (MSRP), setting the objectives for the U.S. Mission in Cairo as a whole for the following year. MSRPAs reflect foreign policy, development, and security objectives.

USCENTCOM engagement activities include current operations, as well as combined exercises, security assistance, combined training, combined education, military contacts, humanitarian assistance, and other activities. This level of activity mandates maintaining access to facilities and building strong relationships with regional leaders.\(^\text{39}\) U.S. Department of State’s goals generally align with broader security cooperation and assistance goals found in DOD’s regional combatant command (COCOM) Theater Security Cooperation Plan.\(^\text{40}\) The State Department funds training and arranges foreign military financing through its operating budget to fulfill strategic objectives.\(^\text{41}\)

Together State and Defense have a rich menu of programs available to carry out security assistance. These include Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and IMET, the International Military Education and Training Program as well as funding military advising to foreign governments on internal defense. FMS is supposed to provide defensive weapons. FMS is distinguished from FMF because FMF carries with it advantageous financing terms, in the form of grants and loans. FMS are sales, involving host nation funds, or donor funds, leases, or FMF.

\(^\text{39}\)Ibid.  
\(^\text{40}\)U.S. General Accounting Office.  
\(^\text{41}\)Ibid.
IMET programs provide funding for grants for friendly militaries to send qualified officers to U.S. service schools. Many service schools, including the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth as well as the National Defense University, host international military students. While frequently, these service members return to leadership roles in their home countries, U.S. training can also isolate military candidates who are reintegrating in a force whose promotion policies discriminate against Western education.

Egypt receives the full gamut of U.S. security assistance: FMF, FMS and IMET support. In addition to these types of assistance, the U.S. engages its security partners, including Egypt, in military exercises. Military exercises project U.S. military power. “Combined exercises” involve foreign troops.

CJCS Exercise program supports all DOD corporate goals but most particularly “shape the international environment and respond to the full spectrum of crises by providing appropriately sized, positioned, and mobile forces.” The CJCS exercise program, a key component of the Joint Training System (JTS), is the Chairman’s principal vehicle for achieving joint and multinational training.\(^42\)

Proposed levels of U.S. security assistance including participation in combined exercises, IMET, FMS and FMF for FY2012 totals $14 billion.\(^43\)

**U.S. Strategic Interests: Purchasing Peace and Access**

With joint exercises and IMET added to FMF support, U.S. security assistance to Egypt is extraordinary in its magnitude of over $1.4 billion each year, its duration over three decades and its breadth of coverage, from equipment financing to professional training to joint exercises

\(^42\)Globalsecurity.org.

with all services. In return for providing such support, the U.S. receives critically important strategic assistance in the Middle East. The keystone of the relationship is the Egypt-Israel Treaty emanating from the Camp David Accords. Any efforts, such as putting the Treaty to an up-or-down public referendum in Egypt, that might jeopardize the sanctity of the treaty, threaten the security cooperation. Many Egyptian parties have publicly reiterated their support for the Egypt-Israel Treaty. Three leading Presidential contenders in Egypt, Moussa, ElBaradei and El-Fotouh, have also indicated that they will support the Peace Treaty with Israel.

At the same time, since the January 2011 toppling of the Mubarak regime, the new military-led Government has taken or permitted steps to broaden Egypt’s role within the Middle East region. Steps away from the U.S. include sponsoring a meeting in Cairo between the Gaza’s Hamas Party and the West Bank’s Fatah Party; allowing an Iranian vessel to pass through the Suez Canal; discussing the exchange of ambassadors with Tehran and opening the border between Gaza and Sinai, only to close it again. The steps are all outside of the political boundaries established by the Mubarak regime to keep Egypt within a frame that did not counter major U.S. priorities. The United States would like to see a pro-active Egypt oppose Hamas including a closed border with Gaza. However, Egypt will be able to move closer to align itself with broad Arab support to both West Bank and Gaza without jeopardizing its security cooperation with the United States as long as the Treaty holds. Ongoing support for Egypt from the Obama Administration appears to indicate a willingness to see Egypt adjust its role in the region by demonstrating greater foreign policy independence from the United States and reflecting a more fully Arab policy alignment. Perhaps this is because while security cooperation helps maintain peace between Israel and Egypt, it has an even broader strategic value for the U.S. military.

The first benefit is regional access. Mark A. Gunzinger, a former Pentagon and White House strategic planner and Air Force command pilot, said, “Losing access to Egypt, for military
planners, would be part of a larger problem. We have operated in the past with a great deal of freedom of maneuver in the air, at sea, . . . . We always knew we could deploy the fighters, the carriers can get in close, there’s no significant threat to bases, and our supply lines would be fairly secure.” He further commented that the United States does not have an alternative if access to and through Egypt disappears. Facilitated U.S. passage through the Suez Canal, air rights and equipment contracts for U.S. producers are all important features of the U.S.-Egypt relationship.

Strong military-to-military ties among leaders on both sides have served to smooth out the bumps in the political relationship. Experts in security cooperation concur that the durable U.S.-Egypt security relationship will weather most political storms. U.S.-Egypt security cooperation satisfies strategic military and political interests for the United States but for Egypt, the ties are not only political and military strategic ties, but also economic ones.

**Egyptian Strategic Interests: Acquiring Guns and Butter**

Egypt’s political leaders, Sadat and Mubarak, have accepted security cooperation readily, because its leadership is rooted in its military. Unlike other potential security partners, Egypt has not historically feared a coup from a military strengthened by outside support because the military is already in control. Even after the toppling of President Mubarak, the population acceded to and arguably supported open military rule.

To assess the possible changes in the political climate that affect security cooperation, two key issues appear central to the military, now the Egyptian Government. These are the Egypt-

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44Wood.


46Reveron, 148-149.
Israel Peace Treaty and the contribution of security assistance to the military’s economic control and stability in domestic affairs. The Treaty above all other issues, has the potential to end U.S. security assistance. Economic control is the structure on which the military’s power sits.

Security cooperation reinforces the peace with Israel, which allows Egypt to focus on its major domestic challenges. Evidence that conflict with Israel could serve even the most cynical ruling block in Egypt is hard to identify. The “cold peace” that prevails between Israel and Egypt allows Egypt to continue its support for the Palestinians without the threat of Israeli invasion into the Sinai to counter that support.

U.S. security cooperation allows Egypt to acquire the modern weaponry and equipment in support of efforts to regain the country’s historic dignity as a leader in the Arab world, not only as a center of Islamic learning, but as a political force after the temporary exile Egypt suffered in the region for signing the Camp David Accords. Regaining the mantle of a modern military also helps Egypt to maintain a respectable military pace with Gulf neighbors such as Saudi Arabia.

Whether Egypt’s military is matching the infrastructure modernization with an updated doctrine and strategy is debatable. Some experts believe the Egyptian military continues to focus strategically only on traditional preparations for land war with Israel. Commentators note growing concern about the diversion of Nile water and the potential pressures from a new southern Sudan regime on Egypt’s southern border but indicate that the military is not assessing these challenges.47 Egypt has other strategic concerns, such as Iran’s role and Red Sea piracy, that require attention.48 U.S. security cooperation appears not to press or educate Egyptian leaders regarding these issues.


By shouldering the cost of hardware and training, security cooperation shields the Government budget from paying for modernization. The military budget is then free to support salaries and pursue its unusual domestic role in the economy, including supporting the draft. Conscript life in Egypt means providing labor for the military’s many economic ventures, but may still improve the draftees standard of living. Gotowicki explains the military’s domestic role in socializing and supporting young conscripts:

Egyptian military service is an important socialization agent in Egyptian society. In the military, a new recruit with a traditional background, is placed in an egalitarian environment which provides the soldier with the prospect of social mobility through a system of promotion based on merit rather than class/kinship factors. The conscript is also exposed to a work ethic based upon operational goals and objectives. Military life provides the conscript a relatively satisfactory life from a material point of view. The conscript receives a monthly salary, adequate food, medical care, uniforms and living accommodations. . . . Military service provides a soldier with a sense of citizenship, responsibility, and nationalism--all especially important in the Middle East where the credibility and legitimacy of a central government usually diminishes rapidly as distance increases from its capital.49

The Army is an important mechanism for political integration, inculcating in urban and rural conscripts alike a shared national identity and a loyalty to a secular institution.

The role of the military in socializing young men is reflected in the society’s acceptance of the military’s role in the uprising and subsequent takeover of the Egyptian Government. Many Egyptian families have sons or relatives who served in the military. Egyptians have ongoing ties to the military through the number of young men who serve as well as through the military role in the labor force.

Security cooperation allows the military to devote itself to its economic organizations and protect the wealth of the officer class. The military’s role in the economy began when President Sadat launched the socialist economy by using the military to construct civilian infrastructure in the 1950’s. His successor, President Mubarak, used economic rewards to incentivize political

loyalty among the military leaders. Military leaders have created their own housing complexes, such as Nasr City, which offer preferential mortgage rates. Some housing complexes boast schools as well as subsidized groceries and clothing store ‘cooperatives.’ Military officers have holiday villages for their families as well as separate hospitals from civilians. They retire into jobs in the military-industrial complex.50

In addition to organizing for construction of power lines, sewers, roads, schools and telephone exchanges, military-owned industries play a large role in the production of consumer goods and in agricultural production. Gotowicki states in 1997 that, “Military facilities now manufacture a wide variety of products such as washing machines, heaters, clothing, doors, stationary, pharmaceuticals, and microscopes. Most of these products are sold to military personnel through discount military stores, but a significant percentage also reach commercial markets. Profits from these activities are, like military export earnings, off budget.”51

Military-led agricultural production extends to “a broad network of dairy farms, milk processing facilities, cattle feed lots, poultry farms, and fish farms. The military produced eighteen percent of the nation's total food production and sixty percent of the army's required consumables (food, uniforms, footwear, etc.) in 1985.”52 Civilian contractors may gain from participating in military construction, further extending the role of the military into the Egyptian economy and society. In 1975, the military founded the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), intended as a regional partnership to produce and export arms.53 While regional partners have dropped out, the AOI website describes an active international service business.54

50Steavenson, 22: 41.
51Gotowicki.
52Ibid.
54The Arab Organization for Industrialization website can be found at: http://www.aoi.com.eg/aoieng/.
Even though the percentage of the GDP devoted to the military in Egypt decreased over the past twenty years to about 2.3 percent, the military benefits from off-budget profits on a wide range of economic activities. The Egyptian military budget is secret. However, if the total military budget is extrapolated from estimates of GDP, the military budget is in the mid-single digits, perhaps $5 billion, and the U.S. contribution is important, perhaps one-third of the total.\textsuperscript{55} An end to the security assistance, while not a death knell for military economic control, would force a rebalancing of effort away from domestic and export production to weapons and equipment modernization, or, an acquiescence in a slow decline and loss of military effectiveness.

**Security Cooperation and Assistance Provided under Mubarak**

U.S.-Egypt security cooperation is rooted in the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Egypt’s President Anwar al-Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed the historic agreement brokered by U.S. President Carter. The Peace Treaty and the anger it generated among large segments of the Egyptian populace and the Arab world, may have been a factor that led an Army soldier and Islamic jihadist to assassinate Sadat. Mubarak, a military officer and Vice President, became President following President Sadat’s assassination in 1981. Mubarak’s regime held power for three decades, during which the United States provided security assistance as agreed at the time of the Accords. Aspects of the security cooperation codified in the 1980s and 1990s formalized activities but made no change in the historic level of assistance.\textsuperscript{56}

By some estimates, the United States provides thirty percent of Egypt’s total military budget and eighty percent of its weapons procurement budget.\textsuperscript{57} Table 1 shows the levels of U.S. security assistance to Egypt and its remarkable consistency year-to-year, averaging over $1.3

\textsuperscript{55}Calculation based on “Military Expenditure as Percent of GDP in Egypt” (Trading Economics using World Bank data; translated by U.S. Inflation Calculator).

\textsuperscript{56}Quandt, 65, 107.

\textsuperscript{57}Sharp, 7.
billion annually from 1979 to the present. These amounts exclude military exercises which come from other funds.

In addition to the overarching strategic objectives of peace between Egypt and Israel, and access to the region, the United States has tangible operational level objectives for FMF. These include making Egypt a more effective military partner by modernizing its weapons and equipment with U.S. models. Secondly, the U.S. operational objectives include Egypt’s achieving a level of interoperability with U.S. forces to jointly address common concerns in the Middle East. Egypt’s military then defends itself more effectively and the United States acquires a dynamic military partner.58 A U.S. General Accounting Office report on security assistance to Egypt reiterates the interoperability goal.

Officials and several experts assert that Egypt supports the U.S. goals of the FMF program, which are found in State’s annual Mission Performance Plan for Egypt and its Congressional Budget Justification. Specific goals include (1) modernizing and training Egypt’s military; (2) facilitating Egypt’s participation as a coalition partner; (3) providing force protection to the U.S. military in the region; and (4) helping guarantee U.S. access to the Suez Canal and overflight routes. Another key goal of the program is to enhance Egypt’s interoperability with U.S. forces.59

The same 2006 Report from the General Accounting Office, the U.S. Government’s audit agency, breaks down purchases over the six-year period from 1999 to 2005. “With about $7.8 billion to Egypt in FMF funds, Egypt spent almost half, about $3.8 billion, on major equipment such as aircraft, missiles, ships, and vehicles,” shown in Table 2.

58The U.S. withholds sensitive communications systems.
59General Accounting Office.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Military Aid (US$ million)</th>
<th>IMET (US$ million)</th>
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<td>2012 Request</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,289.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>1,300.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<td>1994</td>
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<td>1993</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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<td>1990</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>550.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Aid provided through ESF Loan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0</td>
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The United States objectives for FMF aim to replace old Soviet-era weaponry that Egypt relied on through the mid-1970’s. U.S. military officials prefer to see a strategic procurement program that reflects a strategic vision of Egypt’s force in 2020. Each year’s purchases would build towards a strategic capability. In contrast, Egyptian leaders show up at meetings each year with a list featuring the latest equipment, not the most strategically useful in augmenting their force.60

To ensure resources for adequate maintenance of new equipment, DSCA works with the Egyptian Defense Ministry to ensure that defense purchases include support items and services in the total price. Freestanding items ship with built-in service and parts arrangements.61 “Egyptian officials stated that approximately one-third of their FMF funds are dedicated to follow-on support; one-third to upgrade U.S.-supplied equipment; and nearly one-third to new procurements.”62 Egypt is required to allocate maintenance funding designed to keep the equipment repaired and updated. In practice, Egypt has allocated maintenance funding at the minimum levels required by the program, which neglects the updating required for sustainment of weapons systems. Egyptian Ministry of Defense officials point out that weapons and equipment costs are rising while their FMF budget is static year-to-year.63

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62Ibid.

63Sharp, 7.
Table 2. Egyptian Purchases Using U.S. Foreign Military Financing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items purchased</th>
<th>Percentage of funds</th>
<th>Detail</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft, missiles and ships</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Helicopters, ground-, air- and sea-launched missiles, patrol ships, ship spare parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Tanks, self-propelled artillery, cargo trucks, ambulances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of equipment</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Clothing, medical supplies, hand tools, automotive supplies, transportation and shipping fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies and supply operations</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Technical assistance for aircraft and missiles, aircraft engine and combat vehicle repair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons and ammunitions</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Rifles, machine guns, weapons, spare parts, weapons ammunition, explosives, rockets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications and support</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Radio navigation equipment, radar systems, construction equipment, metalworking machinery, safety and rescue equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Training, construction of military facilities, studies and program management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does not add to 100% due to rounding.

*Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, Security Assistance, April 2006*

The largest FMF program is the co-production of the Abrams M-1 tank (M1A1) by the United States and Egypt. The M1A1 tank is one of the U.S. Army’s “Big Five” pieces of equipment, still an important warfighting vehicle for the land force. In 1988, Egypt adopted a program for co-production of the tank for purposes of developing self-sufficiency in tank

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64 According to the GAO, specifically, “For example, Egypt spent 8 percent of its FMF funds on missiles, including 822 ground-launched Stinger missiles, 459 air-launched Hellfire missiles, and 33 sea-launched Harpoon missiles. Egypt also spent 14 percent on aircraft, including 3 cargo airplanes; 10 percent on communications and support equipment, including 42 radar systems and 8 switchboards; and 9 percent on supplies and supply operations, including 1,452 masks to protect against chemical and biological agents.” DSCA indicates that Egypt also receives hundreds of millions of dollars worth of materiel annually from the Pentagon in Excess Defense Articles. “Past EDA sales and grant transfers have included two PERRY class and two KNOX frigates, numerous HAWK (missile) parts, mine rakes, helicopter spare parts, assorted armored vehicles (M60 tanks and M113 Armored Personnel Carriers) and various types of munitions.”
production as well as for economic development and expansion of arms exports. The goal has been trimmed from production of 1,500 tanks to a total of 1,200 tanks. Under the terms of the program, a percentage of the tank’s components are manufactured in Egypt at a facility on the outskirts of Cairo and the remaining parts are produced in the United States and then shipped to Egypt for final assembly. The United States supported construction of the plant, through General Dynamics. According to one source, 863 tanks had been produced by 2010, but only about seventy-five percent were delivered to field units.

U.S. contractors provide both equipment and technical assistance. General Dynamics Corp., Lockheed Martin Corp., Boeing Co., and United Technologies Corp. have all been cited by news reports as contracted providers of security assistance. Egypt can purchase directly from contractors using FMF, or purchase through DSCA contracts. Egypt receives good financing terms, not available to all partner countries, which allowed the Defense Ministry to make purchases with a down payment of FMF funds in one year, relying on U.S. future year funding to pay the balance of the equipment costs. This arrangement has been available only to Egypt and Israel.

By some assessments, modernization has been at least fifty percent successful, but sought after interoperability remains elusive. According to the GAO writing in 2006, the strategic and


66Sharp: 7.


70Ibid.

71Ibid.
political objectives appear more central to the United States than the military objectives like modernization and interoperability. “CENTCOM defines modernization as the ratio of U.S.-to-Soviet equipment in Egypt’s inventory and does not include other potentially relevant factors, such as readiness or military capabilities.” ⁷²

Achieving interoperability in Egypt is complicated by both the lack of a common definition of interoperability and limitations on some types of sensitive equipment transfers. CENTCOM officials also stated that they would prefer to operate with Egyptian forces according to the interoperability standard used by the United States. They noted, however, that the Egyptian military’s definition of interoperability is limited to participation in joint exercises, such as Operation Bright Star. Additionally, Egypt and the U.S. use interim short-term solutions to minimize limitations with respect to interoperability. For example, U.S. officials stated they have established temporary communications installations on certain equipment and have flown alongside Egyptian C-130s to facilitate Egypt’s participation in a joint exercise. Egypt lacks specific equipment that limits its interoperability with U.S. forces, but DOD has not formally assessed this limitation and its implications on interoperability. ⁷³

While authorities acknowledge that fifty percent of Egypt’s military equipment is updated, critics argue that Egypt resists disposing of older Soviet-made equipment. Eliminating aged equipment inventory would release maintenance and operating funds. However, U.S. equipment carries lower manpower requirements, while Egypt uses the high labor requirements of the older equipment to maintain jobs in an economy with high unemployment.

Smaller grants for professional military education accompany the $1.3 billion spending on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for U.S. military equipment. IMET provides an average of $1 million a year in military training, as well as combined exercises and meetings. The International Military Education and Training Program has increased its emphasis on professionalizing the Egyptian military. As Nathan Toronto points out, in the past decade, IMET enrolled an increasing number of officers in professional military education (PME). Funding for IMET has increased, and the depth and duration of professional military education has

⁷²Ibid.
⁷³Ibid.
expands. Officers now participate in senior-level professional courses in contrast to previous periods when IMET focused on training them how to operate FMS-acquired equipment. As Figure 1 shows, more officers attend senior-level seminars for longer periods. Over time, IMET graduates should move up within the ranks of the Egyptian senior officer corps. Whether U.S.-trained officers could assume leadership roles is an open question. U.S. military officers express enthusiasm for their U.S.-based studies, but the professional placement of Egyptian IMET graduates remains an area for future study. Regardless, the education that officers receive likely contributes to the strong military-to-military relationship between the United States and Egypt at whatever rank it occurs.

Figure 1. Egyptian Students by IMET Type: 1979-2010


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74Toronto, 9-10.
75Ibid.
For the United States, making an impact by educating less than 1/10th of one percent of an active force of 466,000 governed largely by patronage, is challenging. While IMET strengthens the U.S.-Egypt military-to-military cooperation, it has less power in reforming the structure of the Egyptian military. As cited by Toronto, Egypt’s military structure may sideline U.S.-trained officers on their return to Egypt; in any case, they do not serve as direct counterparts to U.S. security cooperation officials. “US-educated Egyptian officers are kept out of positions in which they will interact on a continual basis with American officials.” In addition, Egyptian military culture suffers from overcentralization, and “an irregular training regimen, poor standardization, a lack of meritocratic advancement in the officer corps, a rigid higher command structure, and the tendency for Egyptian officers educated in the US to be kept out of positions in which they can apply the farthest-reaching aspects of their education.” IMET influence may be felt indirectly, if U.S.-educated officers can preserve their new approaches in their day-to-day military interaction. More significantly, some U.S. security cooperation experts believe that as the leadership of the Egyptian Armed Forces ages, U.S.-trained officers must inevitably wield greater influence.

In addition to receiving U.S. FMF and IMET assistance, Egypt’s services have until 2011, participated robustly in U.S. joint military exercises. Table 3 below provides examples of exercises organized by CENTCOM with Egypt.

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77 Toronto, 11.


79 Coughlin, interview.
Table 3. U.S. Joint Exercises with Egypt (1981-Present)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exercise</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Cost (if available): (US$Million)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Host</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bright Star</td>
<td>Field Training: ground, sea, air</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>Biennial</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle Arena</td>
<td>Air Exercise: 4 days</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1998 Table 4 - Exercise</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eagle Salute</td>
<td>Naval Exercise</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Cobra</td>
<td>Special Operations Capable Exercise</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Annual: through the 1990’s</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Postponed this year because of the uncertain political environment, Operation Bright Star is Army CENTCOM’s largest exercise outside the United States. Bright Star began as a single service exercise between U.S. and Egyptian ground troops performing desert maneuvers, in 1981, after the signing of the Camp David Treaty. Over nearly thirty years through 2009, it grew into a biennial “Joint/Combined Coalition computer-aided command post exercise and a tactical air, ground, naval and special operations forces field training exercise involving [militaries from ten European and Middle Eastern nations] and more than 70,000 troops.” In 1999, Al Ahram, the Egyptian online news weekly, cited joint exercise Bright Star’s reputation as “one of the biggest and most important joint training programmes in the Middle East.” CENTCOM’s website presents Bright Star’s purpose--to strengthen military-to-military relationships and improve readiness and interoperability between U.S., Egyptian and Coalition forces. While CENTCOM

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81Ibid.
sponsors a range of exercises in its area of operations, with its price tag exceeding $12 million, Exercise Bright Star appears as the costliest.\(^{82}\)

Bright Star is unique in its span of operation and size, but it is not the only exercise to flex the muscles of land, naval and air forces. As Table 3 indicates, the United States sponsored Special Operations exercises, Iron Cobra, from 1984 through 1998. Egyptian paratroopers learned from U.S. Special Forces in operations based in the western desert. Iron Cobra also expanded into a multi-service air-based exercise.

Naval exercise “Eagle Salute” targets counter-terrorism practices that improve maritime security operations and strengthen damage control operations. “Engagement with regional countries provides a mechanism to create a broad-based maritime coalition actively engaged in countering the terrorist threat both at sea and ashore,” said Commanding Officer of USS Taylor (FFG 50), Cmdr. Kurush Morris. “Local countries have a vested interest in interoperability, knowledge sharing, and assistance with deterrence against international terrorist organizations that pose a threat to key infrastructure,” added Morris.\(^{83}\) Eagle Salute covered an extensive area of international waters in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea. Rounding out the air exercises, “Eagle Arena” was a one-time exercise utilizing Egyptian Air Force fighter jets, early warning planes and helicopters. The Egyptian Air Force provided range access to U.S. Navy fighter jets from aircraft carriers within the Eisenhower Battle Group. The exercise provided combat training, day and night overland strike operations, and sea and air defense training.

\(^{82}\)Ibid.

Section Three: Peace, Access and the Emerging Egyptian Political Leadership

Given the extensive U.S. commitment to Egypt’s military in funding hardware, training and collaborative exercises, and the strategic interests that this assistance serves on both sides, this section examines the balance of political forces in Egypt that control those resources and how they view the issues that are critical to maintaining U.S.-Egypt security cooperation.

This section looks at the political organizations and known presidential contenders (as of August, 2011) and their political stance and how they present their views on the key issues that shape the U.S. security cooperation with Egypt. Party positions on Egyptian foreign policy as well as on the economy have impacts on security cooperation. While most political parties publicly accept the Peace Treaty, most concur that foreign policy should focus on building better partnerships with Arab neighbors. Though domestic forces in the economy are not the topic of this paper, and political forces are not currently contesting economic control, parties with platforms which obliquely or directly seek to open the economy or redistribute economic control from the military bear watching over the longer-term. If they win, they may chip away at the military’s economic control and by extension, at the security relationship.

In Egypt, influential political and social leadership groups artfully build and shift coalitions with each other in a highly pragmatic fashion. They appear below in three large but distinct categories: the military, the Muslim Brotherhood and civil society or liberal political parties. The military’s outsized political role, since 1952 but also in the aftermath of the January Revolution, when it assumed governing authority alongside the Prime Minister, makes it an important political player.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)

The willingness of the Egyptian people who fomented the January 2011 Revolution to accede to military leadership after President Mubarak was forced from office is a testament to the
role of the military in Egypt. Since 1952, when the Army deposed King Farouk to establish a constitutional republic, the military has served as a source of stability and reliability. By 2011, enough families in Egypt had sons and relatives who had performed military service to create a reasonably high level of identification between the Egyptian public and the military.84

At the top of the military hierarchy is the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, SCAF, which consists of the leaders of the services in Egypt and the leaders of regional Army units. The SCAF assumed control of government on the resignation of President Mubarak on February 11, 2011. The SCAF then suspended the Constitution of 1971 and the state of emergency, in response to the popular uprising against the Mubarak regime. On March 19, 2011, a referendum approved the proposed temporary constitutional amendments that set conditions for parliamentary elections in the fall of 2011. According to these amendments, Presidential elections in Egypt will follow the parliamentary vote. The SCAF proposed these amendments in conjunction with the Egyptian Supreme Court. In addition to mapping out the path to elections, the early decrees by the SCAF underlined that Egypt will continue to observe its international treaties and obligations.85 This reassurance confirms the ongoing adherence to the Treaty with Israel.

Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi leads the SCAF and serves as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces as well as Minister of Defense. His Deputy and possible successor is the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Sami Hafez Anan. Anan leads the biennial delegation of Egyptian military to the United States to discuss arms purchases under the $1.3 billion arrangement established under the Camp David Accords. According to newspaper reports, Lt. General Anan is a key Pentagon contact in Cairo, who has built relationships with military leaders ranging from Admiral Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the Commander of

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85Sharp, 5.
CENTCOM. He is reputedly destined for a large role in Egypt’s future, although it may be behind the scenes as Commander of the military.

A chart of the SCAF leaders appears below. Egyptian commanders assume customary geographic commands, and the Egyptian military leadership also perform less traditional roles, including a leader for Armed Forces operations and morale, and, a General responsible for U.S. relations. Without an understanding of the jobs behind the titles, it is difficult to determine whether these might be economic roles as much as military ones.

Like their senior SCAF colleagues who have spent several decades in the Egyptian military, two of the best-known top SCAF members, Tantawi and Anan both have deep roots within the Mubarak regime. These officers are among the most likely to recall and emulate President Mubarak’s emphasis on stability and unity of Egypt’s disparate social and political groups. SCAF officers came of age in a military seasoned by the 1973 War and saw President Sadat assassinated by an Islamist military officer. Many were trained in the Soviet Union and have a socialist heritage. They would have absorbed the Mubarak regime’s political vision favoring strong central government control. They would echo his concern about extremes on all sides, the democratic left and the Islamist right, while inheriting the benefits of “Military, Inc.” and experiencing the power that comes with autocratic rule.

86Bumiller.
### Table 4. Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>SCAF Title (Age)</th>
<th>Professional Military Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi</td>
<td>Chairman (76)</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces - Minister of Defense and Military Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen Sami Hafez Anan</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman (63)</td>
<td>Armed Forces Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Admiral Mohab Mamish</td>
<td>(63)</td>
<td>Navy Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Marshal Reda Mahmoud Hafez Mohamed</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>Air Force Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Hassan al-Rowini</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commander of the Central Military Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Ismail Atman</td>
<td></td>
<td>Director of the Morale Affairs Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Mohsen al-Fanagry</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Defense Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Mohammed Abdel Nabi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commander of the Border Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Mohamed Hegazy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commander of the Second Field Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Sedky Sobhy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commander of the Third Field Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Hassan Mohammed Ahmed</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commander of the Northern Military Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Mohsen El-Shazly</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commander of the Southern Military Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Mahmoud Ibrahim Hegazy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commander of the Western Military Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major General Abdel Fatah El-Cisse</td>
<td></td>
<td>Head of Military Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Mohamed El-Assar</td>
<td></td>
<td>In charge of relations with the U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Mokhtar El Mollah</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant to Minister of Defense; previously Head of War College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Mamdouh Shahin</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant Minister of Defense for Legal Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Mohamed Saber</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chief of the Armed Forces operation authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Tarek Mamdy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interim Head of Egyptian Radio &amp; Television; former Commander of Air Defenses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** This list was derived from the arabist.website, *The New York Times*, and the *Egyptian Armed Forces* site and *al Jazeera (English)*. Names in italics were added by the arabist website only. The arabist website provides 19 names, but the *New York Times* repeatedly cites an 18-member SCAF. Sharp of Congressional Research Service cites a SCAF of 20.
History shows, though, that Mubarak and the Armed Forces had an uneasy coalition. President Mubarak allowed the military to acquire wealth and keep its hands on the levers of production in order to focus their interest away from political power towards economic control. Mubarak’s ability to buy off the military allowed him to rule in an autocratic manner. However, when he put forward his son, with no military experience, he was thought to have gone too far down the dynastic path.

Press and Pentagon commentators agree that, while four Presidents have come from the military, the SCAF does not seek an overt governing role. Their control of the country’s arms and their economic power ensure less visible status at the top of the political hierarchy. The military leadership seeks first, political stability and unity for Egypt, and second, economic control for itself. The SCAF indicates that it will not run a candidate for President, nor overtly support Parliamentary candidates, but neither will the SCAF allow the Government to shift direction without its agreement. In addition, commentators disagree over the extent of SCAF control over younger officers, some of whom openly supported the Revolution.

Six months after the January 2011 Revolution, the SCAF finds itself at the center of a debate regarding the role of the military in government. SCAF set up a legal committee to establish constitutional guidelines that will allow the military to step in to protect the secular state should Islamists in power threaten to institute Islamic law. The legal committee agreed upon a set of principles that codify basic human rights, but declined to include military freedom of action and principles submitted by the military in their draft. The judge leading the committee indicated that the military, as the duly-named government of Egypt, retains the right to alter the draft.

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87Springborg, 102-103.
Based on its efforts to insert a ‘free agent’ role for the military in the Constitution’s foundational documents and perceived “old regime” tendencies, the military has a fragile relationship with post-Revolution civil society. Nonetheless, history shows their stabilizing role:

The Egyptian military only reluctantly intervenes in Egyptian domestic affairs. In the previous 35 years, they have interceded in internal affairs only three times— the 1977 IMF bread riots, the 1985 police recruit riots, and the 1997 terrorist attack in Luxor. Protecting civilians and restoring order were their primary objectives. In the context of the current situation, the military clearly faces more challenges than they ever have in the past. The violence of the last several weeks is beyond what anyone anticipated. They are balancing their desire for order and discipline with their duty to protect Egyptian civilians. The military will move cautiously, but firmly, with full awareness of their stabilizing role.90

The military’s reluctance to assume its current governing position has not been enough to prevent friction between the SCAF and the April 6 Movement, a founder of the Revolution. One demonstrator chanted: “Down with the junta.”91 Others shouted, “Down with military rule,” as the military participated in clearing the remaining protesters from Tahrir Square on August 1, 2011.92 While the military made over 200 arrests, they fired shots only in the air, maintaining their generally non-aggressive posture towards the population. The military seems to be able to operate within parameters that permit general public support. Some members of the public have begun to cite the occupation of Tahrir Square as a nonproductive action that now serves more to obstruct traffic and commerce than to advance a political agenda. Unease damages the traditional trust between the military and the “people” but has yet to destroy the traditional trust entirely. Perhaps acquiescing to the military’s clearing of the Square, demonstrators decided to leave the Square during the month of Ramadan, during August, 2011.


While the SCAF may prefer to maintain the status quo with Israel and the U.S., the Muslim Brotherhood, breaking free of political restraints for the first time in decades, appears more willing to set off in new directions, breaking with the past.

**The Muslim Brotherhood and the Waf’d Alliance**

After over three decades of repression, when Mubarak jailed prominent and active Brotherhood members, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) formally reentered politics through its Freedom and Justice Party in 2011. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is a broad social organization with a wide and deep base of support. Its astute alliance with the also strong Waf’d Party could land half of the seats in Parliament in 2011 elections, the Brotherhood’s first unrestrained run at elections in decades. While the Brotherhood affirms that it does not aspire to lead Egypt, and will not run a candidate for the presidency, presidential candidate Dr. Abou El-Fotouh, has left the Brotherhood in order to make a run for the highest office. He is expected to attract MB votes.

Founded in Egypt in 1928, by Hassan El Banna, the Brotherhood has global reach, with offshoots in countries ranging from the Gulf States to Tunisia, including small organizations in Russia and Indonesia. The MB is a grassroots organization whose appeal stems from the promise that being a good Muslim will ensure a place in heaven. As a social organization, the MB has a history of filling the gap in commercial and social services when the Government of Egypt fails to meet local needs. According to Shadi Hadid of the Brookings Institution Doha Center, “It has

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a whole parallel set of institutions. It either is involved in or controls banks, businesses, mosques, clinics, day care centers, schools, even Boy Scout troops. It’s very much in the thick of Egyptian society, working among the people, and that explains, in part, why they’re popular.”

The MB as a group responded first and most effectively to the 1992 earthquake, the largest tremblor in Egypt in recent history.

Sources place the active dues-paying membership of the Muslim Brotherhood at between 300,000 and 750,000. While significant on an organizational level because this number represents an active core membership, the numbers belie MB’s greater influence on a population of 82,000,000. Each active member influences family and relatives. The MB had about 1,000,000 members at its peak in the 1940’s, and was then a major portion of the population of 20,000,000. Part of its current influence derives from its status as a largely urban, middle-class organization, which relies on professional members from medicine, law and engineering. This educated base can organize, fund and turn out the vote for its list of candidates more effectively than its secular party counterparts. Egypt votes according to a list system, under which voters indicate a party preference, accepting the candidate list from that party.

To build on its significant mobilization capacity, the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party has opened at least thirteen new local headquarters throughout the country, inaugurated additional headquarters for its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in most governorates, and cemented an alliance with twenty-seven other parties, many of which sacrificed their demands for delayed elections in exchange for the MB’s cooperation in drafting electoral procedures. The Brotherhood's primary aim is to hold elections as soon as possible, before other parties can organize effectively enough to become competitive.

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For a discussion of the role and potential influence of parallel governance organizations in nation-states, see publications by Jerry Silverman, such as Jerry Silverman, Governance and Poverty: An Alternate Paradigm (Singapore: World Bank), Powerpoint.

Frontline.

Ibid.
It would then use its electoral success to control the subsequent constitutional drafting process, through which it hopes to establish an Islamic state.98

“Potential participants in the new Brotherhood alliance say they are seeking to heal growing mistrust between Islamic and non-Islamic forces around the divisive issue of when to hold the elections and who gets to write the new constitution.”99 Writing the rules of the government will surely lock in principles and processes that favor the writers. The Brotherhood is strategically focusing its coalition-building to areas where an alliance may tip the electoral balance in their favor and allow them to prevail in the voting. Yet the same coalition-building skills that have been used with secular parties have been used to forge alliances with Salaf’ists and other Muslim groups, such as Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Gama’a al-Islamiyaa is recognized by the United States as a terrorist organization). The appointment of a Christian Governor in Upper Egypt brought the Islamists together to ensure his removal.100

Perhaps the most adept and effective move in coalition-building to date came with the announcement that the MB and the Waf’d Party formed an alliance. The Waf’d historically has refrained from running candidates in areas where cooperating political opposition parties were running.101 They will not compete with the MB. This joining of an old-line party and an organization with strong roots in Egyptian society creates a strong political force. The Brotherhood and the Waf’d Party had been rivals. “This may give them a very solid base in areas

100 The old cleavages between Christian Copts and Islamists in Egypt and the implications for the civil state are outside the scope of this monograph. For an account of the incident in Qena and careful thought on the role of Islamists in Egypt, see Carnegie Institute for International Peace, ‘Arab Reform Bulletin’ at http://carnegieendowment.org/arb/
they hadn’t previously been strong,” said Elijah Zarwan, an Egypt researcher at the International Crisis Group. The Brotherhood “is taking a long view of Egyptian politics. It’s a very significant switch.”102 In addition, the MB is working to forge as many as a dozen additional coalitions.103 Although no single party is expected to gain a majority in Parliament, the MB and Wat’d Party assuredly share that objective. They will run one joint list of candidates, combining their strengths in different parts of the populace.104

Still, the MB is fractured at present, with youth members attuned to the democratic yearnings of their secular peer groups, and traditional professionals and other Brotherhood members seeking socially conservative political objectives. The Egyptian Current party was founded by a 33-year old tech worker, Islam Lotfy, and other Brotherhood youth. They promulgate “a neo-Islamism approach: separation of religion and politics, individual freedoms, and an ‘embrace’ of Islamic morals and culture.” The disparity between the youth of the Brotherhood and the established elite was widening in a post-Tahrir Egypt, as Lotfy argued in a National Journal article: “the concept of the revolution is against the Brotherhood. A gap had emerged, a vacuum in which the complications of reconciling a conservative Islamic approach with the reality of liberal modernity resided.”105 Others have broken away from the MB, for ideological and practical reasons, to create ‘centrist’ parties.

In addition to fractures with more liberal Islamists, cleavages have appeared between politically-active members and those who refrain from politics and hold to the Brotherhood’s social role. The challenges of identifying a unified MB position are apparently also frustrated

102Fadel.
103Associated Press.
104Fadel.
through the active participation of radical Islamic groups in the demonstrations that make up the public face of the January Revolution. Table 5 identifies influential political parties and representative radical Islamist parties, such as Salaf’ists, whose dramatic statements and energetic participation in demonstrations may alienate voters otherwise sympathetic to the MB.

Salaf’ists in Egypt represent the most fundamental of the Islamist groups. Linked to Wahabist groups in Saudi Arabia, Salaf’ists are accused of spawning Al Qaeda and similar terrorist movements. While the doctrinal argument posits that “jihad” means the reform of the self, both traditional Muslim organizations as well as Western governments agree that ‘jihad’ is generally a violent form of attack on non-Islamic beliefs and institutions.106 Hasan El-Banna, the author of early Muslim Brotherhood doctrine, describes it that way.107 Most recently, Salaf’ists and religious parties took over a call for protest against the military regime, turning a day of unity in Tahrir Square on July 29, 2011 into a highly polarized call for the imposition of Shari’a law. The Muslim Brotherhood disavowed that view.108

Despite political debates, the MB’s legal system is based on the Kor’an. Critics of the Brotherhood’s ambitions argue that the doctrinal basis of the organization and the Muslim Brotherhood’s public statements are irreconcilable.109 These critics suggest that casting the Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party as “moderate” is both inaccurate and misleading, since the goals of the Brotherhood--being a good Muslim according to the Kor’an--require accepting the objective of eventual global domination by Islam. These critics of Islam’s moderate public face suggest that, along with domination are complementary goals that allow gradualism

109 Coughlin, interview.
and pragmatism while working to attain the ultimate goal--the imposition of universal Islamic
law.

Carrying that view further, those concerned about the MB agenda point out that at the
international level, linkages among Islamic writers and doctrine and key membership
organizations, attest to a similar doctrine. According to this view, groups such as the Organization
of the Islamic Conference of which the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) is a
member must, because of their membership in OIC, leave open the opportunity to fight to
overcome non-Muslim countries and organizations, rather than coexisting peacefully alongside
them. OIC doctrine references texts that carry unambiguous imperial goals.110

Cairo’s Al Azhar University, the seat of learning for Sunni Islam, has declared its own
support for international treaties. Al Azhar, currently under state control, is using the January
Revolution to agitate for a return to life as an independent entity. The same document of
principles is as contradictory as any published by MB. Affirming that the basis of the state is
shari’a law, Al Azhar’s document affirms Egypt’s desired political status to be a constitutional
democracy, based on separation of powers and freedom of religious expression, not a theocratic
state.111

The debate divides at least three serious camps: those who retain a healthy skepticism
regarding the actual goals of Brotherhood participation in political life, those who believe that
participation in governance has a moderating influence on radical organizations and those who
passionately fear the Brotherhood as the instigator and beneficiary of a widening Arab Spring,
sowing seeds in the West and Europe.

110Ibid.
(accessed August 2011)
The positions espoused by the Brotherhood as recounted since the January Revolution contradict earlier statements. While at one time, the Brotherhood espoused the view that the Treaty with Israel might be abrogated, or put up for referendum, more recently, spokespeople state that international treaties would be observed by MB politicians. A recent poll by the Pew Charitable Trust shows that the majority of Egyptians support ending the treaty, but Brotherhood spokesmen indicate that they will rely not on popular will, but on foreign policy committees. "There are no conflicting statements whatsoever. There is a formal stance. The Muslim Brotherhood will respect international treaties," says Freedom and Justice Secretary-General Dr. Mohamed Saad Katatny."

Pragmatism guides Muslim Brotherhood policies.

So we're talking about a massive organization. And in that sense, it's almost a big bureaucracy. The Brotherhood, really, at the end of the day, is a slow, bumbling giant. It's hard for them to take decisive action.

Their history and their current approaches speak to an ability to forge coalitions of necessity using diverse partnerships to ensure political survival and, if possible, ascendancy. During decades of repression under Mubarak, MB members willing to leave Egypt found a home in exile in the Gulf states. Now that their political role is open and allowed, the Brotherhood finds itself accused of collaborating with the military to leave the military structures intact. At the same time, the Brotherhood shares the goals of the Revolutionary youth including an end to military trials for civilians, justice for families of those killed in January during the Revolution,

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114Frontline.

the speedy trial of former President Mubarak and a clear path for transition to civilian rule from the SCAF.

The Brotherhood has taken steps to show that its interests are broader than an anti-U.S. or anti-Israel foreign policy. Experts point out that Egypt cannot afford to devote resources from its domestic needs and struggling economy to a conflict with Israel.116 Egypt.com, an official site, writes about a meeting between Muslim Brotherhood representatives and U.S. and Australian business representatives to discuss investment prospects in Egypt. “The MB will make economic affairs a top priority in their quest for political power in New Egypt,” said Rashad Abdou, professor of economics at Cairo University. The political group will focus entirely on economic policies after the election of the first parliament after former President Hosni Mubarak was ousted, he added.117 The Brotherhood used to favor an economy modeled rigidly on Islamic principles rather than on the free market and foreign investment, but for the moment, their economic approach reflects a recognition of the impact of the global economy on Egypt. Regardless of whether the Brotherhood’s long-term aims are to serve the Egyptian population or control them, the movement remains highly pragmatic in its public outlook.

Models for Egypt’s direction range from Turkey, where Islamists arguably are overwhelmed by secular concerns and a behind-the-scenes (although diminishing) military presence and Iran, which has adopted radical Islam and become an outlaw state. Whichever direction it leans, Egypt will chart its own course. The next discussion looks at the constellation of political organizations that will join the Muslim Brotherhood to set the terms of the debate affecting foreign policy and security cooperation. It concludes by looking at where Egyptian views intersect and how those views might affect security cooperation.

116Dabbs.
New Civil Society Political Organizations

Egypt’s Arab spring has seen a burst of new political parties registered since the end of January, alongside traditional parties that are reregistering. Current licensed political parties number twenty-two on Carnegie Endowment’s ‘Egypt Political Parties’ website with four seeking licenses. “The Atlantic” magazine is tracking forty-six political groups. Ayman Nour, jailed twice for charges created after his runs against Mubarak for the Presidency, acknowledged twenty-four political parties in Egypt before the Revolution, in 2010. The parties however, were accordingly to Nour, “nominal”, broad in their range of political perspectives, but without deep power bases. Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) controlled the levers of state power for three decades, leaving little political space for the opponents. Prior to the Revolution, a Government political party committee determined whether a party could exist legally or not, and granted permission only sparingly.

Of those parties able to overcome the barrier of the political party committee, few were left with the momentum to organize and campaign to attract a mass following. Fear of repression by the state security apparatus limited political organizing. Al-Ghad Party, meaning “Tomorrow” Party, was an opposition party during most of that period, whose leader, Ayman Nour, cited above, was imprisoned on two separate occasions for long periods. Political and social organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood were subject to harassment or worse.

The blatant fraud perpetrated in the Parliamentary elections of November, 2010 increased the popular frustration and the activity of demonstrators. Popular groups including the MB and the Waf’d Party received one seat each in Parliament of a total of more than 600 in both upper and lower houses, when it was widely accepted that their share of the vote entitled them to greater representation. Political movements, Kefaya (“Enough”) and the April 6 Youth Movement formed around specific grievances in 2004 and 2008 respectively, succeeded as movements rather than as parties. While their members were also subject to attack and arrest, they remain
opposition groups rather than parties with platforms running candidates. The April 6 Youth Movement has indicated that it will serve as a political watchdog, rather than a party.\textsuperscript{118} Kefaya’s political agenda was an end to the Mubarak regime, which allowed it to attract wide support from diverse parts of Egyptian society.

Because the April 6 Youth Movement declines to become a party, there are as many as twenty-three groups clamoring to represent revolutionary youth and other new participants to politics. The preference to remain a movement leads charismatic youth leaders to hold back from party politics, yet most parties are built around identifiable individuals. The splintering of the non-Muslim political community has led to the view that the youth will be unable to focus their electoral efforts sufficiently to achieve real political power.

It’s true that a number of revolutionary youth are active in political parties, but almost never in leadership positions. Ad-hoc groups--whose names invariably include some combination of the words “youth,” “coalition,” “January 25th” and “revolution”--are pullulating, with no real mandate yet speaking on behalf of the revolution nevertheless. The public tolerates a few of these youth groups, in the absence of a coherent representation. Their divergent political ideas--from boycotting the existing government to coordinating with the army--dilutes the youths’ power.\textsuperscript{119}

Groups like the April 6 Youth Movement initiated the demonstrations in Tahrir Square that culminated in the January 2011 Revolution. Because some powerful political organizations decline to become political parties, as recently as August 1, 2011, the groups in Tahrir Square numbered, according to a member, twenty-six “political \textit{powers}.”\textsuperscript{120}

The counterargument regarding the value of political movements that are not parties is their ability to generate voting blocs for existing parties. Political activity, which leads to the


creation of effective voting blocs, continues apace among not only the youth, but also among secular labor and professional groups, outside of the view of the Western press. University elections have taken place throughout Egypt leading to the departure of doctrinaire faculty and their replacement with “liberal” youth.

Professional “guilds” called ‘syndicates’ are prevalent in Egypt in white-collar middle-class fields.

As Mozn Hassan noted: "The March elections in the doctors' syndicate, where they threw out the old guard Muslim Brothers as well as Mubarak-linked leaders and where women captured some leadership roles, represented the end of an era when professionals had leaned toward social conservatism."

The doctors syndicate also voted to give 3,000 Egyptian pounds (US$500) to the family of each person killed in the Tahrir demonstrations. In the same period, the Supreme Constitutional Court declared state attempts to freeze syndicate elections unconstitutional; the journalists' syndicate dumped its old regime leader and mobilised to end state control and corruption of television and the press; and the lawyers' syndicate sent its Mubarak-linked leader on a "permanent holiday" and organised new elections.121

Observers writing in Al Jazeera point to university elections which replace the old guard with new faces, syndicate elections and labor strikes by workers as signs of burgeoning political activity that bodes well for diverse and energetic elections.

*Al Masry al Youm*, an Arabic newspaper, published a survey of the strikes happening on a typical midweek workday up and down the Nile in small towns and factory outposts:

350 butane gas distributors demonstrating against the Ministry of Social Solidarity in the town of Takhla; 1,200 bank employees on strike, demanding better wages in Gharbiya; 350 potato chip factory workers striking in Monufiya; 100 nursing students holding a sit-in to take over the medical syndicate in Beheira; 1,500 villagers in Mahsama protesting the city council's decision to close a subsidised bread bakery; workers at a spinning and weaving factory on strike in Assiut; thirty teachers blocking the education ministry in Alexandria to demand tenure; and 200 tax authority employees occupying the collector's office in Cairo demanding better wages and benefits.122

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122Ibid.
The voice of the ‘man on the street’ influences the direction of not only domestic but also foreign policy.

Formal political parties do form, representing all shades of the political spectrum, from Christian Copts to radical Islamic Salaf’ist parties to socialist parties built around a charismatic leader from the past, like the Nasserist Party. Egypt has a registered and financially struggling Green Party, based on environmental principles, founded by an Ambassador in 1990. Because of the limits they faced under Mubarak, even parties with history are starting over, alongside parties born in the aftermath of the January Revolution. Starting over means that some liberal, centrist and left secular and Christian parties are late in organizing support and accumulating funds for upcoming parliamentary and presidential races. Novices at the all-important task of coalition-building, these parties have only three months remaining to organize if parliamentary elections take place as planned in November, 2011. Some of the parties are struggling financially, while others may be too inexperienced to develop and support slates of candidates. The wealthy NDP was legally dissolved, with its funds turned over to the state. Its successor party is the New National Party, which, though led by a former Mubarak opponent from the Waf’d, is not expected to gain more than five percent of the vote because of its association with the discredited President.

With a tradition of parliamentary politics and over twenty political parties at any given time, even while party formation was repressed, parties use coalition-building to gain electoral strength. The Waf’d Party is now aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood. Two of the oldest groups, with the deepest name recognition and popular roots, they are widely expected to gain half of the seats in Parliament as indicated above. In early June, one group of secular, “liberal” parties met and decided not to compete against each other, which means the formation of civil, secular, unified candidate lists.
Most recently, a second group of secular “liberal” parties met to coalesce in recognition that the organizational skill and reach of the Brotherhood and the cooperating Waf’d Party may overwhelm secular forces at the polls.\(^{123}\) The coalition includes the Democratic Front (formed around the man who is now Prime Minister), the Egyptian Social Democratic Party of influential political scientist Amr Hamzawy, and three other parties. The Democratic Front has already formed coalitions with two smaller “liberal, leftist, nationalist, Islamist” parties: the Masrena and the Reform and Development Party.\(^{124}\) Their leadership says that they expect to gain a majority of seats.\(^{125}\) Similarly, the socialist parties have formed a coalition including about 5000 members of the Workers Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, the Revolutionary Socialist Party, the outlawed Communist Party and the Popular Democrats.

Table 5 shows major political parties.\(^{126}\) This table also indicates where parties have expressly affirmed or declaimed the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.

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\(^{125}\) Ibid.

\(^{126}\) To become official and registered, an Egyptian party must collect 5,000 signatures with a notary present. Of the 5,000 signatures, 3,000 must be equally collected from 10 of the 27 provinces (called “governorates”), obtaining at least 300 from each governorate. Signatures qualify as official once the signatory pays the notary to validate their form. In addition, parties may not form on the basis of religion or class. They must pay 1 million Egyptian pounds to publish news of their formation in the newspaper according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A detailed list of political parties and groups is available at The Atlantic’s Interactive Graphic and, for older pre-2011 parties, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website, which is reportedly scheduled for updating.
Table 5. Influential Political Parties in Egypt & the Treaty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL GROUP</th>
<th>BACKGROUND</th>
<th>COMMENT ON INTERNATIONAL TREATIES</th>
<th>FOREIGN POLICY PLATFORM (if provided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tagammu’ Party (National Progressive Unionist)</td>
<td>Founded in the 1976 after Pres. Sadat dissolved the Arab Socialist Union; Leftist, socialist legacy</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Oppose normalization of relations with Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adl or Justice Party</td>
<td>Founded 2011: youth membership, open to alliance with Freedom and Justice; ElBaradei’s sister helped found</td>
<td>ElBaradei has indicated that the treaty will hold. Maintain</td>
<td>Oppose normalization of relations with Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>Founded 2011: leftist, merger of Egyptian Democratic Party and Liberal Egyptian Party</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution</td>
<td>Founded 2011; leftist, represents six political groups</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Egyptians Party</td>
<td>Founded 2011, supported by Coptic Christian businessman Sawiris</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td>Developing stronger ties with Turkey and Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ghad “Tomorrow” Party</td>
<td>Founded 2004; Party of Ayman Nour, long-time Presidential opponent of Mubarak</td>
<td>Cancel</td>
<td>Resolve international disputes through mutual respectful dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood-Freedom &amp; Justice Party</td>
<td>Founded 2011: Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm.</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td>Developing stronger ties with Turkey and Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Waf’d Party</td>
<td>Founded in the 1920’s as an aristocrat’s party. Most established.</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td>Cooperate with regional parties to achieve a just peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Wasat “Center” Party</td>
<td>Founded 1996: Centrist breakaway party from Muslim Brotherhood; Party of Aboul Fotouh, Pres. candidate</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Prioritizing relations with Sudan &amp; Nile Basin countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Front</td>
<td>Founded 2007: Centrist liberal party formed around balance of power, rule of law, Party of Essam Sharaf-Prime Minister. Supports Baradei.</td>
<td>Unspecified: Maintain presumed</td>
<td>Rejects meddling by foreign powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karama “Dignity” Party</td>
<td>Founded 1996 ; leftist</td>
<td>Cancel</td>
<td>Oppose Western interference in Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New National Party</td>
<td>New name of former National Democratic Party, Mubarak’s party – now led by opposition leader to Mubarak’s NDP</td>
<td>Unspecified: Maintain presumed</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Renaissance Party</td>
<td>Founded 2011: SalaFist Muslim</td>
<td>Unspecified: Cancel presumed</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SalaFist Nour Party</td>
<td>Founded 2011; SalaFist Muslim, from Alexandria</td>
<td>Unspecified: Cancel presumed</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Multiple articles including “The Atlantic MonthlyInteractive Graphic: Visualizing Egypt's Diverse Political Parties” and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website: “Carnegie Guide to Egypt’s Elections.” SalaFist radical Islamic parties would likely abrogate the treaty, and Mubarak’s legacy New National Party would likely affirm the Treaty, so several limited presumptions have been made. Parties lacking foreign policy positions often seem to have focused substantially on domestic issues such as the legal basis of the constitution, the electoral process and economic rights. Parties are also inconsistent in aligning their ideology with their membership stance. Since parties seeking legal status are prohibited from excluding members on the basis of either religion or class (a salient category in Egypt), even radical Islamists make public statements welcoming Christians into their membership.
Egypt’s active political culture has led to efforts to brand parties with labels such as liberal and conservative, but these labels do not correspond neatly to explain political party support or opposition to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, the most critical issue tied to security cooperation. Islamist politics does not predict Treaty opposition. For a country that has--according to a 2010 Pew poll--95 percent of its population supporting Islam’s influence in politics, only 48 percent of that public believes it plays a large or significant role. For example, Islamist-dominated major parties, including the Brotherhood, the Waf’d and the al-Wasat (Centrist) Party have indicated that they will maintain support for the treaty. Prior to 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood indicated in statements to the press that they favored a referendum for the Egyptian populace to vote on the Treaty, however, they have altered the stance to state that they will leave the Treaty in place, not holding any vote. Al-Wasat, is a “Center” party that broke away from the Brotherhood in 1996 but advocates a political system that is firmly anchored in Islamic law. Contrary to expectations of an Islamist-based party, Al-Wasat views shari’a principles as flexible and wholly compatible with the principles of pluralism and equal citizenship rights and also supports the Peace Treaty.

Leaders of two parties considered liberal, al-Ghad (Tomorrow) and al-Karama (Dignity) have both said that they would cancel the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Their position aligns with the popular perception that the Treaty caters to international rather than to Egyptian interests. The Treaty is identified with the Mubarak regime. Parties seek to enhance their electoral chances by aligning their language with that of the Revolution and by repudiating Mubarak’s policies. Even

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127Rumley.
parties supporting the Treaty have platforms that share common themes with Treaty opponents. Common themes include placing domestic economic and social concerns first, along with constitutional reform. Foreign policy themes highlight the “cold peace” with Israel, featuring support for the Palestinian cause and opposing the normalization of relations with Israel.

Major political parties, which publicly pledge to maintain the Treaty, also distance themselves from Israel. For example, Waf’d leader Al-Badawy describes his position in “Daily News Egypt” as:

He always stressed the importance of Palestinian rights during meetings with foreign officials like the assistant of the US Secretary of State, the US ambassador in Egypt and the European Union delegation.

I was the first Waf’d leader to declare the party's stance on the peace treaty with Israel when I said that the treaty will go through a difficult test should Israel refuse to commit to establishing a Palestinian state on the land it occupied in 1967.130

Badawy was hosting the Hamas delegation at the time the article appeared. Another mainstream party founder, Coptic Christian and telecom chief, Naguib Sawiris, cites the impatience of the man on the street with Israeli arrogance. Sawiris’ view is that the Israelis should accept the 1967 boundaries without further delaying tactics, even though he does not oppose the Treaty.131

**Leading Egyptian Presidential Candidates**

Egypt’s current constitutional system consists of a strong executive with weak legislative and judicial branches. While Parliamentary elections can generate constitutional reform and a more robust separation of powers, the outsized leadership role of the President is likely to remain...

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a feature of political culture for the foreseeable future. The Presidential candidate’s positions on
the Egypt-Israel Treaty matter in any case. While candidates continue to enter the race, the key
players may have already taken the stage. These are: Amr Moussa, Mohamed ElBaradei and Dr.
Moneim Abou El-Fotouh.\textsuperscript{132} For the first time in six decades, none of these frontrunners have a
military background. Both Moussa and ElBaradei are diplomats, having served at the U.N. and in
regional or international roles. From the Mubarak era, Moussa is 74 years old while ElBaradei is
69 and El-Fotouh is 59.

Amr Moussa, a diplomat and statesman, has a popular following in diverse segments of
Egyptian society based on government service in Egypt and leadership of the Arab League.
Moussa was Mubarak’s Foreign Minister from 1991-2001. He has also served in India and as
Egypt’s Permanent Representative to the U.N. Mubarak may have appointed his former
colleague, Moussa, to the Arab League, outside Egypt’s political circles, so that Mubarak would
not be overshadowed by this popular figure.

At the Arab League, Palestine was Moussa’s top issue. While linked to Mubarak
periodically in the press, through his repudiation of Israel, Moussa may be able to remake himself
as a reformer. Moussa’s popularity is tied to his anti-Israel rhetoric. “The source of his popularity
is almost entirely derived from his image as an Arab nationalist who’s very critical of Israel.”

While his popularity has declined since February, Moussa is still considered the
frontrunner.\textsuperscript{133} In a country where thirty percent of the population is illiterate, Moussa may have
benefited from being the topic of a popular, laudatory song.\textsuperscript{134} A June, 2011 survey gives Moussa
twenty-five percent of the vote, with five percent for ElBaradei and lower numbers for other

\textsuperscript{132}In English, ElBaradei uses an unhyphenated name.

\textsuperscript{133}“Egypt’s Rising Power Player,” The Daily Beast (2011), http://www.thedailybest.com/
newsweek/2011/07/10/why-amr-moussa-is-egypt-s-presidential-frontrunner.html (accessed 6 August
2011).

\textsuperscript{134}Ibid.
candidates. Moussa is now also courting the Muslim vote. He comments about the Egypt-Israel Treaty that: “The treaty is a treaty. For us, the treaty has been signed, and it is for peace, but it depends also on the other side.”\textsuperscript{135} “I will tell you two things: No. 1, that the treaty, we’re not going to abrogate it. And No. 2 . . . . We want to rebuild the country, and rebuilding the country by necessity [means] not to follow an adventurous policy.”\textsuperscript{136} Moussa, like other leading Egyptians, wants to avoid adventurism abroad in favor of stable policies that allow a focus on domestic problems.

Mohamed ElBaradei is Moussa’s competitor, currently polling significantly behind Moussa. ElBaradei was formerly head of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) where he is known for having stuck to his view that Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, countering the view of the Bush White House. Also while at IAEA, ElBaradei was co-awarded the Nobel Peace Prize with the IAEA as an organization, in recognition of their work in nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Like Moussa, ElBaradei is a career diplomat and has a law degree. ElBaradei’s father was head of the Egyptian Bar Association. Beginning his career with the IAEA in 1984, ElBaradei served in other roles outside Egypt. He taught at the NYU School of Law for six years in the 1980’s. ElBaradei disconnected from Egypt during his professional life in a way that Moussa has not, and therefore carries no baggage tying him to the Mubarak regime. At the same time, he has much lower name recognition in the population. ElBaradei reportedly however, has the support of the Tahrir Square demonstrators, the youth and several liberal political parties. The Democratic Front, allied with the current Prime Minister, and the Adl “Justice” Party founded by his sister, ElBaradei.


\textsuperscript{136}Egypt’s Rising Power Player.
are two examples. The Adl Party is reportedly open to considering coalitions with the MB Freedom and Justice Party, and ElBaradei is considered sympathetic to Islamist concerns.

In a February interview on Meet the Press, ElBaradei confirmed his view that Palestine must be recognized as an independent state. He also confirmed his view that the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is solid.

The third candidate is Abou El-Fotouh. El-Fotouh was a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, serving on the MB governing body, the Guidance Council for 25 years. He is Secretary-General of the Arab Medical Union. He wrote the book *A Witness to the History of Egypt's Islamic Movement*. El-Fotouh grew frustrated with MB positions, both their Islamist conservatism and the position that MB members could not join political parties outside of the Freedom and Justice Party. He also disagreed with the Brotherhood declaration that they would not run a Presidential candidate. Abou El-Fotouh not only joined another party, but decided to run for President. He is now leading the al-Wasat “Center” Party, the old-line centrist party that itself left the Brotherhood in 1996.

El-Fotouh is running on a “platform combining a form of progressivism and Islamism. “El-Fetouh (sic) condoned the rights of women to reject the veil, the conversion between Muslims and Christians, and even mentioned the possibility of a woman or… a non-Muslim ascending to the presidency one day.”137 Given the fractures within the MB, El-Fotouh is expected to attract votes from Brotherhood members. Through his identification with the Brotherhood, he is likely to do best with conservative and rural voters, and less well in liberal and Christian enclaves. However, he has already garnered support from Brotherhood youth, who have broken away to form their own political party, the “Current” Party, seeking change and principles more similar to those of El-Fotouh.

137 Rumley.
El-Fotouh has published his view on the Egypt-Israel Treaty on *The Washington Post* Opinion page. “Our track record of responsibility and moderation is a hallmark of our political credentials, and we will build on it. For instance, it is our position that any future government we may be a part of will respect all treaty obligations made in accordance with the interests of the Egyptian people.”

The al-Wasat/El-Fotouh foreign policy issues include a focus on Sudan, on resolving the Palestinian question and on Arab cooperation. Both Moussa and ElBaradei seek to focus on the Palestinian peace talks. They criticize Israel’s lack of seriousness in the talks to date. Moussa has confirmed his support for the Saudi declaration that Israel is obliged to agree to the creation of a Palestinian state, the Arab declaration of 2002. ElBaradei has raised the spectre of an Israeli attack on Gaza, the home of Hamas, and indicated that such an attack would trigger an Egyptian response. So at the same time that leaders confirm the treaty, they caution that it is not elastic enough to contain all possible Israeli actions.

**U.S. Leadership: Divergent Views**

In addition to the support the Treaty needs from Egyptian leaders, to maintain security cooperation, the U.S. security cooperation with Egypt depends on the concurrence of multiple U.S. Government leaders on the $1.3 billion contribution to Egypt’s military. While the Administration proposes the funding for military sales and loans, Congress makes the budget decisions. The Congress has diverse purposes and constituencies. The U.S. military, specifically the security cooperation establishment, may point to the modulated response of the Egyptian military to the revolution as a ‘poster child’ for an ongoing investment in the relationship.

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Congressional leaders express concern that aid to Egypt’s military would be better placed in civilian hands as economic support.

In 2004 and 2005, a minority in Congress have attempted to shift funds from military to economic assistance, but were unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{139} Recently, a Republican bill surfaced which would have conditioned security assistance on the Egyptian Government’s response to the Revolution. Security assistance for Israel increased, under a 2007 Memorandum of Agreement, but Egypt’s security assistance stayed the same. Economic aid for both Israel and Egypt was trimmed in a 3:2 ratio, under the Glide Path Agreement signed the same year.\textsuperscript{140} With a new regime in power, pressures could increase to augment economic aid in support of democratization. One place to get increased economic support funds is from security assistance.

Even in a budget-cutting year, it will take time for the United States to make changes in Egyptian security assistance. President Obama has proposed increasing debt forgiveness for Egypt by $1 billion in 2011, on top of Egypt’s annual security and economic aid. He has also proposed another $1 billion in loan guarantees. “Cutting” this year would involve reducing an increase. Cuts in the bedrock $1.3 billion would then await the FY2013 budget. On the merits, if Egypt’s elections lead to a more democratic state, Egypt’s relative stabilizing influence in the Middle East puts it in a strong position for funding, one reason that security assistance is likely to remain largely intact for the foreseeable future or change only around the margins.

\textbf{Section Four: Conclusion- Forces of Stability and Change}

Now, as before the January Revolution, U.S.-Egypt security cooperation hinges on Egypt maintaining the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty developed through the Camp David Accords. While that peace holds, the U.S.-Egypt security cooperation will endure because it meets the strategic

\textsuperscript{139}Sharp, 28.
\textsuperscript{140}Sharp, 8.
needs of U.S. military and political leaders and Egyptian political and military leaders. The Egyptian military leadership has not changed, and the predominant political leadership, both presidential candidates and parties, support the Treaty. New political leaders look like coalition-builders, unlikely to take on the military’s grip on power for some years. The forces of stability are stronger than the forces that could change the U.S.-Egypt security cooperation.

For its part, the United States values strategic access to a region connected to the two major conflicts that the country has engaged in over the past twenty years. Security cooperation has built a strong and durable military-to-military relationship at the Joint Chiefs level in both countries. The United States has effectively traded interoperability with the Egyptian military, a nominal goal, for a close and strategic military relationship which has paid larger dividends in the access it provides the United States to advance its interests in the Middle East. Priority use of the Suez Canal, flyover and landing rights, and presence in the region, have contributed markedly to allowing the United States to manage its military initiatives in the region effectively and efficiently.

The $1.3 billion in annual U.S. assistance modernized the Egyptian military’s infrastructure and insulated the military’s domestic industrial network from the cost of security infrastructure. Building that relationship further, a cadre of Egyptian officers matriculated through U.S. professional military education programs. Joint military exercises involving all of the services on both sides have allowed the United States and Egypt to practice maritime, desert and aerial maneuvers in the Mediterranean region.

The January Revolution of 2011 ended the Mubarak regime that governed during twenty-nine of thirty-one years of U.S.-Egypt security cooperation. The Presidential candidates and the political parties that take seats in Parliament are developing a new Constitution for Egypt, with a potential for dramatic change. While new conditions prevail throughout much of the Egyptian political universe, historic features remain. The military leaders have not changed since the
January Revolution. To ensure stability, the military was chosen to govern, rather than, for example, the judiciary. The choice may reflect the military’s historic role, its perceived wealth and political ties or its ability to control the means of force. Regardless, the military will retain a significant amount of economic and political control.

The new government will reflect an Egyptian consensus and unpredictable coalitions. Many current political parties have indicated a preoccupation with domestic social and economic conditions. The ruling parties, in both the executive and the legislative arenas, are most likely to take an incremental approach, avoiding dramatic change in foreign policy where possible in order to manage change on the domestic front. Further, the political parties appear to be coalition-builders, pragmatists whose ideology allows them to form alliances and move incrementally towards their objectives. Alliances between the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood are already widely written about in the media. Alliances between “liberal” political candidates and the Muslim Brotherhood party are likewise shaping the political landscape. The Muslim Brotherhood’s own pragmatism is likely to engage should they take a significant number of seats in Parliament and achieve major political leverage.

The deep-rooted U.S.-Egyptian political and security alliance and Egypt's peace treaty with Israel do not only serve American interests in the region, however. Should the Muslim Brotherhood be in a position to spearhead policy in the future, the group is not likely to confront the military on such an issue. Abolishing peace with Israel would strip the military of that aid and usher in further international isolation. For such reasons, leading figures in the Brotherhood's recently legalized political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party, claim the peace treaty will stay intact. 141

The new regime will still make a break from the past. The leading Presidential candidates and most of the political parties reflect the popular view that, in foreign policy, it is time to focus on an Egyptian and Arab agenda rather than an international one. The populace will be less accepting of U.S. definitions of terrorism and more interested in creating their own definitions.

141Dabbs.
The regime, while still in transition, has already made overtures towards Gaza’s Hamas Party and towards Iran.

The Egyptian foreign policy agenda surfaces in political party platforms that seek closer ties to the Gulf and the Arab region. Egypt is likely to take further steps to regain its historical primacy in the Arab world, broadly defined. The government elected after the transition will define security in new ways, relative to Sudan, the creation of a Palestinian state and constraints on Israel. Regardless of the number of seats it gains in Parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in government has already increased. In an article explaining the Brotherhood’s approaches to economics and foreign policy, a commentator suggests: “The MB will also make strategic geopolitical moves,” economic researcher Abdel-Rahman added from a Brotherhood meeting in August, “claiming that the movement will distance itself from Europe and the United States and concentrate its energies on improving partnerships with countries like Turkey and Iran.”

The new government may in fact, save Egypt from greater radicalism by releasing built-up pressures towards change in moderate steps, however distasteful these may be to the idealized U.S. worldview. In addition, the new government can attract news coverage through foreign policy shifts that fulfill the popular preferences. By allowing great Muslim Brotherhood participation and by reaching out to Muslim partners that the United States has condemned, the new government demonstrates its independence and Arab-first approaches. Cynics argue that outreach alone is just a gesture without practical consequences for the United States and Israel. "Especially in Egypt, propaganda is one thing, and practicality is a second. It means nothing," says Tel Aviv University Professor Gil Feiler, in World Politics Review, "We have lived like this

142egypt.com.
for decades. This is nothing new."\(^{143}\) Even if Egypt’s turn towards its Arab neighbors is real, it will be a matter of degree, and won’t become a radical 180 degree turn. The turn will simply not go far enough to abrogate the Egypt-Israel Treaty and threaten the security cooperation.

While the SCAF continues to balance artfully between the demands of the demonstrators and their own traditional interests, the tightrope is getting harder to cross. If the SCAF can continue to navigate the challenges of constitutional reform, labor strikes, political demonstrations, a weakening economy and international concern for the future of government, they can emerge from elections behind the scenes, with their economic superstructure intact and a conciliatory civil government in place. Based on the likelihood that the Egyptian military will maintain its key role as a behind-the-scenes force stabilizing the civilian government, and therefore that the military’s will prevails on security cooperation, security cooperation is likely to continue at the same levels, adjusting incrementally in favor of economic aid over time.

However, there are counterpoints that can quickly erode the security cooperation. If the SCAF missteps seriously on the way to elections, the ensuing violence will mar their credibility and confront the new government with difficult choices about how to limit the power of the military. Even if the $1.3 billion in security assistance shrinks at the margins, the bedrock ties between Egypt’s current Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the U.S. military leadership can protect a level of security assistance. For example, the level of assistance could decrease. Or, if Egypt prefers less visible U.S. assistance, the scale or frequency of military exercises may shrink.

Failing to observe the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in law and in practice will break the cooperation apart. The leading Presidential contender already stated that should Israel attack Hamas-controlled Gaza, Egypt will come to Gaza’s aid. Secondly, if the Arab spring is really an

\(^{143}\)Dabbs.
Islamic spring, and the inclusion that Islamic candidates like El-Fotouh preach is simply a campaign device as some aver, the United States would be forced to examine its security assistance. Since the United States deemed its strategic interests in line with two major airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) plane sales to Saudi Arabia, a Wahabist Islamic state, this examination could still come down in Egypt’s favor. Divisions within Egypt’s own Islamist camp mitigate the prospect of an increasingly radical Islamic takeover, however.

The United States, on the other hand, faces extraordinary budget constraints. The Congressional role of freshman lawmakers on budget issues has introduced a new wildcard into the system. Long-time members of Congress already made efforts to shift military aid to economic aid and moved to place conditions on a new $1 billion in debt forgiveness and $1 billion in loan guarantees related to military assistance. Congressional moves to alter Egypt’s security assistance evaporated. Egypt is still likely to emerge from challenges to the security assistance, in the short-term, as a priority country for U.S. security support. The security cooperation is likely to hold with only incremental changes for the immediate future.

Many topics remain for future scholars to tackle. These include the impact of potential isolationist sentiment in the United States on cooperation with Egypt. More immediately, the September attacks on Israel’s Embassy in Cairo, which took place after this paper was written, reveal Egyptian willingness to turn to violent demonstrations to express frustration on long-simmering issues. This Israeli Embassy attack led to the Egyptian Prime Minister’s statement that the Camp David Accords may need a renewed look, but, in a visit to Washington, D.C. in September when he met with Secretary Clinton, the Prime Minister amended his statement and indicated that he will support the Treaty. Street violence in October 2011 between Coptic Christian Egyptians, the Army and Salafists raises questions about the Army’s ability to lead a fragile Egyptian society through peaceful elections and severely tests the military-to-military goodwill with the United States.
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