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**DIVISION CHEF / PHONE:** David Hamon 703.767.5713  
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The Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR)

PROFESSOR THE HON PETER ANDERSON¹
CATR Chair, 2008-2009
Director, the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University

Introduction

The Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR) has its roots in the initial months following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Although the United States initially received widespread global support for what the Bush administration called the “global war on terror,” over time, as the US “war on terror” expanded its reach beyond al-Qaida’s safe haven in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, allies and partners began to question some aspects of the US approach. Regional experts criticized the disproportionately military response to what they regarded as a threat with primarily political, social, and economic roots and the focus on religiously-motivated “jihadists” that overlooked other, largely secular, but no less dangerous, violent extremist movements. The regional view of the landscape of transnational threats in Asia extended well beyond al-Qaida, involving loose networks of violent groups that traded resources and know-how, but did not necessarily have a central leadership, common motivations, or a shared agenda. To understand and cope with this threat landscape would require a multilateral and nuanced approach, in which states across the Asia-Pacific region could work in partnership with the United States to develop comprehensive responses to an increasingly complex threat environment.

By late 2004, it had become apparent that the roots of the jihadist terrorism that had produced the 9/11 attacks reached far beyond Afghanistan. The operational and organizational links between Al Qaida and jihadist groups in South and Southeast Asia had already become clear by 1995 when Philippine police broke up a plot involving Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to bomb multiple commercial aircraft en route from Southeast Asia to the United States. A series of events in the months and years following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, however, highlighted the need for counter terrorism partnerships in Asia that would draw more effectively on the considerable experience and expertise of potential Asian partners. In December 2001, Singapore security forces uncovered a Jemaah Islamiyya (JI) conspiracy to launch multiple suicide bombing attacks on Western embassies in the city-state. In October 2002, JI operatives conducted a devastating car bomb attack in Bali, Indonesia, that killed 202 people from 22 countries. The SuperFerry 14 bombing in the Philippines in February 2004, conducted by the Abu Sayyaf Group, killed 116 people. A highly-networked threat would require a networked response. It was in this atmosphere that the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the United States Pacific Command asked the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) – a non-profit, federally-funded research and development center (FFRDC) in Alexandria,

¹This is a revised and expanded version of an article that first appeared in the special CATR-themed issue of the Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 4(1), 2009. It was written in close collaboration with Drs Caroline F. Ziemke-Dickens and Kongdan Oh Hassig, who provided invaluable notes and sources of information.
Asian Transnational Security Challenges: Emerging Trends, Regional Visions

The Council for Asian Transnational Threats Research (CATR)

Edited by
Caroline Ziemke-Dickens
Institute for Defense Analyses

and

Julian Droogan
Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT),
Macquarie University, Australia

October 2010

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Asian Transnational Security Challenges: Emerging Trends, Regional Visions

The Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR)

The Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR) was founded in 2005 to provide specialized research that draws from the diverse expertise and perspectives of resident experts across the South and Southeast Asian regions. Through regular communication and collaboration, CATR members have developed new approaches, enhanced existing capabilities and built integrated and cooperative efforts to counter terrorist, insurgent, and other violent transnational threats in the Asia-Pacific region. CATR represents a commitment by its member institutions to engage in an ongoing program to develop a deeper understanding of the causes that give rise to terrorism and politically motivated violence, to forge more effective national and regional responses to share best practices in counter-terrorism/counter-radicalization.

CATR Member Institutions

Afghanistan Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS)
Australian Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University; Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Bangladesh Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence; Bangladesh Institute for Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS)
India Institute of Conflict Management (ICM)
Indonesia Institute of Conflict Management (ICM)
Japan Center for the Study of Islam and Society at the State Islamic University of Indonesia; Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Malaysia Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Pakistan Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Philippines Strategic and Integrative Studies Center (SISC); Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR)
Republic of Korea Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA)
Singapore International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) and the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Sri Lanka International Centre for Terrorism Research and Conflict Management (ICTRCM)
USA Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)

The Editors

Dr. Caroline Ziemke-Dickens, Institute for Defense Analyses, USA
Dr. Julian Droogan, Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University, Australia

Permission to reprint articles elsewhere should be sought from: The Editors, at Julian.droogan@mq.edu.au, Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Level 2, Building Y3A, Macquarie University, NSW 2109.

Please note

Views expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect those of the Editors or of the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism. Any errors of fact are the responsibility of the authors.

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CATR owes particular gratitude to Associate Professor Kumar Ramakrishna, Head of the Centre of Excellence in National Security (CENS) of Nanyang Technical University in Singapore, who hosted the Authors’ Workshop for this project in May, 2010. Dr. Ramakrishna and his excellent assistant, Ms. Yvonne Lee, offered invaluable administrative and conference support in the planning and successful execution of the workshop. In addition, Ms. Yeap Su Yin, Ms. Yolanda Chin, Ms. Jenna Park, Ms. Ng Sue Chia and Mr. Clint Lorimore, Associate Research Fellows at CENS, kept the workshop running smoothly, provided valuable input into the discussions, and kept a valuable record of the proceedings. Dr. Helene Lavoix, Visiting Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at NTU was also generous with both her time and her intellectual input over the course of the workshop.

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Last but definitely not least, we want to acknowledge the “Empress Dowager” of CATR, Dr. Kongdan (Katy) Oh Hassig. Without her inexhaustible energy, extensive regional networking, administrative and financial acumen, and motivational skill, CATR would neither exist, nor remain the collegial and productive environment that it is.
Chairman’s Preface

As the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR), I am pleased to present Asian Transnational Security Challenges: Emerging Trends, Regional Visions. This publication is the product of the CATR Emerging Threats Survey, a year-long collaborative research project conceived by the CATR Board of Governors, carried out by CATR member institutions, and coordinated by the Institute for Defense Analyses with support from the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT) at Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia.

The objective of the Survey was to provide a rigorous, country-by-country analysis of the most important emerging non-traditional and transnational security threats in Asia over the coming five to 10 year horizon. This resulting volume represents the CATR’s ongoing commitment to producing high-quality collaborative research on the origins, nature and evolution of transnational threats across the Asia-Pacific region. It is our hope that this book will constitute a springboard for fresh discussion, debate and collaborative approaches to threat reduction both within the CATR and in the broader academic and policy communities.

Since its creation in 2005, the CATR has provided a multilateral institutional forum for the cultivation of sustained dialog and cooperative research on a broad range of issues related to terrorism, political violence, and other transnational, non-state threats to the sovereignty and security of Asian states and societies. Through its international symposia, workshops, website and publications, the CATR provides a platform for academic and policy discussions and networking for individuals and groups from a wide variety of disciplines: academic researchers, policy analysts, journalists, policymakers, educators, students, and military, intelligence and law-enforcement officials.

The personal and professional relationships forged through CATR have provided the foundation for intellectual and analytical collaboration under the auspices of CATR and beyond. CATR’s work follows from the shared understanding among its member institutions that effective responses to continuing and emerging transnational threats in Asia require not ideological or analytical conformity but the emergence of compatible visions that result from mutual understanding of each state’s unique perspectives and cultural and political context. CATR’s goal in producing this survey is to contribute to that process by identifying what we see as some of the most important emerging trends in the ever-shifting landscape of transnational threats.

Rommel Banlaoi
Executive Director, Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR),

Manila
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Introduction

The Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR) has its roots in the initial months following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Although the United States initially received widespread global support for what the Bush administration called the “global war on terror”, over time, as the US “war on terror” expanded its reach beyond al-Qaida’s safe haven in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, allies and partners began to question some aspects of the US approach. Regional experts criticized the disproportionately military response to what they regarded as a threat with primarily political, social, and economic roots and the focus on religiously-motivated “jihadists” that overlooked other, largely secular, but no less dangerous, violent extremist movements. The regional view of the landscape of transnational threats in Asia extended well beyond al-Qaida, involving loose networks of violent groups that traded resources and know-how, but did not necessarily have a central leadership, common motivations, or a shared agenda. To understand and cope with this threat landscape would require a multilateral and nuanced approach, in which states across Asia could work in partnership with the United States to develop comprehensive responses to an increasingly complex threat environment.

By late 2004, it had become apparent that the roots of the jihadist terrorism that had produced the 9/11 attacks reached far beyond Afghanistan. The operational and organizational links between al-Qaida and jihadist groups in South and Southeast Asia had already become clear by 1995 when Philippine police broke up a plot involving Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to bomb multiple commercial aircraft en route from Southeast Asia to the United States. A series of events in the months and years following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, however, highlighted the need for counter terrorism partnerships in Asia that would draw more
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**The birth of the CATR**

As a first step, IDA organized a symposium bringing together leading terrorism experts from across Southeast Asia to assess the nature and depth of the terrorist threat in their region. IDA designed the conference as an exercise in strategic listening. Rather than bring Western experts in to lecture the Asians on how to solve their problems, the conference gave Asian analysts a platform from which to inform American policymakers on the nature of the terrorist threat as seen through Southeast Asian eyes. IDA drew on its extensive network of academic and government contacts across Asia to assemble leading scholars and officials and young, rising stars in the field of counter terrorism research. The international symposium, entitled “The Dynamics and Structure of Terrorist Threats in Southeast Asia” was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 18-20 April 2005. Co-hosted by IDA, the US Pacific Command, and the newly-established Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCCT) – part of the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – the symposium brought together over 30 experts from across the region, including academics, journalists, policymakers, and military, intelligence, and law enforcement officials.

The quality of discussions at the Kuala Lumpur conference exceeded expectations. Multilateral forums the world over, but especially in Asia, have the reputation of being staid and formalized affairs. At the close of the meeting, a consensus emerged that the sponsoring institutions needed to find a way to maintain the momentum of positive and creative exchange of ideas that had started over the course of the three-day symposium. A sustained engagement effort designed to promote cooperative research on terrorism and political violence in Southeast Asia would advance both government and non-government efforts to develop a better understanding of the roots of the terrorist threat and its links to other trends across the region and, more importantly, to develop effective responses. IDA’s sponsor from the Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed to provide initial funding for such an effort, and the Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR) – renamed the Council for Asian Transnational Threats Research in October 2009 – was born.
IDA drafted a charter for the CATR, which it presented to representatives from four institutions that had participated in the Kuala Lumpur symposium: the State Islamic University of Indonesia (UIN), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at Nanyang University, Singapore, the International Centre for Terrorism Research and Conflict Management, Sri Lanka, and the SEARCCT (Malaysia). A Steering Committee met on the UIN campus in Jakarta in July 2005 to draft a set of general principles for the CATR and agree on a final charter. The charter went into effect with the establishment of a permanent CATR Board of Governors at the First Biannual CATR Symposium in Denpasar, Bali on 19 October 2005. Since the establishment of the CATR in 2005, its scope has expanded to include South, Southeast and Northeast Asia and its membership has grown to include 18 institutions from 13 nations across the Asia-Pacific region. The CATR has a rotating institutional chairmanship. The UIN (Indonesia) served as the first CATR Chair, followed by the Strategic and Integrative Studies Center (Philippines), and the SEARCCT (Malaysia). Macquarie University’s Centre for Policing, Intelligence, and Counter Terrorism (PICT) became Australia’s lead institutional representative on the CATR Board in 2007 and assumed the CATR Chair in November 2008. In late 2009 the Chair was transferred to the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR).

From its inception, the CATR came face-to-face with the disruptive effects of terrorism and political violence. The Jakarta Steering Committee had agreed that the First Biannual CATR Symposium should be held in Colombo, Sri Lanka; but a few weeks before the meeting was to convene, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) assassinated Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister, triggering a State of Emergency. In the ensuing atmosphere of tension, the Sri Lankan government warned the organizers of the Colombo meeting that it could not guarantee the security of CATR participants and recommended that the meeting be cancelled. The CATR’s institutional Chair at the time, UIN, stepped into the breach and offered to host the re-located CATR Symposium in Denpasar, Bali. Then, on 1 October 2005, a series of suicide bombings killed twenty people in Kuta and Jimbaran, Bali. Despite travel warnings issued by several of the members’ governments, the CATR participants were unanimous in their determination to go ahead with the Bali meeting. Thanks to the UIN organizers, CATR members, and the gracious people of Bali, the First Biannual CATR Symposium was a great success. CATR participants had the opportunity to observe first-hand the immediate and devastating consequences of terrorism – not only the physical destruction at the bomb sites but also the socio-economic cost to the Balinese people whose livelihood depends so heavily on the tourist industry, which had just begun to recover from the devastating October 2002 bombings. As soon as Sri Lanka lifted its state of emergency, the CATR elected to hold its second Biannual Symposium in Colombo in March 2006. Again, the CATR experience was enriched by the opportunity to learn first-hand how living with an ongoing insurgency shaped the lives of ordinary citizens and, more importantly, how communities like those in Bali and Sri Lanka pull together to overcome the disruptive effects of those who use violence to try to achieve their goals at the expense of the innocent.
The CATR organizational culture

According to its charter, the CATR was established “for the purpose of providing systematic ways for promoting and sharing regional research on terrorism and counter terrorism and enhancing the capabilities of member institutions and countries in the Asia-Pacific region to counter terrorism, drawing on the unique strengths and perspectives of each member”. The underlying philosophy of the CATR is that the best way to build such a network is through building sustained relationships among a core membership. While the CATR always welcomes new participants to expand its analytical and knowledge base, the group’s primary emphasis is on sustaining and encouraging contact between its core institutional members and individual participants, many of whom have been involved in the CATR since its inception. As a result, CATR discussions and analyses are characterized by a level of openness that is rare in institutional forums, and particularly so in Asia. In its early stages, participants in CATR meetings felt strongly that, in order to maintain the atmosphere of open exchange of ideas and information, the group should maintain a relatively low public profile. All discussions at CATR conferences were, and continue to be, conducted according to the Chatham House rule of non-attribution. CATR proceedings were circulated widely among government agencies in the member states, but the CATR did not publish materials for public distribution or provide press information about its meetings. Over time, however, the CATR’s institutional members have come to support the idea that the CATR should share its insights and analytical products with a wider audience, and each CATR Biannual meeting now includes at least one public session open to local experts, the media and other interested parties.

The CATR brings together representatives of government counter terrorism centers, strategic analysis institutes, military research centers, staff colleges, and major secular and religious universities, along with prominent academics and journalists from across Asia. In addition, the CATR attempts to encourage and give a forum to rising young analysts in the field and bring its members into contact with other specialist groups, such as journalists, law enforcement officers and religious educators. As of mid-2010, the CATR has held eight more biannual symposia, hosted by institutions across the CATR region: Goa, India (October 2006); Manila, Philippines (March 2007); Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (November 2007); Sydney, Australia (April 2008); Tokyo, Japan (November 2008); Jakarta, Indonesia (April 2009); Seoul, South Korea (October 2009); and Singapore (May, 2010). In addition, the CATR has hosted a series of special roundtables in conjunction with some of its meetings: The Future of Terrorism Research in Asia (March 2007), Terrorist Use of the Media (November 2007), Cyber Terrorism (April 2008), Nuclear and WMD Smuggling (November 2008), and Pesantren Education (April 2009). The CATR published its first collaborative research product, a CATR White Paper entitled The Asian Security Landscape after the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in November 2008 and held its first open symposium before an audience of over 100 experts in Tokyo on 12 November 2008. In January 2009, the CATR introduced a monthly electronic newsletter, “Asian Conflicts Reports”, which publishes short articles on
timely subjects by CATR members and other regional experts. Topics covered in recent issues have included; the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, the fall of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the March 2009 mutiny of the Bangladesh Rifles, the July 2009 suicide bombings in Jakarta, and the July 2010 rise of privately armed groups in the Philippines. In conjunction with this publication, CATR is launching a website (www.catr-acr.org) to provide wider access to its analytical products, as well as an online forum for sharing news and ideas on a wide range of topics related to terrorism and political violence in Asia. The CATR’s increased interest in producing collaborative, widely-disseminated research products, such as the White Papers and “Asian Conflicts Reports”, marks an important milestone in both the evolution of the CATR’s institutional culture and the nature of counter terrorism cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

The CATR’s mission

The goal of the CATR’s symposia and research products is to share new and unique insights into the Asian security landscape, threats, and counter-threat capabilities from the perspective of the local experts and authorities whose primary mission is to track and combat them. The CATR promotes productive dialogue among experts and policymakers across the region with the goal of facilitating the rise of a regional analytical network to which all the CATR members’ nations have access. The CATR has paved the way for cooperative and comparative analyses of the roots of terrorism, the nature and motivations of terrorist and insurgent organizations and their leaders, and the varieties and relative success of local approaches to countering terrorism, political violence, and the violent ideologies that promote them. Over the past five years, the CATR’s focus has expanded to include other non-traditional, transnational security threats, including organized crime, piracy, cyber-terrorism, arms and drug trades, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other advanced weapons technology by dangerous non-state actors.

The CATR’s mission is to encourage these regional partners to broaden their thinking about transnational threats, coordinate with the United States and one another, and develop innovative approaches to responding to all levels and dimensions of transnational threats, not only the ones that relate directly to violent “jihadism”. In South and Southeast Asia, political violence – whether conducted by militant jihadists, ethnic and religious separatist groups, political dissidents, or criminal organizations – long predated the emergence of al-Qaida. Terrorism and political violence in the CATR regions is often the product of long-standing local conflicts with deep historical roots that, while complicated by the infiltration of Arab Wahhabism and the presence of al-Qaida, would likely continue to fester even if the United States and its regional partners succeeded in eliminating the global jihadist movement. To view “violent Islamist extremism” as a “monolithic” threat risks obscuring other important factors contributing to insecurity and instability in the CATR regions: the role of family ties, the importance of local political and economic agendas, and the role of small groups and social networks in spreading radical ideologies and creating social tolerance for
violent political ideologies. CATR members promote a greater focus on the roots and evolution of terrorism and political violence. Only in this way will it be possible to anticipate the emergence of nascent transnational and non-traditional threats at a stage where they are more effectively countered.

The CATR “Emerging Threats Survey”

Over its first five years, CATR’s mission has evolved from a relatively narrow focus on terrorism and violent extremism in South and Southeast Asia to a broader regional focus on emerging non-traditional and transnational threats. CATR’s name has changed – from the Council for Asian Terrorism Research to the Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research – and its scope has expanded, but its fundamental goal has not. CATR remains dedicated to sustaining and expanding its community of interest by building synergies among researchers and analysts across the Asia-Pacific region and providing situational awareness based on regional expertise to policymakers and institutions around the world. The CATR Emerging Threats Survey is the fruit of five years of regional engagement, dialogue and cooperative research. Its objective is collaboration and compilation rather than consensus. Still, looking across the surveys, a number of themes and trends become apparent and point to some common factors that are shaping the emergence of new transnational threats and challenges across the CATR region. The goal of this survey is to build on the insights gained from individual country surveys to identify promising lines for more in-depth cooperative research, analysis, and responses.

The charge to the authors of this CATR Emerging Threats Survey was to draw on data from their individual countries to identify the most important emerging, transnational and non-traditional security threats – those that threaten the survival and development of sovereign states, but which result from sources other than military-to-military action, interstate political action or traditional diplomacy. The temporal horizon of the survey was set to extend out to the next five to ten years, although most of the papers in this volume present a three to five year outlook. The emerging threats identified in the CATR survey combine traditional military and economic measures of power with non-traditional political and cultural ones that do not lend themselves to analysis according to existing national and international security concepts alone. We have focused, in particular, on those emerging threats that rely heavily on new technological platforms or structural changes resulting from globalization.

Individual countries face a broad spectrum of internal threats – many of which are identified here – but, increasingly, the boundaries between internally-driven and externally-driven threats and challenges are blurring. For this reason, the authors of the country surveys were asked to focus primarily on transnational security challenges that exploit weaknesses in state security mechanisms and international security cooperation.

The papers in this volume are arranged in rough geographical order, starting with the perspectives of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and progressing through South and Southeast Asia to those of Indonesia, Australia and Japan. India has been a strong contributing member to the CATR almost since its inception, and currently there are
The Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR)

plans to involve China to a larger degree. However, the countries represented here – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia and Japan – reflect the regional perspectives of key small and middle power nations. As a consequence the survey provides a timely snapshot of the emerging security threats, challenges and opportunities of a number of Asian nations all responding to a series of similar concerns, from the continuing terrorist threat, to social and religious dislocation, energy security, environmental degradation, and the inevitable shifts in economic and military power balances that result from the emergence of China and India as major regional powers.

The concluding paper attempts a broad synthesis of the emerging themes and points to three broad categories, or conduits, along which the emerging transnational threats are spreading across Asia: structural, technological and ideological. Structural conduits are those that have emerged from changes in national and international political, economic and social relationships as a result of economic development, trade liberalization, globalization, political and social reforms, and environmental changes. Technological conduits consist of those advanced information, communication and transportation technologies that are enabling more rapid economic development and integration, but that also provide vast opportunities for illicit and malevolent activities. Ideological conduits emerge from the experiences of multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-class societies in the face of increased globalization and the accompanying structural and technological changes mentioned above, with the result that issues of identity and belonging become increasingly securitized.

This “securitization of identity” is one of the major cross-cutting themes to have emerged across the CATR region, with all of the nations represented in this volume increasingly needing to respond to fragmented populations with many competing layers of religious and ethnic identity, often at odds with the mainstream national discourse. Processes such as globalization, trade liberalization, the rise of new media, migration and displacement are all contributing to this emerging regional security threat.

At the same time, a deficit of effective government and a lack of effective security apparatus and insufficient resources are contributing in many places to the increasing privatization or “atomization” of security. Across the CATR region states have diminishing control over political messages, and when this is coupled with the rise of sub national organizations such as private armed groups, warlords, paramilitary organizations, and insurgent groups, a serious challenge is posed to the legitimacy and effectiveness of national governments. Affinity groups that rival national governments are increasingly taking responsibility for “securing” ungoverned or under-governed areas, providing basic services such as education, healthcare, local enforcement, justice and conflict resolution in ways that reinforce religious, ethnic or ideological identities to the detriment of national ones.

A compatible vision

As might be expected in any project involving an international team of researchers from a wide variety of disciplinary and professional backgrounds, there has been considerable discussion and debate over the scope and terms of reference we have used
to frame and present the findings of the CATR Emerging Threats Survey. As becomes apparent across the individual country surveys, each country – and individual researchers and institutions within each country – define, identify and prioritize their emerging threats differently. At the broadest level, however, the country surveys presented in this volume point to a number of important trends worthy of further serious research, both within the CATR organization and in the broader policy and analytical communities. We expect that this publication will be the first in a series of collaborative CATR projects that will, over the next few years, explore in greater detail some of the key themes and trends identified in this regional overview.

Over the course of CATR’s development, its participants have come to the understanding that success in building effective collaborative responses to terrorist and insurgent threats does not require ideological or analytical conformity. What it does require is the emergence and negotiation of compatible visions that follow from mutual understanding of each state’s unique perspective, challenges, and cultural and political context. The CATR, through its symposia and publications, provides a valuable window into the underlying rationale of its members as they struggle, individually and collectively, to respond to the emergence and evolution of a constantly shifting landscape of violent transnational and non-state threats. It also provides its members with an opportunity to influence how those visions will evolve over the years ahead, and, perhaps, to convince their regional partners that their concerns are being heard and taken seriously.
Introduction

This paper focuses on the threats and trends emerging from both traditional and nontraditional challenges in post-war Afghanistan. In the last three decades, the attention of the Afghan governments and the international community has focused on the war, and there has been little concentration on the Nontraditional Security Threats (NTST) that arise out of non-military sources and impede the development and wellbeing of ordinary people. Weak central governments and their inability in providing basic services during these years greatly contributed to the poverty and misery of the ordinary Afghans. As a result, the living conditions for the people became harsh and they were obliged to leave their homeland and migrate to neighboring countries.

The fighting in the last three decades has seriously damaged Afghanistan’s social, political and economical structures. During this period, more than a million people have been killed and around four million disabled. Agriculture, regarded as the backbone of the country’s economy, has been severely damaged as most agricultural land was destroyed by Soviet bombardments. The educational sector was also seriously affected. Many schools in the districts and villages were closed due to continued fighting. Basic infrastructure such as roads, bridges and dams were also destroyed by both sides in the conflict.

Over the past eight years, the Afghan government has made some efforts to deal with the issues that arise from both sources and to some extent it has succeeded. For instance, more than five million children have gone back to school. Despite all these achievements and successes there is still a lot to be done. The indicators of various public sectors show that Afghanistan still trails far behind neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Iran. To improve the delivery of basic services, the government should improve the capacity of its institutions. The elimination of administrative corruption and the fostering of merit based appointments will greatly help it in this regard.

In order to improve political and economical development in a war torn country it is important for the government to not only pay attention to traditional security threats such as war, terrorism and insurgency but also to nontraditional security threats. Events in recent decades have proved that nontraditional issues have significant impacts on areas of traditional security. For instance, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami which killed over 230,000 proved that it could be more lethal and devastating than traditional wars and terrorist attacks. The Chinese magazine Shijie Zhishi (World Affairs) has offered the following four metrics for nontraditional threats: (1) they transcend national boundaries and are thus transnational in nature; (2) they go beyond
the military sphere; (3) they are often sudden and unexpected; and (4) they are frequently interwoven with traditional security threats. The issues that are explored in this paper cover both traditional security challenges such as terrorism, threats from ungoverned areas and insurgency, and nontraditional security threats such as sociopolitical unrest, health, environmental threats, human migrations, challenges to the rule of law and others.

**Terrorism**

**BRIEF HISTORY AND TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN**

An important factor behind the emergence of religiously motivated terrorism, particularly Islamist groups in Central Asia was the Afghan war against Soviet occupation, which began in 1979 and continued till 1989. During this war, Muslims from all over the world came to neighboring Pakistan in order to cross the border and enter Afghanistan. Although Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the Soviet protégé government lingered in Kabul until 1992. Following the fall of Kabul, a civil war erupted between different Mujahedeen factions. It was also in this period when Osama bin Laden moved with his allies to Sudan, where he lived until 1996. These were the formative years for bin Laden as he developed a strong anti-American and anti-Saudi worldview. Meanwhile, the year 1994 witnessed the emergence of the Taliban in southern Afghanistan as a reaction to the civil war, corruption and lawlessness that had continued unabated since 1992. In 1994 they took control of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan and then gradually spread their writ to other parts of the country. They finally managed to capture Kabul in September 1996.

In October 1998 al-Qaida attacked the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed 223 people altogether. Retaliating US missiles struck suspected al-Qaida installations in Sudan and Afghanistan, but failed to cause any serious damage to al-Qaida’s organization. In the year 2000, al-Qaida operatives bombed the US Navy destroyer USS Cole outside of Aden, Yemen, which killed 17 American sailors. The most spectacular attack was carried out on 11 September 2001, however, when al-Qaida operatives managed to crash two hijacked planes into the World Trade Center in New York, and a third plane into the Pentagon. Soon afterwards, the United States blamed al-Qaida and the Taliban for the attack and, in October 2001, attacked Afghanistan in order to topple the Taliban regime. Despite several attempts to detain or kill him, bin Laden and his lieutenants have remained alive to this day.

Contrary to popular belief, the current Afghan insurgency is not made of the remnants of the Taliban regime, but other groups who have joined with the former Taliban in order to fight against the international presence in Afghanistan. Understanding the roots of the current conflict requires an exposition of key players that are involved in the insurgency as follows:
TALIBAN

As mentioned above the Taliban’s refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden and other wanted al-Qaida members following the 11 September attacks, compelled the US to conduct massive aerial bombardment of Taliban targets in support of Northern Alliance action on the ground. This led first to the collapse of the Taliban’s hold on Mazar-e-Sharif, and then the rest of the country.

Following the collapse of its government based in Kandahar, the Taliban lost not just huge swathes of territory but thousands of fighters who were killed, imprisoned (and then killed), or who simply abandoned the organization. What remained was a core, radical element which withdrew from the urban centers and regrouped, reportedly with foreign allies and probably al-Qaida elements, in the mountainous center of Afghanistan and areas bordering Pakistan.

The Taliban re-emerged as a potent force in early 2005 in the east and south of the country which are predominantly Pashtun settled areas. Their primary targets were government officials, including employees, teachers, judges, attorneys, doctors, engineers and others. Later on, they gradually started targeting the international forces, using suicide bombers. This tactic proved very efficient and caused significant casualties to the international forces. 2007 witnessed the peak of suicide attacks, with 131 people detonating themselves. However, this figure was reduced to 122 in 2008. By the beginning of 2009, they could spread their influence to other parts of the country, especially the north and east. The tactics of the Taliban evolved significantly in the same year. Instead of launching small-scale individual attacks, they conducted well coordinated group attacks on government buildings and police check-posts. The increasing insurgency and resulting insecurity have fueled criminality in some volatile areas of Afghanistan. In those areas, the criminal gangs have become stronger than before. These criminal gangs pave the way for the insurgents to launch their attacks successfully. They also supply sophisticated weapons to insurgents and sometimes provide shelter to them. For example, in some occasions the criminals disguise themselves as Taliban and stop buses on main highways in order to loot passengers.

HAQQANI NETWORK

Originally an active member of the Hezb-I Islami, led by Mawlawi Muhammad Yunus Khalis, Jalaluddin Haqqani was one of the Jihadi commanders who were admired for his bravery during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Shahzad, 2004). In the 1980s, Jalaluddin Haqqani was one of the few commanders who received tens of thousands of dollars in cash from the CIA for his work in fighting the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.

Haqqani joined the Taliban movement in 1995 when the Taliban captured the eastern city of Jalalabad. In the Taliban regime, Haqqani served as the Minister of

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1 An unconfirmed report by Bakhtar News Agency has surfaced indicating legendary Mujahedeen commander and Taliban era Minister Jalaluddin Haqqani has died. According to a source that refused to be named, Haqqani “had Hepatitis problems and died very recently”. The report must be treated as pure speculation until further information is available.
Borders and Tribal Affairs and governor of Paktia Province. Soon after the collapse of the Taliban he, along with his supporters, moved to Waziristan to form a resistance group and to fight against the Afghan and international forces. His group is now known as the Haqqani Network.

The Haqqani Network is believed to rely on local intelligence and face-to-face meetings to plan its operations. Siraj Haqqani, the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani has increasingly taken over responsibility for the military operations of the network. The Haqqani Network facilitates the shipment of weapons, ammunitions and other assistance packages to foreign fighters through madrassas and other critical nodes in Waziristan. It acts primarily as a facilitator, expediter and strategic springboard. It is nevertheless responsible for the increasingly high number of militancy-related incidents along the border of Paktia, Paktika, and especially Khost.

HIZB-I-ISLAMI GULBUDIN (HIG)

Hizb-i-Islami was formed by Gulbudin Hekmatyar in 1976 after he fled to Pakistan following a failed 1974 coup attempt against the previously Soviet-affiliated Sardar Daoud. In exile, Hekmatyar received training from the Pakistani military, while awaiting the opportunity to return to Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later in the year afforded Hekmatyar the opportunity he needed, as Hizb-i-Islami became one of the eight mujahedeen groups that fought against the Soviet occupation throughout the 1980s.

Between 1992 and 1996, Hizb-i-Islami was a vocal participant in Afghanistan’s civil war – even while Hekmatyar was Afghanistan’s nominal prime minister from March 1993 to January 1994. Following the emergence of the Taliban in 1994 and takeover of Kabul in 1996, Hekmatyar went to exile in Iran during the years of Taliban and al-Qaeda ascendancy to power and remained there until 2002 (Isby, 2004). Since the reemergence of the Taliban, Hizb-i-Islami remains one of their close supporters and cooperates with them in fighting against the international forces.

TAHREEK-I-TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP)

Tahreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is one of the main insurgent groups in Pakistan engaged in fighting with the central and provincial governments. The group emerged in 2002 in reaction to the Pakistani army’s operation in the tribal areas in order to stop the infiltration of the militants who were crossing the Afghan border and entering the tribal areas of Pakistan.

Initially, the group’s primary objective was to enforce Sharia law, defeat the NATO-led Coalition forces in Afghanistan and resist the Pakistani Army for their collaboration in the overthrow of the Taliban regime. Later, as they grew stronger, their demands extended to opposing the Federal Government’s control of their areas. By 2004, TTP had consolidated their power in the Waziristan area and was in a position to negotiate with Islamabad to take control of the rest of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The Pakistani government finally agreed to give up some areas to the Taliban.
By the end of 2007, the group was officially headed by Baitullah Mehsud, who refused to recognize the Durand Line as a legitimate frontier and explicitly ruled out any end to the ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan.

Posing a serious threat to the local authorities, the Pakistani government banned the group, froze its bank accounts and assets, and barred it from appearing in the media in August 2008. The government also placed remuneration bounties on the heads of the prominent TTP leaders.

In August 2009, a US drone attack killed Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan. His death was kept secret for sometime till the new leader of the group Hakimullah Mehsud was elected after reported clashes over the leadership of TTP between Hakimullah Mehsud and his main rival Wali-ur-Rahamn. The killing of Baitullah Mehsud provoked the TTP to carry out retaliatory attacks in the major cities of Pakistan. In reaction to these attacks, the Pakistani army launched a major air and ground operation in October 2009 in South Waziristan which is still ongoing at the time of writing.

FOREIGN FIGHTERS

Foreign fighters include different groups and nationalities, such as Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks and others. Foreign fighters, along with many prominent al-Qaida members including Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, are believed to have escaped to FATA following the US invasion of Afghanistan. Yet, some prominent leaders were later arrested in major Pakistani urban centers, like Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, who was arrested in a guesthouse in Lahore in March 2003.

These foreign fighters generally call for jihad and have played a major role in the re-grouping of the Taliban and its fight against international and Afghan forces. In some parts of the Tribal Areas, local tribal elders created militias to fight the Pakistani Taliban groups, especially those who were hosting foreign fighters. In South Waziristan, this led to violent battles between a local tribal militia and Uzbek fighters led by Tahir Yuldash and supported by Baitullah Mehsud. A number of Uzbek fighters were killed and others were forced to shift to other areas where they were given protection.

There is little evidence that foreign fighters have been involved in the insurgency in the southern provinces of Afghanistan. The reason for this is that the southern parts of Afghanistan border the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, where it is more difficult for foreign fighters to hide and find protection than it is in the Tribal Areas.

TRENDS IN THE INSURGENCY

Eight years after the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the security situation still remains a major concern for the Afghan government and the international community. The Taliban, operating from their traditional stronghold in the South, in coordination with other indigenous groups, have expanded the insurgency towards...
the southeast, east, west and now gradually towards the north. Every day, reports of clashes between militants and Afghan and international security forces in these areas are broadcast in the media. Until now, most of the suicide attacks have taken place in the south of the country, which is the stronghold of the Taliban and its allies.

The tactics of the Taliban have evolved significantly in the last eight years. Besides conducting well coordinated group attacks on government buildings and police check-posts the insurgents are also using IEDs as an effective tool against Afghan and international forces. According to the USA Today website, 75% of the casualties to Coalition forces in Afghanistan are due to IEDs (http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2009-04-02-IEDs_N.htm). This has concerned many military commanders because most of the IEDs in Afghanistan are home-made but the materials used are largely available. The countermeasures to these weapons have been formidable, and this has forced the terrorists to place more and more bombs, at greater expense, and to employ them more effectively. The organizations that provide the money for bomb building, and help with obtaining materials, are based in the neighboring countries. During the last three years, a number of the IED gangs have been destroyed, or severely damaged. But while attempts are made to decapitate the IED campaign, work continues at the grassroots level to detect, disable and destroy those that are placed.

### Threats from ungoverned areas

Ungoverned districts in some provinces of Afghanistan together with the cross-border infiltration of terrorists from tribal areas along the Af-Pak border has made the campaign against the insurgents difficult. It is clear that after the fall of the Taliban regime many of their hard-line commanders fled to the FATA. Later, they regrouped and started launching attacks against the Afghan and international security forces.

Meanwhile, there are also some districts in the provinces of Kandahar, Uruzgan, Ghazni, Badghis, Wardak, Kunar, Nuristan, Kunduz and Helmand that are out of government control or where the Taliban exercise more influence than the district officials. In these areas the Taliban have set up a parallel government and rule of law. They also use these areas as safe havens to recruit fighters in. A good example is the district of Gezab, which has been out of government control since 2007. The international forces have made no attempt to capture it back from the Taliban.

In terms of security assessment per province, most of the attacks take place in the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Kunar, Wardak, Paktika, Khost and Nimruz. According to Muhammad Hanif Atmar, the Interior Minister, these areas are particularly targeted by the Taliban because either they share a border with neighboring countries or it is easy for the Taliban to infiltrate (Afghanistan Times, 2009). To prevent further infiltration by the Taliban, it is pivotal for the Afghan and international forces to increase their presence in bordering areas and install the latest technology to strictly monitor these areas.
Environmental challenges

Afghanistan’s environment has been seriously damaged both as a result of deliberate exploitation and neglect. Following the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, a large number of refugees returned to the country, particularly from neighboring Iran and Pakistan. This rising population has seriously affected the environment, as the growing migration towards urban centers has increased traffic and air pollution. As a result, major cities in Afghanistan have become overcrowded and highly polluted.

The Ministry of Health estimates that some 3,000 people die every year from pollution-induced illnesses in Kabul, making this the biggest cause of natural death in a city of almost five million. According to the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) nearly 80% of Kabul’s hospital patients suffer from diseases caused by polluted air and water. With an increase in exposure of 10 micrograms per cubic meter in the level of small particulate matter, “there is a six percent increase in cardiovascular deaths and an eight percent increase in deaths from lung cancer per year”. Kabul has three times the amount of particulate matter per cubic meter than cities in neighboring countries, according to NEPA (Gopal, 2009).

The excessive numbers of vehicles and generators are major factors of air pollution in major cities, specifically in Kabul, which has a capacity of 800,000 people, according to the 1978 Master-Plan, and yet today is home to more than four million. For instance, the number of vehicles has significantly increased from 70,000 in March 2003 to 900,000 in April 2009 (personal interviews with the Director of the Customs and Revenue Department of the Finance Ministry, 2 October, 2009). Additionally, the inadequate provision of basic services such as clean water and electricity has resulted in more people using generators that produce carbon dioxide. A 2008 NEPA report estimated that 200,000 generators were used in Kabul due to the absence of reliable electricity. Most of these generators were used by international NGOs, the UN and government offices. In some parts of the city the electricity system is still not functional after years of civil war. However, it is predicted that the aforementioned figure of generator consumption is likely to decrease because most parts of Kabul city now have reliable electricity.

Meanwhile, the government has not succeeded in totally preventing the cutting and smuggling of timber in provinces rich in natural jungles like Kunar, Nuristan, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika and Khost. According to the 2002 United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) report the deforestation in Kunar and Nuristan began in the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, a 2002 report by Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) claims that the rate of deforestation in this area increased dramatically with the fall of the communist government in Kabul. During the years of civil war, a large number of the trees were illegally cut and exported to Pakistan. The UNEP reports indicated that between 1977 and 2002 Nangarhar province was the hardest hit, with a 71% decrease in forest cover. Meanwhile, forest cover in Nuristan has decreased by 53% and Kunar by 29%. Residents predict similar losses
for the forested regions in the provinces of Paktia, Khost and Paktika. When the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, people expected them to save the forests, as it is a religious duty. But instead they actually made it easier for the timber thieves by opening up roads to the forest on the pretext of clearing old cut trees. This cleared the way for locals to cut down even more trees and export the timber abroad (http://www.easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2008/01/05/timberlords-and-the-deforestation-of-afghanistan/, 2009). This increased the rate of deforestation and significantly reduced the amount of natural jungle. After the establishment of the interim administration the government imposed strict regulations on the cutting and export of jungles, although continued insecurity makes this difficult to implement.

Health

Years of conflict in Afghanistan had left the health sector devastated by the time the interim administration came to power. Most of the professional doctors and healthcare personnel had left for neighboring countries. One of the results of the long conflict has been the decreasing number of qualified health professionals, particularly qualified female staff.

With the establishment of the Interim Administration in 2001, the government and the international community focused efforts on transforming the healthcare system into a modern and functional service. The principal purpose was to effectively and efficiently reduce the high levels of morbidity and mortality that had adversely affected the ability of the population to develop socially and economically. As a result of these efforts, the healthcare system has significantly improved over the last eight years. The Afghanistan Health Survey (AHS) conducted in 2006 shows a 20% reduction in the under-five mortality rate (U5MR) over 2001 (from 257 to 191 deaths of children per 1000 live births) and in under-one child mortality (from 165 to 129 deaths of children per 1000 live births).

In general the standard of health of the Afghan population remains poor. Some common treatable diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria, dehydration, malnutrition and others still cost the lives of thousands of ordinary people. There is no record of major pandemic outbreaks in recent years in Afghanistan, however, and some minor pandemic diseases which mainly broke out in northern parts of the country such as Takhar and Badakhshan provinces were brought rapidly under control.

In the last eight years the government and international NGOs have managed to build healthcare facilities in many areas of the country to prevent the deaths from common and preventable diseases. But there are still some regions where the healthcare facilities are not functional because of insecurity and difficult mountainous terrain. The central highland areas are somewhat secure, but the lack of basic infrastructure like paved roads has made it difficult for the local populace to access the aforementioned facilities. Bamyan and Dai Kundi provinces, for instance, are secure but there is absence of delivery of basic health services because in the winter season the roads that link these areas to other provinces are completely closed for three to four months due to the heavy snowfall. Doctors and healthcare staff
in the southern region are regularly threatened by the Taliban and other insurgent groups. In some cases they are even assassinated while performing their duties. In such an environment, people who mainly live in remote villages travel hundreds of kilometers to take their patients to the healthcare centers.

Meanwhile, the poor working and living conditions of many ordinary people have increased their risk of becoming ill. A notable case is the many children who are illegally employed in the coal mines of Herat and Logar provinces. Working in such environments makes them prone to various health risks such as injuries, respiratory infections, skin diseases, eye infections and others (Child Laborers in Afghanistan Exposed to Health Hazards, 2007). In order to improve the working and living conditions of workers it is necessary for the government to take preventative measures in this regard, such as limiting working conditions in mines and punishing factory owners who employ children in their factories.

**Sociopolitical unrest**

Afghanistan has witnessed sociopolitical unrest since the 2001 collapse of the Taliban regime. In the last eight years, clashes between ethnic and political groups have taken place in different parts of the country. Most of these conflicts were not at first significant, yet over time, they have been exploited by interest-driven political entities. These conflicts include:

**KUCHI-HAZARA CLASH**

In 2008, the Kuchis and Hazaras clashed in the central highlands, in two districts of Wardak and one district of Ghazni provinces. Conflict erupted when Hazaras banned Kuchis from entering the pasture lands in and around Hazara settlements. Kuchis defied the ban, reasoning that they had used the pasture land for decades during their seasonal migrations.

The Kuchis argued that they were granted the right to use the central highlands and other parts of the country as a pasture land by a *Firman* (Royal decree) of Emir Abdur Rahman Khan in the 19th century. Whereas the Hazaras argued that those decrees were null and void and that they were used against them as a tool of repression for decades. This issue still remains unresolved, however according to a decree which was issued by President Hamid Karzai in 2008, the Kuchis are temporarily banned from entering the disputed areas until the issue is resolved.

**DOSTUM-AKBAR BAI CONFLICT**

The conflict between General Rashid Dostum and Akbar Bai dates back to 2006 when serious disagreements arose between the two over the leadership of the Junbish-e-Millie Party. Akbar Bai is reported to have been a former ally of Dostum. The conflict reached a boiling point when more than 50 of Dostum’s fighters kidnapped Akbar Bai on February 2, 2008. Dostum’s men broke into Bai’s house and reportedly
beat Bai, his son and a bodyguard, and shot another bodyguard. Early on February 3, Dostum’s house was surrounded by police after Bai complained. Bai and the three others were freed and hospitalized. The stand-off between guards and the police ended at Dostum’s house when Dostum agreed to cooperate with the authorities in the investigation of the incident. Radio Free Europe, quoting former Afghan Attorney-General Abdul Jabar Sabit, reported on February 6, 2008, that although Dostum had been charged with kidnapping, breaking into a private space, and assaulting a private citizen, the charges remained pending because “the political and security situation would make it difficult to prosecute Dostum” (Feared Afghan Strongman Suspended from Government Post, 2008).

Later, on February 19, it was declared that Sabit had suspended Dostum from his position as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief after he failed to appear when summoned for the investigation. According to Dostum, this was “not in line with the law”, and he said that he would request Karzai’s intervention (ibid). The issue remains unsettled and General Dostum is currently living in exile in Turkey.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Civilian casualties from US and NATO airstrikes have become a bone of contention between the Afghan government and international forces. The increasing number and intensity of NATO air strikes against the Taliban and other insurgent groups have resulted in more civilian casualties than ever before. According to Human Rights Watch, the number of civilian casualties from air strikes tripled in 2007, compared to a year earlier.

One of the main reasons behind the increasing civilian casualties is the use of residential areas by the Taliban as a human shield. In many cases the Taliban are reported to have deliberately targeted the convoys of international troops from residential areas. The international forces are then invited to retaliate with air strikes, which result in civilian casualties and the destruction of the civilian property. For instance, in the August 2008 bombardment that took place in Azizabad Village of Shindand district in Herat province, more than 90 civilians were killed and dozens of others were injured. This incident provoked public outrage at the international forces. In another incident that took place in Bala Baluk district of Farah province in May 2009, more than 100 civilians were killed and dozens of others were wounded when the Coalition forces bombed the Granai village.

RATIFICATION OF SHIITE LAW

In June 2009, the ratification of a controversial law for the Shiite minority living in Afghanistan sparked condemnations from within and outside the country. The Shias, who make up around 15% of the country’s population, called for a separate Personal Status Law that, although in accord with the Ja’afarite school, entails minor differences from the Hannafite jurisprudence underlying the Afghan constitution. In March 2009, the proposed law was approved by a committee of the parliament, yet the articles of the law were not discussed in general meetings. Following its ratification...
by President Karzai, some Afghan women’s rights activists and intellectuals objected to two articles of the law. The first stipulates that women should ask for their husband’s permission prior to venturing outside, and the second requires women bound by Ja’aferite jurisprudence to satisfy the sexual desire of their husband twice a week. The controversy even sparked some riots in Kabul between the supporters and opponents of the law. After the riots, President Karzai sent the law back to the parliament to rectify the controversial articles.

**Weapons proliferation**

Afghanistan has one of the highest concentrations of guns per person in the world. It is estimated that there may be up to 10 million small arms circulating among a population of 25 to 30 million people (Oxfam, 2006), roughly one weapon for three persons. This has worrying implications for democracy, development and security.

There is no weapons manufacturing factory in Afghanistan; instead, many of these weapons were imported into the country during the period of Soviet occupation from 1979-1989. Throughout the decade of Soviet occupation, both the Soviet Union and the United States were responsible for importing vast quantities of small arms to the country. The era of Mujahedeen-infighting, and the subsequent rise of the Taliban movement from 1992-1996, brought further large numbers of arms into circulation. Inside Afghanistan, the main market that serves as a meeting point is the Panj River Bazaar, where dealers exchange the arms for drugs. However, there are four major arms bazaars in Pakistani tribal areas close to the Af-Pak border that arm the insurgents. These are the Dara-e-Adam Khil Market, Landi Kotal Market, Miranshah Market and the Bara Market. All these markets are located in areas where the law cannot reach. Thus, most of this trade goes unhindered and unchecked. The FATA areas in which these markets operate remain fiercely independent.

Since the establishment of the interim government in 2002, Afghanistan has continued to receive arms from abroad in order to build up an effective Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently said in a report that a large quantity of weapons given to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by the US, are missing. Nearly 87,000 weapons including rifles, pistols, machine guns, grenade launchers, shotguns and mortars are missing. Aside from weaponry, the report also found an inadequate oversight of sensitive equipment such as night vision goggles, issued to the Afghan National Army (ANA). Out of the 87,000 missing weapons, the serial numbers of 46,000 weapons have not been recorded. The serial numbers of the remaining 41,000 weapons were recorded but the American military officials have no idea where those weapons are. The report also said that the US military has failed to keep records of about 135,000 weapons donated by allies to the ANSF (GAO, 2009). Meanwhile, Amnesty International (Arms Proliferation Fuels Further Abuses, 2008) has indicated that the current total number of Afghan security forces is 182,000 personnel, while the number of small arms imported and redistributed to the Afghan security forces since 2002 amounts to 409,022. There have been some disarmament efforts put into place
under the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) programs, but many warlords and leaders of armed groups still possess sufficient arms to pose a serious threat to security.

**Migration and refugees**

Afghans began fleeing their country in large numbers in April 1978, when the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), overthrew the government of Muhammad Daoud (who had himself seized power from his cousin, the Afghan king Zahir Shah, in a bloodless coup in 1973). The trickle of refugees accelerated when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. It is estimated that around three million refugees fled to Pakistan and two million to Iran. A final wave of refugees numbering 200,000 to 300,000 people left Afghanistan during the US-led invasion of the country in October 2001 (CRS Report for Congress, 2007).

Over 4.5 million Afghans have returned home since 2002. On their return, a large number settled in major cities. This has created substantial problems for the people and government of Afghanistan. The government is unable to provide houses, employment and other basic healthcare facilities. Some of the returnees define themselves as vulnerable – being sick, disabled or single parents, while a large number of them are unskilled or unfit for the workplace. The aforementioned return of the refugees has not ended and there are still about 2.1 million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan and about a million in Iran. Therefore, migration issues are not only an internal security challenge but also a regional political challenge.

Afghanistan has a large number of internally displaced people. They can be divided into five major categories: previous conflict-affected, new conflict-affected, returnees and deportees from neighboring countries, displaced as a result of food insecurity, and displaced because of a lack of housing. Most of the internally displaced people live in southern Afghanistan, especially Kandahar. A large number have come from the northern regions. The living conditions in the camps remain poor and most of them have no access to clean drinking water or healthcare facilities. Unemployment is also a major concern in these camps because unemployed youth may join the Taliban.

Some of the displaced people are willing to return to their homes. However, their homes and lands are either usurped by the local commanders or they do not have enough money to return. So it is important for the Afghan government and UNHCR to provide transportation facilities for them and return properties that were seized by the local warlords.

**Drug trafficking**

Drug trafficking in Afghanistan has remained one of the most lucrative businesses. The drug trade increased significantly following the collapse of the Taliban regime (Taylor, 2006), while the volume of poppy production has increased by 150%.
Recently, some Western media has reported that a significant number of high ranking government officials, including cabinet members, are involved in drug trafficking (Drug Trade Reaches to Afghan Cabinet, 2006). One report even suggested that Ahmed Wali Karzai, the younger brother of President Hamid Karzai, who is the head of the provincial council in Kandahar, routinely manipulates judicial and police officials to facilitate shipments of opium and heroin (Afghan Drug Trade Thrives with Help, and Neglect, of Officials, 2009). In a state like Afghanistan where the justice system is very weak and corruption is prevalent, it is hard to identify or prosecute such high ranking government officials.

Traditionally, the eastern and southern regions of Afghanistan are regarded as the centre of the poppy cultivation. Recently, poppy cultivation has spread to areas which were not previously growing poppy, such as Badakhshan and Takhar. However, the cultivation level has also dropped significantly due to drug eradication programs within Afghanistan and demand reduction programs abroad. Besides this, projects providing alternative markets for farmer’s produce in the east and north of the country have also been implemented. For instance, the province of Nangarhar is a good example of a region where poppy cultivation has dropped to almost zero since 2007.

There is also a direct link between the insurgency and the drugs trade. The United Nations Office on Drug and Crimes (UNODC) in its 2008 report, also acknowledged this fact and wrote that the Taliban receive at least 80-100 million dollars a year from poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. A large percentage of the money earned by drug lords is used by the insurgents for buying sophisticated weapons and for the payment of their fighter’s wages.

**Rule of law**

After the signing of the Bonn agreement in 2001 and the creation of the interim Afghan administration, emphasis was placed on strengthening the rule of law and implementation of reforms in the justice sector. Many hoped that with the help of the international community the Afghan government would succeed in the establishment of a functional and transparent justice system. However, after eight years the primary indicators are disheartening. The justice sector reforms have been rendered ineffective in most parts of the country. In the south and east of the country, the Taliban have setup their own courts to resolve disputes among the local people. Most of the people in the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul, Badghis, Wardak and Logar prefer referring their cases to the Taliban than to the government courts. People believe that resolving cases through the formal judicial mechanism is not efficient as it takes more time and resources, in the form of bribery, to resolve simple issues.

Besides the formal and Taliban justice systems, there is also a third source through which cases are resolved, called tribal *jirga* and *shuras*. This system is functional in a few areas where both the Taliban and the government have little influence and people still obey tribal elders, such as districts in the provinces of Paktia, Paktika and Khost. Cases and disputes are resolved in accordance with the tribal codes known as *Pashtunwali*. This system has existed for centuries and is particularly popular in
Pashtun-dominated areas. The positive aspect of this system is that almost all people know the norms and procedures of the jirgas. The jirgas do not implement harsh punishments such as killings or cutting hands on those found guilty, compared to the Taliban. The negative point is that in some cases the verdicts of the jirga is not accepted by one or other side and they refer their cases again to the government or the Taliban.

Meanwhile certain former commanders and warlords, especially in the north, still exercise authority and influence on the populace and operate outside the purview of the government. Regardless of their ideology and sources of support, these warlords create a climate of repression. Unless immediate steps are taken to counteract the growing power of the regional warlords, Afghanistan will be at the mercy of essentially the same figures whose rule and fighting devastated its people in the early 1990s (Afghanistan: Return of the Warlords, 2002).

There is a correlation between the weakening rule of law and rising insecurity in some parts of the country. The focus on security demands in such an unstable environment has sometimes led to excessive emphasis on security at the expense of the rule of law. This approach subordinates justice to security considerations and turns police into a force primarily used in combating insurgents instead of protecting the populace and supporting law and order. Obviously, in conflict-ridden conditions, there is a need to meet security threats head-on; however, such an approach cannot compromise the administration of justice. It is, after all, the rule of law that contributes directly to the security of the nation and its people (Jalali, 2007).

Organized crime

Organized crime in post-war Afghanistan is affecting the country’s efforts to achieve its basic goals such as reconstruction, development and attraction of foreign investments. Following the establishment of the Interim Administration in Afghanistan, many people returned to the country to set up business. As a result, many modern markets, shops and business centers were built. But as the businesses grew, so did the rate of kidnappings for ransom. The kidnappers are mostly members of illegal armed groups who have formed organized criminal gangs, particularly active in the northern region. This situation has made many entrepreneurs concerned and, after some killings of hostages, many have decided not to invest in the country.

Criminal gangs have been active all around the country, particularly in the western regions. The rate of kidnappings considerably increased between 2007 and 2008. Although there is no hard evidence which proves the involvement of high ranking police officials in kidnappings, it is speculated that some of them had connections with the kidnapping gangs. The level of kidnappings declined only when the newly appointed Interior Minister transferred most high-ranking police officials from the provinces.

Human trafficking

Afghanistan is a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation and involuntary servitude.
Afghan children are trafficked internally and externally to Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Oman for commercial sexual exploitation, forced marriage, settlement of debts or disputes, forced begging, debt bondage, service as child soldiers, or other forms of involuntary servitude. Afghan women are trafficked internally and to Pakistan and Iran for commercial sexual exploitation, and men are trafficked to Iran for forced labor. Afghanistan is also a destination for women and girls from China, Iran and Tajikistan trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation. Tajik women and children are also believed to be trafficked through Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran for commercial sexual exploitation.

Human trafficking in Afghanistan can be attributed to many factors, including a long-standing conflict, lack of internal security and poverty. The Afghan government has had limited success in lowering the level of human trafficking. Although in recent years some traffickers and kidnappers have been prosecuted, the numbers are minimal. In the absence of a capable law enforcement agency and weak judicial system, it is difficult to identify and prosecute those who are involved in this crime. In some cases the traffickers are backed by powerful warlords who dominate a large number of government institutions.

**Conclusion**

It is crucial for the Afghan government to pay attention to the threats that are emerging from traditional and nontraditional challenges because most of these threats directly impact the security and development of the country. Despite the fact that the government has had certain achievements in the last eight years, the deteriorating security situation in some parts of the country has made it difficult for the Afghan people to benefit properly from reconstruction and development projects. The government authority in some of these areas is limited to the centre of the district. People in many cases have not benefited from the billions of reconstruction dollars due to misuse and miscoordination by national and international NGOs and government officials. It is worth mentioning that a large amount of the money pledged by the international community has been channeled through NGOs which has restricted the Afghan government from holding them accountable for the money they have spent during these years.

Lack of major reconstruction and development projects, along with weak rule of law, have enabled the Taliban and other insurgents to regroups and pose serious threats to the presence of the international community in Afghanistan. In some areas of the country the rate of unemployment has reached its peak because the government doesn’t have enough capacity to provide jobs for people. Some unemployed young people who have returned from Pakistan and Iran have joined the Taliban in order to earn income. To make the situation worse, the drug traffickers, who are mostly former warlords, have reportedly been helping the Taliban financially to fight against the Afghan and international security forces, because their interests would be severely threatened if the government consolidates its control over the areas where the poppy is grown.
In order to enable the Afghan government to deal with these threats it is necessary for the international community to improve the capacity of Afghan institutions. Eradicating corruption from government departments, particularly from the police and justice sectors, and the appointment of competent officials in the central and provincial administrations should remain on the top of government priorities. Currently, the level of trust in the government remains low, as do basic services provided to the ordinary people. Many Afghans believe that the government should do more to win the hearts and minds of the people. The alternative is that the Taliban will gain more support and expand their influence into areas which were previously calm and secure.
3  ■  Pakistan

MUHAMMAD AMIR RANA
Director, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)

SAFDAR SIAL
Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)

Introduction

This paper uses a mixed method approach to provide a rigorous, in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the most important emerging non-traditional and transnational security threats in Pakistan, looking out to the medium term. An effort has been made to better understand this threat matrix by converging both quantitative (statistical) and qualitative data. Available statistical data has been used to develop a diachronic (vertical) comparison of the various security threats over time in order to see their current trends and future projections. At the same time, emerging security threats and challenges have been analyzed and assessed using qualitative interviews with the experts.

Internal security threats and challenges

ENERGY SECURITY

Pakistan’s energy sector faces tremendous challenges. Pakistan’s domestic energy production infrastructure is weak and trapped in a debt cycle – between Pakistan State Oil, the Water and Power Development Authority, independent power production companies and government subsidies – that undermines its ability to deliver power at its full potential (Interview with Safiya Aftab, 29 January, 2010).¹

While Pakistan relies heavily on gas and oil for power; coal, electricity and LPG are other key contributors to the energy mix. As Pakistan’s limited oil and natural gas reserves – which currently provide just 40% of domestic needs – are depleting faster than new discoveries are being made, Pakistan is increasingly dependent on imports. The share of imported energy, which had risen to 35% in 2008, stood at 27.7% by April 2009. Between 2008 and 2009 annual energy consumption decreased by 3.4%, 2.5%, and 26.5% for oil, gas and coal respectively. An increase of 0.7% was, however, witnessed in annual consumption of electricity. The downturn in consumption of petroleum products reflects both the economic downturn and higher

¹ Safiya Aftab is a research fellow at Islamabad-based consulting and research firm Strategic and Economic Policy Research (SEPR), Islamabad. Interviewed by Safdar Sial.
consumer prices for POL products. Pakistan’s energy consumption patterns in 2007-08 are given in Figure 1.

![Chart 1: Total Energy Consumption in 2007-08 = 39.4 MTOE](image)

*Hydro Carbon Development Institute of Pakistan*

**Figure 1: Pakistan’s energy consumption patterns**

The government strategy of demand suppression has perpetuated unavailability of energy, curtailed economic growth, and led to a decline in industrial investment in Pakistan. Moreover, most of the oil and gas reserves in Pakistan are located in conflict zones.

The electricity shortage and increasingly lengthy periods of load-shedding affect the quality of life as well as commercial and industrial activities. Power shortages remained above 3,500 MW throughout 2008 and the first half of 2009. Experts argue that if the load of the ‘shut down’ industries is taken into consideration the actual shortfall is in the 5,000 MW range. Even if the government’s promised 32 small and medium sized dams are constructed by 2014, the rising demand for electricity will not be fully offset (Ahmed, 2009).

Roughly 30% of electricity generation in Pakistan comes from hydro and 70% by thermal and other sources. Over the past decade, there have been no major government initiatives to assess future energy needs and make appropriate plans. The mega water storage projects face environmental and political opposition as well as concerns over the overall scarcity of water (Interview with Safiya Aftab, 29 January, 2010). Yet, the government has taken few meaningful steps to increase thermal power generation capacity. To bridge the gap between power demand and supply, the present government has focused on (i) electricity import agreements, (ii) Rental Power Plants
Pakistan is pursuing the option of importing electricity from Iran and some Central Asian States. The Export Development Bank of Iran agreed in January 2009 to extend a US$55 million credit facility to Pakistan for the construction of 70km of transmission lines capable of importing 1000 MW of electricity from Iran. Pakistan will import another 1000 MW of electricity from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan under the Central Asia–South Asia (CASA 1000) project. Continued instability in Afghanistan raises real concerns among experts over the wisdom of increasing Pakistan’s reliance on Central Asian power, which must be transmitted through Afghanistan. Others counter that the project is also in the economic interest of Afghanistan, which helps ensure the project will become reality.

The government is relying heavily on Rental Power Plants (RPPs), which many see as an effort to get quick resolution of the power crisis. The Asian Development Bank carried out a third party review of rental power for Pakistan that was issued in January 2010. Besides mentioning the weaknesses in technical, legal and financial arrangements, the ADB review also highlighted the Pakistani government’s power management flaws, such as insufficient emphasis on energy efficiency and loss reduction programs (Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Rental Power Review, 2010). The rental power arrangement also faces political opposition, with opponents arguing that it will increase the cost of electricity by about 25% and place economic burdens on the people. The government’s short-term power plan, however, envisages that ten IPP plants, currently in the pipeline, will be commissioned by the end of 2010 adding 1,305 MW with five Rental Power Plants (RPPs) providing another 605 MW. At least four RPPs have already been inaugurated, three in 2010, and one in November 2009. The government has also signed a US$125 million energy aid agreement with the United States to overhaul and maintain existing power plants.

The government’s long-term plans include building new dams and reservoirs for power generation. A 5 June 2009 memorandum of understanding with the Islamic Development Bank provides a loan of US$140 million for the Neelam-Jhelum Hydropower Project. The 4500 MW Diamer-Bhasha dam was cleared by the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (Ecnec) in August 2009. The 2009-10 budget earmarked Rs 47 billion for dam construction and Rs 12 billion for the Mangla Dam. Finally, an accord has been signed with three Korean companies to construct a 150 MW hydro-power plant near Muzaffarabad in Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

The government has approved two nuclear power plants, Chashma III and Chashma IV that will produce 340 MW of electricity each, at a total cost of Rs 190 billion. The Chinese government briefly withdrew its offer to provide two plants of 1000 MW each in response to Western media attention but restored the programs after further negotiations. Approval has also been given by the government to set up a fuel enrichment facility, at a cost of Rs 14 billion, to ensure uninterrupted supply of fuel to the proposed plants.

Despite these efforts, the issue of electricity shortage is unlikely to be resolved in the next three to four years, making further damage to Pakistan’s industry, agriculture, commercial sector and quality of life likely. The actual generation capacity of Pakistan’s aging power plants is 10,300 MW, out of an installed capacity of 19,000
MW, and declining. Even at full capacity, the power generation infrastructure would not meet ever rising demand. According to government assessments, the annual increase in power demand is about 8% and will reach 36,000 MW by 2015 and 114,000 MW in 2030. Without utilizing more hydro and coal sources and importing more power it will be very difficult for Pakistan to meet its future power demands.

Pakistan does have sizeable reserves of natural gas, but over the past five years, demand has increased by 8% annually. According to the Directorate General of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, daily gas production in Pakistan stood at 4 billion cubic feet (BCF) in 2009. If this production rate continues and no new reserves are discovered, Pakistan’s domestic reserves will be consumed in 20.4 years. In November 2009, official estimates revealed that Qadirpur gas field – the country’s second largest with reserves of 3.5 trillion cubic feet (TCF) – was likely to run dry by June 2010, mainly due to higher gas take off which resulted in pressure loss in the gathering system.

Given inadequate domestic gas reserves to meet demands over the long term, Pakistan has been pursuing two proposed gas pipelines: the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) pipeline. After about fifteen years of delayed negotiations on the IPI gas pipeline, Iran and Pakistan finally signed the US$7.5 billion gas deal in June 2010, sans India, for supply of natural gas to Pakistan from 2014. Under the deal, Iran will export 21.5 million cubic meters (760 million cubic feet) per day of gas to Pakistan. The pipeline project faces some regional and international challenges. Originating in Iran’s southern port city of Asalouyeh, the pipeline will reach other parts of Pakistan via Baluchistan. Thus, instability in Baluchistan can cause a major setback to the project. At the international level, the United States opposes the pipeline because of the financial and strategic benefits it would provide to Iran; it favors a pipeline that supplies gas to Pakistan and India from Turkmenistan. Local experts, however, believe that abandoning what has come to be known as a ‘peace pipeline’ agreement with Iran would seriously undermine Pakistan’s plan to meet its energy needs in the next two decades.

Coal production has remained stable at approximately 4 Mt/year since 2000. The reserves of lignite coal at Thar in Sindh province have been estimated at 180 billion tons which, experts say, are sufficient to produce 20,000 MW of electricity for three to four decades. The Thar lignite is a feasible source of heat and electricity and has greater heating value than the lignite found in many Asian and European countries.

The energy crisis will continue to haunt Pakistan if the government does not take practical short, medium and long term steps to bridge the existing gap in demand and supply. Options include the optimum utilization of available resources – mainly coal and gas; proper water management to reduce losses; a comprehensive energy conservation campaign; and exploration for new reserves. This roadmap can also include exploring alternative sources of energy such as wind power, biogas, solar power, and small hydro-electric projects while inciting and encouraging both local and foreign investments of existing coal reserves (Pakistan Annual Security Report 2009, 2010, p. 38).
WATER CRISIS

Pakistan faces a water crisis. Water issues have dominated the political arena since the inception of the country, developing into inter-province conflicts over allocation and distribution. Provincial governments continue to squabble over water rights, while at the local level, the capture of irrigation by elites and upstream communities and farmers is a frequent source of conflict.

Increasing agrarian and non-agrarian demand for water in Pakistan and relative depletion of supplies over time has widened the demand-supply gap. The scarcity and inequitable distribution of water shapes both foreign and domestic power relationships in Pakistan. Control of the headwaters of the Indus and other river systems remains a chronic source of tension between India and Pakistan.

According to a Planning Commission and Water Sector Investment Planning Study (WISPS-1990), Pakistan faces severe gaps in water requirements and availability by 2025. By 2013, irrigational and non-irrigational water requirements will be 266 million-acre feet (MAF) while water availability will be just 132.5 MAF – a net water shortage of 133.7 MAF. This water shortage is predicted to bulge to 186.2 MAF by 2025. At the time of independence, 5000 cubic meters of water was available for each Pakistani. This was reduced to 1000 cubic meters in 2004 because of uncontrolled population growth. The situation will be much more worrisome by 2025 (see Figure 2).

Politicization of and opposition to the mega water projects such as Kalabagh Dam, financial and technical problems with constructing small dams, unresponsive water management, and ongoing Indo-Pak conflict over water all pose fundamental threats and challenges to Pakistan’s agriculture, power generation and industry, and domestic water use.

Figure 2: Water availability vs. population growth in Pakistan
(http://www.wapda.gov.pk/pdf/KBDAM.pdf)
Some experts contend that the fundamental problem for Pakistan is not the availability and potential to store water but, rather, ineffective water management planning and the lack of political consensus and will. According to Dr. Shoaib Ahmad, an expert on water issues, there is 142 MAF of water flowing on annual basis in the Indus River System, as per WAPDA statistics. Out of this, 104 MAF of water is diverted to canal systems. At this very first stage, 38 MAF of water is lost from our river system. In addition, about 25% of the water diverted to canal systems is lost as “line losses” in the water-conveyance system leaving only 78 MAF of water in hand. The untapped potential of ground water extraction is about 40 MAF. Cumulatively there is 182 MAF of water available in watercourses’ heads but about 50% is lost (Focus group discussion with Dr. Shoaib held at PIPS, 3 November, 2009\(^2\)).

Secondly there are six very important potential projects available in Pakistan, which the WAPDA also recognizes. These include Gomal Zam Dam (potential of 1.14 MAF), Mirani Dam (0.2 MAF), rising of Mangla Dam (3.10 MAF), Spatha Dam (0.02 MAF), Bhasha Dam (5.87 MAF), and Swan Bridge Barrage (0.6 MAF). This huge potential of water storage, 10.9 MAF when combined, suggests that the water crisis in Pakistan is not hopeless.

INDIA-PAKISTAN WATER CONFlict

The 1960 Indus Basin Treaty seemed, at the time, to amicably resolve the issue of water distribution between Pakistan and India. The treaty addresses water utilization for diverse rivers like the Beas, Ravi, Sutlej, Indus, Chenab and Jehlum by giving Pakistan control over the waters of the Jehlum, Chenab and Indus rivers and India control of the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi rivers.

Indo-Pak water disputes revived, however, with the initiation of major Indian dam projects that Islamabad argues violate the Indus Basin Treaty by altering the flow of rivers feeding into Pakistan. In 1985, India started construction of a dam on Jehlum River in occupied Kashmir. The Wullar Barrage, 30 kilometers (19 miles) north of India held Kashmir’s summer capital Srinagar, violates the water sharing treaty by affecting the flow of water and threatening irrigation and power projects downstream in Pakistan. Pakistan argues that by enabling India to cut off the flow of water through the Jehlum the dam poses a serious threat to Pakistan – reducing water supplies to downstream irrigation, power generation and other water projects. Construction of the barrage was halted in 1987 following Pakistan’s protests and the dispute is part of composite dialogue between the two countries (Iqbal & Sial, 2009). Pakistan has also challenged the Baglihar Dam, a 330 MW hydroelectric project on the Chenab River.

Pakistan is also demanding that India stop work on the Uri-II and Kishan-Ganga Hydropower projects claiming they too violate the Indus Basin Treaty by constructing a gated structure on the Uri-II. These gated structures, including the Neelum-Jehlum project, were not authorized by the treaty and result in water diversion by India that adversely affects hydropower development. It can also affect agriculture in some

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\(^2\) Dr. Shoaib is a social scientist and visiting faculty member at the Department of Government and Public Policy, National Defence University, Islamabad.
areas of Azad Kashmir. India counters that Pakistan’s failure to develop its hydro resources shows the country does not take the diversion issue seriously (ibid).

Pakistan raised the issue of Indian violations of the 1960 Indus Basin Treaty at foreign secretary level talks held in New Delhi on 25 February 2010. These talks were held 14 months after the Indian government suspended the “composite dialogue” to protest what it characterized as Pakistan’s responsibility for the November 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai. On April 29, 2010, prime ministers of both countries met on the sidelines of the 16th Summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Thimpu, Bhutan and decided to resume talks, although not the “composite dialogue”. Foreign ministers and the foreign secretaries of both the countries will work out modalities for the future course of talks. Pakistan’s foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said after this meeting that the water issue will be on the table as there is a need to evolve a mechanism to address it (The News, 30 April, 2010). While both countries seem all set to restart the dialogue process, Pakistan’s foreign office has repeatedly stressed including the water issue in the agenda of talks. Resumption of the Indo-Pak dialogue bodes some hope for Pakistan’s water security.

**PROTRACTED ECONOMIC CRISIS**

The current economic crisis in Pakistan developed over 2007 and early 2008. A volatile internal security landscape coupled with international food and fuel crises hit Pakistan’s economy especially hard. The country was forced to rely on borrowing from the central bank to meet the fiscal deficits which resulted in increased rates of inflation. The government also turned to the IMF amid a heightened political debate and conflicting public opinion of seeking IMF funds and its implications for the country’s economy. It was however in November 2008 that a 23-month, US$7.6 billion Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) was approved by the IMF’s Executive Board. The funding was later expanded to US$11.3 billion on August 8, 2009 and the program was extended to 25 months.

The SBA is now Pakistan’s basic economic policy roadmap. It aims to control and reduce Pakistan’s fiscal deficit – which had reached 7.8% of GDP in 2008 – and bring it down to somewhere between 4 and 5% by tightening up fiscal and monetary policies. This translated into an end to government borrowing from the central bank which, in turn, increased the discount rates. Not ready to take risks, commercial banks adopted a retrenchment strategy, increasing interest rates, resulting in a negative impact on consumer pricing potential (Interview with Safiya Aftab, 29 January, 2010).

Second, the IMF prescription aimed to raise budgetary revenues through comprehensive tax reforms and cuts in expenditures. To increase its revenues, Pakistan has been relying on restructuring the Central Board of Revenue (CBR) and increasing indirect taxes, which are inherently regressive in nature. Both initiatives remain largely unsuccessful. Pakistan’s tax to GDP ratio, currently about 9.9%, is unimpressive in comparison with regional and global figures. The government is also likely to rely, in part, on value-added taxes in the upcoming national budget. The IMF has prescribed a 1% of GDP cut in the Public Support Development Program (PSDP). However, most expenditures – including those incurred in debt serving and providing
subsidiess to power production and agriculture sectors—remain unavoidable to a great extent (ibid).

Growth in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors in Pakistan is also showing downward trends. In 2008-09 a tangle of multiple factors arising out of policy, management and unavoidable forces of nature severely affected Pakistan’s major cash crops including rice, wheat, sugarcane and cotton. Water scarcity resulting from low rainfall contributed to reduced rice, wheat and sugarcane yields, while pests attacked the cotton crop. Although a revival of agriculture is possible within the next two to three years, it remains unpredictable and increasingly unlikely in the aftermath of the catastrophic floods of July and August 2010.

The manufacturing sector also faces multiple challenges such as the poor security environment, power and gas shortages, and tightened monetary and fiscal policies. The services sector, which has flourished in Pakistan in the past, has also been hurt by the poor security environment. Slow GDP growth and economic crisis is expected to be prolonged, with a projected maximum economic growth rate of 3 to 4% over the next three years (ibid).

The unrest from continued militancy bodes a particularly bleak economic outlook for the FATA and NWFP, which were already struggling under resource deficits. The security of trade routes between NWFP province and Karachi through seven of its districts have continued to deteriorate amid the worsening law and order situation in Dera Ismail Khan, Lakki Marwat, Karak, Kohat, Peshawar and elsewhere. The import and export business has suffered as trade with Afghanistan has almost come to a standstill. The establishment of the long-awaited Reconstruction Opportunities Zones (ROZs) has been repeatedly and probably fatally delayed (Interview with Brigadier Mehmood Shah, 18 March, 2009).3

Afghan refugees remain an economic burden but, over time, have begun to be productive, running successful enterprises in the transport, restaurant and labor areas (Interview with Nasir Yousuf, 17 March, 2009).4 The rehabilitation, settlement and economic support for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Swat, Bajaur, Waziristan and other conflict areas, however, continue to suffer as trade with Afghanistan has almost come to a standstill. The establishment of the long-awaited Reconstruction Opportunities Zones (ROZs) has been repeatedly and probably fatally delayed (Interview with Brigadier Mehmood Shah, 18 March, 2009).3 At the same time, the vested interests of some influential groups are further limiting the socio-economic development of tribal people.

Domestic retail and wholesale commerce—the economic lifeline of the majority of people in conflict zones—has also been badly damaged. Large numbers of shops (extremist attacks have singled out music, video, and barber shops and Internet cafes) have been damaged in NWFP, having a discouraging effect on others. Even in non-conflict zones, insecurity, strikes and political unrest have undermined economic

3 Brigadier Mehmood Shah is the former chief of security in Tribal Areas. Interviewed by Safdar Sial, Peshawar.
4 Nasir Yousuf is a senior bureaucrat in Peshawar. Interviewed by Safdar Sial, Peshawar.
5 Dr Humayun Khan is a former Ambassador and Foreign Secretary. Interviewed by Safdar Sial, Peshawar.
security. In Islamabad after the Marriott blast, in Swat, and in other areas, tourism is no longer a viable source of income for local people. Small and medium enterprises have also felt the negative effects of insecurity and militancy in the form of supply chain disruption and restricted information flow.

Development projects also face direct threats from militants in conflict zones like Baluchistan and FATA. In Baluchistan, nationalist insurgents contend that outside companies, in collaboration with the federal government, are plundering the resources from the province. In FATA, development projects are seen as part of an enemy operation. NGOs also find it difficult to operate under the constant threat of target killing, kidnapping and abuse (Interview with Ghulam Dastgir, 16 March 2009).6

Pakistan’s provinces perceive government responses to the economic crisis as part of a larger pattern of discriminatory development and opportunity. The relationship between federal and provincial governments has long been uneasy and lopsided in favor of the center. Resource allocation and revenue collection are perennial causes of conflict in Pakistan, with provinces feeling they do not get their fair share of resources (Interview with Zafarullah Khan, 19 March 2009).7 The federal government counters that the provinces have demonstrated limited capacity and will to raise revenues and to set and implement provincial-level policies (Mezzera & Aftab, 2009).

**FOOD SECURITY**

The World Bank lists Pakistan as one of 33 countries at risk of political and social unrest as a result of food shortages. The food security risk index developed by Maplecroft ranked Pakistan at 11th position among 148 vulnerable countries. As a result of the global economic crisis and other market factors, nearly 50% of Pakistanis are at risk of severe food shortages, largely due to surges in prices. According to the World Food Program, 95 of Pakistan’s 121 districts face problems such as hunger and malnutrition-related diseases (UN Inter-Agency Assessment Mission on the Impact of the Food Crisis in Pakistan, 2008).

The growth rate of agriculture in Pakistan is 2.5%, below the country’s population growth rate of 2.69% (Raza, 2009). The critical nature of the situation in underdeveloped areas of Pakistan is highlighted by such factors as rising incidences of suicide and food-related unrest. In 2009, 20 women and girls were killed at a food distribution site in Karachi.

Many agriculture experts foresee even more severe food crises in the country in the near future. For example, Punjab produces 16 million tons of wheat annually whereas Pakistan’s current wheat requirement stands at close to 23 million tons. In the next few years, Pakistan will need around 30 million tons of wheat for its domestic consumption, but Punjab does not have enough surplus cultivable agricultural land to increase its wheat production by anywhere near that much (Memon, 2009). The

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6 Ghulam Dastgir is a human rights activist. Interviewed by Safdar Sial, Peshawar.
7 Zafarullah Khan is Director for Civic Education Pakistan, Mujtaba Rathore, Islamabad. Interviewed by Safdar Sial.
depleted flow of water in the Indus river system, insufficient rain (and now, flooding), and mismanagement of water system are the main contributors to the heightened food crisis in Pakistan. Another factor is continued terrorist activity that undermines the ability of development and relief NGOs to operate effectively. For example, the World Food Program, a United Nations agency providing food relief in Pakistan, was attacked on October 5, 2009 resulting in the death of five people and the closure of all UN offices in the country.

**SOCIO-POLITICAL FRONT**

With its high rates of fertility and population growth, Pakistan is experiencing an expanding, and undereducated youth bulge. The country’s population over the last three decades has increased from 65 million to over 162 million at present, and is expected to increase to 234 million by 2025 and 357 million by 2050 (Sardar, 2009). Although some recent surveys suggest that fertility rates have declined over the last decade and population growth has dropped below 2% – to about 1.8 per cent in 2008 – the demographic balance skews very young – 65% of 103 million Pakistanis are 25 years of age or younger (Burki, 2008). Moreover, of the more than 36 million Pakistanis between 15 and 24, literacy rates are only 53% for males and 42% for females.

The young constitute a tremendous potential economic resource if properly educated and trained to participate productively in a growing and modernizing economy. A skilled and educated youth could also export its labor to countries with labor shortages, like Japan, North America, Europe and the Middle East. But the under-development of human resources in Pakistan is leading the youth to become economically and socially marginalized, with dire implications. Not only does a large population of unskilled youth contribute to the expansion of militant, violent and criminal activity, but it contributes to the failure of socio-economic growth in the country overall and a weak basis for the future development of health, education, housing and other basic necessities of life.

According to the State Bank of Pakistan’s Annual Report for fiscal year 2007-08 unemployment stood at 5.2% (it reached 15.2% by 2010), education expenditures are just 2.3% of GNP, and health expenditures merely 0.6% of GNP. Because of an administrative and governance system that has long failed to meet the people’s needs, there is a strong sentiment, especially in conflict zones, that the public has no stake in government policies.

The governance challenges facing Pakistan have deep social roots. The Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2008, released by the World Bank (WB), reveal that, among countries in South Asia, the level of government effectiveness in areas vital to national well-being (political voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption) Pakistan ranks at the bottom. In voice and accountability, Pakistan is ranked 19th among 212 countries, well below India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. In Asia, only China comes out worse than Pakistan, at sixth
position. According to the same index, Pakistan has the highest political instability in the world, number one among 212.

A major factor in Pakistan’s political instability is the fact that out of 62 years of Pakistani independence, the military has been in power for more than half – 32 years. Repeated military takeovers have ensured that democratic systems of representation, even when they are in place, cannot mature. Democratic and governance institutions that continue to be manipulated by the army and the civil bureaucracy contribute directly to continuing systemic dysfunction.

Pakistan’s formal institutions are embedded in the social hierarchy, and the boundaries between public and private spheres are porous. Pakistan’s leaders at all levels are more likely to secure positions of formal authority through social networks and patronage than through measures of merit. At the grassroots level as well, Pakistani citizens are more likely to access basic goods and services through personal networks of kin and biradri (clan/caste), informal intermediaries and facilitation payments, than through formal institutions and processes, making regulation difficult. As a result, policy and legislation in many areas crucial to development and economic growth are not reinforced by effective legal and regulatory regimes (Mezzara & Aftab, 2009, p. 33).

Public attitudes toward political processes and service delivery reveal deep distrust and low expectations. Voter turnout in Pakistan, for instance, is among the lowest in the world. Since independence, turnout for parliamentary elections has averaged 45.3%, by far the lowest rate in Asia. Citizens have little faith in public services and are more likely to turn to informal systems of adjudication and service delivery, even if they reinforce the dominance of corrupt and illegitimate local elites. There is also a stark contrast between the legal framework and reality on the ground: constitutionally established quotas for women in political offices, currently set at 33% at the local level and 17% in national and provincial legislature, are often ignored. Women continue to be excluded from key decision-making or administrative positions. Those who do manage to rise to prominent political positions most often do so through kinship or family ties to male politicians (ibid).

Government decisions and policies are, in reality, designed and implemented by a small political, military and bureaucratic elite. The political elites remain largely indifferent to, and even ignorant of, societal change. Their prime motivation for participation in government is advancing and defending their personal interests (Interview with Zafarullah Khan, 19 March, 2009).

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution enjoyed federal consensus and popular support, but critics charge that it has yet to be implemented in its true letter and spirit, especially as regards provincial autonomy. Numerous amendments over the years, particularly the ones added during military rule, have turned the 1973 Constitution into a legal and political mess.
The present government formed the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms (PCCR) – with representation from almost all the political parties – to review the 1973 Constitution and make recommendations for undoing the most damaging amendments. The committee drafted the 18th Amendment Bill in 2010, both houses of Parliament passed it with strong majorities, and President Zardari signed it on 18 April. The new law, among other changes: transfers key presidential powers to parliament, enhances provincial autonomy, repeals the controversial Musharraf-era 17th Amendment, and deprives the presidency of discretionary powers to dissolve the National Assembly and appoint heads of the armed forces and provincial governors. It also abolishes a clause barring the election of a prime minister to more than two terms.

Besides constitutional amendments, most of which have been corrected by the 18th Amendment, Pakistan’s elected and military leaders have also relied on decrees (ordinances) to circumvent parliamentary law-making. According to the HRCP Report for 2007, 70 ordinances were issued in 2007 alone, “a number of them only a day before the National Assembly was due to meet” (Mezzara & Aftab, 2009, p. 33).

Apart from the constitutional reform process, Pakistan is experiencing a phase of heightened tension between the executive and the judiciary, particularly on the issues of appointment of judges to higher courts and the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) – which former president Musharraf issued to end politically-motivated cases against political leaders, activists and others. The Supreme Court has declared the NRO null and void after the Parliament could not ratify it. This executive-judicial conflict, if not resolved amicably, has the potential to derail the democratic process and create political chaos.

Some analysts see the judiciary entering a transition phase in which it is attempting to assert itself against executive supremacy through judicial activism. Until recently, the judiciary, like other weak institutions in Pakistan, repeatedly fell back on the army. Judges appointed through political patronage made the judiciary subservient to political elites as well. Expectations were chronically low regarding judges whose appointment came through favoritism and nepotism rather than merit (Khan, 1999, pp. 10-11). Since 1958, the judiciary had been catering primarily to the army and political elites, legitimizing military rule through the doctrine of necessity. The historical lack of instances of the Supreme Court’s challenging the military establishment or political ruling elites further undermined the independence and legitimacy of the judiciary. While the heightened conflict between the judiciary and executive in recent years is creating further political tension in Pakistan, the long term results may be beneficial. When the dust settles, both the judiciary and executive may emerge with a more mature outlook and ability to work cooperatively within their respective jurisdictions. This transformation will not happen quickly. It may take several years of relative political chaos before the branches of Pakistan’s democratic system work smoothly.

ETHNO-NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

Since its creation, nation-building has proven a difficult challenge for federal Pakistan. Ethnic and linguistic divisions sowed internal tensions and conflicts into
Pakistan’s political discourse from inception. Bengalis rejected Urdu as the official language of Pakistan along with Pashtun, Sindhis and Balochs. Ethnic diversity and regional identities injected increasingly strong centrifugal tendencies into the politics of the ruling elites, with economics and distribution of resources the underlying factor. All this was countered, at the center, by efforts to establish Islam as the binding force for both national cohesion and state security.

A number of potential threats and challenges emerge out of regional nationalist movements among the Sindhi, Baloch and Pashtun – not to mention the sub-ethnic ones – at local and provincial levels. Nationalist movements in Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan have fairly deep historical roots in pre-partition regional autonomy movements in British India (Amin, 1988, p. 57). These regional autonomy movements, which emerged against the backdrop of British colonial policies, assumed the character of ethno-national movements espousing autonomy or separatism.

Some political analysts warn that a majority of Pashtuns on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border (Durand Line), although currently leaderless, are beginning to perceive their community as the ultimate victims of three decades of continuous war and foreign intervention on their soil. During the Soviet-Afghan war and the subsequent (and continuing) US-led coalition war, millions of Pashtun people have been killed, injured, and/or become refugees. There is a growing possibility that the Taliban, which are enjoying increasing Pashtun support on both sides of the Durand Line, may exploit the leadership vacuum. When the Taliban emerged in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, it was perceived as a champion of the Pashtun community in the seemingly endless bloodshed and fighting between militant groups – especially against the Northern Alliance, which was regarded as anti-Pashtun. The Taliban was also wary of Iran between 1996 and 2000, given Iran’s concerns about emergence of a Pashtun-dominated government in Afghanistan. Some leaders of other Pashtun nationalist parties, such as the Parcham and the Khalq, also joined the Taliban government. Support within Pakistan for Afghan Jihadist leaders such as Hekmatyar also had roots in the ethnic Pashtun cultural ties (Yousufzai, 2009, pp. 45-51).

A similar (although less dramatic) shift of Pashtun support toward right wing groups and leaders, including religious parties and the Taliban, was also apparent in Pakistani Pashtun areas – including FATA, NWFP and the Pashtun belt in Baluchistan – in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Many knowledgeable observers now raise the possibility that, should the Taliban soften its ideological and political stance and reposition its agenda from a religious extremism toward Pashtun nationalism, the shift could have major political implications in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the other political parties in frontier regions, like the ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Awami National Party (ANP), fail to address Pashtun grievances and aspirations, popular support could shift in favor of the Taliban, with complex political, religious and ethnic consequences (ibid).

Baloch and Sindh nationalist movements started to gain substantial popular support in the 1970s. Apart from the proliferation of organizations with secessionist agendas in both provinces, the most disturbing indicator of rising public support for the Jeeya Sindh and Baloch movements was the increase in anti-government and
ethnic violence. Estimates of the number of people killed in Sindh in language riots in 1972 and two civil disobedience movements launched in 1983 and 1986 range from 600 to 800 people. About 6000 to 9000 people were killed in the civil war (1973-77) between Baloch insurgents and the Pakistan Army (ibid., p. 223). While the Sindh nationalist movement gradually became dormant, the Baloch insurgency continues, led by Baloch nationalist parties and armed groups.

Sindh nationalism in Pakistan today manifests itself as ethno-political violence, mainly in Karachi and parts of rural Sindh. Secessionist and separatist movements no longer enjoy much political support, largely because the mainstream Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) enjoy fairly broad electoral support in urban Sindh. Baloch nationalism however remains problematic and constitutes a major security threat for the Pakistani state. The province has seen four nationalist insurgencies against Pakistan’s central government since independence. The first three, which involved extensive military operations in Baluchistan, took place in 1948, 1968 and 1973. The latest – which started with the 1999 military takeover that established President Musharraf’s regime – still continues. The construction of military cantonments and mega-development projects like Gwadar Port triggered resentment among nationalist forces. A rocket attack on General Musharraf, during a visit to Kohlu town in December 2005 elicited retaliation from the military government, which launched a military operation in Dera Bugti and Kohlu (Baluchistan: Conflicts and Players, 2009, p. 49). The death of Nawab Bugti on August 26, 2006 during another military confrontation further inflamed the Baloch insurgency. Baloch insurgents have continued their attacks on state institutions, security forces, gas and power installations and, more recently, non-Baloch, particularly Punjabis, in the region.

The number of insurgent and terrorist attacks by Baloch nationalist insurgents has increased gradually from 2006 to 2009 as illustrated in Figure 3.

In addition to the older groups – like the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA), Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF) and Bugti Militia – new insurgent groups have surfaced, including Lashkar-e-Baluchistan, Bugti Force, Bugti Lovers, the Baloch National Army and Baloch Liberation United Front (BLUF). A new Baloch Islamist group, Jandullah headed by Abdul Malik Ragi, has also emerged with the stated goal of establishing an Islamic state encompassing Iranian, Afghan and Pakistani Balochs.

The present government made concessions to Baluchistan in the 7th National Finance (NFC) Award and has also announced a special rights package for Baluchistan, yet comprehensive reconciliation is unlikely. Political critics argue that the Baluchistan package, or The Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Baluchistan Package, is just a set of recommendations lacking the force of law. Hence, the real test will be government implementation, especially of those clauses requiring a two-third majority in the Parliament.

Most Baloch nationalist parties boycotted the 2008 elections, don’t see the present provincial government as representative of the Baloch people, and have increasingly called for an independent Baluchistan. Efforts of the present government may close the trust gap between Baluchistan and the federal government, but the demands
of the Baloch insurgents and the nationalist political parties are wide-ranging. The federal government will find it difficult to meet them without buy-in from the military establishment and other stakeholders. These demands include: abolishing military cantonments in Baluchistan, the release of Baloch and political prisoners, resettlement of internally displaced Baloch from Dera Bugti and Kohlu, provision of fiscal and political autonomy, acknowledgement of Baloch claims over economic resources of the province, and compensation and justice for past killings of Baloch people and leaders.

There are no signs of an imminent halt in the Baloch insurgency. If the current process of reconciliation stalls for any reason in the coming years, the consequences could be devastating for both Baluchistan and the Pakistani state.

**RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM**

Pakistan gradually came under the grip of terrorism following the September 2001 al-Qaida attacks against the United States. The number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan since 2005 has increased by an astronomical 746% (see Table 1). In 2009, a total of 2,586 terrorist, insurgent and sectarian attacks were reported across the country that killed 3,021 people and injured 7,334 (see Figure 5).

It has taken more than five years for an anti-terrorism consensus to take root in Pakistan. Although the country had already suffered two decades of sectarian violence, the motivations and objectives behind the post-9/11 increase in the strength and number of attacks were, in the popular view, ambiguous. Many dismissed increased terrorism as a reaction against the regime’s collaboration with the US invasion of Afghanistan and the aggression of the West against the *Ummah* – a sentiment expressed by many Pakistani militants, religious political parties and a big
MUHAMMAD AMIR RANA, SAFDAR SIAL

Figure 5: Terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2009  
(PIPS Annual Security Report 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total attacks</th>
<th>Annual increase (%)</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>159%</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>1,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,503</td>
<td>129%</td>
<td>3,448</td>
<td>5,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2,577</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>7,997</td>
<td>9,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3,816</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>12,632</td>
<td>12,815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Comparison of figures for the last three years  
(PIPS Annual Security Report 2008)

section of the media. This perception hindered effective counter terrorism responses and encouraged public opinion to favor the political accommodation of extremist agendas. But as it became apparent that political steps were failing to stem the Talibanization in the Swat Valley, public support for security options increased. A Pew Research Center survey in August 2009 found that 82% of Pakistani respondents saw the Taliban and militants as a critical threat (Pakistan Public Opinion, Pew Research Center, 2009). The question remains, however, whether this reflects a permanent shift of opinion against the extremists.

The total number of militant groups has fallen dramatically in Pakistan and Kashmir, but in the Federally Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA), more than 50 local Taliban groups have emerged as a more serious threat. Moreover, militant groups have become more diverse since 9/11. Divided along sectarian lines, each has its own agenda for political, social, economic, cultural and ideological reform according to their own version of Shariah. While militant groups may line up ideologically with politico-religious parties, they have also expanded their scope and agenda from the local to the global level, developing ties with regional and global terrorist networks. They are widely networked across the country,
with presence, recruitment bases, infrastructure, and ideological and operational training facilities in FATA, South Punjab and Karachi. These three strongholds are the basis for a triangular militant structure that has enabled militant networks to operate with devastating cost in lives and damage to public and private properties.

These groups pose a serious threat to internal security on three levels: 1) they weaken the writ of the state and state–society relationship, 2) they upset the sectarian, social and cultural equilibrium of the society, and 3) they slow down economic and political development. On the regional and global levels, continued violence undermines Pakistan’s legitimate strategic interests by creating a hostile regional atmosphere with neighboring countries, not only India and Afghanistan but also China and Iran. The support base of these militant groups is not extensive, despite the apparent willingness of local populations to harbor them. Recent shifts in the global, regional and domestic environment leaves the militants in a vulnerable position, and Pakistan is developing the political will to wipe out the militants and to dismantle their networks. Success, however, will require careful planning, capacity-building – both local and international – and, most importantly, a long term and comprehensive strategy.

Transnational security threats and challenges

PANDEMIC DISEASES

Pandemic diseases spread without respect for international borders. The world is vastly more interconnected today than it was during previous pandemics, so what happens in one place will inevitably affect another. There is now broad, international consensus that emerging and reemerging pandemics constitute a major threat to global security and have the potential to create catastrophic damage in a relatively short period of time. Some studies suggest that some vector-borne diseases like dengue, malaria and plague will also become more common in Pakistan and across South Asia as a result of global climate change, creating additional public health pressures.

The Pakistan government has launched comprehensive programs to control pandemic diseases including HIV/AIDS, influenza, and tuberculosis (TB), but its meager health budget, lack of public health infrastructure and awareness, poor sanitation conditions, contaminated drinking water, unsafe food and malnutrition, and other deteriorating health indicators suggest that Pakistan is highly vulnerable to any future outbreak of transnational pandemic disease.

CLIMATE CHANGES AND ECOLOGY

Pakistan is among the countries which will be hit hardest by the effects of climate change and is already experiencing severe pressures on its natural resources and environment. Water supply, already a serious concern in many parts of the country, stands to decline dramatically, affecting food production as well as export industries like fisheries. Some coastal areas face the risk of inundation as sea levels rise, flooding
low-lying areas and potentially creating millions of climate refugees. If predictions of a 50% reduction of Indus River flow, intensified droughts and sea-level rise are accurate, Pakistan faces major social upheaval if national and regional governments fail to plan for the consequences.

The Himalayas govern climate across the Indian subcontinent and are the source of three major river systems: the Ganga, Indus and Brahmaputra. Besides supporting India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the southern Himalayas are home to millions of people in three countries. Water availability is a critical issue for communities living in the mountains and floods originating from these areas pose a major threat to millions more in downstream communities, as the devastating floods of 2010 attest. Deforestation and loss of biodiversity in the mountains present major concerns for environmental security, but any effort to counter them runs up against deeply-entrenched cultural practices, the effects of climate change, and the constant need to expand human habitation to accommodate growing populations. The adverse effects of climate change already threaten the livelihoods of many people across the region and will require vastly more national, regional and global government expenditure on adaptation to climate variability (Sharma, 2009, pp. 26-30).

Pakistan experiences periodic water scarcity that is aggravated by below normal winter rainfall, as was the case in most parts of the country in 2009. During the month of December 2009, winter rain was 37% below normal across Pakistan, except in Baluchistan. Abnormally dry weather conditions contribute to crop failures that aggravate food shortages in urban areas.

**BORDER TENSIONS**

The boundary disputes that have triggered decades of insurgencies and separatist movements, not to mention interstate conflict with its neighbors on Pakistan’s eastern and western borders, date back at least to the end of British Rule in 1947. Pakistan’s boundary dispute with Afghanistan – over the highly controversial Durand Line – and with India over the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Kashmir are the key destabilizing factors in the South Asia region. Pakistan has no outstanding boundary disputes with China and Iran, but Baloch and Uighur Separatist movements are potential sources of tension – Baloch separatists threaten national cohesion in both Iran and Pakistan, and China fears links between its Muslim Uighur minority and Pakistani jihadist groups.

The Kashmir issue has triggered three full scale wars between India and Pakistan and was a key factor in the nuclearization of the subcontinent. The LoC, which allowed each country to retain control over their occupied territories, was meant as a temporary agreement brokered by the United Nations until a permanent resolution could be negotiated. Unfortunately, decades of on-again-off-again negotiation has failed to produce any consensus on the issue, uncertainty which has been instrumental in mobilizing violent Kashmiri separatist sentiments.

8 Taken from the address of Dr. Rajendra Kumar Pachauri, Chairman of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in a two-day regional conference on climate change: challenges and opportunities for South Asia, held on 13 January 2009 in Islamabad.
Pakistan shares a 2,250 kilometer border with Afghanistan that was drawn in 1893 by Sir Mortimer Durand, then British India’s foreign secretary, and was acceded to by the Emir of Afghanistan in the same year. After the British withdrawal, Afghanistan – charging that the Durand Line was an illegitimate exercise of imperial power over a weak regime – called for the establishment of an independent Pashtun state, to be called Pashtunistan or Pakhtunistan. Pakistan, as the legatee of the British in the region, insists that the Durand Line is legal and legitimate, but the local tribes inhabiting the border areas do not recognize the boundary at all. Despite the ongoing dispute, there was no major armed conflict and neither state deployed regular Army units along the border until after 9/11. Pakistan deployed its regular forces at the border with Afghanistan for the first time to stop the infiltration of the al-Qaida and Taliban remnants following the US-led coalition overthrow of the Taliban regime. Afghanistan now also deploys troops on the border, and small-scale armed clashes have become routine. Taliban and al-Qaida presence along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and the vulnerability of overland supply routes for the international forces have made the region a major strategic concern for NATO and US-led allied forces in Afghanistan. Cross-border Taliban activity across the Durand Line has also become a source of major tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan (PIPS Annual Security Report 2009).

Pakistan’s relations with Iran have improved in recent years, as symbolized by the signing of a major gas pipeline agreement. Still, the shadow of Jundullah, a separatist militant group active on both sides of the border, looms large in bilateral security relations. Tehran, claiming that Jundullah was using Pakistani territory to launch terrorist attacks in Iran, has, in the past, accused Pakistani intelligence agencies of backing the terrorist group (Mir, 10 June, 2009). The Iranians have also asserted their right to conduct security operations across the border with Pakistan. Islamabad has assured Tehran that its territory will not be used against Iran and the two countries have begun to develop joint counter-terrorism mechanisms, including joint patrolling on the borders.

Tension across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and the Kashmir issue will remain key security issues for Pakistan. Kashmir, as a potential nuclear flashpoint, will continue to draw the attention of the international community and create a sense of urgency for India and Pakistan to find a resolution. The tension on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border could also escalate with the eventual withdrawal of US and NATO forces – particularly if the Taliban continues to transform into a trans-border ideological and ethnic insurgency.

**DRUG TRAFFICKING AND SMUGGLING**

Pakistan is not a drug producer, but domestic drug smuggling and addiction are becoming major problems. Prior to 1980, Pakistan had almost no drug addicts, but according to the UNDCP, by 2003 Pakistan had an estimated four million drug addicts, out of a population of 140 million. It now has one of the highest rates of drug addiction in the world (Mehmood, 2003).
The rapid increase in drug smuggling and use in Pakistan began after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which made Pakistan a major transit route for drugs. Tribal Pakistan's economy has deep historical and cultural links with Afghanistan due to geographic and ethnic proximity. The mountainous FATA region has limited agricultural land, so local tribesmen depend heavily on business or trade, without much concern over the legality of their ventures. The illegal arms and drug trades, informal trade to Afghanistan through Pakistan, foreign exchange transactions through *hawala*, *hundi* and smuggling are among the major businesses in the tribal areas. Informal trade and smuggling are completely dominated by the tribesmen. Although most people involved in business in FATA are not militants or pro-Taliban, the roads used for the transportation business are in Taliban control and subject to security payments to the militants (Mian, 2009, p. 92). Poppy cultivation has increased in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, and Pakistani tribesmen are deeply involved in the narcotics traffic out of Afghanistan. Statistics on the volume of narcotics trade through the tribal areas are not available, but Pashtun-controlled FATA areas and parts of Baluchistan under Baloch militant’s control are known to be trafficking routes to Europe and beyond.

Continuing border conflicts, the lack of effective border control cooperation between countries in the region, consolidated networks of smuggling/trafficking groups, and the expanding nexus between militant and terrorist groups for whom drug trafficking is a key funding source, all present vital threats to the security of Pakistan, its regional neighbors, and the world. Yet effective national and regional mechanisms for stemming the flow of drugs and weapons are virtually non-existent in Pakistan and the region.

**WEAPONS PROLIFERATION**

Pakistan is also a transit route, manufacturing center, and marketplace for illicit arms. Hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis are involved in the arms industry. Illicit weapons are traded in huge markets in Darra Adam Khel, a town located between Peshawar and Kohat in the NWFP, Sakhakot (Malakand), Bara (Khyber Agency), Peshawar’s Karkhano Market, Miranshah, the main town of North Waziristan Agency, and in Mohmand Agency. Weapons manufacturing and trade exists, albeit on a smaller scale, across the FATA region. Around 250 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and 2,200 families are associated with the weapons manufacturing business in Darra Adam Khel and Bara (ibid., p. 93). Baluchistan has also become a hub of the arms trade, through which arms and weapons are distributed to Sindh, southern Punjab, and in refugee camps situated along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The north-western districts of Baluchistan, Pishin and Zhob, and the towns of Chaman, have acquired legendary status in weapons smuggling. A massive cache of weapons is dumped in two small border towns – Girdi Jungle in Baluchistan and Shorabuck in southern Kandahar – for onward supply to insurgent groups in Baluchistan and warring tribes in rural Sindh. Weapons bound for Karachi are primarily transported via the RCD Highway which passes through Mastung, Kalat, Khuzdar and Lasbela districts before entering Sindh (Ahmed, 2007).
While progress in controlling the illicit trade of conventional weapons has been slow, Pakistan has worked hard to reassure the international community of the security of its nuclear arsenal. It has initiated a number of measures, such as strengthening export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programmes, to ensure the security of its nuclear facilities. Still, political instability brought on by various crises, rising and expanding waves of militancy and terrorism, and the apparent weakening of state authority and control in the key conflict zones of NWFP, FATA and Baluchistan poses an extreme challenge to Pakistan in both securing its nuclear weapons and convincing the rest of the world that it is capable of doing so.
Introduction

Transnational security issues have been of concern to policy makers for some time. Global terrorism, human trafficking, small arms proliferation and other transnational security threats have raised concern among policy makers for several reasons. First, the negative impacts of such transnational issues do not remain confined to the territorial boundary of a state; rather these spill over and affect other countries. Second, in recent times, transnational security threats have caused serious damage to economic, social and political development at the systemic level. For instance, drug trafficking in Latin America or transnational terrorism in South Asia have created significant economic, social and political instability. The third reason is equally noteworthy; limitations of national-level legislation and an absence of adequate transnational collaborative mechanisms or legal regimes have made it quite difficult to decisively deal with most transnational threats.

Bangladesh faces a host of transnational security threats, including terrorism, arms and drug smuggling, human trafficking, climate security, financial crime and transnational organized crime, all of which jeopardize its already fragile economy and impede social and political development. Bangladesh is geo-strategically significant for a number of reasons: It is the world’s 7th most populous nation with more than 150 million people. It is also the third largest Muslim nation in the world in terms of demographic strength. Bangladesh sits in close proximity to two ‘would be’ superpowers – China and India. Hence, if unchecked, the transnational problems facing Bangladesh will have serious consequences for this entire region. In this regard, this paper identifies the major transnational security threats facing Bangladesh, analyses how severe the threats are and recommends measures to effectively address these challenges.

Definitions

Transnational security challenges are threats to the security of nations “characterized by an event or phenomenon of cross-border scope, the dynamics of which are significantly (but not necessarily exclusively) driven by non-state actors (e.g., terrorists), activities (e.g., global economic behavior), or forces (e.g., microbial mutations, earthquakes)” (Fidler et al., 2005, p. 3). According to James Cockayne and Christoph Mikulascheck transnational security includes “international terrorism, transnational organized crime, climate change and climate-related migration, as well
as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and small arms and light weapons (SALW), are among the most salient transnational security challenges on a global scale” (Cockayne & Mikulascheck, 2008).

Paul J. Smith defines transnational security issues as the “nonmilitary threats that cross borders and either threaten the political and social integrity of a nation or the health of that nation’s inhabitants” (Smith, 2000). Unlike traditional security threats, “such as a nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan, or Serbia’s military campaign in Kosovo”, transnational security threats do not have a crisis “focal point”. The absence of a focal point makes it difficult for policymakers and government leaders to direct their attention and energy effectively (ibid.).

According to the US Department of Defense, “transnational threats are major security threats for the 21st century”. These threats are characterized by their global nature “which means, by definition, that these threats straddle both the domestic and foreign spheres” (Pumphrey, 2008). Transnational security threats have also redefined the role of the military. Previously, the US military was primarily responsible for ensuring national security, while domestic security was in the province of law enforcement agencies. After the emergence of transnational security threats, “these clear-cut divisions no longer exist. This poses some profound constitutional and security challenges” to nation-states (ibid.).

What compounds the scenario is that transnational threats are difficult to deter, detect and control. “National boundaries are not effective barriers, and are often used to an adversary’s advantage. With little or no tie to national identity, attribution can be difficult in the event of an attack, and retribution may not be possible” (The Defense Science Board, 1997). Experts believe that the advent of globalization has rendered “unprecedented economic growth, commerce, and international migration”. Easier communication has expanded the global, national and regional horizons creating new opportunities for most countries. However, at the same time, globalization has also opened “the floodgates to more sinister elements”, i.e. transnational security threats (Smith, 2000).

The transnational security threats to Bangladesh

The transnational security threats challenging Bangladesh which this paper focuses on are: terrorism, arms trafficking, drug trafficking, human trafficking, climate change, water security, financial crime and infectious diseases.

Terrorism and religious militancy

Terrorism and religious militancy have become a major concern for Bangladesh. Terrorism and religious militancy in Bangladesh have caused severe damage to the moderate image of the nation. Terrorism has threatened people’s lives, the country’s economy, and Bangladesh’s political establishment and religious pluralism. Terrorism has generated insecurity and instability within the state and society.
A number of Islamist militant groups and their offshoots have sprung up in the country over the course of the last two decades, among which Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Hizbut Touhid, Islami Samaj, Hizb-ut Tehrir, and Alla’r Dal, are prominent. These terror outfits also maintain and harbor linkages with other transnational/international terrorist groups.

MAJOR TERROR ATTACKS IN BANGLADESH

A number of major terrorist attacks have taken place post 9/11 in Bangladesh. Notwithstanding Bangladesh’s Muslim-majority status, the people of this land have traditionally sustained close affinity with Bengali language, culture and heritage. Their distinct Bengali identity has been a source of religious harmony and peaceful co-existence among different confessional communities in Bangladesh for many centuries. Extremist and religious militants oppose the Bengali secular image, and targeted the traditional Bengali new year cultural festivities on April 14, 2001. Bomb blasts at a crowded festival, on the morning of the Bengali New Year, claimed nine lives, and injured many others (The Daily Star, August, 2004).

The terrorist groups planned and executed their terror plots in a sequential manner within the country and society. After targeting symbols of Bengali culture, the militants attacked Bangladesh’s judicial system. Nine people, including two lawyers and a police constable, were killed, and 78 others injured on 29 November, 2005, in two suicide bomb attacks by the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), on the Chittagong and Gazipur court premises (The Daily Star, November, 2005).

The JMB targeted the judiciary as a part of its attempts to replace the current legal system with Shar’ia-based Islamic law. Militants also attacked the administrative components of the government. The most noteworthy of these, a series of blasts in August 2005, rocked 63 administrative districts (out of a total 64 in the country) within just 30 minutes. Government establishments were targeted in the attack. The country’s democratic political parties were also targeted. Militants launched grenade attacks on a political rally in an attempt to assassinate the chief of the then main opposition party (and present Prime Minister), Mrs. Sheikh Hasina. More than 16 people were killed and over 200 people were injured in the attack (The Daily Star, August, 2004). Foreign diplomats serving in Bangladesh were not spared. Two people were killed and the then British High Commissioner to Bangladesh, and a Mr. Anwar Choudhury, was among about 70 injured in a powerful bomb blast at Hazrat Shahjalal’s Shrine in Sylhet (The Daily Star, May, 2004).

TRANSNATIONAL LINKAGES

Intelligence sources reveal that the militant groups active in Bangladesh have established links with international and regional terror groups and receive support, assistance, training and funding to carry out activities within and beyond the national boundaries. It is alleged, for instance, that the HuJI-B was formed in Bangladesh, drawing inspiration from al-Qaïda, and that the group continues to maintain active
links with the al-Qaida network and remnants of the Taliban militia. The police in the neighboring Indian state of Assam suspect that JMB is also trying to expand its operations into Indian territory.

The HuJI-B, for its part, is believed to have links with terrorist groups based in Pakistan. According to intelligence sources, HuJI-B also has connections with insurgent groups operating in Northeast India. Some recent developments have generated more surprises. According to reports, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operatives of Indian and Pakistani nationalities are active in Bangladesh, and are working to build a strong militant network here. While investigating the alleged LeT plot to attack the Indian and US embassies in Dhaka, the intelligence agencies have gathered information that the Pakistan-based militant group is recruiting cadres from Rohingya refugees in Chittagong. The Dhaka Metropolitan Police Commissioner, AKM Shahidul Hoque, told journalists that a good number of Lashkar operatives are part of a covert campaign to carry out subversive activities in Bangladesh (The Daily Star, February, 2010).

Indian security analysts report that the United Liberation Front of Asam (ULFA), an ethnic insurgent group from northeast India, maintains linkages with terrorist groups operating in Bangladesh. It is also reported that ULFA established its camps in the Bangladeshi territory and that ULFA operatives received training at various camps of the HuJI-B. Indian analysts depict an interesting alliance between Indian Hindu ethnic separatist groups and Islamist terrorist organizations such as the HuJI-B and the Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen. It must also be mentioned that Bangladesh has facilitated the arrest of a number of top ULFA leaders and subsequently handed them over to India (The Times of India, February, 2010).

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The Bangladesh Government has made serious efforts to thwart the menace of terrorism. In 2004 a special force (the Rapid Action Battalion) was raised to curb terrorism. Since then, law enforcement agencies have been able to disrupt the command and control structure of several terrorist groups. Top leaders of the JMB were apprehended, put on trial, convicted, and executed (The Daily Star, March, 2007). Many operatives of HuJI-B and JMB are still on the run. In terms of legislative responses, special laws and ordinances were enacted to curb terrorism and terrorist financing in Bangladesh. Recent statistics show a dramatic decline in the number of fatalities resulting from terrorist attacks in Bangladesh (South Asia Terrorism Portal, February, 2010).

However, considering the transnational nature of global terrorism, Bangladesh cannot effectively act alone against terrorism; it needs the institutionalization of regional/transnational cooperation or the adoption of collaborative mechanisms by South Asian countries.
### Exhibit Box 1

The major provisions of the Anti-terrorism Ordinance (2008) are:

- Penalties for offences including:
  - arms running,
  - financing terror attacks,
  - committing murders, and
  - creating panic and endangering national sovereignty.
- Maximum punishment is the death sentence.
- Punishment for being associated with proscribed organizations.
- Financing of terrorism has become a subject of punishment.
- Creation of a special tribunal to put terrorists on trial.

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## Transnational criminal organizations

Globalization, trade liberalization, and faster connectivity have played a critical role in the development of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO). The notion of the “global village” has fundamentally changed the context in which both legitimate and illegitimate businesses operate. This has created immense opportunities for transnational criminal activity (Phil Williams, 1994).

TCOs from countries all over the world have formed strategic alliances to traffic in drugs, arms, intellectual property, humans, archeological treasures and a number of other lucrative but illegal trades. In Bangladesh, for instance, a well-organized criminal network exists that traffics women and children to India, Pakistan and the
Muniruzzaman

Middle East for prostitution and domestic work, while children are sent to the Middle East to become camel jockeys (The Daily Star, July, 2003).

TCOs and the national security of a country have a close relationship. Though it does not pose direct military threats or challenges to the state, drug trafficking and arms smuggling can cause serious problems.

Arms trafficking

Illegal firearm trafficking is a serious transnational problem for Bangladesh. Bangladesh is now increasingly being used as a transit route by transnational militant and insurgent outfits for smuggling weapons. According to intelligence sources, the north, south and southeastern parts of the country, especially Chittagong, Khagrachhari, Bandarban, Sandwip, Haluaghat and emerging Char Islands, are being used for transportation of illegal small arms (The Daily Star, February, 2009).

Alarmingly, illegal arms trafficking has also picked up in southwestern Bangladesh. Law enforcement agency sources have identified 29 points in six border districts where arms traffickers are active in carrying out the illicit trade. The districts are Kushtia, Meherpur, Chuadanga, Jhenidah, Jessore and Satkhira. The smugglers use at least four points on the Kushtia border, five in Jhenidah, four in Chuadanga, three in Meherpur, six in Satkhira, and seven in Jessore (The Daily Star, February, 2009).

TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIONS

The smugglers operate across the India-Bangladesh border, and local (Bangladeshi) gun-runners keep close linkages with their Indian counterparts. The illegal firearms being trafficked through Bangladesh are mostly made in China, the USA, the Czech Republic and India. They include eight-shooter guns, sawn-off rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, pistols and Indian-made arms like pipe guns, one-shooter guns, musket rifles and revolvers. Sources say the demand for Indian-made firearms is particularly high due to their low price and wide availability.

Because of its geographical location, porous border and poor border management, Bangladesh has become a desired transit route for arms trafficking in South Asia (see Map 1). In order to protect itself from illegal movements and activities, India started fencing the border in 1986, amid criticisms of violating international law. By November 2009, 2,677 km of fencing had been completed out of an eventual 3,436 km (Centre for Civil Society, New Delhi). Nevertheless, a large section of the border remains unprotected, and this has facilitated illegal arms trafficking over the years. The easy availability of firearms has given rise to different criminal groups which have created serious social problems for the country.

The traffickers adopt various operational strategies to avoid detection. They usually do not smuggle firearms in bulk, but rather in a piecemeal fashion. They often dismantle the arms into small parts for easier trafficking into the country. Later, the
arms are assembled and dispatched to the sales point. According to a report published by the Bangladesh Development Partnership Center (BDPC), at least 400,000 illegal and 25,000 licensed guns are used across the country for criminal activities.

South Asia Partnership (SAP) Bangladesh and International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) jointly organized a conference in Dhaka as part of the 2006 Global Week of Action Against Small Arms. Major General Syed Muhammad Ibrahim (Retd.), who presented the keynote paper in the conference, stated that around 128 syndicates in the country were engaged in criminal activities including gun running, human trafficking, extortion, prostitution, illegal occupation of land, smuggling of contraband items, drug peddling, drug dealing and money laundering. He also claimed that more than 600,000 operatives (of whom 40% were under 18 years of age) used 400,000 unauthorized weapons to carry out illegal activities across the country. Religious militant groups and insurgent outfits of neighboring countries use Bangladesh’s south and southeastern regions as a transit route. The government of Bangladesh and its law enforcement agencies, because of their limited resources and other constraints, have failed to take decisive action to curb the illegal commerce.

**MAJOR ARMS HAULS**

On 1 April, 2004, law enforcement agencies of Bangladesh recovered ten truckloads of arms and ammunition from the jetty of the Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Factory (CUFF), in the port city of Chittagong. This was the largest arms haul in the country’s history. 1,290 SMGs, 100 Tommy guns, 400 semi-automatic spot rifles, 150 40mm rocket launchers, 2,000 grenade launchers, 840 rockets (40mm), 25,020 hand grenades, 6,392 magazines for SMGs, and 184 million rounds of ammunition were recovered.

Reports said that this huge quantity of arms and ammunition was smuggled into Bangladesh from a third country and was intended to be shipped to recipients in...
northeastern India. The incident showed the scale of Bangladesh’s vulnerability in terms of transnational arms trafficking (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Offence</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arms Act</td>
<td>2,293</td>
<td>2,370</td>
<td>1,836</td>
<td>1,552</td>
<td>1,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive Act</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Number of registered cases under the Arms and Explosive Acts, 2003-2007

THE CHALLENGE TO THE STATE

Arms trafficking poses serious challenges to the Bangladeshi state. It challenges democratic practices, governance and development. The national security of the country is also significantly compromised. It is a big challenge for regional security and stability. Many security analysts believe that the internal factors and sub-systemic dynamics of South Asia have contributed to turn the region into a large illegal arms trading centre. It may be difficult to stop this illegal trafficking completely. However, observers suggest that law enforcement agencies must take into account the supply and demand equation in order to devise effective mechanisms to arrest these lethal contraband flows. Brigadier General Shahedul Anam Khan ndc, psc (Retd.) has identified two important factors relevant to curbing arms trafficking: First, to realize the universality of the problem. Individual states in isolation cannot combat the menace of arms trafficking; they will require collective effort and global response mechanisms. The second factor is to establish a synergy between development and security. Development will eradicate the sense of insecurity of the groups/individuals that otherwise would resort to violent means.

Drug trafficking

Bangladesh has become an attractive transit point for narcotics destined for international markets. Bangladesh’s long and porous borders have made the country vulnerable to trans-border smuggling (see Map 2). Drug trafficking – mainly of heroin, hashish, opium, phensidyl, pathedine, or other psychotropic substances like methamphetamines and precursor chemicals like acetic anhydride – poses a real challenge to the nation. A host of factors have contributed to Bangladesh becoming a lucrative narco-transit zone for the transnational drug trade, including easy access to international air and sea links, and modest detection and interdiction capability (*The Daily Star*, August, 2006).

Bangladesh customs officials seized 23.5 kg of low-quality heroin at Dhaka’s international airport on November 12, 2007. A month earlier, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) recovered 3 kg of heroin from a village in Sylhet district. The heroin, according to RAB, came from an unknown location in India. In October, 2007, RAB made one of the largest drug busts in the country. In a raid, RAB seized about 130,000 yaba tablets, with a street value of more than US$1 million. Large amounts of drug-
making equipment and raw materials were also recovered (International Narcotic Control Strategy Report, 2008).

Map 2: Drug trafficking routes through Bangladesh (Department of Narcotic Control, Bangladesh)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Drug</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009 (April)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heroin</td>
<td>Kg.</td>
<td>16.288</td>
<td>20.856</td>
<td>29.013</td>
<td>21.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charash</td>
<td>Kg.</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popy Plant</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60,038</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14,50210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illicit Distillation</td>
<td>Litre</td>
<td>23,582.200</td>
<td>22,959.400</td>
<td>23,597.600</td>
<td>22,671.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codeine (Phensidyl)</td>
<td>Bottle</td>
<td>46,995</td>
<td>28,241</td>
<td>53,239</td>
<td>58,875</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Narcotic seizure statistics in Bangladesh  
(Department of Narcotic Control, Bangladesh)

In late December, 2009, a joint team of RAB and the Department of Narcotic Control (DNC) seized a kilogram of heroin and arrested four suspected drug traffickers, including three foreigners, at Uttara in the capital. These instances demonstrated that
drug trafficking in Bangladesh has direct transnational connections (The New Age, December, 2009).

According to the latest 2008 report from the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), in 2007 anti-narcotic agencies in Bangladesh made a record seizure of more than 70,000 tablets containing codeine. India is the main source of tablets containing codeine and codeine-based cough syrup (under the brand name Phensidyl) smuggled into Bangladesh. The report also stated, “Pharmaceutical preparations diverted from licit manufacture in India continue to feed the widespread abuse of such products in South Asia”.

“Yaba” is currently one of the most popular forms of methamphetamine abuses in South Asia. It contains a mixture of caffeine and about 30% methamphetamine. Law enforcement agencies have reported large seizures of yaba tablets in Bangladesh. This drug is smuggled into Bangladesh from neighboring countries such as Myanmar. According to UNODC, 1.2 million methamphetamine tablets originating in Myanmar were seized in Bangladesh in 2007 (International Narcotics Control Board, 2008).

INCB also blamed a lack of resources and training of law enforcement agencies for Bangladesh’s failure to properly implement its drug control policy. INCB has identified the Chittagong seaport as the main exit point for drugs leaving the country, while the remainder is smuggled out through Sylhet and Chittagong airports (The Daily Star, February, 2010).

According to Bangladesh’s DNC, international drug barons and mafia networks often find “Bangladesh as a safe and alternate trafficking route when the Indian and Myanmar routes become risky”. Bangladesh has a long, remote and porous border with India on three sides and with Myanmar to the southeast. The three border routes for drug smuggling are as follows:

The western routes with India: Darshana and Jibannagar in Chuadanga district, Hili and Birol in Dinajpur district, Moghulhat, Aditmari, Durgapur, Fulbari and
Bangladesh (Part I)

Nageshwari in Kurigram, Nawabgonj, Rajshahi, Meherpur, Debhat and Kaliganj in Khulna district, and Benapole and Chowgacha in Jessore district.

Eastern routes: Akhaura, Jhautala, Sadullahpur, Nawagaon, Singer bil, Col. Bazar, Gangasagar and Kasba in Brahman Baria district, Bibirbazar, Chagalnaiya, Maharajganj and Gutuma in Feni district, Barkal and Baghaichari in Rangamati district, Chittagong, Teknaff in Cox’s Bazar district, and Dighinala, Panchari and Matiranga in Khagrachari district.

Northern routes: Haluaghat (Telikhali/Karaitali/Surjyapur/ Bandarkata/ Munsirhat/ Munshipara) in Mymensing district, Durgapur (Bijoypur and Bhabani area) in Netrokona district, and Bangla Bandha, Bhurungabari, Jhenaigati, Sunamgonj and Tamabil.

Since drug trafficking in Bangladesh is a transnational issue, Bangladesh cannot fight it in isolation. A joint and collective (both multilateral and bilateral) mechanism and legal regime are equally important to stopping drug trafficking in this region. India and Bangladesh have recently signed an agreement on fighting terror, organized crime and drug trafficking (Indian Express, January, 2010). Similar instruments should also be adopted between other countries in South Asia in order to effectively fight drug trafficking and drug abuse.

Human trafficking

The term “human trafficking” is used to denote a wide variety of crimes and human rights abuses associated with the recruitment, movement and sale of people into a range of exploitative or slave-like circumstances. The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defines trafficking as follows:

Trafficing in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

Human trafficking is a crime against humanity. This is a global problem and Bangladesh is one of the worst victims of human trafficking. The US released the ninth annual “Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP)” on 16 June, 2009. TIP’s Bangladesh section has identified Bangladesh as a source and transit point for men, women and children trafficked for forced labor and sexual exploitation. Experts have identified several forms of human trafficking in Bangladesh; the most common forms are trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced prostitution, domestic servitude, forced labor and other forms of exploitation.
The figures give a gloomy picture of Bangladesh in terms of human trafficking. Studies have uncovered that over a million women and children have been trafficked out of the country in the last 30 years. According to a UNICEF report, approximately 400 women and children in Bangladesh are victims of trafficking each month. Another study reports that approximately 300,000 Bangladeshi children and women between the ages of 12 and 30 have been trafficked to India alone in the last 10 years. Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid, an organization based in Pakistan, in its annual report reveals that around 200,000 Bangladeshi girls and women were trafficked to Pakistan over the same period.

**Exhibit Box 2**

The UAE compensates 879 Bangladeshi camel jockeys

In May 2009, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) handed over to Dhaka compensation worth $1.43 million for 879 Bangladeshi children who once had been used as camel jockeys in the Gulf kingdom. A UAE government delegation called on Bangladesh Home Minister Sahara Khatun and handed over to her the compensation package. The money will be spent for the education, treatment and housing of the children who were once trafficked to the Gulf country and returned home in phases over the last decade as a result of vigorous anti-trafficking campaigns around the world and Bangladesh’s own efforts against human trafficking.

Trafficers use 20 main points in 16 southern and south-western districts of Bangladesh along the Indian border to run their illicit trade. The main cross-border trafficking route is the Dhaka-Mumbai-Karachi-Dubai route. Experts also believe that without devising meaningful collaborative mechanisms among the countries in South Asia, it would be impossible to stop cross-border flows of human trafficking. Joint efforts need to be made for the effective prevention, rescue and repatriation of the victims, and prosecution of trafficers.

**Climate change**

In the academic arena, climate change is now regarded as a major human security challenge. Climate change is a complex phenomenon and it affects many domains of life, including politics, economics, migration, human rights, development, trade, and health. Climate change can trigger conflict, instability and cause humanitarian crises. In addition, climate change consequences may spill over state borders, and thereby result in transnational tensions or worse.

Against the backdrop of globalization, unabated climate change is likely to overstretch the capacities of a still insufficient global governance system. According to a GTZ study (2008, p. 7):
Climate change can heighten existing social and political tensions or can lead to new ones. State institutions already overstretched will come under additional pressure, and will find it increasingly difficult to perform elementary state tasks. Combined with growing environmental stress, this will impact the adaptive capacity of societies adversely and will thus also limit their capacity to engage in peaceful conflict resolution.

Climate change could ultimately impact the availability of fresh and safe drinking water, and impose adverse effects on human health and food security around the world. Climate change is now becoming a contributing factor to poverty and forced migration. Similarly, scarcity of water and food shortage would lead to displacement of population. Many fear that the cumulative impact of poverty, displacement, competition over limited resources and societal stress may go beyond the already limited government capacity to deal with deteriorating conditions and might ultimately lead to conflict (Human Impact Report, 2009).

**CLIMATE CHANGE AND BANGLADESH**

Because of its unique geographic, topographic, demographic and socio-economic characteristics, Bangladesh is regarded as one of the most vulnerable countries in the world facing the adverse impacts of climate change.

The anticipated adverse effects of climate change, including sea level rise, higher temperatures, enhanced monsoon precipitation, and an increase in cyclone intensity, could well exacerbate the existing stresses that already hinder development in Bangladesh. The consequences of climate change, such as increased natural disasters, loss of agricultural productivity, shortage of safe drinking water, sea level rise, territorial loss and salinity intrusion, may result in the state’s inability to function and to provide services to its citizens. The worst-case scenario would be the meltdown of the state machinery. The impact of climate change on the national security of Bangladesh was envisioned in a report published in the *New York Times* (August 8, 2009):

An exercise last December at the National Defense University, an educational institute that is overseen by the military, explored the potential impact of a destructive flood in Bangladesh that sent hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming into neighboring India, touching off religious conflict, the spread of contagious diseases and vast damage to infrastructure. “It gets real complicated real quickly,” said Amanda J. Dory, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy.

According to the Fourth Assessment Report of IPCC, the following changes have been observed in climate trends, variability and extreme events in Bangladesh:

- In Bangladesh, average temperature has registered an increasing trend of about 1°C in May and 0.5°C in November during the 14-year period from 1985 to 1998.
- Decadal rain anomalies are above long-term averages since the 1960s.
• Serious and recurring floods have taken place in 2002, 2003 and 2004. Cyclones, originating from the Bay of Bengal, have been noted to decrease since 1970 but their intensity has increased.

• The frequency of monsoon depressions and cyclones forming in the Bay of Bengal has increased.

• Water shortages have been attributed to rapid urbanization and industrialization, population growth and inefficient water use, which are aggravated by the changing climate and its adverse impacts on demand, supply and water quality.

• Salt water from the Bay of Bengal has penetrated 100 km or more inland along tributary channels during the dry season.

• The precipitation decline and droughts have resulted in the drying up of wetlands and severe degradation of ecosystems.

![Figure 1: Environmental destruction, population migration and types of conflict (Swain, 1996 p. 20)](image)

Considering the scale and magnitude of the problem, it is assumed that climate change and its consequences will pose serious threats to the Bangladeshi state. In the event of such environmental catastrophe in Bangladesh, neighboring countries would face the brunt of the spill-over impact, including mass migration and conflict. Therefore, climate change has become a transnational problem and countries should be united to address the emerging negative consequences.

**WATER SECURITY**

Water security in Bangladesh has also emerged as a transnational issue in recent times. Bangladesh’s water security concerns have two dynamics, internal and external. The internal source of water insecurity includes salinity encroachment, arsenic contamination, and the drawing down of underground fresh water reservoirs.

Bangladesh is an overly-populated country. Its huge population size and extreme population density have made it difficult to sustain even a modest economy. Bangladesh also has an agrarian economy, although statistics show that its GDP dependence on agriculture has gone down over past years. However, agriculture remains a key accommodating sector to its huge rural labor force. The entire agricultural sector of the country is highly dependent on fresh water for irrigation.

The Himalayan River Basin countries, including China, Bangladesh, India and Nepal, share a common ecology and river system. Being a lower riparian country,
availability of river water in Bangladesh depends much on the flow of water from the upstream countries. Fifty-four rivers enter Bangladesh from India. The availability of river water in Bangladesh, both during the monsoon and the dry season, is determined by the level of water flow from upstream. Unilateral withdrawals of river water by up-stream countries will have severe impacts for Bangladesh.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Basin</th>
<th>Percent of total river flow originating outside of border</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Indus, Tarim</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>GBM</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>GBM</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>GBM, Indus, Tarim</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>GBM, Indus</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Tarim</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Tarim</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>GBM</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>GBM</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Indus, Tarim</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4: Dependency of major South Asian countries on trans-boundary surface water (FAO, UN)**

Indian reports reveal that the Government of India is actively planning to build a water dam on the Barak River in India. If the proposed plan is implemented, it will generate severe ecological consequences for Bangladesh. Analysts believe that the dam, popularly known as the Tipaimukh Dam, on the Barak River would result in the drying up of the Surma and Kushiara Rivers (*The New Nation*, October, 2009).

The Government of India is also implementing its “river linking project” to link up major rivers to hold up water in reservoirs and to channel it from northwest to northern and southern India (*The Financial Express*, July, 2009). This is already a concern for Bangladeshis, as many believe it would further divert the current flow of water entering Bangladesh from India.

The proposed dam and the river linking projects will render negative ecological and environmental changes. There is a high probability that if the South Asian states do not address the water sharing issue conclusively, it will eventually trigger intra-/inter-state conflict across the region. The scarcity of water may generate movements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Bangladesh, and these IDPs may try to seek refuge and a livelihood beyond the state boundaries. Since India virtually encircles Bangladesh from three sides, India is likely to experience an *en masse* influx of IDPs from Bangladesh.

Another aspect of the problem is of increasing import and worthy of future examination – whether the scarcity of water in this region will lead to inter-state conflict. Since all the countries in this region are facing acute water scarcity and are
already having disputes over sharing of common river water, there is an increased probability that the crisis may escalate into conflict.

**Transnational financial crime**

Bangladesh is often considered a safe haven for financial crime. *Hundi* (also known as *hawala*), a black market money exchange procedure, is a commonly used mode of transaction for cross-border money transfers. Bangladesh has a large number of expatriate communities living in Gulf countries, Europe, other parts of Asia, and elsewhere. A segment of these wage earning expatriates use the unofficial channel of *hundi* to remit money back home. *Hundi* is also a popular mode for fund transfers to terrorists, as such fund transfers often leave no trace. Because of *hundi*, the Government each year loses an extensive amount in potential revenue. Other common financial crimes in Bangladesh are:

- **Corruption**: Abuse of public power or position for personal/group gain.
- **Tax evasion**: Remaining outside the tax net, non-disclosure of actual income, non-payment of income tax, underhand agreements with the tax authority, gross abuse of the tax holiday provisions etc.
- **Loan defaulting**: Intentional defaulting, siphoning off money from the authorized ventures for which the loan was taken.
- **Regular fraud**: Pyramid savings schemes, misleading overseas job seekers (recently local job seeking has also been investigated). Counterfeit notes are also an area of concern.
- **Smuggling**: An estimated US$1 billion worth of dutiable goods are smuggled each year into Bangladesh from India alone.

An appropriate legal framework is essential to stop financial crime. Bangladesh has a number of legal regimes in place. The Bangladesh Penal Code, Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947 (FERA), Income Tax Ordinance, 1984, Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2002 (MLPA) and Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) Act, 2004 are all laws designed to prevent such crimes. The cumulative impact of globalization and technology has made the financial sector very much susceptible to financial crime. Therefore, transnational collaboration is important in this regard.

Money laundering has become a serious concern for Bangladesh. Terrorist groups use money laundering to finance terrorist and militant activities. It is reported that every year huge amounts of funds are raised in the Gulf countries in the name of charitable organizations and the fundraisers, often sympathizers to terror groups, have recourse to money laundering for bringing the funds to Bangladesh. The Money Laundering Prevention Act 2002 came into force on April 5, 2002 with the aim of preventing money laundering (*The New Age*, December, 2005). Some key aspects of this law are:

- The Central Bank of Bangladesh can conduct investigations into any alleged crime of money laundering.
• Bangladesh Bank will observe and supervise all financial activities.
• Establishment of a money laundering court.
• Legal seizure of property.
• Provision of punishment for violating the law.
• Government can enter into agreements with a foreign country.

**Infectious disease**

In today’s world epidemic diseases are considered serious threats to national and international security. Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, especially AIDS, constitute a national security threat and a foreign policy challenge. When the UN Security Council held a session on AIDS in Africa and proclaimed that it posed a serious threat to regional stability and security, the linkages between infectious disease and security came to the forefront.

Bangladesh is a low HIV/AIDS prevalent country. WHO estimates that there are 13,000 HIV-positive people in the country and that the HIV prevalence rate among the adult population is less than 0.01%. Nevertheless, the country is highly vulnerable because neighboring India hosts over 2.5 million HIV-positive cases (UNAIDS estimate). According to WHO, the presence of covert multi-partner sexual activity and denial, the low level of knowledge and low condom use, unsafe professional blood donations, lack of a desirable environment and the violation of human rights, all may lead to an outbreak of HIV in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh is one of the world’s most densely populated countries. The high population density ensures the rapid spread of infectious diseases in the case of an outbreak. Moreover, the high frequency of natural calamities like floods and cyclones in Bangladesh makes it more susceptible to pandemic outbreaks. Many believe that in the case of any large-scale movement of internally displaced people, fleeing from the affected area of the outbreak, Bangladesh will lack any strategic depth (owing to its small size) to accommodate such people internally. Naturally, the IDPs would in that case try to enter India. Again, it would be reasonable to assume that, in the face of such an event, India might not allow people from Bangladesh to enter its territory *en masse*. This impasse may lead to regional conflict.

**Conclusion**

In 1997, the US Defense Science Board Summer Study Taskforce prepared a report for the US Department of Defense on DOD Responses to transnational threats. Thought it looked into the problem primarily in the context of transnational terrorism, the taskforce identified three advantages that the transnational actors have: 1) they can have ready access to resources they need; 2) they cannot easily be deterred as they have no specific homeland; and 3) they respect no boundaries, whether political, organizational, legal or moral.
The taskforce recommended that the DOD should address transnational security threats, an increasingly important class of threats, and should use existing national security structures and processes to face these challenges. It shows that the transnational security problems pose serious threats to nations.

In recent times, transnational security problems have been burgeoning in Bangladesh and also across South Asia. Thanks to a weak economy, fragile democracy and social fragmentation, it has become difficult for Bangladesh to address these transnational security threats on its own. The transnational nature of the threats also demands a collective and comprehensive approach to face the challenges posed. In this regard, policy planners can adopt the following measures to establish a common platform to counteract the transnational security challenges facing Bangladesh.

**Capacity building**: South Asian states do not have the institutional capacity to face the ever evolving challenges posed by transnational actors. States should emphasize building and strengthening institutional capacity with a view to facing the challenges effectively.

**Regulatory framework**: A regional regulatory framework is essential to stop trans-boundary movement of illicit goods and infiltration of terror groups. A regulatory framework is also indispensable to face the challenges of trans-boundary water sharing.

**Political will and cooperation**: Owing to the lack of political will and cooperation, South Asian countries have repeatedly failed to fight transnational security problems successfully. Political will and cooperation between and among states in South Asia will bring about the necessary changes in this regard.

**Intelligence sharing**: Countries must share intelligence to prevent such threats from posing inordinate risks. The process will also generate confidence building measures among and between countries.

**Legal regimes**: An absence of all-encompassing regimes to counter transnational security threats remains a critical challenge for South Asia. Countries should join hands to plug the legal loopholes in the existing system and to introduce effective laws.

**Social awareness and global consensus**: Creating social awareness and developing a global consensus against transnational security threats would provide a leap forward in addressing these challenges. International organizations also have an important role to play in bringing states to a common forum to address the challenges, and in developing effective and comprehensive solutions.
5 Bangladesh (Part II)

GOLAM MOHAMMAD
Director General, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS)

A K M NAZRUL ISLAM
Research Director, Defence Studies Division, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS)

SEGUFTA HOSSAIN
Research Fellow, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS)

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has undergone radical change. The traditional militaristic conception of security, now known as Traditional Security, was found to be very narrow and highly inadequate with respect to evolving dimensions of security. Neo-realists continued their emphasis on the primacy of the state, since they maintain that the international political system is anarchical. Barry Buzan, in his seminal work *People, States and Fear*, argued that the conventional discourse on security that dominated the Cold War era was “too narrowly founded” (Buzan, 1992, p. 14), and he proposed a “broader framework of security” (ibid., p. 20). He included political, economic, social and environmental threats, in addition to those that are militaristic in nature. This broadened approach of realists towards Non-Traditional Security (NTS) emphasised “the non-traditional threats to national security from non-traditional actors, such as transnational criminals, organized criminals, terrorists, extremists, and separatists” (Dongyan, 2007, p. 1). Human security and individual security were not yet part of NTS. It was the postmodern, or critical security approach, which considered human security as one component of the overall concept of security (Dongyan, 2007, p. 2). Ken Booth argued that human security is ultimately more important than state security (1994, p. 4). The concept of NTS is still not precisely defined. However, it generally includes threats to state from non-traditional actors, and threats to human security. It covers all types of political, economic, social and environmental threats.

For a developing country like Bangladesh, NTS threats are real and prominent. While the issues are old, their securitization is a fairly new phenomenon. As the scope of NTS is large, the major challenge today is to identify as well as securitize the NTS threats. This paper attempts to identify and analyze some of the important NTS threats/issues in Bangladesh looking out 5-10 years from now. The study has
been divided into four sections. Section two gives an overview of the current security threats and challenges of Bangladesh, and is concerned with the most pronounced politico-strategic, economic and social issues. Section three deals with emerging threats and challenges, including transnational, environmental, health, social and demographic issues. Section four provides a summary of the conclusions.

A qualitative methodology has been applied to this study. Data and information have largely been culled from published works, newspaper reports and analyses.

**Current security threats and challenges**

The patterns of NTS threats faced by Bangladesh have commonalities with many other developing countries. Nevertheless, the nature and character of those threats in Bangladesh are distinctive. Threats are manifested in all the primary sectors, as identified by Buzan: political, economic, social and environmental. In the political arena, NTS threats emanate because of weaknesses in political stability, governance, law and order, measures against corruption and border security. Economic security covers poverty, food security, illegal trade, and manpower export. Social security issues are wide ranging and cover overpopulation, employment insecurity, crime, terrorism, trafficking of humans, drugs, small arms, etc. And environmental security covers climate change, water management and security, and environmental degradation. Out of this long list of NTS threats, the most important ones have been deliberated in the succeeding paragraphs.

**POLITICAL STABILITY**

Since independence, Bangladesh has experienced much political turmoil. Until 1991, Bangladesh was ruled either by civil or military, or civil-military governments. Unhealthy rivalry and antagonism between the political parties has given rise to an unstable political culture. Since 1991 the country has become more democratic. While democracy is maturing, traditions of acceptance and tolerance are taking root, and political culture is also improving. However, the tendency to shift to violence on issues of political discordance continues, and appears to be related to a culture of achieving high political impact with limited means. In the competition for political support, the cost and repercussions of violence have largely been ignored by the mainstream parties, further exacerbating the issue and even promoting it by signalling tacit acquiescence (Sobhan, 2009).

*Hartal* (total shutdown of all workplaces), which is often associated with violence and the destruction of property, is the political tool of a degenerative political culture. The use of this tool takes a toll on the national economy and creates enormous suffering for people of all walks of life, and at times leads to serious political instability. In 2006, under the Caretaker Government, a unique form of constitutional Government in Bangladesh for conducting elections, the country witnessed the devastating effect of political turmoil which claimed innocent lives, destroyed public and private property, upset social and economic progress, created political instability and governance
problems. On 11 January 2007, the Caretaker Government was reconstituted, and ran the country for the next two years. Following a free, fair and credible election on 29 December 2008, the Caretaker Government handed over power to the democratically elected government on 6 January 2009. Yet, during the last one and a half years of restarted democracy, a lack of consensus on national issues and dissensions reflect the persistence of the old political culture. The opposition has repeated the previously practiced phenomena of abstention from joining parliamentary sessions and the use of hartal. This state is viewed by the Bangladesh Development Forum, assembled in Dhaka on 15-16 February 2010, as “stalling the pace of democracy’s consolidation” in the country (The Daily Star, 17 February, 2010, p. 1).

GOVERNANCE

As far as good governance is concerned Bangladesh scores near the lowest amongst developing countries. In fact, all the symptoms of an underdeveloped condition of governance are observed in Bangladesh. The participants of a four-day workshop, held in Dhaka in November 2009, identified absence of good governance as the primary security concern, and the first among the top five priorities. A wide range of challenges were associated with it: inadequate application of the rule of law, political party reform, inadequate parliamentary oversight of Government, ineffective public service commission, reform of civil administration, and inadequate selection and promotion procedures (see http://www.biiss.org/cmrs.pdf). The workshop participants included members of parliament, former ministers, opposition party members, senior government officials (both civil and military) and civil society representatives. All issues, political, economic, social and environmental, are directly related to good governance. For a new democracy like Bangladesh, the challenges of good governance are also directly linked with most other NTS issues. The ultimate challenge of good governance, therefore, is to deliver the political goods to the people.

CORRUPTION

Corruption is a global issue, and is widespread in Bangladesh. Although political and bureaucratic corruption is still believed to be rampant, Bangladesh has recently improved its position in the Corruption Perception Index. According to the Corruption Perception Index 2009, Bangladesh is ranked in 139th position among 180 countries (see http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table, 2009). However, corruption has become pervasive throughout society. It hinders development, creates obstacles for investment and economic activity and distorts the market and the economy. Corruption prevents the rule of law, which leads to the violation of basic constitutional laws and human rights. As a result, crime, social frustration, discontent and insecurities increase in the country (Iftekharuzzaman, 2005, p. 3). In Bangladesh, corruption manifests itself in many areas: the procurement of goods and services including the award of contracts by the government; the administration of taxes and prevention of smuggling; the disposal, sale and allotment of government property including disinvestment of industries and other commercial units;
the administration of loans by public financial institutions; the outright embezzlement of government funds; as well as all kinds of shop-floor malpractices (Khan, 2003, p. 57). It is universally known that almost all kinds of corruption are rife in Bangladeshi politics and administration. The most common form of corruption is pecuniary bribes (Taslim, 1994, pp. 291-307).

POVERTY

Poverty has been a major challenge to the security and development of Bangladesh. Historically, poverty in Bangladesh has been very high. More than 40% of the people live below the poverty line. In Bangladesh, 72% of the people reside in rural areas, and a significant number of them are landless peasants (State of World Population 2009, 2009, p. 86). Poverty is worse in rural, rather than urban, Bangladesh. Poverty-stricken people lack both the physical and the financial assets needed for raising their income adequately to escape the poverty cycle. Their poor financial conditions prevent them from participating in education or increase their human capital. Thus they are tied to a vicious circle. Many people become poor and cannot overcome the situation for a number of reasons such as natural disasters like flood, drought, cyclone, riverbank erosion, and accidents, sickness, social injustice and the loss of land. As per geographic regions, poverty is higher in the northwest and southern parts of Bangladesh, where development is relatively low. Since independence in 1971, the poverty situation in Bangladesh has been improving, but it still remains a major challenge for the country. According to the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2005, Bangladesh has been able to reduce poverty at a rate of 1.8% between 1990 and 2005 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2005). According to a security analyst, “poverty stricken people cannot be expected to contribute to the security of Bangladesh. They are just indifferent to the state structure and do not care for the sovereignty of the country. They rather drag the country backward and increasingly make it unfit to compete with the external world” (Nuruzzaman, 2003, p. 16).

OVER-POPULATION

Bangladesh is one of the most overpopulated countries in the world. Over 150 million people live in a comparatively small area of 144,000 square km. Though the country has a brilliant record in bringing the population growth rate from 2.5% in 1980 to 1.41% in 2008 (Iftekharuzzaman, 2010, p. 1), it is predicted that Bangladesh’s current population will reach more than 190 million by the year 2025. Because of overpopulation, the per capita share of land in the country is already very low. With the growth of the population, pressure on land is increasing. At about 0.08 hectare per capita, cropland is already desperately scarce, and population growth will reduce the per capita share of cropland by half by 2025 (Choudhury, 2010). Rapid population growth has worsened the mutually reinforcing effects of poverty and environmental degradation. Overpopulation has also posed severe strains on the economy in the form of poverty, rising unemployment, dependence on foreign aid and the like. An
ever-increasing number of “floating” people with no access to basic amenities of life pose a substantial threat to the national security of Bangladesh.

Emerging security threats and challenges

In this section, prominent emerging security threats and challenges faced by Bangladesh are discussed. These threats and challenges include NTS issues which have surfaced newly or come to prominence in recent times. Although an exhaustive list of such issues is long, due to limitations on the size of the paper, the discussion has been confined to terrorism, small arms proliferation, climate change, environmental degradation, HIV/AIDS, arsenic poisoning, gender security, energy security and rural-urban migration.

TERRORISM

The existence of terrorist groups and the evidence of their activities are noticeable in the country. Though Bangladesh has witnessed a sharp rise in religious terrorism since the mid-nineties anti-state terrorism by ultra-leftist groups has been active in the country since the pre-independence period. Ethnicity based terrorists or insurgent groups such as Chittagong Hill Tracts People’s Solidarity Association (PCJSS) have been active in the Chittagong Hill Tracts since the early seventies. Despite the signing of a Peace Accord in 1997, the area is still not fully peaceful; renegades still have arms, and some degree of violence continues. At present, the country experiences two types of terrorism: religious extremism by the extremist religious groups, and the political terrorism by the left-wing political groups. The religion-based extremist groups are operating across the country, and the ultra-leftist groups are concentrated mainly in the north and southwest districts (Islam, 2008, p. 160). Recently, extremist religious groups have demonstrated their capacity for violence all over Bangladesh.

The terrorist outfits engaged in promoting religious terrorism in Bangladesh include Jaamatul Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB), Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJ-B), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMBJ), Hizbut Tawhid, Allah r-Dal, and Shahadat al-Hikma. The execution of JMB leaders in 2007 was a clear demonstration of the government’s resolve in dealing with such extremists and can be seen as a significant development in containing extremism in Bangladesh. Subsequently, continuous vigilance and many operational successes by the law enforcement agencies of Bangladesh have kept the extremist religious groups’ activities under control. However, some of the terrorist groups have been attempting to regroup and expand their networks in different parts of the country. Their objective is to establish Khilafat/Sharia (Islamic rule) in Bangladesh through Jihad. They do not recognize any other political/social system other than pure Islamic values, and condemn all non-Islamic customs. While these terrorists have very few supporters or sympathizers, they try to take the advantage of poverty and illiteracy.

From that standpoint, religious extremism can be said to be the outcome of a defective education system, the political use of religion and the socio-economic...
backwardness of the country. Furthermore, fanaticism evolved as a response to the degradation of values in the society and rising corruption. To some extent, political patronization and the design/interest of external powers are also causes of religious terrorism in Bangladesh. These activities generate national security threats, and impede socio-economic and political development.

Most of the extremists’ activities in Bangladesh are thought to be home grown. However, the recent arrests of some of the Pakistani and Indian terrorists operating in Bangladesh have given rise to an apprehension that these extremists’ activities could be linked with international terrorist organizations (Islam, 2009).

**SMALL ARMS PROLIFERATION**

Bangladesh is alleged to be a transit route, both via land and sea, for weapons to the conflict zones of South Asia. There are several insurgent groups in the Indian north-eastern areas. These groups run their activities from near the Bangladesh-India border. Security problems, arising from their activities, multiply and deepen because of porous borders, the incomplete and disputed demarcation of the boundary between Bangladesh and India, the absence of effective border management, illegal activities around the border, and lack of mutual trust between India and Bangladesh. Illegal crossings from Myanmar and India into Bangladesh cannot be adequately checked owing to the inaccessible hilly terrain that surrounds the southeast part of Bangladesh. It is also difficult to keep the maritime borders under watch and control. Bangladesh has also started to act as a destination for arms. Demand for arms and explosives within Bangladesh increased with the rise of criminal syndicates and extremist groups over the past decade. Evidence suggests that the number of illegal firearms has increased. Over the last few years, the availability and wide use of illegal small arms and improvised explosive devices (IED) has increased greatly. One of the major factors that led to the recent rise of terrorism in Bangladesh has been the easy availability of small arms and light weapons. As a result, the proliferation of small arms is becoming a growing concern. As pointed out by an eminent Bangladeshi security analyst, “political instability, nexus of politics and violence, proliferation of small arms, etc., are all recipes for disaster and, unless addressed, will impact on our national security adversely” (Khan, 2001, p. 6).

**CLIMATE CHANGE**

Bangladesh is widely recognized to be one of the countries most vulnerable to climate change. Natural calamities that result from increased rainfall, rising sea levels, and tropical cyclones are expected to increase due to climate change. This will seriously affect agriculture, water and food security, human health and shelter. Climate change is affecting the frequency and intensity of the natural calamities in Bangladesh. The areas prone to floods, cyclones and salinity intrusion may increase in the coming decades. It is predicted that by the year 2030, an additional 14.3% of the country will become extremely vulnerable to floods, while the existing flood prone areas will face higher levels of flooding (Muyeed & Rahman, 2009).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group II Report (2007) noted that Bangladesh has been experiencing a rise in temperature as a result of climate change. It also noted that Bangladesh experienced a rise in the seriousness and frequency of floods during 2002, 2003 and 2004 as a result of the same. As the sea level rises, the most important climatic change will take place along the coastline. The report has identified Bangladesh as one of the countries most affected by climate change induced sea-level rise (IPCC, Working Group II, Climate Change 2007, 2007). Former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, warned that a rise in sea level could lead to the disappearance of much of the world’s largest delta, in Bangladesh (see http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/122036.stm).

In fact, most parts of Bangladesh are less than 12 ms above sea level, and it is believed that about 50% of this land would be flooded if the sea level were to rise by 1 meter (Ali, 1996). A study of the Climate Change Cell of the Department of Environment found that a sea-level rise of 0.5 meters over the last 100 years had already eroded 65% of the landmass of the 250 square km area of Kutubdia, 227 square km of Bhola, and 180 square km of Sandwip islands (Climate Change and Bangladesh, 2007). Berlin-based Germanwatch, in its Global Climate Risk Index 2010 report stated that Bangladesh was among the countries facing “continuous” natural disasters. According to the report, the country incurs annual losses of 1.81% of GDP due to extreme weather events and the total losses averaged $2.19 billion a year from 1990 to 2008 (The Financial Express, 9 December, 2009, p. 1). The Government of Bangladesh developed the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) in 2008 to manage climate change and its impacts. The action plan of programs addresses the need for substantive interventions with a definitive timeline for their implementation.

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

Only recently have environmental issues been identified as reckonable threats to national security. The environment of Bangladesh, because of its geographic location, is particularly disaster prone. Besides natural disasters, the country is facing several major environmental problems such as land degradation and the depletion of natural resources, as well as the degradation of soil conditions and fertility. The vulnerability to such threats increases manifold due to poverty, food insecurity, hunger, and inequity within society.

Environmental threats can displace people from affected ecosystems: cyclone affected areas, coastal zones, river basins and drought prone areas. As a result, rural to urban migration is enhanced. The poor are the most vulnerable to the impacts of environmental problems. The impact can be direct in the case of a loss of crop yields and food insecurity, water scarcity and growing health risks. Because of lack of resources and technology, land hungry farmers resort to cultivating erosion prone hillsides and moving into tropical forest areas. This results in a rapid loss of forestry to the detriment of the environment as a whole. The degradation of soil is caused by the reclamation of land for agriculture, over grazing, the extensive use of fertilizers and pesticides and the expansion of irrigation. “If a nation’s environmental foundations
are depleted, [...] its economy may well decline, its social fabric may deteriorate, and its political structure may become destabilized. The outcome, all too likely, is conflict, whether in terms of disorder and insurrection within nation or tension and hostilities with other nations” (Myers, 1987, p. 46). This emerging threat definitely demands concerted efforts at the national as well as regional and global level.

**HIV/AIDS**

Bangladesh remains vulnerable to an HIV/AIDS epidemic. However, in Bangladesh, less than 0.1% of the population is estimated to be HIV positive (HIV/AIDS Health Profile, Bangladesh). The first case of HIV in Bangladesh was detected in 1989. By the end of 2008, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) had confirmed 1,495 HIV cases, 476 of which had developed Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) (The World Bank and UNAIDS, 2009). Although the HIV risk remains low for the majority of people, the risk is high for sex workers and their clients who have unprotected sex, and injecting drug users who share needles. National HIV surveillance indicates that the rate of HIV infection among street-based sex workers in central Bangladesh is higher compared to sex workers in other parts of South Asia. HIV among injecting drug users is already at 4% (HIV/AIDS Bangladesh, 2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Population*</th>
<th>150 million (mid-2007)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Population Living with HIV/AIDS****</td>
<td>7,500 [6,400-18,000] (end 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult HIV Prevalence**</td>
<td>&lt;0.1% [&lt;0.2%] (end 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV Prevalence in Most At-Risk Populations**</td>
<td>IDUs: 4.9% (2004-2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MSM: &lt;1% (2004-2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sex Workers: &lt;1% (2004-2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of HIV-Infected People Receiving Antiretroviral Therapy***</td>
<td>&lt;3% (end 2006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *US Census Bureau **UNAIDS ***WHO/UNAIDS/UNICEF Towards Universal Access, April 2007 ****ICDDR, 2005

**Table 1: HIV and AIDS estimates (HIV/AIDS Health Profile, Bangladesh, USAID)**

Poverty, illiteracy, ignorance and the high prevalence of other STDs all make Bangladesh vulnerable to an HIV/AIDS epidemic. Unemployment, slum housing, the frequent cross-border movement of people, lack of awareness, unsafe blood transfusion, physical and sexual abuse all also create a risk-environment in which the young people of the country are more vulnerable. The location of Bangladesh also makes it vulnerable to a HIV/AIDS epidemic. According to the UNICEF Country Representative Morten Giersing, “Bangladesh is bordered with India, the second largest HIV infected country in the world; the country is therefore at high risk for the HIV/AIDS epidemic” (Khan, 2004).
A Bangladeshi HIV/AIDS prevention program started in 1985 under the overall policy support of the National AIDS Council (NAC). In 2004, a six-year National Strategic Plan (2004-2010) was approved. The World Bank supports the government’s two-pronged strategy: first, increasing advocacy, prevention, and treatment of HIV/AIDS within the government’s existing health programs; second, scaling up interventions among high-risk groups. DFID and USAID are working with the government to prevent and control HIV/AIDS among the population. Outside the government, more than 380 non-governmental organizations and AIDS service organizations work in Bangladesh to implement programs designed to reach most-at-risk populations and stem the spread of HIV/AIDS (HIV/AIDS Health Profile, Bangladesh).

**ARSENIC POISONING**

Bangladesh has become a victim of arsenic poisoning due to the over exploitation of groundwater. Arsenicosis is an emerging threat to public health. Groundwater is frequently contaminated because of the high arsenic contents in the soil. Arsenic poisoning has become a grave concern, as it affects people physically, economically, and psychologically. It results in skin lesions, swollen limbs and loss of feeling in the hands and legs. Long-term exposure to arsenic can also lead to cancer in the lungs, bladder and kidneys. A recent survey by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) showed that 12.6% of Bangladeshi households, or about 20 million people, still drink water containing arsenic above the government’s recommendation of no more than 50 micrograms per litre (see [http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62L35P20100322](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62L35P20100322)). According to the World Health Organization, arsenic-contaminated water directly affects the health of 35 million people in Bangladesh (see [http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62L35P20100322](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62L35P20100322)). Some basic data about the arsenic contamination in Bangladesh is given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arsenic contamination in Bangladesh</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Estimated number of tube wells in Bangladesh: 8,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tube wells tested for arsenic: 4,750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tube wells marked green (safe): 3,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tube wells marked red (unsafe): 1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Estimated total villages in country: 87,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Villages screened: 54,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Villages where &lt; 40% of the wells are contaminated: 70,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Villages where 40-80% of the wells are contaminated: 8,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Villages where 80-99% of the wells are contaminated: 6,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Villages where all wells contaminated: 2,316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The government of Bangladesh has initiated various actions through the Department of Public Health Engineering (DPHE), local administration and local government to mitigate the arsenic crisis. UNICEF has the largest arsenic response program in Bangladesh and is working with the DPHE. With a view to increasing people’s access to safe drinking water free from arsenic and pathogen in rural communities, the DPHE has undertaken a project titled “Bangladesh Water Supply Program Project” with assistance of the World Bank (The New Nation, 28 March, 2010).

GENDER SECURITY

Bangladesh is a patriarchal society in which women’s access to social, economic, cultural, political and legal institutions is controlled by men. Sixty-two per cent of women are economically active in Bangladesh, which ranks above average among developing countries (Yasmin, 2000, p. 23). It is the agricultural sector, which is the highest employer of both males and females, which has the highest proportion of female employment, at 71% of the total female labor in the country. The only other sector with significant female employment is manufacturing, at 21% of the total. Women’s employment is negligible in all other sectors, except the household (i.e. domestic service) (Baden et al., 1994, p. 9).

Although women’s voting rights have been long established, female involvement in politics and administrative activities has only increased gradually. In the last Parliament election of 2008, 19 female participants were elected which was 6.3% in a house of 300 parliament members (Mohsin, 2009, p. 247). The law also allows reserved seats for women in local government. The micro-credit program has significant influenced the empowerment of women in rural Bangladesh. Studies show that women that have participated in any formal institutions (micro-credit institutions or others) are more empowered, compared to those who do not have any institutional participation (Hoque & Itohara, 2009, p. 247). Bangladesh has also progressed in the sector of female education. A World Bank study shows that the far-reaching changes in Bangladesh in terms of female education seem to have had equally far-reaching impacts on the value of girls’ education relative to boys.

Although the percentage of economically active women is high, there is a striking disparity in the wages and earnings of women in Bangladesh. The gender differential is much wider in non-agricultural than agricultural employment in both rural and urban areas (Baden et al., 1994, p. 12). Although, women employments and activities have significantly increased over the years, respect for women and recognition of their role in society is highly inadequate. Absence of appropriate working environments is another hindrance to female employment in Bangladesh. Women often face various kinds of violence ranging from verbal harassment to physical torture. Such violence even sometimes leads to death. Acid attacks are a particularly cruel form of violence in Bangladesh. The victims are attacked for many reasons. In some cases, it occurs because a young girl or woman has spurned the sexual advances of a male, or she or her parents have rejected a marriage proposal (see http://www.acidsurvivors.org/, para. 1). The maternal mortality ratio of 600 per 100,000 live births remains very high even by the standards of less developed countries, and has shown little sign of
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decline (Baden et al., 1994, p.58). Thus, the gender security issue remains a major concern for Bangladesh.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acid Attack Statistics (May 1999-December 2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 (May-December)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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ENERGY SECURITY

Energy is the driving force for the development and economic growth of a country. At the moment meeting energy demands, ensuring energy for all and promoting development are all major challenges for the government of Bangladesh. The country ranks as one of the lowest among the developing countries in electricity production and consumption. Although demand for power has been rising by 10% every year, past government efforts for the development of this sector have been highly inadequate. Natural gas is the main source for power generation in Bangladesh. Due to low gas productivity, electricity generation by the existing power plants is low. The contribution of coal and other renewable energy sources in electricity production are quite insignificant. Furthermore, the production capacity of some of the old plants has gone down. Currently, the production of gas stands at 1850-1900 million cubic feet per day (mmcfd), and the shortage is at 300 mmcfd. Similarly, the country has a generation capacity of 4,000 megawatts (MW) of power against a demand for 6,000 MW (The New Age, 6 April, 2010, p. 15). So there remains a shortfall against the daily demand.
The delivery of power, gas and, as a consequence, water supply has deteriorated for the last two decades. Every year, the country experiences rallies calling for the smooth supply of power and water. The farmers also face a power crisis during the *boro* (a major rice harvest in Bangladesh) cultivation season. Presently, industrial units are operating at 20-30% of their capacity owing to a shortage of gas and power. Spokesmen from different industries expressed their concern that Bangladesh’s electricity and gas crises have put its economy at risk of contraction, and may reduce the country’s much needed export earnings (Rahman, 2010). Some leading economists are of the opinion that investment and export will bear the brunt of the energy crisis, and as a consequence employment generation and poverty reduction initiatives will be hampered (Rahman, 2010).

**RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION**

Bangladesh is predominantly a rural country characterized by a huge number of rural populations, who are engaged in agricultural activities. Rapid urbanization began after independence in 1971. Urbanization in developing countries often takes place not because of industrialization, but because of the growth of tertiary and informal manufacturing sectors, and a positive correlation between development and urbanization has been obvious in Bangladesh (Islam, 1999, p. 1). These development sectors attract rural people who migrate to urban areas. Issues like land scarcity, inadequate land for subsistence, and the availability of large numbers of agricultural laborers act as push factors for the rural population to migrate to urban areas.

In Bangladesh, nearly 50% of the urban population is concentrated in the metropolitan cities and divisional headquarters like Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, Sylhet, Rajshahi and Barishal. The capital city Dhaka is the main urban center. Being the main administrative and economic center, it attracts people from all over the country. According to a report, more than 28,000 people live in every square kilometre area of Dhaka (*The Daily Ittefaq*, 16 March, 2010, p. 1). According to United Nation’s Population Projections, the size of the urban population in Bangladesh will exceed 50 million by the year 2025 (Islam & Azad, 2005, p. 3).

This rural-urban migration takes place among both the rural rich and poor classes. The rural poor migrate to the urban areas for the alleviation of their poverty, whereas the rich migrate to the urban center for better education, health facilities and to uplift their social status. The positive impacts of rural-urban migration in Bangladesh include improved economic conditions, higher marriage ages, and low fertility rates. It also has a number of negative consequences like increased slums, environmental degradation, lack of urban services, difficulties in the traffic system, pressure on the job market, and criminalization.

**Conclusion**

This paper has identified and broadly discussed the major NTS threats to Bangladesh. While most of these threats are common to developing countries, their
ramifications are different in each. Historically, NTS threats to the political sector have proved to be degenerative and destabilizing to the country, and much more menacing than other types of threat. The imbroglio between the major political parties in 2006, which led to violence, loss of life and instability in the country, is a case in point. Good governance and the rule of law are two important sectors where human security suffers the most. The next in priority is the social sector, where overpopulation, unemployment, terrorism, domestic and transnational organized crimes have overbearing effects both on state and human security. Security threats to other two sectors – economic and environmental – also affect national security.

Despite being faced with a wide range of severe challenges from varied sources, Bangladesh has made remarkable progress in many areas; it has had a steady economic growth of 5-6% since the 1990s; HDI increased from 0.365 in 1980 to 0.543 in 2009; population growth reduced from 2.5% in 1980 to 1.41% in 2008; poverty reduced from 59% in 1990 to 40% in 2009 (Iftekharuzzaman, 2010). It also has vibrant private and non-government sectors, which make substantial contributions to its economy. More importantly, these sectors have helped sustain the country through the recent global economic downturn.

Democracy also has deep roots in Bangladesh. With the reinstatement of the democratic process in 2009, the government has undertaken several initiatives aiming to develop Bangladesh into a mid-income country by 2021. Economic growth and sustainability are essential for a stable democracy. The second Parliamentary Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper was recently approved for lowering poverty to a tolerable level through the achievement of higher economic growth. Steps have also been taken to double the number of beneficiaries receiving allowances for aged and distressed women. This project focuses on reducing the number of poor from the current 65 million to 45 million by 2013 and 22 million by the year 2021. Opportunities for self-employment have been created by providing technical and vocational trainings to the urban poor, unemployed and destitute women. A preliminary draft for the Civil Service Act has been prepared for making the country’s public administration more efficient and dynamic. The Research and Reform Cell of the Cabinet Division is implementing the Good Governance Program with assistance from the Asian Development Bank. A program has been undertaken for communicating with the field administration through video-conferencing. The separation of the judiciary from the executive has been given a permanent shape through the unanimous passage of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill 2009 in the Parliament.

Bangladesh has also taken a clear and strong stance with regard to combating terrorism, climate change, and protection of its labor market in the backdrop of a global recession. The Government has charted a course to make Bangladesh a middle-income country. Overall, multi-dimensional efforts by the government to ameliorate the NTS situation are progressing at a steady pace.
Introduction

Sri Lanka officially announced the total annihilation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on May 19, 2009. However, the declaration of victory did not allow the Sri Lankan government or security forces to lower their guard. Checkpoints still remain and regular troops and civil defense force personnel continue to patrol and stand guard at vital junctions across the country. These security measures indicate that the government and its security apparatus still consider the remnants of the LTTE a security threat. For the LTTE cadres, their leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, whose death sealed the victory for the Sri Lankan government, is still an inspiration. They will die for his memory and for the cause of a separate state that he championed.

This post-conflict security threat assessment of Sri Lanka looks first at threats from domestic elements of the former LTTE, and then at those from overseas. The second part of this paper looks at Sri Lanka’s position between the shifting power plays of emerging regional powers, India and China, and concludes with a consideration of how the shifting geopolitics could affect the future of the LTTE remnants.

The LTTE as a domestic threat

Currently, the domestic security concern in Sri Lanka is twofold: first, it is focused on hunting down LTTE remnants and recovering hidden weapons; second, on taking measures not to create conditions for another insurgency in Tamil areas by disgruntled youths. Thus, any countermeasures involve both continued military action as well as a political solution. The government appears to have made some progress with regard to military action, with security forces personnel arresting some 11,000 LTTE suspects, most of them from refugee camps. Interrogation of the suspects in custody has led to the regular recovery of weapons not only in the war
zone but also in Colombo and elsewhere. But with regard to a political solution, the government’s position is ambiguous. There appears to be a wide gap between its promises and its actions.

The government is also concerned about remaining guerrillas regrouping, either under the banner of the LTTE or under a new name. Defense circles expressed concern over a recent London Times online story about a new Tamil militant group emerging in Sri Lanka’s east (Lloyd, 7 December, 2009). Reportedly, the Makkal Viduthalai Ranuvam (People’s Liberation Army – PLA) formed two months after the war ended in May and has some 300 active members. The group’s leader, Commander Kones (a *nom de guerre*), told the timesonline.co.uk correspondent Anthony Lloyd that he hoped to recruit 5,000 volunteers from the civilians recently released from the IDP camps in the north.

According to the report, the PLA is comprised mostly of Marxist inspired ex-militants opposed to the Tiger brand of militancy, which frequently targeted Sinhala civilians in the pursuit of Eelam. Commander Kones claimed that the PLA “is much more politically skilled than the LTTE ever were” and knew how to avoid the “terrorist” label. He said he had recently returned to Sri Lanka after living in Europe for some time following his escape from army detention. “This war isn’t over yet”, Times quoted Kones saying. “There has been no solution for Tamils since the destruction of the LTTE in May. So we have built and organized the PLA and are ready to act soon. Our aim is a democratic socialist liberation of the northeast for a Tamil Eelam” (ibid.). The report also said the PLA had links with Cuba, Indian Maoist groups and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. The Palestinian ambassador in Colombo vehemently denied any links with the new group, saying it was probably a conspiracy to strain friendly relations between the Palestinian and Sri Lankan people (Interview with the author, Shanaka Jayasekara).

The danger of the Tigers regrouping, either as a political force or a political-force-turned-rebel outfit, is real given the Eelam ideology that has been fed to active cadres. There are concerns also about some 11,000 LTTE suspects in government custody. The government has said these suspects would be interrogated and tried if there is evidence that they were involved in terror activities. Those against whom there is no evidence will be released after rehabilitation. The rehabilitation process has already begun at several centers where the inmates have been given basic education and taught skills necessary to earn a living. There is no guarantee, however, that these rehabilitated cadres, once released, would not be attracted to a renewed Eelam ideology or an armed rebellion. Given the security forces’ strength and presence in the North and East and regular discoveries of hidden weapons of the LTTE, it will be difficult for any rebel group to blossom into a power like that of the former LTTE. However, localized radical elements engaging in internecine warfare at a low level cannot be ruled out.

It is also believed that overwhelming numbers and poor screening processes at displacement camps has led to the escape of some LTTE senior figures to India (Sivaramakrishnan, 3 August, 2009) who could keep the Eelam struggle alive.
However, any revivalist attempt will need to re-engage Indian support, and this is unlikely.

At the domestic level the likelihood of the LTTE regrouping will depend on several factors. The extent to which the government will address Tamil concerns will be paramount. The government can focus on promoting reconstruction and development in conflict affected areas, which desperately need basic infrastructure, as an alternative to addressing political issues. On the other hand, the government can respond to both development and demands for political reform, thereby creating a sense of belongingness.

The risk will increase as the 11,000 surrendered combatants are released after rehabilitation. While withdrawing in the face of the security force’s offensive, the LTTE began to conceal weapons and explosives. The security forces have been able to unearth large quantities based on information provided by the surrendered combatants, however the true extent of the buried haul remains unknown. At this stage it is only possible to highlight the possible convergence of skilled combatants and weapons material in the near future. It is not possible to estimate whether the factors of motivation, leadership and organization will also be present and able to foster a rebirth of the LTTE.

### The LTTE as an overseas threat

Having dealt with the internal security concerns surrounding remnant LTTE, it is equally important to assess the threat posed by the LTTE’s international network. This section focuses on the LTTE’s international operations, its financial assets and business empire.

Currently there is a battle for supremacy among key leaders of the LTTE’s international network. The LTTE had engineered a cult tradition of commemorating Tamil Heroes’ day on 27 November each year. In the past, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran used this day to deliver his annual address to the Tamils and outlined his policies and directions. Last year on 27 November 2009, an aspirant to the LTTE top post Vishvanathan Rudrakumaran, a New York-based attorney, issued the customary speech. This was immediately followed with a competing statement by Kathirkamathamby Arivazhakan, head of LTTE overseas intelligence and another statement by the LTTE International Head Office.

Rudrakumaran is currently leading an initiative to establish a transitional government of Tamil Eelam as the continuity platform of the LTTE. This government in exile is constituted by elected members from the Tamil diaspora in Europe and North America. However, there seems to be two factional powerbrokers controlling the electoral process. The Global Tamil Forum (GTF) led by Fr Emmanuel and the Rudrakumaran group. The conduct of the electoral process in each country was the prerogative of the faction that had greater influence. Therefore the candidates that were selected to contest were in fact factional representatives.
Rudrakumaran has had close association with the LTTE; he participated at the peace talks as a member of the LTTE delegation. He has participated in several pro-LTTE events in the US which blatantly hoisted the LTTE flag – although the LTTE is a proscribed organization in the US. However, the Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Blake, told a news conference that Rudrakumaran could not be arrested as he had not committed any crimes on US soil.

Prior to the defeat of the LTTE, the international network was centrally controlled from Kilinochchi, the LTTE de-facto capital. However, following the defeat of the LTTE, the international network has splintered, primarily around asset-centers. The stringent financial management and discipline enforced by the LTTE collapsed with its defeat. Now factional leaders have acquired access to LTTE’s overseas assets that generate a regular income, and the factionalism is as much about finances as it is about personalities.

An article in Janes Intelligence Review (Lords of War, 2008) quoted that the LTTE earned up to US$300 million a year through a sophisticated and complex global network of fundraising activities. The cumulative assets are not known, but they could easily extend beyond a billion dollars. The Janes article revealed that the LTTE was making money through charitable organizations, which had been created and staffed by the outfit itself. Fronts working for the group also ran Hindu temples, grocery shops and fuel stations in Europe and North America besides real estate, commercial shipping, financing movies in India, and illegal activities such as drugs, arms and human smuggling to fill the LTTE’s coffers.

However, the current structure of the LTTE’s international network is very unclear. Most analysts have been accustomed to the LTTE as an authoritarian organization with a hierarchical structure. Therefore, the newly decentralized configuration has redefined the operational workings of the LTTE international network. It is important to remember that the November 27, 2009 heroes’ day events held across Europe and North America showed the Tigers can mobilize sections of the Tamil diaspora. This show of support comes despite the differences in the LTTE’s international leadership in the aftermath of the LTTE’s military defeat.

The LTTE international network was under the purview of the International Secretariat headed by Veerakathi Manivannan (“Castro”). During the ceasefire period, Tamilselvan and Castro restructured the international network. A key outcome of this reorganization was that confidants of Tamilselvan received key positions. The international network was the sole contributor of financial resources to the LTTE. The purpose was to keep control of LTTE funds and assets, among the Tamilselvan-Castro cabal which had the confidence of Prabakaran. The ceasefire provided the Tamil diaspora with greater access to the LTTE and multiple channels of contact began to emerge. It was essential in this context to ensure financing and fund flows were not impacted by the multiple contacts.

In January 2009, as the end was drawing close for the LTTE, Prabakaran appointed the former head of LTTE weapons procurement operations Kumaran Pathmanathan (“KP”) as the head of its International Relations Department. In the past KP was in overall charge of fund management and weapons procurement operations for
the LTTE. However, since the ceasefire, with more Tamil diaspora leaders making direct contact with the LTTE leadership, the role of KP was marginalized. Given his position as one of the most senior members and a close personal friend of Prabakaran, it was thought that KP would go on to mobilize international support against the Sri Lankan government.

After the defeat of the LTTE and killing of Prabakaran on 19 May 2009, the elements of the Castro chain of command rallied factional leaders in Norway. The LTTE at all times maintained separate surveillance on the activities of the Tamil diaspora. The LTTE had an overseas intelligence wing that reported directly to the head of TOSIS (Tiger Security Intelligence Organization) Pottu Amman. The head of the overseas intelligence wing, Kathirkamathamby Arivazhakan was also operating independently and resisted the authority of KP.

The public face of the LTTE international network initiated plans to fill the vacuum created by the defeat of the LTTE by establishing a Tamil Eelam government in exile. Initially, on the recommendations of KP a group of Tamil legal practitioners crafted a proposal for the Provisional Government of Tamil Eelam. However, as the electoral process for membership to this body got underway, many factional differences emerged. Countries were allocated to factional leaderships to avoid intra-Tamil clashes in host countries. This allocation to factional leaders meant that the symbolic elections were limited to factional confidants. Finally, in August 2009, in a well-planned extraction operation between the Malaysian and Sri Lankan security agencies, KP was arrested in Kuala Lumpur and transferred to Sri Lanka.

With the LTTE’s international leadership now in disarray, sympathizers of the Eelam cause are divided as to the future course of the struggle. They are angry, depressed and frustrated because the LTTE has failed; because the international community has let them down; because the Tamils in Tamil Nadu failed to get the Indian government to stop the war when the LTTE was facing defeat; because the millions they contributed to the Tamil cause and thousands of Tamil lives sacrifices for the cause have yielded them nothing but shame and humiliation.

Efforts are also under way to bring the different diaspora groups under one umbrella. One such umbrella group is the Global Tamil Forum whose representatives recently succeeded in not only getting British Foreign Secretary David Miliband address a conference organized by it but also meeting British Prime Minister Gordon Brown amidst protests from the Sri Lankan government (Jones, 25 February, 2010). The group in its website (http://www.globaltamilforum.org/gtf/content/about-gtf) declares that it will “use all resources available to the Tamil Diaspora to establish the Tamil people’s right to self-determination and their right to re-establish their nationhood which was taken away by force from them by the succeeding colonial powers including the Sri Lankan government”.

At the moment, the collective mindset of the Tamils living in Sri Lanka appears to be in hibernation. The absence of a credible and respectable leadership and the psychological wound they have suffered as a result of the crushing defeat of the LTTE have made the Sri Lankan Tamils collectively drift like a rudderless ship. Given this situation, it appears the Tamil people in Sri Lanka and their political leadership have
come to adopt a realistic approach to the Tamil problem, probably because they are still recovering from the shock of the last stages of the war and because they have no strength to undergo any more hardships. Even the main Tamil party, the Tamil National Alliance, which acted (or was forced to act) as the LTTE’s voice in Sri Lanka’s parliament, has been talking of a united Sri Lanka. It calls for devolution of power and not a separate Tamil Eelam.

Overall, the mood of a majority of Tamil people in the North of Sri Lanka in the face of the deaths and destruction they witnessed for three decades is favored towards peace and economic growth rather than separation. They do not see violence as a political currency that can give them relief and redress. This mood is also underscored by the intermingling of Northern Tamils with the increasing volume of Sinhalese from the South visiting the North after the opening of the main A-9 highway to Sri Lanka’s northern capital, Jaffna.

Given these ground realities, it comes as no surprise that the diaspora’s resource-rich network is on a pause. The pro-Eelam diaspora Tamil groups are probably waiting for the right conditions to emerge, both in the international arena and in Sri Lanka, before they strike. As long as the ground support is unfavorable, the waiting game continues. But if it turns favorable, the diaspora Tamil groups will seize on the opportunity to intensify the fight for Eelam.

THE THREAT TO SRI LANKAN ASSETS

Certainly, over the past two years there have been a number of Tamil attacks on Sri Lankan assets and cultural symbols abroad. These have included: In April 2009, members of the Tamil diaspora forcibly entered and rampaged through the Sri Lankan embassy in Norway. In a similar action, the Sri Lanka Consulate General Office in Toronto also came under attack with protesters storming the premises. The Sri Lanka embassy in Berlin, Germany was attacked in February 2009 and again petrol bombed in April 2009. The Sri Lankan High Commission in London was damaged by stone throwing protesters in April 2009. In January 2008, there was a violent attack on the Deputy High Commission office in Chennai in Tamil Nadu. In October 2009 the Sri Lanka High Commission to India located in the diplomatic enclave of Chanakyapuri in New Delhi was attacked. In December 2008, the Sri Lankan Airlines Office in Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, was attacked, and in January 2009, the Bank of Ceylon branch at Poonthmallow Road, Chennai in Tamil Nadu was attacked. The Sri Lankan Buddhist Temple in Kingsbury, London, was rebombed in January 2009, and there was an arson attack against the Sri Lankan Buddhist Temple in Scarborough in Toronto in November 2009.

CYBER ATTACKS

It is in this context that fears are also entertained about the possibility of technosavvy Tamil diaspora youth resorting to cyber attacks. It is no secret that states use cyber warfare. But among the non-state actors, the LTTE is a pioneer in cyber attacks,
though it is not known whether the group, or its sympathizers, engages in cyber attacks in an organized or haphazard manner.

Ravinatha P. Aryasinha, Sri Lanka’s ambassador to the EU, in a paper posted on the Sri Lankan President’s information unit website, has this to say (2008):

The Patterns of Global Terrorism Report 1997 identified the LTTE as being responsible for the first known attack by a ‘terrorist group’ on a target country’s computer system, when in August 1997 a group calling itself ‘Internet Black Tigers’ claimed responsibility for ‘suicide e-mail bombings’ aimed at disrupting the electronic information network/communications systems used by Sri Lanka’s Missions abroad. This brazen act of ‘information warfare’ paralyzed the communication systems of most of Sri Lanka’s overseas missions. At the time the US said the incident ‘did cause us to sit up and take notice’ because it was the first of its kind involving a group branded as a terrorist organization by Washington, and was a possible ‘portent of worse things to come.

The danger of such LTTE hi-tech gangs breaking into highly computerized data files of Sri Lankan government institutions such as the Central Bank, the Finance Ministry and the international airport remains very high. On January 5, 2009, the website of the Sri Lanka’s Defense Ministry was hacked. The Ministry blamed LTTE hackers (Ministry of Defense Website, 5 January, 2009). The government is well advised to take early warning systems and counter measures such as back up file storages.

**MERCENARY SERVICES**

Another area of concern is the possibility of the LTTE’s international network being used by other terrorist organizations and criminals involved in money laundering, human trafficking and drug peddling. The combat trained Tamil militants’ skill can serve in a mercenary capacity to the highest bidder. On this score, the LTTE’s international network is not only a threat to Sri Lanka’s security but also to the security of the international community. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Kilinochchi-based centrally-controlled command structure of the LTTE, a repeat of the Maldivian-coup like situation cannot be ruled out.

In this context, it is the responsibility of Sri Lankan government leaders to draw the attention of the international community to these dangers and make sure that the international and regional support for the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka remains unchanged. But the manner in which the Rajapaksa government handles its relations with the West and its ambiguity with regard to a political solution do not augur well for Sri Lanka’s national interest.

One trend that is emerging is the use of seafaring skills by former members of the LTTE’s shipping fleet to transport asylum seekers to overseas destinations. The LTTE vessel MV Ocean Lady (formerly MV Princess Eswarie), captained by Kamalraj Kandasamy, was the main vessel used to transport weapons from North Korea. Captain Kamalraj, together with other suspected LTTE members used this ship to transport 76 asylum seekers to Canada. This trend continued when the LTTE
members purchased an old cargo ship, the MV Harin Panich 19, and converted it to a human smuggling vessel named the MV Sun Sea and transported 492 asylum seekers to Canada. It is suspected that the vessel was crewed by LTTE members.

**INTERNATIONAL REACTION**

The government’s lack of success in cracking down on the LTTE’s international operations is largely due to two factors:

First, there is an international perception that the Tamils in Sri Lanka are a marginalized people and they have been discriminated against by government policies and therefore a political solution is needed to address their grievances. Countries which hold such a view do not come down hard on pro-LTTE elements in the post-conflict era.

Second, the government’s decision to spurn advice from the West, especially during the last weeks of the war has caused remaining friction. The government’s firmness in rejecting calls by the international community, especially Britain and France whose foreign ministers made a visit to Sri Lanka during the last stages of the war, to bring about a ceasefire that could help hundreds of thousands of civilians trapped in the war zone to flee to safety was not well received. The repercussions of such diplomatic bungling are now being felt. For example, the country could not succeed through effective diplomacy to dissuade the European Union from its decision to suspend the GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) Plus concessions offered to Sri Lanka’s exports to European markets. Another case in point was Britain’s opposition at the November 2009 summit of the Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOFM) in Trinidad and Tobago to Sri Lanka’s move to host the next summit. The British government’s official justification was that it did not want to reward a country known for human rights violations with the honor of hosting the 2011 summit. Other countries which opposed Sri Lanka’s bid were Canada and New Zealand.

Sri Lanka’s diplomatic relations with the United States, whose war-on-terror policy helped Colombo to isolate the LTTE internationally as a terrorist organization, were also strained. Instead of resorting to diplomacy guided by prudence, the government demanded an apology from US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for her remarks that rape was used as a war weapon in Sri Lanka. In spite of a US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report that called on the Obama administration to adopt a strategic shift in policy in winning back Sri Lanka, Washington has not substantially changed its Sri Lanka policy.

This is evident in the presentation of a bill in the US House of Representatives on 11 December that approved the imposition of restrictions on US military assistance to Sri Lanka and sought a report from the Secretary of State on alleged crimes against humanity during the last phase of the war there. Though a report presented together with the bill hailed the defeat of terrorism (*Sunday Times*, 13 December), it expressed concern over the “displaced Tamils who are still detained in closed camps, as well as other persons who have been imprisoned or are being prosecuted for publicly
reporting attacks on civilians”. The report outlined conditions such as bringing those who are guilty of war crimes to justice and states: “If all conditions are met by Sri Lanka, then the Secretary of State should ensure that any military assistance to Sri Lanka be used to support the recruitment and training of Tamils into the Sri Lankan military, Tamil language training for Sinhalese military personnel, and human rights training for all military personnel” (ibid.).

The US stance indicates that although Washington does not support the LTTE, the Tamil cause is considered to have some validity. The European stance also appears to be the same. The separatist cause has not lost its appeal in India’s Tamil Nadu state, home to some 70 million Indian Tamils, where it continues to remain a major debating topic in the Tamil Nadu electronic media and dominate the front pages of the newspapers.

The Tamil diaspora wields substantial voting power in many of the countries where they are domiciled. In Britain, Norway and Canada politicians are bound to listen to the Tamil grievances, including their demand that those involved in alleged war crimes in Sri Lanka should be brought to justice. In fact, the cry for war crimes trials is one of the aims and goals of the diaspora Eelamists. However, the success of the diaspora groups depends on their adaptability to the current anti-terrorist world order. This is why the umbrella group Global Tamil Forum is projecting itself as a non-violent freedom fighting group. Even KP, upon assuming the leadership of the movement, advocated a non-violent struggle aimed at achieving their goal of a separate state.

### Shifting geopolitics in the Indian Ocean

In some diaspora pro-LTTE circles the dream of a separate Eelam is kept alive by a belief that India will find the Tamils natural allies in an emerging “cold war” with China, and will extend support for a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka’s north. In this regard, an analysis of the geopolitics of South Asia assumes great importance for a number of reasons.

The geopolitics of South Asia are extensive, complex and dynamic. Poor economic standards, the legacy of colonial rulers, the existence of a large number of ethnic communities with contrasting linguistic and cultural differences, cross-border homogeneous ethnic and religious relationships of peoples, the relative low literacy rate in most parts of the region, and the strategic positioning of the region have contributed to the complex character of South Asia. The recent trend of religious radicalism has become an additional factor in this mix.

Post Cold War global politics has given rise to the formation of new alliances in Asia. This alliance formation has been subtle and at the core of it are economic and strategic considerations. In this realignment the United States has moved towards India as a check against China’s growing military power. China on the other hand has been strengthening its relationship with countries such as Russia and Iran. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), to which Sri Lanka was admitted as a dialogue partner in 2009, can be interpreted as a security alliance between China,
Russia and Central Asian states. It should be noted that both China and Russia rejected a US application to join the SCO as an observer.

The recent US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report (cited above) noted that as a result of the policies of the US and the West, Sri Lanka is increasingly aligning towards Asian powerhouses like China. It noted that politically and economically Sri Lanka is distancing itself from the West because of the criticism on the Sri Lankan Government’s handling of the war and its human rights record. Although China and India, along with Pakistan, Iran and Russia, extended significant help to Sri Lanka in defeating the LTTE, support from Beijing saw a sharp increase after the Hambantota harbor project agreement was signed (see below), with some reports saying that China’s aid to Sri Lanka in 2008 exceeded US$1 billion. This included massive military supplies such as fighter jets and other war material that eventually helped Sri Lanka beat the LTTE (Nazemroaya, 2009). Not only has China secured the Hambantota harbor project, it has also won the dragon share of Sri Lanka’s post-war development projects.

Certainly, Sri Lanka’s strong military and economic ties with China are a concern for India and the United States. Both these countries will be taking counter-measures into the near future in order to make their presence felt in Sri Lanka.

**SRI LANKA AND INDIA**

India can be considered the epicenter of regional geopolitics, with tensions intermittently mounting on many fronts. The gigantic market potential and the huge labor market in the country are two vital ingredients in the makeup of many trends that attract the industrial West into the country. Sri Lanka’s relationship with India – which has always oscillated between love and hate – dates back to the pre-historic era. In most of the interactions between the two countries India played the dominant role, often forcing Sri Lankan rulers to adhere to India’s agenda. Thus, India has been, and continues to be, the prime influencing factor in Sri Lankan politics.

India has a vital strategic stake in Sri Lanka. An unfriendly Sri Lanka or a close neighbor under the influence of powers unfriendly to India would not be tolerated. At the same time, the strategic geo-political positioning of Sri Lanka is also an issue of concern to India – especially in maintaining her military, commercial and political interests in the region. Sri Lanka’s eastern natural harbor of Trincomalee has always been of interest to India. For instance, it is important for the switching of naval fleets from the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea and vice versa.

India has always enjoyed strong cultural, ethnic and religious ties with northern Sri Lanka, and India has always been alert to the developments of the neighboring island nation. This sensitivity was vividly evidenced when President Jayawardene, nicknamed “Yankee Dicky”, followed a pro-Western policy in the 1980s. He did so partly in order to obtain military capabilities for his less experienced and poorly equipped armed forces, threatened by a dozen Tamil rebel groups including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who were primarily trained and equipped by India. His foreign policies not only made India uncomfortable, but also provoked
her to act ferociously. India’s reactions created an environment where Sri Lanka’s Tamil insurgency was blown into a fully fledged 30 year long civil war claiming more than 70,000 lives, with India initially assisting the Tamil rebels by providing them with arms, money and training.

Relations between India and Sri Lanka deteriorated as the conflict with the LTTE, and Sri Lanka’s alignment with the US and allies, grew. An Israel Interests Section was established within the US embassy in Colombo in 1984 and there were attempts by several US interests to gain access to the huge oil tank farm around the strategic eastern port city of Trincomalee. Facilities were granted for the transmission of Voice of America (VOA) in the northwestern coastal village of Iranavila.

As the conflict with the LTTE intensified it prompted thousands of Tamil refugees from the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka to flee into the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu. This created a tense situation in Tamil dominated Tamil Nadu, giving leverage to Indian leaders to interfere in Sri Lankan affairs as a countermeasure and punitive action against Sri Lanka for teaming up with the opposite bloc. In the eighties the Indian intelligence services were able to provide arming, training and funding to Tamil militant groups which facilitated the Sri Lankan civil war. This situation took a total U-turn, however, under the premiership of Rajiv Gandhi, who wanted to decelerate the Tamil rebellion in Sri Lanka, and he signed an accord with Sri Lankan President Jayewardene in 1987, after applying extensive diplomatic and indirect military pressure.

The accord was formulated in the name of rights of Sri Lankan Tamils and Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity, but vividly pointed to India’s geopolitical concerns, with specific reference to “relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel”, “making Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka available for military use by any country”, “operating the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm” and “Sri Lanka’s agreements with foreign broadcasting organizations”, an implied reference to the issue of involving the US interests in Sri Lanka. (For the accord see http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papers/indo_srilanks_agreement.htm.) These issues had nothing to do with the infringement of Tamil rights which, according to Tamils and India, triggered the Tamil rebellion.

The growing strength – both military and political – of the Tamil Tigers was an increasing concern for the Rajiv Gandhi government. However, India realized the real threat of Tamil insurgency only after the LTTE assassination by female suicide bomber of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 during his electioneering campaign.

With the escalation of the war in Sri Lanka, India – traditionally one of the major providers of logistics and training to the Sri Lankan military – was increasingly constrained by Tamil political pressure in the south from providing large-scale direct military assistance to Sri Lanka. It was an arduous task for India to balance South Indian Tamil pressure in the wake of heightening military offensives in northern Sri Lanka. This dilemma – on one hand providing indirect military and diplomatic assistance to the Sri Lankan military forces while on the other hand facing the mounting pressure from Tamil Nadu against the offensive – has in recent years gradually forced Sri
Lanka to search for diplomatic and military assistance elsewhere, including from China.

Upon the recent annihilation of the LTTE by Sri Lankan armed forces, India is witnessing a slow increase of Tiger movements in its Southern Provinces. In early May 2010 it extended the ban on LTTE for another two years, admitting that the Tigers still remain a threat on its soil. India’s Home Affairs Ministry feels that India’s territorial integrity is threatened by Indian sympathizers, supporters and agents of the LTTE. Following the defeat of the LTTE, the Tamil diaspora has been of increasing concern to the Indian Government. According to a gazette notification issued by the Home Ministry on May 14, 2010 the diaspora is “spreading anti-India sentiments” among Sri Lankan Tamils through the Internet. The ministry says the diaspora is doing so by “holding top Indian political leaders and bureaucrats responsible for the defeat of the LTTE”. Such activities, according to the Indian Government, are likely to threaten the security of Indian VIPs (Sunday Times, 30 May, 2010).

For some time, Sri Lanka has been mooting the idea of signing a Defense Co-operation Agreement with India. However the Congress Government of India has been unsure, as the LTTE enjoys support within a section of Tamil Nadu polity and the Congress’s coalition partner, the DMK. Besides the many military advantages that would flow from an India-Sri Lanka Defense Co-operation Agreement, it would also help India ensure access to Trincomalee for its naval fleets.

Meanwhile, Sri Lanka has been careful to engage India’s regional economic interests in the post conflict development and rehabilitation projects – mainly in the north and east of the country. India has been provided with the opportunity to build a coal power plant in Sampur in close proximity to Trincomalee, soon after the Eastern Province was recaptured from the Tamil Tigers in 2007. In June last year Sri Lanka submitted a proposal to India on renovating and rehabilitating the strategic Kankasanthurai (KKS) harbor in the northern tip of the Jaffna peninsula. For India, a presence at KKS would be of strategic benefit because of its proximity to its southern coast. Thus, India will have access to Sri Lanka’s most important northern and eastern ports. India, along with its rival China, has been selected to rebuild the northern railway line that was destroyed by the LTTE during the war. This is a clear example of Sri Lanka’s balancing of diplomacy between India and China.

SRI LANKA AND CHINA

Over the past five years, China has become one of Sri Lanka’s major diplomatic and military allies. The vacuum created by India’s dilemma on providing military support to Sri Lanka in its effort against the Tamil Tigers was partially filled by China, through providing Sri Lanka with military hardware and economic assistance. Many Chinese development projects are now underway in Sri Lanka – the most important being the gigantic port development project in the southern district of Hambantota (see Figure 1).

Sri Lanka is a strategic country by virtue of being located in the southernmost tip of South Asia. During World War II it was believed that those who controlled Sri
Lanka’s eastern port of Trincomalee controlled the Indian Ocean. Today, the same might be said of Hambantota harbor where China is building a deep sea harbor for Sri Lanka. The agreement between China and Sri Lanka was signed in 2007 and can be interpreted as part of a Chinese strategy of building similar ports in Pakistan and Myanmar in a bid to protect and facilitate oil and other vital supplies to China from the Middle East.

![Figure 1: Hambantota port (Colombopage, http://www.colombopage.com/)](image)

The cost of the project is US$1 billion provided mainly by China. The entire project is expected to be completed in 15 years in four phases. The first stage is US$360 million, of which 85% comes as a loan from China’s Exim Bank while the balance is provided by the Sri Lankan government. The port will eventually be capable of handling 20 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) per year with 11 km of berths. The project includes a gas-fired power plant project, a ship repair unit, a container repair unit, an oil refinery and a bunkering terminal. The US$600 million funds needed to launch the second project, to be completed in 2014, are also expected to be found with Chinese assistance. Under the third phase of development a dockyard will be constructed. Funding for the third phase is yet to be decided.

Hambantota is of vital strategic importance in the Indian Ocean because of its situation astride the major sea lanes of communication from Europe to East Asia and the oil tanker routes from the oil producing countries of the Persian Gulf to China, Japan and other Pacific countries (see Figure 2). It is also possible to interpret the Hambantota harbor project as part of a Chinese move to militarily dominate the Indian Ocean. In the military sense it is important to the United States as these same sea routes are used for transference of naval power from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Thus, using Chinese interests in such a strategic
development project is a significant feature in Sri Lankan government policies. Both the Sri Lankan government and Beijing have categorically denied that the Hambantota harbor will be used as a Chinese military base, claiming that it is a pure commercial project.

![Figure 2: Sri Lanka’s strategic location astride sea lanes of communication](image)

India has requested Sri Lanka’s clearance to open two new Deputy High Commission (DHC) offices; one in the northern city of Jaffna and the other in Hambantota. While the requirement to open up the Jaffna DHC is understandable, the Southern Hambantota DHC is probably to balance the Chinese activities in the region.

Among other Chinese investments and development projects, Sri Lanka and China’s Exim Bank signed two deals in August 2009 to build an oil bunkering facility at Hambantota, and a highway from the Sri Lankan capital Colombo to the country’s one and only international airport in Katunayaka. China, meanwhile, has offered an US$891 million, 20-year loan with a 2% interest rate to build the second and third phases of the 900 megawatt coal-fired Norochcholai power plant on the Northwestern coast of Sri Lanka.

**INDIA-SRI LANKA MARITIME BOUNDARIES: FISHING AND SEABED RESOURCES**

India and Sri Lanka share a maritime border of more than 400 km, which cuts across three different seas: the Bay of Bengal in the north, the Palk Bay in the centre and the Gulf of Mannar in the south. The maritime boundary is close to the shores of both the countries in the Palk Bay region, where the maximum distance separating them is around 45 km, and the minimum is 16 km. Even before the Law of the Sea was negotiated at the United Nations, there were maritime agreements of 1974 and 1976 between India and Sri Lanka. The 1974 Agreement demarcated the maritime boundary in the Palk Strait and ceded Kachchativu, a small, barren island in the region, to Sri Lanka. The 1976 Agreement barred either country’s fishermen from fishing in the other’s waters.

Fishing around the uninhabited island of Kachchativu in the Palk Strait has long been a contentious issue between the incumbent regimes of India and Sri Lanka. The problems stem in part from fishing restrictions around the northernmost Jaffna peninsula imposed by the Sri Lankan security forces due to the then activities of the...
Tamil Tigers in these troubled waters. This led to a major decrease in the harvesting of fish on the Sri Lankan side of the boundary. Before 1983, some 25% of the total fish productions in Sri Lanka, amounting to 48,000 metric tons, were from the north while in recent years the north was able to produce only 1,000 metric tons (Dr. Augustine Susai Siluvaithasan, Department of Geography, University of Jaffna, private communication, 20 September, 2008). This has tempted Indian fishermen to sail close to or beyond the Sri Lankan maritime boundary in order to have a better catch. About 18,000 boats from Tamil Nadu are engaged in fishing in this Strait. Against this backdrop there have been frequent allegations of Sri Lankan navy firing on the Indian fishermen, occasionally creating tensions in Tamil Nadu, which the Indian Central Government could not ignore.

However, there are signs that the situation might become less tense with the decimation of the LTTE leadership. On 28 February 2010 fishermen of the two countries attended the festival in St. Anthony’s church on Kachchhativu for the first time in years.

Seabed claims by India and Sri Lanka have not hitherto been contentious issues, but the recent claims by both countries to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf show that it has the potential to become one (see Figure 3).

![Figure 3: India-Sri Lanka claims to the seabed](United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)

According to the Live Mint news agency (12 May, 2009), India has quietly staked a claim to nearly half a million square kilometers of seabed that stretch to the west of
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and that potentially contain large reserves of oil, minerals, metals and gas hydrates. In the near future India is likely to vie for another half a million square kilometers, some of which may conflict with a similar claim made by Sri Lanka. Though the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea may not have as copious oil reserves as the Arctic Circle, where a host of countries from Russia to Denmark are staking claims under the same UN treaty, India has an ongoing program to tap gas hydrates – a major component of untapped seabed wealth.

Meanwhile, Sri Lanka’s Continental Shelf submission claims an area of seabed approximately 25 times the size of the country – or 1,725,800 square km. However, the precise outer-limits will be determined on the basis of technical and scientific data provided in Sri Lanka’s submission to the UN Commission. Sri Lanka’s submission is likely to be taken into consideration by the Commission around 2025. Many states including Sri Lanka have expressed dissatisfaction at the long delay in the scheduling of the hearing of the Commission.

Conclusion

Though the war against the LTTE has ended, Sri Lanka cannot be complacent. The separatist struggle could erupt again if the government loses its focus on development of the Tamil areas in the north and east and take measures that will make Tamils feel that they are equal citizens of this country. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy also needs to be redefined. It is advisable that foreign-policy makers recollect Sri Lanka’s period of non-alignment when the country successfully balanced its relations, not only with the United States and the Soviet Union, but also with India, Pakistan and China. During the Indo-Sino war of 1962 and the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971, Sri Lanka played a major role in bringing peace among the adversaries.

Most importantly, the Sri Lankan government should be careful that its foreign policies and economic and military ties with other nations do not threaten India to an extent that will prompt New Delhi to look at the Tamil cause sympathetically, as it had done in the 1970s and 1980s. In the event that the “cold war” between India (backed by the United States) and China intensifies and the Colombo government is seen by New Delhi as siding with Beijing, Indo-Lanka relations could reach a low ebb, as they were from 1977 to 1987. Needless to say, such a situation would be to the advantage of the Eelam separatists.

A change of government in New Delhi and a change of administration in Tamil Nadu, with pro-LTTE elements holding the key to government formations, could also be disruptive. Thus, Sri Lanka should also aim to improve its relations with the people of Tamil Nadu. This can come only if the Tamils of Sri Lanka become content with a political solution at home.

In conjunction with a political solution, efforts also must be taken to promote a Sri Lankan identity that will ensure unity in diversity and to develop the northern and eastern Provinces. This can only be achieved by government leaders rising above petty politics. They cannot keep rousing nationalistic feelings to win votes. A genuine effort must be made at all-party talks to solve the Tamil question through consensus politics. If the government fails then the danger of another Tamil rebellion in the near future cannot be ruled out.
Introduction

The end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization have brought new dimensions to Southeast Asia’s regional security challenges. The world’s changing sociopolitical environment compels the international community to look through different and new lenses at its understanding of peace and security. Although it can be argued that the Cold War’s security legacy continues to dominate regional security agendas, countries in Southeast Asia also have to adapt to new security risks and challenges, which need to be addressed well beyond traditional frameworks of sovereignty and state survival. Threats are no longer mainly military in nature and security is not primarily about defending national boundaries. These non-military risks have become one of the focal points of state survival, as well as to the survival of populations that live within the state’s boundary.

Malaysia’s understanding of security has also been affected by the changing debate and nature of the international political environment. As one of the most strategic countries in the Southeast Asian region, Malaysia was caught in the ideological political rivalry between the two superpowers during the Cold War period. The country was also one of the important political theatres for the attempted expansion of communism in the region. For decades, since its independence from the British in 1957, Malaysia has continued to unite its fragile societal composition through integrated socio-economic developments that emphasized social and political harmony as one of the main strategies to build a more resilient state.

Yet in the face of current global challenges, Malaysia has to respond to a myriad of security threats that have the potential to pose challenges to its sovereignty and survival. It can be argued that Malaysia’s security and threat perception have been influenced by two broad categories, i.e. the structural and the social. Structurally, the physical configuration of Malaysia, which has distinctive strategic geo-political features – the national territories are made up of west Malaysia (the Malay Peninsula) and east Malaysia (in the island of Borneo), and its sharing of physical and maritime boundaries with nearly all its Southeast Asian neighbors – has an important bearing on its conception of security. At the same time, Malaysia’s security has been influenced by the country’s political and social variables, for instance, on the multi-racial composition of the society. Living in a multiracial society requires an insight into other race’s psyche and culture (Abdullah, 2009).

Hence, Malaysia’s security threats encompass both external as well as internal dimensions. At the same time, the changing structure of international system, and
challenges posed by the process of globalization have produced new and emerging non-traditional security threats.

The evolution of threats and security in Malaysia

Since independence, Malaysia’s conception of threats and security have shared the traits of other developing countries, and differed somewhat from Western conceptions. Eliminating threats emanating from other actors in the state-dominated international system is one of the main approaches in protecting the sovereignty of the state. Caroline Thomas (1987, p. 10), however, argues that developing countries’ insecurity emanates from their struggle first and foremost for political, and later economic, independence. Deteriorating economies produce domestic conflicts that not only affect a developing state’s socio-political stability, but more importantly also threaten the regime in power. This is because regime survival is one of the important elements in promoting national security in developing countries (Buzan, 1988; Collin, 2003; Ayoob, 1995; Azar & Moon, 1988; Singh, 2004). Although sovereignty lies with the people, it has been the government that defines security. Therefore, threat and security encompass a “broad spectrum of values held dear by the majority; otherwise the government would lose its legitimacy” (Singh, 2004, p. 2). Unlike with developed countries, this broad concept of security includes “domestic determinants such as crisis of confidence in the political leadership, internal war, poverty, social dislocation, income inequalities, secessionism, sabotage, and contested legitimacy of government” (ibid., p. 3). Furthermore, Nathan (1998, p. 515) argues that the “pursuit of national security in the Malaysian context has been governed not only by an emphasis on state survival, common to many developing countries, but also by ethno-national security doctrines that have evolved over time […] Nation-building is an ongoing process […] and Malaysia is no exception. It is an elite-led formulation of a national identity”.

Hence, in its early statehood (1957-1969), Malaysia (formally Malaya) was preoccupied with building and unifying a nation of diverse races and religions. Issues of development and race relations dominated the agenda of national security. At the same time, the Cold War rivalry of the two superpowers, the perceived threat from China, and the prospects of a regional expansion of communism loomed large, and forced the Malayan government to align itself with Western powers. Domestic communists led by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) further reinforced the regime’s political control. Hence, Malaya had to form a security arrangement with its formal colonial master, Great Britain, through the Anglo-Malayan Defense Arrangement (AMDA) to ensure its early survival.

Notwithstanding, the changing regional power distributions (the fall of the democratic regime in South Vietnam and China’s alarming power influence) provided further insecurity to Malaya. Realist paradigms dominated the thinking of policy makers, by bringing a realistic approach to Malaya’s response to regional structural changes. Recognizing its limited capability, Malaya had no choice but to rely on help to protect its external security. Furthermore, a loose defense coalition, the Five Power
Malaysia

Defense Arrangement (FPDA), was formed with Australia, Britain, New Zealand and Singapore. The FPDA was also part of confidence building measures between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore after the bitter separation process in 1965 (Kin Wah, 1992, pp. 199-200).

At the same time, the FPDA also raised suspicions that it was another post-colonial strategy for major powers to restore their power position in the region. Indonesia and the Philippines were particularly sensitive. For Indonesia, the FPDA did not go along with its strategy to empower Third World countries through the Non-Align Movement (NAM). Furthermore, the security arrangements delayed the possible political union between Malaya and Indonesia. The establishment of Malaysia in 1963 with the merger of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Northern Borneo shattered Indonesia’s dream of unification and fueled anti-Malaysia sentiments. Although the formation of Malaysia was part of the Malayan and Singapore government’s attempt to placate socialist influence, it was not well received by neighboring countries. Jakarta, together with Manila, argued that the creation of Malaysia was part of a political game played by the United States and Great Britain to weaken and destabilize regional power distribution. Hence, Indonesia’s Sukarno launched a Konfrantasi (Confrontation) against the newly established Malaysia in 1963; the military campaign went on for more than two years, until the Sukarno regime was toppled by General Soeharto (Mahmud, 2000).

Domestic determinants continued as one of the crucial factors of Malaysia’s security agenda in the subsequent phases of its statehood. Given the multiracial and multi-religious nature of the society, it is no doubt that harmonious race relations are one of the important core values of national security. The irony is that although promotion for racial harmony has been on the political agenda since independence, government strategies appeared to have acted in the opposite direction. The education system inherited from the colonial period continued to allow four different types of school system, namely the Malay, Chinese, Tamil and English. Under the unwritten social contract between the three major races prior to independence, the Chinese and the Indian were allowed to promote their identity and culture. The vernacular schools have since continued with minimal assistance from the Federal government. Furthermore, the Malay and English schools were subsequently amalgamated into a national school system in which a Malay-based Bahasa Malaysia was used. The three types of school nonetheless did not help the country to promote its unifying nationhood objectives. Instead it contributed to serious political tensions because the three major races failed to integrate with one another. As a result, tensions in race relations culminated in the outbreak of bloody racial riots on the 13th of May, 1969.

In recent years, globalization has added another pressure to Malaysia’s political and economic security. Politically, Malaysia is still fragile, while economically the country is susceptible to a fluid international environment. Thus the process of globalization is not openly welcomed in Malaysia, given its struggle to restructure the society and to focus on poverty eradication projects by providing more development opportunities to its people. This does not mean that Malaysia has ignored the rapid process of globalization. It has in fact become part of the process by incrementally opening its economy to the outside world (Embong, 2000, p. 71). It cannot be denied...
that Malaysia has benefited from globalization. Its economic growth prior to 1997 was an average of 8% a year (Ariff, 2009, p. 2). It has successfully diversified its economy from being purely commodity-based to becoming an electronics-oriented exporting country. Although the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis temporarily shut Malaysian doors to the world, the country continues to enjoy moderate growth as a result of its open economy.

The globalization process has also been associated with political democratization. Malaysia appears to be a democratic country, with a Westminster style of government. It also holds a good record in holding general elections every five years, except for a period between 1969 and 1971 when the constitution was suspended due to the racial riots. Secret balloting and vote counting have been carried out fairly. Outside observers have been invited to monitor elections and determine whether they were conducted in a fair and impartial manner. Furthermore, opposition candidates could gain seats in the Parliament. In fact, the main opposition pact consisting of the Anwar-led Parti Keadilan Rakyat or Justice Party, Democratic Action Party (DAP) and PAS captured five major states, namely Kedah, Penang, Perak, Selangor and Kelantan, in Peninsular Malaysia in the 2008 general elections. This suggests that democracy does exist in Malaysia.

However, critics have argued that democracy as practiced in Malaysia is not simply about “increasing political participation of the masses in the making of the rules, checking arbitrary rules and the replacement of unjust rulers” (Singh, 2000, p. 525). But rather is a oligarchic structure that is premised on the idea that “governmental authority rests on a small group of elites which, while in power, would seek to perpetuate its rule. Political elites in Malaysia themselves play a central role in democratization” (ibid.). How democracy is practiced depends “heavily on the interests, values, and actions of political leaders, whether ensconced, downwardly mobile, or at least potentially, upwardly mobile” (Bunce, 2000, p. 707).

Hence the major political debate in Malaysia is centered on good governance, justice and democratization. According to Sivapalan Selvadurai (2009), Malaysia will succumb to a political crisis if several reforms are not taken. Lack of able or trustworthy leadership can lead to loss of faith in the political administration. Furthermore, he argues that the “lack of decisive and consistent execution of institutional mechanisms (especially justice and rightful ethics) can lead to loss of faith and discredit governance systems (especially formal ones)”. Karminder Singh Dhillon (2010) further argues that there is deteriorating governance in Malaysia. Furthermore, “in the rest of the developed world […] the trend is towards accountability, transparency and lesser government. There is no such trend in Malaysia. It can and will threaten the long-term political and social health of the nation” (ibid.). The problem with Malaysian political governance, according to both authors, is the absence of checks and balances within the branches of government. The monarchy, judiciary and civil service are increasingly lacking in power, legitimacy and the ability to perform their functions in the event of a breakdown of governance or a political crisis. Such impotence will become a threat if and when a political or constitutional crisis occurs. It is also argued that the breakdown of ethics in politics has become endemic within the Malaysian polity. Society has come to terms and accepted that politicians are unscrupulous,
deviod of morals and corrupt. In fact, corruption has become accepted as a way of life in the nation, and thus nothing serious can or will be done about it (Dhillon, 2010; Ahmad 2010). Therefore, according to commentators such as Dhillon (2010), Malaysia is in need of political reform.

As a result, calls for more accountability and transparency have become common from nearly all quarters of the Malaysian social strata. The Anwar Ibrahim saga of 1998 added to the political confusion. Anwar Ibrahim, who was the Deputy Prime Minister under the Mahathir administration, was forced to step down for alleged involvement in sodomy and corruption. He was acquitted on the sodomy charge, but jailed for corruption. However, the charges did not prevent him from actively involving himself in politics, especially after his release from jail. He led a newly established Parti Keadilan Rakyat or Justice Party (PKR) and formed an unexpected alliance with the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS). Anwar then led the opposition coalition alliance under the banner of Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Coalition) in the 2008 General Elections and created a political tsunami when the opposition managed to challenge the decade-long Barisan Nasional’s two-third Parliamentary majority. Moreover, the opposition coalition was also successful in taking over five states.

It can be concluded that Malaysia’s threats and security challenges derive from internal as well as external variables. Its internal threats are fundamentally more challenging since, as a relatively young country, domestic cohesion is of the utmost importance to the survival of the state. The ability of the state to consolidate its internal sovereignty will also determine its resilience to external threats. Furthermore, like other developing nations, the idea of insecurity and threats are “almost inconceivable without the inclusion of the interests of the political regime, given the weaknesses of other institutions of the state especially in the light of the growing entrenchment of authoritarian political structure” (Singh, 2004, p. 3). There is also a gray distinction between state and regime security, given the domestic security issues such as poverty and development, racial conflicts and religious militancy will need the involvement of a strong regime to manage.

The contemporary and emerging threats

One may argue that Malaysia’s conception of security and threat has not substantially changed over time. Since “security” and “threat” are regime defined, it is clear from the onset that internal variables and issues such as racial and religious harmony are Malaysia’s core values. But these assumptions may limit one’s understanding of Malaysia’s broadened national security challenges both currently and in the future.

To identify and analyze the major emerging security concerns to Malaysia, email interviews were conducted between July and December 2009 to solicit selected practitioners’ and experts’ opinions. A total of 25 emails were sent in late July and August 2009 to selected respondents based on their occupational backgrounds. Twelve respondents replied. Out of these 12 respondents, eight came from academia (ranging
from senior lecturers to professors, all experts on security), two were from the police, and another two were senior government officials. It should be emphasized here that the small number of respondents has made it difficult to generalize experts’ as well as practitioners’ opinions on the emerging security threats to Malaysia. However, the results can be considered as preliminary and to form the basis for further study.

The results are summarized in Table 1 below. The respondents’ major security concerns can be divided into two sections: existing and continuous threats (structural), and emerging threats and risks (issues based). In fact, existing and continuous threats dominated the discussion among respondents. It can be implied from the replies that although they acknowledged the emergence of new security risks and threats, such as environmental degradation and economic security that have gone beyond the notion of state survival, they were also at the same time concerned with more traditional domestic challenges.

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<th>Emerging Security Risks and Threats</th>
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<td>• Politicization of race and religion</td>
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<td>• Territorial and maritime disputes</td>
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<td>• Spillover effect of neighboring countries’ political and economic crises</td>
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<td>• Religious fundamentalism, terrorism and political violence</td>
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<td>• Foreign intervention</td>
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<td>• Poverty and food security</td>
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<td>• Cyber threats</td>
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Table 1: Security threats to Malaysia

Respondents were ambiguous on the issue of emerging threats, although some did discuss it in detail. There was debate among respondents regarding what constitutes an emerging threat. Some argued that terrorism should not be listed as an emerging threat since Malaysia has faced the problem for years (Singh, 2009; Harun, 2010). Since independence through to the end of the Cold War, Malaysia had to face the CPM’s insurgency. At the same time, Malaysia has also experienced scores of religious militancy attacks. Some groups, like the Kumpulan 4 Sahabat (Friend of Four Group), Ahmad Nasir Ismail Group and the Tabrani, held deviant interpretations of the Quran at odds with the official Islamic stance adopted by the state. They became security concerns when they decided to wage physical attacks against civilians and government security establishments. Ahmad Nasir Ismail Group, for instance, launched an attack on a police station in Batu Pahat Johor on 16 October 1980, which resulted in the deaths of eight people (Hammim, 2010, p. 11). Hence, threats such as terrorism and religious fundamentalism are placed under the “Existing and Continuous” section of the table.
It is not surprising that the majority of respondents appear to have come to a consensus that the fragile structure of Malaysia’s socio-political system still haunts the national security agenda. The social process of nation building is of great concern due to the multiracial and multi-religious nature of the Malaysian society. After 50 years of nationhood, Malaysia is still grappling with the issues of social and cultural tolerance. The following quote is from Dr Karminder Singh Dhillon (2010), the undersecretary of the Policy Division at the Ministry of Defense, in the follow-up interview after the survey:

[The] lack of inter-cultural understanding amongst the different groups within the society especially by race, gender and inter-generation appear to create a fragmented society. We therefore need a common ‘spirit’ or ‘soul’ and at the same time space for diverse expressions. Otherwise solidarity and cohesiveness amidst freedom of expression amongst society cannot be achieved.

Dhillon’s opinion is in line with the scholarly writings on Malaysian social and security challenges cited above. Shamsul (2005) and Abdullah (2003) argue that Malaysian society is still racially fragmented. The Malaysian political system is racially based, with major racial groups being represented by political parties to protect their interests; the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MIC) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). Although one may argue that Malaysia also has several influential multiracial political parties such as the Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and People’s Progressive Party (PPP), these parties are in fact politically dominated and led by one racial group. The DAP, for instance, is a Chinese-dominated party, whereas the PPP is Indian-dominated.

Malaysia’s education system has also become racially politicized. The introduction of three types of educational system since independence, namely, the National (Malay), Chinese Mandarin and Tamil Indian, has failed to integrate the society under a common identity. The higher education system is also not spared. The decision by the University Malaya administration, for instance, to appoint a non-Indian to temporarily lead the Indian Studies Department created political furor within the Indian community (The New Straits Times, 8 July, 2009). The MIC, which badly lost voting support from the Indian community in the 2008 General Elections, demanded that the university authorities appoint an Indian to lead the department. The party also rejected the university’s decision to rename the department the Department of Indian and South Asian Studies.

Other respondents who were interviewed also expressed their concerns on the issue of racial harmony. And some even suggested the possible recurrence of the May 1969 ethnic violence in which hundreds of people were killed due to continued racial hatred, economic disparity, and political manipulation. Some even suggest that racial riot incidents would continue as a result of continuous racial hatred. Their arguments have been further substantiated by several incidences of vandalism of religious places since December 2009. The occurrence of a series of attacks on religious places has been seen as a retaliation to Malaysia’s High Court verdict allowing The Herald, the Roman Catholic Church’s main publication in Malaysia, to use the word “Allah” in
KAMARULNIZAM BIN ABDULLAH

reference to the Christian God (The Star Online, 9 January, 2010). The verdict has divided the Muslim population. Some agreed with the government’s insistence that “Allah” is an Islamic word that should be used exclusively by Muslims, and that its use by other religions would be misleading. However, more liberal Malaysian Muslim scholars argue that non-Muslims should be free to use the word. For years attempts by Malaysian Christians to use “Allah” in Malay-language literature have been perceived by some Muslims as a plot to convert Malay Muslims to Christianity.

A new dimension has also been added into the fabric of inter-racial relations in the country. Malaysia not only faces inter-racial challenges but also intra-racial “class cleavage arising from economic imbalance or perceived lack of job opportunity among middle and lower strata” (Selvadurai, 2009). Continued economic growth in the last decade not only produced economic opportunities for all three major races but has also widened the gap between the rich and the poor. This situation is more acute in the Indian society, which has been neglected for decades. The economic slowdown in recent years could create dissatisfaction resulting in agitation and resistance tendencies (ibid.). It could also create a dysfunctional society, unable to withstand the pressure of domestic, regional and international competition. Of particular concern is the tendency for interested racially and non-racially based political parties to continuously politicize race, religion, the media and education in order to take or remain in power (Dhillon, 2010).

Challenges to the interrelations of the Malay community center on the issue of class relations and, more importantly, religious politicization. For Ruhanas Harun (2010) and Wan Shawaluddin Hassan (2009), the threat from Muslim fundamentalism could destabilize society. The question of the rightful interpretation of Islamic teachings has not only affected the political equilibrium between UMNO and Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), which champions the implementation of syariah (Islamic) law in Malaysia, but it has also created deep division within the Malay society. According to Jaffary Awang (2009), from the Department of Da’awah, Faculty of Islamic Studies at the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, religious misinterpretation by some Salafi (fundamental) movements such as al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has given Islam a bad reputation. They use terrorist acts and violence to achieve their political objectives and do not reflect the true teaching of Islam.

The survey has shown that “new” security issues have also increasingly become of concern to the population and to policy makers. It must be emphasized here that the majority of respondents did not single out globalization itself as a security threat, but that it is the secondary impacts of globalization process that are of concern. Most of the respondents also agreed that security challenges have gone beyond the state’s boundary, and that these challenges affect human as well as state security. Based on the follow-up interviews, it can be concluded that threats such as the outbreak of contagious disease, environmental degradation and illegal immigrants, are likely to have a direct impact on societal well-being because of the increasing feeling of insecurity among the Malaysian population as a result of perceived inability of the state to deal with the threats effectively (Harun 2010; Cheng-Chwee, 2010; Dhillon 2010).
The influx of migrants, particularly illegal entries, has become one of Malaysia’s major contemporary security concerns (Harun, 2009; Ahmad, 2009; Hassan, 2009). It has been estimated that the number of illegal migrants in Malaysia is between 450,000 and 600,000, but no one, including government security agencies, has exact figures (Ching, 2010). Some reports have estimated that Malaysia is a home to 750,000 illegal foreign workers (Malaysiakini, 20 March 20, 2010). The illegal migrants are of concern because their presence has created social problems in local communities. From the perspective of locals, illegal immigrants, particularly Indonesians, have hijacked their job opportunities by offering cheap labor. This is a major security concern in the Borneo state of Sabah, since it has not only to deal with thousands of undocumented migrants but is also the host of some 84,000 refugees from the Mindanao conflict (*The Star*, 27 July, 2010). Some of these refugees and illegal immigrants have managed to obtain formal documents such as identity cards that provide access to benefits like education, jobs and health. Illegal immigrant issues in Sabah have also put the State and Federal Governments at odds over who has the responsibility and power to control it.

In 2009 it was reported that 60% of women inmates in Kajang Prison, the biggest in the country, were illegal immigrants who soon would be deported (AFP Wire Report, 28 September, 2009). Furthermore, according to Malaysia’s Prisons Department Director-General Datuk Zulkifli Omar, nearly one-third of prisoners nationwide are foreigners, a leading factor behind congestion in jails (Utusan Malaysia, 19 January, 2010). Indonesian inmates made up the highest proportion, at 5,000. Of this, more than 50% committed offences under the Immigration Act, which includes entering the country illegally. Out of the total of 32,130 inmates held at 31 prisons nationwide, 10,833 are foreigners. Malaysia’s prisons have the capacity to accommodate 36,740 (ibid.).

Nonetheless, one may argue that putting illegal immigrants, particularly by focusing on the Indonesians, as part of Malaysia’s security threat is itself a contradiction. According to Liow (2004, p. 25), the issue raises “potential for contradiction between the various dimensions of security associated with illegal Indonesian migrant labor, where, for example, the latter might threaten the societal security of Malaysian people whilst at the same time contribute to the economic security of the Malaysian economy”.

It has been accepted that migrant workers particularly from Indonesia have contributed immensely to Malaysia’s economic development. In the early 1980s, Indonesian migrants “were then perceived as bangsa serumpun who would eventually assimilate with the local bumiputra. Thus, in the long-run the Indonesian immigrants were regarded to have strengthened the Malays’ electoral power vis-à-vis the non-Malays because it was assumed that they will be assimilated with the local Malays” (Abdullah, 1992, pp. 45-46).

Abdullah’s argument, however, refers to the “first wave” of Indonesian migrant workers from the early 1970s through to the late 1980s. It is the “second wave” of Indonesian economic migrants, as a result of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, that is of current concern. These immigrants have made great sacrifices in order to look for a better life in Malaysia. But these groups of migrants have also created
socio-economic problems in their new host country. They often live in squatter areas, illegally clearing government lands to start up Indonesian colonies. At the same time, they are subject to exploitation by unscrupulous Malaysian employers in need of cheap labor.

The sense of insecurity among Malaysians has been further fueled by the influx of illegal immigrants from areas such as India, Bangladesh and China (Ajis; Keling; Shuib; Mokhtar, 2009). Possible links between migrants and terrorists are of concern not only to the authorities but also to the public. They also have been blamed for the rise of serious crimes like armed robbery and rape, although a recent study shows that illegal migrant workers contributed to between only 2-3% of total serious crimes in Malaysia (Hashim, 2003).

Another noted emerging issue is threats from contagious diseases (Chwee, 2010; Balakrishnan, 2009; Hamin, 2009). Recent outbreaks of global contagious disease such as H1N1 influenza have put the international community on alert. The outbreak of H1N1 has so far infected 14,067 people in Malaysia, and killed 82 (The Star Online, 7 May, 2010).

Another major concern is environmental security. Issues of environmental degradation have recently been given serious thought by Malaysian political leaders. According to Sharifah Munirah Alatas (2009), climate change will mean that Malaysia will not be spared from drought, changes in sea levels, or a shortage of natural resources. Seasonal El Nino cycles, for instance, have created prolonged drought and haze problems for Malaysia. The problems in turn produced multiple effects on the Malaysian socio-economy such as the sudden rise of medical bills due to increasing numbers of asthmatic patients and loss of revenue due to the lower numbers of tourists.

Recognizing that environmental problems could affect its future survival, Malaysia has become one of the active players in mapping out a plan to reduce carbon emissions. During a speech at the 2010 Abu Dhabi’s World Future Energy Summit, the Malaysian Prime Minister said that Kuala Lumpur plans “to reduce its dependence on fossil fuel, by such methods as increasing usage of energy from renewable resources to 2,000 MW by 2020 from 50 MW now” (The New Straits Times, 19 January, 2010). The plan is part of Malaysia’s action in the global effort to cut carbon emissions and improve global energy security. In fact, Malaysia has been proactive in preserving the environment by introducing several incentives to promote renewable energy, including the Small Renewable Energy Program which provided for a higher purchasing price for electricity generated through renewable energy resources by the grid operator. Malaysia also launched the National Biotechnology Policy and the National Biofuel Policy in 2005. These policies seek to leverage on the natural strengths of Malaysia where at least 50% of land area remains forested.

Transnational organized crime such as drug and small arms smuggling, and human trafficking has become a major security concern in Malaysia (Ahmad, 2010). Furthermore, Malaysia has been identified as one of the major transit points of human trafficking in the Southeast Asian region. Human trafficking, which includes human smuggling for forced labor and military services as well as trafficking of women and
children for trade, exploitation, and prostitution, has become a major issue. In early June 2009, a report by the United States government downgraded Malaysia’s status from “watch list” (Tier-2) to “blacklist” (Tier-3) for its failure not only to comply with minimum standards to eliminate trafficking but also its inability to make significant efforts to do so. The Tier-3 status also meant that Malaysia has failed to control human trafficking cases and to formulate and implement concrete laws to overcome the issue. The report caught the attention of local leaders, the populace and the media.

Media reports on the arrest of foreigners, who paid thousands of Malaysian ringgit to be smuggled by boats to Indonesia en route to Australia or elsewhere, fueled heated debates on the state’s border patrol capability. Furthermore, there were also reports on the arrest of foreign prostitutes, mostly Indonesian, Thai and Chinese, who were lured into the business by local and international syndicates. There have been an increasing number of cases whereby foreign nationals were smuggled into Malaysia to work in prostitution. The numbers are alarming; the total number of Indonesian and Chinese nationals who were caught since 2001, for instance, reached 14,163 and 17,815 respectively (see Table 2). Only 188 people were charged for alleged involvement in human trafficking activities under Malaysia’s Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act 2007 (MalaysiaKini, 30 January, 2010).

<table>
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<td>204</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6478</td>
<td>5956</td>
<td>7636</td>
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</table>

Table 2: Number of human trafficking victims working in prostitution in Malaysia 2001-2008 (Royal Police of Malaysia, Bukit Aman, 2009)

As expected, the US report received protest and denials from the Malaysian government and security forces. Kuala Lumpur vehemently denied the findings, arguing that Malaysia has introduced several measures including a tough Anti-Human Smuggling Act of 2008 to curb the problem. Nonetheless, several Malaysian NGOs agreed with the report and called on Kuala Lumpur to implement more serious efforts to deal with it (The New Straits Times Online, 22 June, 2010). The question,
however, remains as to why Malaysia has become an increasingly popular transit point for human trafficking in the region?

From the above discussion it is apparent that structural or domestic determinants are not only the major sources of potential insecurity in contemporary Malaysia. As part of the international community, Malaysia is also affected by the changing nature of security threats. There are new issues such as environmental degradation, the inflow of illegal immigrants, and transnational threats that are beginning to be accepted as potential threats to the country’s security. What is more interesting is that the acceptance of these new threats is no longer controlled or defined by state regime, but has evolved within society. There are several explanations for these changes. It can be argued that the expansion and the increasing role of civil society have contributed. Rapid economic development since the late 1980s, associated with increasing tertiary education for Malaysians, has generally expanded the politically and socially sensitive middle income cluster in society. This more educated cluster has become part of a new social force that critically examines the government’s policies and actions. They also form part of non-governmental organizations that demand greater transparency, accountability and political democratization – a call that the government cannot afford to ignore. As a result, this middle class cluster is also part of the securitizing process in the country.

The advent of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and the use of multiple channels of societal communication via printed and electronic media, the Internet, and public forums is another explanation for the changing perception and understanding of threats in Malaysia. Media and Internet communication (either through independent electronic newspapers or blogs) not only disseminate fast-moving information but also become an avenue for society to express its security concerns, ranging from the public’s concern over the rise of criminal activities associated with migrant workers, to the over-development of hilly areas that could trigger environmental disaster.

Hence, it can be argued that a securitizing process is taking place in Malaysia. This explains why new security issues such as transnational organized crime, human trafficking and smuggling, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration are of increasing security concern. Both the society and the state have perceived these as emerging threats to Malaysian security.

**Conclusion**

For the last 20 years, international systems have undergone several phases of structural change. These structural changes have inevitably transformed international security threats and perceptions. The process of globalization in the post-Cold War period, for instance, added a new dimension of security. Economic liberalization and political democratizations have produced new security challenges to individual states in terms of how well they could adapt to the new forces. The 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington further challenged the neo-realist security perspective by making it clear that threats could come from non-state actors, and could even
destabilize international politics. At the same time, non-traditional security issues such as migration, environmental degradation, refugees, health, and human trafficking are taking increasing importance on global security agendas.

The article concludes with some important observations. Firstly, despite the current challenges of globalization and the changing nature of international systems, internally driven factors continued to be perceived as major challenges to Malaysia’s security. Secondly, there are added dimensions to these internally driven factors that go beyond the prevalent understanding of the Malaysian security complex. The ethnic cohesion problem, for instance, has also to be understood in the context of political governance and transparency. Furthermore, globalization has given added dimension to Malaysia’s internal as well as external sources of insecurity. Finally, like other countries, Malaysia shares some global issues such as climatic change, economic security, and transnational crime as emerging non-traditional security threats. These non-traditional security issues have increasingly been accepted as emerging threats among Malaysian academia, security experts and practitioners.
2009 was a significant year for Singapore. For most security analysts the highlight of the year was the re-arrest in May of Singapore’s most wanted terrorist, Mas Selamat Kastari, the operational leader of the local cell of the Al Qaeda-affiliated but Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network. Mas Selamat, or “MSK” as he is known, had created a furor in February 2008, escaping from detention and sparking a massive nationwide manhunt. Eventually, based on information supplied by the Singapore and Indonesian authorities, the Malaysian Special Branch re-arrested MSK in Johore, in southern Malaysia – just across the Causeway from Singapore (The Straits Times, 8 May, 2009). While violent religious extremism as exemplified by the MSK affair appeared to dominate the headlines, a more careful appraisal of the security landscape in Singapore suggests that this was in fact not a stand-alone phenomenon but rather merely one “species” of a much broader trend – religious fundamentalism – that appeared to afflict the city-state that year. In this respect, the MSK recapture aside, the nation was also captivated by the so-called AWARE saga that took place between March and May 2009. AWARE, which stands for Association of Women for Action and Research, is a secular, civil society grouping that has sought to promote women’s rights down the years. In March 2009, a group of Christian women from a church captured control of AWARE because they had been offended at what they felt was AWARE’s pro-homosexual agenda (The Economist, 7 May, 2009). Partly because of unusually sensationalistic reporting by the normally careful pro-government mass media, the issue very quickly became framed as a clash between a rapacious, thrusting, Christian minority and an Alternative Lifestyle lobby fighting a rearguard action to preserve its rights. In a, by Singaporean standards, raucous Extraordinary General Meeting in early May, the Christian women were ousted and a more secular management team voted in to take charge of AWARE affairs (The Straits Times, 15 May, 2009).

The Singapore State was extremely concerned at these various developments. To be sure, it paid as much attention to the MSK affair as to these other manifestations of a broader trend of religious fundamentalism. As this paper shall show, the State regards religious fundamentalism as a serious existential threat to the social fabric of Singapore.

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1 The views expressed in this paper are personal to the writer and do not reflect any institutional position. This is a shortened and revised version of the author’s earlier working paper “‘Muscular’ versus ‘Liberal’ Secularism and the Religious Fundamentalist Challenge in Singapore”, Working Paper 202 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 10 June, 2010).
the nation, and regards it as a national security issue of the utmost importance. This paper, following an introductory section sketching the geopolitical, multi-religious, multi-cultural context of Singapore, will then engage in a brief conceptual discussion to examine why religious fundamentalism deserves to be framed as a national security issue. It will then show that the divisive forces of religious fundamentalism have been a recurring feature of Singapore’s post-war history. The paper will then address two contending perspectives in coping with religious fundamentalism in Singapore, which we may term the “Muscular Secularist” and “Liberal Secularist” views. The paper discusses the increasing pressure both from inside and outside Singapore on the State to soften its no-nonsense Muscular Secularist stance on coping with religious fundamentalism in Singapore and imbibe elements of the more nuanced Liberal Secularist perspective. However it assesses that Muscular Secularism is likely to remain the State’s preferred philosophy for managing religious fundamentalism for the foreseeable future.

Singapore in brief

Singapore is by no means an old established nation. It is a young and densely populated Chinese-majority island city-state in the midst of a largely Malay-Muslim archipelago, 704 square kilometres in size – which makes it similar in geographical extent to New York City. A former British colony, modern Singapore is a thriving, cosmopolitan metropolis with a population of about five million, which includes about 1.8 million non-citizens and permanent residents (Population Trends 2009, 2009). A multi-cultural, multi-lingual and multi-religious society, the city-state’s citizenry comprises principally ethnic Chinese (74%) with large ethnic Malay (13%) and Indian (9.2%) minorities. Importantly, in terms of religious affiliation, most Chinese in Singapore are Buddhists, Taoists and Christians (both Protestant and Catholic), while most Indians are Hindus, with a smaller number being Christian as well. The Malays are however overwhelmingly Muslim (Nasir et al., 2010). To be sure, Singapore has had a rather tumultuous history since the end of World War II. Geopolitically, the Cold War did not spare the city-state from its complex zero-sum power calculus: colonial and later self-governing Singapore had to endure a debilitating campaign of Communist subversion that started immediately after the end of the Second World War and ensured a long period of tension lasting from the 1950s till well into the 1970s. On top of this, the first generation of Singapore State elites had to cope with a politically painful ejection from the Federation of Malaysia in August 1965 whilst fighting a rearguard action against the ambitious Indonesian President Soekarno’s so-called policy of Confrontation – a conflict that ended only with his ouster by the more sober-minded and pragmatic General Soeharto in the mid-1960s. These historic global, regional and internal instabilities imposed considerable stress on the State elites and helped create an existential siege mentality that has lasted till this day (Tilman, 1987; Lee, 1998). Hence the State has never assumed that socio-religious harmony and political stability occur naturally. In October 2007, a comment by Senior Minister and Co-ordinating Minister for National Security Professor S Jayakumar, reflected a long-held mindset. He noted that for Singapore,
“racial and religious harmony is not just a desirable objective to achieve but is the fundamental basis for our social stability, cohesion and security” (Jayakumar, 2007).

**Framing religious fundamentalism as a national security concern**

Before proceeding further, a brief conceptual discussion framing religious fundamentalism as a national security issue is warranted. In general, all human beings seek cognitive consistency – that is, for emotional and psychological health it is very important that their deeply held beliefs enable them to embed readily into their surrounding societal milieu. However, this inside-outside integration does not always occur, creating a significant disconnect between the mental worlds of some individuals and the realities that surround them; what psychologists term “cognitive dissonance” (Selengut, 2003). As far as religious individuals are concerned, they could respond to the cognitive dissonance generated when they find themselves embedded in a societal milieu that does not accord with their innermost beliefs in one of three basic ways. First, they could decide that their beliefs are outmoded and make a conscious decision to renounce them, adopt secular attitudes and assimilate into the environment. The Dutch-Somali writer and activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali is a good example of such an assimilationist response to modernity, as her poignant memoir illustrates (Ali, 2007). Assimilation aside, a second option would be reinterpretation or adaptation, where religious individuals seek to update or modernize their beliefs so as to ensure that they remain relevant in the context of globalized modernity.

This is what animated the reform efforts of the 19th century Muslim modernist intellectuals such as Muhammad Abduh, who sought to modernize Islam so as to ensure that the Muslim community could keep pace with Western intellectual, social and political achievements (Esposito & Voll, 2001). A third option to reduce cognitive dissonance is to the polar opposite of assimilation: transformation. In this case, the religious individual may seek to actively transform the environment in order to ensure that it accords with his interpretation of what the holy texts proclaim. Religious fundamentalists, regardless of their faith background, are transformationists (Selengut, 2003). Religious fundamentalists believe they alone hold the “Truth” and that they have the religious legitimacy and duty to restructure the wider sociopolitical environment to accord with that Truth (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005).

Religious fundamentalism should be distinguished from spirituality. According to psychiatrist Robert Cloninger, who has studied both Eastern and Western religious traditions and analyzed the “lives of prophets and saints, mystics and seers, gurus and yogis”, spirituality may be regarded as concerned with “self-transcendence” (Hamer, 2004, pp. 21-35). In particular, the latter quality may be seen as comprising three inter-related elements: “self-forgetfulness, transpersonal identification and mysticism” (ibid., p. 23). Religious fundamentalism correctly understood is of a different category altogether. It may be regarded as a particularly strict form of “piety or deep personal religiosity”, where overriding emphasis is put on uncompromising adherence to literal readings of holy texts, and hence utter purity in doctrine and
praxis. Often the by-product of such a standpoint is an obsession with the avoidance of “contamination” through close contact with those outside the imagined moral circle. Thus: “the consequence of piety is to sharpen the sense of separate religious identities and to reinforce social boundaries” between “insiders and outsiders” (Nasir et al., 2010, p. 11). Moreover, as ultimate moral security is to be found in a transformationist strategy that restructures the surrounding environment so that it accords with one’s beliefs, religious fundamentalism at its core, as critical theorist Stuart Sim rightly posits, has more to do with power rather than spirituality per se. Religious fundamentalists, regardless of the specific content of their beliefs, ultimately seek “control, control, control” (Sim, 2004, p. 100). Hence religious fundamentalism ultimately seeks the power to dominate and transform the environment so as to impose one’s epistemological system to the exclusion of other contending perspectives.

Religious fundamentalists may seek such sociopolitical domination and transformation through several modalities. To take a Southeast Asian Muslim example, religious fundamentalism could take the form of aggressive civil society activity to influence the State and society – as is the case with the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) in Indonesia (Wahid, 2007). Religious fundamentalists may also seek actual State capture through constitutional means such as elections, as is the case with the Islamic Party of Malaysia (Noor, 2003) and the well-known if controversial Prosperity and Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia (Bubalo & Fealy, 2005). Other religious fundamentalists may turn to illegal, violent means to restructure society in accordance with their version of the Truth; in this connection, the religiously-motivated political violence and terrorism of Al Qaeda and in Southeast Asia, JI, is a good example. Religious fundamentalism – with its intrinsic us-versus-them, black-and-white, good-versus-evil “binary worldview”, can therefore, given the right mix of circumstances and accelerants, generate a pathway leading toward violent religious extremism and terrorism (Ramakrishna, 2009b). It is in this sense that religious fundamentalism deserves to be considered as a national security concern par excellence.

**Religious fundamentalism in Singapore’s history: A recurring concern**

In his National Day Rally Speech in August 2009, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong pointed out three risks facing Singapore’s social fabric:

Aggressive preaching, proselytisation. You push your own religion on others; you cause nuisance and offence [...]. Intolerance is another problem, not respecting the beliefs of others or not accommodating others who belong to different religions [...]. Exclusiveness is a third problem, segregating into separate exclusive circles, not integrating with other faiths. That means you mix with your own people. You’ll end up as separate communities (*The Straits Times*, 18 August, 2009).

In other words, rather than just singling out the continuing threat of religiously-motivated terrorism per se, Lee expressed a wider worry about the threat of
religious fundamentalism more generally to Singapore’s social fabric. Religious fundamentalism has left an indelible mark on the political history of Singapore. For instance, during the colonial era, the so-called Maria Hertogh Riots in December 1950 erupted over a court decision to award custody of a Dutch girl who had converted to Islam during World War II, to her biological Christian parents who had returned to seek her whereabouts. Thanks to toxic reporting by the mass media that portrayed the affair in terms of a zero-sum contest between Christianity and Islam, Muslim resentment was stoked to the point at which violence broke out that killed 18 people, injured 173 others and resulted in extensive property damage. The Hertogh riots had a lasting effect in shaping Singapore leaders’ views on religious fault-lines in Singapore society (The Straits Times, 10 July, 2009).

By the 1980s, moreover, religious fundamentalism seemed to have gathered strength: university undergraduates were harassed by extremely zealous Christian students, while in hospitals, some doctors and medical students sought to convert critically ill patients to Christianity. In addition, in August 1986, worshippers in a Hindu temple found posters announcing a Christian seminar pasted at the entrance of their temple. Hindus were also outraged when Christian missionaries appeared to distribute pamphlets to people going into temples. Yet it was not just pugnacious Christian fundamentalists that were causing much angst. Well before the emergence of JI in 2001, one lecturer from Indonesia in 1973 had branded Singaporean Muslims as “stooges” for not standing up for Islam (The Straits Times, 25 July, 2009). Soon after the September 11 2001 Al Qaeda strikes in New York and Washington, Singaporeans were stunned to learn of the JI plot to attack Western diplomatic and commercial interests in the city-state (JI White Paper, 2003). While in early 2002, the Muslim fundamentalist activist Zulfikar Mohamad Shariff posted inflammatory material on his website (fateha.com) accusing the State of oppressing Singaporean Muslims and preventing them from freely practicing their religion. For instance, he pilloried the State for imposing restrictions on the wearing of the headscarf (tudung) by Muslim girls in government schools, and criticized Muslim members of parliament for not doing enough to defend and advance Malay Muslim rights in Singapore. These previous episodes – over and above the incidents that occurred in 2009, exemplify the very real tensions between the State’s ongoing quest to forge an overarching Singaporean identity and the divergent pulls of Singaporeans’ globalized, transnational religious allegiances (Mutalib, 2005). As far as the State is concerned, it has never assumed that religious pluralism and religious harmony are two sides of the same coin (Sinha, 2005). Rather, the potential for conflict generated by the collision of competing and in particular, absolutist versions of the various religions is always regarded as a possibility that requires guarding against. This concern has shaped the Singapore State’s response to religious fundamentalism – a policy posture that we may characterize as Muscular Secularism.2

2 I am indebted to Professor Sumit Ganguly of the University of Indiana at Bloomington for coining this phrase during a talk at a workshop on ethnic and religious conflict at Arizona State University in October 2004. Professor Ganguly was not making reference to Singapore, however.
State response to religious fundamentalism: Muscular secularism

In August 2009, Deputy Prime Minister Wong Kan Seng found it necessary to reiterate the State’s no-nonsense position on religion in Singapore:

As we seek out religion, we must not do so in a way that leads to closed minds and exclusive groups. Singapore is a dense urban city with people of different races and religions living in close proximity. Our diversity can be both a source of our strength as well as our Achilles heel. The practice of religion should not lead to exclusivity where we only interact with people of the same faith or worse, criticise and exclude people of other faiths (Wong, 2009).

Wong was intimating that the State in Singapore was “secular” in the sense that it does not profess a state religion nor does it promote any particular faith at the expense of others. It acts as a neutral umpire between the contending interests of the various faiths. Wong added that religious groups should stay out of the political arena and not “campaign to change certain government policies, or use the pulpit to mobilise their followers to pressure the Government, or push aggressively to gain ground at the expense of other groups”. He asserted that “keeping religion and politics separate is a key rule of political engagement”. Driving home the point, he made it clear that Singapore’s “political arena must always be a secular one”, because its “laws and policies do not derive from religious authority, but reflect the judgments and decisions of the secular Government and Parliament to serve the national interest and collective good” (ibid).

Wong’s rhetoric has been buttressed down the years by several potent legislative and administrative instruments that have given substance to its policy of Muscular Secularism. For example, the Internal Security Act empowers the State to engage in preventive detention of individuals suspected of being involved in terrorist or other activity deemed prejudicial to public order and national security (http://presspedia.journalism.sg/ doku.php?id=internal_security_act, 2007), while the Sedition Act empowers the State to prosecute individuals that post offensive comments against other religions on websites or pass out offensive material. For instance, in October 2005, the latter Act was invoked against three ethnic Chinese who had posted disparaging and incendiary comments about ethnic Malay Muslims and Islam online (Wong, 2005). In addition, the Undesirable Publications Act enables authorities to ban “objectionable” publications that are regarded as threatening religious harmony and/or public morality. Last but by no means least, a most significant piece of legislation that truly exemplifies the policy of Muscular Secularism is the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, passed in November 1990, and which empowers the State to prosecute “any religious leader, official or member of any religious group or institution, who causes ill-will between different religious groups or promotes a political cause or carries out subversive activities under the guise of propagating or practicing any religious belief” (Sinha, 2005).
In addition, since the foiling of the JI Singapore plot in December 2001, the State has promulgated a whole slew of measures aimed at fostering inter-religious amity and unity. These have included Inter-Racial Confidence Circles (later rechristened Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles or IRCCs) that were set up in each of Singapore’s 84 constituencies in January 2002 and that represent grassroots social networks seeking to promote inter-religious activities. In addition, so-called Harmony Circles were organized to promote “inter-racial confidence building” in schools, workplaces and neighborhoods (Sinha, 2005). A major initiative, the Community Engagement Program (CEP) was inaugurated by current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong in February 2006. The CEP is designed to promote a bottom-up approach to “outreach and community bonding” amongst religious and ethnic groups in addition to other functional sectors of society (http://www.sgemployers.com/public/industry/cep.jsp, 2004).

Yet another Muscular Secularist policy initiative of no small significance has been the Singapore Muslim Identity Project. With a view to “cognitively immunizing” the Malay-Muslim community against the violent extremism of Al Qaeda and JI, the project seeks to promote a “contextualized” Singaporean identity for Singapore Muslims. Developed by the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), a government statutory board charged with administering the religious affairs of Singapore’s Muslims, the project has identified ten “Desired Attributes of a Singapore Muslim Community of Excellence”. These attributes, in a nutshell, call for local Muslims to develop the capacity to mesh their religious faith with the demands of living in a globalized, multi-religious city-state like Singapore. The project, in other words, represents an attempt at adapting the faith to keep up with modernity and eschew narrow-minded us-them fundamentalist worldviews (http://www.cscollege.gov.sg/cgl/pdf/SMI.pdf, n.d.). What ties these various initiatives together is the state-driven logic of Muscular Secularism. Senior Minister Goh sums up very nicely the assumptions inherent in this standpoint, and the plethora of aforementioned policies animated by it, in the following telling comment made in February 2002:

Some Singaporeans have argued that racial and religious harmony cannot be forced, and hence, these artificial mechanisms will not work. But some things need prodding. In the absence of external stimulus, the natural tendency is to congregate among our own kind. Over the years our race and religious relations have been smooth, Singaporeans have drifted toward this more natural pattern of human behavior. It is time to give Singaporeans a jolt, to remind them they are living in a multi-racial, multi-religious society (Sinha, 2005).

Enter “liberal” secularism?

Senior Minister Goh’s terse assertion that Singaporeans need to be “prodded” and subjected to the occasional “jolt” to do the right thing for the greater good, suggests that politics in the country retain the somewhat unique characteristics, as founding father Lee Kuan Yew famously put it in 1966, of a “tightly organized society” (Lee, 1966). This is a fact not lost on scholars of comparative politics for whom Singapore
has long been regarded as an anomaly and a subject of intense academic interest (Means, 1996; Case, 1996; Chua, 1997; Brown, 1996; Mutilib, 2000; George, 2009). Despite being a wealthy country (between independence in 1965 and 1995 for example the economy grew three times as fast as the US while gross national income shot up from US$1 billion to US$86 billion) and an extremely well-travelled, highly educated population, Singapore has long defied optimistic post-Cold War prognoses that liberal democracy represents the best political system for meeting humanity’s deepest aspirations and that ultimately all political systems will evolve toward this end-state (Fukuyama, 1992; Kampfer, 2009). The Singapore State can certainly be considered as a democracy in the procedural sense that it subjects itself to regular free and fair elections, as even the US State Department has acknowledged (George, 2000). Nevertheless, as we have noted in our discussion of the State’s Muscular Secularism posture, while basic freedoms are guaranteed by the Constitution, these are heavily qualified by restrictive legislation circumscribing freedom of expression and association as provided for under such laws as the Sedition and Internal Security Acts. Moreover, while the local print and broadcast media are expected to “have an instinctive grasp of Singapore’s national interests and how to protect them” (George, 2000), the 1986 Newspapers and Printing Presses Act empowers the State to slap costly defamation suits in response to perceived scurrilous reporting by the foreign media, as the editors of notable international periodicals and newspapers such as the Economist, International Herald Tribune and the Wall Street Journal have discovered to their chagrin down the years (The Guardian, 30 Nov, 2009).

The State’s philosophy of Muscular Secularism has had its critics. There are two main counter-arguments. The first posits that the State in Singapore needs to cede more political space so as to engender the spontaneously active citizenry and civil society characteristic of mature polities. The other argues that faith groups should have greater liberty, within the secular constitutional framework, for untrammeled religious expression without the State setting limits on what those modes of expression should be. Taken together these two strands of arguments may be regarded as constituting a “Liberal Secularist” perspective on the issue of coping with religious fundamentalism in Singapore.

In the first instance, Liberal Secularist advocates insist that the 21st century Singapore citizenry, despite their diverse faith and ethnic backgrounds, are well able to display the necessary political and emotional maturity to exercise rational judgment in matters of religion. The State, they argue, should therefore trust Singaporeans to do the right thing and do away with its paternalistic attitude toward governance. It is asserted that the prevailing State philosophy of “guidance without trust” in the “self-steering mechanisms of civil society” may not be politically healthy over the longer term (Nasir et al., 2010, p. 34). Such views have been articulated by the well-known Singaporean writer Catherine Lim in her astute political commentaries, especially her controversial “The PAP and the People – A Great Affective Divide”, published in 1994 (Lim, 1994).

The corollary Liberal Secularist notion that the citizenry is well able to fend off religious fundamentalists of all stripes on their own, without State prodding or jolting, appeared to be buttressed by a much-quoted 2007 report, The Ties that
Bind and Blind. Based on a survey of 1824 Singaporeans of all faith and ethnic backgrounds, it found that race and religion played virtually no role on Singaporeans’ preferences concerning their “next-door neighbor, co-worker, Member of parliament or policeman” (Chin & Vasu, 2007). In this regard, the resolution of the AWARE saga in May 2009 with the entirely constitutional (if boisterous) removal of the religious hardliners from the leadership, arguably vindicated the Liberal Secularists by demonstrating the innate capacity of Singaporean civil society – in this specific instance the Alternative Lifestyle lobby, many of whom are well-represented in the well-educated professional classes – to counter and neutralize the machinations of religious fundamentalists without any assistance from the State. The episode, one blogger suggested, debunked the State’s long-held premise that “politics, if left unattended by the heavy hand of autocracy, degenerates into anarchy”, proving instead that by and large “Singaporeans are an educated lot, and they know that civility and passion can mix, often to good effect” (http://www.sgpolitics.net/?p=2917). Interestingly, in like vein, Shiv Malik argues that the British State should not ban radical Islamist organizations but rather, in Liberal Secularist fashion, permit their virulent ideologies to be intellectually demolished in open debate in the marketplace of ideas (Malik, 2010).

While some Liberal Secularists argue for more political space, others press for greater religious space, expressing discontent at the way the State has appeared to have exceeded its remit by defining the acceptable limits and modes of religious expression. In this regard the lingering perception, since the public discussions leading to the passage of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act in 1989, of Christianity in Singapore being characterized by “aggressive proselytizing”, has remained a source of irritation in some Christian quarters (Sinha, 2005). The AWARE episode as well as the case of the Christian couple prosecuted under the Sedition Act in mid-2009 (see above) only stoked concerns in these circles that the community would face even greater State scrutiny in future, with further restrictions placed on proselytization efforts – a core facet of evangelical Christianity. In August 2009, for example, Protestant Christian Singaporeans faced a barrage of online complaints by Buddhists and Catholics about perceived overzealous proselytization efforts by Protestant doctors, nurses and teachers. One respondent replied to the criticism by reminding all concerned that “While we must be mindful of causing undue offence, each individual has a constitutional right to freedom of religion, and to profess, practice and propagate his belief within reasonable limits” (Yeo, 2009). Another cautioned that “banning” proselytization “or evangelism” would be “detrimental to racial and religious harmony” (Chan, 2009).

While some Christians chafe about the limits on untrammeled proselytization, it is the Malay-Muslim community that arguably continues to best exemplify the clamor for greater religious space. While Islam has been an integral aspect of being ethnically Malay for centuries, the global wave of Islamic revivalism of the 1980s led to a strong “reaffirmation of Islamic ethos among the republic’s Muslim community”, thereby sharpening its “particularistic desires and aspirations as Malays and as Muslims” (Mutalib, 2005). This greatly heightened sense of “piety or deep personal religiosity” has generated friction between the community and the State since the
late 1990s, most evidently in the sensitive realm of Islamic education. Specifically, the State’s desire to rationalize Islamic school (madrasah) education so as to ensure that there would be no future over-supply of Islamic teachers and conversely a dearth of Malay-Muslim graduates “economically prepared for work and to ‘experience’ multiracial integration” provoked a sharp negative reaction from widespread sections of the community (Nasir et al., 2010, p. 73; BBC News, 28 April, 1998).

Some observers added that if the State wants to limit so-called “mono-racial” schools like the madrasahs in the name of multi-racialism, then why are Special Assistance Plan (SAP) schools, which are “almost exclusively all-Chinese in composition” and whose publicly declared aim is to train “bicultural” students proficient in English and Mandarin, supported? (Nasir et al., 2010, pp. 72, 83). In addition, the ban of the wearing of headscarves, or tudung, by Muslim schoolgirls attending national schools led to more grumbling that the State was being overly “severe and rigid” (read Muscular Secularist) in its policies; and again, as in the case of the madrasahs and the SAP schools, not entirely consistent: Sikh students in Singapore schools are permitted to wear turbans as mandated by their religion (Nasir et al., 2010). The following exasperated comment of a 40 year old male Malay-Muslim accountant nicely captures the essence of that strand of the Liberal Secularist perspective that calls for the State to cede greater religious space to society:

But this [concern about the tudung] is a silly notion; I honestly don’t think a Singaporean worries about this, other than the government. The Chinese don’t bother about this, the Christians are also not going to bother […] why does the State think that allowing the tudung will lead to a slippery slope where everybody will make their own demands? There should be a live and let live mentality, not a one size fits all! (Nasir et al., 2010, p. 78).

Muscular secularism sustained?

Lest the wrong impression is created, it should be emphasized that the State is most keen to keep Singaporeans on-side politically, for solidly pragmatic reasons. The first is that a combination of low birth rates and significant numbers of Western-educated young Singaporeans opting to stay away has meant that immigration of educated professionals from China, India and elsewhere has been needed to maintain a critical and economically viable population mass. This however has led to other sorts of problems and eventually resulted in the creation in April 2009 of a National Integration Council to promote better interaction between indigenous local-born Singaporeans and the new arrivals (http://www.mcys.gov.sg/MCDSFiles/Press/Articles/15-2009.pdg, 2009).

Second, and more fundamentally, it is increasingly recognized that loosening up and empowering various combinations of governmental, civil and business networks to flexibly and nimbly adapt to and exploit the complex, non-linear peculiarities of a world characterized by accelerating technological change, may increasingly represent a sine qua non for longer term national productivity, competitiveness and ultimately national security (Ramo, 2009).
Juan Jose Daboub of the World Bank articulated a similar concern in May 2008:

One such challenge is the tricky task of balancing a desire for social order and stability – for many years a defining quality of Singapore’s growth – with a need to allow more innovation and creativity to produce high-value goods and services in a more competitive global economy (Kampfner, 2009, p. 37).

Daboub added that “innovation and creativity” are not commodities that can be regulated. Hence the State in Singapore simply has to strike “the right balance” between order and creative chaos and will not be able to avoid “skilled stewardship and probably some risk-taking” (ibid., p. 37).

Should the Singapore State, in the spirit of Daboub’s advice, take the risk of loosening its hitherto unwavering adherence to its Muscular Secularist philosophy and rely on Liberal Secularist notions of the “market forces” of ideas to diminish the appeal of religious fundamentalism and its more insidious extremist variants? To be frank, the Singapore State would be remiss to ignore how pronounced religious piety could, given the right stimuli, progress toward religious fundamentalism and even ultimately violent extremism. The intrinsic potential of religious belief systems to be manipulated so as to spark calamitous violence, is a major reason why the respected if controversial British evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins and the American philosopher Sam Harris argue so strongly for the adoption of atheistic over religious outlooks (Dawkins, 2006; Harris, 2005).

To recapitulate, while the genuinely spiritually self-transcendent believer, whatever his religion, would be well able to practise his faith within the extant secular political system, other believers whose focus is more on ritual piety, while still feeling able to accept an overall secular framework, would be more likely to engage in various social distancing practices to preserve ritual purity in diet, behaviour and dress (Nasir et al., 2010). For a smaller minority of these deeply pious believers moreover, the focus may imperceptibly shift toward preserving the social boundaries between insiders and outsiders as the overriding requirement for preserving ritual piety and moral purity. From that point onwards, the transition to full-blown religious fundamentalism with its incipient rejection of the secular framework is well within the realms of possibility; the emphasis now being on promoting societal transformation as the best means of securing the sanctity of the imagined moral community. For instance, the aforementioned Zulfikar Mohamad Shariff, who gained notoriety in 2002 for his strong criticisms of the State’s Muscular Secularist approach to the tudung issue, had wanted the State to also cease dealings with the United States and American multinational companies so as not to offend local Malay-Muslim sensitivities (Ibrahim, 2002).

Finally, it is often from the ranks of the religious fundamentalists, with their deeply held binary us-them outlooks, that the violent extremists arise. It is thus no surprise that some of the Singapore JI detainees, in discussing the myriad factors that had driven them down the path of violence, mentioned that, as with fundamentalist Singapore Muslims like Zulfikar Shariff, they had been incensed by perceived State encroachments on Malay-Muslim religious space such as the no-tudung rule in national schools and the compulsory education policy that rationalized madrasah
education. However, unlike other Muslim fundamentalists, they had embraced violent jihad ideology as a solution (Ramakrishna, 2009a; Ramakrishna, 2009b; Ramakrishna, 2005).

The fact of the matter more generally is that the potential for religiously-motivated unrest and conflict, no matter how remote, cannot be ruled out entirely in modern Singapore. This is because Singaporeans remain, despite their international exposure and worldliness, a generally religious lot. Secularization and atheism do not appear to have taken root. While a big part of the reason for this is that “religious beliefs have a genetic component” (Wolpert, 2006, p. 138) and “spirituality is one of our basic human inheritances”, culture also plays a big role (Hamer, 2004, pp. 6-8). The respected World Values Survey in 2002 for instance showed that over 70% of Singaporean respondents considered religion “important” or “very important” in their lives; generally fulfilled religious obligations and “were more likely to place religious activities above other social activities” (Pereira, 2005, pp. 161-77).

Hence, to reiterate a national security concern well recognized by the State, tackling religious fundamentalism within Singapore is by no means an academic matter. Thus it is little surprise that the State has opted for caution: in July 2009, Senior Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security Professor S Jayakumar sent a strong signal that the State’s Muscular Secularist posture was being sustained, in remarks worth quoting at length:

I worry that an entire new generation which has never experienced communal conflict may believe that we have nothing to worry about, that our present religious harmony is a natural state of affairs and will never be under threat. I worry that people don’t realise how fragile racial and religious harmony is. It is foolhardy to take these things for granted and become complacent. The greatest danger to racial and religious harmony is complacency, to believe that all will be fine always; that we have arrived. The reality is that maintaining religious harmony will always be a work in progress. It requires active monitoring and intervention when necessary. I worry that some of our people are taking racial and religious harmony for granted (The Straits Times, 25 July, 2009).

In his excellent book on the Bosnian war, The Warrior’s Honor, Michael Ignatieff argues that the effective citizenship required for successful and stable polities requires that individuals consciously “fly free” of the primordial “nets of nationality, religion and language” and learn to think in us-us rather than us-them terms (Ignatieff, 1997). In Singapore, the State has apparently decided that in the final analysis, despite the increasingly challenging demands of preserving domestic legitimacy with influential elements of a generally well-educated, well-travelled and demanding civil polity – while simultaneously negotiating strategies for survival in a globalized, unendingly complex, competitive economic order – there remains a basic and irreducible fundamental assumption that must never be forgotten: Singaporeans, being in the end, inescapably human, simply are not likely to achieve the ideal of flying free of the “nets of religion” on their own volition without vigilant, occasional “prodding”. The mutually reinforcing, virtuous cycle of religious harmony, political stability and economic growth remains the perceived sacrosanct formula for continued national success, and this has to be managed assiduously and not left to chance (Lam, 1999).
While finer future details of policy and strategy may evolve at the edges, ultimately, everything else must continue to be organized around the core formula.

In coping with religious fundamentalism in a post-9/11 world, and despite the protestations of liberal advocates in the media and academe, Muscular Secularism can be expected to remain the philosophy of choice for quite a while to come. This, it should be gently reiterated, may not be such a bad thing. After all, the historical, enduring prevalence of religious fundamentalism and its occasional offspring such as extremist violence and terrorism in Southeast Asia, Europe, the United States, Africa and elsewhere appears, sadly, to have vindicated Hobbesian visions of a nasty and brutish existence in the absence of a Leviathan. Rousseau’s romantic ideal of the peace-loving, amiable Noble Savage may never have existed (Pinker, 2003). Dispassionate, ideologically neutral future historians may yet judge the hard-nosed Singapore State on balance, relatively favorably for having the nous to cleave to a Muscular Secularist philosophy in managing the fundamentalist impulses lurking dormant within the social fabric of the tiny, trans-nationalized, multi-religious polity.
Introduction

As a developing nation, the Philippines grapples with complex security threats and challenges from a wide array of traditional and non-traditional sources. Many of these security threats and challenges are shared with other developing nations but some are unique to Philippine domestic situation as a result of its geographic location, colonial history, cultural heritage, and politico-economic system, among other factors.

This study aims to identify emerging threats and challenges to Philippine national security in the context of the country’s current domestic security environment and evolving security architecture in the Asia Pacific region. Informed by a framework of analysis popularized by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998; see also Smith & Acharya, 2002), which views security as a comprehensive concept, this paper relies on literature review, documentary analysis and interview of key experts as methods of the study.

DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT

Crucial to the identification of emerging threats and challenges to Philippine security is a clear understanding of the definition and evolution of the concept of national security as articulated in various official documents.

The National Security Council (NSC) defines Philippine national security as “a state of condition where our most cherished values and beliefs, our democratic way of life, our institutions of governance and our unity, welfare and well-being as a nation and people are permanently protected and continuously enhanced” (Office of the National Security Council Secretariat, 1999). Though some Filipino writers erroneously attribute this definition from the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), the definition actually evolved from the concept of national security developed by the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) in 1964. NICA defines it as “the state of condition wherein the people’s way of life and institutions, their territorial integrity and sovereignty, as well as their welfare and well-being are protected and/or advanced” (National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, 1964, p. 2). The NSC continues to use this definition (National Security
Council Secretariat, 2009) though it is being contested by scholars in the academe and non-government sector (Banlaoi, 2010).

The Department of National Defense (DND) provides a more coherent analysis of the Philippine national security concept. The DND recognizes the complex linkages of internal and external security concerns. It regards Philippine national security as a fusion of internal and external security. Though internal security is the priority of the Philippine government, external security is also part and parcel of Philippine national security because external security also affects the pursuance of internal security. To advance external security concerns of the Philippines, the DND promotes defense diplomacy with the outside world. The DND asserts (Department of National Defense, 2006):

The country’s national security, as a responsibility of the Philippine government, is no longer preserved and enhanced within its borders, but well beyond them through its first line of defense – diplomacy. The Philippine government stands ready to work with its friends and neighbors with the nation’s interest as its underlying beacon. Thus, Philippine foreign policy must be timely, responsive and driven by a desire to bring about change that makes foreign policy work directly for the benefit of generations of Filipinos.

The official reading of current threats to Philippine national security

The Philippine military regards internal security threats as the most pressing concern of the government as the country “faces no immediate threat of aggression from other countries” (The Strategic Direction of the AFP International Military Affairs, 2008, p. 6). This is based on the policy perspective of the Philippine defense establishment asserting that “The Philippines is unlikely to be confronted with invasion or direct-armed aggression in the near to the medium-term” (Strategic Defense and Security Outlook, 2007, p. 2). According to the DND, internal security threats will continue to shape Philippine security policy, strategy and plans (ibid.). Thus, the cornerstone of Philippine national security policy is Internal Security Operation (ISO), which is embodied in the implementation of the expanded National Internal Security Plan (NISP).

Yet, the DND is mindful that external developments also affect the pursuance of Philippine national security interests. Thus, it adopts the Defense International and Security Policy (DISP) to provide “strategic direction to bilateral and multilateral defense engagements with strategic security partners including regional and international organizations with a view to furthering the security aims of the state” (Department of National Defense, 2007, p. 2). Based on this policy, the DND formulates the International Defense and Security Engagement Plan (IDSEP) to set the direction for the country’s international security engagement activities.

From various defense and security policy directives, the AFP identifies the following threats to Philippine national security (The Strategic Direction of the AFP International Military Affairs, 2008, pp. 7-8):
Internal Security Threats

- Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
- Local Communist Movement (LCM)
- Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
- Renegade faction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

Potential External Threats

- China threat over the issue of the Spratlys
- Malaysia threat over the issue of Sabah and Spratlys
- Threats from other claimants in the Spratlys
- Threats from flashpoints in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Straits
- Threats of international terrorism and other non-traditional security threats

Having identified the current security threats facing the Philippines, which are likely to continue under the presidency of Benigno Simeon Aquino III, what are the emerging security threats and challenges that the country has to confront in the years to come?

Emerging domestic security threats and challenges

The emerging domestic threats and challenges to Philippine national security are largely determined by the country’s current internal security threats emanating from ASG, LCM, MILF and rogue MNLF. Other emerging domestic security threats and challenges also come from current threats posed by transnational organized crime and non-traditional security issues. All these issues have become deeply enmeshed with each other and have formed complex interrelationships, and so addressing them requires a complex strategy. The following, therefore, are the emerging domestic threats and challenges to Philippine national security: 1) Terrorism-crime nexus; 2) Environmental degradation, natural disasters and climate change; 3) Infectious diseases; and 4) Rapid population growth.

TERRORISM-CRIME NEXUS

Terrorism and crime are continuing threats to Philippine peace and order and internal security. A terrorism-crime nexus has become a rapidly emerging security threat in the Philippines as a result of the growing collusion of terrorist groups and organized criminal syndicates that can blur the distinction between military and police operations against them. Arms smugglers, drug traffickers and human smugglers are now closely linked with terrorists and vice versa. Trafficking and smuggling routes provide terrorists with convenient passages to their operatives. Terrorist groups venture into the smuggling of arms, drugs and persons to mobilize resources. They also connive with ordinary criminal groups to mount kidnap-for-ransom activities to generate income.
The ASG is the largest terrorist group in the Philippines. From its peak of 1,270 reported members in 2000, its strength reduced to an estimated 445 members as of the first quarter of 2010. Getting the exact membership of the ASG is difficult as the group colludes with ordinary bandit groups in its usual areas of operations. The ASG usually operates in the mountainous terrain of Sulo, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi. ASG members are also sighted in Zamboanga City and Marawi City.

Sulo has the highest concentration of ASG members, followed by Basilan, Zamboanga City, Tawi-Tawi and Marawi City. These areas are also favorite havens of organized criminal groups operating in the southern Philippines. Because terrorists and criminals have the same operational turf, they mount joint activities for mutual gains.

Thus, since its founding in 1989, the ASG has never been a homogenous organization. It has been composed of various factions whose leaders have various motivations – from mere banditry to Islamic insurgency. There is a current debate on who is presently leading the ASG. Yasser Igasan, who is more ideologically motivated, is recognized as the over-all amir of the ASG. Yet, there are other leaders with great propensity to commit crimes who wield tremendous influence on the operations of the group. The 18 cellular groups of the ASG, released by the AFP in 2009, indicate that the Abu Sayyaf is a heterogeneous movement. Each of these groups have their own network with local bandits and organized criminal groups that are deeply engaged in piracy, armed robbery, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, extortion and kidnap-for-ransom activities.

Among the notorious criminal groups in the southern Philippines, the ASG had reported linkages with the Pentagon Gang and the Abu Sofia Group. The Pentagon Gang was deeply engaged in various kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) activities in Mindanao. Founded by Tahir Alonto, who was associated with the MILF, the Pentagon Gang also connived with the ASG in several KFR operations in the southern Philippines (Philippine Center on Transnational Crimes, 2003). The Abu Sofia Group, on the other hand, was founded by Bebis Binago, who was known to have close relations with MILF and ASG personalities operating in Central Mindanao. The Abu Sofia Group was involved not only in several extortion and KFR activities but also in the drugs and arms trade. It has been recently estimated that 80% of the current ASG members are plain bandits and only 20% of its members have ideological conviction. Most of its members have, in fact, become “militants for hire” to earn a living in the poverty stricken island of Mindanao.

The LCM or the New People’s Army (NPA) also has confirmed collusion with organized criminal groups. The Red Scorpion Gang (RSG), which masterminded several bank robberies, KFR, drug smuggling, gun running and extortions in the Philippines, was organized by NPA guerillas who joined forces with criminal groups (Coronel, 2003). NPA leaders also used ordinary criminal syndicates in their extortion activities. In 2008 alone, the AFP reported that the NPA extorted a total amount of P62 million (US$1.5 million) from business establishments, quarry operators, local politicians, construction companies, telecommunication companies, mining companies, logging companies, fishpond owners and private individuals as part of what the NPA calls “revolutionary taxes”.
The Philippines

NATURAL DISASTERS, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE

By virtue of its geographic location, the Philippines is prone to natural disasters. The Philippines suffers an average of 20 typhoons a year, six to seven of which can cause tremendous flooding and landslides. In 2009, Typhoon Ketsana devastated the Philippines, killing at least 464 people, displacing 300,000 others and destroying more than 11 billion pesos worth of property (National Disaster Coordinating Agency, 30 September, 2009). Being located in the Pacific Ring of Fire, the Philippines is also prone to earthquakes that can cause massive volcanic eruptions and tsunamis. The Philippines experiences on average 887 earthquakes annually. So far, the worst earthquake that hit the country was in 1990, which killed 1,621 persons and damaged multi-billion pesos worth of property and infrastructure. Because of the toll on human life and property, natural disasters have become a threat to the human security of Filipinos. Without effective disaster management systems, the impact of natural disasters can be more devastating than terrorist attacks.

Aside from natural disasters, the Philippines has also been suffering some man-made disasters as a result of environmental degradation caused by deforestation, pollution and illegal fishing. Because of illegal logging and slash-and-burn agricultural practices only 3% of the Philippine environment is now covered by forest. The continuing loss of the Philippine forest is causing soil erosion, which threatens the country’s rich land biodiversity. With little forest cover left, pollution problems are aggravated. Air pollution creates severe health problems, while water pollution destroys the marine biodiversity of the Philippines. The combined impact of deforestation and pollution makes the Philippines, one of the world’s most biologically rich countries, one of the areas with the most endangered species.

The rapid loss of Philippine biodiversity is exacerbated by the harsh impact of climate change, which is manifested in the Philippines by the occurrence of extreme weather such as floods, drought, forest fires and an increase in tropical cyclones (Philippine Star, 4 November, 2006). It has been reported that:

These extreme weather events associated with climate change, and the disasters these have wrought, have caused losses amounting to billions of pesos. From 1975 to 2002, tropical cyclones have resulted in losses of 4.578 billion pesos due to damage to property, including damage to agriculture worth 3.047 billion pesos. Drought in Southern Mindanao in 1998, the 2nd hottest year on record, incurred crop losses amounting to 828 million pesos. And damages due to four successive tropical cyclones towards the end of 2004 cost the nation an estimated 7,615.98 million pesos (ibid.).

The effects of climate change are an emerging threat to Philippine national security as they can cause severe devastation to the Filipino people and its territory. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has forewarned that climate change “could have a devastating impact on the Philippines, leading to widespread destruction of the country’s flora and fauna and flooding the capital Manila” (Agency France Press, 17 September, 2008). According to NASA scientist, Josefino Comiso, “The Philippines is a country that is among the most vulnerable to the effects of
climate change” (ibid.). Scientific studies also validate the great vulnerability of the Philippines on the harsh impacts of climate change (Jose & Cruz, 1999).

Climate change has become a rapidly emerging security concern across Southeast Asia (Resurreccion, Sajor & Fajber, 2008; for the security impact of climate change see Abbott, 2008; Busby, 2007). The United Nations’ Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) contends that climate change can result in adverse effects including increasing temperatures, rising sea levels, increased intensity of storms, greater frequency of heat waves, floods and droughts, more rapid spread of diseases, and accelerated loss of biodiversity. In the Philippines alone, the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomena have been more frequent, persistent and intense since the mid-1970s, compared with the previous 100 years. However, the traditional coping mechanisms of developing countries, like the Philippines, to natural calamities are inadequate to cope with the harsh impacts of climate change (Anshory & Francisco, 2009).

INFECTIOUS DISEASE

The spread of infectious diseases has also become an emerging security concern in the Philippines and the wider Asian region. According to the Philippine Society for Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, the Philippines’ top five infectious disease problems are: respiratory tract infections (like pneumonia, tuberculosis, etc.), diarrhea (many causes like amoebiasis), dengue (all-year round), typhoid fever and malaria. The onslaught of AH1N1 Flu virus (initially known as “swine flu”) in early 2009, the outbreak of H5N1 virus (avian influenza, or “bird flu”) in 2004, the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, and the rapid spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) that started in the 1980s are also alarming indicators of the seriousness of infectious disease problems. From being simply a health issue, the spread of infectious diseases is becoming a security issue, because it can cause panic that can undermine domestic and international stability.

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the spread of HIV/AIDS has become one of Southeast Asia’s most pressing health and human security problems. The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) revealed that out of the 30.6 million HIV/AIDS cases worldwide, there are around 6 million cases in South and Southeast Asia. Though the Philippines is still “a low-HIV/AIDS prevalence” country, the number of HIV infections has steadily increased since 1984, with sexual transmission as the primary mode. The Philippine Department of Health (DOH) AIDS Registry reported that around 3,456 Filipinos are living with HIV/AIDS as of 2009. But UNAIDS estimated that at least 12,000 Filipinos were HIV-positive by the end of 2005. If the spread of HIV/AIDS viruses is not controlled, it can threaten health security in the country and this has tremendous implications for state and human security. These health insecurities are exacerbated by the emergence of other pandemic diseases like bird flu and swine flu.

Bird flu, for example, affected Southeast Asia in 2004. Around 200 million birds in Southeast Asia have either died or were killed as a result of the outbreak (Adams Country Health Department, 2005). Among the ten countries in Southeast
Asia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam were the most affected. Though the impact of bird flu in the Philippines was not as severe as its neighbors, the outbreak of bird flu caused human panic in the region because the H5N1 virus directly infected some humans (ibid.). Scientific research shows that the bird flu virus may mutate into a new form of human flu that can spread rapidly. Thus, bird flu is considered an emerging security risk (Kimball, 2006). This was a great challenge to ASEAN as a regional institution, considering that Southeast Asia was also hit by a pandemic disease of SARS in 2003.

Singapore was the worst hit by SARS, with 206 reported cases and 31 deaths. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam were also affected by SARS to different levels of intensity. The SARS outbreak created a dent in the economy of Southeast Asia creating enormous impact on the Philippine economy, particularly in tourism. The recent outbreak of AH1N1 virus also created state and human security risks considering that it spread worldwide. The WHO declared the virus a global pandemic issue having had more than 30,000 verified cases in at least 74 countries in 2009. The Philippines was affected by the spread of AH1N1 virus with the infection of at least 800 persons and the death of one.

There is no doubt that infectious diseases are spreading across national borders, which can undermine regional stability and national security. Thus, ASEAN is intensifying its cooperation in order to address the regional security implications of the spread of infectious diseases. ASEAN has also endorsed the creation of a Southeast Asian Nations Infectious Diseases Outbreak Surveillance Network. Since 2007 ASEAN has been implementing the emerging infectious disease (EID) program to strengthen regional and global networks for the purposes of information sharing and collaborative actions against the spread of infectious diseases (Caballero-Anthony, Balen & Chang, 2009). The Philippines actively participates in the EID program through the Department of Health (DOH).

RAPID POPULATION GROWTH

Rapid population growth has also become an emerging security issue in the Philippines. With an estimated population of 92 million in 2009, the Philippines ranks as the 12th most populous country in the world (National Statistics Office, 2006). With an annual population growth rate of 2.04% in 2006, which is in fact lower when compared to 2.3% in 2000, it has been projected that the Philippines will reach a population of around 94 million at the end of 2010. If this rate continues, the Philippine population will double in three decades at almost 140 million. If not managed effectively, rapid population growth will create tremendous stress on national resource allocation, particularly in the areas of food security, health, housing, basic education and other social services (Achacoso-Sevilla, 2004, pp. ix-xv).

1 This section is based on the author’s report to the League of Municipalities of the Philippines. See Localizing population management in the Philippines: A record breaking accomplishment and exemplary practice of the League of Municipalities of the Philippines (Manuscript, December 2009).
As early as the 1960s, experts already warned the world about the fast ticking of
the “population bomb” (Ehrlich, 1968). Uncontrolled population growth can become
a world menace as it exacerbates world hunger and strongly contributes to the rapid
deterioration of the world’s natural environment (ibid.). Rapid population growth
could severely aggravate Philippine poverty, quickly slow down national economic
development, seriously magnify health-related problems, and terribly worsen the
country’s environmental degradation, which, if taken together, would unleash an
enormous threat to Philippine national security.

Emerging external security challenges

Aside from emerging domestic security threats and challenges, the Philippines
also faces emerging threats from external sources. The “rise” of China looms large in
the security threat analysis in the Philippines. Related to the rise of China are renewed
tensions in the South China Sea. Though these two issues are not officially viewed
as security threats by the Philippines, they do in fact pose emerging challenges to
Philippine national security.

THE RISE OF CHINA

There is no doubt that China is the fastest growing power in the world today
(Fenby, 2009). A phenomenal economic growth of almost 9% annually since 1979
is giving rise to China as a comprehensive power (Pumphrey, 2002). This draws
Southeast Asian countries into free-trade agreements, strategic partnerships, military
exchanges and security dialogues. China is presently using its economic leverage
and other soft-power capabilities to increase its influence in Southeast Asia and
demonstrate its growing great power status not only in Asia but also among the wider
global community (Lum, Morrison & Vaughn, 2008; Cheow, 2004; Schmidt, 2006).

China’s burgeoning economic power also has spillover effects on China’s
expanding military power causing security concerns in Southeast Asia (US
Department of Defense, 2009). In 2007 alone, it has been noted that China’s defense
budget reached US$44.94 billion, representing an increase of 17.8% compared to
2006. The 2006 military spending was double the defense budget in 2000. In 2009,
China’s defense budget grew by 14%, equivalent to US$70 billion.

If the current rate of China’s defense spending continues, it is projected that
China’s defense expenditure will reach threefold, or US$185 billion, by 2025. It is
forecasted that by 2025, China will become the second largest economy in the world
and the leading military power in Asia.

There is no doubt that the rise of China is creating some security wariness in the
region (Economy, 2005; Sutter, 2005; Banlaoi, 2003). But the Philippines presently
adopts an open-minded attitude towards China; the Philippine government does not
view the regional and even global ascendance of China as a current threat. Rather,
the Philippines views China as an opportunity with concomitant emerging security
challenges (Banlaoi, 2007). The Philippines has, in fact, a great interest in engaging
China comprehensively to overcome any potential threat that China may pose (see esp. Baviera, 2000). Although the Philippines has irritant relations with China over the issue of the South China Sea, which makes the military establishment suspicious of China’s strategic intentions in Southeast Asia, the Philippine civilian government wants to sustain friendship and enhance defense and security cooperation with China, albeit in a very cautious manner. The recent signing of the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) is an important contribution to prevent military confrontation in the disputed area.

RENEWED TENSION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Another emerging external security challenge that the Philippines has to face is the renewed tensions in the disputed territories in the South China Sea. These disputes place Philippine security relations with China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and, to a certain extent, Brunei in a challenging situation.

Security tensions over the disputed Spratly Islands have increased over the past two years despite the adoption of the DOC in 2002. While tensions in the South China Sea have no doubt de-escalated during and after the signing of the DOC (Emmers, 2007), security irritants pervaded as claimants continued to improve their civilian and military facilities in their occupied islands, islets, reefs and shoals. Taiwan protested the signing of the DOC as it only included Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. It is widely believed that the exclusion of Taiwan from the DOC has made the declaration ineffective in managing tensions in the South China Sea.

Though the DOC temporarily calmed the waters by upholding the principle of amicable settlement of maritime boundary disputes, its “non-binding” character made it fragile and tenuous. Thus, disputes in the South China Sea continue to be major sources of maritime insecurity in Asia. China’s growing naval power in recent years has exacerbated this regional maritime security dilemma, leading the other claimants to upgrade their naval assets and modernize their maritime capabilities. The maritime security dilemma in the South China Sea raises the possibility of armed conflict in the Spratlys, something claimants and stakeholders alike are keen to avoid.

Based on ten days of field research by the author in the Philippine-occupied Spratlys between the 6th and 15th of May 2009, all claimants involved in the disputes, with the exemption of Brunei, are strengthening their effective occupation of what they consider their territories in the Spratlys. China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have been seriously consolidating their physical presence in the South China Sea since the adoption of the DOC.

Photographic evidences indicate that claimants have been involved in various infrastructure projects that aim to intensify their military and civilian presence in their occupied islands, islets, reefs and shoals with the strategic intention of proving their effective occupation of these areas and thereby strengthening their claims for...
ownership. Proving their ownership of these areas has huge implications for the
definition of their baselines and exclusive control and exploitation of rich maritime
resources in the South China Sea.

Fishing activities in the South China Sea have also been major sources of irritants
among claimants as they accuse each other of illegal fishing and poaching in their
waters. To justify the construction of facilities in their occupied territories, claimants
call these facilities “fishermen shelters”. Some claimants even erected light posts and
observation towers in their controlled areas in aid of navigation. It is already known
that there is an enormous amount of sea traffic in the South China Sea, making it one
of the maritime superhighways of the world.

Because of the strategic and economic value of the South China Sea, all claimants,
except Brunei, have invested their resources in their occupied territories to maintain
and consolidate their physical presence and prove their effective occupation. Since
2002, claimants have been engaged in a number of construction activities that aim to
improve and fortify their military and civilian presence in their occupied areas. These
include:

VIETNAM

Vietnam presently occupies 21 islands, reefs and cays in the Spratlys where it
has impressive facilities. Its largest occupied island, Lagos (or Spratly Island), is
the most heavily fortified, with a solid runway, a pier, at least 35 building structures,
around 20 storage tanks, at least 20 gun emplacements, at least five battle tanks and
some parabolic disk antennas and a spoon rest radar. In April 2009, Philippine aerial
surveillance found two newly-constructed two-storey buildings on Lagos Island with
12 newly-installed lightposts and 12 windmills.

Aside from Lagos Island, Vietnam also maintains facilities at Pugad Island
(Southwest Cay), which is a little less than two nautical miles away from the
Philippine-occupied island of Parola (Northeast Cay). Pugad Island has several
gun emplacements, gun shelters, civilian buildings, military barracks, parabolic
disc antennas, concrete bunkers, a lighthouse, a football field, a helipad, and many
lightposts. In April 2009, the Philippine Air Force sighted a supply ship in the vicinity
of Pugad Island with newly installed lightposts, polarized dipole array antenna, and
a broadband facility. Pugad Island also has a well-maintained lagoon suitable for
tourists. The surrounding waters of Pugad Island are good for scuba diving and other
water-based sports.

Other facilities in at least 14 Vietnamese-occupied reefs seem to follow a standard
pattern of construction. South Reef, Pentley Reef, Discovery Great Reef, Collins
Reef, Pearson Reef, Lendao Reef, West Reef, Ladd Reef, Central London Reef,
East Reef, Cornwallis Reef, Pigeon Reef, Allison Reef and Barque Canada Reef all
have identical structures featuring a golden-painted three-storey concrete building
with built-in lighthouse on top, gun emplacements on both sides, a T-type pier, solar
panels, parabolic disc antennas and garden plots.
THE PHILIPPINES

The Philippines controls the second largest number of occupied areas in the Spratlys. It is presently in control of nine facilities that are considered parts of the Municipality of Kalayaan. Its largest occupied facility is the Pag-Asa Island (Thitu Island), the closest island to the Chinese-occupied Subi Reef. Pag-Asa Island has an already deteriorating runway maintained by the 570th Composite Tactical Wing of the Philippine Air Force. It also has a naval detachment maintained by the Naval Forces West of the Philippine Navy, a municipal hall called Kalayaan Hall, a village hall called Barangay Pag-Asa, a police station maintained by the Philippine National Police (PNP), sports facilities, an observation tower, a commercial mobile phone station and several civilian houses and military barracks.

Pag-Asa Island is the only occupied island of the Philippines with civilian residents. At least five families reside on Pag-Asa. This island is the main seat of the Municipality of Kalayaan established by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1596 issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos on 11 June 1978. Registered voters of Kalayaan Municipality cast their votes on Pag-Asa Island. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) maintains an office on Pag-Asa Island.

The Philippines also maintains makeshift naval detachment facilities in five other islands, one reef and one shoal. Its facilities in the Rizal Reef (Commodore Reef) are just wooden structures and two small single-storey hexagonal concrete buildings manned by four personnel of the Philippine Navy. The Philippines also maintains a naval detachment in Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas Shoal) established out of a dilapidated landing ship tank called LST 57. Ayungin Shoal is the closest Philippine structure to the Mischief Reef occupied by China.

CHINA

Though China does not occupy any island in the Spratlys, it has solid facilities on seven reefs and shoals including concrete helipads and military structures. Its most controversial structure is on the Mischief Reef, which currently has a three-storey concrete building and five octagonal concrete structures in the vicinity. The three-storey building has a basketball court, dipole and parabolic disc antenna, search lights, solar panels and cross-slot type radar. In April 2009, the Philippine Air Force sighted three naval vessels in the vicinity of Mischief Reef: a Fulin Class Survey Ship, Shijian Class Survey Ship and Yannan Class Survey Ship. Three fishing vessels were also sighted in the lagoon of Mischief Reef.

China maintains a very impressive helipad facility in the Johnson Reef. This reef has a three-storey concrete building armed with high powered machine guns and naval guns. Johnson Reef has identical structures to Chigua Reef and Gaven Reef. In April 2009, the Philippine Air Forces sighted in Johnson Reef a Huainan Jiangwei Class Frigate with body number 560; it was believed to be armed with surface to surface missile, surface to air missile, 100mm guns, 32mm guns, anti-submarine mortars and a Harbin Z9A Dauphin Helicopter.
MALAYSIA

Malaysia, which presently occupies five areas in the Spratlys, has well-maintained facilities in the Swallow Reef. This reef has a diving center called “Layang-Layang”. Swallow Reef has a resort-type hotel, swimming pool, windmills, communication antennas, control communication tower, civilian houses, military barracks and a helipad.

Malaysia also has a very good facility in the Ardasier Reef with an excellent helipad, sepak takraw court, gun emplacements and control tower. The facilities in the Ardasier Reef are almost identical to the Malaysian facilities in the Erica Reef, Mariveles Reef and Erica Shoal. Malaysia also maintains a lighthouse in the Louisa Reef.

TAIWAN

Taiwan only occupies one island, called Itu-Aba, but officially named by Taiwan government as Taiping Island. It is the largest and the most heavily fortified among the occupied islands in the Spratlys. It has more than 50 buildings used for military and civilian purposes. Itu-Aba has an excellent helipad and a very long runway inaugurated by then President Chen Shuibian in March 2008. The whole island is protected by at least 500 troops armed with at least 20 coastal guns, 20 gun emplacements and communication towers.

Like other occupied islands in the Spratlys, Itu-Aba has several parabolic disc antennas, radars, solar panels and concrete bunkers. The island also has a firing range and sports facilities. Aerial surveillance by the Philippine Air force in April 2009 indicated that Itu-Aba has a newly-constructed three-storey building, new access ramp, and a new firing range.

From the foregoing, all claimants, with the exception of Brunei, have been consolidating their civilian and military presence in the Spratlys to assert their territorial claims. Though the adoption of the DOC in 2002 de-escalated the sources of conflict in the South China Sea, renewed security tensions occurred in late 2007 indicating the limitations of the DOC in managing territorial disputes. Thus, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea continue to play a destabilizing role in the security of the Asia Pacific region that can pose emerging external security challenges for the Philippines.

Conclusion

The Philippines faces emerging security threats and challenges from internal and external sources. The terrorism-crime nexus; environmental degradation, natural disasters and climate change; infectious diseases; and rapid population growth are emerging internal security threats. The rise of China and the renewed tensions in the South China Sea are the two main emerging external security challenges facing the country.
Identification of these emerging security threats and challenges is driven by the country’s status as a developing nation, which regards internal security as the top priority in security strategy, policy and resource allocation. External security challenges are also part of the country’s security agenda as they have repercussions on the pursuance of internal security. In fact, there is a view that the growing and widening gap between the rich and the poor should be the country’s most pressing internal security threat – a threat shared by all developing nations (a view advanced by an anonymous reviewer of this paper).

As previously discussed, the Philippines defines its national security as the fusion of internal and external security. Thus, it adopts a holistic approach in its national security policy in major official documents. The great challenge to the present Philippine government, however, is how to match policy with performance.
10  Indonesia

JAMHARI MAKRUF
State Islamic University (UIN), Jakarta, Indonesia

MUTIARA PERTIWI
State Islamic University (UIN), Jakarta, Indonesia

Introduction

Over the past decade, the Indonesian security framework has been gradually transformed from a traditionally military-centric one to a “multisectoral” one (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p. 22). What is meant by multisectoral security is that the Indonesian government has adopted a wider scope of security, to not only include territorial integrity but also other non-traditional issues such as politics, economics, societal, and even environmental sectors. Through this new framework, the Indonesian government constructs more complex approaches towards security issues and incorporates more actors, rather than only relying on military forces.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a survey of Indonesia’s non-traditional security (NTS) challenges. This includes any non-traditional issues which have the potential to cause harm to the Indonesian national population and territorial integrity. To serve this purpose, traditional issues such as external military threats are excluded from this discussion, but without underestimating their significant dynamics in Indonesian security. Through data analysis, this research reveals that there are at least five NTS issues in Indonesia which should be taken into account by policy makers: (1) economic instability; (2) separatism; (3) terrorism; (4) natural disasters; and (5) corruption.

This essay is divided into four parts. First, it clarifies the theoretical framework related to NTS issues and briefly explains the background of its adoption in the Indonesian security framework. Following this, the second section identifies NTS threats to Indonesia over the upcoming five to ten years. The essay will then close with an analysis of the character of political responses to NTS issues in Indonesia.

A conceptual framework

The recognition of non-traditional issues in security studies is an outcome of a trend towards “securitization” in the realm of public policy. By the end of the 1990s, some scholars under the Copenhagen School of Security Studies had already introduced this concept (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 24-42). Securitization refers to a social-political process of “reframing” non-military issues into security issues. This
process is recommended for any “public issues” which represent “existential threats” to a referent object (usually the state) and require more than just common political responses. Buzan et al. clarify that “a public issue” may have three alternative statuses for a government: non-politicized, politicized, or securitized. An issue needs to be politicized to be included in a government’s “public policy”. When the character of the issue is escalated to being an “emergency”, securitization is required to enable greater effort and resource allocation in dealing with the issue. In other words, securitization is the final stage in an issue becoming highly prioritized by a government.

There are at least two elements in regards to security issues that should be clarified before applying the above framework when investigating NTS threats to Indonesia: the element of existential threats and referent objects (those who have “a legitimate claim to survival”). As this paper focuses on the perception of non-traditional threats from inside Indonesia, the referent objects of security are the Indonesian people and territory. People here represent Indonesia as a nation, and are the main objects of the state’s protection. The inclusion of people as a legitimate referent object of security is a must. This is to be consistent with the Indonesian commitment to democratic values, based on people’s aspirations. Consequently, “existential threats” is defined as a risk that may harm either: (1) state sovereignty; (2) people’s survival; or (3) national identity. Removing any of the three may eliminate the substantial integrity of Indonesia as a nation-state.

Employing this framework, the following discussion will identify the five most urgent NTS issues for Indonesia. The elaboration will also unpack the extent to which the country now responds to them.

### The five most urgent NTS threats to Indonesia

This part of the paper is a survey of NTS challenges to Indonesia. It reveals the five most urgent NTS issues, which have been public concerns over the last five years and may still pose a sense of insecurity in the upcoming five years and beyond. The five issues, based on priority order, are: economic instability; separatism; terrorism; natural disaster; and corruption. The priority list is arranged based on the extent to which a threat has the potential to cause any systemic harm to either Indonesian: (1) state sovereignty; (2) people’s survival; or (3) national identity.

### ONE: ECONOMIC INSTABILITY

The most urgent NTS threat to Indonesia is economic instability. The economic challenge is considered the most fundamental NTS issue because of its structural impacts on other sectors. Without a strong economy, Indonesia will not have the resources to afford development and build resilience to other security threats. The state will be vulnerable to social political unrests, which can damage people’s lives and reduce political support for the government.

For Indonesia, the economic downturn in 1997 cannot be repeated. The event exposed a concrete fact that the Indonesian state could collapse through non-military
means. High inflation pulled Indonesia into bankruptcy while a weak economic structure impeded its quick recovery. In fact, the social and political ramifications of this crisis continue. In 2009, Indonesia has at least 9.3 million jobless people and 33 million poor people (BPS, 2009). They are the most vulnerable parties when economic instability prevails. The post-Suharto governments should be more careful in planning economic policies when faced with global trade and interdependence.

Currently, there are at least two major threats to Indonesian economic stability: (1) the global financial crisis; and (2) trade liberalization. The former has been shadowing Indonesian growth since 2007. It was triggered by the sub-prime crisis in the US, which resulted in the shortfall of large financial institutions, stock markets and banks around the world. In Indonesia, the crisis brought the international trade sector into deficit. In fact, export deficit reached 30% in 2008. At the same time, the real sector production was increasingly uncompetitive as domestic growth reached 3.6% negative growth (Rosidi, 2009). The crisis was worsened by the bad governance of some local Indonesian banks. The most phenomenal case was the Century Bank, which finally forced the government to implement a controversial bailout in 2008. The Indonesian government has been criticized ever since. The majority of Indonesian Legislative Assembly members consider the Rp 6.7 trillion bailout policy as imprudent because Century is a small bank without systemic impacts (Kompas, 6 March, 2010). Until today, this case is still under the investigation of the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) while the government is struggling to maintain the people’s support. This illustrates how the crisis has clearly had a systemic impact on Indonesian politics.

While a significant economic slowdown is inevitable, Indonesia is relatively more alert and resilient than it was during the 1997 crisis. This is revealed in the research of Basri and Siregar who argue that the Indonesian economy is resilient (Basri & Siregar, 2009, p. 3). The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has similarly concluded that Indonesia is on the right track to recovery (Bhaskaran & Gosh, 2009). The government is now in the process of redrafting the Security Safety Net Bill and Financial Authority Bill. These regulations are expected to enhance Indonesia’s resilience against any economic crisis in the future. Indeed, much more progress should be made to strengthen the accountability of financial institutions, stimulate exports and boost the job market. The government and other economic actors still have homework to do in order to provide the nation with an escape from crisis.

The second economic challenge to Indonesia is trade liberalization. Indonesia is attached to at least four multilateral free trade agreements, which include: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), World Trade Organization (WTO), ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). Additionally, there are bilateral trade agreements (BTA) between Indonesia and other countries, such as with the US, Japan, New Zealand, Australia and the European Union (Chandra, 2005, p. 544). The threat of liberalization to Indonesia will be more apparent when the ACFTA agreement comes into action this year. In many assessments, Indonesia has almost no competitive advantages against China (Antara News, 9 January, 2010). Local industries and workers are fraught with pessimism. If Indonesia keeps counting on cheap, unskilled labor as a competitive advantage, liberalization will not increase
Indonesian worker’s prosperity. In fact, it may provoke violent conflicts just as has recently occurred in Batam, where Indonesian workers protested and attacked their Indian managers for harassing their skills and nationality (Antara News, 22 April, 2010). Batam is an island on the Indonesian border, which developed a free trade zone earlier than other regions. The expatriate numbers on this island reached more than 90,000 people in 2008 and around 50,000 people in 2009. Most of them are working at management levels (Antara News, 27 April, 2007). Their presence on Batam as bosses of the local people raises antipathy amongst the local population. This reveals that careless liberalization can ignite social unrest.

These liberalization commitments also become problematic because Indonesia is very slow in improving its domestic competitiveness. Chandra’s research in 2004 reveals many Indonesian local industries are failing to compete in the free market (2005, p. 559). He found that a corrupt bureaucracy and weak law enforcement are the source of the problem. In 2010, an Indonesian Expert Roundtable Discussion suggested a similar argument, that inefficient bureaucracy is the source of high transaction costs and weak industrial structures in Indonesia. Responding to this, the government promised to reform the bureaucracy, enhance support for local businesses, enhance mitigation of the energy crisis, launch more micro-finance programs for small business, and build more economic infrastructures. Particularly with China, the government proposes to delay and renegotiate the liberalization of 228 commodities (Bisnis Indonesia, 20 April, 2010). This is to provide extra time for local businesses and the government to improve domestic competitiveness with China.

TWO: SEPARATISM

The second most urgent NTS threat to Indonesia is separatism. It refers to any organized action launched to disaffiliate from the state. Separatism is considered dangerous because it is a direct challenge to a state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In many cases, separatism leads to civil wars and terrors, which brings about massive civilian casualties. Failure in containing and providing a solution to this threat may result in state disintegration. The Indonesian government has classified separatism as a threat to its sovereignty since the state was established, and which is regulated in some clauses of Indonesian Criminal Law (Articles 104, 106, 107, 108, 110).

In Indonesia separatism is a real latent threat. The country has never been free of separatist movements. Some of them have roots in old separatist conflicts such as the Indonesian Islamic State (DI/TII), which launched an insurgency in 1949 and was defeated in 1962; the Revolutionary Government of Indonesian Republic (PRRI/Permesta) in Sumatera and Sulawesi, which was launched in 1958 and was defeated in 1961; the Fretilin in Timor Leste, which started a revolt in 1975 and finally obtained independence in 2002; Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM) in Aceh, which started its revolt in 1975 and finally reached a peace agreement with the Indonesian government in 2005; the Republic of South Maluku (RMS) in Southern Maluku, which has been demanding independence since 1950; and the Free Papua Organization (OPM) in Papua, which has been in revolt since 1965. To different degrees, the last three still pose risks to Indonesian security. RMS and GAM no longer have active armies,
but their sympathizers sometimes expose their political symbols in public (*Berita Indonesia*, 20 July, 2007). The threat from the OPM is more evident as it is still in armed and active revolt.

In the Suharto era, destroying separatist movements was a military mission. The collateral damage that resulted from this approach was enormous. The Human Rights Watch estimated more than 1,000 Acehnese died during military operations during the 1990s and around 2000 East Timorese died in the last 25 years of the Suharto leadership (HRW, 27 August, 1999). These numbers do not include rights violations, internally displaced people, or casualties from other separatist conflicts. The international community has condemned the militaristic approach, and this has forced the post-Suharto governments to gradually construct alternative methods in conflict resolution. It invites scholars, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and also other states to facilitate a dialogue with separatist groups. The responsibility of countering separatism and other internal conflicts is gradually transferred from the military to the police. More importantly, the government is steadily being informed that separatism is not only a security problem but also a justice issue.

In regards to this issue, decentralization by enhancing regional autonomy is considered the best available solution. Indonesia has established Law No. 22/1999 of the Regional Governance and Law No. 25/1999 of the Fiscal Balance between the Centre and the Regions for Aceh and Papua. Additionally, there are two specific autonomy laws: Law No. 18/2001 and Law No. 22/2001 to provide special autonomy for these two problematic provinces. Further, Indonesia established Law No. 32/2004 and Law No. 33/2004 to provide a legal basis for the direct elections of heads of provinces (governors) and districts (regents and mayors).

Decentralization policies are generally welcomed by the regions. It was effective in calming separatist sentiments which particularly increased after Timor Leste detached from Indonesia in 2002. The tsunami in Aceh in 2003 was also a blessing in disguise, as GAM finally agreed to sign the August 2005 Helsinki Peace Agreement between GAM and Indonesia. Subsequently, the government accommodated GAM’s aspiration in formulating Law No. 11/2006 of Aceh Local Government. At the end of the same year, the first local election was held in Aceh, which resulted in a victory for Irwandi Yusuf, an ex-member of GAM. This demonstrated progress in conflict resolution in Aceh, as GAM finally found a peaceful instrument to achieve its social political purposes. Since then, the post-conflict reconstruction has effectively started and security tensions have been significantly reduced.

However, decentralization policies in Papua have been half-hearted and therefore have failed to bring substantial peace. The implementation of special autonomy in Papua is not as progressive as in Aceh. The central government has been slow and inattentive to local aspirations for improving regional welfare and dignity (Bertrand, 2007, p. 16). Gustav Kawel, the facilitator of peace in Papua, argues that the government has a lack of political will in addressing sources of conflict in Papua, such as resource exploitation, separatism, discrimination to Papua’s cultures, human rights violations, and racial issues. Additionally, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) clarifies two more sources of Papuan conflict: the failure of development policies,
and the clash of histories between Papuan and the central government’s versions of
the process of “integration and reconstruction of Papuan identity” (Widjojo et al.,
2008, p. 2). Given these complex issues, there should be more efforts to enhance
Papuan trust of the Indonesian government.

The 2009 statistics reveal that Papuan regional economic growth has fallen at
least 30% since decentralization policies were established (BPS, 2009). During the
same period, violence increased in this region (Kompas, 4 February, 2008). This
included the Wasior incident in 2001; Wamena incident in 2003; Abepera incident in
2006; Tembagapura incident in 2009; and also the Bremeincident in April 2010.
There is a clear indication that the Papuan conflict still continues. A Conference of
Indonesian Peace Facilitators in Makassar, January 2010, also recommended that
Papua is currently the most vulnerable region to internal conflict in Indonesia. There
are 11 other Indonesian regions which are considered to be sensitive to internal
conflicts by this conference: South Sulawesi, Aceh, Lampung, West Kalimantan,
North Sulawesi, Sulawesi Tengah, Maluku, Maluku Utara, NTT, NTB and West
Papua (Tempo Interaktif, 27 January, 2010).

THREE: JIHADI TERRORISM

The third most challenging NTS issue is jihadi terrorism. It refers to any
intimidation or violent action launched by Islamic radicals to pursue Islamic justice
or to revitalize an Islamic caliphate system (Singh, 2007). Similar to other forms of
terrorism, jihadi terrorism is sporadic and crosscuts with other criminal activities. It
does not usually attack its enemy directly, but rather attempts to create an atmosphere
of fear amongst the public by targeting symbolic interests and civilians. This is why
jihadi terrorism can harm both state and human security. A failure in countering this
threat in Indonesia may result in internal conflicts or even the terrorist hijacking of
the state. As jihadi terrorism tends to be sectarian and pursues the reinvention of an
Islamic caliphate system, this can also harm Indonesian identity as a democratic and
pluralist state (Hainsworth, 2007).

Jihadi terrorist bombings first occurred in Indonesia in 2000 with a series of
church bombings on Christmas night. Its existence has become more obvious since
the Bali suicide bombing in 2002, which resulted in at least 202 civilian deaths
(Republika, 9 November, 2005). Ever since then, annually, there has been at least one
jihadi bomb blast in this country, including: the Marriott Hotel bombing in 2003; the
Australian Embassy bombing in 2004; the second Bali bombing in 2005; the second
Marriott Hotel bombing and the Ritz Carlton Hotel bombing in 2009. Members of
Jamaah Islamiya (JI) have claimed to be responsible for these attacks and declare a
connection with the global network of jihadi terrorism, led by al-Qaida.

The current anti-terrorism legal basis for this issue in Indonesia is the Criminal
Law and Law No. 15/2003. The main actor in countering this security measure is
the Indonesian Police. A special police unit named Detachment 88 is assigned to this
mission. By 2010, Indonesian Police claimed to have arrested 452 jihadi terrorists and
killed some key leaders of JI, such as Dr. Azahari, Noordin M. Top, Saefudin Djaelani
and Dulmatin (Liputan 6, 14 April 2010). Additionally, the police were successful
in paralyzing a new al-Qaida funded-jihadi training camp in Aceh early this year. Indonesia’s international partners commend this progress. In fact, Australia granted President Sosilo Bambang Yudhoyono an Honorary Companion of the Order of Australia in appreciation for his partnership in combating terrorism.

Despite the achievements of Detachment 88 in combating jihadi terrorism some assessments suggest that Indonesia is relatively slow in combating terrorism overall. At the beginning of the anti-terrorism campaign, the government tended to deny there were any active radical Islamists in Indonesia. The government was also reluctant to investigate the sympathizers and ex-leaders of JI. Consequently, the police had a short list of terrorist suspects and often lost its targets (Hainsworth, 2007, p. 6). Even after a range of achievements since 2008, the Indonesian Police are still criticized for their slow detection of terror.

Responding to this, civil society groups tend to divide between two dissenting opinions. The first suggests that this slow action is a reflection of a weak legal and operational framework in combating terrorism. Supporters of this argument propose a revision of Law No. 15/2003 to enhance the Indonesian Police’s authority. On the other hand, the second argument suggests that the problem is located more at an operational level rather than at a judicial level. It suggests that a failure in trust, a lack of NGO involvement, a weak intelligence system and a weak post-prison monitoring program have resulted in an ineffective counter-terrorism strategy (ICG, 20 April, 2010; Bataviase Online, 20 April, 2010; Republika, 2010). According to this later argument it is not the law which is at fault, but its implementation. Revising Law No. 15/2003 to enhance the authority of Indonesian intelligence is unnecessary. In fact, it can be counter-productive in light of the potential for human rights violations.

Besides the debate over law revision, the ambivalent public support towards counter-terrorism efforts also impedes the police from taking firm action. Particularly during President George Bush’s war on terror in Iraq, combating terrorism has been a sensitive issue in Indonesia. While Indonesians tend to agree that terrorism is a threat, they do not want to be an ally of the US in the war on terror. A survey by The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) in 2008 revealed that while 72% of Indonesians in 2007 considered terrorism “a very big problem”, 80% of Indonesians disliked the US’s policies for “humiliating the Islamic world”. This suggests that most Indonesians are against both jihadi terrorists and the US policies in the Islamic world. The government and the police were aware that any action should not send a message that the state was attacking Muslims. In general, this problematic situation has led the police to become overly cautious in taking action against terrorism, and therefore any action tends to be weak (Suara Pembaharuan, 14 August, 2009).

Another caveat is that the seeds of radical Islam still exist amongst the populace. When Amrozi and Muklas, the perpetrators of the first Bali bombing, were executed by a firing squad in 2008, thousands of their home-villagers and sympathizers marched on the street and honored the terrorists as heroes (syuhada). Abu Bakar Baasyir, an ex-leader of JI who has completed his jail sentence, was among those people who claimed Amrozi as a jihadist (Tempo Interaktif, 9 November, 2008; 11 November,
Urwah, another member of a jihadi terrorist group who was killed in 2009, also had similar public respect from his villagers. Other evidence of sympathy towards radical Islam amongst the public includes a statement by Abu Rusydan, an ex-leader of JI, on national television (Sabili, 31 July, 2009); he contended that there is a possibility that jihadi terrorism has only been condemned because “the public does not understand the motive”. While Rusydan did not transparently defend jihadi terrorism, he did not condemn it either. In addition, there is currently an online source available (http://www.arrahmah.com) which aims to help to disseminate and reproduce a discourse that Islam is under attack. Delivering its message in Bahasa Indonesia, this website frames jihadi terrorism as holy martyrdom. Other fundamentalist websites (such as http://www.eramuslim.com and http://www.swaramuslim.net) may not be as provocative as Arrahmah, but they also tend to be reluctant to condemn jihadi terrorism. This ideological propaganda is an active instrument to gain and maintain support for jihadi terrorism. Its existence suggests that the war for the hearts and minds in Indonesia is still far from over.

FOUR: NATURAL DISASTERS

The fourth most urgent NTS issue in Indonesia is natural disasters. The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defines natural disasters as disastrous events due to “atmospheric, geologic and hydrologic phenomena on solar, global, regional, national and local scales”. While most natural disasters are unpredictable, unprepared mitigation of their incidence can cause severe human casualties. Further, survivors of disaster events may still suffer from economic, health, geopolitical and societal emergencies. This may also have contagion impacts on other regions of a state, or even to other states. This is why natural disasters pose threats to human and state security.

Indonesia is one of the countries most at risk from natural disasters. A survey on the potential for mortality caused by natural disasters conducted by the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), classifies Indonesia in the most critical category. Some of the contributing factors to Indonesia’s vulnerability are: (1) its position on the Pacific seismic belt in which most earthquakes and volcanic eruptions occur; (2) the existence of 129 active volcanoes in Indonesia; (3) poor environmental governance; (4) corruption; and (5) a lack of disaster-preparedness systems. The most up-to-date statistics in Indonesia reveal that there were at least 1,100 natural catastrophes in 2008, including flood, volcanic eruption, cyclone, forest and land fire, drought, high tide, landslide and earthquake. The death toll from such events reached at least 500 people that year (BNPB, 2008). Some of the most devastating disasters in Indonesia during the past decade include the tsunami in Aceh and North Sumatera in 2003, which caused at least 166,080 deaths and 617,159 displaced people; the earthquake in Yogyakarta in 2006 which resulted in at least 3,098 deaths; and the earthquake in Padang in 2009 which resulted in at least 800 deaths (Ministry of Health). The most recent earthquake in Indonesia occurred in Aceh in April 2010 (Media Center, 12 April, 2010). This event destroyed more than 1,000 houses and caused more than 20 people to be hospitalized.
However, evidence suggests many events of natural disaster in Indonesia are preventable. They occur as a result of environmental mismanagement, such as destructive resource exploitation, illegal resource exploitation and development in conservation areas, unsustainable urban planning; and governmental negligence. Some preventable events which have occurred to date include various floods and landslides in some regions resulting from environmental mismanagement, a mud flood in Sidoadjo on the 29th of May 2006 resulting from a drilling error by PT Lapindo Brantas; and the Situ Gintung dam burst, which killed more than 90 people in 2009, resulting from unprofessional dam management.

Mitigation of natural disasters in Indonesia is regulated under Law No. 24/2007 on Disaster Management (BKNPB, 3 May, 2007). This law represents a significant paradigm shift in approaching natural disasters “from emergency response to risk management; from state’s authority to human rights; and from state centric to multiple actors” (MPBI, 2009). The National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB) was formed in 2008 to lead these new mitigation efforts. Similar agencies have been established at a regional level to empower local resilience to natural disasters. They develop a disaster management framework, early warning systems, organize workshops, update the disaster database, coordinate and supervise partnerships with NGOs in mitigating natural disasters, conduct post-disaster recovery operations and manage relief distribution. The Head of BNPB, Syamsul Maarif, also recently received an East Java Press Association Award in March 2010 for his contribution to Disaster Reduction Programs (BNPB, 26 April, 2010).

However, the award cannot disguise BNPB weaknesses. This agency is regularly under criticism for being slow and inadequate in responding to emergencies. According to the Ministry of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform performance ranking, the BNPB ranked at number 61 out of 74 government institutions in 2009 (Rakyat Merdeka, 13 November, 2009). The ministry admits that the government budget allocation and facilities to support BNPB are still disproportional to its burden, and that this has therefore limited BNPB activities. Nirwono Yoga, from Green Map Indonesia also affirms this. He adds that ineffective coordination with other government institutions is the main contributing factor in BNPB’s slow actions.

Besides BNPB’s weaknesses, Indonesian disaster management is still disappointing because of its inconsistent commitment to environmental protection. The Indonesian Forum for the Environment and the Indonesian Society for Disaster Management highlight some incompatibilities between Law No. 24/2007 and other regulations. They identify at least 148 regulations in Indonesia which are exploitative of, and unfriendly toward, the environment. Some examples include city plans of Java, farming license regulations, forest regulations, and mining regulations (MPBI, 13 April, 2010). These regulations tend to increase the risk of natural disasters and are counter-productive to any mitigation efforts.
FIVE: CORRUPTION

Corruption is the fifth most challenging NTS issue in Indonesia. The United Nations Convention Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division defines corruption as any purposive “bribery” or other misuse of authorities in the realm of public administration, private sectors, or independent agencies for self or other’s benefit. This is classified as a security issue because of its potential for disrupting the economic, social and political stability of a state. Corruption may lead to ineffectual public, security and defense policies. In a developing country with multi-dimensional problems such as Indonesia, corruption can have deadly impacts. For example, corruption in the health sector may close off access to medication for wide range of people; corruption in disaster relief distribution may cause victims to fail to survive; and corruption in development policies may lead the poorest people into hunger. In fact, corruption may also provoke terrorism: a corrupt government can fuel a fighting spirit and provide propaganda ammunition for terrorist organizations.

Corruption is an endemic problem in Indonesia. While it had been practiced long before the modern nation was born, corruption was first institutionalized in the government bureaucracy during the Suharto era. His authoritarian regime ensured that the existing Law No. 3/1971 of corruption eradication could not disturb the main networks of corruption within the government. McLeod (2008) reveals that the Indonesian bureaucracy was designed to collect rents from public and private sectors for the benefit of Suharto’s businesses and power. The state was governed through a complex patron-client system rather than professionalism. Recruitments and promotions in the bureaucracy tended to benefit those who were loyal to Suharto’s franchises. With poor budgets and salaries, civil servants have easily become dependent on corruption. This is how corruption becomes a daily practice and part of the culture in Indonesia. It interrupts development at all sectors and results in fragile societal, political and economic infrastructures.

The demand from civil society for clean government was one contributive factor that led to the end of Suharto’s authoritarian leadership in 1998. The post-Suharto governments therefore inherit the burden to reform. Based on a survey by Transparency International in 2009, Indonesia’s current corruption perception index is still categorized as severe, which places Indonesia as the 69th most corrupt country in the world (Transparency International Indonesia, 17 November, 2009). A similar survey, which was released by the Hong Kong-based Political & Economic Risk Consultancy in March 2010, concludes that Indonesia is the most corrupt country in the Asia Pacific region (The Jakarta Globe, 9 March, 2010). This is a caveat that Indonesia has not improved as much as it may have liked since Suharto left office.

Currently, corruption is regulated by Law No. 20/2001 of Corruption Eradication, and Law No. 7/2006 of the Ratification of the 2005 United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Mandated by the former law, the government established the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2003 to lead anti-corruption law enforcement. Its authority is regulated under Law No. 20/2002 of KPK. The Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) reveals that while KPK’s performance is still far from perfect, the commission performs qualitatively better than other law enforcement institutions.
From 2004 to 2008, KPK sent more than 80 public officers to the corruption court (KPK, 2005-2008). Among them were regional leaders, members of the legislative assembly, a former minister, Indonesian Central Bank officers and state attorneys. All of them were convicted and found guilty; each was given at least a four year jail sentence. On the other hand, in the same period, only 765 of 1,421 corruption suspects tried in the regular criminal court were found guilty. They only received, on average, six month jail sentences. This soft law enforcement against corruption in the regular criminal court raises public trust and expectations of KPK. The strengthening KPK is now widely promoted.

However, the campaign against corruption has been increasingly intricate since 2009. KPK’s leader, Antasari Azhar, has been sent to jail for murder. In the same period, Bibit Samad Riyanto and Chandra M. Hamzah, two of KPK’s deputies, are fighting allegations of bribery and the misuse of authority. The media, civil society organizations and scholars are suspicious that a scenario to impede corruption eradication in Indonesia is underway. The Indonesian public is curious as to whether these events have any connection to KPK’s investigation into corruption in the Century Bank bailout (Kompas, 19 April, 2010). Following this, a police general and former Head of the Criminal Investigation Agency, Susno Duadji, reported on a corruption network within the Indonesian Police. Just like other earlier cases, however, the validity of his report is still under investigation.

Over the past year, corruption issues have constituted the main public discourse in Indonesia, with the topic almost permanently in news headlines. This suggests that corruption is now acknowledged as a concrete national enemy.

**The character of Indonesian NTS issues**

As explained above, Indonesia is facing at least five major NTS challenges which include: (1) economic instability, particularly with regard to liberalization and the global financial crisis; (2) separatism, particularly in Papua; (3) jihadi terrorism, both in terms of violence and ideology; (4) natural disasters, either preventable or unpreventable; and (5) corruption. In analyzing the current status of these five issues, there are at least four important characters which can be highlighted.

First, the securitization of the five NTS issues tends to be widely accepted in Indonesia. The five issues are widely understood as security issues, which require higher priority and resource allocation than common public issues. Based on the Copenhagen School’s framework, a public issue requires at least three steps to be a security issue: government awareness, public acceptance and resource allocation. The five NTS issues above seem to have all attracted these three steps. The government has acknowledged the security dimension of these five issues. Official rhetoric and specific regulations relating to these five issues indicates that there are efforts to allocate resources to countering them. The wide involvement by civil society actors in making policy towards resolving these five issues affirms public acceptance of this securitization.
Second, each of the five issues is not exclusive, but they are part of the same cycle of insecurity. Economic instability, for example, may lead to job insecurity which may be conducive to social frustration and terrorism recruitment; prolonged separatism may stimulate terrorism and create an insecure environment for investments; the issue of jihadi terrorism may harm economic stability; the mismanagement of environmental and national disasters may harm the local economy and also provoke eco-terrorism; and corruption can make all efforts to mitigate the other four issues counter-productive. Overall, a failure in addressing one issue can have negative consequences for addressing the other four issues. There should be a comprehensive framework to ensure that all five issues receive proportional attention.

Third, the five most urgent issues cannot be addressed through single sector policies. A simplistic approach to these problems may result in other complications, as illustrated in the social protest in Batam towards foreign workers; the prolonged separatism in Papua as a result of discrimination; the dissemination of the radical ideology of terrorism; preventable natural disasters as a result of unsustainable development; and the creation of corruption opportunities as a result of a weak bureaucracy. These illustrations suggest that liberal trade is not only about economy, but also about social life and culture. Separatism, terrorism and corruption are not simply about crimes, but also about justice; and natural disaster may not be completely natural, but it can also be criminal. With this level of complexity, these five NTS issues require multisectoral approaches. An effective partnership between government, non-state actors, and also the international community is recommended.

Finally, the government’s position on NTS issues is sometimes problematic. While its role is vital in countering NTS issues, the government is also a part of the barriers to progress. As revealed in the previous section, all of the five issues involve problems of inadequate multisectoral coordination frameworks. This is due to the lack of resource allocation and the weak bureaucracy. Some special units, such as Detachment 88 for terrorism, BNPB for disaster management and KPK for corruption eradication, find that there are many operational difficulties in undertaking their responsibilities. This suggests that the securitization of the five NTS issues will be insignificant in practice if the government does not improve its accountability. A concrete political will to reform the bureaucracy is imperative.

The elaboration above suggests that while the five issues are widely accepted as traditional security threats, there are still complex barriers to addressing these issues. In theory, NTS issues deserve more operational support than other common public policy issues. However, in real practice, there are budget constraints and an ineffective bureaucracy, which limits any effort to respond to the five challenges. With limited resources, Indonesia should work extra hard to unpack the complexity of these issues.

**Conclusion**

This paper identifies the five most urgent NTS issues in Indonesia, which in order of priority include: (1) economic instability, particularly with regard to
Indonesia

liberalization and the global financial crisis; (2) separatism, particularly in Papua; (3) jihadi terrorism, both in terms of violence and ideology; (4) natural disaster, either preventable or unpreventable; and (5) corruption. Indonesia has attained a certain level of achievement in responding to these five NTS issues. At the least, these five issues are widely accepted as NTS issues and there are specific regulations to allocate resources to address them. Yet, there are complex barriers in implementing the regulations. Limited budgets and incompetent bureaucracy often contribute to ineffectiveness. Moreover, the absence of reliable multisectoral frameworks in facilitating these five multidimensional NTS issues sometimes leads to counterproductive results.

Therefore, Indonesia has to be more serious in designing approaches to address NTS issues. As a substantial move, reforming the state’s bureaucracy and promoting government accountability are recommended. These steps will support corruption eradication and automatically empower any efforts to counter other security challenges to Indonesia. It is time for this country to do its homework, as there is still a great deal of room for improvement.
Introduction

Recent years have seen the completion of a number of major futurist projects that attempt to forecast strategic and policy thinking into the first third of the twenty-first century. These include the US Intelligence community’s report, *Global trends 2025: A transformed world*, the ongoing Millennium Project’s *State of the future* reports, and the 2020 ideas summit held by the new Australian Government in 2007. These attempts to read and address the future reflect an understanding that the world political, economic and social structures are presently going through a unique period of major realignment, as well as reflect an underlying anxiety about the eventual security outcomes of this process. For instance, *State of the future* (2009) claims that at present:

- Half the world is vulnerable to social instability and violence due to rising food and energy prices, failing states, falling water tables, climate change, decreasing water-food-energy supply per person, desertification and increasing migrations due to political, environmental and economic conditions.

*Global trends* (2008) forecasts that in the next two decades the world will face an increased threat of nuclear war, environmental catastrophe and the decline of America as the dominant global power.

In the context of so many major, and generally bleak, projections, PICT has opened this discussion wide to the members of our Centre and created a collaborative response to the question of emerging non-traditional security challenges/threats to Australia. While by no means attempting to cover all the possibilities, or claiming to be definitive, we have chosen three main areas of discussion that we believe are of particular concern for Australia and its immediate region. These are:

1. The economic and political rise of China, India and the other BRIC nations, and the effect on Australia’s economic and resource security;
2. The potential for an increase in socially excluded communities within Australia and the region in the context of globalization, and whether marginalization, especially in young men aged 15-25 years, may lead to increased radicalization;
3. The growth of cybercrime.

In analysing these themes we have adopted two specific methodological perspectives; that security challenges today are as much about dealing with factors
that impact on the wellness, rather than the survival, of the nation state; and that many of these challenges, or supposed threats, may also simultaneously be considered national, or even regional, opportunities.

National security used to be all about the survival of the nation state, but now it is more about the wellbeing of the nation state. Security challenges today may be internal to the nation state or external. They include, amongst other things, climate change and extreme interpretations of Islam. In many ways the nation state has less capability to deal with the external challenges posed by globalization and non-state actors than it had in the past to deal with the threat posed by hostile nation states. This perspective is particularly central to the discussions below on social exclusion/radicalization and cybercrime (parts three and four), both of which are driven by non-state actors largely external to Australia, and are threats to the country’s wellbeing rather than to its territorial integrity.

Furthermore, many challenges, or threats, may also simultaneously be considered national or even regional opportunities. We believe that when considering futurist scenarios it is important not to present an overly pessimistic view, or to fall into the trap of fuelling anxiety, without also considering potential positives. An example is the economic rise of the BRIC countries, especially India and China (part two), where both success and failure have their corresponding positive and negative repercussions for Australia and the region.

The impact of China and India on Australia’s economic and resource security

Over the coming decade economic and resource security will be of critical importance for Australia’s overall security, given the importance of economic globalization to Australia’s future. In particular, Australia’s agricultural, energy and mineral commodity exports will remain vital for its future prosperity. Furthermore, the majority of Australia’s exports will continue to be destined for Asia-Pacific markets and consequently the future security of China, India, Japan and South Korea will be vital for our overall security.

In particular, China and India have emerged as key growth countries in the global economy and are likely to be even more important over the next decade. The long-term shifts in the global economy at a macro-scale are outlined by the US National Intelligence Council (2008, p. 7):

In terms of size, speed, and directional flow, the global shift in relative wealth and economic power now under way – roughly from west to east – is without precedent in modern history. This shift derives from two sources. First, sustained increases in oil and commodity prices have generated windfall profits for the Gulf States and Russia. Second, relatively low labor costs combined with certain government policies have shifted the locus of manufacturing and some service industries to Asia [...] These shifts are the driving force behind globalization that [...] is a meta-trend, transforming historic patterns of
economic flows and underlying stocks, creating pressures for rebalancing that are painful for both rich and poor countries.

Australia is well located to benefit over the next decade from the global shifts in economic power to Asia. Because of their need to import minerals to support rapid industrialization China and India offer the greatest opportunities for Australia’s economic security, but their rise will also pose significant challenges. This section looks first at emerging opportunities, then at the challenges, and finally evaluates the potential for the emergence of a future robust China-India economic and security configuration in the model of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China).

ECONOMIC SECURITY OPPORTUNITIES

Australia’s long-term economic security position is benefiting from the trends identified in the US National Intelligence Council report. China and, to a lesser extent, India have become key trading partners for Australia. China has become Australia’s largest export market with almost one-quarter of its exports, whereas in the late-1990s it took less than 5% (Battellino, 2009). India is of lesser importance in trade, but its role is also rising rapidly, taking 7% of Australia’s exports in 2009. Both countries’ role in Australia’s trade is likely to continue rising over the next decade.

While China’s role as a supplier of foreign investment in Australia has risen in recent years with well-publicised and often controversial investment proposals, its overall share of the stock of foreign investment is still relatively small. India’s role as a foreign investor in Australia is also quite small. It is likely that Australia will need significant injections of foreign capital from these capital surplus countries in the future.

Over the next decade it is also likely that trade and investment with both countries will expand rapidly. Australia offers key advantages for large resource-hungry countries that are rapidly industrialising. Both China and India want to improve their resource security by investing in supplier countries and Australia provides a safe, reliable and cheap means of achieving such long-term goals in a wide range of minerals and agricultural products.

Furthermore, China has been growing rapidly as a supplier of imports to Australia. This trend is likely to continue over the next decade, partly because of its shift into more sophisticated manufacturing industries. China is likely to displace industrial imports from Australia’s traditional suppliers, Europe and the US.

ECONOMIC SECURITY THREATS

Australia is fortunate to be located near two of the emerging giants in the global economy, both of which are deficient in many of the resources that Australia has in abundance. However, several conflict areas between Australia, China and India are likely over the next decade.
OVER-RELIANCE ON THE CHINESE MARKET

An emerging threat for Australia and other Asia-Pacific countries is their growing heavy reliance on China as an export market destination. The huge growth of the Chinese market has been a major positive for these countries, especially during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) since traditional export markets of Japan, the US and Europe have experienced a severe economic downturn. The reliance on the Chinese market is likely to rise over the next decade since the traditional western hubs of the global economy are unlikely to resume their growth for several years.

Some of the dangers of over-reliance on China include:

- China wants to integrate backwards and purchase Australian mineral and energy companies. The danger is that the prices paid for commodities produced by Chinese-owned companies could be manipulated, thus leading to lower Australian government taxes and export income.
- The dispute in 2009 between Rio Tinto and China was dramatically escalated, with the imprisonment of a number of Rio Tinto’s executives. It illustrated the fallacy of the belief that Chinese state and commercial interests can be kept separate.
- Soft-power pressure from China on Australian foreign policy is more potent when a large percentage of export income is reliant on one customer. For example, China may increase its pressure on the Australian government over such issues as Taiwan relations or criticism of Chinese policy in Tibet or Xinjiang.

Therefore it is of considerable importance for Australian policy makers to encourage the emergence of markets in other countries as a counterbalance to China. Clearly, India is already rising in importance as a market for Australian goods and provides significant computer software and outsourcing services for Australian companies. Furthermore, India is a major source of migrants to Australia. Indian companies are likely to invest more heavily in Australian resources over the next decade as India expands its growth profile. Australia’s economic security would be significantly improved if India became a counterweight to China.

INTERNAL WEAKNESSES IN CHINA AND INDIA

Australia’s emerging reliance on China and India means that it will rely on the domestic stability of both countries. China and India suffer from a wide range of domestic problems. These include:

- Domestic social cohesion and political stability

China has experienced rising regional inequality from the early-1980s as it opened up to globalization. This inequality primarily reflects lagging rural incomes compared with booming incomes in cities. Many have expressed the fear that China will become politically destabilized by this inequality. While this issue is important and likely to continue over the next decade, it is important not to over-emphasize the significance of rural unrest, most of which is due to illegal or unfair land acquisition.
Australia currently relies on massive infrastructure spending (roads, railways and housing) as well as rapid industrial development of both countries. The ongoing spread of development throughout China and India over the next decade is crucial for Australia’s economic future. Such developments will create massive long-term opportunities for Australia’s mineral and energy exporters. On the other hand, any domestic destabilization will negatively impact on Australia’s exports.

- Environmental degradation and climate change

Rapid economic growth in China and India has led to massive environmental degradation and this situation is likely to worsen over the next decade. Already, both countries are suffering significant losses in industry and agriculture, as well as a worsening quality of life for their citizens. For example, the North China Plain is already facing significant water availability problems and water quality is very poor. This situation is highly likely to worsen over the next decade. Similarly, water availability and quality in India is deteriorating, with poor villagers unable to afford ever-deeper wells to irrigate their crops.

Climate change may have significant negative effects on China and India over the next decade, although many of the issues are likely to be long-term. However, melting of glaciers at the headwaters of Chinese and Indian rivers is already leading to greater river flow fluctuations in both countries. Other impacts (for example, rising temperatures and more irregular rainfall) are likely to be apparent over the next decade.

Any further reduction of economic growth in China and India because of environmental degradation would impact on Australia’s economic security because of a reduced demand for Australian commodity exports. Furthermore, rising carbon dioxide emissions in China and India would indirectly harm Australia because of accelerated global warming.

- Food security

Food security is a major issue for both China and India and is closely related to the above discussion of environmental degradation. A reduction in food security in both countries would dramatically expand opportunities for Australian agricultural exports. Unfortunately, it is likely that Australia will also suffer from declining output, since climate change models predict a significant decline in rainfall and higher temperatures in the Murray-Darling basin as a result of global warming.

**THE EMERGENCE OF A ROBUST CHINA/INDIA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY CONFIGURATION?**

Over the past decade the developing world has made a number of attempts at formalizing a coherent agenda on economic and security issues. Led by the four large...
economies of China, India, Russia and Brazil, emerging inter-governmental groups such as BRIC, the Shanghai Corporation Organisation, and the G-15 provide a forum for the expression of solidarity, but as of yet they have not progressed beyond intent in any real sense.

However, over the next ten years this situation is likely to change, with the member states of these groups either being encouraged towards further collaboration or increased competition. The configuration of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) is particularly interesting as it groups four emerging economies with almost half the global population. The BRIC configuration can, therefore, be used as a case study to determine whether future economic and security collaborations between the emergent regional powers of China and India are likely.

The success factor of an inter-governmental group is driven by common philosophy, interests and expectations in the political, economic and security field. However, the BRIC configuration struggles to identify key attributes that will contribute towards its strength. These include:

• **Common value systems**

  The partnerships among the developed countries find strength and common ground on democratic values and governance systems. At the political level, however, the BRIC partnership is confronted with multiple political systems; democracies, pseudo-democracies and one-party systems. Rather than complement and strengthen relations, it tends to have a distancing effect on each other.

• **Economic collaboration or competition**

  At the economic level, trade between the emerging economies is on the rise. It is likely that China will replace the US as India’s largest trading partner over the next few years (Muthiah, 2010, p. 29). At present the Indian economy is extensively weighted on the service sector while the Chinese economy is based on manufacturing and construction (ibid.). Yet, as the Indian economy expands into manufacturing, the two emerging economies will be forced to compete for markets.

  Access to resources, technology and finances will be the prime factors that will spur competition among the emerging economies, especially between China and India. In terms of resources, access to energy security will be a key attribute that will determine competitiveness and growth. Already China has invested in oil exploration in Africa and Central Asia, with India also following with similar investments.

• **Strategic rivalries**

  The access to energy reserves is important and likely to remain increasingly so over the next ten years, with logistics of uninterrupted energy transport a concerning factor. China is expanding its naval capability in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and South China Sea to safeguard the vital sea-lanes of communication. There is also investment in terrestrial pipelines from gas fields in Central Asia.

  Similar developments have also been witnessed in India, China and Russia, with significant modernization of their naval capabilities. The reach of Chinese naval power, especially in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea which both extend
beyond the Chinese sphere of influence, is a point of mistrust between China and India (Garver, 2002). Chinese investments in acquiring maritime assets in Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka recently have raised concern in New Delhi. The status of the Tibetan government in exile operating from India, Chinese occupation of Kashmir (Aksai Chin) and the disputed McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh are also points of contention in the relationship that have the potential to become flashpoints in the near future.

CONCLUSION

The competition for energy security and access to resources will continue to shape the security agenda of China and India. Over the next decade, groups such as BRIC that have limited political and security coherence among members, will find it a challenge to build strong links for cooperation. While BRIC, or other future configurations like it, can play a role in providing a forum, space and opportunity for discussion and debate, the next decade is unlikely to see the emerging powers develop a feasible collaborative arrangement at the politico-economic level. For the foreseeable future, Australian interests with the BRIC countries will continue to have to be developed at a bilateral level to secure opportunities in these emerging economies.

Social exclusion and demographic armament

Australia sits at the centre of a number of large-scale population movements and demographic changes that are forecast to accelerate over the coming decade. These include an expanding youth population in an arc across the region to Australia’s immediate north and east, while simultaneously Australia will see a declining birth rate at home that will only be reversed through immigration. Migration into Australia will increasingly be from the small states across its region, as well as from the emerging economic, and possibly cultural, superpowers of China and India.

These developments will provide a series of opportunities and pose a number of challenges. Opportunities include the further integration of Australia into an economic and socially dynamic region, as well as the direct harnessing of human and economic capital through the continuing pursuit of a multicultural domestic agenda. Yet the possibility that significant challenges to national, and even regional, security may emerge from these demographic changes is real. These will largely depend on whether communities undergoing the stresses of rapid demographic change feel themselves to be socially excluded, economically marginalized, and have the potential to become mobilized against their wider communities.

Over the coming decade socially excluded groups will continue to feel they are excluded by mainstream society from participating fully in its economic, social and political life (Yasmeen, 2008). However, in the context of an increasingly
globalized twenty-first century, questions of social inclusion/exclusion will take on an interregional, and even global, character. Social exclusion will pose a threat to national security when marginalized groups decide that it is in their interest to take social or political action against their wider communities, and over the next ten years this has the potential to occur at a regional as well as domestic level.

REGIONAL DEMOGRAPHIC ARMAMENT AND THE YOUTH BULGE

In contrast to declining birth rates in much of the Northern Hemisphere many of Australia’s neighbor states continue to experience rapidly expanding populations. The population responsible for most civil crime, the 15 to 25-year-old fighting-age male, is also the population most likely to be recruited to staff the criminal and non-state organizations that may engage in security crime. Over the next ten years an arc of states from Timor-Leste through Papua New Guinea to wider Melanesia are likely to suffer from an increasingly criminalized underclass of young men who find themselves unable to benefit from the processes of globalization.

Globalization has seen products, processes, capital, information, technology and raw materials increasingly shake off the shackles of geography but the laboring class remains, on the whole, grounded. State economies that cannot provide for the aspirations of this cohort place themselves and their neighbors at risk. Groups of unemployed and underemployed young men in the Asia-Pacific region, denied the pathways to realize their aspirations, denied reasonable opportunities to partake in the consumption that is presented to them in the media, and denied an appropriate identity as persons worthy of respect, are not acting rationally if they simply stand by. For them the status quo holds little promise.

Sociologist Gunnar Heinsohn (2003, cited in Caldwell 2009, p. 225) “argues that the violent acts of young men may have nothing to do with any ideological vision”. His thesis is that a society experiencing a bulge in population age structure, caused by an excess of young men particularly, is automatically headed for strife. This youth bulge places additional pressure on young men looking to “wrest a position of respectability from an otherwise indifferent society” (ibid. p. 226). The youth bulge occurs when 15 to 25-year-old “fighting-age” males make up one third of the males of a society. The case is so strong that Heinsohn (2006, pp. 20-21) refers to populations building towards these levels as undergoing a process of “demographic armament”. Furthermore, research by Population Action International (Leahy et al., no date) establishes that age structure has a significant and identifiable influence on a society’s governance, development and security. “Between 1970 and 1999, 80 percent of all new outbreaks of civil conflicts occurred in countries in which 60 percent or more of the population was under age 30” (ibid., p. 22).

That feelings of un-wantedness, economic marginalization and existential angst can lead to criminality among young men rings true conceptually and is well supported empirically. “It shouldn’t be surprising to learn that elderly people are not very criminally intent: the average sixty-five-year-old is about one-fiftieth as likely to be arrested as the average teenager” (Levitt & Dubner, 2005, p. 124). As young men search, consciously or unconsciously, for social support, comradeship, reduced
uncertainty, the benefits of diffused responsibility and a resolution of feelings of
cognitive dissonance, they tend to clump together in football teams, street gangs,
religious groups or even terrorist cells. Christina and Semple (2009, p. 44) note
that even “insurgent networks cohere as much on the basis of social and economic
interests as on political and ideological grounds”.

Hence, the population responsible for 75% of crime, the 15 to 25-year-old male
(Edwards, 2005 & AIC, 2008), is also the population most likely to be recruited to
staff the criminal and non-state organizations that may threaten state and regional
security. The potential for young males to tear down social and political arrangements
that fail to give reward is substantial. The 9/11 Commission Report (2006) found a
significant and growing population of young Muslim men with little or no prospects
of meaningful and ongoing work to be “a sure prescription for social turbulence”.

Populations of young men, without sufficient prospect of a return on investment
in the status quo, are easily convinced of the legitimacy of a rebellion against it. Their
motivation is then built around perceptions of unfairness (see Moghaddam, 2005)
and an identity as rebels and as harbingers of a new order. Marginalization breeds
discontent, and the discontented and disenfranchised are open to radicalization
and to being co-opted by criminal and anti-state organizations. This “depraved-on-
accounta-I’m-deprived” argument (Caldwell, 2009, p. 225) can be overused, but its
essential validity suggests that emerging trends of horizontal, or demographic-based,
social exclusion will pose significant challenges to regional security over the coming
decade.

Using current population age structures based on CIA, UN and OECD research
(see http://www.nationmaster.com.graph), countries in the region that are apparently
engaging in demographic armament include the Solomons, Laos, Kiribati, the
Marshals, Papua New Guinea, the Federated States of Micronesia, Timor-Leste,
Cambodia, Tonga, Vanuatu and Fiji. The median age for males in Fiji and Indonesia
is 27, in Vanuatu it is 24, in Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste it is 21 and declining.
While every state is unstable in its own way, the mixture of groups excluded from the
fruits of globalization, a youth bulge, and weak political institutions is particularly
volatile in that it will continue to create a situation in which young men are increasingly
more likely to repudiate their side of the social contract.

SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND MIGRATION WITHIN AUSTRALIA

Over the next decade the impact of changes to Australia’s demographic makeup
due to immigration have the potential to dramatically increase levels of social
exclusion within both migrant and longer-established Australian communities.
Ongoing demographic change could exacerbate social instability, with Anglo-Celtic
youth reacting to perceived disenfranchisement in the face of increased ethnic
migration, and migrant individuals and second-generation immigrant populations
facing an increased lack of social acceptance within the wider Australian society.
In both cases a process of demographic armament could result in higher levels of
communal violence and radicalization in marginalized youth communities. In extreme
cases there is the possibility that some may engage in acts of homegrown terrorism.
As a nation built on successive waves of immigration, but with a history of cultural and racial exclusionary policies put in place to attempt to control this process, Australia is particularly vulnerable to the challenges of social exclusion and demographic armament. As set out in the December 2008 National Security Statement to the Australian Parliament by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, the “impact of demographic change” is one of the emerging national security concerns facing Australia. While internationally, migration has moved up the scale of important issues facing the countries of the developed world, so that now it is at the top of the policy agenda of the G8 countries (IOM, 2009).

The following statistics highlight the diverse nature of Australia’s demographic makeup:

- As at June 2008, 5.5 million migrants from over 200 countries living in Australia were born overseas, over one quarter of the population.
- In March 2009 the Australian population was 21,779,000. Nett overseas migration (278,200 persons) contributed 63% to the total population growth over the previous year.
- There are approximately four million migrants in Australia, making it the eleventh-largest host country for migrants in the world.
- Nearly one in four Australians are born overseas, nearly half of all Australians were either born overseas or have one or more parents born overseas and up to one in five Australians speak a language other than English at home.
- In September 2009, Treasurer Wayne Swan announced that Australia’s rate of population growth would approach 65%, to 35 million by 2049. This will mainly occur through increased immigration (SMH, 2009).

Australia is a generally cohesive and inclusive society, but the increasing pressure of migration in the near term poses challenges, particularly in preventing social instability among vulnerable migrant populations, who may become marginalized and potentially radicalized within their own communities. There has been a significant shift on the issue of multiculturalism in wider Australian society, with many claiming that migrant minorities, in particular Islamic individuals, should either “love it, or leave it” in regards to Australia. There has also been considerable debate on how much culture ethnic minorities have to give up before they are considered a part of Australia. Simultaneously, the sense of Muslims being the ‘other’ has increased in recent years (Yasmeen, 2008). The excessive emphasis on the War on Terror and Muslim extremism has created some fear among the wider society of Muslims. This fear contributes to mutual exclusion.

An example of this phenomenon of lower tolerance to multiculturalism within Australia is abundantly clear in the Cronulla riots of December 2005, which stemmed from ethnically motivated confrontations between Muslim youths and other Australians. There was a gathering of nearly 5000 people, most of Anglo-Celtic background in order to “reclaim the beach” after two youths of Middle Eastern
extraction attacked Cronulla lifesavers earlier in the week. Violence broke out due to a combination of mob mentality and alcohol and many non Anglo-Celtic individuals were attacked and assaulted. Three years later, in October 2008, Attorney-General Robert McClelland warned that the racial tensions that sparked the 2005 Cronulla riots are still simmering in Australia (Bergin, 2009).

The Cronulla riots illustrate the power of the vented frustrations of 15 to 25-year-old fighting-age males when coupled with perceived social exclusion and possible economic marginalization. Although Australia has lower youth unemployment rates than other OECD countries (prior to the current economic crisis, only 10% of young unemployed Australians were unemployed for more than a year, compared to an OECD average of 19.6%) (OECD, 2009), winning the hearts and minds of young people within vulnerable communities will be important in the coming decade. It is important to underline that vulnerable communities will comprise both those of traditional Anglo-Celtic extraction as well as newer, and presumably more socially fragile, groups.

The Somali community is an example of a new migrant community in Australia that is socially and economically marginalized and vulnerable. In the state of Victoria, Somali-born Australians have recorded unemployment rates approaching 50%. While this is not unusual amongst a migrant population establishing new lives in a new land, this figure indicates that for some recent arrivals there are extreme levels of disadvantage that must be addressed for these migrant communities to thrive. There is also evidence that members of emerging African Muslim youth communities feel excluded on both religious and racial grounds, and the Australian Federal Police have turned their attention to radicalism among Somalis (Bergin, 2009).

Such high levels of economic/social marginalization and exclusion can breed discontent, and the discontented and disenfranchised, especially the young, are open to radicalization and to being co-opted by criminal and anti-state organizations. This “depraved-on-account-of-being-deprived” hypothesis is supported by the 2009 arrest of four Somali-Australians in connection with a suicide plot by Al-Shabaab supporters to storm a Sydney military base.

CONCLUSION

Over the next five to ten years migrant groups within Australia will continue to struggle to find social inclusion within the broader community. As a result, Australia will need to develop new soft power approaches to improve social cohesion through community policing and engagement to combat the development of marginalized communities. Over this period, levels of migration could be exacerbated by regional insecurity and destabilization, such as the early effects of rising sea levels in response to climate change, in areas adjacent to Australia, such as Papua New Guinea or the wider Pacific. Simultaneously, these areas will feel the effects of an increasingly marginalized and angry youth bulge leading to a process of demographic armament.
The potential for future social marginalization, dislocation, violence, and even home-grown terrorism within Australia and its region cannot be dismissed.

Cybercrime and cyber security

Over the coming decade cybercrime will continue to evolve as one of the major threats to the wellbeing of citizens in states across the globe. At present cybercrime is a global growth industry and the trends that will affect the remainder of the world will also be significant threats to Australia. When national security is defined to include the wellbeing of the state and its constituent citizens, cybercrime has the potential to pose serious and prolonged challenges to state security in Australia and across the region.

Cybercrime can be defined as either crimes created by the Internet, including Internet banking fraud; the creation of botnets; system intrusion (hacking); and distributed denial of service attacks (DoS), and traditional crimes aided by the Internet, including frauds and scams; child sex exploitation; money laundering; and terrorism.

WEB 3.0 AND A FIVE YEAR OUTLOOK

Any prediction of future security challenges resulting from cybercrime needs to take into account the law of accelerating returns whereby technology expands at an exponential, rather than linear, rate. This exponential nature of computer development and its rapidly increasing integration into daily life (Web 2.0 leading to Web 3.0) makes predicting computer related developments more than five years ahead impractical.

For instance, over the next five years personal computer use will increasingly shape almost every aspect of daily life in Australia. The latest RBA submission (2009) noted that the implementation of the National Broadband Network phone porting and wire transfers could have a significant impact on the increase of cybercrime.

At the same time, the integration of a person’s personal life into distributed computer networks will accelerate, especially in the young. Recent research from the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC, 2009) indicates that social networking sites will continue to be a significant source of concern, due to grooming activities perpetrated by cybercriminals in order to gather personal details and the poor security-related behaviors of younger participants. It is important to note that despite better education and awareness, and having grown up with the Internet, Gen Y and Gen Z (iGen) continue to exhibit poor security behaviors on social networking sites. For the foreseeable future, human factors will remain a significant component of cybercrime. Continuing education and awareness is required and it is important to realize that Gen Y and iGen are not immune to making the same mistakes as older computer users.

Taken together, these factors – the exponential rate of technological development, the increasing integration of computer technology into daily life, and the continual use of social networking sites – limit the predictive ability of this paper to a five year, rather than a ten year, horizon.
THE EMERGING TREND

There is little coordinated and up-to-date information available to help track emerging cybercrime trends. What is available is mainly industry-based, which may show a bias towards product sales, but can be used to indicate the shape of things to come.

Various surveys published by consulting firms (The sixth annual global security survey, 2008) and security tool vendors (AVG, 2008) strongly suggest a continuing upwards trend in industry-based incidents of cybercrime. In terms of commercial exposure to cybercrime, all areas of industry are experiencing security incidents, as shown in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: Rate of industry-based cyber attacks in Australia](chart)

The trends are transnational and, somewhat surprisingly, appear to have little relationship to the emerging technologies used in business. The enduring impression from these reports is that people continue to be the issue, that people are the targets, and that people continue to make poor decisions in relation to risk. This human element can be considered a constant to be factored into any considerations of the future.

THE FUTURE OF CYBERCRIME: THE INCREASED CRIMINALIZATION OF CYBER ATTACKS

Since 2003 there has been a major shift in cyber attacks away from noisy malicious software (malware) such as worms like Melissa, Code Red, Nimda and
Sasser, towards types of less detectable infiltrating software under the control of organized criminal syndicates. This earlier malware was generally intended to spread quickly and announce itself, and had been essentially about bragging rights for the authors within the hacking community. Increasingly, however, the new motivation is criminal profit, with malicious software becoming stealthier and focused on capturing passwords and using compromised systems as a part of a wider botnet.

Over the next five years the consolidation and increased global penetration of organized criminal syndicates is set to continue. At present these groups are mainly based in Eastern Europe and to lesser extent in Nigeria and Brazil, but over this period similar gangs will probably begin to appear in Asia in larger numbers. Increasingly, one of the features of Eastern European organized cybercrime is the mixture of legitimate and criminal enterprises. For instance, the St Petersburg organized crime group, Tambov used its PTK petroleum company’s IT division to conduct phishing attacks, and then reinvested the stolen money into research and development. This level of sophistication in organized crime financing and high maturity and functionality in attacks will continue to grow over the next five years and probably beyond.

**BOTNETS**

Over the next five years the major form of malicious software used by organized cybercrime will remain the botnet. A botnet is a series of compromised computers, infected by malware, that are organized together into a network. Because any one compromised computer in this network is indistinguishable from one that is uninfected, botnets have become the most prevalent tool used by cybercriminals. Botnets are used for sending spam, hosting phishing sites, hosting mule recruitment sites, for proxying all kinds of Internet traffic, for inserting Trojans to log passwords to, and as infection points for malware. This multi-usefulness will ensure that botnets will continue to be a key part of cybercrime groups’ arsenals in the foreseeable future. It can be predicted that over this period the control of botnets will become less centralized and become peer-to-peer enabled. This will further enhance the ability for cybercrime syndicates to work globally and avoid detection.

At the same time, a vulnerability gap will continue to grow in favor of the attacker, allowing an ever-greater number of computers to be infiltrated and co-opted as part of a botnet. As operating systems and applications have grown in complexity, so have the number of bugs that provide an opportunity for malicious compromise. For example, the lines of code in Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 numbered about 10 million but with Microsoft Vista it is over 50 million. This increase in complexity will continue over the next five years and with it will emerge a number of new vulnerabilities.

**BOTNETS AND CREDENTIAL STASHES**

With the massive growth of botnets there is an increasingly vast sea of compromised systems spread throughout Australia and the globe (estimated currently at more than seven million computers worldwide). As a result, all sorts of personal and institutional information (credentials) have been captured for potential future use.
Potential high-risk targets for future on-line fraud include cashed up superannuation funds and on-line broking services. However, any system using the same data inputted via a computer is potentially vulnerable. In fact, a great number of credentials have probably already been compromised but as yet have not been used. Amongst these vast stashes are large numbers of credentials for social networking sites such as Facebook. While this provides a massive opportunity for identity takeover in the near future, it is more likely the systems with readily available monetary capital, such as online superannuation and broking sites, will be seen as more easily exploitable by cybercriminals over the next five years.

PHISHING (PASSWORD FISHING)

Over the next five years social engineering (the use of a person’s private details to perpetrate fraud) will continue to be a key part of cyber attacks. Phishing at its simplest is merely an attack to trick the user to think they are communicating with their real bank in order to gain their password.

The Commonwealth Bank of Australia was the target of the first documented phishing attack on an Internet Bank in March 2003. The Ukrainian Alex Mosh, a leading spammer, was the CTO of the hosting company of this site. Within weeks the same company also hosted phishing sites targeting both Westpac and ANZ. Internet crime means these criminal groups in one country have immediate global reach. Unfortunately while this Eastern European connection has grown, no Russian or Ukrainian has been arrested for any Australian attack to date despite visits by Australian law enforcement to Eastern Europe as early as 2003 to respond to reported cybercrime.

The Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007 Personal fraud survey conducted during July to December 2007 portrays an equally worrying picture, suggesting that a significant portion of the population over the age of 15 have been subject to fraud, sometimes repeatedly. The experience of repetition is mirrored in the 2009 UK Office of Fair Trading scam report, which suggests that experience is not a good indicator of protection. There are no later statistics available, but the most recent reports suggest that human factors continue to play an important role in phishing and that as yet the rate of phishing success shows no sign of decline.

Taken together these factors – the prevalence of phishing attacks, the global reach of organised crime perpetrating these attacks and the difficulty of prosecution, as well as the apparent continuing naivety of computer users – all suggest that online fraud and phishing attacks will continue to gain pace over the next five years.

CYBER ESPIONAGE

Recently claims of state sponsored cyber spying have been levelled at China by the US, Germany and others. Targets have allegedly included Australia’s Rio Tinto. Based on the evidence in the public domain it is unclear whether these are acts of government, a proxy or a by-product of the high level of cybercrime activity. Given the significant level of system compromise across the Internet it is not surprising that systems which may have interest to spy agencies are vulnerable. Whether China’s
information warriors are weaponizing the Internet or merely playing catch up with the US (Ranum 2010) is yet to be established.

DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS (DOS)

Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are coordinated strikes on an Internet site which flood servers with traffic thus taking the site offline. Currently, as with the use of botnets, this technique is also becoming increasingly criminalized, with a move from apparent childish experimentation, as with the DoS attacks on CNN, EBay, Amazon and CNN in 2000 by a 15-year-old Canadian, to a tool of blackmail used by organized criminal syndicates. DoS attacks were first used in this way in 2003 by Eastern European organized crime gangs to blackmail online betting organizations and casinos. In Australia, DoS attacks have since been used to disrupt response efforts by Australian Banks (2006/2007) and AusCERT (2006).

DoS attacks will continue to be a tool of choice used by cybercrime groups to cause disruption to Internet sites, hold companies at ransom, and disrupt response teams. Although outside the scope of this paper, DoS attacks on government military, social and critical infrastructure sites will also continue to be a prime weapon used by state-based cyber-warriors. In response, the hardening of critical government sites is becoming an ever-higher priority in Australia and abroad, while the prevalence of withholding access to computer-based resources is becoming more common in the commercial world, primarily outside Australia.

CONCLUSION: FUTURE ABILITY TO RESPOND TO AN ATTACK

As reported in industry news (Tung, 2008) 55 representative organisations from Australia failed to repel cyber attacks during the Cyber Storm II cyberwar-game event in 2008. Cyber Storm III is scheduled for late 2010 and will provide more up-to-date information relating to industry capabilities and, more importantly, better statistics relating to rates and areas of improvement since Cyber Storm II.

However, Cyber Storm II demonstrated that, despite some years of publicity, education, tool and technology availability, technology advance and improved industry awareness, there were still significant weaknesses that led to successful exploits in all areas of business. There is a reasonable expectation that industry will respond in a similar manner and show no significant improvement in 2010 or, indeed, in 2015.
The nexus between illicit networks and WMD proliferation: The case study of North Korea

North Korea has proven capable of successfully advancing its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs over the past decades despite isolation and sanctions imposed by the international community. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been able to import a variety of materials, equipments, machineries, technologies, knowledge and information required for its weapon programs through the combined use of both legitimate and clandestine international trade networks. North Korea has also been skilful in sustaining its arms export to foreign countries. It is estimated that this arms trade, operating under the command of the Workers Party of North Korea, amounts to more than US$1 billion a year, and constitutes a vital part of the North Korean economy (Kim, 2009). In order to sustain this clandestine economy, North Korea has developed sophisticated procurement skills, both for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional weapons that exploit points of weakness in international non-proliferation efforts.

North Korea’s WMD programs have a direct implication for Japan’s homeland defense and hence are at the heart of Japan’s security concerns. Constraining North Korea’s WMD capabilities is a top priority of Japan’s security agenda, and Japan has invested a significant amount of effort to enforce sanctions on the North. Even so, North Korea continues to use its operatives within Japan and abroad in order to procure illicitly a variety of goods and information. North Korea also continues to export arms to earn foreign currency in order to sustain its WMD program.

North Korea employs front companies and networks, in Japan and beyond, for the procurement of dual-use technologies, equipments and information. A body of analysis exists in English that examines North Korea’s role in the “A. Q. Khan network”, an illicit nuclear smuggling network that was centered on the Pakistani

1 The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not represent those of the Research Institute for Science and Technology for Society or its research sponsors. Also, this article is an updated and expanded version of the article by K. Furukawa (November, 2007).
nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan (Albright, 2010; Franz & Collins, 2008; Corera, 2009; Fitzpatrick, 2007). Yet, other cases of North Korea’s illicit procurement and proliferation involving Japan, China, Europe and the former Soviet Union region over the past decade have not been analyzed systematically to bring to light the pattern of North Korea’s illicit activities. This paper explores cases of North Korean operations in Japan and abroad that demonstrate the nexus between illicit networks and WMD proliferation, and explains the adaptive and complex character of such illicit networks. It concludes with policy suggestions for addressing the challenges associated with this nexus.

SCOPE AND DEFINITION

Weapons of Mass Destruction can be defined as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and associated vehicles, including missiles. Yet, this paper will also refer to cases of the proliferation of conventional weapons that have similarities with the patterns of WMD proliferation. In this paper, “illicit networks” are defined as those networks, whether legal or illegal, that engage in activities not in conformity with (or in contravention of) international and domestic laws and regulations related to non-proliferation; including the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718 (2006), which prohibits the transaction of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology related to WMD or missiles.

The case of North Korean clandestine networks in Japan

CHOSSEN SOREN

North Koreans have been operating clandestine networks for espionage and smuggling within Japan since the late 1940s (Abe & Kimura, 2008). Rampant smuggling was conducted between Japan and North Korea from the late 1940s through to the 1950s. The Japanese Communist Party used ethnic Koreans in Japan to smuggle heroin from the Korean Peninsula. In September 1950, the Japanese police revealed North Korean spy networks in Japan and arrested a key Korean spy who had collected information about US Forces in Japan (Abe & Kimura, 2008, pp. 49-50). Even after this incident, North Korea tried to construct successive spy networks in Japan in order to collect information about the Japanese economy, politics, and South Korean military activities, and also to establish business infrastructure for smuggling and trade with Japan. The Japanese police continued to expose such networks and arrested North Korean operatives in 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1958 (Abe & Kimura, 2008, pp. 49-51).

In 1955 North Korean-origin Japanese formed the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, known as the Chosren. Based on a predecessor organization, the League of Koreans (Choren), the Chosren was composed of communist sympathizers whose aim was the reunification of South Korea into the communist North (Abe & Kimura, 2008, pp. 35-48). These ethnic North Korean Japanese have a complex history. The discrimination they faced in Japan was a
motivating factor for their involvement in various illicit activities, including yakuza activities and drug trafficking. In addition, many Chosen Soren members were loyal to North Korea, and some were suspected to have engaged in clandestine operations in Japan, such as spying and abductions as well as economic activities (both legal and illegal), under the direction of Pyongyang. For example, in 1957 the Chosen Soren established “Study Units (学習組),” local units with the objective to engage in ideological indoctrination and clandestine operations (Abe & Kimura, 2008, p. 47). Also, a clandestine operation unit called Naktonggang (洛東江) is believed to have engaged in a variety of illegal activities, including the abduction of Japanese citizens.

In the meantime, North Korea lobbied influential Japanese politicians, businessmen, journalists and opinion leaders to resume bilateral trade with Japan. As a result, bilateral trade was gradually legalized after 1956. North Korea originally obtained technologies from Japan through bilateral exchange of technicians, through various vehicles including the Japan-North Korea Trading Association (日朝貿易会), established in 1956, and the Japan-North Korea Committee on Cooperation for Science and Technology, established in 1965. Japanese trading companies, such as Toko Trading Corporation (東工物産), Wako Trade Corporation (和光交易) and Tokai Trading Corporation (東海商事), played an important role in developing bilateral trade (Abe & Kimura, 2008, pp. 66-76). In 1965 and 1969, Japanese companies joined commercial exhibitions in Pyongyang and displayed various industrial machines and precision measurement instruments, most of which were afterward sold to the North, including radioactivity measuring instruments essential for uranium refinement (Abe & Kimura, 2008, p. 92).

From the late 1950s through to the early 1980s, the Chosen Soren initiated a major public campaign to seduce ethnic Koreans and their families in Japan to immigrate to the North. Eventually, a total of around 100,000 people migrated to North Korea, constructing diverse networks among the family members, relatives and friends left behind in Japan. Afterward, North Korea was able to use these networks to procure various materials, equipment, machinery, information and technologies (Abe & Kimura, 2008, p. 199).

BACKGROUND OF KAKYO

Sometime in the 1950s, or shortly before, Chosen Soren created the Korean Association of Science and Technology (KAST), or Kakyo, as it is known in Japan, an association of scientists and engineers of North Korean origin resident in Japan. Kakyo has since made substantive contributions to the development of science and technology in North Korea by providing a wide range of information, as well as equipment and machinery.

Sources differ on the history of Kakyo. While the Chosen Soren’s official website states that Kakyo was established in June 1959, a report by an independent North Korea specialist places its origins in June 1946, when the Association of the Scientists of North Korean Residents in Japan (Zainihon Chosen Kagakusha Kyokai) was established (Al-Kuffar, 17 April, 2007). According to this report, the organization was reorganized in May 1954 into the Association of the Natural Science and
Technology of North Korean Residents in Japan (Zainihon Chosenjin Shizen Kagaku Gijutsu Kyokai). Similarly, in the Kansai area, in western Japan, the Association of the Natural Scientists of North Korean Residents in Japan (Zainihon Chosen Shizen Kagakusha Kyokai) was established in July 1953. In 1959, these two entities were merged to form a new Association of the Natural Scientists and Technological Experts of North Korean Resident in Japan (Zainihon Chosenjin Shizen Kagaku Gijutsusha Kyokai). After several institutional regroupings, Kakyo was established in its current form in 1985 (Al-Kuffar, 17 April, 2007; Open Source Center, 2006).

Today Kakyo has its headquarters in Tokyo, with 12 branches located throughout Japan. In addition, Kakyo is believed to have eight professional committees: mathematics, physics, chemical materials, biological and agricultural researches, automation robotics, computer, construction and electronics; although the Chosen Soren official website states that Kakyo has seven committees without providing any details (Open Source Center, 2006: Chosen Soren 2007). Many Kakyo members have specialized in areas of physics and engineering (Open Source Center, 2006). According to a January 2006 analysis:

The association’s own documents, as well as Japanese, GAKRJ [Chosen Soren], and DPRK media, show that Kakyo is a nation-wide network of resident Korean scientists, engineers, and manufacturers committed to using their technical expertise to aid Pyongyang. The GAKRJ website’s thumbnail profile of KAST describes the association’s scientists and technicians as “working so that their achievements in science and technology aid the construction of the Fatherland and the development of the Korean society resident in Japan” (www.chongryon.com). An article on KAST’s website, now defunct, on the building of an intranet in North Korea referred to how much easier it had become for KAST members to conduct searches for technical literature “and other items requested by the Republic” [italics added by the author].

In 1982, ethnic North Korean scientists and engineers established “Issatsu no Kai” (the Association of One Book), intended to promote the donation of science and technology books and journals to North Korea. Between 1980 and 1995, Kakyo reported that they had sent to North Korea 300,000 volumes on science and technology, and about 100,000 items of equipment, samples and materials, including those related to issues of nuclear engineering and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel (Korean Association of Science and Technology, 15 July, 1995). These scientists and engineers also arranged major science and technology exhibitions in North Korea. In general, countries with proliferation concerns have often identified specific dual-use items as of interest at occasions such as international exhibitions (Tanoue & Morimoto, 2008, p. 149). In addition, Kakyo invited delegations of North Korean scientists and engineers to Japan to conduct joint research activities with North Korean scientists, and promoted exchanges of technologies between the two countries (Abe & Kimura, 2008, p. 126).

Under the instruction of Kim Jon Il Kakyo played a key role in gathering various advanced equipments, products, and associated parts from Japan. In the 1980s Kim prioritized advancing North Korea’s science and technology in areas
such as integrated circuits, electric engineering and automobile engineering (Kim Jon Il, 1985). Some of the primary topics of research by the Kakyo members at this time included super conductivity ceramic, polymer materials, computer, automatic control, robot engineering, small engines and NC manufacturing machines (Abe & Kimura, 2008, pp. 129-130).

It is also believed that Kakyo contributed to the DPRK missile and nuclear weapon programs, although Kakyo denies such charges. Since 2003, when Japanese authorities discovered the involvement of a Kakyo-affiliated company in the illegal 1994 transfer of a Japanese-made jet mill machine to North Korea, Japanese law enforcement officials have focused increasing attention on the role of the organization in the unauthorized transfer of dual-use technology to the DPRK. A series of raids and arrests in late 2005 and 2006 brought to light additional details about the group’s alleged involvement in military and industrial espionage in Japan.

Kakyo has about 1,200 members, and among them 300 members hold executive positions (Asahi Shimbun, 29 January, 2007). Japanese officials who have closely monitored Kakyo confirmed that the association has “several hundred” members, and is engaged in the systematic collection of advanced scientific research in Japan for transfer to North Korea (Furukawa, 19 September, 2007). Another official concurred with the above number of 1,200 members, but takes the view that not all members are necessarily engaged in assisting Pyongyang (Furukawa, September 27, 2007).

THE OCTOBER 2005 RAIDS

In October 2005, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Agency, in cooperation with other prefectural police agencies, conducted search and seizure raids on entities related to the Chosen Soren, and in particular against Kakyo. Kakyo’s headquarters was among the locations raided. The police confiscated a list of the Kakyo members, which included their names, affiliations and areas of expertise (Furukawa, 15 November, 2006; Furukawa, July, 2006). The lists revealed that Kakyo members were affiliated with a wide range of scientific research programs at major Japanese universities and corporations, many of which had dual-use applications.

The Japanese authorities subsequently disclosed that documents seized in the raids provided evidence that Kakyo was under the direct control of the External Relations Division of the (North) Korean Workers Party, the organization’s intelligence arm, which had tasked Kakyo to obtain specific advanced technologies in Japan and transfer them to North Korea (Asahi Shimbun, 30 November, 2006; Sankei Shimbun, 18 November, 2006).

Among the other targets of the police raids was the Kim Man Yu Foundation for the Promotion of Scientific Research, and the Nishiarai Hospital. Dr. Man Yu Kim, who died in 2005, was a former president of the Nishiarai Hospital and a founder of the Kim Man Yu Foundation. In 1955, Kim was arrested for his involvement in a North Korean spy network in Japan. The hospital and foundation, both located

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2 A jet mill is used to grind material to a super-fine powder and is used in the production of solid fuels for missiles
in Tokyo, are suspected to have been one of the principal sources of funding for Kakyo (Sankei Shimbun, 14 October, 2005). There were many indications suggesting the close relationship between this hospital and Pyongyang. In 1986 Dr. Man Yu Kim established a hospital in Pyongyang, a task which would have been impossible without close ties to important figures in North Korea (Sankei Shimbun, 14 October, 2005). Furthermore, it has been alleged that one of the perpetrators of the bombing of the 1987 Korean Airliner received medical treatment at Nishiarai Hospital in Tokyo in 1985, and Japanese police suspect that this hospital may have been involved in the abduction of Japanese citizens (Sankei Shimbun, 14 October, 2005).

In January 2006, Japanese police revealed that investigations drawing from data gathered during raids of late 2005 had found that Kakyo obtained data on the guidance system of the latest version of the 03-type medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) of the Japanese Ground Self-Defence Force (Sankei Shimbun, 24 January, 2006). The police believed that this information had already been sent to North Korea. The stolen information was simulation software for the evaluation of the SAM’s capability to intercept incoming tactical ballistic missiles. Reportedly this company had subcontracted some of this work to a company thought to be linked to Kakyo (Open Source Center, 2006). A Japanese official told the author that he was certain that a specific facilitator had transferred the company’s classified information to Kakyo (Furukawa, 10 April, 2007).

THE NOVEMBER 2006 RAIDS AND JANUARY 2007 ARRESTS: SUSPECTED LINKS TO THE DPRK MISSILE PROGRAM

On July 5, 2006, North Korea launched a series of missile flight tests, breaking a seven-year moratorium, and on October 9, 2006, Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test. These events caused an international furore that led the UN Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions against the DPRK under Resolution 1718 (United Nations Security Council, 2006).

Simultaneously the Japanese law enforcement authorities tightened their grip on Chosen Soren. On November 29, 2006, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department raided the home of Seo Seok-Hong (sometimes spelled “So’ So’k-hong”) on suspicion of violating Japanese labor laws by operating a temporary employment agency without properly complying with applicable regulations (Nomura, 2007; Jijiweb, 2007). Seo was a former Vice Chairman of Kakyo and was then serving as an advisor to the organization. He is a graduate of the Engineering Department of the University of Tokyo and received an award for excellence from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.

Press reports allege that Seo is also a renowned expert on rocket engines – a North Korean version of “Werner von Braun” – although publicly available information about his biography indicates only that he is a recognized specialist on two-stroke diesel engines (Sankei Shimbun, 2006; Al-Kuffar, 2005; Seo & Kim, 1967). In Japan, he worked for automotive manufacturers. One of these companies also produced engines for Japanese space rockets, but it is unclear whether Seo was involved in the rocket
engine program. Seo is also said to have been managing the Kumgang Engine Joint Venture Company in Pyongyang. This organization, apparently because of its links to the North Korean missile program, is currently on the “list of the foreign users [of proliferation concern]” of the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2007). This, in effect, restricts all Japanese exports to this organization under Japan’s “catch-all” regulations, which limit exports to entities believed to be involved in North Korean missile and WMD programs.

Reportedly, Seo’s relationship with Kumgang Engine led Japanese authorities to launch an investigation of the role of Kakyo in supporting North Korea’s ballistic missile programs (Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 November, 2006). On January 29, 2007, Kanagawa prefectural police arrested Seo and his wife for violating Japanese labour laws by failing to file required documents with the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, most likely a convenient means for interrogating Seo and confiscating his documents and records for the purpose of further pursuing the investigation of Kakyo (Yomiuri Shinbun, 29 January, 2007). Reportedly, Seo had frequently travelled to North Korea at times that coincided with important missile tests by Pyongyang, adding to suspicions regarding his involvement in North Korea’s missile program (Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 November, 2006). However, given that his expertise is in diesel engines, many Japanese intelligence officials are not convinced that he contributed to North Korea’s missile and rocket programs (Furukawa, October 23, 2007). Seo was not prosecuted and was subsequently released.

According to another report, there are other Kakyo members who have similar backgrounds believed to be related to rocket engineering. Among them are two experts with the same family name of Seo (or So). One of them has a similar background to Seo Seok-Hong, including expertise in the area of engine engineering and a past affiliation with the Institute for Industrial Science of the University of Tokyo (Al-Kuffar, 31 January, 2007; Nomura, 2007). The second Seo also reportedly received an award from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers for his joint work with Seo Seok-Hong (Al-Kuffar, 31 January, 2007; Nomura, 2007). In 2000, it was reported that this individual served as the Vice President of the above mentioned Kumgang Engine Joint Venture Company when Seo Seok-Hong was its President. He was also the Vice President of Daiei Kikai Corporation (or Daiei Machinery Corporation) when the third Seo was its president (Tokushima Shimbun, 18 October, 2000). Some journalists believe that some or all of the three Seos are related, but a Japanese official has denied this charge (Nomura, 2007; Furukawa, 23 October, 2007).

A fourth Kakyo member of a different family name, who was formerly affiliated with the Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science of University of Tokyo, is believed to have been present in North Korea at the time of the Taepodong missile launch in 1998 (Fujiyoshi, 2007; Furukawa, 19 September, 2007). He is believed to have been a professional working in Japan specifically in the area of rocket engineering and was at one time employed by US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Shuukan Bungei Shunju, 2 October, 2003).
KAKYO LINKS TO CHOSEN SOREN ENTERPRISES

Kakyo members have been closely associated with Chosen Soren-related companies. Among them the above-mentioned Daiei Machinery Corporation, which was believed to have been run directly by the Chosen Soren and subsequently reorganized into a new corporation named the Daiastar Corporation (Al-Kuffar, 29 January, 2007). According to a journalist who investigated this company, the Daiei Machinery Corporation arranged the export of measurement equipment and used railroad tracks to North Korea in the past and established Kumgang Engine J.V. Co. in North Korea in 1993 (Fujiyoshi, November, 1999). The Daiastar Corporation, together with another Chosen Soren-related entity, Shin-ei Shouji Corporation, are believed to be run directly by the Chosen Soren because they are run by Kakyo members and located in the same Tokyo building as the Chosen Soren (Fujiyoshi, November, 1999; Al-Kuffar, 29 January, 2007; Nomura, 2007).

A JAPANESE VERSION OF DR. A. Q. KHAN?

Although the focus of investigations was principally on North Korea’s missile program, Japanese law enforcement officials were also alerted to the possible emergence of a Japanese version of A. Q. Khan. Reportedly, during the police raids in October 2005, police found a document that indicated that a particular individual, whose name has not been officially released, might have assisted North Korea’s nuclear program (Tokitou, et al., 2006). This person is believed to be one of the key figures from Japan’s Rokkasho-mura plutonium separation plant, since he was a former director of the Nuclear Power Generation Safety Management Division, and the Technology Division of the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, within the Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry. Reportedly, he was born in Seoul, but his mother was of North Korean origin (Tokitou, et al., 2006).

During an interview with the Japanese media, the individual flatly rejected suspicions about his involvement in North Korea’s nuclear program. However, he acknowledged that he travelled to North Korea four times between 2002-2005 with the purpose of “observing the status of North Korea’s economy”. Police confiscated a document at the Chosen Soren’s headquarters which described this individual as an important guest for the North. During the interview, he stated (Tokitou, et al., 2006): “What America is demanding on the North is absurd. The US asserts that North Korea should not possess a nuclear program. However, the North certainly has the right. Once out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the North even has the right to possess nuclear weapons.”

Separately, it is worth noting that the first chairman of Kakyo was a scientist who studied under Professor Kouji Fushimi of Kyoto University, famous for his research on uranium enrichment, a technology usable both for peaceful nuclear energy production and for the development of nuclear weapons (Al-Kuffar, 29 December, 2005). Fushimi was a member of the Japan-North Korea Committee for Science and Technology Cooperation when it was formed in 1965. At the invitation of Kakyo, Fushimi visited North Korea in the 1980s. Fushimi later became a parliamentary
member in the 1980s, and passed away in 2008. In recent years there existed at least two Kakyo members who were affiliated with this university’s nuclear research program (Furukawa, 10 April, 2007). Kakyo also invited other prominent Japanese scientists to North Korea, including Hideo Itokawa (a prominent space engineering scientist) and Eiji Munakata (the former board chairman of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, who died in 2004) (Abe & Kimura, 2008, p. 130). While there is no evidence to suggest that these individuals contributed to North Korea’s weapon programs, the North was certainly interested in establishing relationships with these Japanese scientists.

As shown above, North Korean residents in Japan have most likely played an important role in identifying key information related to dual-use technologies and items in Japan. Kakyo engaged in extensive open source intelligence (OSINT) operations in Japan. North Korea used scientific interactions with Japanese scientists and engineers as one of the primary tools of OSINT operations in Japan. As of early 2010, according to a Japanese official, the Kakyo members still continued to visit North Korea via China. But it is difficult to grasp what communications took place in Pyongyang.

CONTINUING ACTIVITIES OF ILLICIT PROCUREMENT

Alerted by North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, especially after the North expelled the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in December 2002, the Japanese government has lately strengthened its export control regulations. Even so, in addition to, and most likely in cooperation with, the above activities of procurement of intangible assets, North Korea has continuously attempted to illicitly procure dual-use materials, equipments and machineries.

In April 2003, for example, a direct-current stabilized power supply machine (a dual-use item useable for the production of nuclear weapons) was illegally exported from Japan to North Korea via Hong Kong and Thailand (Center for Information on Security Trade Control, 2010). Subsequently, this illegal shipment was confiscated in Hong Kong on its way to Thailand. Other examples of illegal exports of dual-use items from Japan to North Korea include: precision machineries in 1970-71; synchro scopes (regulated by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) to a procurement body for the Korean People’s Army; personal computers and integrated circuits (subject to COCOM regulation) between 1988-1989; sodium fluoride and hydrofluoric acid (subject to regulation by the Australia Group) in 1996; 2,360 pairs of double-valves, parts of military equipment for scuba diving operations, in 1996; a freeze dryer (a dual-use item usable for the production of biological weapons) in September 2002; a frequency converter (a dual-use item useable for the production of nuclear weapons) in aeroplane hand luggage via China in November 2003; a track trailer (a dual-use item usable for ballistic missile deployment) in April 2003; and a large tank lorry (a dual-use item usable for ballistic missile deployment) in January 2008 (Center for Information on Security Trade Control, 2010). In most of these cases the prosecuted were ethnic Koreans residing in Japan.
Additionally, in June 2009, the Japanese police arrested three individuals for attempting to illegally export a magnetometer (which measures magnetic fields and can be employed in ballistic missile guidance and control systems in addition to legitimate commercial activities) to Myanmar via Malaysia, under the direction of a company associated with illicit procurement for North Korean military programs (Yamaguchi, 30 June, 2009; Albright et al., 2009). The equipment was intercepted before it made its way to Myanmar. Among the three individuals who were arrested, one was Li Gyeong Ho, a North Korean Japanese and the president of the Toko Boeki trading company. In this case, the original order for the equipment came from the Beijing office of the New East International Trading, Ltd., which is believed to operate under the command of the Second Economic Committee of North Korea, according to the police investigations (MSN Sankei News, 10 July, 2009). The company’s headquarters were located in Hong Kong, and its Pyongyang office is on the Japanese METI’s List of End Users with Proliferation Concerns. Reportedly, the Japanese police found that similar equipment had already been shipped to North Korea several times since the late 1970s. The police suspected that after North Korea had perfected their missile technology, the North might have begun to export this technology to Myanmar (MSN Sankei News, 10 July, 2009). In 2008 the perpetrator also exported three small-size cylindrical grinding machines, another dual-use item which could be used for missile development, to Myanmar illicitly (MSN Sankei News, 5 November, 2009). This suggests that North Korea is helping Myanmar develop its own ballistic missile capabilities. Experts also suspect that North Korea may have begun to use Myanmar as a transit point from which to route items to North Korea (Albright, et al., 2009).

Furthermore, in June 2010, Seibu Kosan Ltd. and Arrival Co., Ltd. were charged against an illegal export of a used power shovel without statutory permission, a material subject to export control regulation, via Dalian Global, a trading company in China (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2010). Reportedly, the end user was a North Korean company allegedly run by a senior member of North Korea’s internal security apparatus, with which the Dalian Global maintains a close business relationship (MSN Sankei News, 22 June, 2010). The Japanese police suspect that the power shovel was to be used at facilities of the North Korean military or internal security organ.

The above cases suggest clearly the continuous attempts by North Korea to exploit the points of weakness in Japan’s export control regulations, utilizing the ethnic Korean networks in Japan to illegally export prohibited items to the North.

**TECHNIQUES USED FOR ILLICIT EXPORTS FROM JAPAN**

There are other cases of the violation of export control regulations which were not prosecuted due to the statute of limitations. Hiromichi Tanoue and Masamitsu Morimoto, the Japanese experts who were formerly in charge of export control at the METI, categorized the general techniques used for illicit exports as below (Tanoue & Morimoto, 2008, p. 149):
• *Double contracts with a side letter between the sender and the recipient*: An official contract between the sender and the recipient describes the export commodity in such a specification that does not require an export license. However, it is attached with an unofficial contract (a side letter) which pledges to export the commodity with specifications of a higher-grade that should require an export license if legally adhered.

• *Masking*: The exporter falsely disguises the export commodity in such a way as if it does not require an export license.

• *Hand baggage*: The exporter exports the commodity within hand luggage when traveling abroad.

• *Deconstruction*: The exporter deconstructs the machines and then exports them separately.

• *Diplomatic*: The commodity is supplied to the recipient country’s embassy in Japan so that it can then be sent abroad in the form of a diplomatic pouch.

• *Poor customs*: Dual-use items are exported through local customs offices which have relatively poor administrative capability to enforce export control regulations.

• *Third country*: Export via a third country.

Originally, from the late 1950s through to the early 1980s, North Korea imported most dual-use materials, equipment and machineries directly from Japan. However, after the 1985 revelation of the Toshiba Corporation’s violation of COCOM, Japan began to strengthen its export control systems, and bilateral trade with the North became more strictly regulated. In the 1980s, North Korea began to import dual-use goods illegally from Japan via third countries, such as Singapore and China (especially from the cities of Shanghai and Tientsin) (Abe & Kimura, p. 132). As Japan further strengthened its export control regulations in the 1990s, North Korea began to use Taiwan and other Southeast Asian countries as additional transit points for its procurement of dual-use items. After many Southeast Asian countries began to institute export control systems, North Korea began to use Myanmar as an additional channel of procurement. Those countries where North Korea has an embassy or consular general’s office, and where export control is weak, were especially selected as transit points.

## Nuclear procurement in Europe

Japan has not been the only location for North Korea’s efforts at illicit procurement. The DPRK has used the IAEA as a vehicle for its OSINT activities. In this context, the work by Yun Ho-Jin, considered to be one of the central figures of the North’s nuclear procurement activities, deserves close scrutiny. Yun served as the North Korean ambassador to the IAEA in Vienna from 1985 to 1994. From his post he was able to access important information which could be used for dual-use purposes, including plutonium reprocessing (NHK, 2009).
In response to North Korea’s nuclear test on May 25, 2009, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on five North Korean trading companies and five North Korean individuals. Among them were the Namchongang Trading Corporation (NCG) and Yun Ho-Jin, then director of NCG. The NCG is alleged to have procured aluminum tubes, pumps or other dual-use materials from various countries, including Japan.

Yun was involved in a number of trade transactions in Germany, including the procurement of goods believed to be used for the Yongbyong Nuclear Center (Albright, 2009, p. 155). There is also a media report indicating that some of those products were intended for a planned nuclear reactor in Syria (Wright & Warrick, 2008). In 2003, when North Korea attempted to procure more than 200 aluminum tubes from a German trading company, they were intercepted by the French and German authorities at the Egyptian port of Alexandria on their way from Germany to East Asia. The internal diameter of these tubes matched precisely with that of the ones that A. Q. Khan of Pakistan had procured for uranium enrichment programs. Yun had placed an order for these aluminum tubes.

Yun approached the German trading company in 2000. At first, Yun imported goods seemingly unrelated to nuclear development, including camera parts. Later, in 2002, Yun ordered 200 high-strength aluminum pipes along with many other items, such as weld cables and silicon adhesives, in order to divert attention from the aluminum tubes. Yun explained to the German company that the end user of these equipments was Shenyang Aircraft, an aeronautic company in China which assembles fighter planes for the Chinese military (Weiner, 2003; Albright, 2009, p. 157). Yun pretended to be an intermediary for this Chinese company. Shenyang had a subsidiary in the Chinese city of Dandong, which is linked to North Korea by the Friendship Bridge across the Yalu River, and often used as a transit point for equipment to the North (Albright, 2009, p. 157).

Export control in China is relatively loose and North Korea has been exploiting this weakness (Albright et al., 2010, p. 91). NCG seems to have had no difficulty smuggling shipping from China to North Korea. David Albright (2009, p. 158), President of the Institute for Science and International Security, argued: “In China, the NCG can effectively buy equipment from suppliers throughout the world, even Europe and possibly the United States, particularly if the suppliers have subsidiaries in China. When NCG buys an item from another company in China, the transaction can appear as a domestic sale.” Even after additional sanctions were introduced under the 2009 UN Security Council Resolution 1874 the NCG has not been discouraged from continuing its illicit activities through China (ibid., p. 159).

As a result of this shipment the president of the German trading company was arrested and charged for violation of export control (CNS Observer, 2003, p. 16). A NHK documentary regarded the German trading company as an innocent victim of Yun, however there is a contesting observation that the German president exported aluminum tubes despite a request by the German customs not to export them to North Korea (Albright, 2009, p. 157).
According to the same NHK documentary report, Yun was under the surveillance of the Western authorities in Vienna from the late 1980s through to the early 1990s. However, at that time the European authorities did not consider North Korea’s nuclear weapons program an eminent threat. North Korea’s technological capabilities were underestimated and did not draw enough attention.

Yun has managed to remain at large. This is one example of how North Korean individuals manage illicit procurement. There are others whose activities are barely able to be detailed through open sources.

**The roles of China and Taiwan in North Korea’s procurement and proliferation**

As shown above, China has been a critical transit point for the North Korean arms trade (Arakaki, et al., 2009). In 2002, for example, the Spanish and US navies interdicted and inspected the North Korean ship “So San”, suspected of carrying missiles in the Gulf of Aden. So San carried Scud missiles bound for Yemen, and the last port it stopped before the seizure was in China (ibid.; Kan, 2009). In addition, the US government made a diplomatic protest to China for granting over-flight rights to Iranian cargo planes which were suspected of picking up missile components in North Korea. The frequent use of China’s ports and airspace as a transit point for North Korean arms trade raises the question whether the Chinese government recognized the content of the cargo and the true end-users of those shipments (Kan, 2009).

The US government has also been concerned about secondary nuclear proliferation from China to North Korea via Pakistan. According to US intelligence, A. Q. Khan sold nuclear bomb designs he had obtained from China in the early 1980s to Libya (Kan, 2009; US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2006). This incident raises the question of whether Khan sold nuclear-related technologies to other countries of proliferation concern, such as North Korea. Considering the links identified between North Korea and Pakistan, it is a legitimate concern that China’s nuclear supply to Pakistan indirectly contributed to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

Taiwan is another source of concern. Taipei-based Royal Team Corporation is an active participant to the annual Pyongyang International Trade Fair (Furukawa, July, 2010). Reportedly, this company exported dual-use items to North Korea, including a refrigerator capable of handling temperatures of minus 70 degrees Celsius (Minnick, 2009). Due to US pressure this company’s manager moved to Beijing. Another Taiwanese company, Ching Hwee International Trading, was accused of selling machine tools for munitions production to the North (Minnick, 2009).

As these cases demonstrate, China and Taiwan remain major loopholes in the international ring of non-proliferation. Illicit networks in these countries seem to remain largely intact.
Illicit network for the arms trade

North Korea has also proven skilful in manipulating international sanctions on arms trading. Most recently, this was demonstrated in the Thai authority’s 2009 seizure of a cargo aircraft carrying weapons from North Korea. When a Russian-made cargo aircraft arrived in Bangkok from North Korea for fuelling, the Thai authorities was informed by several foreign intelligence agencies that the cargo aircraft was carrying North Korean weapons. After the seizure the Thai authorities found 35 tons of weapons with an estimated value of US$15-18 million, including anti-tank rocket launchers and surface-to-air missiles. Five crew members were arrested, four Kazakhs and one Belarusian.

The Associated Press investigation indicated the involvement of Alexander Zykov, a Kazakh arms trader involved in a global network of arms smuggling (Shuster, AP, 2010). Zykov runs a small air freight company called “East Wing” in Kazakhstan, and the five crew members arrested were employers of Zykov’s company. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many freight crews lost their jobs, old Soviet-made aircrafts were abandoned, and some businessmen like Zykov bought old aircrafts and hired crew to start air freight companies.

The weapons trade was carried out according to a careful and thorough plan. According to the AP, the flight plan revealed an extremely complicated route, with the estimated flight distance of 24,525 kilometres (Shuster, AP, 2010). First, the plane took off from Kiev, Ukraine, and then landed in Baku, Azerbaijan, Alo-Fujairaha in the UAE, Bangkok, and then Pyongyang to take on the weapons. The cargo aircraft then left Pyongyang, and reached Bangkok where it was seized. However, had it not been seized, the cargo would have flown to Sri Lanka, back to Al-Fujairah again, and then to Kiev before reaching Teheran to offload. After that, it was scheduled to continue its flight to Montenegro. Zykov tried to conceal the registry of the aircraft with a complicated chain of lease agreements involving several small companies in multiple countries, with some of the agreements being created and registered just before the transaction.

There are many factors that remain unknown. It is unclear who placed the order for the shipment, or for what purpose. It is also unclear how Zykov came into connection with North Korea, or if he had full knowledge of both ends of the illicit trade, the true seller and the true buyer. Eventually, the Thai government decided that it would not be in its interest to prosecute the crew members and dropped the charges. The crew members would instead face trial in their own countries.

There are similarities between this case of arms trafficking and another case a decade ago (Furukawa, 27 April, 2010). Both involved arms smuggling networks originating in the former Soviet Union region, and both used the complicated route of the cargo to disguise the real buyer of the shipments. In 1999, North Korea attempted to import MiG-21 jet fighters from the Kazakh air force through a small Czech company called “Agroplast” (Kuranov, 1999). Originally, in 1996, North Korea intended to buy 133 MiG-21 fighters from the Kazakhstan government; however the deal was
called off due to US intervention. But the deal was revived three years later, albeit illicitly. A former Kazakh Colonel and arms trader disguised a contract document in which the Czech firm Agroplast was listed as the buyer, instead of the North Korean company. Agroplast was also involved in illegal arms trade with other countries such as Iran, Libya and Ecuador. It also used complicated routes to move cargo. The cargo aircraft chartered in Russia flew into Kazakhstan to upload six disassembled MiGs, and other military equipment, stopped at Baku for refuelling, where the Azerbaijani customs intercepted the transaction (Kuranov, 1999).

While it is unclear to what extent North Korea might have been involved in constructing these complex plans for arms trading, both cases are certainly indicative of the North’s close connection with illicit international networks. Both attempts exploited the existing illegal arms trade network in the former Soviet Union region, which still remains as a weak point in the international cooperation for non-proliferation.

Conclusions: The need for an international web of prevention

North Korea has used layers of paper companies and third countries to conceal its illicit trade. North Korea’s illicit networks of procurement and proliferation pose serious threats. However, given the sophisticated tactics and supporting networks for illicit activities, it is difficult to reveal the full picture of North Korea’s procurement and proliferation activities.

However, it is conceivable that if one illicit network can be scrutinized then it can potentially lead to the exposing of illicit activities by other states. For example, when Libya abandoned its WMD programs and revealed the information about their illicit procurement networks, it was discovered that several Japanese companies had provided Libya with dual-use items. The revelation of the procurement route from Japan to Libya led to the revelation of the procurement route of the illicit export of dual-use items from Japan to Iran as well (Furukawa, 2007). Yet it is unclear to what extent the WMD-interested states might have shared among themselves the logistic routes for procurement. It is certainly conceivable, at a minimum, that one illicit network may be interested in doing business with multiple customers (whether state and non-state actors), given that such network may hold the most updated information about the points of weakness in the international efforts for non-proliferation.

In order to meet the challenge of proliferation, it is critical to strengthen international cooperation to counter the illicit networks in many parts of the world, by mobilizing all relevant stakeholders, including those in the areas of intelligence, law enforcement, export control, custom, and border control as well as science and technology. Those stakeholders should strengthen international cooperation to exchange information about the case studies of export control violations in order to detect signs of violation effectively. Also, multilateral cooperation in law enforcement should be further strengthened, given that illicit networks cut across multiple countries. Especially, China and Taiwan must be engaged robustly. In
addition, law enforcement in respective states should be strengthened in order to enforce non-proliferation laws and regulations effectively.

Furthermore, the revelation of the Kakyo’s alleged activities in Japan poses a new challenge to non-proliferation. While many details have yet to be revealed, it appears that important information regarding Japanese dual-use technologies might have been transferred to the DPRK through the channel of scientific community. Japan has confronted considerable difficulties in applying export controls to intangible technology transfers of the kind at issue in the episodes described above.

How can a country minimize the possibility of the diversion of information and knowledge related to dual-use technologies to another country with WMD concern? In the case of Japan, should the government regulate the access of students and researchers to dual-use technologies at universities, based upon whether their parents or grandparents were born in North Korea? Should Japanese companies prohibit the employment of new researchers on similar criteria? Such rules would surely be in direct conflict with the Japanese Constitutional provisions protecting individuals’ human rights and prohibiting discrimination. Leakage of the kind of information Kakyo is alleged to have transferred must be prevented, but the available tools may not be sufficient.

It may not be possible to manage this problem solely through the application of laws. Also, it may be necessary to seek the adoption of better governance structures within the academic/scientific community. It is necessary to develop not only regulatory but also voluntary measures to secure sensitive dual-use technologies with significant risk, with the cooperation of the scientific community. Close cooperation among intelligence, law enforcement, national security and scientific communities is essential. In addition, legal and administrative tools as well as voluntary measures in areas of intellectual property rights or ethics in science (such as codes of conduct) could be expected to contribute to strengthening the non-proliferation of intangible dual-use assets.

Kakyo’s motto states, “Science has no border. But a scientist has a home country.” (Al-Kuffar, 17 April, 2007; Abe & Kimura, 2008, p. 159) The credo underscores the great difficulty of protecting sensitive knowledge in the midst of the information age. But the difficulty should not prevent the international community from developing new tools to ensure non-proliferation; tools that involve new stakeholders, as well as close international cooperation among government, industry and academia.
Conclusion: The Emerging Trends

CAROLINE ZIEMKE-DICKENS
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), Alexandria, USA

JULIAN DROOGAN
Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University, Australia

Introduction

The papers collected in this volume provide a window into a fast-changing region at a time when major global shifts in economic, military and cultural power are well underway. As these trends accelerate over the coming decade, economic, resource and environmental security will be of critical importance for the human and national security of all the CATR member nations. In particular, China and India have emerged as key players in the global economy, and from an economic, strategic and cultural perspective they are likely to continue to grow in importance over the next decade and beyond. As part of this process, the transmission of relative wealth and economic power is likely to continue to flow from west to east, especially in light of the fiscal deficit currently facing most Western nations. Once again, the small and medium powers find themselves adjusting their security and sovereignty concerns to a new and uncertain global security environment – as they did with the arrival of the European empires in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, during World War II and its aftermath, and during the independence/Cold War era. Taken together, the effects of this new phase of globalization will continue to strain traditional assumptions (whether of the nature and role of national security or the utility of established strategic alignments), pose new challenges, and give new life to established and emerging threats.

Terrorism and other forms of violent ideological extremism will remain in the top tier of these emerging threats, but the driving forces that motivate the underlying process of radicalization will evolve. Although the guidelines for this project encouraged the researchers to look beyond terrorism in identifying key non-traditional and emerging threats, they were not discouraged from identifying terrorism as part of their threat horizon – and not surprisingly, terrorism is predicted to continue as one of the important security challenges across the CATR region. Yet in most cases it is the larger social, economic and environmental trends – which give rise to social and economic marginalization and feed instability and radicalization – which emerge as the first-order concerns for the mid to long-term.
It is also clear that as globalization gathers pace, and the competition for energy security and strategic advantage become more competitive, the challenges of national security will become increasingly transnational, even regional, in character. The papers collected here argue strongly that given the economic, political and technological connectivity of today’s world, even local threats and challenges have regional and global connections and consequences. As a result, the most effective responses may not be state-centered. Most of the emerging threats outlined in this survey do not lend themselves to purely domestic or national responses or solutions, and even those identified as “internal” rarely lend themselves to unilateral solutions. Most cannot be effectively measured, tracked, and analyzed in a purely national context, but have common roots in underlying structural trends that do not respect national boundaries.

The following summary provides an overview of the emerging threat landscape by isolating some of these underlying structural trends from the collected papers, and examining their networks of causes, or “conduits”. Particular attention is given to two related emerging macro-trends that will be of increasing importance across the CATR region over the coming decade: the “securitization of identity” – in which ideology and identity politics impinge on regional and national security, and the “privatization of security” – where the authority of the state and its ability to act as a provider of human security is increasingly challenged and eroded by non-state actors.

1. Conduits and obstacles

Transnational threats are evolving, and new ones are emerging at an alarming pace, capitalizing on the conduits of modernization and globalization. At the same time, a governance deficit is proving an obstacle to effective responses at both the national and international level. The national surveys presented here point to three broad categories of conduits along which the emerging transnational threats are spreading into and across Asia: structural, technological and ideological.

STRUCTURAL CONDUITS

Structural conduits are those that have emerged from the changes in national and international political, economic, and social relationships as a result of a disparate set of forces including economic development, trade liberalization, globalization, political and social reforms, and environmental change.

A dominant theme that emerges from this volume is a regional trend towards increased scarcity as more people and more wealth chase finite or shrinking resources – water, food, energy, fisheries and minerals – most of which do not easily conform to state boundaries or sovereignty concerns. Freshwater disputes in South Asia, where Pakistan, India and Bangladesh are all predicted to remain increasingly dependent on rivers originating outside their boundaries and where programs by one country to respond to its resource challenges (building hydro-electric dams to increase power production in India, for example) aggravates resource challenges for their neighbors (water supply in Pakistan and Bangladesh) are an example of a major
Conclusion: The Emerging Trends

structural change occurring across an extensive region. Converging demographic, technological and environmental trends have created a vicious cycle of regional insecurity: rapid population growth and urbanization creates greater demand for water and contribute to climate change; climate change, more intensive water use through upstream irrigation and the development of hydropower stations contributes to diminishing freshwater reserves; diminishing freshwater reserves slow economic growth and development; and competition over diminishing reserves contribute to regional insecurity.

Table 1: Summary of the main emerging threats/challenges as perceived by the CATR nations
Population growth has been, and will remain, one of the prime underlying drivers of a broad range of structural challenges across the CATR region. As well as creating additional food, water and energy security pressures, demographic growth has the potential to aggravate unemployment and poverty over the coming decade. A striking example is Pakistan where population growth has largely prevented the economic benefits of globalization from reaching the vast majority of the population. Youth bulges and the accompanying process of “demographic armament”, in which populations of economically marginalized 15 to 25-year-old “fighting age” men repudiate their side of the social contract and adopt identities in opposition to the status quo, have the potential to create cohorts of socially excluded and aggressive young men who are open to radicalization and cooption by terrorist organizations.

Trade liberalization and globalization are challenging the autonomy of national economies and the sovereignty of national governments. Smaller, less developed economies like Indonesia and Bangladesh are finding it increasingly difficult to compete in globalized international markets while even rapidly expanding economies like India are struggling with widening economic disparities. Countries with a low percentage of skilled labor will continue to be particularly vulnerable in the years ahead as companies shift their locus of production. This process is already occurring in Bangladesh, where a number of international corporations have recently shifted to Indochina in the search for ever cheaper labor, triggering increased domestic unemployment just at a time when the demand for export labor has seen dramatic declines.

The increased movement of people is another fundamental structural trend likely to shape a number of security challenges in the years ahead. Historically, migration has been an important safety-valve for economic, political and population pressures by moving excess populations from countries where they face unemployment, inadequate resources, or political, religious or ethnic discrimination to countries with more jobs, more abundant resources and/or a less hostile political, social or religious environment. Today, however, a global economic downturn combined with a rise in political and religious extremism has created an environment in which many countries that traditionally welcomed immigration have become more wary, owing to their own domestic economic and political pressures. One CATR country that is facing a steep increase in illegal immigration is Malaysia, where a high percentage of prisoners are now illegal migrants. This is also having a follow-on effect, with human traffickers using Malaysia as a transit point in smuggling illegal migrants.
(often Afghans) onwards to Australia. The spread of organized crime networks to facilitate the trafficking in illegal migrants, as well as child and sex workers, is a further consequence.

A large percentage of migrant labor from the CATR countries, especially Bangladesh and the Philippines, has traditionally gravitated to the oil-rich Gulf States, either legally or illegally. However, in the aftermath of the Iraq War and, later, the Global Financial Crisis, most Gulf States have cut back dramatically on their reliance on migrant labor. The result has been the creation of growing populations of unemployed, underemployed, or otherwise disadvantaged people – many of them young men – ripe for exploitation by human traffickers or radicalization by political or religious extremist groups. The previous CATR White Paper, *The Asian Security landscape after the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq* (2008), examined in detail the potential economic and social pressures from repatriated export labor. The effects of the Global Financial Crisis process have since exacerbated these trends. One nation particularly vulnerable to this emerging challenge is Bangladesh, where the export of labor to the Gulf States has effectively ceased over the past two years. A few countries that are highly dependent on remittances for foreign capital – notably the Philippines – have established government programs to monitor, educate and train migrant workers in high-demand fields like healthcare. Bangladesh and Pakistan, in contrast, have no such training programs and find in the current economic environment that the global demand for unskilled emigrant labor is declining.

Finally, economic growth, industrial development, and rapid urbanization are all contributing to environmental degradation and global climate change. Deforestation and dangerously high levels of pollution are cited as emerging threats to human security by the Philippines, Afghanistan and Indonesia; sea-level rise and encroaching salinization of freshwater sources (rivers and groundwater) by Bangladesh; and more frequent natural disasters, such as extreme floods (Pakistan and Bangladesh) and catastrophic storms (Philippines). Regular but unpredictable natural disasters like earthquakes and tsunamis magnify the scale of human suffering. Over the coming decade the follow-on effects of environmental instability and natural disasters on regional security are potentially huge: one early indication is the emergence of “climate refugees” fleeing flooding in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Over the coming years there will be a continuing need across the CATR region to balance concerns over environment and climate change with pressure for economic development and growth. Too often, the societies and communities that will pay the highest price for environmental degradation and climate change in terms of suffering, scarcity, displacement and disease, will be the ones reaping the fewest material benefits from growth and development.

**TECHNOLOGICAL CONDUITS**

Technological conduits consist of those advanced information, communication and transportation technologies that have, in the familiar parlance, shrunk and flattened the world. The same technology platforms that are enabling more rapid economic development and integration – the Internet, wireless communication, and
transportation – also provide vast opportunities for a whole host of new illicit and malevolent activities.

The Internet is gradually breaking down many of the traditional infrastructure barriers between countries, especially in commercial and communication sectors, but also, increasingly, in such areas as public utilities and emergency services. While most states in the CATR region have infrastructures that remain wholly or partially “off the grid”, this is rapidly changing with further modernization and development. That this process will lead to new security threats is indicated by the high priority that the seemingly exponential growth of cybercrime has been given by Australia, where the inverse relation between the technological penetration of daily life and human security is cited.

Concern over cyber threats is growing, but the nature and scope of those threats, not to mention the appropriate national and international responses, remain difficult to define. It is clear, however, that the rise of the Internet has created new venues for the spread of extremist ideologies. Extremist groups of all stripes have become adept at using the Internet and social networking to raise and launder money, spread their ideologies and technical know-how, plan and coordinate operations, mobilize supporters and diaspora communities, and provide information for the rising class of “do-it-yourself-radicals”. Criminal and extremist networks are also able to use the Internet to cross national and regional boundaries, such as Eastern European cybercrime gangs working in Australia. As a result, some criminal networks are becoming extremely complex, hard to trace, and more adaptable than national and international regulatory and response mechanisms. This is a trend examined in some detail in the Japan paper on nuclear smuggling in the Koreas.

Modern transportation has made it much easier to move things from place to place, whether products, people or pathogens. The volume and complexity of trade and the difficulty of monitoring the vast volume of sea commerce provide cover for illicit trade, enabling traffickers to hide the illegal movement of arms, drugs and people “in plain sight”. The difficulty in balancing export controls on dual use technologies with the benefits and desire for free trade is highlighted in the Japan paper on the smuggling of nuclear materials between Japan and North Korea. As the high-tech industry shifts its manufacturing and development base into Asia, the tension between security and commercial interests rises. Countries like Malaysia, India and Singapore face growing challenges in balancing free flows of trade with the need to monitor illicit activity through export control and customs regimes. Although drug smuggling remains the highest earning criminal activity in the region, illegal arms trafficking poses an equal or higher threat to security. The two main regional hubs for the illicit trade in small arms, artillery and explosives appear to be Pakistan and the Philippines, with Bangladesh emerging as a third epicenter for this trade.

Both the volume and relatively low cost of air travel enables people to move easily from one place to another. It used to take months or even years to migrate to a new country. Now it can be done in days or even hours; and migrant populations can more easily maintain close contact with their homelands. As a result, the lines between diasporas and their homelands is blurring. Diasporas can present a challenge
for host countries, and in an age of increased travel and pressure for migration these challenges are likely to grow more complex. The Australian experience of needing to balance numerous ethnic diasporas with a population that is increasingly wary of a longstanding Government policy of high immigration, and also of needing to protect immigrant groups from social marginalization and “do-it-yourself” radicalization, is a good example of the pressures that host countries will continue to face. In the aftermath of civil war, Sri Lanka faces the real possibility that its large and well-organized Tamil diaspora could provide cover for a Tamil separatist movement “in exile” – perhaps under the auspices of a rump LTTE. While in Japan, the need to monitor the Korean diaspora and police its links with the North Korean nuclear program is an indication of how the issue of mobile cultural diasporas can affect bilateral relations in the region.

The countries of origin from which immigrants are drawn will also face challenges as their most skilled and economically valuable citizens leave to pursue greater opportunities abroad. Regionally, South Asia is particularly vulnerable to this trend, with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh all reporting an increase in emigrants fleeing their home nations due to war, environmental pressure and poverty. If continued over the long term this trend can only lead to a draining of talent in these countries and increased shortfalls in state-employed human capacity.

Population movement can also facilitate the spread of pandemic disease, a concern listed by a number of nations. Contagious diseases once traveled at the speed of horse drawn vehicles and sailing vessels; then at the speed of steam trains and ships. Today, they can travel at the speed of commercial airliners. It took two years (1347-1349) for the Black Death to spread from Central Asia to Britain. It took roughly six weeks for the 1918 Spanish Flu to spread from Kansas to Asia. In 2009, the so-called Swine Flu (H1N1) spread from North America to New Zealand in six days – less than the gestation period for the flu virus. Agricultural pathogens also spread more quickly, facilitated by widespread agricultural trade. Near real-time communications and the 24/7 news cycle facilitate the rapid dissemination of information – reliable or not – about potential outbreaks or epidemics. On the one hand, this enables timelier national and international public health responses; on the other, it can lead to popular hysteria and overreaction as was seen in the cases of SARS in 2003, Bird Flu (2004) and Swine Flu (2009).

**IDEOLOGICAL CONDUITS**

Ideological conduits are those that emerge as the self-understanding of individuals and collectives are re-evaluated in the face of the pressures of globalization, the erosion of national boundaries and the spread of secular culture. A century ago, few people had any first hand experience, or even awareness of communities beyond the limits of their geographical and cultural roots. Today, migrants move back and forth between geographic and cultural spaces relatively easily and quickly and “virtual” migrants shift quickly and seamlessly from one ideological world to another via the Internet and other communication platforms. At its best this has given rise to cultural and ideological cross-pollination, cosmopolitanism and the emergence of vibrant
multicultural communities across the region such as Singapore and the Australian urban centers; at its worst it has resulted in instances of reactionary cultural parochialism, identity politics based upon the exploitation of cultural difference and paranoid religious fundamentalism.

Over the coming decade many migrant communities will continue to develop so-called “hyphenated identities”, with returning migrant workers bringing both wealth and new ideologies that challenge the status quo back to their homelands. At the same time it is likely that second and third-generation immigrant communities will return to their ancestral homelands, especially India and China, and in doing so bring with them new, hybrid ideologies and identities, with unique expectations and cultural values.

Migration and the Internet are creating new kinds of communities: communities of interest that bind individuals together around religious and political ideologies or causes. In many cases, these communities of interest appeal particularly strongly to those who feel marginalized and alienated by modernization or by the political or cultural mainstream.

Perhaps the strongest force around which these new, chosen identities gravitate is religion. The assumption that because secularization was an integral part of the Western European experience of modernization, the same would be true of modernization in other parts of the world has been shown to be fallacious. Modernization in much of the world has led to the rise of new, thoroughly modern forms of religion, some fundamentalist and reactionary in their response to modernity. As people have become dislodged from their traditional socio-cultural context, they have turned increasingly to defensive religious ideologies that appeal to emotion rather than intellectual complexity. Fundamentalism is made for modern communication, especially the Internet, as it presents simple, clear-cut “Truth” that is easy to learn by mastering a few “rules” that fit easily in a pamphlet or on a webpage. In the globalized world religious ideology is increasingly delinked from its traditional social and cultural context and appeals more to the individual than to society, paving the way for “do-it-yourself” radicalization. Fundamentalism that attempts to apply the rationality and literalism of empirical science to religion, rendering it factual, historical and empirical, reduces the complexity and nuance of traditional religious theology into streamlined ideologies that deal in easy to grasp absolutes: good versus evil, Truth versus blasphemy, black versus white, us versus them. Fundamentalists can resolve the cognitive dissonance that emerges when their version of “Truth” is not reflected in the world around them by attempting to aggressively impose their ideological “rules”, giving rise to radicalization, terrorism, separatism and insurgency (see Singapore, Indonesia).

**OBSTACLE: THE GOVERNANCE DEFICIT**

One major conclusion that can be drawn from these papers is that the disconnect between the transnational nature of emerging security threats and the shortage of effective national and transnational governance capable of understanding and responding to them is increasingly unsustainable. Weak national and international
legal frameworks give rise to legal gray areas in which illicit activities take place. Technological and economic forces make threats more fungible and flexible, but state institutions have not kept pace and have too frequently responded to change by becoming less flexible and, hence, less able to respond to a rapidly changing threat environment. It may be the case that national governments are inherently ill-suited to dealing with many of the root causes and challenges of emerging transnational threats, or that while governments are still the key stakeholders and prime movers in responding to security threats, the traditional tools available to them – law enforcement, judiciary and military – may not be sufficient.

Governance deficit has been identified as a major issue in a number of these country surveys. An ingrained lack of adequate national capacity to meet emerging regional challenges has been clearly identified in Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Philippines. There is a deficiency of effective regional multilateral governance, regulatory frameworks and voluntary cooperation on a range of issues ranging from water sharing to migration, drug trafficking and the proliferation of small arms across the CATR region. Such mechanisms are lacking entirely in South Asia. Japan has identified a need for stronger export control mechanisms at national and international levels in order to prevent the smuggling of nuclear materials and technology. New regional legal regimes are needed to meet the challenges of radicalization. Intelligence and information sharing mechanisms are also needed to track a wide range of illicit activities. Capacity-building support from wealthy partners such as the US, Australia, Japan and Singapore is important but can only go so far in the absence of other collective regional responses.

At the national level, integrated responses by government, private sector, and civil society institutions seem increasingly necessary, but in many countries, trust between various agencies and sectors is low. In those cases where formal government institutions cannot or will not provide public goods like security, it falls to civil society to do so. In the best case, government works cooperatively with civil society – NGOs, research institutions, religious leaders, educators, financial institutions, political parties, media and corporations. In the worst case, organized crime, extremist groups, and warlords move into communities to provide the security and basic services that governments have failed to provide, in the process gaining socio-political legitimacy (often at the expense of national governments and mainstream political parties) and ideological influence.

At the international level, state security apparatuses have evolved over the centuries primarily to deal with state-on-state threats and are primed to deal with other states in conflict rather than cooperative modes. The post-imperial sensitivities – especially the jealous husbanding of national security prerogatives at the expense of regional and extra-regional security cooperation – that have shaped the security culture of South and Southeast Asia appear to be proving increasingly ill-suited to responding to emerging transnational threats like trafficking, smuggling and piracy.

The ASEAN way, for example, has been successful in preventing interstate conflict in Southeast Asia primarily because it is founded on the assumption that conflict is the default interactive mode of states. Cooperation between the Philippines,
Indonesia and Malaysia in patrolling and ensuring the security of the Malacca Straits is an example of a step in the right direction. However, this trilateral cooperation only emerged once the economic cost from piracy threatened to become catastrophic and external powers such as the US and China seemed likely to intervene directly. As China and India expand their economic presence in Southeast Asia over the coming decade, the pressure to develop collective security approaches to ward off outside intervention will grow.

2. Securitization of identity

Most countries in the CATR region are multi-ethnic and/or multi-religious and, as a result, face the ongoing challenge of balancing their identity as modern nation-states with often deeper and more complex cultural identities. It is a struggle that dates at least as far back as the rise of anti-imperialist independence movements in the late 19th century, but it has become a fixture of both domestic and international politics across Asia with the rise of independent nation-states in the wake of World War II. In an ideal world, ethnic and religious minorities can protect their rights and interests through political and legal mechanisms. Increasingly, however, such groups have lost their trust in the ability of governments, legal systems, and mainstream political parties to defend their rights and interests. An example is the case of non-Muslims in Malaysia who are facing increased legal restrictions to the practicing of their faith.

Often, these communities are instead relying on oppositional means – ranging from separatist and identity political movements to terrorism, armed political resistance, and ideological extremism – to advance and defend their rights and interests. Instead of linking their wellbeing and survival to finding a place in the political and legal mainstream within the context of the nation-state, minorities come to see their identities as under existential threat and defendable only through maintaining and hardening their separateness. In many cases, these new, separatist identities pose a direct challenge to the more inclusive underlying philosophies of nation-states, such as pluralistic secularism in Singapore, Pancasila in Indonesia, and secular democracy in India and Australia. The 2004 bombing of the Bengali New Year festival by Islamist extremists in Bangladesh was an attack against the symbols of secular Bengali identity and culture, while riots between Muslim and traditional Anglo-Australian youth at the beachside suburb of Cronulla in 2005 were essentially an attempt by rival identity groups to take control of an important national symbol of territoriality, in this case the beach.

As recently as a decade ago, many social scientists and opinion leaders (especially in the West) confidently predicted that economic liberalization, development and globalization would bring with them the “privatization” of such cultural identity. In The End of History and the Last Man, for example, Francis Fukuyama wrote that “Contrary to those who at the time believed that religion was a necessary and permanent feature of the political landscape, liberalism vanquished religion in Europe. After a centuries-long confrontation with liberalism, religion was taught to
be tolerant”. Nationalism (and, by implication, other securitized forms of identity), he went on to predict, would “fade away” as a political force and be expressed “more and more in the realm of culture rather than politics” (Fukuyama, 1992, pp. 270-275). Economic forces – for instance, liberalization and globalization – will, the argument went, encourage the breakdown of national barriers and result in the final “neutralization” of nationalism. Instead, across much of the world, the opposite seems to be happening. In diversifying societies pushed ever closer by globalization, communication and transportation, people feel a continued (and perhaps stronger) need to belong to affinity groups that define themselves not as part of a nebulous “global village” or even a “nation” but as something different, apart and culturally or ideologically unique.

The securitization of identity follows naturally from many of the trends identified above. The rise of multi-ethnic nation-states that encompass multiple regions and ethnic groups, combined with migration, mass communication, and global trade has resulted in the phenomenon of “hyphenated” and “chosen” identities. At the national level, deeply-entrenched ethnic, religious and regional identities with cultural and historical roots that reach back decades, and even centuries, give rise to security challenges that range from internal political dissent to armed separatist and resistance movements.

The social contract that underlies the modern nation-state requires individuals and groups to cede some of their autonomy and allegiance to the state. In return, the nation-state accepts responsibility for providing the basic public goods (border security, economic infrastructure, rule of law, education) necessary to provide human security. In many countries around the world, that social contract has begun to break down. Individuals, sub-national and transnational groups have come to resent corrupt and inept governments that are either unable or unwilling to provide all their people with basic human security. Partially-failed, near-failed and failed states are nothing new; but increasingly, non-state, civil society and identity-based organizations are stepping in to fill the gap by providing public goods such as food aid, health services and education. The migration of education from the public to the private sector is particularly troublesome. Such privatized education too often results in the politicization and securitization of curriculums in ways that undermine national cohesion by emphasizing particularistic (ethnic, religious) identities, values and agendas at the expense of national and civic identities.

Nations across the CATR region have responded to this challenge differently. The policy of “Muscular Secularism” adopted by the Singaporean Government can be read as an attempt by the State to proactively control a prescribed national secular identity. In Indonesia, the rise of greater political pluralism has resulted in vigorous political and social debate that has mitigated the political marginalization of conservative religious parties and, as a result, robbed some of the most dangerous regional and sectarian extremist groups of their raison d’être. Nations such as Pakistan and Afghanistan face a long and difficult struggle to establish a workable civil society and viable shared national identity while others, such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka, struggle to reconcile regional and minority populations alienated by
years of conflict (Muslims in the Southern Philippines, Tamils in Northern Sri Lanka) and bring them into the political and economic mainstream.

Rapid and large scale migration also encourages the politicization and securitization of identity, both among diaspora communities and host countries. Immigration, emigration and stifled migration all have potentially disruptive effects on regional security. Youth bulges can result in large numbers of unemployed young people whose sense of purpose and economic opportunities are frustrated, making them vulnerable to radicalization by groups promising to challenge the status quo and create ideal societies. Growing immigrant and migrant communities also create security concerns for host nations. The challenge of integrating large immigrant and migrant communities often creates culture clashes and concerns about the degradation of traditional national identities and gives rise to confrontational identity politics. An example is Japan, which, despite a growing labor shortage, has resisted importing foreign workers because of concern over the long-term threat to Japanese cultural and national identity. Even Australia – for which immigration is a keystone of national identity – is struggling with the long-term challenge of incorporating growing immigrant and refugee populations into its civic and national values, norms and identity.

Culture is an important dimension of human security, providing the touchstones that give individuals and groups a sense of self, meaning and well-being. Migration has made culture an even more important source of political identity as concerns spread over “soft power” imperialism by growing diaspora communities. It is important to consider that soft power projection flows in a number of ways: Western culture has traditionally been exported globally via a number of factors including consumer products, popular culture and economic ascendancy, but the West does not hold a monopoly over soft power. Across the CATR region, large local immigrant and diaspora communities are viewed as soft power threats, for instance the Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia, the Chinese and Muslim groups in Australia, and the Indians in Singapore and Malaysia. Over the next decade, as migration pressure intensifies, this interplay of competing soft power projections will gather pace, especially in large multi-ethnic urban centers.

Opportunist political parties in many of the nations represented in this volume exploit cultural insecurities among minority, migrant, and even host country communities to cast “outsider” individuals and groups as threats to security and identity. In the most extreme cases, separatist and terrorist groups have turned cultural insecurity into a rallying point for political violence that often targets the national symbols of those they characterize as threats to group security and identity. One only has to think of the recent attacks on Christians in Indonesia; church bombings in Malaysia; sectarian violence in Pakistan; Hindu extremist violence in India; and anti-immigrant political and social tensions in Australia, to imagine how the ongoing securitization of identity, exacerbated by a series of emerging structural, technological and ideological trends mentioned above, could act to further destabilize regional security over the coming years.
3. Privatization and atomization of security

Many of the same factors that have contributed to the securitization of identity have also triggered the privatization and atomization of security. Large and complex systems of trade and transportation facilitate legitimate trade, but they also create new pathways for illegitimate activities such as smuggling and trafficking. Across South and Southeast Asia, the robust illicit arms market has broken down the state monopoly on the use of force and facilitated the proliferation of private armed groups, warlords, paramilitary organizations and insurgent groups. In some cases, these groups are the product of regional or ethnic separatist movements, in others they are simply the result of the national government’s lack of effective security apparatus and insufficient resources.

Communication in the Internet age has also eroded state control of political messaging. A wide variety of ethnic, religious and ideological groups have arisen to challenge the accountability and transparency of national governments. In many cases, these voices of dissent are dramatically more effective at strategic communication and political messaging than national governments and their leaders. Unencumbered by the complexities of governing or any responsibility to function within the constraints of national law and politics, leaders of such groups are often more charismatic and appear more competent and responsive to the needs of their constituencies than government leaders.

Modern transportation has broken down the structure of “national” populations as migrants move relatively freely – by both legal and illegal means – between countries and regions. Illegal immigration is a growing challenge not only in Western Europe and the United States but in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia. Severe capacity deficits and corruption combined with a weak culture of security cooperation in much of the CATR region limit governments’ ability to provide basic law enforcement and border security. Displaced populations such as the Rohingyas in Bangladesh and Tamils in Sri Lanka may well prove to be breeding grounds for extremism and instability.

In many un-governed or under-governed regions, private armies, warlords, and criminal and insurgent groups are increasingly filling this void and establishing governing mechanisms that operate outside the rule of law, outside the control of national government institutions, and outside the reach of international norms and institutions. This privatization of security not only blurs the center of gravity within nation-states, but also the lines between licit and illicit organizations. Local populations, often hungry for the basic trappings of human security, are willing to tolerate and even support the illegal and sometimes repressive activities of private armed groups. In other cases – tribal Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Southern Philippines, for example – local populations probably have no choice in the matter as government security is weak or non-existent and private armies, insurgent groups or local protection rackets remain the “only game in town”.

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Affinity groups hostile to or directly challenging the authority of central governments are often more trusted, less corrupt, and/or more effective in providing the essential elements of human security in their communities. There are areas in which there is little or no effective government service, and civil society (whether licit or illicit) is stepping in to fill the gap in provision of public goods. In many areas, such as health, education, disaster relief and counter-radicalization, civil society has been considerably more effective than government institutions. Radical and insurgent groups understand the political advantage this affords them and are often loathe to open the playing field; hence, humanitarian NGOs providing basic health care, disaster relief and education development have increasingly come under attack, most recently in Afghanistan and flood-ravaged Pakistan. The overall ability of civil society to step in and provide basic services where governments fail to do so may be a net positive in terms of providing for human security, but in the long run it results in divided loyalties and, in too many cases, serves to de-legitimize national governments and dissolve the powers of the nation-state from the “bottom up”.

The atomization of education and the inability of some governments to provide basic education to all children have resulted in the rise of private schools with identity-based or religious curricula that, in contrast to the traditional image of public education as the “school of the nation”, tend to emphasize and harden ethnic, religious and class divisions and recast the boundaries of identity and security within nations. Moreover, in many cases, these identity-based schools have greater access to resources and provide better and more reliable education than public school systems. In fact, in too many cases, they provide the only education available to the poor, refugees, and remote communities.

Counter-radicalization experts have long understood that, for poor, rural populations and refugees in places like western Pakistan, sending their children to radical madrassas for education (and often, room and board or at least one good meal a day), however limited, looks like a better option than no education at all.

**Conclusion**

The history of international relations and national security has always been marked by change and transition. However, the early 21st century is a period of particular transformation and potential volatility across the CATR region. The overwhelming impression one gets from these papers is of movement; capital flows are moving eastward, people and cultures are moving and displacing older established certainties, communication technologies are spreading and breaking down familiar national barriers, environments are changing and resource use is intensifying, while networks of illicit goods in arms, drugs and people are spreading. Old civilization centers such as China and India are once again taking their places as global economic, strategic and cultural leaders, to the discomfort of their smaller regional neighbors.

As individuals and communities adapt to these continuing meta-trends many are renegotiating their identities to fit a more complex world, with the result that identity is becoming an increasingly problematic and securitized issue for many nations.
At the same time, the nation-states themselves are often suffering from a deficit of effective governance, or their monopoly on the use of force and as the providers of human security is being eroded by private sub-national groups.

The national boundaries drawn upon familiar maps of Asia appear to be increasingly ineffective in containing these emerging regional and often interrelated security challenges. The CATR region will continue to claim a larger relative share of world economic output and political importance well into the 21st century. It will also remain at the center of an increasingly complex and interrelated network of emerging security challenges and this will encourage member nations to search for cooperative solutions at a regional level.
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Notes on Contributors

Kamarulnizam Abdullah is Associate Professor at the Universiti Kebangsaan, Malaysia (UKM). His main research area is political violence, religious militancy, and national security issues pertinent to Malaysia and Southeast Asia. He is also currently editor-in-chief for *JEBAT: the Malaysian Journal of History, Politics and Strategic Studies* and also an editorial member for the *Human Security Journal* (RMIT Press). He has published numerous articles in books and journals, among others, *Contemporary Issues of Education, Development & Security* (with co-editors, UKM Press, 2010); *Malaysia in Regional International Relations* (UUM Press, 2010); ‘Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI): the Links’, in the *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 3(1): 2009; and, ‘Managing the Threat of Muslim Radicalism in the post-September 11 Incidents’, in *Across the Causeway: A Multi-Dimensional Study of Malaysia-Singapore Relations*, edited by Takeshi Shirashi (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009).

Peter Anderson (The Hon) is Director of the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University, Australia. Professor Peter Anderson has been associated with policing for more than 40 years, including a 10-year career within the NSW Police Force, largely as a Police Prosecutor, before being elected to the NSW Parliament in 1978. Between 1981 and 1986 he was Minister for Police and Emergency Services, before taking on a range of other senior portfolios including Youth and Community Affairs, Aboriginal Affairs and Health. From 1989 to 1994 he served as Shadow Minister for Police and Emergency Services. Professor Anderson has served as Chairman of the Council for Asian Terrorism Research (CATR), Member of the Advisory Committee of the Research network for a Secure Australia (RNSA), Member of the International Advisory Board of the Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR), Member of the Board of the Australasian Council for Security Professionals.

Milton Baar is an Adjunct Lecturer at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University, Australia. His particular areas of interest are the impacts of behavior on the information security process, operating systems and their misuse in the commercial world, and information warfare.

Rommel Banlaoi is the Chairman of the Board and the Executive Director of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR) and Head of its Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies. He is currently the Chairman of the Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR). He was professor of political science at the National Defense College of the Philippines (where he became Vice President), Assistant Professor in international studies at De La Salle University, instructor in political science at the University of the Philippines (Los Banos), and University Research Associate at the University of the Philippines (Diliman, where he took his BA, MA and PhD in Political Science, ABD). He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Yuchengco Center of De La Salle University, while also lecturing at the...
Notes on Contributors

Command and General Staff College (CGSC) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). He is the author of seven books to date, the latest of which is *Philippine Security in the Age of Terror* published in 2010 by Taylor and Francis.

**Julian Droogan** is an Associate Lecturer at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University, Australia. Julian graduated from the University of Sydney with a Ph.D. looking at mechanisms of religious ideology and identity formation. At PICT Julian heads various research programs and is Editor of the *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*. His research interests include religious radicalization and its relationship to demographic and social pressure, the history of religious terrorism and political violence, and South Asian history and culture. He is also the co-editor of a monthly CATR ejournal, *Asian Conflicts Reports*.

**Katsuhisa Furukawa** is a Fellow of the Research Institute of Science and Technology for Society (RISTEX) in the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST), where he is in charge of a research project on science and security. He has joined various Japanese government study groups, including the Office of the National Security and Crisis Management of the Cabinet Secretariat, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is also a member of the Council of Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR), and a lecturer for the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee Regional Workshop. Mr. Furukawa earned a Master of Public Administration at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

**Segufta Hossain** is a Research Fellow at the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), where she has worked in the Strategic Studies division since September, 2004. She has carried out research works on various security and strategic issues, and has published a number of journal articles and book chapters. Segufta holds Bachelors and Masters Degrees in Geography and Environment from Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh.

**A K M Nazrul Islam** is the Research Director and Head of the Defence Studies Division of Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). He is also an Associate Editor and Editor of individual issues of the *BIISS Journal*. He was awarded his Masters Degree on Defence Studies from National University of Bangladesh. He is a serving military officer who has undergone training both at home and abroad. He graduated from the Defence Services Command and Staff College, Bangladesh and also had his Armed Forces War Course graduation from National Defence College, Bangladesh. In his military career of more than three decades he has served in various command, staff and instructional appointments. Prior to joining BIISS he was the Chief Instructor of Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations Training. He participated as a Military Observer in the United Nations Operation in Mozambique in 1993-1994 and as a Multinational Brigade Headquarters Staff Officer in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2004-2005. His research interests include defence related issues, national security, terrorism, peace keeping and civil-military relations.

**Ameen Izzadeen** is the Deputy Editor of the *Sunday Times* in Sri Lanka. He is a Visiting Lecturer in international relations at the Defence Services Command
and Staff College (Sri Lanka) and the Bandaranaike Diplomatic Training Institute (Colombo). He has written extensively on the Sri Lankan conflict and regional issues.

Shanaka Jayasekara is an Associate Lecturer at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University, Australia. He has served as an advisor to the Sri Lankan government delegation to peace talks with the LTTE from 2002-2006. He lectures in Terrorist Support Networks and Operations in the PICT postgraduate program.

Ranga Kalansooriya is the Head of the International Centre for Terrorism Research and Conflict Management (ICTRM) in Colombo, Sri Lanka. He was a senior diplomat at the Sri Lankan High Commission in Malaysia and also held the position of Director General, Sri Lanka Press Institute. He is currently a consultant and media advisor to an international media organization in Denmark.

Hekmat Karzai is currently the Director of the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS), one of the leading research centers in Kabul, Afghanistan. Prior to his current position, he served as a RMS Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore, where his primary focus was the South and Central Asia regions. He conducted research in development, security and conflict and is considered an authority on Afghanistan. He teaches various courses on conflict and security and serves as non-resident Senior Fellow at the East West Institute in Brussels. From 2004 till 2005, he served as an International Fellow at the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University where he conducted research on terrorism, militancy, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Al Qaeda movement. Mr. Hekmat Karzai was also previously appointed as the Head of the Political Department at the US Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C.

John Langdale is an Associate Professor at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University, Australia where he teaches in the International Security Studies program. He has taught at Macquarie University in Economic Geography and in the Communications and Business programs. His research has focused on the interlinkages between globalization and economics, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. His current interest is in the area of global economic security, with particular interests in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as energy security. He has undertaken consultancies for Australian government departments, local councils, telecommunications carriers and private firms. He was chair of Telstra’s Social and Policy Research in Telecommunications and has been the recipient of a number of Australian Research Council grants.

Jamhari Makruf is a Lecturer at the State Islamic University (UIN), Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. He has studied and written widely on the issue of democracy and the rise of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia, as well as on Islam, religion and society. He co-edited with Fuad Jabali a book on *IAIN dan Modernisasi Islam di Indonesia (The Role of Islamic Higher Education in Modernizing Islam in Indonesia)*, Jakarta, 2001. His latest book is *Gerakan Salafi Radikal Islam di Indonesia (Salafism Radical Movement in Indonesia)*, Jakarta, 2004, co-edited with Jajang Jahroni. He is also co-author with Jemma Parson of *Islamic Legal Education in Indonesia: Tradition and Transition*.
Notes on Contributors

Stephen McCombie is an Associate Lecturer at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University, Australia. Stephen’s current research interests are in computer forensics and cybercrime, having published a number of papers on these topics. He also lectures in and manages PICT’s computer forensic postgraduate program. Stephen was formerly the founder and manager of the National Australia Bank’s Computer Emergency Response Team (nabCERT). In 2009 nabCERT won AusCERT’s Annual Award for Organizational Excellence in Information Security. He held similar roles at IBM and Westpac Bank and worked in corporate security at Qantas as an investigator. Stephen, prior to working in the IT industry, spent 14 years in the NSW Police as a Detective and was instrumental in the establishment of their computer crime investigation team.

Rebecca Mitchell is an Associate Lecturer at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University, Australia. Prior to receiving her Masters Degree, she worked at Dun & Bradstreet as a Senior Business Analyst and Fraud Investigator, analyzing High Risk businesses. Becky is the NSW representative of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers (AIPIO); a member of the Editorial Board of the Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers; the Associate Editor of the Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, and a member of the Australian Working Committee to Develop a National Organisational Resilience Standard.

Golam Mohammad, Major General, is Director General of the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). He was commissioned on 14 June 1979 in the East Bengal Regiment (Infantry) of the Bangladesh Army. In his long military career, he has served in various command, staff and instructional appointments. He has served as Commanding Officer of two Infantry Battalions, Commandant of President Guard Regiment, Commander of an Independent Infantry Brigade, Director General of Directorate General Forces Intelligence, and General Officer Commanding of an Infantry Division. He also served as Staff at Brigade and Division Headquarters, and as Directing Staff of Defence Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC). He took part in UN peacekeeping operations under United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia as a Military Observer from 1989 to 1990. He graduated from National War College under National Defence University, USA, Defence Services Command and Staff College, Bangladesh, and Defence Services Staff College, India. He obtained his Masters Degree on Defence Strategic Studies from Madras University during his course in India in 1994-95, and Masters Degree on National Security Strategy from National Defence University, USA.

ANM Muniruzzaman, Major General, ndc, psc, (Retd.), is the President of the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS). He is a career military officer who has served in important command, staff positions. He is a former UN peacekeeper and also headed the post-election UN Mission in Cambodia. He was the Military Secretary to the President of Bangladesh and also headed the Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) as Director General and CEO. He is a founding member of the consortium Non-traditional Security – Asia (NTS-Asia), based at NTU, Singapore. He is a member of the International Military Advisers Council (IMAC) on Climate Change and the Global Futures Forum.
Naoko Noro is Associate Fellow of the RISTEX-JST, Tokyo, Japan. She earned a Masters Degree in Security Policy Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. She is currently conducting a research project on Science and Technology for Security at RISTEX. Her research interests include counter terrorism, East Asian security, the US-Japan security relationship, and science and technology policies.

Mutiara Pertiwi is a Lecturer at the State Islamic University Jakarta. She completed a Master of Arts in International Relations at the Australian National University and Bachelor of Arts at the University of Indonesia. Her research interests are in Southeast Asian security and international relations theory.

Kumar Ramakrishna is Associate Professor and Head of the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His major book, *Emergency Propaganda: The Winning of Malayan Hearts and Minds, 1948-1958*, (2002) was described by the *International History Review* as “required reading for historians of Malaya, and for those whose task is to counter insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists”. His most recent book, *Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalization in Indonesia* (2009) was identified by *Choice* in October 2009 as a “recommended” reading.

Muhammad Amir Rana is an expert on terrorism and regional strategic issues. He has authored several books on the phenomenon of Islamic militancy including *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan* and *Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA*. Rana received his Masters in Geography in 1996 from the University of Punjab, Lahore. Rana was the founding member of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) in 2006, and has since then been its Director. He is also the Editor of the English research journal *Conflict and Peace Studies*, as well as the Urdu monthly *Tajziat*.

Safdar Sial is a journalist and researcher who focuses on socio-economic conflicts in Pakistan, regional military affairs and Central Asian energy conflicts. After completing his education in marketing research from Lawrence Institute of Management Sciences, Lahore, in 1995, he worked in English journalism as an investigative reporter. He has worked with *The News*, and *The Nation in Lahore*. He joined the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) in April 2007 as a research analyst.

Mark Weston Wall is a consultant and academic with experience in higher education and public sector development, and a history of wide-ranging service in management, administration and operations roles in the public and private sectors. He has tertiary qualifications in development, management, industrial relations, education and ethics. His international experience covers defense, education, public
policy and policing projects in Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Cambodia, Hong Kong, the wider Pacific (Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands), Bangladesh, and most recently in Vietnam. He is currently working in community relations, and preparing for a strategic planning assignment in Syria.

Caroline Ziemke-Dickens is a Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in Alexandria Virginia. She has a Ph.D. in Military History and Strategic Studies from the Ohio State University. She has been a key facilitator in the establishment of the Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR). She is also the co-editor of a monthly CATR ejournal, Asian Conflicts Reports. She has also developed a Strategic Personality Typology designed to help analysts and policymakers understand how historical and cultural factors shape the strategic conduct of states and groups in the modern world. Her publications include “National Myth and the Strategic Personality of Iran: A Counterproliferation Perspective,” in Victor Utgoff. The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, US Interests, and World Order (MIT Press, 2000), Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence (IDA Document D-2537, November 2000), and Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence: Deterring Iraq and Iran (IDA Paper P-3658, September 2001); “Reading the Elephant: Building Cooperative Approaches to Countering the Global Terrorist Threat,” in The International Symposium on Non-Traditional Security: Challenges and Responses (Beijing: CIISS, June 2005); “Social Factors Contributing to Terrorism,” in Joseph McMillan, ed. In the Same Light as Slavery: Building a Global Anti-Terrorist Consensus (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2007); and Agents of Radicalization in the Non-Arab Muslim World (IDA Paper P-4038, May 2005).