Scanning the Horizon:
Implications for Navy strategy of national, joint and other services' strategic trends

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**Title:** Scanning the Horizon: Implications for Navy strategy of national, joint and other services' strategic trends

**Abstract:**
This study reviews and assesses strategies, concepts, doctrines, policies, and trends in strategic thinking, as reflected in documents published by five U.S. national security entities: National and joint authorities (including the President, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Joint Staff); and the U.S. Army, Air Force, Coast Guard and Marine Corps. From these reviews and assessments, the study then derives implications and recommendations for a potential U.S. Navy refreshment of the basic maritime strategy document A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS 21) signed in October 2007 by the heads of the three maritime armed services. Key questions answered are: What are the most salient current strategic concepts/policies/trends in the joint arena and in the other four armed services? What are the potential implications for Navy strategy from each of the five assessed areas (national/joint and other four services)? How should the national/joint and other four services' strategies/ concepts/ trends in strategic thinking be reflected in future maritime strategy updates?

**Subject Terms:**
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Introduction

Overview

This study is part of a broader effort to provide analytic support to the Chief of Naval Operations' Strategy and Policy Division (OPNAV N51) in its development of appropriate ideas for a potential "refreshment" of the basic maritime strategy document *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (CS 21) signed in October 2007 by the heads of the three maritime services.¹

Scope

This study reviews and assesses strategies, concepts, doctrines, policies, and trends in strategic thinking, as reflected in documents published by five U.S. national security entities:

- National and joint authorities (including the President, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Joint Staff)

- The U.S. Army, Air Force, Coast Guard and Marine Corps

From these reviews and assessments, the study then derives implications and recommendations for a potential U.S. Navy refreshment of the CS 21 strategy.

Since most of the Navy's capstone documents (such as CS 21) and their counterparts in other services and agencies are unclassified, this study was limited to examining unclassified documents. This also enables the study to reach a wider potential readership, enhancing its potential utility.

Analytic approach

The analytic approach was designed to bound the very broad scope of the five areas for analysis, and to ensure that the findings provided clear and relevant recommendations for consideration in potential Navy staff updates to the October 2007 strategy.

Key questions for analysis

- What are the most salient current strategic concepts/policies/trends in the joint arena and in the other four armed services?
- What are the potential implications for Navy strategy from each of the five assessed areas (national/joint and other four services)?
- How should the national/joint and other four services’ strategies/concepts/trends in strategic thinking be reflected in future maritime strategy updates?

Methodology

Because the Navy must consider strategy updates in the context of overall national security and military policy and strategy, the analysis below first considers the recent, unclassified, overall keystone national strategy guidance documents, and the capstone and other joint concept and doctrine documents that might influence Navy strategy. It then looks at each of the other four armed services’ strategies, concepts, doctrines, policies, and trends—with this final element of trends in services’ strategic thinking being of particular interest.

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2 This study examined documents published prior to Aug. 2011.
The research methodology here deliberately relies on only a limited number of focused interviews with senior service leaders or strategists, to provide an authoritative preliminary view of any requirement for updates to the CS 21 strategy (in the case of the three heads of the sea services interviewed), a top-level articulation of trends in service strategic thinking when that service lacked recent updated formal strategy statements (in the case of the Air Force), or a frank (and anonymous) assessment of a service's recent strategic thinking by an experienced service strategist (in the cases of the Coast Guard and Army).

For each of the five areas being analyzed—the national/joint area and the other four armed services—the steps in study methodology were as follows:

- Identify and review, through official public documents and/or articles, current key strategy/concepts/doctrines/policies/trends in that national/joint or four services’ area concerned.

- Assess documents/articles in each of these five areas for key issues, especially current/future strategic requirements.

- Identify potential implications of each of the five areas for Navy strategy. Implications are derived from the review and assessment based on the following three criteria: potential relevance to Navy strategy, potential value added to Navy strategy, and clarity/coherence of the issue.

- Provide recommendations for each of the five areas on how the identified selected implications of their strategic thinking should inform Navy inputs to update the strategy or related staff actions. This step draws out the key implications of the analysis and applies them to yield recommendations for Navy strategic planners.

The analysis concludes with general observations and a consolidated recapitulation of all the recommendations contained in the earlier chapters. Appendix A is a selected bibliography, and appendix B lists the people we interviewed for this study.
U.S. Navy capstone documents

Before identifying and analyzing the non-Navy documents that are the subject of this study, it is useful to discuss briefly the Navy's current family of 'capstone' documents, to provide a reference point and baseline for the analysis.

Since 2005, the Navy has developed a family of capstone documents to provide the intellectual underpinnings for the acquisition, education, training, deployment, and use of naval forces, in peacetime, crises, and war. As of mid 2011, this family of documents included:

- Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare (NDP 1) (2010) ⁵
- Annual Navy strategic plans in support of Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development (most recently the Navy Strategic Plan in Support of Program Objective Memorandum 2013 (NSP 13) (2010) ⁶
- Annual CNO Guidance (CNOG) documents (as of mid 2011, most recently in 2010) ⁷

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• CNO “Posture Statements” to the Congress (most recently in 2011).*

CS 21, NOC 2010, and NDP 1 were co-developed with the Marine Corps and Coast Guard, and co-signed by the Commandants of those other naval services. NSP 13, and the annual CNOGs and Posture Statements were developed within the Navy only, and signed only by the CNO, although they were informed by the ideas presented in the three tri-service documents. All these documents are unclassified and publicly available, except for the Navy Strategic Plan, which is classified.

These documents have counterparts at the national level, as well as within the joint system and among the other services. Most of these non-Navy documents are not exact equivalents of the Navy document family, due to differences in the purposes and operations of their organizational sponsors. This study examined a selection of these non-Navy counterpart documents, in order to gain insights that might prove useful to the Navy as it refreshes its own family of documents.

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* See, for example, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead, *Statement of Admiral Gary Roughead before the Senate Armed Services Committee on FY 2012 Department of the Navy Posture* (Mar. 8, 2011).
As national and joint strategies and concepts provide a foundation for all services’ strategies, it is appropriate to begin by reviewing and assessing some key national and joint strategies, concepts, doctrines, policies, and, especially, recent trends in strategic thinking. This assessment then identifies the potential implications of major national and joint issues for Navy strategy (based on the three criteria of relevance, value added, and clarity). It concludes with specific recommendations for Navy strategists who may consider updates to the CS 21 strategy.

**Current national strategies/concepts/trends in strategic thinking**

This review considers, in sequence of publication dates from earliest to most recent, the four major (unclassified) national strategy guidance documents that have been issued since the October 2007 promulgation by the Navy and other sea services of the CS 21 maritime strategy. These four key national strategy documents are the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), President Obama’s National Security Strategy (NSS) (May 2010), and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael G. Mullen’s The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining America’s Military Leadership (NMS) (February 2011). In addition to these four key national strategy documents, we also reviewed the four special topical reviews written over the past two years—the DOD Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (BMDR) (February 2010), the DOD Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) (April 2010), President Obama’s National Space Policy of the

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Three other documents from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, not discussed below, deserve acknowledgment. Two of these documents are classified: the key annual Secretary of Defense guidance to the services and agencies on budget development, currently titled the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) (previously known as Guidance for the Development of the Force, or GDF); and the annual Secretary of Defense guidance to the services and combatant commanders (CCDRs) on operational planning, the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). These documents contain near-term directions to the Navy and other services that may have some implications over time for strategies. A third document, the biennial update of the Unified Command Plan (UCP), establishes the missions, responsibilities, and geographical boundaries of each combatant command (COCOM). The most recent UCP, issued April 8, 2011, in its unclassified version indicates that the U.S. Northern Command now has responsibilities for Arctic operations, including those by naval forces. 11

With that background, we will now review the key national strategic documents.

**National Defense Strategy (NDS)**

Secretary of Defense Gates’ June 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) serves as the capstone document to execute the military part of the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS), in that it “provides a framework for other DOD strategic guidance,” and “describes our overarching goals and strategy.”

In the NDS, Secretary Gates’ emphasis was on rebalancing defense planning (and budgets) to place more emphasis on the two irregular conflicts that constitute the “current war” in Iraq and Afghanistan, in addition to the traditional focus on major state conflicts that the Pentagon is geared for in terms of force planning and resourcing. As Secretary Gates noted, “We must display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that

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which we possess in conventional combat." The NDS also frankly states that "we will need to hedge against China's growing military modernization [and expanded] conventional military capabilities, emphasizing anti-access and area denial assets [and] a full range of long-range strike, space, and information warfare capabilities." Accordingly, the NDS concluded that DOD will respond to China's expanding military power "through shaping and hedging [and] continue to improve and refine our capabilities to respond to China if necessary." The NDS cited five key objectives of the Department of Defense in support of the National Security Strategy: "defend the homeland, win the long war, promote security, deter conflict, and win our nation's wars."

Secretary Gates concluded by noting that "although improving the U.S. Armed Forces' proficiency in irregular warfare is the Defense Department's top priority," the possibility of interstate conflict cannot be ignored. Strengthening and expanding alliances and partnerships were highlighted, as was the need for "an expanded understanding of ‘jointness’" with broader interagency and international cooperation.

Finally, Gates emphasized that "the United States requires freedom of action in the global commons and strategic access to important regions of the world to meet our national security needs."

**Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR)**

With Gates' June 2008 NDS as its strategic underpinning, it is no surprise that the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) issued in February 2010 emphasized rebalancing strategic and budget emphasis toward the current irregular wars. However, the QDR also concluded that the United States "needs a broad portfolio of military capabilities with

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13 Ibid., 3.

14 Ibid., 10.

15 Ibid., 6

16 Ibid., 13. Press reports indicated that the four service chiefs did not concur with Secretary Gates' emphasis on rebalancing emphasis away from preparing for major state wars, and that in the end he had to issue his NDS in Jun. 2008 over their objections. See "Gates Approves New Defense Strategy Over Objections of Service Chiefs," InsideDefense.com, Jun. 12, 2008.

17 Ibid., 16.
maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict” and directed “more focus and investment in a new air-sea battle concept, long-range strike, space and cyberspace, among other conventional and strategic modernization programs.” The QDR went on to observe that “operations over the past eight years have stressed the ground forces disproportionately, but the future operational landscape could also portend significant long-duration air and maritime campaigns for which the U.S. Armed Forces must be prepared.”

In service guidance, the QDR directed a series of enhancements for naval forces, and characterized trends as requiring naval forces to “continue to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection operations, even as they add capabilities and capacity for working with a wide range of partner navies.” The QDR noted how “the rapid growth in sea-and land-based BMD capabilities will help meet the needs of combatant commanders and allies in several regions,” and that “land-based and carrier-based aircraft will need greater range, flexibility, and multi-mission versatility in order to deter and defeat adversaries that are fielding more potent anti-access capabilities.” The force levels across the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) identified in the QDR included 10-11 aircraft carriers, 3 maritime prepositioning squadrons and “29-31 amphibious warfare ships”—a reduction from the 33-ship amphibious force level that Navy and Marine Corps leaders had agreed on in January 2009 (as discussed below in assessing Marine Corps policy and strategy).

**National Security Strategy (NSS)**

After the February 2010 QDR was issued, President Obama, in late May 2010, released his overarching National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS addressed not only military but also other (diplomatic, economic, information) elements of overall U.S. national strategy, with a strong emphasis on renewing the U.S. economy as “the wellspring of American power.” Cast at a more general level than the QDR or even the NDS, the NSS spoke of the need to “balance and integrate all elements of American power” and “maintain our military’s conventional superiority, while enhancing the capacity to defeat asymmetric threats.”

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18 QDR 2010, i.
19 Ibid., vi.
20 Ibid., x.
21 Ibid., xvi.
The NSS further emphasized that the military must continue to strengthen "its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments." Throughout the NSS, the President emphasized the need to avoid over-relying on military power, and stressed the importance of diplomacy, information, and intelligence, and the need to strengthen alliances and build partnerships with emerging powers.

**National Military Strategy (NMS)**

The most recent of the four key national strategy documents is *National Military Strategy 2011* (NMS), issued by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen in February 2011 to "provide the ways and means by which our military will advance our enduring national interests" as articulated in the 2010 NSS and the 2010 QDR. Admiral Mullen's themes were emphasis on a broader joint force leadership approach ("facilitator, enabler, convener, and guarantor"), emphasis on deepening security relationships with allies and creating diverse partnerships, and being prepared for a future requiring "a full spectrum of military capabilities and attributes." Admiral Mullen also cited the U.S. national debt as "a significant security risk."

The NMS first emphasized the need for assured access to, and freedom of maneuver within, the global commons, "challenged by state (and non-state) actors developing anti-access and area denial capabilities and strategies to constrain U.S. freedom of action [and] challenge our ability to project power from the global commons and increase our operational risks." The NMS then established four national military objectives: counter violent extremism, deter and defeat aggression, strengthen international and regional security, and shape the future force. It highlighted the need for the joint force to counter anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategies, and for joint force doctrine to better integrate core military competencies, which include "complementary, multi-domain power projection, joint forcible entry, the ability to maintain joint assured access to the global commons and cyberspace should they become contested, and the ability to fight and win against adversaries."
The NMS also committed the military to “improve synchronized planning and force flow between regional theaters.” In discussing these theaters, the NMS committed to “partner with Canada on regional security issues such as an evolving Arctic, and look to build an increasingly close security partnership with Mexico,” and to help build regional security cooperation in South and Central America and the Caribbean. Further afield, in the Middle East, the U.S. military will “maintain an appropriate presence capable of reassuring partners and allies and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear arms,” and “build partner capacity in Africa.” In Europe, the joint force will continue to support our “preeminent multilateral alliance” in NATO, including BMD. Finally, the NMS identifies the Asia-Pacific region as the area from which U.S. “strategic priorities and interests will increasingly emanate,” with U.S. presence and alliance commitments (especially in Japan and Korea) key to preserving stability, while “we must invest new attention and resources in Southeast and South Asia,” expand cooperation with Australia and India, and “expand the scope and participation of multilateral exercises across the region.”

Regarding China, the NMS stressed the need for a deeper military-to-military relationship, but expressed concern at China’s assertiveness in the maritime domain, and pledged to oppose “any nation’s actions that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons and cyberspace, or that threaten the security of our allies.”

The NMS highlighted transnational challenges such as terrorism, piracy, trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as threats that CCDRs must counter in ways tailored to their region and coordinated across regional seams. The strategy noted the need for better interagency and international coordination in Theater Security Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance across all theaters.

Finally, the NMS section on capabilities and readiness required “modular, adaptive, general purpose forces that can be employed in the full range of military operations.” These forces will need to improve their ability to surge on short notice and be interoperable with other U.S. government agencies, and “must become more expeditionary in nature” with a small logistical footprint. Land, sea, and air forces must
all be capable of “full spectrum operations,” and be able to “retain the ability to project power into distant, anti-access environments.”

Looking to the future, the joint force “will explore joint operational concepts leveraging mobile and more survivable bases, sea-borne mobility, and innovative uses of space,” and be “conducting more joint, combined, interagency, and multinational training exercises and experimentation” as “forward presence and engagement will take on greater importance.”

Supplementing reviews

Four recent supplementing reviews on BMD, nuclear posture, and space are significant as strategic guidance in their respective areas, but their content in terms of potential implications for Navy strategy is limited, and can be briefly summarized here.

*Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (BMDR)*

The February 2010 *Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report* notably committed the United States to a new European Phased Adaptive Approach within NATO, featuring (in addition to some new shore-based radars) a near-term mobile, sea-based defense from U.S. Navy ships equipped with the modified Aegis combat system with SM-3 interceptor missiles and, in the longer term, the addition of “Aegis ashore” radars with more advanced sea- and shore-based SM-3 interceptor missiles.

*Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)*

The April 2010 *Nuclear Posture Review* (NPR)—while reflecting President Obama’s commitments to reductions in nuclear weapons, particularly in the New Start Treaty with Russia—reaffirmed the maintenance of the current U.S. nuclear alert posture, including “a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time.”

Looking ahead, the NPR said the United States “will consider reducing from 14 to 12 Ohio-class SSBNs in the second half of this decade,” and highlighted the requirement for development of a follow-on to the Ohio class.

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33 Ibid., 18-19.
34 Ibid., 20.
36 Ibid., 22-23.
The NPR also committed the United States to “retire the nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N),” judging that it served a “redundant purpose in the U.S. nuclear stockpile” to other “means to forward-deploy nuclear weapons in time of crisis.”

**Space policy documents**

There are two key recent space policy documents: President Obama’s *National Space Policy of the United States of America*, and the *National Security Space Strategy* (signed by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence). They emphasize three things: a policy of peaceful and safe access to, and use of, space; the importance of space to U.S. national security; and the need for enhanced U.S. space situational awareness.

**Joint documents**

With these key national strategic guidance documents in mind, we reviewed the joint military guiding documents and doctrine, in order to identify top-level joint doctrinal guidance with potential implications for Navy strategy. As of February 2011, there are 82 joint doctrine publications, 33 of which were written by CCDRs, 28 by the services, and 21 by the Joint Staff. Thus, our review was of necessity quite selective, focusing on the highest-level documents.

**Joint Operating Environment (JOE)**

The first joint publication of note here is the periodically updated Joint Forces Command’s *Joint Operating Environment* (JOE), “intended to inform joint concept development and experimentation” throughout DOD, by providing “a perspective on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications,” speculative and not predictive, for the next 25 years. The JOE helps to frame future security problems and highlight their military implications, while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS’s) companion document, the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) (discussed below)

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77 Ibid., 28.
78 That said, it should be noted that it was a modified sea-based U.S. Navy SM-3 interceptor missile that in Jan. 2008 proved a capability to destroy an errant satellite in space.
is designed to answer the problems defined in the JOE and state how the future joint force will operate. Together, these two capstone documents drive concept development and experimentation to develop the future joint force.  

The 2010 JOE identifies seven major trend categories: demographics, globalization, technology, scarcity of natural resources, rising state powers, rising power of non-state actors, and weapons of mass destruction. From a naval perspective, the importance of trade routes, critical straits, and ports, and the criticality of undersea cables for the internet are of particular interest. The JOE then identifies several “contexts,” which are the confluence of two or more trends with warfighting implications for the future joint force. These “contexts” include “competition and cooperation among conventional powers,” which may deny U.S. forces access and freedom of operations in the global commons; “weak and failing states,” which require early identification, response, and stability operations; “security in urban environments,” which complicate U.S. ISR and firepower advantages; “Battle of Narratives,” which uses the tools of globalization to mobilize populations against U.S. forces; and “protection of the homeland,” which may require U.S. forces to defend against direct attacks or play key roles in domestic disasters. The JOE concludes that, overall, future trends suggest the need to build a joint force that is adaptable, agile, and resilient.

**Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)**

The companion document to the JOE that answers the challenges of the future identified in the JOE (and, together with the JOE, is supposed to drive concept development, experimentation, force development and employment) is the CJCS Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), last published in 2009. The CCJO “describes in broad, conceptual terms” the CJCS vision “for how the joint force circa 2016-2028 will operate in response to a wide variety of security challenges.”

The central thesis comprises three ideas intended to guide a generic process of operational adaptation: the need to address each situation on its own terms; the need to conduct a combination of four basic categories of activity—combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction; and the need to assess results and adapt/modify as required. The CCJO provides 10 precepts underlying all successful future joint operations (and as a basis for subordinate joint operating concepts). Among the precepts

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41 Ibid.


43 Ibid., 12-21.
with most potential relevance to future Navy strategy are “combine joint capabilities to maximize complementary rather than merely additive effects,” “avoid combining capabilities where doing so adds complexity without compensating advantage,” “operate indirectly through partners to the extent each situation permits,” and “ensure operational freedom of action.”

The CCJO concludes with a long list of “institutional implications” of adopting the CCJO concept, which in short requires “a more adaptive and versatile joint force.”

**CCJO Activity Concepts**

Perhaps of greater value and specific relevance to Navy strategists than the overall capstone documents (the JOE and the CCJO) is a long CJCS document developed to elaborate on concepts for each of the CCJO’s four categories of activities (combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction), with the purpose of more specifically guiding force and concept development and experimentation.

This November 2010 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Activity Concepts (CCJO Activity Concepts)* document is also signed by CJCS Admiral Mullen and includes a specific list of the implications that adopting each of the four activity concepts will have for the services. Here, briefly highlighted, are some of the key implications from those lists of potential relevance for Navy strategy.

- For the joint combat activity concept, implications included pursuing precision capabilities in all forms (maneuver, fire, information), pursuing weapon systems with scalable munitions effects, developing the capabilities and capacity to fight for superiority in all domains (including maritime and air), and improving capabilities required to defeat advanced anti-access capabilities and to conduct forcible-entry operations.

- Key implications of the joint security activity concept were the need for specialized security-focused training, developing non-lethal capabilities, and

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44 Ibid., 21-28.
developing capabilities and procedures to operate across multi-jurisdictional boundaries.46

- Implications for services of adopting the joint engagement activity concept included addressing engagement more prominently in joint doctrine, focused training, and establishing policy advisor (POLAD) teams within the joint force.47

- Finally, some key implications of adopting the concept for the joint relief and reconstruction activity concept included developing command and control processes for interagency unity of effort and developing scalable mobility and logistics mechanisms to allow adaptability for each operation.48

Overall, CCJO Activity Concepts contains the most detailed derivation of implications for the services found in any of the key joint publications surveyed for this study.

**Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Joint Pub 1)**

Other joint doctrine publications reviewed included Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Joint Pub 1).49 This document proclaimed itself "the capstone joint doctrine publication," as it outlined command relationships and authorities for U.S. armed forces. It is useful as background, but has no specific implications for Navy strategy. Likewise, a review of the massive *Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning* establishes key elements for joint operations planners, but has no specific strategy implications for the Navy.50 Most of the other dozens of joint concepts and doctrine publications focus on narrow functional categories and activities of the joint force, but all these publications ultimately derive from the guidance in the key documents highlighted above: the JOE, CCJO, and CCJO Activity Concepts.

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46 Ibid., JSC-30-JSC-35.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., JRC-48-JRC-54.
49 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, Joint Publication 1, * Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 02 May 2007, Incorporating Change 1, Mar. 20, 2009.
50 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Aug. 11, 2011).
Potential implications of national and joint strategic concepts for Navy strategy

The following implications, derived from the discussion above, meet the three criteria of potential relevance, value added for Navy strategy, and clarity/coherence, and will form the basis for the subsequent recommendations for future Navy strategy:

- Hedging against China's growing military modernization is a key element in US national security policy and strategy
- Robust forward presence and power projection capabilities, as well as freedom of action and access in the global commons, are US national security requirements
- US national security initiatives should be joint and internationally cooperative whenever feasible
- The US must retain a broad range of military capabilities across a wide spectrum of possible conflicts and other activities
- A significant US Navy SSBN capability is required for strategic nuclear deterrence

Recommendations for Navy strategy

The following recommendations should be considered to inform potential Navy inputs to update the 2007 tri-service CS 21 strategy:

- Retain and increase the emphasis on versatility and full-spectrum capabilities of naval forces.
- Ensure that any update addresses in some detail the Navy threat appreciation (citing China, Iran, and other potential threats by name) and briefly sets forth the Navy response to the anti-access/area-denial challenge, including an unclassified description of ongoing Air-Sea Battle concept development with the Air Force (and other services), enhancements to counter ballistic and cruise missile threats, and plans for eventual long-range unmanned aircraft.
- Ensure that any update highlights how the Navy (teamed with the Marine Corps and Coast Guard forces) routinely provides forward presence and
forward engagement and (through operational concepts such as Global Fleet Stations) has been building capacity of partner maritime forces.

- Highlight the Navy's indispensable role in providing sea-based missile defense.

- Consider expanding the current brief discussion of “sea-based strategic deterrence,” to point out that this is a continuing top-level national requirement of the Navy.

- Recognize that a continuing challenge for Navy strategic planners will be to closely track (and contribute to) the elaboration of key national and joint strategy and doctrine publications, particularly given a new Secretary of Defense and a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As a final observation on the relationship of Navy strategy with the joint arena, it should be noted that a recent senior Navy strategist wrote a series of articles advocating that the Navy focus on enhanced support to the joint force (led by “littoral sea control” with the Marine Corps) as its main strategy. Navy strategists may wish to consider that this or other future Navy strategic emphases will need to be reflected eventually in joint doctrine—but as an ultimate result of validated service action and experimentation, not as an initial step.\(^1\)

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U.S. Army strategic concepts

This section discusses the findings of a review and assessment of Army strategies, concepts, doctrines, policies, and, especially, trends in strategic thinking. It then identifies the potential implications of this service's key issues for Navy strategy (based on the criteria of potential relevance and value added for Navy strategy, and clarity/coherence). It concludes with specific recommendations for Navy strategists considering updates to the CS 21 strategy.

Current service strategies/concepts/trends in strategic thinking

As the two traditional large U.S. services dating to the founding of the Republic, the Navy and the Army have a history of over two centuries of complex relationships, often characterized by rivalry, conceptual disagreements, and competition for defense resources, as well as examples of superb operational cooperation. Against this background, the official statements of current major Army strategies, concepts, and doctrine will first be examined, followed by consideration of the challenges facing the Army as it adapts its concepts to the evolving security and budget environments.

The Army Capstone Concept (ACC)

The foundation document for current Army concepts is The Army Capstone Concept (ACC) (December 2009). Its stated purpose is "to describe the broad capabilities the Army will require in the 2016-2028 timeframe. It describes how the Army will apply available resources to overcome adaptive enemies and accomplish challenging missions in complex operational environment and establishes the foundation for subordinate concepts." This

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53 General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, Commander U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept (ACC), Operational Adaptability—
conceptual foundation requires the Army to “remain ready to conduct full-spectrum operations” (i.e., simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability support operations). Rejecting the 1990s Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) theorists’ faith in the dominance of technology on the battlefield, this current concept emphasizes that the Army “must take an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary or “leap ahead” approach to force development,” and “focus on understanding and adapting to the complexity and uncertainty of future conflict.”

In this regard, the ACC identifies six supporting ideas contributing to future forces’ ability to apply operational adaptability in future operations:

- “develop the situation through action” (close contact).
- “conduct combined arms operations” (defined as “integrating fire and maneuver and appropriate combinations of infantry, mobile protected firepower, offensive and defensive fires, engineers, Army aviation, and joint capabilities)—which “will remain the Army’s most fundamental and important competency,”
- “employ a combination of defeat and stability mechanisms,”
- “integrate joint capabilities” (mentioning particularly the Air Force’s and Navy’s complementary “joint fires and precision strike capabilities,” as well as the Army’s capabilities to seize/destroy enemy air defense and anti-ship missile capabilities threatening the other U.S. services),
- “cooperate with partners” (joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational and private sector partners), and
- “exert psychological and technical influence.”

In addition to these supporting ideas, the ACC identifies a set of core operational actions that future Army forces must conduct: (1) security force assistance, (2) shaping and entry operations (including joint forcible-entry operations where Army units will require “access to joint capabilities, especially intelligence, fires (offensive and defensive),

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54 Ibid., 9.
55 Ibid., 15.
56 Ibid., 17-24.
logistics, airlift, and sealift” [and] protection under a joint air and missile defense umbrella, (3) inter-theater and intra-theater operational maneuver, (4) full-spectrum operations, and (5) overlapping protection operations, distributed support and sustainment, and network-enabled mission command.57

The ACC concludes by noting that its central idea is “operational adaptability,” and that the ACC is the foundation for the other subordinate concepts that make up the Army Concept framework, specifically the Army Operating Concept, “which takes the ideas and tasks from this pamphlet and expands them into specific operational and tactical level actions,” and then provides a series of more detailed functional concepts.58

**United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028 (AOC)**

The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028 (AOC) “builds upon the strategic vision” of the Army Capstone Concept to describe how future Army forces conduct operations as part of the joint force. As detailed above, the Army Capstone Concept already provided two of the Army’s keystone operational concepts—“full spectrum operations” and “operational adaptability”—to enable response to a range of future threats under uncertain conditions. The AOC adds to these two concepts three other key Army concepts: “combined arms maneuver,” “wide area security,” and “mission command.”59

Army forces conduct “combined arms maneuver,” defined as the application of the elements of combat power in a complementary and reinforcing manner, to achieve advantages over the enemy and exploit success.60

Army forces establish “wide area security,” defined as the application of the elements of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to deny the enemy positions of advantage; protect forces, populations, infrastructure and activities;

57 Ibid., 24-30.
58 Ibid., 31.
60 Ibid., 11, 60.
and consolidate tactical and operational gains. Both these concepts are employed to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative at both the operational and tactical levels.

Supporting ideas contributing to the Army's ability to conduct combined-arms maneuver and wide-area security include: operate decentralized, conduct continuous reconnaissance, conduct air-ground operations, expand capabilities at tactical levels, inform and influence populations, conduct effective transitions, and enhance unit cohesion.

In discussing the Army's organization for combined-arms maneuver and wide-area security, the AOC emphasizes the importance of the theater army level at COCOMs, and of the corps and division levels, as focal points for joint interface with other services such as the Navy, for such essential supporting missions as air and missile defense, and fire support to ground forces.

The third key concept highlighted in the AOC is "mission command," defined as "the exercise of authority and direction by the commander and the commander's staff to integrate the warfighting functions using the operations process and mission orders"—with the focus being on lower levels of command having latitude to execute the commander's intent.

Finally, the AOC includes an appendix D, "Implications for Joint and Interagency Partners," which identifies both "What the Army provides the joint force" and "What the Army requires from joint and interagency partners." In the latter section, requirements of future Army forces from joint forces include:

1. Assets to enable forcible entry.
2. Assets for inter-theater movement of forces and sustainment by air and sea, with future air, land, sea, and amphibious platforms able to overcome enemy anti-access, sea denial efforts, or damage caused by disaster.
3. Capabilities to enable seabasing or other alternatives for theater access. Supporting arrival of Army units by sea, joint forcible entry operations provide

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61 Ibid., 11, 61.
62 Ibid., 11.
63 Ibid., 16-21.
64 Ibid., 60.
sea-based assets for command, control, fires, protection, intelligence, reconnaissance, and sustainment.

4. Joint assets to mitigate degradation of Army communication systems. The Army relies on the joint force to maintain communications, navigation, and intelligence systems necessary to conduct operations decentralized over wide areas.

5. Access to joint fires in support of combined-arms maneuver and wide-area security.

6. Interagency capabilities at lower echelons.

7. Protection at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At the operational level, Army forces rely on other services to secure movement of personnel and equipment to and from theaters of operation. At the tactical level, the Army depends on the joint force to gain and maintain air and sea superiority.65

8. Access to joint and national-level assets.

Later in our discussion, we will consider the implications that these Army requirements from the joint forces, as well as the implications of the Army’s overall concepts, have for Navy strategy.

Before discussing implications for the Navy, however, we will consider two of the Army’s key doctrinal publications, and then discuss the broader ongoing debate over the future of the Army.

**Field Manual 3.0, Operations**

The Army’s 2008 Field Manual (FM) 3.0, *Operations*, "initiated a comprehensive change in Army Doctrine" by establishing “full spectrum operations—simultaneous offensive, defensive, stability, or civil support operations—as the central tenet of how the Army applies its capabilities (later elaborated upon in the 2009 *Army Capstone Concept*)."66 Then, since the traditional Army framework of command and control was seen as “no longer adequate to ensure success in full spectrum operations,” Change 1 to FM 3-0 (dated

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65 Recalling the many Army battles in the 1980s to keep “maritime superiority” terminology out of joint strategy documents, it is ironic that it is now part of their capstone documents.

February 22, 2011) replaced this command and control warfighting function with “mission command” (as first described in the *Army Capstone Concept* of 2009) as the enabler for a more operationally adaptive force.\(^{67}\) Change 1 to FM 3-0 also tracked with the *Army Operational Concept* of 2010 by adding security force assistance and stability operations, deterrence, and countering hybrid threats as major elements of Army operations.\(^{68}\)

**FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (COIN)**

The other key Army doctrine publication reviewed was the 2006 Army/Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, which established the doctrinal underpinning for what became “full spectrum operations” in the subsequent FM 3-0, the *Army Capstone Concept*, and the *Army Operational Concept*.\(^{69}\) A recent CNA study has already elaborated on the implications of counterinsurgency doctrine. In that study, *The Navy Role in Confronting Irregular Challenges* (CIC), the authors identified four Navy CIC missions: maritime security force assistance, maritime security, maritime stability operations, and counterinsurgency/counterterrorism. Those will not be further elaborated upon here, but have implications for future strategic cooperation of the Navy (and Marine Corps) with the Army.\(^{70}\)

**Changes and critiques**

**From the inside**

The Army’s recent changes to new conceptual and doctrinal underpinnings detailed and discussed above provide benchmarks to assess implications of current Army thinking for Navy strategy. The benchmarks, however, should be seen against the backdrop of a continuing internal Army debate over the future strategy, missions, and force structure of

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\(^{67}\) Ibid., vii-viii.

\(^{68}\) Ibid., viii.


the service. General Dempsey was hardly settled in his office as Army Chief of Staff in April 2011 before he was named in late May 2011 to replace Admiral Mullen as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the end of September. Key documents of Army concepts and doctrine discussed above were developed under General Dempsey during his three years at Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) before he became Chief of Staff, whereas his announced replacement, General Ray Odierno, has (except for the past brief year as commander of a disestablishing Joint Forces Command) been mostly in field operational positions overseas, with little time to ponder the future army.

As retired Army Lt. Gen. David Barno recently commented, “There’s a very good chance the Army will take a 45-degree turn here in the fact that Dempsey and the acquisition chief are leaving at the same time. I think a lot of the directions that Dempsey put in place at [TRADOC] and then continued in this short stint as chief are in question right now.”

Indeed, it was reported that General Dempsey had been drafting an “Army 2020” strategic vision for the service, planned for release on June 15, 2011, the Army’s 235th anniversary. That now appears shelved, though a separate draft “Intent for the Army” document unofficially surfaced in early June—but was more a list of action items than a strategic vision for the future Army. General Dempsey, in early May 2011, had provided his own critique of the current doctrine and rationale for a new “Army 2020 strategy,” stating, “I think we’ve got a well-articulated strategy that is servicing, if you will, the Army of 2011—the modular, [Army Force Generation] Army, the [brigade combat team]-centric Army, but that may not be what we need in 2020, if these units are not adaptable to the lowest tactical level.”

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Another important internal critique came from a transition team of officers and NCOs, who told the new Army Chief of Staff about a number of serious challenges, including tension between military and civilian leaders, lack of soldier training and discipline, concern of service leaders about future deployments and budget cuts, and promotion of soldiers before they are ready for the next rank.74

From the outside

The service’s future has also been questioned by defense analysts, congressional leaders, and Secretary of Defense Gates. These questions remind Navy strategists that future trends in Army strategic thinking are by no means settled. Navy strategists will have to observe closely how the Army’s future roles and concepts evolve, and ensure that Navy strategy adapts accordingly, where appropriate.

According to senior analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS):

U.S. ground forces remain focused but justifiably tired. Whether ground force leaders can shift gears and clearly articulate a new direction and purpose that aligns with projected future challenges and can win public support remains a critical unanswered question. The country is increasingly weary of war and concerned about the national debt. Indications are that the public and its political representatives are unenthusiastic about devoting dwindling national treasure to large ground forces designed to prevail in military engagements that resemble those of the last decade. These circumstances do not bode well for U.S. ground forces.75

Additionally, from the defense analysts’ perspectives, a 2008 assessment of the Army by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) outlined how the Army had transformed from the pre-1991 Cold War garrison force, to a force designed to fight short, conventional wars against regional powers in the 1990s, to the current battle-hardened expeditionary force conducting protracted ground campaigns in two countries, but concluded that the Army would have to change further to confront future

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challenges. The CSBA study highlighted the complications the Army would face in trying to prepare for both conventional and irregular war under its “full spectrum force” concept, with particular issues of force structure and force modernization, as well as the need for emphasis on peacetime training and advising capabilities. The study concluded that Army plans might not be executable within expected budgets, and that the Army would be required to put more faith in the ability of other services to dominate at the high end of the conflict spectrum and focus its own resources on enhancing its irregular warfare capabilities.

In Congress, Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), noted with alarm what he termed a “globally committed and overstretched” Army. Beyond current continuing warfighting commitments, Levin highlighted the need to “find ways to deal with the spiraling growth of personnel costs, begin planning for the personnel end-strength reductions (down 22,000 by 2013, and a further 27,000 between 2015 and 2017), rebuild its strategic depth (i.e., the readiness in the non-deployed force), rationalize and stabilize its modernization programs” (which Levin said have failed for a decade or more), and deal with personnel/families strains and issues.

Finally, in a February 2011 speech at the U.S. Military Academy, Secretary of Defense Gates discussed key issues the Army faces. The first issue he addressed was how the Army will structure itself for the wide range of missions it will face in the future. In this regard, after opining that the future of warfare could not be accurately predicted, he said:

The need for heavy armor and firepower to survive, close with, and destroy the enemy will always be there . . . Looking ahead, though, in the competition for tight defense dollars within and between the services, the Army must also confront the reality that the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military are primarily air and naval engagements . . . The strategic rationale for swift-moving expeditionary forces, be they Army or Marines, airborne infantry, or special operations is self-evident given the likelihood of counterterrorism, rapid reaction, disaster response, or stability and security force assistance missions. But in my opinion, any

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77 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, “Hearing to Consider the Nomination of General Martin E. Dempsey to be Chief of Staff, United States Army,” Mar. 3, 2011.


future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should "have his head examined," as General MacArthur so delicately put it.

The second issue Secretary Gates addressed was how the Army could adapt its practices and culture to these strategic realities, and prepare, train, and retain officers for the broad range of missions, highlighting the need for "leaders who are themselves full-spectrum in their thinking" and junior leaders who are encouraged to innovate and take risks." Secretary Gates' speech, in its challenge to the Army to rethink its future role and culture, is still reverberating among Army leaders and strategic thinkers. In a mid-June 2011 anonymous interview with a very experienced Army strategic thinker, deep concern was expressed that the Army was on a track to eliminate its heavy armor forces (or, at a minimum, place them in the Reserves). He also felt that, while it was good to build partner capacity and work with allies, the United States must retain its own unilateral ground force capabilities for major regional conflict, given both the unreliability of partners and the weaknesses of allies, and said that for this purpose, the United States required conventional ground force capabilities, not just the "magic bullet" of special operations forces.\(^{30}\)

**Potential implications of Army strategic concepts for Navy strategy**

In accordance with this study's three criteria—potential relevance, value added for Navy strategy, and clarity/coherence—the following implications can be drawn:

- Scalable, flexible conventional power projection is needed, and would benefit from closer Navy (and Marine Corps)-Army relationships.

- The five key Army concepts today are "full spectrum operations," "operational adaptability," "combined arms maneuver," "wide area security," and "mission command."

- Six of the eight "Implications for Joint and Interagency Partners"—listed in the Army Operational Concept as required by the Army from the joint force—are of relevance to the Navy:
  - Assets to enable forcible entry.

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\(^{30}\) Interview with anonymous senior Army strategic thinker, Jun. 15, 2011.
- Assets for inter-theater movement of forces and sustainment by air and sea, with future air, land, sea, and amphibious platforms able to overcome enemy anti-access, sea denial efforts, or damage caused by disaster.

- Capabilities to enable seabasing or other alternatives for theater access. In order to support the arrival of Army units by sea, joint forcible entry operations provide seabased assets for command, control, fires, protection, intelligence, reconnaissance, and sustainment.

- Joint assets to mitigate degradation of Army communications and navigation systems.

- Access to joint fires in support of combined-arms maneuver and wide-area security.

- Protection at operational level of movement of Army personnel and equipment to theaters of operation, and at the tactical level, air and sea superiority.

Recommendations for Navy strategy

In light of the above potential for implications, the following recommendations should be considered to inform potential Navy inputs to update the CS 21 strategy and related efforts:

- Recognize that the Army takes the drafting, promulgation, dissemination and operational use of its conceptual and doctrinal publications very seriously.

- To enhance Navy understanding of the current key Army strategic concepts (full-spectrum operations, operational adaptability, combined-arms maneuver, wide-area security, and mission command) and to assess possible future changes in Army strategic thinking with implications for Navy strategy, address these concepts and changes in service-to-service Warfighter Talks. Conversely, the Navy should use these talks to address the key concepts and any changes in its maritime strategy.

- Ensure that Navy inputs to update the CS 21 strategy list how the Navy is addressing some of the key Army requirements of the Navy as a joint force partner. Potential areas of particular mention might include Navy air and sea
assets enabling Army forcible entry, Navy assets for inter-theater movement of Army forces and sustainment (including discussion of how Air-Sea Battle concepts may serve to overcome enemy anti-access, area denial threats), and how Navy forces provide the Army’s requirements for “seabased assets for command, control, fires, protection, intelligence, reconnaissance, and sustainment.”

- Ensure Navy strategy elaboration and enhanced discussion with the Army (and Marine Corps) on evolving seabasing concepts (and limitations), through routine Warfighter Talks and perhaps as a separate dedicated tri-service initiative.

- Find and exploit opportunities to win Army support for improvements in Navy sea control capabilities, pointing out the necessity for sea control to ensure strategic and tactical sealift of Army forces.

- Ensure the success of the recent Army-Navy agreement on Navy operation of new Joint High-Speed Vessels (JHSVs) for the Army.\(^{31}\)

- Ensure that Navy inputs to update the CS 21 strategy list the Navy capability and coordination with Army systems (e.g., Ground Based Midcourse (GBM), Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Patriot) in integrated joint air and missile defense.

- Consider explicitly mentioning Army-Navy cooperation, in any future refreshing of CS 21.

- Above all, Navy strategic planners should keep a weather eye on the further evolution of Army strategic concepts and forces under the new Chief of Staff, and identify their potential implications for Navy strategy. At a time of leadership changes in the Army and some serious challenges to future Army roles and budgets, Navy strategists must remain ready to adapt to future Army changes.

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U.S. Air Force strategic concepts

This section first reviews Air Force strategies, concepts, doctrines, policies, and, especially, trends in strategic thinking. It then identifies the potential implications of this service's key issues for Navy strategy (based on the criteria of relevance, value added, and clarity/coherence), and concludes with specific recommendations for Navy strategists considering updates to the CS 21 strategy.

Current service strategies/concepts/trends in strategic thinking

Air Force vision and strategy

"Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power" has been the consistent theme of Air Force strategy since the publication of America's Air Force Vision 2020: Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power in 2000. Subsequent high-level Air Force strategic documents have continued and reinforced this theme. More recently, in The Nation's Guardians: America's 21st Century Air Force (2007), then-Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Michael Moseley continued referring to the three elements of the strategy theme from the 2000 strategy document, as have other supporting Air Force documents up to the present.

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Air Force doctrine publications

Two Air Force capstone doctrine publications are worth particular note. Air Force Doctrine Document 1 (AFDD 1), titled *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, establishes guidelines for employing air and space forces across the full spectrum of military operations, and provides the Air Force perspective to the joint world. AFDD 1 emphasizes the utility of Air Force global power projection on short notice, airpower as an alternative to the attrition model of warfare, the importance of unity of command, and centralized control and decentralized execution for air and space power employment. The Air Force develops doctrine at three levels: basic (AFDD 1), operational (the AFDD 2 series), and tactical (the AFDD 3 series). In the AFDD 2 series, a doctrine publication of particular interest to the Navy is AFDD 2-1.4, *Countersea Operations*, which focuses on Air Force operations in the maritime environment, and details Air Force roles in counter-air, strategic attack, air interdiction, close air support, aerial refueling support, and ISR operations. Navy strategists would benefit from familiarity with this publication and its Air Force perspective on potential operational cooperation in the maritime environment.⁸⁵

Other Air Force sources

To understand better the areas where these redefined Air Force strategy themes might enable better cooperation with the Navy, it is useful to examine the Air Force Core Functions, assigned by the Secretary of Defense and recognized by the joint community, which the Air Force uses to “provide a framework for balancing investments across Air Force capabilities.”¹ In decreasing order of funding in the FY12 budget request, these Air Force Core Functions are: Agile Combat Support ($33.8B), Global Precision Attack ($16.0B), Rapid Global Mobility ($15.9B), Space Superiority ($11.6B), Air Superiority ($9.2B), Global Integrated ISR ($8.2B), Command and Control ($6.3B), Nuclear Deterrence Ops ($5.2B), Cyberspace Superiority ($4.6B), Personnel Recovery ($1.6B), Special Operations ($1.4B), and Building Partnerships ($0.5B).

Though these budget figures do not include classified or Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, they nonetheless give a strong sense of current Air Force priorities. Another indication of current Air Force issues and concerns is the list of


current "Air Force Priorities" in the most recent Air Force Headquarters briefing on the service, which included: continue to strengthen the nuclear enterprise; partner with the joint and coalition team to win today’s fight; develop and care for airmen and their families; modernize air and space inventories, organizations, and training; and recapture acquisition excellence.  

Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) thinking

While the “bumper sticker” tenets of Air Force strategy have remained remarkably consistent, there have nonetheless been serious, recent, top-level efforts within the service to identify future priorities and themes. General John A. Shaud, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D., was appointed the director of the new Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) in 2008, with a mandate to report directly to the Air Force Chief of Staff for yearly study tasking for Air Force strategy development. In a short period of time, the AFRI has become a leading center for Air Force conceptual, strategic, and long-range thinking.

AFRI Strategic Concept for 2018-2023

The initial product from General Shaud and his AFRI team was the January 2009 publication *In Service to the Nation: Air Force Research Institute Strategic Concept for 2018-2023*. This strategic concept document maintained that the meaning of the three elements of the Air Force strategy theme “had been substantially lost” as they became stove-piped into segregated “specific platform centric or programmatic statements.” Specifically, General Shaud maintained that Global Vigilance had become the advocacy bumper sticker for Air Force Space Command (AFSC), Global Reach for Air Mobility Command (AMC), and Global Power for Air Combat Command (ACC).“

To better encompass the various other critical Air Force missions and their linkages, General Shaud recommended “recasting” the definitions of these three classic elements of the Air Force strategy theme as follows:

- “Global Vigilance” would be defined as situational awareness, both in gathering data and analyzing and disseminating those data.

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• "Global Reach" would be recast as operational access through air, space, and cyberspace.

• "Global Power" would be defined as the ability to create and sustain effects through air, space, and cyberspace with the full range of operations and options.  

This more integrated perspective may make the Air Force strategy theme less "code words" for Air Force organizations and programs, and more an amenable theme for integrating Air Force with Navy capabilities to jointly achieve desired operational effects.

The January 2009 AFRI keystone publication Strategic Concept for 2018-2023, besides proposing a more integrated redefinition of the three elements of the Air Force strategy theme "Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power," identified many specific areas where the Air Force could better contribute to winning the current fight. Some of these areas (intelligence reforms, space defense in depth, and operationally responsive space and cyberspace operations) appear to have potential for enhanced cooperation between the Air Force and the Navy.  

Air Force Strategy Study 2020-2030

Perhaps the most focused and best (and certainly most recent) reference to Air Force future strategic thinking is provided by General Shaud’s January 2011 AFRI publication Air Force Strategy Study 2020-2030. The general concluded that the Air Force should focus on five critical capabilities over the next two decades—power projection; freedom of action in air, space, and cyberspace; global situational awareness; air diplomacy; and military support to civil authorities (MSCA)—and that the underlying theme that runs throughout the study is that success for the Air Force “will depend on the service’s ability to integrate the application of American power through the air, space, and cyber domains.” General Shaud’s strong emphasis on the need for the Air Force to integrate its various domain efforts implies a more systemic view of strategy, arguably closer to Navy views.  

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80 Ibid., 26-27.
81 AFRI, Strategic Concept for 2018-2020.
These five critical capabilities identified as future priorities for the Air Force are all areas with implications for enhanced cooperation with the Navy. First, the study notes that “conventional power projection against peer or near-peer competitors will continue to shape Air Force requirements for the foreseeable future.” Not only are several of the recommendations for Air Force power projection (e.g., scalable flexibility in power projection, capacity building for irregular warfare situations, and enhanced unmanned platforms) applicable to the Navy, but the study explicitly states that the likely continuing drawdown of overseas operating bases “must be offset...through a closer relationship between the Air Force and Navy” (as well as longer-range systems).

Second, the recommended focus on “freedom of action in Air, Space, and Cyberspace” has a clear parallel in the Navy strategy’s emphasis on freedom of navigation (FON) in the global maritime commons, as both services face a growing anti-access, area-denial threat. The Navy shares the Air Force’s concerns about satellite vulnerabilities, both in its own dependence on many Air Force systems and in the Navy area of procurement responsibility for UHF satellites. Though the AFRI strategic concept document claims that the Air Force has “the greatest dependence on cyber of any service,” the Navy also shares the Air Force’s concerns with cyber capabilities—an area of potential opportunity for closer cooperation of the recently activated 10th Fleet/Navy Fleet Cyber Command and the corresponding new 24th Air Force organization.

Third, the focus on “global situational awareness” as an increasingly “long-distance endeavor” for surveillance and reconnaissance not only benefits from Air Force and Navy cooperation but clearly requires it. Such cooperation is particularly needed between the Air Force Global Hawk and the Navy’s counterpart Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as the Navy’s new P-8A maritime reconnaissance aircraft. There is also a potential for enhanced cooperation in data fusion and analysis.

The fourth area of focus for Air Force strategy suggested by AFRI—“air diplomacy”—is clearly an Air Force-centered parallel to the longstanding Navy strategy emphasis on forward presence and engagement, and the more recent focus on building partner capacity. But even on this Air Force “focus point,” there is potential for greater cooperation with the corresponding Navy strategy, especially in coordination of inputs to the Theater Security Cooperation plans of the various geographic CCDRs.

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93 Ibid., 1.
94 Ibid., 12.
95 Ibid., 18-19.
The fifth and final AFRI-suggested area of future Air Force focus, MSCA, identifies Air Force/Air National Guard disaster response roles in situational awareness, medical support, and airlift. Again, though the focus here is on Air Force capabilities, the Navy also can contribute to the situational awareness and medical support missions, as well as complementing Air Force airlift with its own air- and sea-lift assets.

**Other strategic voices**

General Shaud and his Air Force Research Institute are the most authoritative voices of Air Force strategic thought and trends, as AFRI is tasked by, and reports directly to, the Air Force Chief of Staff. However, several other open-source Air Force strategic thinkers bear some mention.

**General Deptula**

Recently retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula was the driving force behind recent Air Force emphasis on ISR, as articulated in *Lead Turning the Future: The Vision and Strategy for United States Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*. As noted above in the review of "global situational awareness," ISR is a shared Navy and Air Force strategic interest, with potential for greater cooperation.

**Colonel Warden**

Retired U.S. Air Force Colonel John Warden, who led much of the Air Force planning for the 1991 strategic air campaign in Iraq, recently published an article which, in the wake of the unsatisfying Iraq and Afghanistan ground war experience, unapologetically advocates a lead role for airpower in U.S. military strategy. Warden’s advocacy of rapid, parallel, strategic air attacks to paralyze enemy systems echoes a dominant advocacy theme of Air Force strategists over the past two decades (notwithstanding Secretary Gates’

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96 Ibid., 24-26.


obvious distaste for such advocacy). Of note for this study, Warden considers "airpower" to include not just the Air Force but also Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, so Warden's airpower-centric strategy would include roles for the naval services.

Colonel James C. Ruehrmund and Mr. Christopher J. Bowie

Retired Air Force Colonel James C. Ruehrmund, Jr., and Christopher J. Bowie, the corporate director of Grumman Analysis Center, recently produced a very comprehensive study for the Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies on the evolution of Air Force force levels. This study provides a striking sense of perspective on how the Air Force roles and force structures have changed over time, and how trends in the reduction of Air Force combat aircraft may constitute a "serious existential dilemma" for the service. The authors note how, at its peak in 1956, the Air Force had more than 56,000 aircraft (compared with less than 6,000 today) and over 50 percent of the total defense budget (in 1960, the Air Force accounted for 21 percent of total federal expenditures, but by 2000 only 4.7 percent). Perhaps most notable, the percentage of Air Force spending on joint force "enablers" such as space, mobility, and ISR capabilities has increased from 33 percent in 1962, to 45 percent of the Air Force budget today. From the perspective of Navy strategy, the Navy (along with other services) is a net beneficiary of this Air Force shift in emphasis, particularly in the three mission areas cited. As noted above, there is still scope for closer cooperation with the Air Force in ISR.

Air-Sea Battle

Finally, two additional significant top-level perspectives on future Air Force strategic concepts have significant implications for Navy strategy: the Air-Sea Battle concept, and Secretary of Defense Gates' recently articulated vision for the future Air Force. Though initially tasked by Secretary Gates earlier (in 2009), the February 2010 QDR announced the focus of the Air-Sea Battle concept as follows:

Air Force and Navy together are developing a new joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries across the range of military operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated A2/AD capabilities. The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities

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across all operational domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace—to counter growing challenges to U.S. freedom of action.¹⁰¹

Though few details of the classified Air-Sea Battle concept development effort are publicly available, the QDR’s emphasis on integrating all domain capabilities of both services clearly implies that this must be reflected as a priority in future Navy (as well as Air Force) strategy. One of the force structure implications of Air-Sea Battle enhancements to future power projection capabilities is already evident for the Air Force, which received OSD approval, starting with the 2012 budget, to proceed with development of a new long-range bomber with an initial operating capability in the mid 2020s.¹⁰² One of the parallel issues that countering the anti-access threat may raise for Navy strategy is whether to increase the priority of developing and deploying longer-range unmanned carrier aircraft.

Secretary Gates

In a March 4, 2011, speech at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Secretary of Defense Gates (who began his long government career as an Air Force officer in the late 1960s) outlined his vision of how Air Force strategic thinking should change as “required to prevail in the more diverse and uncertain security environment of this century.”¹⁰³ Secretary Gates admitted to questioning whether the Air Force (and the other services) had “the right mix of platforms for the future.” Gates noted, however, that he believed that “air supremacy—in all its components—will be indispensable to maintaining American military strength, deterrence, and global reach for decades to come” but said that “air supremacy in this century, however, will almost certainly mean different things, and require different systems, personnel policies, and thinking.” Gates said that for the Air


Force to adapt, it would have to shed its nostalgia for its institutional culture and traditional orientation, which he identified as “air-to-air combat and strategic bombing.”

In addition to fully realizing “the potential game-changing capabilities” of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Gates warned that “stability and security missions, counterterrorism, train, assist, and equip, persistent battlefield ISR, close air support, search and rescue, and the ever-critical transport missions are with us to stay—even without a repeat of Iraq and Afghanistan.” Gates concluded that Air Force leaders must thus have a “comprehensive and integrated view of the service’s future needs and capabilities—including the service’s important role in cyber and space.”

Gates highlighted the importance of the Air Force and Navy cooperation (“off to a promising start”) on the Air-Sea Battle concept. Along with his call for all the services “to think aggressively about how to truly take advantage of being part of the joint force,” the clear implication for future Navy strategy is the top-level desire for even greater Air Force and Navy cooperation.

Potential implications of Air Force strategic concepts for Navy strategy

The current Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz often states that the Navy and the Air Force are “the two strategic services,” and that the national strategic focus and preference may be swinging from large ground forces (as employed in Iraq and Afghanistan) to airpower and seapower. The previous section discussed a number of trends in Air Force strategic thinking that have potential implications for future Navy strategy. The following implications, derived from the discussion above, meet the three criteria of potential relevance, value added for Navy strategy, and clarity/coherence, and will form the basis for the subsequent recommendations for future Navy strategy:

- Scalable flexible conventional power projection is needed, and would benefit from a closer Navy-Air Force relationship and longer-range systems.

- The Air Force and Navy share a common interest in freedom of the (increasingly contested) global commons of air, sea, space, and cyberspace, suggesting the benefit of enhanced cooperation.

- The joint force requires global situational awareness (increasingly from offshore/longer range), impelling greater Navy-Air Force cooperation in ISR collection, fusion, and dissemination.
As the Air Force emphasizes its own forward engagement and partner capacity building, improving Navy-Air Force cooperation in the various geographic regions has a potential benefit.

Navy strategic thinking may (carefully, to avoid charges of parochialism) wish to somewhat parallel Air Force “airpower” advocacy with a stronger public advocacy of the essential benefits of seapower, including sea-based contributions to joint force airpower.

Given the shift in Air Force mission emphasis on and funding for joint support roles in space, ISR, and cyberspace, Navy strategy should make explicit the potential benefits of closer cooperation with the Air Force, particularly in ISR and cyberspace.

The Air-Sea Battle concept has the potential to spur Air Force and Navy cooperation in countering A2/AD threats to both services’ power projection capabilities, but little further detail beyond that can be provided in unclassified updates to the public CS 21 Navy strategy, given the classified and sensitive nature of this ongoing initiative.

Recommendations for Navy strategy

In light of the above potential implications for Navy strategy, the following recommendations, derived from recent Air Force strategic thinking and trends, should be considered to inform potential Navy inputs to update the strategy:

- To better achieve the common Air Force/Navy objective of enhancing scalable, flexible conventional power projection, ensure that current initiatives by both services (particularly in airpower projection) are addressed in service-to-service Warfighter Talks and in discussions between geographic theater component commanders and staffs.

- As the two strategic services “on point” for maintaining freedom of access and use of the global commons of air, sea, space, and cyberspace, the Navy and the Air Force should ensure that these areas are regular topics at Warfighter Talks and in discussions between geographic theater component commanders and staffs, and consider the advisability of a Navy/Air Force-led Global Commons Defense Initiative.
- As lead services providing joint Global Situational Awareness, enhance Navy-Air Force cooperation in planning and executing ISR collection, fusion, and dissemination.

- Ensure that Navy inputs to update the CS 21 strategy strongly advocate the flexibility and benefits of seapower, including its contribution to joint force airpower and power projection.

- Leverage Air-Sea Battle concept development and evolution to spur closer Air Force and Navy cooperation in power projection. Future Navy strategy updates should highlight the existence and importance of the Air-Sea Battle initiative, even though little public mention can be made of Air-Sea Battle details, given the classification and sensitivity of the initiative.

U.S. Coast Guard strategic concepts

This section discusses the findings of a review and assessment of Coast Guard strategies, concepts, doctrines, policies, and, especially, trends in strategic thinking. This assessment then identifies the potential implications of this service’s key issues for Navy strategy (based on the criteria of relevance, value added, and clarity), concluding with specific recommendations for Navy strategists considering updates to the CS 21 strategy.

Current strategies/concepts/trends in strategic thinking

Since January 2007, the Coast Guard’s service strategy framework and articulation has highlighted three broad roles for the service: maritime safety, maritime security, and stewardship. Below, we will detail these three roles and the 11 Coast Guard missions that compose them, as well as the eight officially agreed Coast Guard national defense capabilities.

Like the Navy and Marine Corps, the Coast Guard is a sea service. It has a long history of close cooperation with the Navy, and is a signatory and contributor to CS 21, the overarching national maritime strategy. Indeed, the long history of Navy-Coast Guard cooperation, while beyond the scope of this study is a very interesting study in itself. So the discussion below of the separate, service-specific U.S. Coast Guard Strategy and other significant Coast Guard strategic documents must be understood by Navy strategists in the context of the Coast Guard as a partner and complementary sea service, and a co-developer and co-signatory of the overall strategy and any—potential—future updates.

Three Coast Guard documents are basic to understanding current Coast Guard roles, missions, and defense capabilities, as well as the potential implications that these themes in Coast Guard strategic thinking have for future Navy strategy: The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship; U.S. Coast Guard Publication 1, titled U.S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian; and U.S. Coast Guard Commandant’s Direction 2011.

For an overview of the recent relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard, identifying their history of cooperation, see Peter M. Swartz with Karin Duggan, U.S. Navy-U.S. Coast Guard Relationships, 1970-2010, CNA unpublished draft briefing, May 2011.
U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security and Stewardship

The first of these documents is the *U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship*, promulgated by then-Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen in January 2007—thus predating the tri-service CS 21 maritime strategy of October 2007. This Coast Guard strategy was developed through a decade-old process that was cyclical (based on a four-year cycle, keyed to the Commandant’s tenure) and based on five illustrative scenarios. The process, called Project Evergreen, was led by the service’s strategy office, working with Coast Guard and external stakeholders. This internal service process to develop strategic priorities in an established cyclical fashion was in many ways the most systematic and organized method used by any of the services.

The stated purposes of the Evergreen strategy development process were “to instill strategic intent throughout the Coast Guard and to identify robust core action strategies for the Coast Guard resulting in defined and vetted strategic priorities for the Coast Guard.” Thirteen “core action strategies” were identified to best prepare the future Coast Guard for the full range of the five illustrative scenarios developed: 21st Century Partnerships, Advancing Global Maritime Governance, Maritime Policy Engagement, Strategic Change Management, Mission Portfolio Management, Maritime Domain Awareness, Polar Mission Capacity, Underwater Mission Development, The Best Team, The Right Skills, Intelligent Technology Acquisition, Communications Excellence, and A Green Coast Guard.

The recent products, notably the most recent January 2007 *U.S. Coast Guard Strategy* and the “core action strategies,” seem to indicate that Evergreen process outputs were well-considered guides for service priorities and actions.

The January 2007 *U.S. Coast Guard Strategy* identified six strategic priorities for the Coast Guard: strengthening regimes for the U.S. maritime domain; achieving awareness in the maritime domain; enhancing unity of effort in maritime planning and operations;

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106 U.S. Coast Guard Evergreen II Project Report, 5.

107 Ibid., 27.

108 That said, one knowledgeable officer expressed skepticism about the current actual use by the service of these strategy guides and priorities. (Interview with (anonymous) senior (O-6) U.S. Coast Guard officer with current strategy development posting, Jun. 7, 2011.).
developing a national capacity of Marine Transportation System recovery; focusing international engagement on improving maritime governance; and integrating Coast Guard capabilities for national defense.109

This last priority will be examined in more detail below, but the Navy has some interest in all these Coast Guard priorities.

The January 2007 U.S. Coast Guard Strategy also describes the unique “military, multi-mission, and maritime” nature of the Coast Guard. This status makes the service one of the five U.S. armed forces. (It is the only armed service under the Department of Homeland Security instead of the Department of Defense, although under law it can transfer to the Navy Department in time of war, as was done in both World Wars.) The Coast Guard’s unique nature also gives it law enforcement authorities—which are often denied the Navy and Marine Corps under OSD policy, and denied to the Army and Air Force under the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (as revised).110

Internationally, the Coast Guard’s unique character is significant. It represents the United States in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for international maritime regulations; it interacts with ministries other than defense ministries in many foreign nations; and, perhaps most important, it provides a complementary tool to the Navy for international engagement with other maritime forces (many of which have a majority of missions more similar to U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement missions than to the U.S. Navy’s national defense missions). Indeed, non-naval Coast Guard cutters may in certain cases provide “acceptable presence” in states sensitive to a more robust U.S. military maritime force presence.111

U.S. Coast Guard Publication 1 (Coast Guard Pub 1)

The January 2007 U.S. Coast Guard Strategy and a second major Coast Guard document, the May 2009 U.S. Coast Guard Publication 1 (which defines the service’s history, missions, and purpose as “our capstone document”), both categorize three broad Coast Guard roles—maritime safety, maritime security, and stewardship. Each of these three

109 U.S. Coast Guard Strategy, 6-7.
110 Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Thad W. Allen, U.S. Coast Guard Publication 1, U.S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian, May 2009, 120.
111 Ibid., p. 16-17, and U.S. Coast Guard Strategy 2007, p. 16, provide good discussion on these points. NB: The author assisted the Coast Guard staff by providing review and comment on the final draft of the U.S. Coast Guard Strategy 2007.
broad Coast Guard roles includes several of the 11 missions statutorily assigned to the Coast Guard by Congress.

The maritime safety role includes the missions of marine safety and search and rescue. The maritime security role includes the missions of drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; defense readiness; and ports, waterways, and coastal security. The maritime stewardship role includes missions of marine environmental protection, protection of living marine resources, maintaining aids to navigation, and ice operations.¹¹²

**U.S. Coast Guard Commandant’s Direction 2011**

The third of the Coast Guard documents most helpful in understanding current service strategic thinking and trends is the *U.S. Coast Guard Commandant’s Direction 2011* issued by the new (since mid 2010) Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Robert Papp, and billed as “my trackline for the way forward,” setting the service course with his principles, priorities, and objectives.¹¹³

The Commandant’s four guiding principles include two with potential implications for the Navy: “steady the service” and “strengthen our partnerships.”¹¹⁴ Admiral Papp’s discussion of his principle “steady the service” confirms an emphasis that has also been clear in his public remarks.¹¹⁵ He maintains that the Coast Guard, particularly in the decade since 9/11, has experienced such great change in mission demands and organizational structures that the service needs to consolidate itself (and carefully consider costs) before embarking on any new initiatives.

Second, and somewhat in contrast regarding its potential implications for future Navy strategy, is Admiral Papp’s commitment to “strengthen our partnerships.” One of these partnership areas is in the Arctic, where both the Navy and Coast Guard have in recent years been working to define required capabilities and cooperation to deal with

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¹¹² U.S. Coast Guard Publication 1, 4-15 (note that several of the 11 Coast Guard missions can support more than one of the three service roles).


¹¹⁴ Ibid., 14.

¹¹⁵ He has discussed this in three conference presentations in the past year attended by the author.
increased ice-free waters and activity in the Arctic, where the Coast Guard is the lead U.S. agency for search and rescue operations.116

The National Fleet policy statement and Navy–Coast Guard cooperation

Turning from the overall context of the Coast Guard’s strategic thinking and trends to more specific consideration of the Coast Guard’s defense missions and relationship with the Navy in recent years, the joint Navy-Coast Guard National Fleet policy statement is an important foundational document. First agreed on in 1998 by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Coast Guard Commandant, and most recently updated in 2006, this policy statement commits both services to cooperating and integrating non-redundant and complementary defense capabilities.117

The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy states: “The Coast Guard complements the capabilities of the U.S. Navy, as an essential component of the National Fleet. In this capacity the Coast Guard provides unique, non-redundant support to the military CCDRs in eight agreed Coast Guard defense capability areas.”118 These eight Coast Guard defense capability areas are specified in the May 2008 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security: maritime interception and interdiction; military environmental response; port operations, security, and defense; Theater Security Cooperation; coastal sea control; rotary-wing air intercept; combating terrorism; and Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) support.119 Through these defense capabilities, the Coast Guard not only supports the National Military Strategy as well as the geographic CCDRs, but also routinely cooperates with Navy operational forces. All this is reflected in the development by the Navy and Coast Guard, as well as the Marine Corps, of the global maritime concept in the October 2007 CS 21 strategy, with a goal of effectiveness and alignment of the three maritime services.


118 U.S. Coast Guard Strategy, 12.

119 U.S. Coast Guard Publication 1, 9-10.
Earlier, the January 2007 *U.S. Coast Guard Strategy* had pledged to “expand cooperation between the Coast Guard and Navy,” developing the strategy and engagement between the two services to pursue important “initiatives including: Implementing the National Plan for achieving Maritime Domain Awareness; Integrating USCG-USN maritime defense operations; Establishing joint command, control, and communications (C3) centers; Fielding of interoperable equipment and reducing redundancies in the acquisition of new capabilities; Participating in joint training programs for expeditionary operations, such as the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command; Supporting global maritime partnerships; and Training, manning, and equipping of patrol boat forces.”

Two Commandants’ contrasting perspectives

Against this background of specified Coast Guard defense capabilities, and ongoing Coast Guard-Navy cooperation (intensified in the past decade), two other perspectives on Coast Guard strategic thinking and trends, more specific in their implications for Navy strategy, can be added.

Admiral Allen

The first perspective comes from the previous Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Thad Allen, in his December 2007 testimony on the CS 21 strategy before the House Armed Services Committee. In this testimony, Admiral Allen began by noting: “We need a strategy that integrates the three services’ unique capabilities into a single vision.” He stated that the Coast Guard subscribes completely to CS 21, which “highlights the value of integrated, synchronized operations among the three services.” Admiral Allen then listed the Coast Guard’s specified defense capabilities, and showed how the Coast Guard supports each of the six core capabilities listed in the strategy (Forward Presence, Deterrence, Sea Control, Power Projection, Maritime Security Operations, and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief).

Admiral Allen also pointed out how the Coast Guard is a full participant in the CCDRs’ and services’ deliberate and crisis planning processes, and force apportionments, and how in the current security environment the Coast Guard is increasingly called on to complement the other military services with its unique law enforcement and civil

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129 *U.S. Coast Guard Strategy*, 47.

governance competencies. Indeed, he stated, “In fact, it is these civil competencies and authorities that are often the most valuable contribution a small Coast Guard presence can add to the CCDR’s spectrum of operations,” citing the Coast Guard’s unique role in CS 21 as both an armed force and a federal law enforcement agency. In this regard, he noted that what the Coast Guard “brings to the peace” is the integration and synchronization capability to deal with the “more than 40 of the world’s 70 naval forces structured and focused on performing Coast Guard type functions” to manage seams between ministries of defense and civil departments and ministries of the world’s coastal navies. Admiral Allen concluded his testimony to Congress by emphasizing: “I am committed to implementation and execution of this strategy,” because it is the best thing for the Coast Guard and the U.S. sea services.

Admiral Papp

In contrast, Admiral Allen’s successor, Admiral Papp, in his U.S. Coast Guard Commandant’s Direction 2011, does not even mention the CS 21 strategy or the Navy. As noted earlier, one of Admiral Papp’s four “guiding principles” for the Coast Guard is “Strengthen our Partnerships,” which would include, among others, its partnership with the Navy, as still enshrined in CS 21. However, it may be that Admiral Papp’s first “guiding principle” (in order of listing and apparently in importance), is indeed to “steady the service,” consolidating the many recent operational and organizational changes and minimizing new initiatives. Perhaps as a result, over a year into his leadership of the Coast Guard, there has been no new service strategy to replace the January 2007 U. S. Coast Guard Strategy.

This “steady as she goes” approach by Admiral Papp as the Coast Guard’s current leader is also reflected in his thoughts on whether there is any need to update the October 2007 tri-service CS 21 strategy. Asked about the need for an update to the CS 21 strategy, he responded that he felt that the CS 21 strategy already had the right basic concepts and approach—and referred to his concern that the Coast Guard, like all the military services in a time of increasing budget constraints, would be leery of new strategy initiatives.  

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122 Ibid., 6-7.

123 Author’s interview with Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Robert Papp, Apr. 15, 2011, Washington, DC.
Potential implications of Coast Guard strategic concepts for Navy strategy

The previous section discussed a number of trends in Coast Guard strategic thinking with potential implications for future Navy strategy. The following implications derived from the discussion above meet our three criteria (relevance, potential value added to Navy strategy, and clarity/coherence) and will form the basis for the subsequent recommendations for future Navy strategy:

- Previous and current Coast Guard leaders subscribe to the strategy as it was developed between the two services and the Marine Corps.

- The Coast Guard, by its inherent dual nature as a military armed service with additional civil regulatory and law enforcement responsibilities, provides the nation with unique capabilities in the domestic and international areas. In particular, with a majority of the world's navies having more U.S. Coast Guard-like than U.S. Navy-like missions, the Coast Guard complements the Navy in providing geographic CCDRs with additional specialized tools to engage and train foreign maritime forces in these areas as part of their Theater Security Cooperation plans.

- Of the six strategic priorities in the 2007 U.S. Coast Guard Strategy, "Achieving maritime domain awareness," and "Enhancing unity of effort in maritime planning and operations" are (in addition to the priority of "Integrating Coast Guard capabilities for national defense") essential areas for routine Navy-Coast Guard cooperation.

- The National Fleet policy statement highlights the need for the two services to have interoperable, complementary forces, and to be committed to ensuring that they do.

- U.S. maritime forces must be able to respond with required capabilities and cooperation to the new strategic requirements of an Arctic with increased ice-free waters and activity.

- The 2007 U.S. Coast Guard Strategy included several initiatives to expand cooperation between the Navy and the Coast Guard—some well known and pursued, such as cooperation in Maritime Domain Awareness, but others perhaps less appreciated and implemented, such as establishing joint C3 centers; joint training for expeditionary operations; and training, manning, and equipping of patrol boat forces.
Admiral Papp has as a priority "guiding principle" to "steady the service," with the Coast Guard in a phase of consolidating its many recent operational and organizational changes. However, he also believes that the October 2007 CS 21 strategy was, and remains, on target in its basic concepts and approach.

Recommendations for Navy strategy

In light of the above potential implications for Navy strategy derived from recent Coast Guard strategic thinking and trends, the following recommendations should be considered to inform potential Navy inputs to update the CS 21 strategy:

- As an overarching approach, given the Coast Guard leadership’s satisfaction with CS 21, and current Coast Guard emphasis on consolidation, Navy strategists should be cautious in proposing any changes to basic concepts/core capabilities. They might better focus on ensuring full implementation of already-agreed areas of Navy-Coast Guard cooperation.

- In their Warfighter Talks between headquarters staffs, and, perhaps even more important, through a newly elaborated Navy-Coast Guard regular liaison at geographic CCDRs’ staffs, Navy strategists might usefully seek to further identify/leverage the Coast Guard’s unique entrée to foreign maritime forces and ministries, and ensure that Coast Guard forces are more fully integrated with Navy (and Marine Corps) forces in annual Theater Security Cooperation engagement planning.

- The Navy should ensure that its inputs to update the CS 21 strategy cite success stories of Navy-Coast Guard cooperation (e.g., Maritime Domain Awareness, maritime intelligence sharing, and Coast Guard integration in theater Global Fleet Stations and Carrier Battle Group deployments) and that they strongly advocate for the continuation of such successes.

- Navy strategists should re-emphasize the commitment of the bi-service National Fleet policy statement to integrated, complementary, interoperable maritime defense capabilities from both services. In this regard, they should ensure that less prominent areas of potential cooperation previously identified (e.g., establishing joint C3 centers, joint training for expeditionary operations, and training, manning, and equipping of patrol boat forces) are also pursued.
The current CS 21 strategy of October 2007 reflects the long history of cooperation between the Navy and Coast Guard, which has become even more intense in the post-Cold War (especially the post-9/11) period. With both services committed to the basic concepts of a strategy born in a spirit of Navy and Coast Guard cooperation, the real challenge for Navy strategists will be to ensure continued progress in global cooperation of the two complementary maritime services at a time when both services will be under increasing budget constraints.
U.S. Marine Corps strategic concepts

This section first discusses the findings of a review and assessment of Marine Corps strategies, concepts, doctrines, policies, and, especially, trends in strategic thinking. It then identifies the potential implications of this other naval service’s key issues for Navy strategy (based on the criteria of relevance, value added, and clarity). It concludes with specific recommendations for Navy strategists considering updates to the CS 21 strategy.

Current service strategies/concepts/trends in strategic thinking

The Marine Corps has very recently published four documents that reflect a rethinking and repositioning of the service for an era of budget constraints and post-Afghanistan requirements. These documents are the Marine Corps Operating Concepts (third edition), the U.S. Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2011, Reshaping America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness: Report of the United States Marine Corps 2010 Force Structure Review Group, and the Commandant’s Planning Guidance 2010. These documents emphasize the Marine Corps’ classic strategic role as “America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness,” and highlight two of its varied missions: assuring littoral access “as part of the naval team,” and “responding to crisis” at the “right end” (“small wars”) of the response spectrum. As detailed in a previous CNA analysis of the Navy-Marine Corps relationship since 1970, these two recently highlighted Marine Corps missions are consistent with the missions of the service in recent history.

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When considering Marine Corps strategic thinking and trends, it is important to first note the obvious—the Marine Corps is historically the only other armed sea service permanently teamed with the Navy under and within the Department of the Navy. In an analogy to the Chinese saying, “Same Bed, Different Dreams,” the Marine Corps may organizationally ultimately be in the “same bed” as the Navy, but even if it always agreed with the Navy on strategic concepts and emphasis (which has not always been the case), it still has inherent “different dreams” regarding its priorities for force structure and its share of the overall Department of the Navy budget.126

That said, the Marine Corps, as a sea service, like the Coast Guard, has a history of over two centuries of routine close cooperation with the Navy and is a signatory and contributor to CS 21, the current overarching national maritime strategy. Therefore, the following discussion of some of the specifics of recent Marine Corps strategic thinking must be understood by Navy strategists in the context of the Marine Corps as a partner and integral complementary sea service, and as a co-signatory of the strategy and any future updates. Additionally, Navy strategists will want to supplement this brief discussion of recent Marine Corps strategic thinking and its broad implications for Navy strategy with a more focused and tactically dedicated current parallel CNA study of Marine Corps-Navy operational alignment and coordination.127

Soon after becoming the 35th Commandant of the Marine Corps in October 2010, General James F. Amos issued his Commandant’s Planning Guidance, which specified the role of the Marine Corps as follows:

The Marine Corps is America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness—a balanced air-ground-logistics team. We are forward deployed and forward-engaged: shaping, training, deterring, and responding to all manner of crises and contingencies. We create options and decision space for our nation’s leaders. Alert and ready, we respond to today’s crisis, with today’s force . . . TODAY. Responsive and scalable, we team with other services, allies, and interagency partners. We enable and participate in joint and combined operations of any magnitude. A middleweight force, we are light enough to get there quickly, but heavy enough to carry the day upon arrival, and capable of operating independent of local infrastructure. We operate throughout the spectrum of threats—irregular, hybrid,

126 Ibid.
conventional—or the shady areas where they overlap. Marines are ready to respond whenever the nation calls, wherever the President may direct.\textsuperscript{128}

This summary of the Marine Corps role by General Amos is quoted and reflected in subsequent key Marine Corps documents Concepts and Programs and the Force Structure Review Report, and is consistent with the Marine Corps’ core missions as described in the earlier June 2010 third edition of the Marine Corps Operating Concepts document. Other core missions include: military engagement (newly emphasized by the Marine Corps, with plans for more regionalized expertise), power projection “to create access and enable joint combat power,” and “small wars” expertise to counter irregular threats.\textsuperscript{129}

The June 2010 Marine Corps Operating Concepts document references two basic Marine Corps doctrinal publications. MCDP-1, Warfighting, is “the foundation of the Marine Corps’ philosophy of maneuver warfare steeped in the ethos of mission command.”\textsuperscript{130} As further elaborated in the second foundational doctrinal publication, MCDP-6, Command and Control, “Mission Command” emphasizes decentralized decision-making, “Command by Influence,” and embracing “calculated risk.” Interestingly, “mission command,” designed to provide adaptability in uncertain future environments, is also, as noted earlier, the leadership concept newly adopted by the Army in its 2009 Army Capstone Concept document.

The most recent approach to articulating Marine Corps roles/tasks, “distilled from the Marine Corps Operating Concepts, lists five tasks: conduct military engagement; respond to crises (whether natural or man-made); project power; conduct littoral maneuver “in order to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy”; and counter irregular threats.\textsuperscript{131}

Another, earlier, document, Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, was also cited as highlighting the overarching Marine Corps goal to “remain the nation’s force in readiness” through continuous innovation.

Before turning to assess the implications for Navy strategy of the roles recently articulated and emphasized by the new Marine Corps leadership, there is also perspective to be gained from considering the March 2011 Report of the Force Structure Review Group. This review set out to reshape the “organization, posture and capabilities” of the Marine

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{35th Commandant of the Marine Corps Commandant’s Planning Guidance}, 5.

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Marine Corps Operating Concepts}, Third Edition, 1, 9-11.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 15.

\textsuperscript{131} U.S. Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2011, 5-6.
Corps" in a “complex and uncertain” post-Afghanistan security environment “further challenged by fiscal constraints.” The report highlighted the likely geostrategic challenge of “inherently unpredictable hybrid threats” and stated that “sea-based forces, in particular, will be invaluable for discreet engagement activities, rapid crisis response, and sustainable power projection.”

In a discussion of how to meet the operational requirements of geographic CCDRs, the report says, “The Marine Corps force structure must provide a strategically mobile, middleweight force [emphasis in original] optimized for rapid crisis response and forward-presence. It must be light enough to leverage the flexibility and capacity of amphibious shipping, yet heavy enough to accomplish the mission, larger than special operations forces, but lighter and more expeditionary than conventional Army units.” Consistent with a January 2009 Navy-Marine Corps leadership agreement, the report identifies the requirement for 38 amphibious ships to provide sufficient lift for the assault echelon of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), but accepts that fiscal constraints require acceptance of more risk with only 33 ships. To reshape the Marine Corps force structure, the review reduces active force end strength in 2015 (post-Afghanistan) from current 202,000 to “approximately 186,800”; provides “a force optimized for forward-presence,” facilitating “both ongoing engagement activities and rapid crisis response”; “provides readiness for immediate deployment and employment”; “creates an operationalized reserve component”; and “creates opportunity for more closely integrated operations with our Navy, Special Operations, and inter-agency partners.”

Specific key reductions in forces will include: 13 percent in ground combat forces (11 percent in infantry, 20 percent in cannon artillery, 20 percent in armor); 16 percent in fixed-wing tactical aviation (from 70 to 61 squadrons); 9 percent in logistics; and 13 percent in the civilian work force. The Plan also includes measures to increase unmanned aircraft squadrons (from four to five), increase Marine Corps Special Operations personnel by over 1,000, increase Marine Corps Cyber Command personnel by over 250, and increase air and naval Gunfire Liaison Companies from two to three.

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133 Ibid., 2.

134 Ibid., passim.

135 Ibid., passim.
This last element, as well as a March 2011 agreement between the Navy and Marine Corps that Marine Corps squadrons assigned to aircraft carriers would increase from three to five (along with a Marine Corps commitment to acquire some of the F-35C carrier variant aircraft), and a commitment in the report to “explore options for employing Marines from a wider variety of Navy ships, seeking innovative naval solutions to GCC requirements,” all have obvious implications for future Navy-Marine Corps cooperation.  

One other significant prior change in Marine Corps (and Navy) force structure—the MPF—was addressed in the Marine Corps Operating Concepts, third edition, and in Commandant General Amos’ March 2011 annual Posture Report to Congress.  

These documents emphasized the MPF (“employed 55 times since 1985”) and the current MPF enhancement plans (adding to each of the three squadrons one T-AKE auxiliary dry cargo ship and one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) for logistics support to units ashore and limited at sea vehicle transfer capability, respectively), in addition to one Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) cargo ship). As Commandant General Amos noted, this is an “interim solution” to enhance the MPF, but it is considerably less than previous plans for a more elaborate MPF (Future), or (MPF(F)), which fell victim to several years of unclear concepts and rising costs.  

Additionally, as the Commandant noted with concern in his Posture Report, the Navy plans to put one of the three MPF squadrons in a Reduced Operational Status beginning in FY13.  


miles to support amphibious operations in the littorals.” The Posture Report spoke of the need to extend the naval surface fire support range from the current 13 nautical miles to 52 nautical miles, using extended range 5-inch munitions for the 106 guns already in the surface fleet.

A final area of Navy interest in General Amos’ recent Posture Report was his emphasis on the Marine Corps being “partners with the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force in the development of the Air-Sea Battle Concept,” and participating in the Army’s Joint Forcible Entry Warfighting Experiment.

Despite the many initiatives identified above to reposition the Marine Corps for the era of fiscal austerity and then post-Afghanistan, General Amos seems to have a clear appreciation of the Corps’ future roles. In May 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates said, “We will always have a Marine Corps, but the question is: How do you define the mission post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan?” Since then, General Amos and his predecessor, General James Conway, have crafted an answer that emphasizes the Marine Corps’ unique versatility as a “middleweight force,” and justifies amphibious forces in terms of their “inherent flexibility and utility,” which Amos says is “not widely understood as evidenced by the frequent—and erroneous—assumption that “forcible entry operations” alone define the requirement for amphibious ships.” (In fact, of the 107 amphibious operations since 1990, fully 78 were in the “amphibious support to other operations” category rather than the classic amphibious operations categories of assaults, raids, demonstrations, or withdrawals.)

With his flank secure on the big challenge to the Marine Corps’ raison d’etre, General Amos seems satisfied with the broad concepts of the current October 2007 tri-service CS 21 strategy. After the conclusion of a mid-April conference on the Marine Corps, this author asked General Amos directly for his views on the need for an update to the strategy. He responded that he felt that the existing strategy had identified the right core competencies and tasks, and, in its fundamentals, continued to be valid.

139 Ibid., 12.
140 Ibid., 10.
142 Interview with General James F. Amos, Apr. 15, 2011, Washington, DC.
Potential implications of Marine Corps strategic concepts for Navy strategy

The previous section discussed the current status and recent trends in Marine Corps strategic thinking that have potential implications for future Navy strategy. The following implications derived from the discussion above meet the three criteria of relevance, potential value added to Navy strategy, and clarity/coherence, and will form the basis for the subsequent recommendations for future Navy strategy:

• The current Marine Corps Commandant agrees with the key tenets of the CS 21 strategy document signed by his predecessor in October 2007.

• The Marine Corps has already re-postured its strategic emphasis and force structure plans to address the challenges of the current era of austere budgets and eventual post-Afghanistan security environment. Though the Marine Corps leadership articulation of its strategic thinking appears to have occurred largely independently from the Navy, there do not appear to be major disconnects with the Navy, and indeed there are clearly opportunities to enhance cooperation between these two sea services. Some of the more notable implications are detailed below.

• The increased emphasis on the task of Marine Corps forward engagement, largely from Navy ships (and not only amphibious ships, but also “a wider variety of Navy ships”) is one area where closer cooperation in planning and operations between Marine Corps and Navy forces will be needed and desirable to fulfill the Marine Corps goal to increase forward engagement through alternative means such as: “[take] initiatives to increase employability and availability of Marines aboard Navy and Coast Guard platforms beyond amphibious ships,” “increase naval forward presence capabilities and capacities for engagement within the littorals,” and “achieve integration with the Navy and Coast Guard for maritime security operations.”

• The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC), General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., recently affirmed that the Marine Corps would give future priority to its foreign training mission (the service already engages in about

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160 exercises in 50 countries each year). Three of the other four Marine Corps tasks described earlier—crisis response, power projection, and the conduct of littoral maneuver—are closely related.

- Both the Navy and Marine Corps face increasing challenges to access in the littorals. The Marine Corps Commandant, as noted earlier, is a partner with the Navy and the Air Force in the development of the Air-Sea Battle concept to counter such challenges. Indeed, as a senior Marine on the Navy OPNAV staff has pointed out, the Navy/Marine Corps team has faced the A2/AD problem before, in World War II Pacific battles such as Guadalcanal and Okinawa.

- Navy and Marine Corps forces are also frequently partnered in executing the fifth and final major task identified by the Marine Corps, namely countering irregular threats.

- Integration of Marine Corps and Navy tactical aviation assets has been evolving for a decade, and future expanded integration was recently the subject of top-level agreement between the two services.

- In January 2009, the Marine Corps and the Navy reached an agreement on the requirement for amphibious ships—specifically, they agreed that 38 are required, but fiscal constraints limit the actual number to 33.

- Likewise, there is currently an agreement for an “interim solution” to enhance the three squadrons of the Maritime Prepositioning Force.

- The longstanding deficiency in naval surface fire support from Navy ships continues.

- Over the past 30 years, the Marine Corps has enhanced its independent status as a separate and in most ways co-equal service with the Navy, and, as always, it organizationally competes with the Navy for budget share in the overall Department of the Navy budget.

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146 On this point, see Swartz, U.S. Navy-U.S. Marine Corps Relationships, passim.
Recommendations for Navy strategy

In light of the above potential implications for Navy strategy derived from recent Marine Corps strategic thinking and trends, the following recommendations should be considered (along with the results of other separate studies on operational cooperation between the two services) to inform potential Navy inputs to update the strategy:

- As an overarching approach, given the satisfaction of the current Marine Corps leadership with the major tenets of the October 2007 CS 21 document, Navy strategists should be cautious in proposing any changes to basic concepts/core capabilities, and might better focus on implementation of already-agreed areas of Navy-Marine Corps cooperation, as well as elaborating on details of cooperation in those areas highlighted in the recent Marine Corps strategic re-posturing.

- As the Marine Corps seeks to highlight and enhance its forward-engagement role, Navy strategists should ensure that revisions to CS 21 or other capstone documents identify and leverage the integration of the Navy/Marine Corps team (and Coast Guard forces) in forward engagement, ensuring that closer integration is refined through the service-level Warfighter Talks, the new Naval Board deliberations, and discussions at the level of component commanders and staffs of the geographic CCDRs in annual Theater Security Cooperation engagement planning.

- Use service Warfighter Talks and the new Naval Board to explore better integration of Navy and Marine Corps forward-deployed forces through potential innovations such as Marine Corps deployments on a wider variety of Navy ships, including: Joint High-Speed Vessels (JHSV)s and Littoral Combat Ships (with the possible addition of a Marine Corps module for LCS); cross-basing on ships of Navy and Marine Corps attack-capable helicopters; more embarked small Marine Corps detachments for anti-piracy operation; and greater Marine Corps/Navy Expeditionary Combat Command integration in overlap areas such as riverine forces, Navy Mobile Construction units, and explosive ordnance disposal.

- Further explore, in Warfighter Talks, the Naval Board, and/or other venues, how Marine Corps forces can best contribute to Air-Sea Battle concepts to counter A2/AD threats, including a review of the lessons of history from the Navy/Marine Corps team countering anti-access threats in the Pacific in World War II.
• Continue to enhance Navy-Marine Corps tactical aviation integration, and coordinate plans to develop and operate future unmanned aircraft capabilities.

• Build on the “interim solution” for enhancement of Maritime Prepositioning Forces, and the Marine Corps (and Army) requirement for seabasing, to further develop affordable seabasing concepts and equipment.

The current CS 21 strategy of October 2007 and recent trends in Marine Corps strategic thinking are arguably reflective of a very recent “era of good feeling” in the long up-and-down history of the Navy-Marine Corps marriage. The real challenge for Navy strategists will be to continue to cultivate and consolidate progress in the evolving cooperation of the two naval services. There is still work to be done. As a civilian defense analyst recently concluded, major challenges remain with respect to “the very nature of coordination between the Corps and the Navy,” including seabasing, shipbuilding plans, and the Marine Corps’ role in Air-Sea Battle as examples where “the alignment between the Marine-Navy team is not as seamless as it should be.”

As both services compete for a share of the shrinking Navy Department budget, Navy strategists and leaders will have to work even harder to ensure that the two services in the “same bed” do not eventually wake up and respond separately and dysfunctionally to their different dreams.”

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147 P.W. Singer, “The Corps is All Right,” Armed Forces Journal, Mar. 2011: 20-23. Mr. Singer is a defense analyst at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.
General conclusions and recommendations

Differences between the services' strategic concepts

The current status of service strategy and the focal point for development/articulation of future strategy differ in each service.

- For the Army, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) focal point has recently updated the key conceptual Army documents. However, former TRADOC Commander General Dempsey had to move up to CJCS before he could really implement these concepts as Army Chief of Staff; thus, the status and thrust of future Army strategic thinking is again unclear.

- The Air Force's basic strategy theme of "Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power," has been notably unchanged since 2000. But the new Air Force Research Institute has been tasked to report directly to the service's Chief of Staff with yearly studies that have outlined new Air Force strategic concepts and priorities for the future.

- The Coast Guard has an institutionalized cyclical strategy development process (Project Evergreen, which the U.S. Naval War College has taught as a model of strategic planning) that in the past decade has produced clear articulation of this complementary maritime service's defense and other missions and concepts. But now, after more than a year in office, the current Commandant, Admiral Papp, has yet to issue a new strategy document for the service, and his "guiding principle" focus is to "steady the service" after a decade of great operational and organizational change. However, this study found that both Admiral Papp and Marine Corps Commandant General Amos believe that the basic elements of the October 2007 strategy remain valid.

- Over the past year, both the new Commandant, General Amos, like his predecessor, has directly led the Marine Corps in articulating new areas of strategic emphasis and corresponding changes in future force structure to reposition the service for the changing budget and security environment.
• The national/joint areas of strategic and doctrinal guidance are in a particular time of change. Between July and October 2011, there have been new appointments to the offices of Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the disestablishment of Joint Forces Command (and transfer of some of its doctrine development functions back to the Joint Staff J7).

All these differences in the center of gravity and leadership of services and national/joint strategic thinking suggest that Navy strategists should best view this study as a recent snapshot and baseline. Going forward, Navy strategists must maintain their own scan of the horizon for changes in service and national/joint strategic trajectories under new leadership or new strategic and budget environments.

Service-to-service Warfighter Talks

The Navy should consider taking on an enhanced role in Navy strategy development and implementation for the bilateral service-to-service Warfighter Talks. Navy strategists should ensure that strategy developments and various topical initiatives are addressed in the context of these periodic talks, now that the Navy has institutionalized them with all four of the other armed services.

Since the current status of the various Warfighter Talks was beyond the scope of this study, that may be a good topic for future analysis to ensure that Navy strategy provides some of the guidance, and then leverages these discussions.
Specific recommendations for Navy strategy

In light of the potential implications for Navy strategy derived from the review of current strategic guidance at the national/joint level and in the other four armed services, the following recommendations should be considered, to inform potential Navy inputs to update the CS 21 strategy and other efforts.

National/joint

- Retain/Increase the CS 21 emphasis on versatility and full-spectrum capabilities of naval forces.

- Ensure that any CS 21 update addresses in some detail the Navy threat appreciation (citing China, Iran, and other potential threats by name) and briefly sets forth the Navy response to the anti-access/area-denial challenge. This should include an unclassified description of ongoing Air-Sea Battle concept development with the Air Force (and other services), enhancements to counter ballistic and cruise missile threats, and plans for eventual long-range unmanned aircraft.

- Ensure that any CS 21 update highlights how the Navy (teamed with Marine Corps and Coast Guard forces) routinely provides forward presence and forward engagement and (through operational concepts such as Global Fleet Stations) has been building the capacity of partner maritime forces.

- Highlight the Navy’s indispensable role in providing sea-based missile defense.

- Consider expanding CS 21’s current brief mention of “sea-based strategic deterrence” to point out that this is a continuing top-level national requirement for the Navy.

- Recognize that a continuing challenge for Navy strategic planners will be to closely track (and contribute to) the elaboration of key national and joint strategy and doctrine publications, particularly now that a new Secretary of Defense and a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have just taken office.
To enhance the Navy’s understanding of the Army’s current key strategic concepts (full-spectrum operations, operational adaptability, combined-arms maneuver, wide-area security, and mission command) and to assess possible future changes in the Army’s strategic thinking that might have implications for Navy strategy, these concepts and changes should be addressed in service-to-service Warfighter Talks. Conversely, the Navy should use these talks to address the key concepts and any changes in its maritime strategy.

Ensure that Navy inputs to update the strategy address some of the Army’s key requirements for the Navy as a joint force partner. Potential areas of importance might include Navy air and sea assets that enable Army forcible entry, Navy assets for inter-theater movement of Army forces and sustainment (including discussion of how Air-Sea Battle concepts may serve to overcome enemy anti-access, area-denial threats), and how Navy forces meet the Army’s requirements for “sea-based assets for command, control, fires, protection, intelligence, reconnaissance, and sustainment.”

Ensure Navy strategy elaboration and enhanced discussion with the Army (and Marine Corps) on evolving seabasing concepts (and limitations), through routine Warfighter Talks and in separate dedicated tri-service fora.

Ensure the success of the recent Army-Navy agreement on Navy operation of new Joint High-Speed Vessels (JHSV) for the Army.146

Ensure that Navy inputs to update the strategy list the Navy capability and coordination with Army forces (e.g., GBM, THAAD, Patriot) in integrated joint air and missile defense.

Above all, Navy strategic planners will need to keep a weather eye on the further evolution of Army strategic concepts and forces under a new Army Chief of Staff, with a view to eventual implications for Navy strategy.

U.S. Air Force

- To better achieve the common Air Force/Navy objective of enhancing scalable, flexible conventional power projection, ensure that current initiatives by both services (particularly in airpower projection) are addressed in Warfighter Talks and in discussions between geographic theater component commanders and staffs.

- As the two strategic services that are "on point" for maintaining freedom of access and use of the global commons of air, sea, space, and cyberspace, ensure that these areas are regular topics at Warfighter Talks and in discussions between geographic theater component commanders and staffs, and consider the advisability of a Navy/Air Force-led Global Commons Defense Initiative.

- As lead services providing joint Global Situational Awareness, enhance Navy-Air Force cooperation in planning and executing ISR collection, fusion, and dissemination.

- Ensure that Navy inputs to update the strategy strongly advocate the flexibility and benefits of seapower, including its contribution to joint force airpower and power projection.

- Leverage Air-Sea Battle concept development and evolution to spur closer Air Force and Navy cooperation in power projection. Future Navy strategy updates should highlight the existence and importance of the Air-Sea Battle initiative, even though little public mention can be made of Air-Sea Battle details, given the classification and sensitivity of the initiative.

U.S. Coast Guard

- As an overarching approach, given the Coast Guard leadership's satisfaction with the October 2007 CS 21 document, and the Coast Guard's current emphasis on consolidation, Navy strategists should be cautious in proposing any changes to basic concepts/core capabilities, and might better focus on ensuring full implementation of already-agreed areas of Navy-Coast Guard cooperation.

- In their Warfighter Talks between headquarters staffs, and, perhaps even more important, through a newly elaborated Navy-Coast Guard regular liaison at geographic CCDRs' staffs, Navy strategists might usefully seek to further identify/leverage the Coast Guard's unique entrée to foreign maritime forces and ministries, and ensure that Coast Guard forces are more fully integrated.
with Navy (and Marine Corps) forces in annual Theater Security Cooperation engagement planning.

- Ensure that Navy inputs to update the CS 21 strategy cite success stories of Navy-Coast Guard cooperation (e.g., Maritime Domain Awareness, maritime intelligence sharing, and Coast Guard integration in theater Global Fleet Stations and Carrier Strike Group (CSG) deployments) and that they strongly advocate for the continuation of such successes.

- Navy strategists should re-emphasize the commitment of the latest (2006) bi-service National Fleet policy statement to integrated, complementary, interoperable maritime defense capabilities from both services. In this regard, ensure that less prominent areas of potential cooperation (e.g., establishing joint C3 centers, joint training for expeditionary operations, and training, manning, and equipping of the two services' patrol boat forces) are identified.

U.S. Marine Corps

- As an overarching approach, given the satisfaction of the current Marine Corps leadership with the major tenets of the October 2007 CS 21 document, Navy strategists should be cautious in proposing any changes to basic concepts/core capabilities, and might better focus on implementation of already-agreed areas of Navy-Marine Corps cooperation, as well as elaborating on details of cooperation in those areas highlighted in the recent Marine Corps strategic re-posturing.

- As the Marine Corps seeks to highlight and enhance its forward-engagement role, Navy strategists should ensure that any updates to CS 21 identify and leverage the integration of the Navy/Marine Corps team (and Coast Guard forces) in forward engagement, ensuring that closer integration is refined through the service-level Warfighter Talks, the new Naval Board, and discussions at the level of component commanders and staffs of the geographic CCDRs in annual Theater Security Cooperation engagement planning.

- Use service Warfighter Talks and the new Naval Board to explore better integration of Navy and Marine Corps forward-deployed forces through potential innovations such as: Marine Corps deployments on a wider variety of Navy ships, including Joint High-Speed Vessels (JHSV)s and Littoral Combat Ships (with the possible addition of a Marine Corps module for LCS); cross-basing on ships of Navy and Marine Corp attack-capable helicopters; more
embarked small Marine Corps detachments for anti-piracy operation; and greater Marine Corps/Navy Expeditionary Combat Command integration in overlap areas such as riverine forces, Navy Mobile Construction units, and explosive ordnance disposal.

- Further explore, in Warfighter Talks, the new Naval Board, and/or a separate venue, how Marine Corps forces can best contribute to Air-Sea Battle concepts to counter the anti-access/area-denial threats, including a review of the lessons of history from the Navy/Marine Corps team countering anti-access threats in the Pacific in World War II.

- Continue to enhance Navy-Marine Corps tactical aviation integration, and coordinate plans to develop and operate future unmanned aircraft capabilities.

- Build on the “interim solution” for enhancement of Maritime Prepositioning Forces, and the Marine Corps (and Army) requirement for seabasing, to further develop affordable seabasing concepts and equipment.
Appendix A: Selected bibliography

These references were selected as most useful to an understanding of the strategies and concepts at the national/joint level and in the other four armed services.

National/joint

President Barack Obama:


Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates:


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael G. Mullen:


Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, August 11, 2011.


Captain Victor George Addison, USN:


George E. Katsos, “Joint Chiefs of Staff J7, Joint Education and Doctrine Division,” Joint Forces Quarterly, issue 61, 2nd Quarter 2011: 122-123.

U.S. Army

General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, Commander U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC):


TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028, August 19, 2010.

Army FM 3-0, Operations, February 2008, and FM 3-0, Change 1, 22 February 2011.

“Win, Learn, Focus, Adapt, Win Again: The Scrimmage Should Be as Hard as the Game,” at www.ausa.org.


U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, "Hearing to Consider the Nomination of General Martin E. Dempsey to be Chief of Staff, United States Army," March 3, 2011.


**U.S. Air Force**


General John Shaud, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.:


Sam Bateman, RSIS Commentaries, No. 82/2011, US AirSea Battle: Countering China’s Anti-access Strategies.


U.S. Coast Guard

Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Thad W. Allen:


Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Robert Papp, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant’s Direction 2011, February 10, 2011.

U.S. Coast Guard:


U.S. Coast Guard Evergreen II Project Report, August 2009.


**U.S. Marine Corps**

Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen James F. Amos:


Memorandum of Understanding Between Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and Commander, Army Capabilities Integration Center, Concept of Employment for Current Seabasing Capabilities: Integrating Seabasing Capabilities into Exercises and Experiments, June 29, 2010.


Appendix B: Interviews

Service chiefs

Brief interviews of opportunity focused on the question of whether they felt that the strategy required changing (and, if so, how) were conducted (one-on-one) following their presentations at conferences in the following cases:

Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James F. Amos, April 15, 2011, Washington, DC.

Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Robert Papp, April 15, 2011, Washington, DC.

Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead (questioned at a restricted meeting—comments not provided in this paper due to confidentiality ground rules of that meeting).

Senior Navy leadership

Brief interviews of opportunity focused on the question of whether they felt that the strategy required changing (and, if so, how) were conducted (one-on-one) following their presentations at conferences in the following cases:

VADM Bruce W. Clingan, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5), Washington, DC, Jan. 12, 2011. (He stated that he was pleased his staff was conducting this study.)

VADM John T. Blake, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8), Washington, DC, Jan. 13, 2011. (He stated that he remained satisfied with the October 2007 strategy.)
Others

General John Shaud, USAF, Ret., Director, Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), was interviewed one-on-one at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama, on May 27, 2011, followed by a two-hour-long group meeting with 10 senior AFRI staff members (Asked to describe the current status and future trends in U.S. Air Force strategic thinking, they provided exceptionally valuable insights.)

U.S. Army and U.S. Coast Guard: To encourage frankness, interviews were conducted on an anonymous basis with both a senior (O-6) U.S. Coast Guard officer with current strategy development posting (on June 7, 2011), and with a senior retired U.S. Army officer who continues to officially contribute to Army strategy (on June 15, 2011). (Asked to describe the current status and future trends in their service’s strategic thinking, they provided very good insights into real senior staff concerns.)

Dr. Floyd Kennedy, CNA representative at the Navy Warfare Development Command, Norfolk Va., was interviewed at various times throughout the spring of 2011.