English archers and knights led by King Henry V face the French Army at the Battle of Agincourt on St. Crispin's Day, 25 October 1415.

"We few, we happy few, we band of brothers. For he today that sheds his blood with me shall be my brother; be he ne'er so vile, this day shall gentle his condition. And gentlemen in England now abed shall think themselves accursed they were not here, and hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks that fought with us upon St. Crispin's Day."

William Shakespeare

Henry V

Act IV, Scene 3, Lines 60-67
### Military Review. September-October 2010

**Report Date:** SEP 2010  
**Report Type:**  
**Dates Covered:** 00-09-2010 to 00-10-2010  
**Author(s):**  
**Performing Organization:** U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 66027  
**DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT:** Approved for public release; distribution unlimited  
**Subject Terms:**  
**Security Classification of:**  
- a. REPORT: unclassified  
- b. ABSTRACT: unclassified  
- c. THIS PAGE: unclassified  
**Limitation of ABSTRACT:** Same as Report (SAR)  
**NUMBER OF PAGES:** 112  

---

*Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)*  
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
FEATURED ARTICLES

2 The Top Seven Myths of U.S. Defense Policy Toward the Americas
Frank O. Mora, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere, and Nicholas F. Zimmerman, Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere
Inconsistencies and fallacies plague the understanding of U.S. policy in the Americas. This article explains the rationale and purpose of U.S. defense policy in the Western Hemisphere.

11 Disarming the Key Leader Engagement
Major General Richard C. Nash and Captain Eric P. Magistad, Minnesota National Guard
When 34th Infantry Division Commander MG Richard Nash assumed command of Multi-National Division-South in southern Iraq, he initiated a key leader engagement program to inform, influence, and educate local Iraqi officials. This article articulates his successful strategy for efficient and productive leader engagements.

21 Thoughts on the Battle for the Mind: IO and COIN in the Pashtun Belt
Commander Larry LeGree, U.S. Navy
A former leader of a provincial reconstruction team asserts that U.S. forces should have a persistent, nuanced, and informed information operations campaign at the center of the COIN strategy in Afghanistan.

33 National Will from a Threat Perspective
E. Margaret Phillips
U.S. adversaries consider the military a proxy target for national will. This article discusses the motivations, tactics, and techniques that could be used against the U.S. in future proxy attacks.

40 Heuristics and Biases in Military Decision Making
Major Blair S. Williams, U.S. Army
The classic Military Decision Making Process is ill-suited for the analysis of problems exhibited in current operations. The complex, ambiguous problems the Army faces today require an emergent style of decision making, where the practitioners are willing to embrace improvisation and reflection.

53 Fundamental Principles and Iconoclastic Observations
Richard Maltz
Shared cultural overlays enable synchronization in warfighting, even in the absence of direct guidance and communication.

59 The Militarization of Gazprom
Lieutenant Commander Cindy Hurst, U.S. Navy Reserve
While the United States has been privatizing its military logistics, Russia is militarizing its corporate security.

Cover Photo: Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) Imperial cavalry guards depicted in a contemporary Chinese print (origin unknown)
68 The Allure of Quick Victory: Lessons from Peru’s Fight against Sendero Luminoso
Major Michael L. Burgoyne, U.S. Army
Peru did not effectively address social inequities after its defeat of the Shining Path in the 1990s, and the insurgency is reigniting.

74 Talking Grand Strategy
Commander John T. Kuehn, Ph.D., U.S. Navy, Retired
The war that lasted from 1914 to 1989 is over. The United States should return to the grand strategy that served it well before World War II.

79 A Practical Approach to Cultural Insight
Colonel Casey Haskins, U.S. Army
The author offers a framework for analyzing cultures, making plans, and informing decisions.

INSIGHTS
88 Now That We’re Leaving Iraq, What Did We Learn?
Colonel Craig A. Collier, U.S. Army
Our Soldiers are the most lethal on earth. Traditional combat operations worked in Iraq.

94 The Challenge of Leadership in the Interagency Environment
William J. Davis, Jr., Ph.D.
In the interagency environment, the way to accomplish the mission is to employ the “six C’s”—comprehend, coordinate, cooperate, compromise, consent, and convince.

97 BOOK REVIEWS

105 LETTERS

108 2010 GENERAL WILLIAM E. DEPUY WRITING COMPETITION WINNERS ANNOUNCEMENT
The Top Seven Myths of U.S. Defense Policy Toward the Americas

Frank O. Mora, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere
Nicholas F. Zimmerman, Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere

Recent discussions and commentaries on U.S. defense policy in the Americas have created a number of myths regarding the Obama administration’s approach to the region and a series of inaccuracies that require clarification.1 This article makes clear the rationale and purpose of U.S. defense policy in the Western Hemisphere and highlights some of the inconsistencies, mischaracterizations, and fallacies of the arguments that inform these myths.

Myth One: The United States is inattentive to the Americas

The first myth is the notion that the Obama administration takes the Americas for granted by paying it insufficient attention, a charge frequently heard from commentators on hemispheric relations.2 Such accusations, however, are factually inaccurate. Indeed, the very fact that the United States is developing a new tone and new relationships by moving away from the Manichean and “one-size fits all” policies of old is a sign that the administration is giving ample attention to the region. High-level visits are one indicator: President Obama met with President Felipe Calderón of Mexico while still president-elect, traveled to Mexico on two occasions, and hosted Mexico’s first couple in his administration’s second state visit, highlighting the importance of the U.S.-Mexico relationship; President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil was one of the first foreign leaders to meet with the President in the Oval Office; the President also received then Chilean President Michelle Bachelet and then Colombian President Alvaro Uribe; Vice President Joe Biden visited Chile and Costa Rica; and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have both recently toured the region, as have the secretaries of Commerce and Transportation, and the Attorney General. In short, President Obama, cabinet officials, and sub-cabinet officials are in frequent contact with their counterparts in the Americas as we partner to improve collaboration in areas of mutual interest.

Many of the charges of inattention stem from the fact that this administration has not developed a catchy slogan or cookie-cutter approach to
HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE POLICY

the region; there is no “Good Neighbor Policy,” “Alliance for Progress,” “Free Trade Area of the Americas,” or “Monroe Doctrine” to which one can easily point. The lack of a slogan, however, does not indicate a lack of strategy. The President’s nuanced approach tends to tailor policies to the distinct characteristics of individual countries and their relations with the United States. Flexibility is increasingly important because the Western Hemisphere is a dynamic and constantly evolving region that has changed considerably in recent decades. The administration recognizes that the challenges and nature of U.S. relations with countries such as Brazil and Chile are fundamentally different than those present in relationships with countries such as Mexico and Colombia and each therefore requires a unique approach. Similarly, the security challenges of the Caribbean and Central America and its geographic proximity to the United States are another example of the need for tailored policies. As a result, the umbrella approaches that characterized past U.S. policy are no longer appropriate. In fact, they can be counterproductive.

Strategically targeted engagement is the most appropriate course of action in the Americas, and indeed, for U.S. foreign policy as a whole in the 21st century. As the 2010 National Security Strategy notes, the United States will continue to rely on close friends and allies to collectively ensure global security, but this alone is not sufficient. The United States will also work to cultivate deeper partnerships with new “key centers of influence,” “emerging nations,” and even “hostile nations” because of our conviction that “our own interests are bound to the interests of those beyond our borders.” In the regional security space, the United States pursues policies such as the Merida Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, bilateral working groups, and Defense Cooperation Agreements such as those signed with Brazil and Colombia. These partnerships permit more creativity by allowing the United States and its partners to optimize limited resources in an increasingly complex environment. They highlight a shift in the objectives of the U.S. Department of Defense’s policy initiatives. As the region continues to make strides, the goal is for the United States to expand beyond the traditional focus on “assistance” to concentrate on neighbors’ needs in developing the capacity to confront the security challenges that threaten all of us. In other words, we should no longer judge U.S. engagement and commitment by absolute increases or decreases in foreign aid, but rather by how successful the United States is in partnering with regional neighbors to build their expertise and competence for their own security and that of the region as a whole. This is not only smart policy, but also a deliberate change from past U.S. policies that were paternalistic and shortsighted. The well-being of the United States is linked intrinsically to a secure and prosperous hemisphere, and this administration is committed to doing what is possible to achieve the true long-term solution: self-sufficiency of our neighbors.

Myth Two: U.S. focus on partnership precludes leadership in the Americas

The second myth is that the Obama administration’s focus on partnership in the region is naïve or misguided because it eschews U.S. leadership in the hemisphere. It is true that President Obama has emphasized that the United States seeks partnership in the region on equal terms, with no senior and junior partners. Because he recognizes the unprecedented interconnectedness of the hemisphere and the world in the 21st century, President Obama has embraced the idea of a new era of engagement based on mutual respect, common interest, and shared values. As he emphasized at the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad & Tobago in April 2009, one important justification for this new spirit of partnership and engagement is that there are numerous areas of mutual interest in the Americas that demand collective action, and one of these areas is our common security.

True leadership demands a clear understanding of the current environment. Security threats in the Americas tend to be transnational, and the United States would be remiss if it did not convey its commitment to, and pursue policies that advance, increased interoperability and cooperation across borders. Simply put, transnational challenges require multinational solutions. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted in his remarks at the November 2009 German Marshall Fund Security Conference in Halifax, Canada, natural disasters and arms and narco-trafficking are among the biggest concerns in the hemisphere and countering
them “require[s] an uncommon degree of coordination among the national-security, homeland-defense, and criminal-justice agencies of our governments, as these threats do not fit into the neat, discrete boxes of 20th century organization charts.” Indeed, events such as the 2009 coup in Honduras, the 2010 earthquakes in Chile and Haiti, and the struggle against drug trafficking in Mexico and Central America confirm that President Obama and Secretary Gates are justified in asserting that U.S. security is linked to the improved security of the hemisphere as a whole. The threats and challenges we face are shared and therefore demand partnership because multilateral action has become a necessary precondition for ensuring security.

The need for partnership, however, does not preclude U.S. leadership. The Obama administration has repeatedly demonstrated its leadership in the region, and it will remain steadfast in defending and promoting U.S. strategic interests within relevant legal frameworks and in accordance with our national values. In addition, the United States will respect the national values of our neighbors and have the courage to allow others to lead, as they are doing today in Haiti. The United States stands alone at its own peril and benefits when other countries assert leadership and assume responsibility in pursuit of common goals. Indeed, it is in the exercise of such leadership that our neighbors better understand what is required, and what is at stake for the region’s well-being.

The U.S. reaction to the earthquake in Haiti is perhaps the most obvious example of U.S. leadership in a spirit of partnership. In the immediate wake of the tragedy, the speed and magnitude of the U.S. response was crucial to the relief effort. Indeed, the importance of the United States’ ability to deliver abundant resources and unique life-saving capabilities to Haiti in a time-sensitive environment cannot be underestimated. However, the United States also demonstrated its capacity to work as a partner by collaborating closely with countries such as Brazil to enable the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and others to provide relief and mitigate the Haitian people’s suffering. In the process, the region as a whole stood in solidarity with Haiti and developed valuable experience in responding to a catastrophic natural disaster that requires multi-national cooperation and coordination.
Another example of U.S. initiative is the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). In Trinidad, President Obama exercised leadership by recognizing the need to foster a collective and multi-national approach to illicit trafficking, committing the United States to strengthening cooperation on security matters in the Caribbean, and pledging roughly $45 million to get started. As the CBSI takes shape, all the countries involved are consulting closely with each other in a spirit of cooperation to develop processes and frameworks and identify strengths and weaknesses. The CBSI is a truly regional effort because the input of all countries involved has been incorporated.

In fact, Caribbean leaders deserve special praise for their political courage and leadership. It is no easy task to recognize that the best way to effectively combat the unlimited resources and reach of drug trafficking organizations is through creative, collective approaches to cooperation such as focusing on air, maritime, and land domain awareness, striving for mutually agreed-upon standard operating procedures, increasing information sharing, and procuring compatible and standardized communications equipment. Because of these leaders’ commitments to the greater good, the region is now moving in this direction.

**Myth Three: The Honduran coup was a defeat for U.S. regional engagement**

The third myth is that the coup in Honduras was a defeat for the Obama administration’s engagement strategy because its position was inconsistent, confusing, and misguided. In truth, the administration’s approach to the coup in Honduras fell within the larger framework of U.S. policy in the region: to be a partner whenever possible and a leader whenever necessary. Indeed, one element of the Obama administration’s emphasis on collective action and partnership is a clear recognition of—and agreement with—past criticism that the U.S. approach to the region tended to be unilateral and therefore counterproductive. Thus, President Obama fulfilled his pledges by working in a multilateral fashion to make clear that the coup in Honduras was unacceptable. The United States worked closely with the Organization of American States, Honduran leaders, then President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, and other actors willing to make a positive contribution to a practical solution. When it became apparent, however, that certain elements in the region either benefited from the political gridlock that subsequently took hold—or simply had no real plan of action to break the impasse—senior-level U.S. involvement was crucial to the negotiations that ultimately led to the agreement that ensured Honduras’ transition back to democratic governance. Frankly, criticism of the U.S. role has been, at times, disingenuous. As President Obama stated in August 2009 at a press conference with President Calderon and Prime Minister Harper, “the critics who say that the United States has not intervened enough in Honduras are the same people who say that we’re always intervening, and the Yankees need to get out of Latin America. You can’t have it both ways.” While consistent with larger U.S. foreign policy objectives, the administration’s approach proved crucial to putting Honduras back on the path to democracy and demonstrated that the coups of the past no longer have any place in our Hemisphere.

In addition, it is necessary to highlight something that does not receive nearly enough attention: the Honduras experience created an important and positive precedent for how to confront similar challenges in the future. The response to the Honduran coup marks the first time that the notion of the collective defense of democracy in the Americas ceased to be merely rhetoric. The coup prompted the first formal invocation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter to suspend a country’s participation in the Inter-American system. In other words, collective defense of democracy in the wake of the Honduran coup became actionable and practical, not merely something to strive for in the future. While its application was imperfect, the implications of a collective defense being triggered to support democracy could be lasting in countries where democratic governance is threatened. At a minimum, it underscores the need to strengthen collective mechanisms, and with support that does not come from the United States alone.

**Myth Four: The U.S.-Colombia defense agreement is a threat to regional security**

The fourth myth is that the United States could use the 2009 U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) to threaten other countries in the region because it will allow for the creation of
U.S. bases and therefore permit an increased U.S. military presence in South America. In fact, this agreement does not fundamentally change U.S.-Colombia defense relations. There will be no U.S. bases and no increased U.S. presence in Colombia as a result of the agreement. Congress establishes the limits on the number of U.S. military personnel and U.S. citizen civilian contractors through legislation, and any increase would require congressional action. Of course, Colombia is an important ally of the United States. The United States has a strong interest and commitment in Colombia’s continued success and the DCA will ensure continued and effective cooperation in addressing security challenges.

The Department of Defense signed this agreement for two reasons. First, the agreement helps collaboration by improving, streamlining, and regularizing the numerous past defense cooperation agreements the United States has concluded with Colombia over the years. The type of cooperation that these agreements facilitate is crucial because—as President Obama and Secretary Gates have stressed—the threats in the region are transnational and require multinational approaches.

Second, the Obama administration has repeatedly emphasized that transparency is a key element to building trust and confidence on defense issues, a necessary precondition for a more peaceful and secure world. Defense cooperation agreements can clearly provide that type of transparency.

The ability of this type of agreement to improve defense cooperation and transparency also motivated, along with other considerations, the signing of the April 2010 DCA between the United States and Brazil. In addition to, for example, facilitating future technology transfer, the agreement had the added benefit of prioritizing our bilateral relationship. As Secretary Gates noted alongside Brazilian Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim at the signing of the DCA, the agreement is significant because it is a “formal acknowledgement of the many security interests and values we share as the two most populous democracies in the Americas.” Minister Jobim also endorsed this notion at the DCA signing when he noted that “peace in the world as we know it will depend much and much more on transparency and this kind of relationship that we [the United States and Brazil] have now.” Finally, as signatories to these agreements, Brazil, Colombia, and the United
States all affirm their commitment to respect the principles of sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter. In other words, these agreements do not pose a threat to any country. In fact, they increase security in the region by furthering shared understandings and responses to security challenges. The benefits of such military cooperation were never clearer than during the coordinated response to the earthquake in Haiti, when U.S., Brazilian, and Colombian personnel worked side-by-side with many others to deliver life-saving relief to the Haitian people.

**Myth Five: The United States contributes to a growing arms race in the Americas**

The fifth myth is that the United States is contributing to—or is indifferent about—what some have characterized as a growing arms race in the Americas. The United States is neither contributing to nor is indifferent about any such thing. In fact, there is no arms race brewing in the hemisphere. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), none of these countries’ defense budgets are close to exorbitant. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Colombia, Chile, and Ecuador were the only countries in the hemisphere that spent more than two percent of their 2008 GDP on defense matters. Furthermore, the region has actually made measured strides in increasing transparency and creating mechanisms of defense and security cooperation through the development of regional institutions such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR, in Spanish) and the Central American Integration System (SICA, in Spanish). Although its successes have not been sufficient, these institutions can facilitate regional understanding and thus reduce potential tensions, which is why the United States supports UNASUR and SICA.

In contrast to these positive trends, Venezuela’s disproportionate and unnecessary purchase of arms has rightly caused some concern in the region. Other countries such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico have also increased defense expenditures, but they have done so because they face real modernization needs and/or internal security challenges from terrorism and narco-trafficking.

For example, modernization is the principal motive for Brazil’s rising defense costs. Brazil has been a regional leader in pushing for transparency bodies like UNASUR and has been forthcoming about the implications of its 2008 National Strategy of Defense, which recognizes the importance of increasing its air, land, and maritime domain awareness to secure its borders, combat illegal trafficking, and improve citizen security. Indeed, Brazil has made military and other forms of public service a priority and linked its procurement approach to economic development through homegrown defense industries and technology transfers. In other words, Brazil is focused inwards, and its increasing expenditures—whether for personnel, helicopters, tanks, or fighter aircraft—are reflective of that.

Similarly, Chile has steadily and openly pursued modernization since at least 2002. An F-16 purchase from the United States was to modernize its aging air force, a key strategic priority for a country whose Pacific territory extends thousands of miles from its mainland. It seems far-fetched to argue that this particular upgrade—or the now winding-down modernization process—is a shift to a more aggressive posture.

Colombia’s situation is different. The Colombian government faces an armed internal conflict with terrorists and narco-traffickers. President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy has been successful, but the policy requires resources. Colombia has focused on making its forces as mobile and effective at counterinsurgency as possible. The navy is a good example; it has focused on becoming an effective brown-water force, with new river support stations and a new coast guard service. Despite President Chavez’s attempts to distort the truth, Colombia’s procurement and expenditures posture is consistent with a country focused on defeating a brutal domestic threat.

Mexico also finds itself in a struggle with organized crime. President Calderon’s leadership and courage in this matter deserves praise. In terms of arms procurement and defense expenditures, there is a new focus on buying items such as pickup trucks, ocean-patrol vessels, interceptor craft, helicopters, and surveillance aircraft suitable for the challenges Mexico currently faces.

Venezuela, however, boasts of signing agreements reportedly worth billions of dollars with Russia for weapons that are primarily suitable for conventional war. President Chavez’s desire for
Kalashnikov rifles and Sukhoi jet fighters does little to promote citizen security or combat the illicit trafficking that is increasingly taking hold in Venezuela. Furthermore, President Chavez has cloaked these transactions in secrecy, which flies in the face of UNASUR’s stated goal of building confidence and trust on defense matters in the region through increased transparency.

In stark contrast, the assistance that the United States has provided through the Mérida Initiative, CBSI, United States Southern Command’s Enduring Friendship, Plan Colombia, and other programs cannot in good faith be construed as inciting an arms race in the region. These initiatives all facilitate the U.S. goal of building our partners’ capacity to provide for their own security and the security of the region.

Myth Six: U.S. military training and education is not committed to the promotion of human rights

The sixth myth is that U.S. military education, training, and capacity building conducted at institutions like the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) at Fort Benning, Georgia, is somehow responsible for—or promotes—human rights abuses. Secretary Gates has emphasized the Department of Defense’s uncompromising commitment to human rights. Indeed, as he noted in November 2009 at the German Marshall Fund Security Conference in Halifax, Canada, “strong human rights programs are vital when conducting military responses” because “security gains will be illusory if they lack the public legitimacy that comes with respect for human rights and the rule of law.”

The argument for human rights is no longer strictly a moral one—although it unquestionably remains a moral imperative. Respect for human rights is also indispensable to the legitimacy of institutions and democracies and, therefore, our national security.

The argument for human rights is no longer strictly a moral one—although it unquestionably remains a moral imperative. Respect for human rights is also indispensable to the legitimacy of institutions and democracies and, therefore, our national security.
present classic dilemmas in human rights and the lawful use of force. The Institute also offers a human rights instructor course, which prepares students to be human rights instructors in their own organizations. In Fiscal Year 2009, 125 students from seven countries—Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru—graduated from this course. Finally, every July, WHINSEC organizes a democracy and human rights week during which every student attends lectures and discussions on human rights. Practical exercises are also included; for example, a trip to Andersonville National Historic Site stresses the need for humane treatment of detainees and prisoners of war.

The training WHINSEC provides is similar to the training provided in a number of institutions. The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, for example, provides expertise for civilians in governance of ministries of defense and training and support for the drafting of national security strategies. The Inter-American Air Forces Academy provides courses that cover human rights, weapon safety training, aircraft maintenance, and engine technician training. And United States Southern Command exercises such as TRADEWINDS, PANAMAX, and UNITAS seek to improve cooperation, shared military tactics, domain awareness, and interoperability.

In sum, there are no sinister or shadowy intentions in the training and education opportunities that the Department of Defense offers. Rather, the department’s objective is to strengthen partnership, build capacity, increase interoperability, and create neighborly camaraderie.

Myth Seven: U.S. Cuba policy is either too over-reaching or too modest

Although not necessarily a security or defense issue, the seventh myth concerns Cuba. In discussing Cuba, there are two critiques of the Obama administration’s policy to date. Simply stated, critics contend the administration has done either too much or not nearly enough. Some claim the administration has not sufficiently broken from the past while others accuse it of propping up repressive Cuban authorities. Neither is correct. It is important to recognize that the President has done exactly what he promised he would do with regard to Cuba policy. He has removed restrictions on family visits and remittances; he has sought to engage on issues of mutual interest such as migration and direct postal service; he has sought to increase the flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people; and he has stood up in defense of the basic human and political rights of the Cuban people by denouncing the tragic death of Orlando Zapata Tamayo and renewing his call for the unconditional release of all political prisoners. Consistent with this approach, in the wake of the tragic earthquake in Haiti, the United States also cooperated with Cuba to expedite the arrival of critical supplies to victims and survivors of the disaster.

In sum, the promises that President Obama has fulfilled are significant. They create opportunities for relationship building and exchange, and they demonstrate that the United States is sincere in its openness and in its desire to write a new chapter in the history of U.S.-Cuban relations. Of course, a fundamental change in the U.S.-Cuba relationship requires action and good will from both sides. Unfortunately, the Cuban authorities have demonstrated little good will and even less positive action to date. As Secretary of State Clinton noted, the Cuban authorities remain intransigent.

Despite the continued obstinacy of Cuban authorities, U.S. policy remains focused on reaching out to the Cuban people to support their desire to determine their future freely, and it remains committed to advancing its national interests. Thus, the promotion of people-to-people bonds will continue. The risk that such bonds somehow aid current Cuban authorities is negligible. As such, the administration’s approach is appropriately cautious because it strikes the right balance between moving the U.S. relationship with Cuba in a positive direction and maintaining pressure on the Cuban government to allow the Cuban people to be truly free.

Conclusion: Proactive communication trumps misinformation

It is worthwhile to reflect on why a number of U.S. policies toward the Americas are in need of clarification. Of course, international relations are complicated, and misunderstandings are inevitable, whether sincere or strategic in nature. Moreover, misinformation, distortions, and lies frequently
seem to outpace truth and facts. It is unsurprising, therefore, that communication and messaging is an increasingly important determinant of the ultimate effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy. The United States will only gain by embracing this truth and being proactive in explaining its intentions and objectives, both domestically and abroad. Through aggressive transparency and communication, the United States can frame its message and in doing so, undermine any attempts to misconstrue its motives. The arguments detailed here provide a solid basis for what must be an ongoing effort. MR

NOTES


5. Ibid.


7. Ibid.

8. U.S. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Summit of the Americas.


10. Ibid.


13. Ibid., 55.


INFORMATION ENGAGEMENTS IN Multi-National Division-South took place at warp speed during the build-up to the 30 June 2009 transition of U.S. forces in Iraq. Iraqi Security Forces were improving their capabilities every day, but were they ready to assume full control of the operations? What would life be like under the security agreement for U.S. forces? The agreement was understood in theory, but its application generated a litany of questions. However, one thing was clear: the way ahead would require systematic engagements with Iraqi leaders to leverage their powers of public persuasion.

Military commanders have been meeting with important local officials since the beginning of the conflict in Iraq. These key leader engagements help commanders advance their objectives by building relationships with influential Iraqis familiar with Iraq’s complex human terrain, but the engagements frequently take place on an ad hoc basis and are rarely integrated into strategic operations. Essentially, a key leader engagement is nothing more than a diplomatic tool to influence, inform, or educate a key leader.

After the calendar page turned on 1 July 2009, Iraqi forces accepted responsibility for security in Iraqi cities, but key leader engagements continued to be important. At Iraq’s request, U.S. forces focused on training, advising, assisting, and coordinating with Iraqi forces inside the cities. Partnered with Iraqi forces, U.S. forces continued to conduct operations, although most U.S. combat troops withdrew from populated areas.

The commander of the 34th Infantry Division and Multi-National Division-South (MND-S) knew that engaging with key Iraqi audiences was central to helping Iraqis understand the new U.S. force posture. He used key leader engagements to connect the host nation key leaders to other leaders both in the community and in MND-S.

This article will help define the key leader engagement process, as well as establish its place in current operations. The phrase “disarming key leader engagement” refers to a homegrown method the 34th Infantry Division used to facilitate the information engagement process. Often, the engagement is conducted to build relationships and continue a dialogue. To maximize the linked effects of engagements across space and time, the MND-S commander...
subscribed to the notion that the key leader engagement should be “disarming”: that is, allay suspicion or antipathy. If leaders could find ways of relating to potential allies through friendly, ordinary conversation, it would expand the sphere of their mutual influence. The division was able to articulate a successful strategy that offers lessons learned for operations in southern Iraq and—by extension—the border areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan. This article provides some recommendations for an Army training strategy using vignettes from the division’s experience during Operation Iraqi Freedom as examples.

A New Engagement Era

Located in Basra, far from the sprawling forward operating bases and congestion of Baghdad, MND-S took its cues from a very different operational environment. In almost every respect—politically, militarily, economically, and socially—Basra is distinct from its nation’s capital. It is a city that has long held promise for its people, with oilfields in west Qurnah and Ramallah and a serviceable international airport built by the Germans in the 1980s. Basra Province, Iraq’s deep-water pathway to the Persian Gulf, is steeped in riches and wracked by internal conflict. However, following the successful Charge-of-the-Knights Operation in 2008, the city began to show signs of life. During 2009, after the nearby deepwater port of Umm Qasr was wrested from militia control, business picked up dramatically as greater numbers of Maersk shipping containers began to arrive each day. Despite these improvements, shipping experts agreed that the port city would need revamped infrastructure, guaranteed electricity, and additional berths before it approached international standards. In addition, local business leaders still complained about corruption at the port—a problem experienced throughout southern Iraq.

As the new environment took shape during early 2009, the 34th Infantry Division Headquarters, an Army National Guard unit headquartered in Rosemount, Minnesota, was assuming command and control of MND-S. In this new Iraqi Security Force-led environment, with a new U.S. division at the helm, what would the division engagement strategy look like? Who should MND-S engage and how? Who would work with U.S. forces and carry command messages to the people? Furthermore, how could U.S. forces work to demystify their presence in the post-30 June era? What were the concerns of the people, and how could the division engage in this new phase of the operation?

As the insurgency lost steam in Iraq and the conflict entered a new stage, the importance of information engagement could not be overstated. Although the militias were largely routed, there were critical events ahead: implementing a security agreement between Iraq and the U.S., holding a parliamentary election, drawing down U.S. forces, and managing the perceptions of ordinary southern Iraqis. These events helped focus the MND-S engagement strategy. Given this context, individuals such as the provincial governors, Iraqi Army commanders, and Iraqi chiefs of police were obvious engagement choices for the division commander.

However, leaders must always think beyond the obvious and look for voices that have not been heard. Religious leaders in foreign countries are among the most vexing subjects to engage—mostly because U.S. military leaders tend to lack a proper cultural understanding of non-Western religions. However, division leaders realized that key religious figures carry a payload as representatives of a population normally unreachable through traditional media (e.g., press conferences). One indirect way to influence public opinion was to influence the religious leaders who presided over a particular public.

The term sayyid is an honorific title Shi’ite Muslims give to males they believe are descendants of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. One such leader in the region was Sayyid Abdul Ali al-Moosawi, who carried weight within the religious information environment. In fact, he held sway over an estimated half-million Shi’ites in Basra Province alone. As the leader of the Shi’ite Shaykhiya sect, his influence transmitted across tribal, provincial, and—quite possibly—national boundaries. In a province with a population of between two and three million people, Moosawi’s voice could potentially reach an audience comparable to a medium-sized cable television network in the United States.

Sayyid al-Moosawi was also a world traveler and an astute businessman who employed more than 1,000 Basrawis in more than a dozen enterprises. When the British departed, Moosawi immediately reached out to the first group of U.S. forces assigned to Basra. In a stroke of luck for the 34th Infantry Division, he also had a connection to Minnesota
through his travel to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, where his father—also a respected and renowned cleric—once received medical treatment. Moosawi led the largest mosque in Basra, with an additional 150 smaller structures throughout the city of 2.5 million. He was a key figure who could “open doors” for the division. After a June 2009 open house at the contingency operating base—to which the division invited a list of prominent Basra-area political, social, and military figures—the MND-S commander engaged Moosawi directly on his farm.

While senior military officers share a set of traits common to all successful leaders, the division commander’s civilian background in industry uniquely prepared him for a business-oriented engagement approach. An individual with a strong set of management skills who had done well in a civilian business environment, he found it easy to be candid and show genuine concern for the other person. In a civilian business environment, it is common to exchange frivolous conversation in the buildup to the actual work of the meeting. Qualities like active listening and relationship building are clearly valued among principals of industry. However, in the military (and down-range in particular), leaders often expect to engage persons hostile to U.S. intentions. By relying on so-called “soft skills” as part of an overarching engagement strategy, a commander can placate a key host nation leader, and thus work toward a common area where the two leaders’ interests intersect.

During their initial meeting, Moosawi and the division commander embraced (in accordance with custom); rode horses; walked around; feasted on a lavish buffet of flat bread, lamb, and locally grown vegetables; met a large gathering of leaders in Moosawi’s meeting hall (or diwan); feasted again; and finally toured a printing factory near Moosawi’s mosque. Clearly, Moosawi was a kind of renaissance figure with business concerns far and wide: a genuine stakeholder in the Basra community. Throughout the day, he and the MND-S commander discussed the subject of Moosawi’s weekly sermon, the rule of law, the prison system, and even the pending security agreement framework. The commander also pledged to support the security agreement’s provisions that U.S. forces would act only when called upon by Iraqi Security Forces. As president of the Al-Moosawi Group—his holding company—Moosawi obviously had a variety of business ambitions. These ambitions did not go unnoticed by the division commander as he discussed Moosawi’s various enterprises.

In austere or hostile environments, commanders frequently develop a “task-purpose-method” mindset and conduct themselves in a serious, business-first manner when engaging with host nation leaders. Expecting immediate results, they may become impatient and irritated when the desired effects of the engagement do not materialize immediately. They believe that direct interaction with an important member of the government is the best approach, since it is the most direct approach. However, in many Middle Eastern cultures it is important to develop a relationship before asking someone to reciprocate. Westerners tend to think in terms of quid pro quo; Iraqi culture does not function the same way. Rapport between two people does not emerge in a day, and building a necessary relationship is a matter of diligence.

Because engagement effects take time, the division developed a robust key leader engagement schedule with Moosawi and other local leaders. Having developed a plan to build the relationship, it became easier to engage on subjects of critical importance—namely attacks against U.S. forces—during subsequent meetings with Moosawi. (Improvised explosive device and indirect fire attacks were still an unfortunate reality in southern Iraq—though far less so than a year or two earlier.) However, a cheerful discussion of the date harvest often launched the division commander’s conversations with Moosawi. On more than one occasion, the two leaders exchanged gifts. It is good to engage an individual with thoughtful questions on things that matter to him and to use the “small talk” period for a specific purpose.

Collecting data is one such purpose. The engagement provides input for the commander and staff on enemy threat networks and insights on how political,
economic, and social structures influence threats in the area. Ideally, intelligence also contributes to the engagement process. Intelligence can offer information and suggest questions that relate to priority intelligence requirements. Perhaps the best way to ensure that intelligence both informs and is informed by key leader engagements is to employ a military intelligence-trained liaison. Depending on their personalities, Soldier availability, and the commander’s desires, military intelligence personnel can be helpful as “note takers” attending engagement events.

From an intelligence perspective, key leader engagement allows the commander to assess his degree of trust in government and military officials. As others have demonstrated, the challenge with using such engagements for insurgent outreach is that the outreach must be tied to a legitimate host nation government effort toward reconciliation or accommodation with the insurgents. Intelligence support to key leader engagement allows a senior commander to assess not only the host nation government’s willingness to protect its own population and conduct operations against insurgents, but also the host nation’s technical capabilities. The commander can also determine the influence the host nation leader may have on his area of operations.

By way of illustration, during a 2009 key leader engagement with Iraqi Security Force leaders in southern Iraq, one senior Iraqi officer told a large group, “If they [insurgents] come into my area, they will face my rifles and be killed.” While this proclamation did not prove his competence or capability, it revealed a quality of the leader and, equally as important, it suggested the type of social environment the Iraqi forces were likely to establish.

Making Friends and Influencing People

According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, “key leader engagement cells provide an effects-based approach to influencing full spectrum operations within a designated area of operations.” Key leader engagements help commanders build productive relationships with influential leaders in their area of operations. The 34th Infantry Division recognized this months before its mobilization and organized a key leader engagement cell to execute this requirement. The cell produced information for MND-S that was key to initiating conversations that helped build personal relationships for a commander with multiple meetings and business contacts on his schedule. Of course, the effectiveness of a division-level key leader engagement partly depends on the personalities of the individuals in the meeting.

Different phases of conflict require different strategies. The need to exercise all four elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) increased as the conflict and environment in Iraq matured. Diplomacy is now more important than ever, and with provincial reconstruction teams operating on the ground and Soldiers conducting “advise and assist” missions, the need to constantly develop meaningful relationships with political, military, and social leaders is paramount.

A commander receives no formal diplomatic training, so it is essential for him to engage his audience using the support of his assigned political advisor. He should prepare and rehearse prior to any formal engagements—especially those not directly linked to military, police, or border enforcement operations. Cultural advisors and experienced interpreters are also important. Their involvement is invaluable to developing talking points. During joint engagements, it is essential everyone speak with one voice and communicate a unified message. This type of consistency will generate superior results and enable each engagement to build on the previous one.

Iraqis, and especially Iraqi Security Forces, perceive a U.S. general officer in a unique way. In the role of diplomat, a U.S. general officer’s words, actions, emotions, and communication skills are important. Appropriate mannerisms, cultural awareness, and Arabic language proficiency contribute to the effectiveness of an engagement. There are any number of ways to show respect for partners, but advising, coaching, and complimenting them on their successes help shape the engagement and produce positive results.

Once the commander establishes his engagement style and achieves a pattern of success, it is time to think about using his partners’ influence to explore other avenues of engagement. Informal social networks are the most important components of society in rural Iraq. In many outlying border areas, tribes are the basic building blocks of Iraqi society.
Knowing this, we chose Moosawi’s farm for the second meeting between the division commander and Moosawi, because its casual environment facilitated opportunities for other meetings—not just with Moosawi but also with those in and just external to his social network. If the division required knowledge of a social network outside Moosawi’s sect, it was a fair bet Moosawi knew who to approach.

During the 34th Infantry Division’s preparation for deployment, we were operationally compelled to reduce our footprint in southern Iraqi cities. This degraded situational awareness for commanders at all echelons, engendered critical information gaps, and caused significant drawbacks for the division. As a result, in addition to informing and influencing Iraqis, key leader engagements also helped U.S. commanders understand the operational environment. A well-structured key leader engagement process can significantly advance a commander’s understanding in ways a dozen intelligence analysts never could.

Multi-National Division-South Strategy

The 34th Infantry Division fires and effects coordination cell is responsible for information engagement, which includes everything from civil military operations to sensor management. Presiding over this confederation of capabilities is the effects coordinator. The effects coordinator’s philosophy can be summarized briefly:

- Focus engagements; less can be better.
- Define the engagement’s task and purpose.
- Link engagements to division priorities and nest them in operations.
- Be cautious; know who is engaging whom.

The accompanying figure depicts the decision cycle used to synchronize and nest key leader engagements within the commander’s objectives and lines of operation.

At the division level, it was standard practice to prepare a key leader engagement package for senior officers. Initially, each packet contained an engagement strategy review. The package included
biographical information along with notes from previous meetings. It sometimes included previous engagement notes, significant events from the area of interest, and projected parliamentary election information. As time progressed, the following information was included:

- Zone of possible agreement.
- Events in the military and global information environment.
- Educated guesses on what motivated the key leader.
- Predictions for how key leaders would behave and speak publicly in the near future.
- Themes, messages, and talking points.
- Information requirements.
- The desired effect we were trying to achieve.

The division effects coordinator reviewed the preparation package at least two days prior to the engagement and made any suggested changes. Twenty-four hours prior to the engagement, the coordinator met with the commander to review the package. The key leader engagement section handled additional requests for information. Once the engagement was complete, a recorder posted the battlefield circulation notes to the SharePoint SIPR website along with an assessment, if applicable. The notes were also coded into the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) database so they could be referenced for future engagements. (As a tool, CIDNE is integrated into corps and division planning, and units at all echelons need to process their data collection using the same platform. There is probably a training opportunity across divisions and brigades to bring cell members up to the same level of CIDNE competency and accountability. By consolidating critical information using the CIDNE tool, the key leader engagement cell can earn its money by being a nimble and mentally adaptable organization for the commander.)

In the COIN environment of workgroups and targeting boards, planners often lose sight of the intended effect. Many times, commanders and their Soldiers engage with and make promises to local leaders without ever thinking through the consequences of their actions. Take a Commander Emergency Response Program project as an example. Everyone agrees it is nice to build a school where there is none. Host nation businesses benefit from the construction activity and local children have a school close to home. However, a commander at any echelon should ask several things before he decides to break ground on the new school:

- Does the population need the school?
- How many people will the school actually serve?
- Will the local government finance school operations?
- What are the second- and third-order effects of building a school?
- Will its construction alienate people in the surrounding communities from U.S. forces?

The commander needs to know the informational objectives for building a school and how to use supporting data. A key leader engagement read-ahead addressing such questions will help him determine what the intended end state and the proper conversation and approach should be.

The Art of Influence

Because key leader engagement is primarily an “influence operation,” nothing illustrates the “disarming” concept better than a quick lesson in social psychology. We use engagements to reach people to propagate a message and expedite the passage of the conflict to its next phase — stability operations. While social influence has several components, education and simple persuasion are better tools to use than, for instance, demands for compliance. When used to influence, engagement aims to impart knowledge or persuade. Influence is an art; coercion is hard science. Divisions build rapport to develop leverage and information collection capabilities at the highest level. This is at the heart of the disarming process.

Pre-persuasion is one tactic to influence a situation and establish a favorable climate for information engagement. Pre-persuasion refers to the way one structures an issue and frames a decision. A communicator needs to establish source credibility and project a favorable image to his target audience. The senior officer communicator needs to appear likable, authoritative, trustworthy, and possessed of any other attribute that would facilitate persuasion. Clearly, one key leader engagement goal is for engagements to beget new engagements and expand the division’s sphere of influence. By inquiring about others’ lives and motivations, a commander can build towards an intended effect by setting the
groundwork for a potential relationship that can lead to a network of relationships. Ultimately, a key leader engagement can influence or inform, but it must always produce an effect and facilitate a collection process and an information objective.

Key leader engagements link division commander engagements to deputy division commander engagements, deputy division commander key leader engagements to brigade commander key leader engagements, and so on. Supporting data from previous engagements to frame divisional future objectives is also used. Supporting data contributes to commander inquiry skills and provides the division the ability to ask the right questions once the relationship is established. Supporting data also permits the division commander to engage individuals on a level that is agreeable to them by asking straightforward questions about the things that interest them most.

Influence involves altering the opinions and attitudes of the population through engagement, and in MND-S, we sought to do this by establishing a trusting relationship using reference points like family and business while always being mutually inquisitive. As referenced earlier, active listening was important, and simply recognizing the fact that people enjoy talking about themselves and their interests invites candor and helps shape future meetings with increasing respect and openness.

Two points on organization: do not rush the meeting, and shape the engagement to get the most out of your limited time together. Prioritize questions and take a calm, deliberate approach. Understand that a key leader engagement is a two-way meeting and prepare to answer tough questions while responding in a professionally diplomatic tone even if you are in an uncomfortable position. Word travels faster than a sandstorm across tribal social networks, and once you have earned your counterpart’s trust and a reputation as a “straight shooter,” your reputation for trustworthiness will precede you wherever you go.

For instance, because we were still operating near the cities even after the 30 June agreement, influential host nation key leaders seemed to distrust our intentions. They wondered why U.S. forces were still there. Because we had developed a relationship through the art of influence and pre-persuasion, we were able to demystify the issues of the day and clear the information fog that too often clouds the operational environment.

Training Strategy
Before the division’s mission rehearsal exercise, the division commander, deputy division commanders, and Soldiers underwent a program of generic cultural awareness training. For the 34th Infantry Division, the exercise was a trial by fire, but the key leader engagement train-up offered little more than the opportunity to work with an interpreter. While this experience is valuable, at the general officer level the goal for this training is to develop a strategy to transition partnerships from one general officer to the next. Therefore, well before he actually arrives down range, it is important to consider the depth of the key leader engagement system and how a division commander can approach the process of bringing about an effect. A commander needs strategic depth and interpersonal adaptability if he is to conduct a disarming key leader engagement that will help him interact effectively and build trust in the field.

Lessons Learned
As with any major unit deployment, expanding institutional knowledge is a professional imperative. While a mission rehearsal exercise is instructive, it only touches on the processes a division commander will face once in theater. That said, the mission rehearsal exercise is also the ideal place for the key leader engagement cell to carve out its role as a conduit for information. As mentioned earlier, the cell should be flexible, responsive, and produce useful information. It will be up to the key leader engagement chief to ensure that information is accurate, up to date, and quantifiable, because there is a need to know whether the key influencer influences 100 people or 100,000. A well-advised effects coordinator should then be able to transform this information into meaningful effects, endstates, and objectives. Armed with this information, the division commander is empowered to succeed.

A disarming key leader engagement is a unique tool in that it is dependent on the personality of the general officer conducting the engagement. In the 34th Infantry Division’s case, the commander had a civilian background that complemented his military training and permitted him to leverage experience as
an operations executive in the commercial construction industry. The commander’s dual perspective as general officer and a civilian executive contributed something to each engagement. While commanders at all echelons may feel the need to get to the point immediately, relationship building involves cultivating influence through the development of mutual trust.

A division commander needs both resources and staff to enable him to win over a host nation leader and expand the division’s sphere of influence. Similarly, he needs both recommendations and strategy. In this way, a division engagement distinguishes itself from a brigade level engagement in both style and content. While a brigade commander has urgent needs—tactical effects pertaining to his area of operation—the key leader seeks engagement effects that are not immediate. The brigade commander stands up his engagement network to protect his troops and disrupt attacks. His patience may sometimes wear thin. He may not have time to question assumptions or have access to information engagement recommendations. On the other hand, the division commander must prepare the engagement foundation for the brigade commanders. The general officer has the engagement infrastructure to provide him strategically useful information and recommendations. He pre-persuades his target audience to produce a deliberate influence strategy and, thus, helps expand the social network of local-national engagers across the division’s brigade and battalion sized units.

During the 34th Division’s engagements with the governor of Najaf Province, the division commander had a latitude on subjects that a brigade commander would not. Because a governor in any province is an important person to engage, the division commander needed to firm up the partnership—not only as a commander and a politician, but also as a diplomat. To do this, the commander met with Governor Zurfi on more than one occasion. During these meetings, the Najaf security situation came up, but they also discussed the governor’s family in Michigan, along with his thoughts on the legacy of Ba’athism, his satellite television preferences, and even his love of the Chicago Bulls. During one such engagement, the commander presented the governor with a coffee table book of Minneapolis/St. Paul (Najaf and Minneapolis had
recently established a sister-cities relationship). A relationship emerged that allowed MND-S leaders to assess the host nation leader’s willingness to work with U.S. forces in operations against Iranian-backed insurgents. A disarming key leader engagement in this situation not only led to an enduring civil-military partnership between the 34th Infantry Division and Najaf Province, but also improved the relationship between U.S. brigades and their Iraqi Security Force partners.

**Afghan Applications**

Much of the current volatility in Afghanistan can be traced to the establishment of the Durand Line, which divided a number of the eastern Afghan Pashtun tribes. The Pashtun include over 60 clans with 12.5 million people residing in Afghanistan and the remaining 14 million in Pakistan. While this paper cannot assess the Soviet Union’s information engagement practices after they invaded Afghanistan, we know that the Soviets initially planned to use terror to convince ordinary Afghans to stop supporting the insurgents. During the 1980s, this use of terror received much more international media coverage than the Soviets expected. As a result, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and others began providing more support to the Afghan resistance than Soviet forces could neutralize. Thus, the unintended effect of the Soviet approach was to alienate the population rather than engage it in a productive way and to create international support for the Afghanistan resistance.

While Operation Enduring Freedom is in a different phase from Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the security of the population has yet to be realized in Afghanistan, the social networks of southern Iraq are likely to have their parallels within the complex Pashtun tribal organizations along the border areas with Peshawar and Pakistan. For developing countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, we generally accept the premise that leadership—whether governmental or tribal—propagates from the top down. Thus, it is likely someone is currently devising a strategy for how to defeat the Afghan insurgency by engaging Afghanistan’s top-level social and religious leaders in order to penetrate the social fabric of the country. At the general officer level, if we employ this strategy properly, we should expect to see mutually influencing relationships emerge among key leaders at all echelons. If general officers adopt the disarming method by incorporating the right mix of interpersonal skills and adaptive behavior, this conflict will also find its way into the next phase.

While every operational environment has a different set of circumstances, we should still approach host nation individuals on the premise that honesty and trust produce a mutually beneficial relationship. In the 34th Division, we believe our key leader engagement process is portable enough to meet the conditions of any location so long as there are reasonable people among the host nation population willing to work toward a common end.

The Sayyid al-Moosawi experience leads us to conclude that key leader engagements do work. A commander should give key leader engagements top priority by using his resources to identify the target, the delivery system, and the desired effects. This degree of sophistication requires intellectual analysis that may reside beyond the scope of the G2 section alone. It should include analysts such as political and cultural advisors, G8, Engineers, and State Department enablers.

**Conclusion**

Key leader engagements are dynamic processes that must adapt to the operational environment. We use the expression “disarming key leader engagement” as a means to describe pre-persuasion techniques and the managed expectation of key leader engagement effects. Effects are not immediate, and we must build them with candor, genuine concern,
and active listening. An engagement framework only succeeds to the extent that it is able to influence others. Thus, to realize an influence, the key leader engagement cell must provide information not only on the key leader but also on the complexities of the information environment, and make strategic recommendations for expanding the key leader engagement network. In this manner, a “disarming” engagement program will prove to be an effective strategy. **MR**

The authors would like to acknowledge the significant contributions of Colonel Neal Loidolt and Colonel Dirk Kloss with the structure and drafting of this article.

NOTES

4. Hull.
5. Ibid.
6. Operationalizing Key Leader Engagements—CJTF-82 Lessons Learned and TTPs, 2 July 2007.

20

**OUR LATEST PUBLICATION**

**WHAT WE DO:**

- Publish books and monographs covering current doctrinal issues from a historical perspective
- Assist, plan, and conduct staff rides around the world for U.S. Army units and agencies
- Develop, maintain, and coordinate an integrated progressive program of military history instruction in the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command service school system
- Conduct the annual CSI Military History Symposium
- For more information about CSI publications or assistance to your organization, contact the following:
  - **CSI Publications and the Symposium:**
    - Dr. Donald P. Wright or Mr. Kendall D. Gott
    - donald.p.wright@us.army.mil / ken.gott@us.army.mil
  - **Staff Rides:**
    - Mr. Robert T. Ramsey
    - bob.ramsey@us.army.mil
  - **Military History Instructional Support**
    - MAJ Clay Mountcastle
    - johnc.mountcastle@us.army.mil

**COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE**

**FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS**

September-October 2010 ● MILITARY REVIEW
COMBAT OPERATIONS PROVIDE intellectual comfort. It is what we, the practitioners of the military art, are trained and practiced at. It is what we have done historically. Nonlethal, economic, development-based governance operations are less familiar and provide little comfort. Ends are unclear and progress is incremental. A common cry, both from critics and in our internal debate, is “This is not in our lane.” Putting aside the debate over who should “own” and resource such operations, the fact is that in the counterinsurgency (COIN) of eastern Afghanistan, the lion’s share of nonlethal activity has fallen to the military. We are there on the ground with personnel, organizational support, and resources. The military can fight a counterinsurgency. The expertise and skills that civilian agencies possess—though perhaps more suited for roles in governance, development, and economic advancement—are not necessarily available for this fight because of security, bureaucratic, and political hurdles.

The essence of COIN is nearly 100 percent political. Politics is all about people, and in this case, people are the center of gravity. These battles require human understanding and skills outside our comfort zone. These human skills require different tools, those enabled by an effective information campaign, smart use of a development strategy tied to basic services, and understanding the power of economics to alter the human landscape on a local level one village at a time.1 Security underwrites a COIN strategy but is wasted without proper means, mechanisms, and institutions that connect people to their government and separate them from the insurgents. Such proper means, mechanisms, and institutions are new territory for conventional forces, territory that lies squarely in the realm of nonlethal operations.

Working side by side with maneuver units, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) focus their efforts on the nonlethal governance and economic lines of operation. Some PRTs fight; others have no need to. Some PRTs center their efforts on active counterinsurgency; others operate further along the stability operations spectrum. PRTs formally integrate Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Agriculture, and military efforts. Provincial reconstruction teams are incorporated in the brigade combat team command structure and are tied directly to interagency efforts.
and reporting. They often serve as the palatable point of entry for the international community and nongovernmental organizations at the local level. To those accustomed to strict unity of command, they are organizationally messy, through necessity. No two PRTs are the same. Provincial reconstruction teams are well positioned to act in the information operations realm, as they are local, informed, on the ground, and tied closely to the government at the district and provincial level.

A Match of Local Human Skills

Good information operations (IO) are hard. We often try to conduct them in an environment that we dimly understand. Sometimes it is as if we’re playing “go fish” at the blackjack table. Some of the world’s best poker players are those who have grown up in the modern battlefields of insurgency. Local people develop survival skills. They develop the ability to balance the demands of embedded insurgents connected by family and tribe against the potential gains of working with government and coalition forces who bring resources, education, health care, and economic opportunity.

I cannot stress the words “economic opportunity” enough. In the poker game of counterinsurgency, an appeal to embedded entrepreneurs who desire to expand their economic sphere and move a couple of rungs up Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is a card well played. Business opportunity is a game changer, because it gets to the fundamental social and economic incentives that drive behavior. While populations affected by insurgent influences are living in fear owing to lack of security, they have to play the middle to stay alive. These populations know the score better than we do, and they understand the game. The fact that it is a deadly game played for the highest of stakes doesn’t eliminate the need to know how to play it, keep a seat at the table, and know when to hold, fold, and play the right cards. The key is to split the seams, sway the middle, and work the margins.

If you are naïve about the rules of the game, and if you do not expect to “get played,” you will probably lose your seat at this poker table. We Americans instinctively think we possess the panacea for the wicked problems of the world. This arrogance handicaps us. We seldom understand
how to exercise tactical patience, and typically do not slow down enough to listen. True partnering with the communities and religious and government leaders involves a lot of listening. The intensely local nature of this insurgency demands local responses. Afghanistan is a conglomeration of local entities, not a homogenous zone where one set of rules will work. Decentralization and disaggregation of efforts are the keys to success. Overarching polices that fail to capture local sensitivities or heed local voices are counterproductive. Americans, it seems, are predisposed to solve “problems” they perceive—often to the exclusion of those who know better and have local knowledge and local understanding. Hindered by our lack of immersion knowledge and cultural understanding, we rely on security requirements while forgetting to listen and watch the other players in the game. This neglect, frankly, gets worse up the chain of command, because security requirements exclude more and more of the relevant Afghan opinions that should matter. The deciders make decisions deaf to local voices and local reason.

Engaging a Complex Society

Just because villagers in a remote mountain valley live simply does not mean that they are simple. Like all people, the Pashtuns of eastern Afghanistan are far more sophisticated than we, in our hubris, give them credit for. Information operations messages need to reflect the subtlety and sophistication of the audience, and be crafted and delivered free of the crippling obtuseness Americans normally approach them with. The population—the center of gravity—has a more nuanced understanding of the players, the stakes, and the movements of the insurgents than counterinsurgent forces have.

The World Health Organization polio vaccination program was a successful information operation that coalition forces alone simply could not have pulled off. The Kunar provincial governor and I were concerned that the people would reject the polio vaccination program as they had in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces, also heavily Pashtun areas. There, the Taliban had spread the rumor heard frequently in parts of Africa that the polio vaccination program was a “Zionist sterilization program,” and the implementation had run into serious difficulties.
We immediately recognized that the solution had to be an Afghan one, and that we must identify anyone against the polio program as against the children of Kunar. The governor and director for public health initiated a public education campaign, engaging leaders at all levels of influence. The governor pitted his credibility against the Taliban’s, and he was successful. The Taliban chose to give tacit support to the program, and thousands of children were vaccinated against the disease. The Afghan solution was nuanced, informed, and effective.

That is not to say that every Afghan voice should have the same weight. Not every Afghan is equally qualified, respected, or educated. We have a habit of “falling in love with the guy who speaks English,” and we forget that the most respected members of an Afghan community may not be eager to talk to us and no doubt gain some of their local credibility through their independence. When we engage with the wrong person—a crooked contractor, a known shady character, the wrong head of the village shura, or an overly corrupt government official—we send a signal that contributes to a negative perception. Such perceptions undermine our legitimacy and that of the government. When we engage with a respected member of the community, it reflects well on us, the community, and the government. Trust is gained through time and delivery, and, yes, sharing cups of tea.

Relationships and the Target Audience

For Afghans, it is all about relationships. In Kunar Province, the PRT and maneuver forces had to be in tune with three principal centers of influence—tribal authorities, religious authorities, and government officials. Inclusion of one group can mean automatic disenfranchisement of another. Each group has information to share, issues that are important to it, and a sphere of influence with the people. Relationships matter, and must be handled properly.

Winning the battle for minds involves understanding which mechanisms to send the desired message to the target. People often see the first message they receive as the truth. Controlling the content and pace of the information cycle is critical for both sides in an insurgency. Typically, control is harder for the counterinsurgent because insurgents create newsworthy events. Limited access also inhibits the counterinsurgent’s control of the information spectrum. Word-of-mouth messages and messages heard in Friday sermons somehow travel faster and deeper into isolated regions than messages on the airwaves. The credibility of the messenger matters most. Low literacy rates in rural and tribal areas—and few radios and televisions—mean that messages travel by storytelling. Stories suffer exaggeration, myth-supporting interpretations, cultural stereotyping, and misinformation. Conspiracy theories run rampant (just as they do in America’s semi-literate sector of society). In rural areas, local mullahs, tribal leaders, and village elders reach the widest audience and have the highest legitimacy. These leaders frequently foist their own biases on the people. They also hold a credibility that we do not.

The Tension of Truth—a Critical Vulnerability

Insurgents always enjoy asymmetric advantages. Truth is optional for them. This means they can always beat the story to market. Reports of civilian casualties are a case in point—the dead and wounded are always their people. The battlefield is messy, and clarity is typically lost after the first rounds head downrange. It often takes days to reconstruct the exact details of company-sized operations; it can take much longer to sort out a battalion-sized or larger operation. In an insurgency without uniforms, counterinsurgent claims about civilian deaths are specious by default. We depend on a variety of indicators of enemy activity, supported by commander’s guidance, rules of engagement, surveillance asset support, and ultimately—the judgment of our commanders who have to live with the decisions they make. We mostly get this right, and few appreciate just how hard it is.

The insurgents understand that U.S. military forces face public sentiment at home that has become hypersensitive to collateral damage. They understand that we often struggle against our own moral sensibilities and that the words “innocent civilian casualties” can do more to undermine military effectiveness than any combat.

Given the enemy’s asymmetric advantages, the counterinsurgent must transmit the facts to the people as soon as possible as well as take the time to get the facts straight. We do more harm when we damage our own credibility than we do through any single lethal
mistake or accident. Mistakes will happen, accidents will occur, and yes, insurgents will complicate the targeting process by placing noncombatants in harm’s way, but the race to win the information cycle must not make a casualty of accuracy. Credibility is too important. Rigor in truth wins.

The Battle of Sangar

In the summer of 2007, a platoon-plus element from Able Company, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne, conducted an airborne insertion into Sangar Valley in Kunar province. The insertion was to be of limited scope and duration, to show a presence and conduct shaping operations. The battle for the minds of the people was at a critical stage in this valley, an area historically supportive of the Taliban, but showing signs of opening up to the Afghan government. The construction of a road and a variety of maneuver and PRT projects nearby were transforming the local economy. A nonlethal engagement strategy, coupled with kinetic support and integration, was well underway in a swing area with a strong Taliban presence. The target population was on the fence, stuck between continuing its support for the Taliban fighters, and shifting support, if only tacitly, to the government.

The well-planned operation included Afghan National Army (ANA) troops of the 3d Kandak of the 201st Brigade, coordinated with Afghan National Police elements for security on the roads, and integration of fires and surveillance assets to support planned engagements. Like many well-planned operations, the plan did not survive first contact with the enemy—the enemy in this case being a large, undetected force of Taliban fighters, far more than initially assessed, massing for an attack against coalition forces. A hot, tough engagement ensued. The small operation quickly morphed into the battalion’s main effort.

The Taliban engaged exposed elements of Able Company and the ANA with heavy fire from homes in a village. They used civilians as human shields and even placed children on their hands and knees to use as tripod mounts to steady the aim of their weapons. Follow-up reports indicated several brutal murders in the village and the settling of old scores for those suspected of working with the government. A then-current Taliban IO tactic involved contacting local media stringers during combat to report civilian casualties, even if those casualties were local Taliban. In an insurgency without uniforms, this proved an effective tactic that threw coalition forces onto their heels.

Realizing the ferocity and scope of the operation, the PRT and battalion immediately mobilized concurrent coordinated real-time IO with the provincial governor. We sought to beat the Taliban to the news cycle and highlight the atrocities underway. The chaos of the battlefield meant it would be days until we could evaluate the final details, but we had no trepidation about telling the story as it unfolded. We had the moral advantage, ethically and psychologically, which gave us confidence in our targeting decisions. We felt it was better for the people to hear about the battle immediately and from a credible Afghan source. The PRT made quick contact with the Ministry of Defense, and the ANA deputy corps commander flew to the provincial capital of Asadabad within two hours. We immediately held a radio and television press conference complete with maps and relevant details of the engagement, provided constant press updates as the battle unfolded, and maintained a credible public dialogue.

By acting inside the Taliban’s news cycle, we put the insurgents on the defensive. They lost the advantage of initiating a story. In the end, it was a tough battle. Two American Soldiers and eight Afghan soldiers were killed, many more were wounded, and ten civilians died. Dozens of Taliban fighters died as well. Losing the information battle colored many of our tactical successes, but this was not the case in the Battle of Sangar. We did not forget the battle for the minds of the people during the heat of the lethal battle. Our efforts to connect the people to their government were successful, despite the worst of circumstances, and the credibility of the government as a voice of reason and authority in a time of crisis improved. Someone was in charge.

In fact, the local IO effort had a wider effect. The press conferences received national attention, and the story was one of several accounts of the Taliban intentionally targeting civilians. This damaged the Taliban’s credibility. With the proper use of conciliatory measures after collateral damage, a COIN campaign can continue unabated if local concerns are addressed fairly. Although there were casualties, truth was not one of them, and trust in government was reinforced.
Target the Real Audience

The mistake of centering the information operations campaign on denigrating the insurgents is an easy one to make. It adds to their legitimacy. We need to tell a better and broader story. The key is to understand the content, intent, and timing of the insurgents’ message, and disrupt or supplant it to the point of irrelevance. Rather than just countering the insurgent’s message exclusively, the target audience’s perspective and perceptions have to be part of the raison d’être of the message. This is not the time to fall prey to the trap of cognitive dissociation—the inability to see perspectives other than one’s own. Target audience analysis fails if countering the enemy is the primary preoccupation. The concerns of the average citizen on an average day should be the basis for the IO campaign.

An example of a relevant topic involves agriculture. In agrarian eastern Afghanistan, 85 percent of productivity revolves around subsistence farming and animal husbandry. Security means food security as well as physical security. What people care about every day is where their food is coming from and having a normal life in a hard society. Such concepts as vegetable diversity and the ability to obtain wider access to markets matter daily to the average Afghan on the street. Poverty is the real enemy in this insurgency. Agriculture is its language.

When the IO campaign’s radio spots, billboards, and public announcements exclusively focus on reporting improvised explosive device (IED) incidents, offer rewards for information about insurgents, or make clumsy attempts to paint the insurgents as bad guys, the audience is not interested. These things are simply not what the average Afghan cares about. It just gives the insurgents “free press.” Tell a man how to grow more wheat on his small plot, give him access to a wider variety of food, or tell him about the bridge that will let him walk to a market and you have the audience’s attention. These are the things that matter, the most effective subjects for the IO campaign.

The contributions of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the National Guard’s Agriculture Development Teams in Afghanistan cannot be overstated. They have had perhaps the greatest impact per person in Afghanistan. Local farmers who work with USDA representatives to improve the technical aspects of their productivity can improve their yields about 30 percent immediately. The impact of this is huge. The farmer not only has enough food to feed his immediate family—his most pressing need and what he cares about—but also has an excess of food. Now he has the ability to trade and buy and sell goods. The secondary and tertiary effects lead to increased demands for goods in the local markets, sparking further demand for imports and services, and attacking the cycle of poverty. By integrating this type of message into your IO campaign, you become relevant to the right people. You showcase what the insurgents cannot offer.

Perception and Identity Mechanisms

Identity matters, not just for empirical analysis, but also as a starting point for managing perceptions. A COIN strategy framed within the bounds of identity has subtlety and substance. Individuals, whether insurgents, government officials, soldiers, or citizens, identify with a political body, family structure, nation-state, religious group, cultural body or any of a variety of other groups. The preferences of groups are no more than the aggregated preferences of individuals. The mechanism of identification is the critical element to a successful COIN campaign.

Ethnic identity is very important to the Pashtuns, although perhaps not to the degree Westerners assume. Certainly, the jihad experience has politicized the national identity of the tribes. Nevertheless, a deep sense of national identity is evident, which transcends tribal affiliation. One could characterize Afghanistan as a weak state bound together by a strong nation. Ethnic identity is important, but not so divisive that it is a matter of life and death. Elements of the Pashtunwali code are certainly central to much of daily life and social
interaction. However, you cannot truly understand Pashtunwali unless you are a Pashtun. To try to understand Pashtuns by listing their attributes is analogous to understanding Christianity by listing 18th century English philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s virtues. To categorize the entire moral code of a complex society is a complicated endeavor. Because the counterinsurgent must also reduce the complexity of this reality into a soldier’s task, it seems enough to simply understand that respect and dialogue go a long way. Afghans are tough, live simply, and are easy to like. We spend a lot of effort trying to make these simple truths harder than they need to be.

Governance and Perception

We must give governance real critical thought. What is it, really? Is it public services and goods? Is it a building where officials work? Is it democracy and fair elections? These are all aspects of governance, certainly. However, seen through the lens of insurgency, it devolves into something much simpler. Governance is the notion that someone is in charge. That is what the people, the center of gravity, are mostly interested in. Politics and mechanics of governance aside, the focus of our “governance” line of effort should constitute ways to reinforce, support, and add legitimacy to the notion that the government is in charge.

This effort entails entering the realm of perceptions and perceptions management, the messy world of public problems, education, health care, infrastructure, and the rule of law. A government’s legitimacy and mandate is ultimately a function of the people knowing that it is someone’s job to fix the potholes, keep the electricity on and the water flowing, and provide health care and education. Someone will fix the broken windows. Someone will keep the streets clean. Someone will mandate safety equipment on job sites. Someone will respond to the crisis of the day. Someone must be in charge. The COIN goal becomes enabling the government to fill that role of being the “someone,” the hidden hand of order.

Countering Differences

The IO campaign has to account for the notion that identity is a conception of self in relation to others. The tendency is to label one’s own attributes as good and those possessed by a competing (or different) group as bad. Insurgent leaders use group identities to mobilize followers and gain support. One specific mechanism is the creation of the “enemy image.” The creation of the enemy image fulfills a social-psychological need of individuals encouraging social differentiation even in the absence of a basis for it. The need to belong to a “group” is framed in terms of both individual and social identification with a cluster of distinctive attributes. It is a phenomenon that all outsiders face in the Pashtun belt.

The challenge facing our IO strategy is that identity issues possess staying power. Because of the emotional content they conjure up, little incentive exists to seek expanded information. Images tend to become self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing. Insurgent leaders use the existence of these images to further their cause. Symbolism and identification with “common evils” are effective for mobilizing mass support of uninformed populations. Once these identity issues adopt a particular form, they tend to become strongly entrenched and difficult to change except incrementally at the margins of perception. For example, the semantics of the Global War on Terrorism play into Taliban themes and messages that our war is a war on Muslim civilization. The religious and cultural symbols that are central to this civilization make fertile rallying points for identity-based threats. The politics of identity are a powerful tool for insurgent leaders, a tool that is largely impervious to lethal effects.

The Link between Identity and Governance

How do governance, violence, and identity interrelate, and how do we tie this relationship to an IO strategy? What explains the differences between the Hutus and Tutsis in Central Africa or those between the Quebecois and Anglophones in Canada? Members of both sets of groups possess strong identification with their groups, yet the level
of violence was catastrophic in Rwanda and nonexistent in Canada. The institutionalization of the norms of stable governance and political stability is the difference. In stable societies, issues of identity are less likely to cause violence. In Canada, identification with the norms of responsible statehood and civil society tempers the divisive identity issue of language and cultural difference.

The legitimacy of the government becomes a force that holds issues of identity at bay. Information operations themes and messages that reinforce this truth and reinforce the notion of “someone’s in charge” are incredibly relevant. Certainly, governance in Afghanistan has miles to go in this endeavor, but an IO strategy that recognizes this truth will not only improve the government’s actual and perceived legitimacy but also increase the likelihood that it will become that unseen hand of order that underlies a properly developing civil society.

**Traditional and Formal Power Structures**

Widespread perceptions that Afghan society is lawless are flawed. Despite the violence and lack of familiar institutions, Afghan society is actually highly rule-based, but not always in a form Westerners recognize. Too often we apply our own perceptions in trying to understand Afghan culture and society and how Afghans process information and relate to their government.

In Afghan society, the relationship between religious and tribal authority is complex. Traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution co-exist uneasily with the relatively new provincial and district governments. Local authority figures are suspicious of the government and expect it will use power arbitrarily. The tribal elders, maliks, and mullahs who make up this informal but deeply established network are loyal to their own tribe, subtribe, or ethnic group, and the extent of their individual authority is sharply bounded by these group identities.

The average Afghan has a different definition of “basic services” and does not necessarily look to the government to deliver them. He distrusts national government and its local manifestations based on his many past experiences of government as a predatory and disruptive force.

The degree to which traditional authorities retain their power and standing within the identity group while accommodating provincial and district government institutions is the critical dynamic to manage with nuance and subtlety. Failure to understand the rule structures, incentives, and institutional frameworks under which this complex society exists will beget a failed COIN strategy. Plunging ahead without this understanding quickly leads down the path of violating the classic maxim to “do no harm.” Programs and plans that support the extension of effective and legitimate government to provide basic services may not have the anticipated effect and can lead to miscommunication and lack of trust. In some cases, lack of understanding leads to outright hostility.

**Critical Vulnerability Analysis**

Wise practitioners understand that IO’s most effective use is in conjunction with a critical vulnerability analysis rather than simply in response to enemy action. Critical vulnerabilities can be ideological or tactical or even logistical (the need for cross border support for resupply and safe haven). They can involve local identity mechanisms and inclusion in tribal communities. Critical vulnerability analysis allows offensive IO, a potent tool in the nonlethal kit.

The need for money, equipment, and safe havens is a critical vulnerability of certain insurgent groups. They must “sell” successes to their handlers for continued logistical support and the accompanying endorsement of their efforts, and this can be attacked. If an insurgent element routinely has its attacks foiled, its IEDs found and disarmed, and has no video to successfully document its attacks, its fighters are less likely to be rewarded with more resources. On the other hand, insurgent groups that can point to videos of successful IED explosions, engagements with counterinsurgent troops, and other events to prove their success will receive continued support. The key task is interdicting insurgents’ activity whose support lies with the people. Just as success begets success, failure begets failure. Every time an insurgent group retreats to its safe haven for rearming and resupply because it cannot rely on local support, it is a victory for the counterinsurgency. The insurgency begins facing an increasingly risky
THE PASHTUN BELT

operating profile as it strives for results. A mature IO campaign finds ways to attack this seam by highlighting insurgent weaknesses and failures.

Another critical vulnerability of the insurgency is its inability to provide basic government services. While sharia judges hold some appeal, the Taliban cannot build schools, provide healthcare services, construct roads and bridges with local labor, provide goods to serve the basic needs of the people, or underwrite economic and social development. This is our asymmetric advantage, yet too often we fail to recognize this aspect as a critical vulnerability for the Taliban. It is, and we must attack it with perception management and information engagement operations as well as with the bricks and mortar of the projects themselves.

Organizing for Success

We are often our own worst enemy when it comes to the way we align and structure our own organizations to fight the information operations battle. Information operations must be flexible, tailored, persistent, and local. Frequently, the command structures under which we operate are simply not capable of this. Centralization prohibits responsiveness. Actual decentralized execution is rare, although we brief it routinely. We depend on legacy structures, legacy doctrine, and legacy organizations to implement information operations. Public affairs and military information support operations (MISO) task organize and delineate roles, responsibilities, resources, and programs for disparate groups who all work in the information realm. Managing messages, providing information, and fighting the mental battle with the enemy for the population are not disparate activities. They have a natural synergy. Yet, all too frequently, we treat them as disparate activities because we get hung up on legacy stovepipes. This causes us to cede our technological, tactical, and moral advantage to the enemy.

The key to overcoming bureaucratic and institutional walls that prohibit synergy is organizational leadership. Certainly, there are political and legal reasons to maintain separation between IO organizations, but not to the extent that one hand does not know what the other hand is doing. Reacting inside the enemy news cycle to enable creativity and effective messaging requires a flat, talented, resourced, responsive organization. It requires leaders who prohibit stultifying staff oversight, legal reviews, and second-guessing. We must empower leaders who “get it” and give them the tools, resources, and freedom of maneuver to act locally and responsively, across all operational levels from team leader to battalion commander.5

Observations and Lessons Learned

Conventional operations are oriented to a great degree on force disposition and employment with a firm basis in doctrine. A counterinsurgent mindset is by its very nature outside the doctrinal box. Intel prep for counterinsurgency is complex. The concepts of will, allegiance, and incentive are not easily analyzed or quantified.6 Bullets and bombs produce an immediate effect. Nonlethal effects may not satisfy this need for immediacy, but they can have a strategic, far-reaching, and lasting effect. Information operations can have great impact in “extinguishing the spirit of the enemy” and rendering him irrelevant.7 A persistent, nuanced, and informed IO campaign should be at the center of the COIN strategy in Afghanistan, and the core of this strategy must reinforce the hidden hand of the government that delivers basic services, underwriting security for the long-term.

COIN and IO are thinking man’s games. Every organization and enterprise has its talent, its thinkers, and its innovators. Treat a thinking man as a resource, and deploy him appropriately. Put your brightest minds on these complex problems. This is not a realm for stolid conformists tied to legacy stovepipes and those who cannot think their way past the doctrine to develop tailored solutions with local relevance.

Agriculture matters. A good USDA presence training and mentoring farmers and properly implemented USAID programs to support rural development have the impact of an infantry battalion in terms of securing stability. Integrate successful agriculture and husbandry programs front and center into the IO campaign.

Building governance takes time. Governance and development lines of effort tackle some of the most wicked problems of humanity.8 They have fundamentally different outlooks, time frames, and challenges than security lines of operation. We are
fundamentally trying to alter long-standing expectations regarding the role of government in society. Leaders must accept a long-term time frame with marginal improvements, not quick victories. Wins will be incremental in nature. When governance and development brief well, the commander should be wary of overly optimistic assessments.

**Be sophisticated in what is measured.** Sophistication in the selection of metrics by which to measure programs and initiatives is critical. Beware of metrics in a counterinsurgency, or be prepared to devote incredible resources to getting them right. Metrics can drive behavior and lead to solutions in search of a problem. They may over-simplify complex dynamics and divert energy and resources from problem solving to data collection and packaging. For example, the number of attacks in a province or district is an unsophisticated measure. The relative price and price trends of an AK-47 on the open market in the arms bazaars near Peshawar is a more sophisticated one.

**Progress is incremental, and thus not sexy.** Some main-line combat units embrace nonlethal effects. Some do not. It is difficult to show progress during a single tour of duty. Non-lethal “effects” brief well, but measures of effectiveness are problematic, and they lose substance when tied to data-driven, effects-based methodologies and short-term measures. We should learn to accept—as the world of public policy does—that incremental progress toward a known good is the reality when working with the “wicked problems” of humanity.

**Build Afghan COIN capacity.** Afghans themselves are an oft-overlooked critical asset in the battle for the minds of the population. We too seldom include those whose country it is in planning for information operations. Develop an organic civil affairs capability in the Afghanistan National Security Forces. Train and enable Afghan-centric information operations and community outreach programs.

**It takes more than a civil affairs cell.** Throwing all of the “development stuff” into the “lane” of the Civil Affairs community removes an important COIN tool from the main effort, and is intellectually dishonest. Deploy organizational talent where it has the most impact.

**Local understanding requires local presence.** Getting inside the mind of the enemy and understanding the mind of the people are notoriously hard to do, until one spends significant time outside the wire where the people are. Too many Westerners limit their exposure to Afghans to those who work on bases, and they form skewed opinions based on that limited exposure.

**It’s in the delivery.** Clear examples of poor target audience analysis abound. The devil is certainly in the details, and these details can offend an audience if handled improperly. Adhere to the principles of immersion knowledge and local legitimacy. Bad information operations help the insurgents.

**Our IO are often unsophisticated and clumsy.** As aforementioned, we frequently forget to listen to our audience and don’t give them enough credit; or worse, we target the wrong audience. Remember, just because the people live simply does not mean they are simple. Focus information engagement strategies on that which the people care about and don’t give unintended relevance to an enemy.

**Seek a local opinion.** Do not disseminate IO or MISO products without a sanity check from Afghans from the area. Ask them questions, knowing that you will often get an answer of “what they think you want to hear.” Wade through that and get a straightforward assessment.

**Use a credible voice.** The best information operations come from respected Afghans with local credibility, not coalition forces. Quit falling in love with the guy who speaks English and deal with members of the community who command respect.

**Relationships matter.** Rotations exacerbate the challenge of relationship building. We are always either coming or going before we have gained local immersion knowledge. Governance and economics lines of operation require expertise gained through study, observation, and relationships with local leaders who understand the needs of the people.

**Learn to listen and drink tea.** Understand how we Americans contribute to the problem when we immediately roll up our sleeves to start fixing something, instead of asking smart questions first and realizing we are in a negotiation. Relevant information about the Pashtun street is not gained through briefs but through local conversation. The only measure of effectiveness that really matters in the IO front is what the local people think. Learn to listen and drink a lot of tea.

**Shura is a process.** Afghans live in a conciliatory, consensus-based society. You will rarely see...
an open disagreement in front of Western eyes, nor are decisions truly reached at shuras, at least, not in the sense we are used to. Our military is composed of “type A” results-oriented people. We confuse the concept of shura with that of a meeting. They are not the same, yet shura is the Afghan way. It is a process. Decisions—even from strong leaders—are rarely discrete events. Rather, they take shape through a complex system of formal and informal consultations. The most respected leaders are not those who promise results, but those who broker disputes. The harder the dispute resolved, the greater the credibility gained. A military leader who walks away from a “meeting” thinking he has brought about a discrete decision is naïve and likely has been told what he wanted to hear.

Development of local media is important. Find ways to increase the professionalism of local media outlets and expose them to standards of transparency and factual reporting.

Afghanistan is not Iraq. There are fundamental differences between Arab and Pashtun societies and cultures. Our unit training systems and courses have focused overwhelmingly on Iraq for years and fail to effectively reflect fundamental differences between Arab and Pashtun societies.

Get U.S. faces away from the microphone. Government legitimacy does not develop when every grand opening ceremony of a school, bridge, health clinic, governance initiative, and every road opening takes place under the blatant aegis of the U.S. government or the international community. Stand aside and let local government officials take the credit. Enable the government’s legitimacy at every step of the planning and implementation process. 

---

NOTES

1. For a discussion of human skills in contrast to those that are purely technological, see Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2006), 106.
3. The exact same dynamic exists with veterinary services, as livestock are an integral part of the rural makeup of this population.
4. See Marina Keltpinski’s “Kunar Handbook,” IDS International, 2008, and “A U.S. Government Strategy for Kunar”—a paper written for the Department of State Office of Stability and Reconstruction in conjunction with the Kunar Provincial Reconstruct Team, PRT. Both of these excellent resources detail the complex interactions inherent in Kunar Province and are indicative of similar complexities in other provinces.
5. Field Manual 3-24, para. A-19 notes that leaders must look beyond rank and position within their organizations to see those with a gift for COIN.
8. A term borrowed from domestic public policy.
9. See Kilcullen, chap. 2., for a cogent discussion on the shortfalls in providing counterinsurgent-training opportunities for Afghan Security Forces.
10. See United States Institute of Peace working paper “Securing Afghanistan: Getting on Track”, January 2009, by Christine Fair and Seth Jones of the RAND Corporation, for a solid discussion regarding the importance of developing indigenous security forces in this counterinsurgency. This paper also is spot-on with regard to the complex systems at work in this insurgency, the challenges of governance, given fractured fiscal policies, and the local nature of problems in this society. See also Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian’s Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (UK: Osprey Publishing, 2008), chap. 12., for a discussion of the challenges faced by the international community in developing Afghan National Security Forces.
U.S. Army War College

STRATEGIC LANDPOWER

Essay Contest 2011

The United States Army War College and the United States Army War College Foundation are pleased to announce the annual STRATEGIC LANDPOWER Essay Contest.

The topic of the essay must relate to the strategic use of landpower. A specific topic of interest for this year’s contest is the application of design in conflict termination.

Anyone is eligible to enter and win except those involved in the judging. The Army War College Foundation will award a prize of $4000 to the author of the best essay and a prize of $1000 to the second place winner.

For more information or for a copy of the essay contest rules, contact:
Dr. Michael R. Matheny, U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013-5242 (717) 245-3459, DSN 242-3459, michael.matheny@us.army.mil

STRATEGIC LANDPOWER Essay Contest Rules:

1. Essays must be original, not to exceed 5000 words, and must not have been previously published. An exact word count must appear on the title page.
2. All entries should be directed to: Dr. Michael R. Matheny, USAWC Strategic Landpower Essay Contest, U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA 17013-5242.
3. Essays must be postmarked on or before 17 February 2011.
4. The name of the author shall not appear on the essay. Each author will assign a codename in addition to a title to the essay. This codename shall appear: (a) on the title page of the essay, with the title in lieu of the author’s name, and (b) by itself on the outside of an accompanying sealed envelope. This sealed envelope should contain a typed sheet giving the name, rank/title, branch of service (if applicable), biographical sketch, address, and office and home phone numbers (if available) of the essayist, along with the title of the essay and the codename. This envelope will not be opened until after the final selections are made and the identity of the essayist will not be known by the selection committee.
5. All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8½" x 11". Submit two complete copies. If prepared on a computer, please also submit the entry on a disk, indicating specific word-processing software used.
6. The award winners will be notified in early Spring 2011. Letters notifying all other entrants will be mailed by 1 April 2011.
7. The author of the best essay will receive $4000 from the U.S. Army War College Foundation. A separate prize of $1000 will be awarded to the author of the second best essay.
Next year we are to bring all the soldiers home
For lack of money, and it is all right.
Places they guarded, or kept orderly,
We want the money for ourselves at home
Instead of working. And this is all right.

It’s hard to say who wanted it to happen,
But now it’s been decided nobody minds.
The places are a long way off, not here,
Which is all right, and from what we hear
The soldiers there only made trouble happen.
Next year we shall be easier in our minds.

— From “Homage to a Government,” Philip Larkin, 1969

THE ARMY TRAINING and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) intelligence office’s Operational Environment document asserts that U.S. adversaries have identified national will as a historically critical vulnerability in U.S. national security posture. Philip Larkin’s poem quoted above speaks to the challenge military operations face when domestic support gives over to fatigue and impatience. Although Larkin wrote in 1969, the sentiments he describes are eternal, and the poem could just as easily be from 2010. National will in the modern age is an even more crucial aspect of military success. As U.S. strategic planners project outward, they must consider just how domestic popular and political support for a conflict (serving here as our definition of the term “national will”) will become a target. Commanders in military operations can expect adversaries to consider U.S. troops not only a military target but also a proxy target for national will. Soldiers on the ground in turn must be made to understand how and why they are perceived as symbols, and be given the tools they need to put this knowledge to use in theater.

Although conventional warfare is always a possibility, the primary focus for American interests in the foreseeable future will be irregular warfare. If a decisive victory remains elusive, attrition will prolong the conflict and strain the resources and resolve of the Nation. This dynamic has happened in the past and is occurring again today. Such conditions highlight public approbation as a key element of achieving military aims.

Motivations, tactics, techniques, and procedures involved in future proxy attacks on U.S. national will are important to understand. Three main variables provide a framework for discussing them here: length of operations, the potential for U.S. involvement in ongoing low-intensity conflicts, and ways in which both the United States and its adversaries can target national will.
Duration of Operation

With the exception of Vietnam, the average length of U.S. engagement in a conflict did not exceed four years—from the American Revolution through the end of the 20th century.³

Among the challenges this history implies for U.S. policymakers is that political objectives can change over time. Such exigencies were certainly the case during World War I, as changing objectives corresponded to escalation of conflict.⁴ A watchful adversary can attempt to synchronize attacks with a change in U.S. objectives, a change in administration, or in response to events on the ground. Adversaries can exploit opportunities to seed and perhaps prompt public doubt. This is especially true when the justification for foreign military involvement is morally questionable to the public. Generating bad news during a time when the conflict’s objectives are unclear or in flux is likely to provoke questions about why the United States is expending blood and treasure on a doubtful conflict.

As the United States looks toward a future of continuing irregular warfare on foreign soil, an operation’s duration becomes increasingly important. History says that time will be on the side of indigenous adversaries, and traditional notions of decisive victory or defeat become inherently elusive in such conditions. Recently, retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General David W. Barno stated that the Taliban thinks it is winning the war in Afghanistan; the war is almost over, and they are merely running out the clock.⁵ Taliban members corroborate this belief. “We never worry about time,” stated one Taliban fighter. “We will fight until victory, no matter how long it takes. The United States has the weapons, but we are prepared for a long and tireless jihad. We were born here. We will die here. We aren’t going anywhere.”⁶ Such an attitude reflects the lesson of history and a universal psychological and moral truth: foreign occupying forces can be worn down over time.⁷

Russia’s experience in Chechnya is illustrative. In 1818, when the United States was a mere 42 years young, Russia sent the brutal General Aleskei Yermolov to bring the restive Chechen territories under Russian rule.⁸ Yermolov’s soldiers committed widespread atrocities, and not surprisingly they were

“We were born here. We will die here. We aren’t going anywhere.”  
Taliban insurgent

Chechen fighters surround a Russian helicopter shot down near the Chechen capital of Grozny, December 1994.
unable to subdue the Chechen people. Ultimately, a young cleric rallied an army of Muslim guerrilla fighters and carried on a rebellion against Imperial Russia for 25 years. Two centuries afterward, relations between Russia and Chechnya remain hostile.

In 1999, then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin once again renewed Russia’s conflict in Chechnya—revived under Boris Yeltsin—promising a two-week engagement. By 2001, with the Chechen conflict still underway, the Russian public was fatigued. Islamic militants and guerrillas ruled the night by 2002, and Chechen resistance forces coordinated attacks on both Russian troops and high-profile targets within Chechnya. Militants began suicide bombings and attacks against civilians as well, eventually staging an attack in Moscow itself in 2002.

The attack on the Dubrovka Street Theater in Moscow marks a transition for understanding the effects on national will of foreign attacks, as opposed to the impact of domestic attacks. By 2002, Russian citizens were largely ambivalent toward the Chechen conflict. The hostage crisis at the Dubrovka Street Theater in Moscow was staged by Chechen militants to try to coerce the Russian government into withdrawing its troops from Chechnya.

A hostage reported a conversation with a militant who explained that because Chechens were unable to do anything to convince the Russian government to withdraw, they were targeting Russian civilians to effect the change they desired. The militant went on to complain that the Russian people were indifferent to the violent situation in Chechnya. The Dubrovka Street Theater was specifically chosen to target Russian national will. It was a symbol of remodeled, post-Soviet Moscow, a capital that thrived while ignoring atrocities carried out in Chechnya by its government. For the next two years, terrorist attacks killed a thousand people in Russia, more than almost any other country in that same period. The attacks prompted harsh responses by the Russian government and military, but initial public fervor eventually waned.

Contrasting these conditions with those in the United States is revealing. Similar attacks on national will (9/11 for example) have historically rallied Americans, but foreign attacks on American soil are also relatively rare. In the collective con-

science of Russia, Chechnya evokes centuries of conflict, but the United States has had a relatively short historical memory to draw upon. Americans are unused to the historical waxing and waning of nationalistic and ethnic conflicts, unlike Russia. (Because one could argue that Native Americans and African-Americans have had to cope with white European colonialism and imperialism for 500 years, this point must be understood with that background in mind.)

In the Irish rebel song, “Go On Home British Soldiers,” the lyrics proclaim: “For eight hundred years we’ve fought you without fear / And we will fight you for eight hundred more.” The sentiments in this song reflect generations of conflict, which flared up again in 2009 with the killing of two British soldiers and the discovery of fertilizer bombs throughout Northern Ireland. Moreover, these sentiments reflect the same strategy articulated by the Taliban fighter: there is plenty of time, we live here, and all we have to do is get you to
leaves. Countries with long historical memories are perhaps more willing to accept and even learn to ignore continued struggle (as the Russians seem to have done with Chechnya), especially when issues of nationalism or ideology are involved. Although the United States has had no experience with long-term conflict, it should recognize the potential for prolonged struggle where long-term peaceful outcomes remain elusive.

**Influencing National Will**

Lengthened conflicts and changing objectives lead to a question frequently raised about Iraq and Afghanistan. What will “victory” look like? In his article “Theory of Victory,” J. Boone Bartholomees supports the Clausewitzian notion that “victory” is achieved through breaking “will” when means of resistance are virtually impossible to eliminate—especially in places where easily purchased and constructed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are the primary “weapon of strategic influence” (a concept to be explored later). But what does “victory” mean in the context of U.S. national will? I accept Bartholomees’ assertion that notions of victory are ultimately an assessment. Objective facts are important, but perception is what allows a side to claim ultimate success. In America, Bartholomees suggests, the group that first declares a U.S. win or defeat is the American population. In his rubric, first and foremost, the American people themselves determine victory, which causes the American political and military elites to declare victory, followed by an acknowledgement of a win by U.S. allies, and finally, the acceptance of a U.S. victory by the international community.

In an irregular conflict, the unlikelihood of a symbolic act of surrender or détente, which denies the American public its neat, historical idea of a clear win or loss, complicates this definition of success. Victory can sometimes mean only successful reinstatement of stability. There is no treaty signed, no sword surrendered, and the objectives of the conflict were esoteric to begin with. If the reasons for and means of executing the conflict are not clear, defensible, and justifiable, then there may be no way to obtain anything that looks like traditional victory.

As the population waits on the home front, the problem that perception-as-victory creates for U.S. commanders is the likelihood that present and future adversaries will “attack U.S. national and political will with very sophisticated information campaigns as well as seek to conduct physical attacks on the U.S. homeland. Military operations will result in operations demanding long-term commitments at extended distances and requiring a wide range of interagency and nonmilitary tools to resolve. All of which will be carried out under the unblinking eye of an omnipresent formal and informal media potentially giving local events global significance.”

The concept known as “the battle of the narratives” has gained traction in certain defense circles, and is described in Joint Forces’ Command’s 2008 Joint Operational Environment as “sophisticated perception management,” in which adversaries incorporate individual attacks and events into a “coherent strategic communications program.” As Kenneth Payne’s “Waging Communication War” articulates, the problem with this viewpoint is that an insurgent does not have to convert every member of a society or population in order to achieve his objectives. Depending on his political objective, the insurgent could accurately say he has won in the event of a U.S. withdrawal. Therefore, adversary messages are unlikely to take the form of a compelling narrative designed to enthrall and seduce an audience. Like the Chechen radicals at the Dubrovka Street Theater, future U.S. adversaries will simply seek to engage in a battle of wills, not narratives, and they will fight that battle with actions and messages intended to weaken U.S. national will.

Attacks against U.S. forces in theater designed to target national will can be particularly effective: state-on-state conflicts are likely to decline as non-state actors increase and strengthen. Irregular adversaries will continue to mobilize their strengths against our weaknesses. As our experience in Iraq demonstrates, dramatic attacks on U.S. forces are a cost effective force multiplier. For the price of a cell phone camera, adversaries can send a powerful message to U.S. policymakers and voters. A rise in online activity, including news consumption, assures a built-in audience for such spectacles. According to Payne, “insurgents in Iraq, particularly, al-Qaida, regularly deployed with combat camera teams and distributed professionally edited short films that intercut ideology and violence.”
Policymakers... are the deciders of whether a war can accrue public moral support (psychologically and ethically).

The U.S. military is not responsible for cultivating the national will required for this kind of conflict (though they are partially responsible for maintaining it). Policymakers and shapers have that responsibility because they are the deciders of whether a war can accrue public moral support (psychologically and ethically). Military planners can only assume from America’s historically limited patience for prolonged military engagement that national will remains an adversary target and act accordingly. As mentioned earlier, U.S. military forces can expect continued attacks from weapons of strategic influence, of which today’s IED is a primary example, since its “immediate and cumulative effect [is to] achieve strategic goals politically, economically, socially, and militarily.” The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization predicts that continued, improved, and expanded use of IEDs will spread globally for the very reason that “no other widely available terror weapon has more potential for mass media attention and strategic influence as does the IED.” Regardless of the future of IEDs themselves, the cumulative impact of IED attacks on U.S. national will can affect and perhaps motivate future adversarial attacks on U.S. forces. The form that weapons of strategic influence take in the future does not matter as much as the characteristics and goals behind them: simplicity, adaptability, visibility, lethality, and exploitability.

Adversaries are always on the lookout for information opportunities to exploit—by not only publicizing their own actions, but also highlighting mistakes by U.S. military members. The ironic predicament of terror tactics is that only an occupying force begins with a moral deficit, and the onus is on that occupier to maintain national will. As aforementioned, information and its value cannot be divorced from a discussion of national will. When photographs or reports documenting irresponsible behavior by U.S. forces find their way into the public sphere, our adversaries have an information opportunity because they have a moral wedge. We must plan future missions under the assumption that someone is watching and broadcasting, often with the intent to influence U.S. national will. That means we have to be consistently better, morally speaking, than the indigenous enemy who begins with a moral advantage.

U.S. operations must therefore incorporate the understanding that conflicts will be long, irregular, and broadcast worldwide. To sustain their morale and resolve, U.S. forces must understand that, while the domestic population is coping with historical, conventional notions of “victory,” they have to accept that irregular conflicts end with unforeseen compromises. The problem of national will persists as long as the public misunderstands the war or if they perceive duplicity in its escalation and execution.

Our adversaries’ main objective then is not merely to win converts, but to weaken U.S. will to the breaking point. In support of that objective, adversaries will likely have studied past U.S. engagements to realize public support wanes the longer a conflict goes on. Furthermore, the rapid spread of information worldwide compresses reaction time and can hasten outcomes. Therefore, attacks against U.S. troops will focus on lethality and effectiveness, on brutality and newsworthiness. An IED attack against a U.S. platoon is ultimately strategic, not tactical.

Ramifications

The relevance for training and leader development is that today, most communications take place at the tactical level between officers and Soldiers without strategic-level concepts. Leaders down to the tactical level must have a comprehensive and evolving understanding of the strategic setting. They have to have the ability to effectively communicate to Soldiers that what they do and how they are perceived has far-reaching and long-lasting ramifications. If tactical units are the targets of weapons of an adversary attempting to send a strategic message to a domestic U.S. audience, they must understand the conflict and operational environment to effectively combat that opponent.
The adversary thinks globally and acts locally. Improved strategic understanding will have successfully permeated U.S. forces when consideration of long-term, global impact informs everything from security, to patrolling, to internal and external communications, and to interactions with locals.

Military leaders will also need to identify information opportunities of their own. Their adversaries are also being watched and broadcast, and their mistakes can turn opinion against them at home and abroad. For example, cell phone images of Guinean soldiers committing crimes served to strengthen opposition resolve to oust the leader of the country’s military junta.38 In such instances of information opportunity, knowing when to insert a troop presence, as opposed to letting a country’s citizens resolve a situation themselves, is a critical instinct U.S. military leaders need to develop. A thorough understanding of the operational environment will help leaders properly identify information opportunities and appropriate courses of action.

Al-Qaeda’s Abu Musab al-Zawahiri said in July 2005, “More than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media . . . We are in a media battle, in a race for the hearts and minds of our umma (people).”39 Our adversaries have said it themselves—they are not interested in a battle of the narratives. Narratives are a means to an end: information intended to diminish U.S. political and popular support for conflict. The term “battle of the narratives” seems to imply that the communication of a compelling narrative is an end in itself. Zawahiri is correct that the battlefield is the media—indeed, the battlefields chosen by Al-Qaeda and organizations like it are those they know present challenges for U.S. forces and opportunities for irregular forces. Their strategic acumen creates a paradox for the United States—while the tactical becomes the strategic, tactical victories do not always equal strategic successes. U.S. forces may win a tactical battle, but they still appear vulnerable when homemade explosives penetrate expensive armor. Battles that would be victories in

---

U.S. and Iraqi military media document Patrol Base Doria’s transfer of authority ceremony near Kirkuk, Iraq, 4 June 2010. U.S. Soldiers from the 6th Squadron, 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, turned over control of the base to Iraqi Security Forces as part of a phased withdrawal from the region.
a tactical military sense become strategic losses
when the public image of that battle is one of
failure, moral or operational.

In a battle of wills, as opposed to a battle of
narratives, what ultimately matters is not so much
symbols or words but deeds consistent with those
words. Looking into a future of continued irregular
warfare, U.S. forces will never be able to achieve
objectives solely by appealing to the public’s faith
in U.S. values. Adversaries will continue to try to
weaken the will of the United States and its allies by
harming and undermining U.S. forces, and planners
at all levels have to limit the adversary’s informa-
tion opportunities. Soldiers and leaders must be
equipped with the tools to act as often as possible in
a way that is clear, defensible, and justifiable. **MR**

---

**NOTES**

and Giroux, 2003), 141.
2010).
barno_this_is_the_taliban_strategy> (28 October 2009).
6. Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “The Taliban in Their Own Words,” News-
week, 5 October 2009.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid. 112.
12. Ibid., 116.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 206.
16. Ibid., 166-167.
17. Ibid., 161.
18. Ibid., 159-160.
19. Ibid., 176.
20. Ibid., 177-178.
hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/8263983.stm> (29 October 2009).
(IED) as a Weapon of Strategic Influence” (MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
2009), i. Bartholomees, 34, 35.
25. Ibid., 31.
26. Ibid., 32, 33.
48.
32. Payne, 48.
33. Ibid.
34. Martin, i.
36. Martin, i.
37. Payne, 48.
38. Adam Nossiter, “In a Guinea Seized by Violence, Women Are Prey,” *New
htr?hp>.
If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of war—the means by which war has to be fought—it will look more than ever like a gamble . . . From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck, and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards.

—Clausewitz, On War.

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ’S metaphoric description of the condition of war is as accurate today as it was when he wrote it in the early 19th century. The Army faces an operating environment characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Military professionals struggle to make sense of this paradoxical and chaotic setting. Succeeding in this environment requires an emergent style of decision making, where practitioners are willing to embrace improvisation and reflection.

The theory of reflection-in-action requires practitioners to question the structure of assumptions within their professional military knowledge. For commanders and staff officers to willingly try new approaches and experiment on the spot in response to surprises, they must critically examine the heuristics (or “rules of thumb”) by which they make decisions and understand how they may lead to potential bias. The institutional nature of the military decision making process (MDMP), our organizational culture, and our individual mental processes in how we make decisions shape these heuristics and their accompanying biases.

The theory of reflection-in-action and its implications for decision making may sit uneasily with many military professionals. Our established doctrine for decision making is the MDMP. The process assumes objective rationality and is based on a linear, step-based model that generates a specific course of action and is useful for the examination of problems that exhibit stability and are underpinned by assumptions of “technical-rationality.” The Army values MDMP as the sanctioned approach for solving problems and making decisions. This stolid template is comforting; we are familiar with it. However, what do we do when our enemy does not conform to our assumptions embedded in the process? We discovered early in Iraq that our opponents fought differently than we expected. As
a result, we suffered tremendous organizational distress as we struggled for answers to the insurgency in Iraq. We were trapped in a mental cave of our own making and were unable to escape our preconceived notions of military operations and decision making.6

Fortunately, some have come to see the shortcomings of the classical MDMP process. It is ill-suited for the analysis of problems exhibiting high volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. The Army’s nascent answer, called “Design,” looks promising. As outlined in the new version of FM 5-0, Operations Process, Chapter 3, Design is defined as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them.”7 Instead of a universal process to solve all types of problems (MDMP), the Design approach acknowledges that military commanders must first appreciate the situation and recognize that any solution will be unique.8 With Design, the most important task is framing a problem and then reframing it when conditions change.9

Framing involves improvisation and on-the-spot experimentation, especially when we face time and space constraints in our operating environment. FM 6-0, Mission Command, Chapter 6, states, “Methods for making adjustment decisions fall along a continuum from analytical to intuitive . . . As underlying factors push the method further to the intuitive side of the continuum, at some point the [planning] methodology no longer applies.”10 In the course of intuitive decision making, we use mental heuristics to quickly reduce complexity. The use of these heuristics exposes us to cognitive biases, so it is important to ask a number of questions.11 What heuristics do we use to reduce the high volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity, and how do these heuristics introduce inherent bias into our decision making? How do these biases affect our probabilistic assessments of future events? Once apprised of the hazards rising from these heuristic tools, how do we improve our decisions? This article explores these questions and their implications for the future of military decision making.

Behavioral Economics

The examination of heuristics and biases began with the groundbreaking work of Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman and Professor Amos Tversky. Dissatisfied with the discrepancies of classical economics in explaining human decision making, Kahneman and Tversky developed the initial tenets of a discipline now widely known as behavioral economics.12 In contrast to preexisting classical models (such as expected utility theory) which sought to describe human behavior as a rational maximization of cost-benefit decisions, Kahneman and Tversky provided a simple framework of observed human behavior based upon choices under uncertainty, risk, and ambiguity. They proposed that when facing numerous sensory inputs, human beings reduce complexity via the use of heuristics. In the course of these mental processes of simplifying an otherwise overwhelming amount of information, we regularly inject cognitive bias. Cognitive bias comes from the unconscious errors generated by our mental simplification methods. It is important to note that the use of a heuristic does not generate bias every time. We are simply more prone to induce error. Additionally, this bias is not cultural or ideological bias—both of which are semi-conscious processes.13 Kahneman and Tversky’s identified phenomena have withstood numerous experimental and real-world tests. They are considered robust, consistent, and predictable.14 In this article, we will survey three important heuristics to military decision making: availability, representativeness, and anchoring.15

In the course of intuitive decision making, we use mental heuristics to quickly reduce complexity. The use of these heuristics exposes us to cognitive biases...
Availability

When faced with new circumstances, people naturally compare them to similar situations residing in their memory. These situations often “come to one’s mind” automatically. These past occurrences are available for use, and generally, they are adequate for us to make sense of new situations encountered in routine life. However, they rarely are the product of thoughtful deliberation, especially in a time-constrained environment. These available recollections have been unconsciously predetermined by the circumstances we experienced when we made them. These past images of like circumstances affect our judgment when assessing risk and/or the probability of future events. Ultimately, four biases arise from the availability heuristic: retrievability bias, search set bias, imaginability bias, and illusory correlation.

Retrieval bias. The frequency of similar events in our past reinforces preconceived notions of comparable situations occurring in the future. For example, a soldier will assess his risk of being wounded or killed in combat based on its frequency of occurrence among his buddies. Likewise, an officer may assess his probability of promotion based on the past promotion rates of peers. Availability of these frequent occurrences helps us to quickly judge the subjective probability of future events; however, availability is also affected by other factors such as salience and vividness of memory. For example, the subjective probability assessment of future improvised explosive device (IED) attacks will most likely be higher from a lieutenant who witnessed such attacks than one who read about them in situation reports. Bias in their assessment occurs because the actual probability of future attacks is not related to the personal experience of either officer.

Similarly, consistent fixation on a previous event or series of events may also increase availability. Naval officers most likely experienced a temporary rise in their subjective assessment of the risk of ship collision after the highly publicized reports of the collision between the USS Hartford and USS New Orleans. The true probability of a future collision is no more likely than it was prior to the
collision, yet organizational efforts to avoid collisions increased due to the subjective impression that collisions were now somehow more likely. People exposed to the outcome of a probabilistic event give a much higher post-event subjective probability than those not exposed to the outcome. This is called **hindsight bias**.

When combining hindsight bias and retrievability biases, we potentially fail to guard against an event popularized euphemistically as a **black swan**. Nassim Taleb describes black swans as historical events that surprised humanity because they were thought of as non-existent or exceedingly rare. We assume all swans are white; they are in our available memory. For example, in hindsight the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks look completely conceivable; therefore, we hold the various intelligence agencies of the U.S. government publicly accountable for something that was not even considered plausible before the event. Furthermore, mentally available disasters set an upper bound on our perceived risk. Many of our precautionary homeland security measures are based on stopping another 9/11 type attack, when in fact the next attempt may take on a completely different context that we cannot imagine (because our searches for past experiences are limited).

Availability played a role in the current global financial crisis. Our collective memories contained two decades of stable market conditions. The inability to conceive a major economic downturn and the flawed assumption that systemic risk to the national real estate market was minuscule contributed to creating a black swan event. Taleb wrote the following passage before the collapse of the asset-backed securities market (a major element of the current economic recession):

> Globalization creates interlocking fragility, while reducing volatility and giving the appearance of stability. In other words, it creates devastating Black Swans. We have never lived before under the threat of a global collapse. Financial institutions have been merging into a smaller number of very large banks. Almost all banks are interrelated. So the financial ecology is swelling into gigantic, incestuous banks—when one fails, they all fail. The increased concentration among banks seems to have the effect of making financial crises less likely, but when they happen they are more global in scale and hit us very hard.

Given the possibility of black swans, we should constantly question our available memories when faced with new situations. Are these memories leading us astray? Are they making our decisions more or less risky? Are our enemies exploiting this phenomenon? Military planners have done so in the past, seeking the advantage of surprise.

For example, the British were masters at exploiting retrievability biases during World War II. They employed the COLLECT plan in North Africa in 1941 to obfuscate the exact timing of General Auchinleck’s offensive (Operation Crusader) against Rommel’s forces in Libya. Via official, unofficial, and false channels, the British repeatedly signaled specific dates of the commencement of the operation, only to rescind these orders for plausible reasons. These artificial reasons included the inability to quickly move forces from Syria to take part in the operation to the failure of logistics ships to arrive in Egypt. Planners wanted to lull Rommel into expecting the repeated pattern of preparation and cancellation so that when the actual operation began, his memory would retrieve the repeated pattern. The plan worked. The British achieved operational deception. They surprised Rommel and after 19 days of fighting ultimately succeeded in breaking the siege at Tobruk. The repetitive nature of orders and their cancellation demonstrates the power of availability on human decision making.

**Search Set Bias.** As we face uncertainty in piecing together patterns of enemy activity, the effectiveness of our patterns of information retrieval constrain our ability to coherently create a holistic appreciation of the situation. These patterns are called our search set. A simple example of search set is the Mayzner-Tresselt experiment, in which subjects were told to randomly select words longer than three letters from memory. Experimenters asked if the words more likely had the letter **R** in the first position or third position. Furthermore, they asked about **K**, **L**, **N**, and **V**. The subjects overwhelmingly selected the first position for each letter given over the third position, and the median subjective ratio for the first position was 2:1. In fact, the aforementioned letters appear with far more
frequency in the third position. This experiment highlighted the difficulty of modifying established search sets. When we wish to find a word in the dictionary, we look it up by its first letter, not its third. Our available search sets are constructed in unique patterns that are usually linear. We tend to think in a series of steps versus in parallel streams.27

The effectiveness of our search set has a big impact on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. When observing IED strikes and ambushes along routes, we typically search those routes repeatedly for high-value targets, yet our operations rarely find them. Our search set is mentally constrained to the map of strikes we observe on the charts in our operation centers. We should look for our adversaries in areas where there are no IEDs or ambushes. They may be more likely to hide there. In another scenario, our enemy takes note of our vehicle bumper numbers and draws rough boundaries for our respective unit areas of operation (AOs). They become used to exploiting operations between unit boundaries and their search set becomes fixed; therefore, we should take advantage of their bias for established boundaries by irregularly adjusting our unit AOs. From this example, we can see that to better structure our thinking to escape search set bias, we should think along a spectrum instead of categorically.28 (Using both methods allows us to think in opposites which may enhance our mental processing ability.)

Imaginability Bias. When confronted with a situation without any available memory, we use our imagination to make a subjective premonition.29 If we play up the dangerous elements of a future mission, then naturally we may perceive our likelihood of success as low. If we emphasize the easy elements of a mission, we may assess our probability of success too high. The ease or lack thereof in imagining elements of the mission most likely does not affect the mission’s true probability of success. Our psychological pre-conditioning to risk (either low or high) biases our assessment of the future. Following the deadly experience of the U.S. Army Rangers in Mogadishu in 1993, force protection issues dominated future military deployments. Deployments to Haiti and Bosnia were different from Somalia, yet force protection issues were assumed tantamount to mission success. We could easily imagine dead American soldiers dragged through the streets of Port-au-Prince or Tuzla. This bias of imaginability concerning force protection

1LT Matthew Hilderbrand, left, and SSG Kevin Sentieri, Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, patrol in search of a weapons cache outside Combat Outpost Sangar in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, 27 June 2010.
actually hampered our ability to execute other critical elements of the overall strategic mission. Biases of imaginability may potentially become worse as we gain more situational awareness on the battlefield. This seems counterintuitive, yet we may find units with near-perfect information becoming paralyzed on the battlefield. A unit that knows an enemy position is just around the corner may not engage it because the knowledge of certain danger makes its members susceptible to inflating risk beyond its true value. These Soldiers may envision their own death or that of their buddies if they attack this known position. Units with imperfect information (but well-versed in unit battle drills) may fare better because they are not biased by their imagination. They will react to contact as the situation develops. As an organization, we desire our officers and NCOs to show creativity in making decisions, yet we have to exercise critical reflection lest our selective imagination get the best of us.

**Illusory Correlation.** Correlation describes the relationship between two events. People often incorrectly conclude that two events are correlated due to their mentally available associative bond between similar events in the past. For example, we may think that the traffic is only heavy when we are running late, or our baby sleeps in only on mornings that we have to get up early. These memorable anecdotes form false associative bonds in our memories. Consider the following example regarding military deception operations from CIA analyst Richard Heuer:

The hypothesis has been advanced that deception is most likely when the stakes are exceptionally high. If this hypothesis is correct, analysts should be especially alert for deception in such instances. One can cite prominent examples to support the hypothesis, such as Pearl Harbor, the Normandy landings, and the German invasion of the Soviet Union. It seems as though the hypothesis has considerable support, given that it is so easy to recall examples of high stakes situations...How common is deception when the stakes are not high...What are low-stakes situations in this context? High stakes situations are definable, but there is an almost infinite number and variety of low-stakes situations...we cannot demonstrate empirically that one should be more alert to deception in high-stakes situations, because there is no basis for comparing high-stakes to low stakes cases.

Heuer highlights the potentially pernicious effect illusory correlation can have on our decision making. Exposure to salient experiences in the past generates stereotypes that are difficult to consciously break. In fact, we may fall victim to confirmation bias, where we actively pursue only the information that will validate the link between the two events. We may ignore or discard important data that would weaken our illusory correlation. In social settings (such as staff work), the effects of illusory correlation and confirmation bias are reinforcing factors to the concept of groupthink, whereby members of a group minimize conflict and reach consensus without critically examining or testing ideas. Groupthink generates systematic errors and poor decisions. Scholars have identified a number of military disasters, such as the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Vietnam War, as examples of the dangers of heuristics associated with groupthink. To avoid illusory correlation, we should ask ourselves whether our intuitive or gut feeling on the relationship between two events is correct and why. This does not come naturally. It takes a deliberative mental effort to ask ourselves a contrary proposition to our assumed correlation. Individually, we may be unable to overcome illusory correlation. The solution potentially lies in

**Exposure to salient experiences in the past generates stereotypes that are difficult to consciously break. In fact, we may fall victim to confirmation bias, where we actively pursue only the information that will validate the link between the two events.**
a collective staff process where we organize into teams to evaluate competing hypotheses.36

Representativeness

Representativeness is a heuristic that people use to assess the probability that an event, person, or object falls into a larger category of events, people, or things. In order to quickly categorize a new occurrence, we mentally examine it for characteristics of the larger grouping of preexisting occurrences. If we find it to “represent” the traits of the broader category, we mentally place it into this class of occurrences. This heuristic is a normal part of mental processing, yet it is also prone to errors. Representativeness leads to five potential biases: insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes, base-rate neglect, insensitivity to sample size, misconceptions of chance, and failure to identify regression to the mean.

Insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes. Consider the following description of a company-grade Army officer:

*He is a prudent, details-oriented person. He meticulously follows rules and is very thrifty. He dresses conservatively and drives a Ford Focus.*

Is this officer more likely to be an aviator or finance officer? If you picked finance officer, then your stereotype of the traits of a typical finance officer may have fooled you into making the less likely answer. You may even hold the stereotype that aviators are hot-shot pilots, who fly by the seat of their pants. It is common to view pilots as individuals who believe rules are made to be broken, and money is made to be spent on fast cars and hard partying. Given these stereotypes, you chose unwisely because there are statistically more aviators than finance officers who fit the given description. As a branch, aviation assesses approximately 20 times more officers than finance each year. It is always important to understand the size of the populations you are comparing before making a decision. Stereotypes often arise unconsciously; therefore, it is important to remain on guard against their potential misleading effects.

Base-rate neglect. Consider the following problem given to cadets at West Point:

While on a platoon patrol, you observe a man near a garbage pile on the side of a major road. In recent IED attacks in the area, the primary method of concealment for the device is in the numerous piles of garbage that lay festering in the street (trash removal is effectively non-existent due to insurgent attacks on any government employee—including sanitation workers). You immediately direct one of your squad leaders to apprehend the man. Based on S2 reports, you know that 90 percent of the population are innocent civilians, while 10 percent are insurgents. The battalion S3 recently provided information from detainee operations training—your platoon correctly identified one of two types of the population 75 percent of the time and incorrectly 25 percent of the time. You quickly interrogate the man. He claims innocence, but acts suspiciously. There is no IED in the trash pile. What is the probability that you detain the man and that he turns out to be an insurgent rather than a civilian?

Most cadets answered between 50 percent and 75 percent.37 This estimate is far too high. The actual probability is 25 percent.38 The 75 percent detection probability from the platoon’s training provides available individuating information. Individuating information allows the lieutenant to believe that he
is individually differentiated from his peers due to his high training score. This available information potentially causes the lieutenant to order information based upon its perceived level of importance. The high detection ability in training may facilitate overconfidence in actual ability and neglect of the base-rate of actual insurgents in the population of only 10 percent. The result is that the lieutenant is far more likely to mistake the innocent civilian for an insurgent. Outside of the lieutenant’s mind (and ego), the base-rate actually has a far greater impact on the probability that the apprehended man is an innocent civilian rather than an insurgent.

**Insensitivity to sample size.** Consider a problem from Afghanistan:

We suspect two primary drug trafficking routes along the Afghan-Pakistani border. A small village is located along the first suspected route, while a larger village is located along the other suspected route. We also suspect that local residents of each village guide the opium caravans along the mountainous routes for money. Human intelligence sources indicate that thirty men from the small village and sixty-five men from the large village engaged in guide activities over the last month. Furthermore, coalition check points and patrols recently confirmed the G2 long-term estimate that on average, twenty-five percent of the male population of each village is engaged monthly in guide activity. The smuggling activity fluctuates monthly—sometimes higher and other times lower. Which village is likely to experience more months of over forty percent participation rate in smuggling?

If you selected the large village, then you are incorrect. If you guessed it would be 25 percent for both villages, you are also incorrect. The small village would have greater fluctuations in activity due to the “law of large numbers.” As population size grows, the average number becomes more stable with less variation; therefore, the larger village’s monthly percentage of guide activity is closer to the long-term average of 25 percent. The smaller village has greater monthly deviations from the long-term average value. This example highlights that insensitivity to sample size occurs because many people do not consider the “law of large numbers” when making probability assessments and decisions.

**Misconceptions of chance.** Many people misunderstand the elements of chance. For example, suppose you observe roulette in a casino. The following three sequences of red and black could occur: RBRBRB or RRRBBB or RBBBBB. Which sequence is more likely? The answer is that all of these sequences are equally likely; however, if you were like most people in similar experiments, then you most likely picked RBRBRB. This sequence is the most popular because people expect the fundamental traits of the equilibrium sequence (50 percent Black and 50 percent Red) to be represented—but if you stopped to do the math, each sequence has a probability of 1.56 percent. If the sequence was RBBBBB, then you most likely would hear people say “Red is coming up for sure”—this is the gambler’s fallacy. Many people expect the equilibrium pattern to return after a long run of black; however, the laws of randomness have not changed. The probability of red is equal to black. The implication is that we unconsciously judge future events based on representativeness of sequence, not on probability.

Now, consider the following question:

Which is more likely: 1) “Iran tests a nuclear weapon in 2013” or 2) “Iran has domestic unrest after its next election and tests a nuclear weapon sometime in 2013.”

If you selected the second scenario, then you are incorrect. The reason is the more specific the description, the less likely the event. The two events occurring in the same year are less likely than only one event occurring; however, many people tend to judge an event more likely as more specific information is uncovered. This human tendency has potential implications for military decision making as situational awareness improves with technology. Adding new details to a situation may make that scenario seem more plausible, yet the mere discovery of further information does not affect the probability of the situation actually occurring.

**Failure to identify regression to the mean.** Suppose we examine the training records of tank crews during gunnery qualification. Observer-controllers (OCs) may report that praising to a tank crew after an exceptional run on Table VII is normally followed by a poor run on Table VIII.
They might also maintain that harsh scorn after a miserable run on Table VII is normally followed by a great run on Table VIII. As a result, OCs may assume that praise is ineffective (makes a crew cocky) and that criticism is valuable (makes a crew buckle down and perform). This assumption is false due to the phenomenon known as regression to the mean. If a tank crew repeatedly executed Tables VII and VIII, then the crew’s scores would eventually converge (or regress) to an average score over the long term. However, at the beginning of this process, the scores are likely to be highly volatile with some scores alternating far above and others far below the average. OCs may falsely assume that their social interaction with the crew has a causal effect on the crew’s future scores. Kahneman and Tversky write that the inability to recognize the regression to the mean pattern “remains elusive because it is incompatible with the belief that the predicted outcome should be maximally representative of the input, and, hence, that the value of the outcome variable should be as extreme as the value of the input variable.” In other words, many times we fail to identify settings that follow the regression to the mean phenomenon because we intuitively expect future scores to be representative of a previous score. Furthermore, we attribute causal explanations to performance that are actually irrelevant to the outcome.

Anchoring

When facing a new problem, most people estimate an initial condition. As time unfolds, they adjust this original appraisal. Unfortunately, this adjustment is usually inadequate to match the true final condition. For example, the average number of U.S. troops in Iraq from May 2003 to April 2007 was 138,000. Mounting evidence during this time exposed this initial estimate as insufficient, yet decision makers were anchored on this number over the course of this four-year period. They did not upwardly adjust the number until Iraq was on the verge of a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. The anchoring phenomenon kept the value closer to the initial value than it should have been. Historically, anchoring bias has had harmful effects on military operations.

As previously identified, the British in World War II were masters of exploiting human mental errors. They exploited German anchoring bias with the deception scheme called the Cyprus Defense Plan. Following the German seizure of Crete, the British were concerned that the 4,000 troops on Cyprus were insufficient to repel a German attack. Via the creation of a false division headquarters, barracks, and motor pools along with phony radio transmissions and telegrams, the British set out to convince the Germans that 20,000 troops garrisoned the island. A fake defensive plan with maps, graphics, and orders was passed via double agents a lost briefcase. The Germans and Italians fell for the ruse. This deception anchored the Germans on the 20,000 troop number for the remaining three years of the war. In spite of their own analysis that the number might be too high, intelligence intercepts and post-war documents revealed the Germans believed the number almost without question. This exposes another negative effect of anchoring: excessively tight confidence intervals. The Germans were more confident in their assessment than justified when considering the contradictory information they had. In summary, the Germans were anchored, made insufficient adjustments and had overly narrow confidence intervals.

Biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events. Anchoring bias appears in our assessments of conjunctive and disjunctive events. A conjunctive event is comprised of a series of stages where the previous stage must be successful for the next stage to begin. In spite of each individual stage having a high probability of success, the probability of total event success may be low due to a large number of stages. Unfortunately,

---

**When facing a new problem, most people estimate an initial condition. As time unfolds, they adjust this original appraisal. Unfortunately, this adjustment is usually inadequate to match the true final condition.**
researchers have shown that many people do not think in terms of total event (or system) probability. Instead, they anchor on initial stage probabilities and fail to adjust their probability assessment. This results in overestimating the likelihood of success for a conjunctive event.

A disjunctive event occurs in risk assessment. When examining complex systems, we may find that the likelihood of failure of individual critical components or stages is very small. However, as complexity grows and the number of critical components increases, we find mathematically that the probability of event (or system) failure increases. However, we again find that people anchor incorrectly. In this case, they anchor on the initial low probabilities of initial stage failure. Consequently, people frequently underestimate the probability of event failure. This overestimation of success with a conjunctive event and underestimation of failure with a disjunctive event has implications for military decision making.

For example, military planners in 2002 and 2003 may have fallen victim to conjunctive event bias during strategic planning for the Iraq invasion. In order to realize success in Iraq, a number of military objectives had to occur. These included—

- Ending the regime of Saddam Hussein.
- Identifying, isolating, and eliminating Iraq’s WMD programs.
- Searching for, capturing, and driving terrorists out of Iraq.
- Ending sanctions and immediately delivering humanitarian assistance to support the Iraqi people.
- Securing Iraqi oil fields and resources for the Iraqi people.
- Helping the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-government.

For illustrative purposes, suppose planners gave each stage a 75 percent independent probability of success. This level of probability potentially anchored decisionmakers on a 75 percent chance of overall mission success in Iraq, while the actual probability of success is approximately 18 percent. The total probability of accomplishing all of these objectives gets smaller with the addition of more objectives. As a result, the conclusion by strategic leaders that Operation Iraqi Freedom had a high likelihood of success was potentially overoptimistic and unwarranted.

A more recent example of conjunctive event bias occurs in procurement decisions. One of the main selling points of the Future Combat System Manned Ground Vehicle family (MGV) was tank-level survivability combined with low weight for rapid deployability. While the M1 tank relies on passive armor for its protective level, the MGV would reach an equivalent level via increased situational awareness (“why worry about armor when you are never surprised by your enemy?”) and an Active Protective System (APS) that vertically deploys an interceptor to strike an incoming threat munition. The Active Protective System is a conjunctive system that requires a chain of stages to occur for overall system success: 1) detect an incoming threat munition, 2) track and identify munition trajectory, 3) deploy appropriate countermeasure, 4) hit incoming munition, and 5) destroy or deflect the munition. Again for illustrative purposes, assume that the individual probability of success for each of these five stages is 95 percent. Suppose that the M1A2’s passive armor is only 80 percent effective against the threat munition. Anchoring bias occurs in that people may conflate the 95 percent individual stage rate with an overall APS system success rate. This is a false conclusion. In this example, the overall APS probability of success is actually 77 percent. When compared to the M1 tank, the APS is actually less survivable than passive armor with this notional data.

We could also view the APS as a disjunctive system. Instead of success rate, suppose the failure rate of each component is five percent. Naturally, a five percent failure rate looks better than the M1 tank’s 20 percent failure rate. Framed this way, many people may erroneously anchor on a total system failure probability of five percent, when the disjunctive probability that at least one critical APS component fails is actually 23 percent. Again, we find that the APS is worse than the M1 tank’s passive armor. This simple example shows that disjunctive and conjunctive events are opposite sides of the same coin. Kahneman and Tversky write, “The chain-like structure of conjunctions leads to overestimation; the funnel-like structure of disjunction leads to underestimation.” The direction of the flawed probability estimate is a matter of framing the problem, yet the bias exists in both types of events.
The XM1203 Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon was a mobile 155-mm cannon intended to provide improved responsiveness and lethality to the unit of action commander as part of the U.S. Army’s Future Combat Systems project, Yuma, AZ, 2009.

Overcoming this anchoring phenomenon is difficult. Even when test subjects are apprised of the bias, research has shown anchoring and inadequate adjustment persist. In dealing with highly volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environments, military professionals need to improvise and experiment with a variety of new methods. These activities are part of the critical task of reframing the problem, outlined in FM 5-0. In order to avoid anchoring, it may be necessary to reframe a problem anew; however, this may be a difficult proposition in a time-constrained environment. 

Summary
The volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity of our operating environment demand that military professionals make rapid decisions in situations where established military decision making processes are either too narrow or ineffective. The fast tempo of operational decisions potentially may render any elaborate approach, either MDMP or Design, infeasible. As a result, commanders and staff may find themselves engaged in more intuitive decision making. FM 3-0, Operations, states that intuitive decision making rests on “reaching a conclusion that emphasizes pattern recognition based upon knowledge, judgment, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, perception, and character.” This article has identified several heuristics that people use to make intuitive decisions to emphasize the potential cognitive biases that subconsciously arise and can produce poor outcomes. When subjective assessments, ego, and emotion are intertwined with cognitive processes, we realize that intuitive decision making is fraught with potential traps. We must constantly strive to avoid these mental snares and plan to compensate for them when they arise. The solution may lie in the organizational embrace of the concept of reflective practice as advocated by previous authors in this journal. Instead of the usual striving toward a “best practices” methodology, which is also full of potential heuristic biases, reflective practice calls for “valuing the processes that challenge assimilative knowledge (i.e. continuous truth seeking) and by embracing the inevitable conflict associated with truth seeking.” Institutionalizing this approach may help us to avoid some of the intrinsic human mental frailties that inhibit good decision making. MR
appear more likely than they actually are,”
provides a mechanism by which occurrences of extreme utility (or disutility) may
highly undesirable outcome, such as an airplane crash. Consequently, availability
can increase its availability, and hence its perceived likelihood. People are pre-
distinction of being a “bullet-magnet.”


cannot be read naturally without first being converted to plain text. This tool is not intended for users with cognitive disabilities. A human reader is required to make the conversion.
44. I am indebted to MAJ Nick Ayers, U.S. Army, for his explanation of tank gunnery training.
46. For a complete description, see Holt, 31-32.
48. For this simple example, we assume independence of events. However, most of these events are conditional on the success of other events; therefore, Bayesian analysis may be more appropriate. The point of the example is that people do not usually think even in terms of simple independent probability, let alone more complex conditional probability.
49. \(0.75 \times 0.75 \times 0.75 \times 0.75 \times 0.75 \times 0.75 = 0.1779\) or 17.79 percent.
51. \(0.95 \times 0.95 \times 0.95 \times 0.95 \times 0.95 = 0.77\) or 77 percent. To be equivalent to the M1 tank, each APS component would have to have a success rate above 95 percent (actual answer is greater than 95.64 percent).
52. This problem is relatively simple to analyze when the probabilities involve objective engineering data. They become much harder when we consider the subjective probabilities found in social situations.
53. 1-0.77 = 0.23 = 23 percent
55. Bayesian inferential techniques may be appropriate tools for overcoming anchoring; however, they take time to model and understand.
58. Ibid., 74.
SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING (by a single decision maker, however august) and shared situational understanding (by multiple decision makers who must act in concert to achieve shared goals and desired outcomes) are two related but very distinct sets of challenges. There has been a great deal of discussion within the defense community in the past several years on these subjects. Some approaches offer “common operational pictures” to eliminate fog and friction in war and stimulate “self-synchronization” between friendly units by providing comprehensive information concerning everything deemed to be of interest in the battlespace.

Needless to say, there are problems. As with most such projects, the problems start with a poor philosophical foundation. In each instance, it is assumed that human decision makers are essentially interchangeable and need only access to a common set of data to achieve “shared situational awareness.” This is generally presumed to automatically result in “shared situational understanding,” which, in turn, is generally presumed to automatically yield the ultimate goal of self-synchronization (disparate units automatically acting in concert, even with limited communications).

Aside from the fact that this chain of causality presumes a great deal too much, and therefore cannot be relied upon, I also see some fundamental philosophical errors and important unaddressed questions. I have observed that even in very sophisticated environments populated with first-rate minds, such concerns are generally overlooked in favor of those to which our cultures of productivity and warfighting reflexively drive us.

Situational awareness (shared or otherwise) is not the same thing as understanding (which, unlike awareness, requires some useful grasp of the information at hand). One might argue further that understanding is different from and inferior to insight or wisdom, and that either of these should be a recognized goal on the path toward self-synchronization (which does not automatically result, even from shared situational insight or wisdom).

That said, shared situational understanding is not a desired end in itself. It is valuable only as a means of enabling desired emergent behaviors, notably synergy, adaptability, and opportunism. These, in turn, facilitate self-synchronization (and vice versa). All of this promotes the ultimate
values of any military enterprise, enhanced effectiveness, efficiency, and economy. The only reason we need shared situational understanding is to achieve these values. Keeping this hierarchy of needs and purposes in mind will help us solve related challenges.

Culture (personal and shared beliefs and values) is the strongest determinant of emergent (indeed, all) behaviors. The culture of warfighting (which is a type of the culture of productivity) determines how and if a warfighter decides to lift his weapon and place himself in harm’s way. It also determines (through frames of reference) what he sees, hears, tastes, smells, feels, emotes, and thinks individually and in groups (in multiple layers of group identity) in response to any given stimulus. Culture does this to a greater degree than do intelligence, aptitude, or any training, instruction, orders, technology, or any other aspect of DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities). We ignore this fact at our peril.

Any stimulus that we may try to convey in order to foster shared situational understanding will have meaning to the recipients only in the context of the disparate frames of reference through which the stimulus must pass within their minds. The same image viewed by 100 people may mean 100 different sets of things to them, unless we shape their frames of reference to increase their predisposition to attain shared understanding. A shared “warfighting culture” is therefore the ultimate key to shared situational understanding in the battlespace. It is on this then that we must focus.

We must, however, guard against any tendency toward tunnel vision or “group think” when we try to shape and promulgate “shared frames of reference.” We should differentiate between the issue...
of group culture and that of cognitive preferences (such as linear, reductive, and analytic versus nonlinear, constructive, and intuitive) when there is a critical need to diversify our ranks further (by expanding the numbers of those who favor the latter approach). Cultures, warfighting and otherwise, exist on several levels simultaneously, from that of the individual to that of the nation, the religion, or other overarching entity. These levels share a fractal relationship reflected in the organizational structure and beyond. At each level, disparate lower-level cultures must be reconciled so that a common vision can be pursued at that level, in support of the vision at a higher level. The common culture formed is an overlay on the subordinate cultures. These overlays can form haphazardly or by design or by some combination of the two. We need to leverage the tendency of such overlays to occur spontaneously while we consciously seek to incorporate essential or desirable elements. With an adequate cultural overlay, each decision maker will intuitively understand what his colleagues are likely to infer from the same information and sense their likely responses, thus permitting “instinctive self-synchronization.” The goal should be to establish shared frames of reference without destroying existing frames of reference shared with other groups.

During World War I, the practice of attempting to substitute the situational understanding of rear command elements for those of forward commanders was called “chateau generalship.” Today, it is known as “network-centric warfare.” It has never worked as expected. Network-centric warfare is based on several technocentric fallacies that do not adequately take into account the immutable aspects of warfighting and warfighters and the primacy of warfighting culture, not machines, in ultimately determining actions in battle. Network-centric warfare strongly resembles other technocentric delusions, such as the notions that airpower alone can reliably win wars, that precision engagement will destroy all threats, or that elaborate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance will eliminate ambiguity, uncertainty, and deception from the battlespace. Our enduring infatuation with such shibboleths illustrates the philosophical and theoretical poverty of our efforts and deprives our generally expert planning of a context and a sound “trajectory.” This leads to random outcomes and the systemic predisposition to expend infinite resources without any assurance of achieving desired outcomes.

While technological and materiel solutions are critically important, we cannot rely on them to carry the day in warfighting. They have inherent limitations to which our culture is generally blind, and they are ultimately inferior to human-centric solutions. In spite of this, we reflexively recoil from using human-centric solutions because they are too difficult to quantify, require more abstract thinking than we care to muster, and offend our cultural imperative for “radical egalitarianism.” (Everyone is equal as far as machines are concerned; but human differences come to the fore in a human-centric paradigm).

Technological and materiel solutions have helped to build great empires, but these empires ultimately foundered on human-centric problems. Athens fell to Sparta, Carthage and Greece fell to Rome, Rome fell to the Goths, Persia fell to the Arabs, Byzantium fell to the Normans, and then finally, to the Turks. China fell to the Mongols, and then to the Manchus. Wealthy, sophisticated, technologically advanced civilizations being crushed by more primitive but vigorous competitors is an historical commonplace. It may happen to us too, if we continue to disregard history.

Shared situational understanding consists of multiple subordinate elements. Many observers reduce these to the concept of “connectivity.” This is partially true, but connectivity manifests itself as “technical connectivity” and “perceptual connectivity.” The former is the network of sensor and communications grids that link users through mechanical and electronic interfaces in order to acquire and share information. The latter is a network of shared frames of reference that enables them to make sense of the information transmitted via the technical connections, and to intuitively understand what other, similar users will infer from that information. In the absence of reliable technical connections, perceptual connectivity can help bridge inevitable gaps in communications through logical assumptions based on shared perspectives.

Therefore, perceptual connectivity is superior; in its absence, technical connectivity conveys only empty symbols, not meaning. But in the absence of technical connectivity, perceptual connectivity can
go a long way toward facilitating shared understanding and self-synchronization, even with very little data. Our culture, however, embraces and invests heavily in technical connectivity; we do not generally bother ourselves with the imponderables of perceptual connectivity.

“Shared situational understanding on the move” adds additional, special requirements that are primarily cultural in nature. These requirements result from the challenges of less support, less time, and the need to think, understand, design, and plan while physically moving. In addition, there are additional challenges associated with the dynamism and complexity of the environment through which you and your adversaries are moving. Such events require a greater emphasis on emergent behaviors, including the need to adapt mentally while the circumstances around you are in constant flux.

Shared situational understanding on the move requires a very different philosophy of conflict and command and renders most of our traditional assumptions on these subjects dangerous anachronisms. In a complex and dynamic environment and with post-industrial-age, third-generation forces, control of one’s own forces in battle is generally only an illusion with respect to actual outcomes in the battlespace. True control of outcomes can usually only be obtained by abandoning direct, prescriptive control of one’s forces and giving them the latitude to adapt freely to circumstances in pursuit of shared goals as defined by the commander’s intent.

Building shared frames of reference is a daunting challenge, but success in doing so is not unprecedented. It generally requires a high level of socialization on the part of the persons and forces involved. W. Edwards Deming’s theories can illuminate the challenges here.3 Consider also the Prussian “Scharnhorst Reforms” of 1808.4 Applying lessons he learned before and during the Napoleonic Wars, Gerhard Von Scharnhorst set in motion a process that led to Erich Von Ludendorff’s “stormtroop tactics” and later evolved into “blitzkrieg.”5 The Israel Defense Force later emulated this process with great success, and our own Marine Corps has been trying to assimilate it since the 1980s under the name “maneuver warfare doctrine.”6 At their core, all of these approaches are post-industrial-age7, third-generation8 techniques of warfighting that focus on strong, shared cultural overlays as a means of consciously and systematically enabling desired emergent behaviors and fostering self-synchronization, even in the absence of direct guidance and assured communication. MR

NOTES

1. The acronym DOTMLPF, having evolved and expanded over recent years from a smaller acronym, is now widely accepted as describing the entire universe of those sets of things that must be taken into account when implementing and accommodating military concepts. This is another fundamental error because this acronym omits the two most important things that determine the success or failure of any military (or other) enterprise: “policy” and “culture.” Thus, if correctly conceived, the acronym would be PCDOTMLPF. We might better express such an unwieldy acronym (in the Chinese style) as “the nine critical determinants of success or failure,” but then some perverse bureaucrat will inevitably come to refer to them as the NCDGF.

2. Together, they can be described as “comprehensive connectivity.” Others have recently discussed this; but to my knowledge, I coined these terms in U.S. Joint Forces Command’s “Joint Operational Warfighting” concept in 2001.

3. W. Edwards Deming was a statistician and organizational productivity theorist and lecturer. The Japanese credit him with reviving their economy after World War II. The once popular “Total Quality Management” (TQM) and “Total Quality Leadership” (TQL) movements claim to be based on his work, although he rejected them as perversions of his theories. His work spans three generations of thought, the first based on “statistical process control,” the second on organizational practices (“14 Points and 7 Diseases”), and the last on “profound knowledge,” which he defined as the union of systems theory, variation theory, psychology, and epistemology. Deming Theory properly applies to a post-industrial-age milieu, superseding the “scientific management” of the industrial age. Among the many luminaries and theories in this field, Deming and his work remain preeminent.

4. Between 1801 and 1805, Gerhard von Scharnhorst organized and presided in Berlin over the Militarische Gesellschaft (Military Society), the world’s first voluntary membership organization dedicated to the advancement of military art. In 1806, Napoleon destroyed the Prussian Army in a single day in the battle of Jena Auerstadt. In 1808, the King of Prussia invited Scharnhorst to rebuild the Prussian Army and transform it from a feudal possession to the military instrument of a modern state (the “Scharnhorst Reforms”). In so doing, Scharnhorst used people and ideas culled from the Militarische Gesellschaft. The process that he initiated crystallized 109 years later as “stormtroop tactics.” It succeeded in bridging previously ir reconcilable cultures and interests of disparate classes in Prussia and ranks in the Prussian Army and did the same for the myriad German kingdoms, principalities, and city-states over which Prussia assumed control in 1871. The successes of this approach are evident in the German “defense in depth” and “stormtroop tactics” of late World War I and their “blitzkrieg” operations of World War II. Their ultimate failure at the strategic level, due to bad senior leadership and being massively under-resourced, does not detract from the spectacular successes demonstrated at the tactical and operational levels.

5. “Blitzkrieg” or “lightning war” was an operational military technique perfected by Germany in the 1930s. It was based substantially on British and Russian theories of armored and combined arms warfare, built on a foundation of the German World War I doctrine (and culture) of “stormtroop tactics” (with the addition of 1930s technology in the form of tanks, aircraft, and radios). It entailed the synchronization of artillery and air support assets to support the deep maneuver of concentrated armored and mechanized units spearheading the attack of larger infantry armies. Blitzkrieg is a post-industrial-age, third-generation warfighting approach (called “maneuver warfare doctrine” by the U.S. Marine Corps). It is dependent upon both technology and “maneuver culture” to achieve its maximum effect. By 1945, in the absence of maneuver culture, none of the Allies were able to reliably employ the same techniques with more than 80 percent of the combat effectiveness enjoyed by the Germans. They were able to mimic its form (technology, synchronization, concentration, etc.), but not its substance.

6. “Maneuver warfare doctrine” is the term used by the Marine Corps to describe their distillation of the German and Israeli military experience, as interpreted through the insights of COL John Boyd. It is historical, theoretical, philosophical, and cultural. It is post-industrial-age and third-generation and stands in contrast to the methodical, industrial age, second generation, control-focused approach that reached its apogee under the French Army of 1917. It is not, properly speaking, a doctrine, and it is completely unrelated to what the Army means when it uses that term.

7. “Post-industrial age” is a term used to describe a paradigm of productivity and
social interaction characterized by a high level of socialization and mass group self-identification (as a nation, rather than as an individual, family, clan, tribe, or other special interest group). This promotes trust, which promotes synergy (and other desirable emergent behaviors such as adaptability and opportunism). These promote productivity and affluence that in turn reinforce higher levels of socialization, trust, etc. The bulk of the working population of this age is intrinsically motivated to be industrious and creative in support of community goals (shared vision) and requires only the removal of systemic barriers to excellence. This age stands in contrast to the industrial age, wherein the principles of Frederick Taylor’s Scientific Management were the most effective way to synchronize the labors of peoples with low levels of socialization, whose work is motivated primarily by extrinsic factors (direct rewards and punishments), and maintaining “control” was of paramount importance. In an industrial-age environment, emergent behaviors would be deemed beyond direct centralized control, and therefore disruptive and intolerable. Post-industrial-age workforces generally achieve at least 20 percent greater productivity than industrial-age workforces because of increased synergies.

8. “Third generation” is a term used to describe a paradigm of warfighting. It is a direct analogue and reflection of the “Post-Industrial age.” Like that age, it is characterized by a high level of socialization and mass group self-identification. Many contemporary military theorists describe it as “maneuver warfare doctrine.” It came into being in 1917 as the German response to the trench warfare of the Western Front. Its defining characteristic is an outward focus on the mission, the environment, and the adversary. This, in turn, leads to the systemic stimulation of desired emergent behaviors (notably synergy, adaptability, and opportunism). It stands in contrast to “second generation” warfighting, which is the industrial age approach to warfare perfected by the French at the same time in response to the same situation (and which maintains an inward focus on the replication and maintenance of existing structures, processes, and culture that it characterizes). “First generation” warfighting is pre-industrial age; “fourth-generation” warfighting is “extra-national” (waged by other than nation-states); and “fifth generation” warfighting transcends the physical battlespace to directly target an adversary’s polity (traditionally known as “political warfare”). The research of COL Trevor N. Dupuy, Martin Van Creveld, Martin Samuels, and others has demonstrated that, when the force employed is properly organized and conditioned, third generation warfighting is reliably at least 20 percent more combat effective than the “methodical,” second-generation, industrial-age approaches with which we are more familiar.
Landmine

A ponderous, bloated contraption
Lumbers up the road,
Troopers peer over its sides, rifles at the ready,
Casually chatting
But with their eyes
In the bush; searching, seeking
For ambush.

But they cannot see, nor can the driver see
What sits beneath the road
Laid in the silent hours
To wait out its short, appointed time
Until
A massive wheel seeks, depresses
A switch
Then a deafening roar as the debris-cloud rises.
Our metallic protector lurches and skids
As the driver becomes
Another passenger.

In the truck behind muscles tighten and
Eyes swivel forward. Their driver brakes. But
They cannot help us. They are observers.
We are lost in the cloud as our shattering ride continues.

Debris is falling. Reaction! We gather ourselves,
Grope for triggers; fire in case of ambush
Hopelessly.
For the danger’s not out there.
It is past. It was beneath us.
Dust settles. Fire ceases.
We spring to life, urgently debussing.
Take cover in the bush nearby.

Two men remain lying on the truck.

We gather our senses. Look around.
The sky is still out there. The earth remains firm
Beneath our feet.
The Dark Angel has only touched us. No more.
We look at each other.
A hard knot of resolution takes form
To catch and to kill
Those who did this to us.

From the book Echoes of an African War, by Chas Lotter, who served as a field medic for nine years in the Rhodesian Army during that country’s civil war, which lasted from 1964 to 1979. Rhodesia is now Zimbabwe, and former Sergeant Lotter now resides in Pretoria, South Africa.
In July 2007, Russia’s Duma passed a bill that would allow energy companies Gazprom (Russia’s state-owned natural gas monopoly) and Transneft (which controls Russia’s oil pipeline infrastructure) the right to create private, internal armies. The new bill raised concern internationally and within the Kremlin that such a move would give these companies too much power. In addition to establishing a private army, Gazprom is bolstering the security of its vast pipeline network with unmanned aerial vehicles.

A Weapon of Diplomacy

In the past, Russia was known as a military superpower, but today Russia’s vast energy resources represent its might. Many observers view Gazprom as one of Russia’s most important weapons. One report pointed out that “the Russian Prime Minister makes no secret of his determination to use the state gas monopoly as a weapon.”1 Recently, Russian journalists Valery Panyushkin and Mikhail Zygar referred to Gazprom in the title of a book they co-authored, Gazprom—The New Russian Weapon.

Some observers call Russian energy specifically a “weapon of diplomacy.”2 In 2008, during a speech given to Gazprom’s board of directors, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev pointed out the importance of the company by referring to Gazprom as “a force to be reckoned with” and “a major force in the world.”3 With these types of statements and Gazprom’s role, which many skeptics view as a “state-within-a-state,” creating an internal, private army with future access to more advanced military technology should not come as a surprise.

Most of Russia’s leaders openly admit that energy is Russia’s most precious resource. Author Marshall I. Goldman writes, “As President Putin . . . noted in a three-hour meeting following our Gazprom visit, Gazprom and Rosneft are very real and each year are accumulating more and more wealth and international influence, which they are using to advance the interests of the Russian state.”4 The question is, how far is Russia willing to allow these companies to grow?

Government control. The energy industry in Russia has gone through some notable transformations over the past three decades. In 1975, the
Soviet Union became the world’s second largest producer of petroleum products. Of the Soviet republics, Russia was the largest producer.

After the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the Russian government moved to create more of a free-market economic system by privatizing previously state-owned businesses. In the energy sector, the Ministry of the Gas Industry was treated differently from the Ministry of Petroleum Industry. In the case of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry, the state completely privatized the controlled oil fields, refiners, and pipelines. Goldman notes that owing to “politics, greed, a flawed design, and corrupt implementation, a small number of investors ended up in control of most of the previously state-owned enterprises.” Some of these so-called oligarchs were former government officials with little to no experience in the energy industry. The system was poorly monitored, and companies suffered great waste. While the oligarchs became billionaires, their mismanagement and tax evasion caused the government to lose an important source of revenue.

In the Ministry of Gas Industry, on the other hand, senior officials managed to retain the properties within the confines of the ministry. In 1989, the Ministry of the Gas Industry transformed itself into a new corporation called Gazprom. The state eventually privatized a portion of Gazprom, but it remained the primary shareholder, giving it control of the organization.

Putin clearly had plans for Gazprom even before assuming the presidency at the end of 1999. This was first evinced through his 218-page Ph.D. thesis, which Putin completed in 1997 at the Mining Institute of St. Petersburg. In his thesis, entitled *Refinement of Tax Mechanisms in the Mineral and Natural Resource Complex, Using the Leningrad Region as an Example*, Putin argued “for greater state control of the raw materials economy and outlined a plan for restructuring the Russian economy.” Gazprom would ultimately become Putin’s primary strategic tool.

Two years later, Putin again highlighted the importance of mineral and raw material resources to the development and success of Russia in an article entitled “Mineral and Raw Materials Resources and the Development Strategy for the Russian Economy.” In the introduction of the article, according to a translation done by Tom...
Sustainable development as it applies to minerals and raw materials is to be understood as the guaranteed provision of economic security to the country through the creation of a reliable mineral and raw materials base for satisfying the current and expected needs of the Russian economy taking into account the ecological, social, demographic, defense and other factors. Mineral and raw materials represent the most important potential for the economic development of the country.

On 31 December 1999, President Boris Yeltsin resigned five months early and appointed Putin as acting president. Three months later Putin hit the campaign trail to secure the new presidency. During his campaigning, he stopped in Surgut, where he offered a glimpse into what would become his strategy to take control of Russia’s natural resources. He said, “We will support [oil and gas companies] by all means, but we will also control their work.”

A jewel in the crown. Gazprom had seen many ups and downs, but it wasn’t until Putin assumed the presidency in Russia that the company truly began to spread its roots and take on a whole new life. In 2000, after the annual shareholders meeting, Gazprom’s directors changed leadership. Company managers no longer had a majority of seats, and a new chairman, Dmitri Medvedev, was elected to replace Viktor S. Chernomyrdin. Medvedev would go on to be the board’s deputy chairman between 2001 and 2002 before reassuming the chairmanship. Meanwhile, in 2001, the CEO of Gazprom was replaced with Alexei Miller, the deputy Minister of Energy and another Putin ally. These three leaders—Putin, Medvedev, and Miller—would go on to become an unbreakable circle firmly tying Gazprom and the Kremlin together.

In 2003, two years after Putin took over the presidency, the government’s stake in Gazprom rose to 51 percent, giving it total control of the company. While Gazprom was not adversely affected, Putin’s determination to control the energy industry became apparent through a number of highly publicized and controversial events, which demonstrated the Russian government’s heavy-handed approach in taking back control. Yukos, once one of the world’s largest nonstate oil companies, was completely dismantled. Shell, which was once the majority owner in the touted Sakhalin 2 project, lost its controlling stake through methods that were highly questionable. British Petroleum also fell victim to Russian business tactics. Essentially, Putin took back state control over Russia’s most strategic industry. Finally, after Putin had served two consecutive terms as president and was not authorized to serve a third term, he endorsed Medvedev’s candidacy. Medvedev won the election, then appointed Putin as Russia’s Prime Minister, allowing Putin to maintain his influential status.

Gazprom has been described as Russia’s “jewel in the crown.” In 2006 it had over 300,000 employees and its tax contributions alone accounted for over 25 percent of the Russian budget. Russia possesses the largest reserves of natural gas in the world and Gazprom is the largest natural gas monopoly. As the strategic value of Russia’s jewel in the crown became more evident, it would become increasingly important to protect it from any harm as any major blow to its infrastructure might be enough to paralyze the government.

Creation of Private Corporate Armies

In 1998, the Russian government claimed to have about 5,000 private security firms employing 155,000 people. However, independent estimates had put the figure between 800,000 and 1,200,000, plus another 200,000 people employed by small security companies that did not have valid licenses. Gazprom’s security service alone was employing 20,000 men. These private security forces provided a number of services, including body-guarding, intelligence and counterintelligence, plant protection, and transport of valuables. Private security forces were typically paid four to six times the salary of a government security officer. Some of these firms were front operations of Russian mobsters.

Today, no one knows exactly how many security forces exist in Russia. According to a February 2009 article in the RBK Daily (a Russian daily internet paper devoted to business and investing in Russia), the number of security forces, excluding Russia’s armed forces, exceeds 2.5 million men. There are clearly more security forces than there are soldiers in Russia’s regular army. According
There are clearly more security forces than there are soldiers in Russia’s regular army.

to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, over 30,000 private security and investigative firms containing more than 745,000 employees registered with the government. Approximately one quarter of this number exclusively protects business executives associated with organized criminal groups. More organizations, which have not registered with the government, likely exist.

In early 2007, as the Interior Ministry began a push to prevent company security guards from carrying weapons, a new amendment hit the Duma’s lower house of parliament. According to Article 12 of the Federal Law on Armaments, “strategic enterprises” and “strategic corporations” could now acquire weapons to perform “their obligations under federal law.” According to Viktor Ilyukhin, who headed the Duma’s security committee, the amendments were needed to counter an increasing number of attacks on pipelines. In April 2004, the Mozdok-Kazimagomed pipeline was blown up, an apparent act of sabotage. Another attack occurred on 8 January 2005, when the gas pipeline in Bugulma was blown up. The blast damaged the gas main.

Illegal siphoning of oil is also a recurring problem in Russia. According to Mikhail Kroutikhin, a partner in Moscow’s RusEnergy Consulting, “Illegal break-ins to siphon oil from pipelines occur frequently, hundreds of cases every year.” According to experts with Russia’s Black Sea transportation oil company in a 2001 report, stolen oil in Russia’s Republic of Ingushetia alone costs millions.

According to Gazprom’s public relations department, “The changes to the law on armaments are aimed at improving legislation in the area of security for strategic facilities, including Russia’s integrated gas supply system.” Distinguishing what constitutes an army in Russia is difficult, but company employees now have the right “to store, carry and use service weapons and special devices for self-defense and in the line of duty.” Meanwhile, the companies themselves are to finance the armed detachments. “Corporate soldiers” are authorized to use force “while in pursuit of individuals who have committed criminal or civil offenses at the facilities under guard.” In other words, their power is not limited to the property or area they are protecting. They can conduct arrests, body and vehicle searches, both on and off their assigned premises. They will also be equipped with “certain types and models of military firearms, issued for temporary use.” The measure has had some analysts and even Russian reporters asking why, with so many armed private security forces already in place, are the current forces inadequate to defend these companies’ interests?

Gazprom and Transneft are believed to have initiated the new bill to establish these private armies. The presidential administration then approved it. Gazprom is a corporate entity clearly molded into a quasi-state instrument of policy. In the past, oligarchs and criminals surrounded themselves with private security forces, making police activity against them difficult. Putin had waged a war against these oligarchs. When Medvedev launched his campaign for the presidency, much of his focus was on the issue of corruption and the “rule of law.” Passing the bill to establish private armies may have been necessary to continue the battle against the oligarchs by stamping out their private security forces. Creating new corporate armies would eliminate the need to contract outside security forces, which might otherwise be shielded by the mafia.

Worth noting is that the new bill allowing Gazprom and Transneft to arm themselves came about shortly after NATO began forging links with multinational oil companies. In May 2007, Jamie Shea, director of policy planning at the office of NATO’s Secretary General, announced, “We are looking very actively at using our maritime resources . . . [NATO wants to see] how we can link up with oil companies.” NATO offered British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell seaborne rapid response forces to
According to Gudkov... If we pass this law, we will all become servants of Gazprom and Transneft.”

defend oil platforms and installations from hijackers and hostage takers.26

Not all Russian government officials were enthusiastic about the idea of these corporate armies, but it did not affect the decision. The amendments to the law reportedly slipped by quickly and with minimal publicity. Deputy Aleksandr Gurov, who headed the Ministry of the Interior fight against organized crime during the Soviet days, tried to explain why Gazprom and Transneft needed armies. In his argument, he pointed out that, “The number of criminal oil pipeline tap-ins had increased from 84 to 1,000 since 1999.” On the other hand, he was unable to explain why regular security was unable to deal with the oil thieves.27

During three readings for the bill, there was little discussion to counter it. However, Deputy Gennadi Gudkov did not hold back on voicing his concern. According to Gudkov, who has a background in law enforcement, it would open up a “Pandora’s box . . . This law envisages the creation of corporate armies. If we pass this law, we will all become servants of Gazprom and Transneft.”28 Gudkov further pointed out:

We can’t say that we have only two exclusively strategic companies—Transneft and Gazprom. What about RAO Unified Energy Systems, LUKoil, Vympe1Com and MTS? Are they any less strategic than Transneft or Gazprom? They’ll demand the same rights and we’ll end up with many corporate armies. For Gazprom and Transneft, this isn’t really a security issue. It’s a show of strength, demonstrating the power of their administrative resources. After all, they do have other options for solving the problem: they could organize private security firms, and they already have their own security services.29

Gudkov went on to describe the measure as “a display of corporate strength within the state.”30 His points are noteworthy because the bill is written, such that other large companies could pursue their own armies, as well. The law “on armaments” will now state that “legal entities with special statutory purposes shall have the right, pursuant to regulatory legislative acts of the Russian Federation government, to acquire civilian and service weapons from legal entities-suppliers after being duly licensed by law enforcement agencies.”31

Stanislav Markelov, a lawyer and president of the Rule of Law Institute, criticized the wording of the new law:

The idea [is] that corporations have some sort of “obligations”—why is a federal law assigning the state’s obligations to private structures?! This clearly erodes the boundaries between the state and corporations: either the state is now functioning as a private company, or corporations are replacing the state. Essentially, due to the weakness of the security and law enforcement agencies, we are legalizing what has been the de facto state of affairs in Russia since the early 1990s.32

Another high-ranking source is concerned that “a corporation has its own interests, which don’t always coincide with the state interests.” He further pointed out that the state will not be permitted to monitor these new army forces, asking, “What if the corporation’s interests diverge from state interests? These corporate armies are potential tools for a coup!”33

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

According to the new law, “the Russian Federation government shall establish the varieties, types, models and number of civilian and service weapons that legal entities with special statutory purpose may acquire.”34 What types of weapons the Russian Federation will allow these strategic companies to possess is the big question.

What if the corporation’s interests diverge from state interests?
There is a growing market in Russia for civilian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The main customers are not defense and law enforcement agencies, but gas and oil companies.

While the Russian armed forces had deemed these UAVs more important after seeing their relevance during foreign military operations such as Desert Storm, there is a perception that the Russian government does not place much importance on producing them domestically. Civilian customers, however, are reportedly keeping an eye on these UAVs with ever-increasing interest.35

In 2007, Gazprom joined forces with Irkut Corporation, a full-scale Russian aircraft-manufacturing company that specializes in both civil and military aircraft, to use unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor and protect Gazprom’s vast natural gas pipeline network. Gazprom began to run trial test flights of the UAVs Irkut 2M and Irkut-850 in 2007. These two UAVs traveled more than 28,000 miles during their trial operations.36

The lightweight Irkut 2M has an effective radius of 6.2 miles. The Irkut-850 has an effective radius of 124 miles and can be equipped with an infrared camera sitting on a gyrostabilised turret. It has a 3-D laser mapping system and a real-time downlink. The Irkut-850 also has a seat for a pilot, but is designed to fly unmanned to conduct surveillance of borders and terrain. It can have a DSP-1 electro optical system, which makes it possible to detect and identify a person at a distance of up to 2.8 miles. The thermal imaging channel does the same at night to a distance of up to 2.5 miles.37 Not overly impressed, the Defense Ministry has largely ignored this particular UAV.38

It is conceivable that Gazprom could obtain more sophisticated UAVs offering more features than either the Irkut-2M or Irkut-850. These features might include enforcement and attack capability. Whether or not these more capable drones will end up in Gazprom’s possession remains to be seen.39 It would certainly explain why representatives from Gazprom reportedly visited Israel (considered a leader in UAV technological innovation) “with the objective of discussing the possibility of using (possible Israeli) unmanned systems.”40

The UAV industry in Russia has been inadequate owing to a lack of government backing. However, as
Gazprom now brings Irkut UAVs online to protect its pipelines, it may give the industry the financial boost it needs to develop more sophisticated and capable drones. Gazprom could also provide much-needed financing for more sophisticated technology such as the MQ-9 Reaper (Predator B-003) class, which, along with a highly capable tracking system, can remain airborne for over 30 hours, reach altitudes of over 50,000 feet, and carry up to 3,000 pounds of weapons.

Since Russian UAV technology is clearly behind that of other countries, the Russian Ministry of Defense will not purchase any of the Irkut drones, which has incensed industry representatives. According to weapons expert Richard Fisher, vice president of International Assessment and Strategy Center, the Soviet Union developed some single-purpose surveillance drones from the 1960s onwards, but did not follow the U.S. and Israeli examples in technological innovation. As a result, Russia had little to offer in the way of exports of UAVs during the 1990s. This could well change once Gazprom begins buttressing that industry for its own benefit.

Conclusions and Possible Implications

In a book titled *At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War*, author Thomas C. Reed explained that the United States was intent on preventing Western Europe from importing Soviet natural gas. In addition, the Soviet Union was thought to be trying to steal a wide variety of Western technology. In his memoirs, Reed, a former Air Force secretary who served in the National Security Council during the Reagan administration, admitted that the president had approved a CIA plan to covertly transfer technology containing hidden malfunctions that triggered a huge explosion in a Siberian natural gas pipeline. The explosion, which occurred during the summer of 1982, was an effort to sabotage the Soviet Union’s economy. According to Reed, the explosion was picked up on U.S. satellites and “was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space.” Some experts believe that the explosion did indeed lead to the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union.
The fall of the Soviet Union caused Russia to lose ownership of many natural gas resources no longer within its borders. Further exacerbating the problem for the state was the privatization of strategic industries. Today, the government has managed to regain control of its most strategic assets. It seems intent on ensuring optimal security and continued success through careful control.

Russia’s new law allowing corporate armies does not completely add up. While the United States has been privatizing its military logistics, Russia is militarizing its corporate security. Western firms do much the same thing that Gazprom is now authorized to do when they operate in unstable regions. However, Russia’s justification is weak in light of there being so many security forces already in place.

The establishment of private armies, coupled with increased surveillance capability that could easily transfer to more militaristic capability (i.e., UAV’s role changing from protective surveillance to spying or attack) deserves monitoring. That Russia must safeguard its vast pipeline infrastructure from sabotage is understandable. Not only is it critical to Russia’s economy, but it is also critical to other countries in Eastern and Western Europe that are dependent on Russia’s natural gas and oil. Gazprom controls approximately 95,000 miles of gas pipelines that link Russia’s gas fields in remote parts of Siberia to urban areas and to Europe. However, with tensions rising between Russia and some of its neighboring countries, more transparency regarding Russia’s intentions and exactly how these forces and equipment will be used would ease concerns. Currently, there is neither press nor public awareness of the status of these corporate armies and whether or not they have actually been formed.

Gazprom could be adding tools to help it rebuild a power base that extends beyond its role as a gas utility. While the new law would allow security forces to be deployed simply to protect infrastructure, with Gazprom’s pipelines extending into Europe the move could somehow allow these security forces to move across sensitive borders into Ukraine, Belarus, and Poland. There are no clear restrictions to these corporate armies. How many troops they can or will hire is a mystery. What types of weapons they are authorized to use is unclear. These armies do not fall under the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Defense, and therefore are not subject to the same laws and scrutiny.

As the bill’s author, Alexandr Gurov, pointed out, “A couple of terrorist acts and an ensuing ecological catastrophe would be enough to immediately declare Russia an unreliable partner and supplier of energy.” However, there seem to be more questions than answers. Is the Kremlin allowing Gazprom to go too far and could these “armies” become a security threat to other power ministries? From an international corporation standpoint, how far will the rest of the world allow Russia to go?

MR

NOTES

4. It should be noted that during the current downward economic trend, Russia has been privatizing its military logistics, with Gazprom’s pipelines extending into Europe. However, the Russian Armed Forces will be reduced to one million men in the near future. The Government of the Russian Federation is planning to increase the number of troops they can or will hire.
5. Goldman, 58.
10. It is not clear where these security forces originated.
12. Ivan Petrov, “Security Structures Intended to Defend Domestic Challenges Outnumber the Regular Army,” RBK Daily, 20 February 2008. [According to Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, there are well over one million men in the Russian armed forces. However, the Russian Armed Forces will be reduced to one million by 2012.]
17. Mikhail Kroutkhin, email exchange, 8 April 2009.
27. Petrov, “For the Homeland, For Gazprom!”
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Petrov, “For the Homeland, For Gazprom!”
33. Ibid.
34. Petrov, “For the Homeland, For Gazprom!”
38. UAVs in Russia’s military are used primarily for reconnaissance and as flying targets. “Russian TV Looks at Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” NTV [Russian], 25 November 2007 and “Irkut Forecasts Sales of 600 Million Euro for UAVs in Russia Before 2010,” Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, 19 June 2007.
43. Carl Mortished, “Gazprom to Raise its Own Private Army to Protect Oil Installation.”
44. Ibid.
FOURTEEN YEARS AFTER a powerful rebellion spread fear and destruction throughout the nation of Peru, the commanding general of the Peruvian Army, Otto Guibovich, provided the ominous warning: “If we don’t do something they will grow and we will realize we have our own FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia).” Sendero Luminoso (SL) conducted a violent campaign of rural guerrilla war and urban terrorism from 1980 to 1995; however, its growth and expansion seemed to vanish in an instant with the capture of its leader, Abimael Guzmán. The rapid disintegration of SL was cited as an example of successful counterinsurgency, but now rising casualties and violence caused by the formerly dormant group have called those conclusions into question. While the importance of the capture of SL’s leadership is incontrovertible, recent events indicate that the underlying problems that fueled the Sendero insurgency remain. The Peruvian government must use a combination of enemy- and population-focused strategies to defeat SL and produce lasting stability.

The Emergence of Sendero Luminoso

The environment that spawned SL is similar to that which produced numerous other insurgencies. Like other nations in Latin America, Peru had acknowledged the need to conduct land reform. In the 1960s, it began an extensive program to redistribute land to peasants from the previous hacienda system. The Peruvian highlands, however, did not receive much support from these initiatives. The government largely neglected the Ayacucho Department, which would become the heart of the insurgency. By 1980, the annual per capita income there was as low as $60, and three of its provinces were among the poorest 15 percent in the nation. Additionally, Ayacucho contained a majority indigenous population that had never fully integrated with Peru’s coastal regions, and its inhabitants maintained the use of their native Quechuan language. The disconnected, impoverished region suffered under an antiquated social-economic structure and was ripe for revolution.

Revolutionary action sprang from the Communist Party. A splintering of the Communist Party of Peru in the 1960s gave birth to the Communist Party of Peru in the Shining Path of Mariátegui (Sendero Luminoso in Spanish). Its leader, Abimael Guzmán, was a devout follower of Mao Tse-Tung and his
Police arrest a protester injured during the riots in Ayacucho, 600 km southeast of Lima on 1 July 2004. Prime Minister Carlos Ferrero claimed that the Shining Path terrorist group was behind acts of violence in Ayacucho where a faction of SUTEP (Single Trade Union of Education Workers of Peru) burned several public buildings and clashed with police, leaving about 40 injured during protests against the privatization of education.

philosophies of guerrilla warfare. Mao’s highly influential book, *On Guerrilla Warfare,* set the tone for the beginnings of SL. Mao advised that “success largely depends upon powerful political leaders who work unceasingly to bring about internal unification.”

Shining Path began this process of unification at the University of Huamanga, in the city of Ayacucho, where Guzmán was a professor. Guzmán and other members of SL were able to dominate the faculty and student organizations of the university during the late 1960s and early 1970s. During this time, they indoctrinated the largely indigenous student body with a Maoist ideology that highlighted the vast disparity of wealth in Peru. In 1974, SL lost control of the university, but it had already succeeded in creating a “revolutionary consciousness” in the population of Ayacucho.

Other Latin American communist movements followed Che Guevara’s *foco* method and brought their ideologies to rural areas. Guzmán’s followers were not foreigners or crusading children from the urban middle class, they were a part of the impoverished rural population already. Sendero Luminoso did not need to build bonds with the population; they were the population.

Having created a powerful support base among the people, Guzmán organized them for active insurgency. Mao Tse-Tung devoted a considerable amount of time in his writing to “organization for guerrilla warfare,” and provides explicit instructions to aid “students who have no knowledge of military affairs.” Mao provides a description of a highly structured organization with clear command and control mechanisms. Following this example, highly organized Sendero units functioned autonomously at the tactical level. All elements operated under the direction of the “central committee” and Guzmán himself. The intense devotion of its followers and its hierarchical organization enabled Shining Path to launch a devastating campaign of violence and terrorism against the Peruvian government. However, Shining Path’s structure also proved to be a key vulnerability.

**Smothering the Shining Path**

The Peruvian government was in an outstanding position to defeat an insurgency when SL began to form. While Ayacucho was a poor and neglected region, a large portion of the country had been satisfied with land reforms and changes in the former hacienda system. Additionally, 1980 marked a return to free elections for Peru, which included participation by Marxist political parties. Under these conditions, Shining Path had difficulty expanding its brand of communist ideology outside of its cultivated support base in Ayacucho.

**Sendero Luminoso did not need to build bonds with the population; they were the population.**
In the beginning, like many governments facing domestic threats, the Peruvian government failed to recognize the seriousness of the situation and struggled with the challenges of counterinsurgency warfare. After some early setbacks, the Peruvian military initiated a more balanced counterinsurgency approach by integrating lethal military action with population security and development. Sendero aided the new strategy by inflicting intense violence and abuse on many Peruvian villages. The government integrated many villages into a local security program called Rondas Campesinas. Under this system, villagers were armed and given authority to defend their villages from SL influence.14 At the time of Guzmán’s capture, Sendero was already reeling under the effects of the new strategies. However, instead of attempting to return to the countryside and win back the population, Guzmán shifted his efforts to Peru’s capital city, Lima, to try a shortcut to victory. Guzmán believed that Peru’s government had been sufficiently weakened, and that extensive terrorist attacks would cause a mass exodus of rich and powerful Limeños with their financial resources. This would cause a run on the banks, economic collapse, and a call for foreign intervention. Shining Path could take up the banner of a nationalist movement against foreign intruders and regain widespread popular support.15

On 12 September 1992, Guzmán was captured along with several other SL leaders in a raid by DINCOTE (Dirección Contra Terrorismo), an elite group of Peruvian national police that had received extensive support and training from the United States.16 Following his capture, Guzmán made statements in support of a cessation of hostilities with the government. The importance of Guzmán’s capture cannot be overstated. Sendero’s highly structured organization was thrown into chaos. In the 18 months after his arrest, 3,600 Shining Path guerrillas turned themselves in or were captured, and political violence decreased rapidly.17 Shining Path was reduced to a minor nuisance and was believed to be utterly defeated, until recently.

In the aftermath of Sendero’s disintegration, the Peruvian government began to dismantle its intelligence agencies in response to accounts of atrocities by some of their operational units. The Barrios Altos massacre by the Grupo Colina, a group backed by now-jailed Vladimiro Montesinos, former head of SIN (Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional), the Peruvian state intelligence organization, proved to be the most powerful motivation for a weakening of agencies once seen as essential in the fight against SL. In addition, the focus on development in disconnected regions of the country lost urgency with the rapid decline of violence.

**Sendero Luminoso’s Return**

Today, after a period of relative calm, there are concerns about a resurgent SL growing in power and influence in Huallaga and the Valley of the Apurimac and Ene Rivers (Valle de los Rios Apurimac Ene abbreviated as VRAE). On 9 April 2009, Shining Path guerrillas ambushed two Peruvian army patrols in the VRAE, leaving 15 dead.18 On the morning of 2 August 2009, a reported group of 50 insurgents attacked a fixed police outpost in San Jose de Secce, leaving three police and two civilians dead.19 On the afternoon of 2 September 2009, long-range fire brought down a Peruvian helicopter on a mission to evacuate three soldiers wounded during a firefight with SL forces in the VRAE. The crash left two dead and one severely wounded.20 Such attacks indicate a more sophisticated level of operations and are a troubling sign for the region.

Perhaps most disturbing is the change in strategy being employed by SL. Following its collapse in the 1990s, SL conducted a 5-year study of its failure and codified its findings in a 45-page summary that became Sendero’s new strategy. Within the document, SL renounces many of its former practices including extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, blackmail, and occupying homes.21 Shining Path concluded that violence against the population was the critical failure of the rebellion. It is now reportedly providing potable water, building sports fields, and painting schools to garner popular support.22 Victor Quispe Palomino, the leader of the VRAE elements of SL, stated that SL would not target transnational businesses or nongovernmental organizations but rather only the “armed forces, police, and those that take part in the so-called fight against terrorism and narco-trafficking.”23 Such statements by SL leaders and large-scale attacks on army and police units indicate that the belief that SL had transformed into little more than a security element for cocaine production was incorrect. Shining Path remains a communist insurgent organization and has now adopted
a FARC-like strategy in which it uses profits from narco-trafficking to fund purchases of equipment and supplies, pays its fighters, and gains the support of the population.

The reason Shining Path is gaining traction once again in Huallaga and the VRAE is the same reason Guzmán was able to develop the organization in the 1970s. These regions remain disconnected and disenfranchised, making them vulnerable to criminal and insurgent influence. Despite the lessons of the 1980s and 1990s, in Huancavelica, Ayacucho, and Apurimac, the average income remains from 60 to 89 percent below the poverty line. Security in the city of Ayacucho has improved, but economic activity remains a challenge due to limited connections with major economic hubs like Pisco, Cuzco, and Lima. Roads and infrastructure linking the poor highlands with the more prosperous coast remain in disrepair or are nonexistent. Lima, with its population of more than seven million, continues to dominate the national government’s resources and focus. The lack of legal economic opportunities has led to continued production of coca. Peru remains the number two producer of cocaine in the world and, according to the United Nations World Drug Report, production has increased for the last four years. The explosive combination of poverty, lack of government presence, and coca production makes the region fertile ground for Sendero.

Occurring in parallel with the continued poverty and coca production in the VRAE and Huallaga is the reduction of pressure by security forces. The degradation of the Peruvian intelligence community and lack of attention to the maintenance of military and police units has reduced their ability to destroy the remaining Sendero elements. Furthermore, unutilized Rondas Campesinas units are now apathetic to counter Sendero’s resurgence. Their leaders worry about the marginalization of Rondas Campesinas, who are not part of the security plan as they were in the 1990s. In addition, the national government has not provided medical benefits and benefits for widows and orphaned children as it promised during the terrorist crisis. Rondas Campesinas commanders...
decided not to participate in an annual parade in 2009 because they were angry at the way the government treated them and because Shining Path had co-opted some of them. Many of the commanders are coca farmers who joined Rondas Campesinas units due to the violence brought by SL. Now with Sendero’s change in strategy, they are less inclined to fight in support of an unappreciative government.29

Currently, SL does not represent a threat to the Peruvian state as it did in the 1990s. However, the Peruvian government is recognizing that SL remains a problem. Following the recent attacks on military and police units, the government has begun increasing troop strength in the regions. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has shown some success with its alternative development program. Between 2002 and 2009, USAID invested more than $110 million and completed 703 public works projects and 54,976 productive projects. Perhaps the most important aspect of the program is that it uses a multipronged approach to strengthen government, provide infrastructure, increase access to markets, and increase access to health care.30 Peru’s Plan VRAE and Plan Huallaga, like USAID, are designed as interagency efforts. It remains to be seen if Peru will be able to manage a relentless pursuit of armed insurgents while extending the benefits of societal inclusion.

Lessons

The story of Peru’s fight against SL is significant for the United States in the current “era of persistent conflict.”31 The Sendero insurgency was and is a symptom of social inequity and lack of opportunity. Peru did not effectively address these underlying conditions after its defeat of Sendero in the 1990s. As the United States withdraws from Iraq and transfers control to Iraqi forces, it must be cognizant of latent dangers. Security gains are not ends in themselves. Depending on the region, underlying conditions for instability could include the lack of freedom of religion, and efficacy economic opportunity, and access to political power. Although the disengagement of foreign troops will remove one irritant, the legitimacy

Police arrest an injured protester in Ayacucho, Peru, 1 July 2004. Prime Minister Carlos Ferrero claimed that the Shining Path terrorist group was behind the acts of violence in Ayacucho.
Colombia could prove to be an example of successful government consolidation following an internal conflict.

...of the elected Iraqi government will be paramount. Equally important will be the final eradication of hard-line Islamists who are similar in many ways to the dedicated Maoists of Sendero.

Iraq shares one additional parallel with Peru: local security forces, the Sons of Iraq, have been critical to achieving security, like Rondas Campesinas. It will be essential for the Iraqi government to follow through on its promises and integrate these forces into government security forces or into civil society.

This same strategy is applicable to Colombia as well. As Colombia consolidates its gains against the FARC, a transition to government services in formerly lawless areas must occur. Colombia, however, may provide a roadmap for post-conflict consolidation. Colombia has developed the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security (Política de Consolidación de la Seguridad Democrática). The U.S. “Colombian Strategic Development Initiative” supports this policy. Both plans focus on delivering enduring economic opportunity and government services to formerly lawless or FARC-controlled regions. Both plans shift resources from the primarily security-heavy efforts of the last decade, while maintaining extremely successful and unrelenting intelligence-based targeting of the FARC leadership. With continued U.S. support and Colombian political will, Colombia could prove to be an example of successful government consolidation following an internal conflict.

America’s support in Colombia and Iraq will be critical in the success of her allies. Follow-through is essential in the final phases of a government victory. The U.S. should heed the lessons of Perú’s long fight against its internal enemies. Perú’s success in the 1990s using targeting and a whole-of-government approach has not proven to be permanent. A failure to persist with the benefits of government services and a lack of pressure by security forces has allowed SL to regroup. To achieve a lasting victory, the government must address the social foundations of insurgency, the intransigent insurgent leadership, and the support of the population from which the insurgents obtain their intelligence, anonymity, and logistical support.

NOTES


3. The hacienda system was a landed estate establishment created by Spanish colonists. These large tracts of lands became a source of social status and dominated small farms and indigenous lands. The system endured until reforms in the 20th century. Peter Winn, Americas (University of California Press, 2006) 48.


9. Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Ocean Press, Australia, 2006), 1-2. The Foco Method is a guerrilla strategy developed by Che Guevara based on the concept that a small nucleus of revolutionaries can develop the conditions necessary for revolution, creating general insurrection.

10. Wickham-Crowley, 253.


13. Wickham-Crowley, 298.

14. See Fishel and Manwaring, 121-24, for a detailed analysis of the Peruvian strategy.

15. Interview with Enrique Obando (Lima, Peru, 16 July 2009).


19. “Por lo menos 50 terroristas atacaron sede policial del poblado de San Jose de Becco,” El Comercio, 2 August 2009.


25. Interview with small business owners (Ayacucho, Peru, 15 July 2009).


29. Interview with Rondas Campesinas commander (Ayacucho, Peru 15 July 2009).

30. USAID Peru Fact Sheet (2009).

31. Term used in the U.S. Army, Army Posture Statement (2008), 1. Describes the current operating environment in which the U.S. military expects to face a “future of protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors who will use violence to achieve political, religious, or other ideological ends.”


33. Interview with USAID office (Bogota, Colombia, 17 July 2009).
At the strategic level, the campaign replaces the engagement, and the theater of operations takes the place of the position. At the next stage, the war as a whole replaces the campaign, and the whole country the theater of operations.

—Carl von Clausewitz

LATELY THERE HAS been a great deal of editorializing, sermonizing even, on the topic of the grand strategy of the United States. A consensus has emerged that the United States has no grand strategy. At one end of the spectrum of opinion, we have Andrew Bacevich of Boston University claiming, “There is no czar for strategy. This most crucial portfolio remains unassigned.” From the other end of the spectrum the ubiquitous Ralph Peters writes, “Pause to consider how lockstep what passes for analysis in Washington has become.” Both men are referring to the U.S. strategy—or lack of it—in Afghanistan. In August 2009, on the opening day of the new class at the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), retired Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni implied that the kind of “reordering” that took place after World War II under President Truman and retired General George C. Marshall has not taken place since. I submit that when General Zinni said “reordering,” he meant “grand strategy.” The implications of this view are troubling. How could a global hegemon like the United States lack the sine qua non of a coherent national security strategy?

In order to have a useful discussion on this topic we must define our terms. First, the intermediate service colleges do not uniformly teach the concept of grand strategy. The Command and General Staff College does not teach grand strategy as a separate level of war to field grade officers, and the Army’s capstone operational doctrine Field Manual 3-0, Operations, does not mention it once. To be fair, some instructors at CGSC do teach the concept—but on their own initiative. On the other hand, the Naval War College exposes students to the concept early and often in its curriculum. Perhaps Clausewitz’s On War best defines grand strategy: “At the strategic level, the campaign replaces the engagement, and the theater of operations takes the place of the position. At the next stage, the war as a whole replaces the campaign, and the whole country the theater of operations.” In other words, grand strategy is “the next stage,”
The historic Potsdam Conference, 17 July-2 August 1945, defined the basic tenets for establishing a peaceful, democratic transition in Germany after World War II. Here, Joseph Stalin, Harry Truman, and Winston Churchill talk informally during a break.

which encompasses the strategic considerations for “the whole country.”

The uneven approach given to grand strategy in professional military education is but one symptom of a larger American problem at this level of war. However, it is not the only problem. There are historical precedents for a situation where a hegemonic or imperial power lacked a coherent grand strategy beyond simply “staying on top.” For example, classical scholars are still debating whether Rome and ancient China really had grand strategies understood as such by their ruling elites. There have been a surprising number of recent books on the topic of grand strategy in the United States, but one suspects that the audiences reading them are limited. There is also the issue of strategic culture, a sometimes nefarious term with many definitions. I define strategic culture as a set of predisposed strategic tendencies. Such tendencies do not necessarily equate to a coherent grand strategy. The United States has had a strategic culture, but no grand strategy, for at least the current and previous three U.S. presidential administrations, perhaps more, if critics like Andrew Bacevich are right.

The United States has had a strategic culture, but no grand strategy, for at least the current and previous three U.S. presidential administrations, perhaps more...
A good place to start looking for a coherent grand strategy is in the Constitution of the United States, from which we can extrapolate a coherent grand strategy. Although the framers of that document could not foresee the elements of national power that the United States began to wield in the 20th century, they probably always believed in the potential of the latent power their system of government promised. They were men who believed that ideas mattered and that an attractive system of democratic and republican government could wield a unique power of its own when yoked to the rich resources of North America. The goals for a uniquely American grand strategy are not the subject of a guessing game and never have been. The Preamble to the Constitution explicitly lists them: “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”

The writers of the Preamble had the long view in mind in claiming these goals for their “Posterity”—us. Additionally, the body of the Constitution implies the means to attain these lofty goals. The cultural means might be the entire document itself, a model of checks and balances using a “holy trinity” of executive, legislative, and judicial branches competing with and balancing each other. A wide spectrum of polities throughout the modern world reflects this system. The message, still in doubt at the time of the framing, was “Our system works, try it.”

A Brazilian army officer attending CGSC presented a “Know Your World” briefing on his country to the students, their families, and interested local residents of the Leavenworth area. His political discussion provided parallels to the U.S. model: three branches of government, bicameral legislature, civilian control of the military, and even a capital created out of the wilderness and given its own political status as a separate province. The way to become exceptional was to adopt the American political model. This is an example of cultural power, one element of grand strategy.

However, this model cannot be divorced from its historical and geographical contexts. These contexts lead to other elements in the Constitution’s grand strategy—no longer well understood—and explain why the United States does not currently have a grand strategy. Simply put, Americans do not understand geography and history, and their educational system reflects this. This was not always the case. The founders understood the natural defense power that their geographic situation promised. Accordingly, they mandated the establishment and maintenance of a Navy to take advantage of the fact that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans protected their “New Jerusalem.” The issue of homeland defense was simply a matter of geography and having enough barriers (through either coastal forts or a fleet) as an insurance policy. As George Washington famously said, “Without a decisive naval force, we can do nothing definitive, and with it, everything honorable and glorious.”

On land, it was a different story. Here the historical context came from America’s British heritage as much as it did from Enlightenment-era philosophy. Britons’ experience with the semi-dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell and the later Glorious Revolution that deposed James II gave them and their colonial cousins a deep mistrust of military strongmen and standing armies. Further, the experience of the French and Indian Wars and the American Revolution created a myth about the efficacy of the militia. Thus, the Constitution enshrined the concept of the citizen soldier in the Second Amendment, while at the same time limiting the ability to create a standing Army in article I, section 8, paragraph 12 of the same document. The same section also contained the Navy establishment clause as well as the provision for trade warfare at sea in paragraph 11. Over time, the grand strategy came to encompass military nonintervention outside the Western Hemisphere, free trade access to whatever markets Americans desired, and the right to act as the hemispheric hegemon. These last two components are known as the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door Policy, respectively. The attainment of a contiguous landmass from sea to shining sea completed the defensive geographical requirement needed by this strategy with a sort of buffer zone in the southwest along the Rio Grande. This was the American grand strategy, constitutionally based, for almost 150 years—although the geographical land component came after the war with Mexico.

The strategy changed in response to the implosion of European-led Western civilization during the first half of the 20th century. The United States made an effort after 1919 to return to its original grand
strategy, but the outbreak of an even more destructive and dangerous world war in 1939 spelled doom for this effort. Competing fascist, militarist, and totalitarian ideologies culturally threatened the U.S. strategy and physically threatened the eastern shore of its oceanic moat. Meanwhile, the Japanese attacked the Open Door trade component and the Pacific moat in 1941. Once the U.S. got involved in the general war raging across the globe, American political leaders now had the force of public opinion behind them (and no Great Depression to restrain them) to replace the old grand strategy with a more internationalist one. Even so, the United States might have reverted to its baseline grand strategy after World War II had it not been for the ideological, cultural, national security, and economic threats posed by the Soviet Union and the spread of communism after the collapse of European colonialism across the globe. A grand strategy focused on a specific threat outside the hemisphere and, within the context of a balance of nuclear power, replaced the more generic grand strategy practiced previously. The ends, catalogued in the Constitution’s preamble, had not changed. The means (economic power, nuclear power, and air power) had. So, too, had the ways—containment and deterrence.14

The end of the Cold War should have occasioned a review of the grand strategy. Modern Americans tend to do well at achieving short-term goals, but not so well with mid- and long-term ones. The failure to revise U.S. grand strategy after the Cold War demonstrates this. It is high time to revise our grand strategy, and sooner rather than later.

The problem seems to be that the challenges of the present prevent us from moving ahead to align the grand strategy of the United States to current global realities and trends. The beautiful thing about a grand strategy is that it need not be any longer than the preamble of the Constitution—that word length is about right. I would submit that there is not much work to do to adopt a new grand strategy. Just re-adopt the old one, technologically updated of course and with a small, but smaller, military establishment capable of defending our air,
sea, and space “moats.” The war that lasted from 1914 to 1989 is over. The grand strategy that served the United States well before World War II is a fine framework for the 21st century.

Today’s operational environment is actually a more promising one in which to implement the traditional strategy than it appears at first blush. The American voting public does not favor interventionism. We need only divest ourselves of commitments made in error (Iraq), in haste with little thought of the end state (Afghanistan and Iraq), and those that have outlived their utility (Korea, Japan, troops in Europe, and our Navy in the Persian Gulf). Strategic retrenchment of this sort, in which we remove the training wheels from the bicycle and stand on the sidewalk, is a necessary step toward healthy growth. The United States has more than enough national power to get involved if the bicycle falls down, but the U.S. must control its tendency toward strategic impatience (a feature of our strategic culture). We need to practice strategic patience. We need to learn to say “no.” In doing so, we may find we actually have more strategic choices—and less strategic imperatives—than ever. MR

NOTES


2. General Zinni’s 11 August 2009 comments to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Class 2010-01 were for attribution.


6. For example, Bruce Berkowitz, Strategic Advantage (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008).


10. See <www.history.navy.mil/trivia/trivia02.htm> (10 July 2009).


12. For a dated but still fascinating discussion of the Open Door in the 20th century, see Thomas Bryson, “Admiral Mark L. Bristol, an Open-Door Diplomat in Turkey,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 5 (September 1974), 450-67. The Open Door was no myth. As a component of national strategy and policy, it can be found in National Archives and Record Administration Record Group 80 General Board 420-2, CNO Memorandum in Re Tentative Draft of U.S. Naval Policy,” 4 March 1922. 1.

A Practical Approach to Cultural Insight

Colonel Casey Haskins, U.S. Army

THIS ARTICLE PROPOSES a simple model to help understand a culture—any culture. Though more than a checklist, it cannot substitute for detailed study of a language or cultural immersion. Neither will it provide any solutions. What it can do is provide the user with a way to think about a particular society, to help focus observations and actions. The object is to help the user figure out what things pose real problems and to provide insight on what solutions might work.

The past two decades have shown, especially since our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq began, that we need some ability to understand and work with other cultures. Lack of understanding has led, at best, to frustration and setbacks, and, at worst, to tragedy. Examples are many and familiar. In 2004, a machine gunner in a Baghdad convoy shot at a car, killing its driver (a father) and wounding the passengers (members of his family) because of a simple cultural misunderstanding. The gunner had signaled the car to stop while the convoy passed. He used the common American arm signal: arm extended toward the driver, palm raised: “Halt!” Unfortunately, the terrified Iraqi driver, raised in a society that used European-style traffic signals, misunderstood the gunner to mean, “Proceed in the direction of my raised arm.” He did, with tragic results.¹

Other examples abound. Construction programs that cost hundreds of millions of dollars ended up not satisfying local needs (and in some instances creating further resentment).² Programs developed state institutions that seemed normal to Americans but were ill-suited to the local society.³

The need is plain enough, but practical methods for achieving cultural understanding seem to be lacking. The Army is currently looking for a better way of achieving “situational understanding.” The still-vague process called “Design” recognizes that understanding a situation takes time. We have already tried a variety of approaches. Doctrine has incorporated various aspects of culture, from adding the “C” (civil considerations) to the acronym METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, time, and now civil considerations); to adopting PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social,
infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time) as a framework for describing the operational environment; to flirting with the concept of “human terrain.” Recent doctrinal manuals are full of discussions of the need to understand and work within local cultures. Pre-deployment train-ups include cultural training, and training centers routinely emphasize it.

The military has tried various organizational changes (Joint Forces Command’s Operational Net Assessment teams, Training and Doctrine Command’s Culture Center, human terrain teams, and various and sundry cultural and political advisors). We have encouraged language training, developed cultural handbooks, and tried a variety of other approaches. As an Army, we have undoubtedly become more attuned to culture and seem to be more adept at working with it. Yet no one is satisfied. In a typical unit, two observations seem clear: its members vary widely in cultural ability, and experience is the best predictor of success. In other words, our Army’s greatest gains in cultural fluency have come the hard way, and we have no satisfactory system for passing that knowledge along.

Attempts to increase understanding have suffered from a number of problems. Some methods are too specific to one particular culture: good if the unit ends up deployed where that culture resides, but not so good when the unit goes other places. The culture in one part of Iraq differs greatly from that in other parts, but unit moves are common. A unit that prepares for Mosul and deploys to Afghanistan instead has an even bigger challenge—and this situation is not uncommon.

Some methods are helpful but too simplistic to be of widespread applicability. “SWEAT-MS” falls into this category. Security, water, electricity, academics, transportation, medical, and sanitation (to cite just one version of this evolving acronym) are all important considerations, but the acronym’s use as a checklist does not necessarily produce either insight or success. If a checklist leads to too narrow a focus, it can even cause important clues to be ignored.5

Indeed, a narrow interpretation and mechanical application can spoil the best of methods—and many of the methods in use are far from “best.” Predeployment cultural training is often scattershot, sometimes confusing. Lists of facts and statistics with no coherent narrative often leave little impression and do not seem to produce a greater number of successful decisions.

Clearly, substantial language training followed by a cultural immersion experience should work, as it does for foreign area officers. Just as clearly, this is not feasible for a number of practical reasons, including the money it would cost, the time it would take, and our ability to predict accurately just which language and which culture we will need by training’s end.

The complex nature of societies makes this all the harder. There is no way to reduce a culture (which results from thousands or millions of people interacting with each other and with their environment over many years) into a simple checklist. Any attempt to do so is bound to disappoint. Even experts disagree. There is no widely accepted academic framework for analyzing a culture, let alone predicting how a policy will work out.6 Yet, we are expected to do exactly this.

To that end, I offer a framework I have found helpful in analyzing cultures, making plans, and informing decisions. It consists of two parts: a simplified model of society (copied from Professor Daniel Chirot) and a list of questions.7 The model is not intended to represent every nuance of reality; its usefulness comes largely from its simplicity and the essential insights it reveals. The purpose of the questions is to help channel observations. Answer them a little, and a little understanding will follow. Answer them some more, and a richer, more thorough understanding will result. The more completely one can answer them, the more one will grasp a particular society, not just foreign cultures, but subcultures everywhere (corporations, university departments, government agencies, international organizations, immigrant neighborhoods, hospitals, etc.). Therefore, the nearest big city can offer a useful training opportunity.

The purpose of the questions is to help channel observations. Answer them a little, and a little understanding will follow.
The questions form a sort of “collection plan” for culture. They are not comprehensive because too many questions would be worse than too few. Many do not lend themselves to absolute answers because societies are too complex for that. They are not prioritized because it is impossible to know in advance what will matter most. Some are obvious, others less so, although I have found all of them useful at some point. Not all of them will be relevant in every situation. (Indeed, in some cases, the user may need to ask additional questions.) Nor will they reveal some magic solution to a problem. In fact, as was earlier stated, they will not lead to any solutions—only, hopefully, to a better understanding of the problems. Their use should also speed understanding and may help those with less experience start to understand a new culture.8

The Model

Chirot’s model of a society has four interrelated parts. The word “interrelated” is important here. It means if a change is made to one part, the other parts will change as a result. The boundaries between parts are not clear. In the real world, it is impossible to separate the economy from politics, or culture from institutions.9 They overlap. That doesn’t matter; the point is not to be comprehensive, but to gain understanding. Deliberate simplification should also help to avoid the fate of many good ideas—ever-increasing elaboration to make things more complete, leading in the end to too much detail to be useful.10

Part I: Political System. This is a conservative force, meaning that it resists change. The key questions are not about governmental structure or political parties or the apparatus of elections. Instead, this model aims at the essence:

- Who has power? It can be centralized or decentralized, formal or informal.
- How did they get it?
- How is it wielded?
- What is it used for?
- What are the checks on their power?

Part II: Economy. The economy is a neutral force, meaning that it neither promotes nor resists change. It is the place where the society interacts with its environment and where ideas meet the real world and are put to the test. In addition to being a testing ground, it is also a source of new ideas, and a source of signals about what might be coming. The economy deserves its own list of questions to focus observations and develop understanding. (The battlefield shares many of these characteristics with the economy. Both are where reality tests ideas, where winners and losers have to deal with the results, and where we find clues about what might come next.)

Part III: Social institutions. These are collective structures—anything from the Boy Scouts to the central bank, to the school system, to the national police force, to a labor union, to a football league. A key property of institutions is that, while members come and go, the institution itself retains some recognizable character and consistent behavior.11 Like politics, social institutions are a conservative force, in that they tend to resist change. Also like politics, the key aspect of social institutions is not their shape, number, or detail, but their function:

- They make rules.
- They enforce (or fail to enforce) those rules.
- They create processes (some significant, some trivial). This matters, because a common cause of failure in both organizations and societies is an ill-advised attempt to use old processes to do new things after circumstances change. It does not work. Old processes only do old things. Doing new things requires new processes.12
- They shape the way people cooperate.

Therefore, questions the user must ask about each institution are:

- What rules does this institution make, for whom, and with what authority?
- Does it enforce them? If so, how?
- What processes is it responsible for that affect people outside the institution itself? How significant are they? How flexible are they? How do they change?
- What effect does this institution have on the way people cooperate with each other?

Part IV: Culture. There is no established definition for culture. Here, we will define it simply as the values, ideas, and collective tastes that guide decisions. Culture is a neutral force: it neither promotes nor resists change, or rather, it sometimes does one, and sometimes the other.

What follows is a list of questions designed to give insight into the culture. The intent is not to judge what is better or what is worse. In fact, if the
user passes too much moral judgment while observing and trying to understand, it will distort what he or she sees. Instead, the intent is to help the user figure out how things work and then to figure out what to do with that knowledge.

A note on the format: Many of the questions begin with two endpoints with a dash between them. The user must decide where to place a particular culture on the implied continuum between endpoints.

I have also provided clarifying comments in italics following the questions. Again, not all questions may be relevant in a given situation. Many are open-ended. They are not intended to be comprehensive. They simply provide a number of perspectives to help the user gain insights and understanding. There may not be a single definitive answer to a given question. Societies are complex and contain many tensions and contradictions.

Groups and Identity

- Individual—Collective. Where on this continuum? What groups?
- Identity (self, groups). How do they describe themselves? As Virginians? As Americans? As Baghdadis? As Iraqis? As Sunnis? As Shi’a? As members of a particular tribe?
- Social divisions. How stratified? How hierarchical? How rigid? Class, race, religion, age, sex, caste, degree of servitude, occupation, region, etc. What applies here and how does it work?
- Homogeneous Groups—Heterogeneous Groups. Are the people in a group more alike or more different?
- Rights for minorities. How strong? How well observed?
- Racism. Is there racism in the society? If so, how is it manifested?
- Family. How insular are families? In some societies, the families are very private affairs rarely glimpsed by outsiders (and then only in tightly controlled circumstances). Other places, families are much more freewheeling, open, and even chaotic, with members and partial members coming and going.
  - How rigidly is family structure defined?
  - What is the role of adult children?
  - What is the role of parents in children’s choice of spouse?
  - What is the role of children in caring for elderly parents?
- Gender roles. How rigid are they?
- What are the roles of the elderly?
● Children. What are their proper roles? What happens to orphans?
● Social mobility. How likely is it that a son will end up in the same socio-economic place as his father, or a daughter as her mother?
● Physical mobility—tied to the land. Americans tend to move to where jobs are. In many other places, it is unthinkable to leave the village of one’s birth. Where on the continuum is this society?

**How Decisions are Made**

● Tolerance. How much tolerance of uncertainty? *Some societies embrace risk and uncertainty. Others do not. Most would agree that America has shifted from a risk-taking society to a relatively risk-averse one, lawsuits being one illustration of that. Nevertheless, many would still see it as less risk-averse than in some Western European countries.* (In general, two types of society are likelier than average to be risk averse. Marginal societies [for instance those that are one bad harvest away from starvation] cannot afford to experiment because of the catastrophic cost of failure. Ironically, on the other end of the spectrum, societies that have experienced prolonged growth and success also tend to lose some of their appetite for risk. This is a by-product of the increasing bureaucratic controls they inevitably develop to handle the fruits of success. Those controls stifle agility, make it more difficult to take risks, and can lead people to believe they are no longer needed.)

● Confidence. When looking outward, do they see threat or opportunity?

● Openness to new ideas. Are they curious? Are new technologies seen more as a blessing or as a menace?

● Rules—Principles and Judgment. Do they tend to legislate and control by rules, regulations, and details, or do they try to agree on key principles and then empower officials to use their judgment in enforcing those principles, holding the officials accountable?
  – Which rules matter?
  – How closely does this conform to formal laws?
  – How is this knowledge passed?
  – Who gets to judge when rules are broken?

  – How important is time in daily life?
  – How strong is the sense of history? *Some societies seem to focus more on the past than on the future. Others have a strong historical sense but are forward looking. Still others seem to have very little sense of history.*
  – How open is history to facts? *Every culture has its historical myths, some trivial (George Washington chopping the cherry tree) and some complex and laden with emotion (the rugged, individualist cowboy as the archetype American—he was, the evidence clearly shows, really a wage-earning corporate employee, often a racial minority, and never as important as portrayed).* How resistant to evidence are the myths?
  – How do they see themselves in their history? *As victims? Triumphant? Both? Even the U.S. case is complicated. For instance, if you ask Americans to name two battles in the push westward of the frontier, most will pick the Alamo and Little Big Horn. Both these represent significant losses, in what was actually an almost unbroken series of victories.*

In just six months, Nawa, Afghanistan, residents went from collecting and carrying water every day to using clean, well-built communal taps near their homes. Children in Nawa fill their containers with fresh running water, 2009.
USAID

Widows in the Adraskan District of western Afghanistan voted to form an association to produce and market traditional wool carpets in a USAID funded project, 2009.

Polje, a disastrous defeat. The Australians annually celebrate ANZAC Day, commemorating their defeat at Gallipoli. Nevertheless, both the U.S. and Australia view themselves as overall victors rather than as victims. It’s fair to say the Serbs see themselves mainly as victims. This can be complex.

- Problem solving. How do they approach problem solving?
  - Big bang—Incremental. Is the tendency to try solving it all at once, or to work at it bit by bit over time?
  - Need for crisis—a view of the future. Is a problem only solved when it becomes a crisis? Or is there a focused view of the future to prevent or minimize a problem? In other words, react—prevent.
  - Inclusiveness—exclusiveness. Open debate—smoke-filled rooms. Who is involved in making important decisions?
  - Consensus—Partisan rancor.

Key Ideas

- Fairness. How strong is the sense of fairness? How is “fairness” understood? If this seems trivial, it’s not. Seemingly similar cultures can differ fundamentally on what’s “fair.”
- Honor. How is “honor” defined? What is the importance of honor? What is the importance of “face”? The appearance and reputation of an individual varies by culture. In extreme cases, a significant loss of face can lead to suicide as the only honorable way out. In other societies, face is at most a minor consideration. How important is it here?
- Win-win? Or only lose-lose? The idea that two parties can make a deal and both end up better off is what makes markets possible. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, many societies do not extend the idea beyond narrow market transactions. Instead they see life as a zero-sum game, where the only way a person can come out ahead is by making someone else come out behind. In such a society, appealing to people by convincing them how much better off they’ll be under a plan won’t work. Instead, it may be necessary to persuade them that while they’ll lose, the others will all lose more.
- Willingness to compromise. Like “win-win,” compromise may seem a universal idea. It’s not. “A strong man has no need to compromise and a weak man can’t.” Compromise is fundamental to democracy. Holding elections in a society without compromise won’t lead to democratic government.
- Human rights. Is there a belief that people are entitled to some fundamental, basic rights? If so, what are those rights? Are there people who aren’t included? This may seem contradictory, but it is
**Social Norms**

- Masculine—Feminine. Degree of masculinity of society. Where on the continuum is this society? Some societies display traits traditionally associated with femininity. For instance, Sweden values consensus, inclusiveness, nurturing all citizens, protection, etc. Pashtuns, on the other hand, are on the masculine end of the spectrum, prizing honor, self-reliance, toughness, independence, and justice.
- Is there a shared “middle-class dream”? If so, what is it?
- Celebrity. What makes one a celebrity? How are celebrities dealt with?
- Information and entertainment. How do people get news? What are popular forms of entertainment? How have they changed over the years and why?
- Expectations of hospitality. When a stranger appears, what treatment should he expect? What about a family member?
- Expected appearance of houses (yards). Is there an expectation of neatness? Of ostentation or of discreetness? Are houses visible or walled off from the street?
- How is trash and garbage disposed of?
- Attitude toward pollution. Does the sight of pollution irritate people?
- Readiness to believe conspiracy theories. Most humans feel the appeal of conspiracy theories. In some societies, this is exaggerated to the point that people will reject visible truths out of hand, believing it must be more complex and more sinister than that.
- Politeness. These questions are not designed to give insight so much as to allow the user to move within the society with minimal friction.

What behaviors are offensive? What behaviors are polite?

- Common facial and arm signals. Learning to interpret these nonverbal communications is every bit as important as learning key phrases in the local language.

**Major Influences**

  - Rigidity of methods and measurements in schools. How tightly are teaching methods controlled? How uniform are they? What about tests? Tests really matter. People everywhere will “train to the test.” Therefore, whatever is measured defines what is important.
  - Creativity valued and promoted? Or conformity?
  - Belief in hard work or talent? Do parents and teachers believe that “some people just can’t do math” (most Americans), or that anyone can do math if they just work at it (most Asians)?
  - Merit or circumstances of birth? What determines one’s place in school?
    - Major subjects emphasized and omitted?
    - Literacy?
- Religion. The details of a particular religion probably matter less than understanding its effects:
  - Types/numbers of religions. In Bosnia, for example, there are three: Orthodox Christians, Catholics, and Muslims. There used to be a small Jewish population too, but no more. While many people are not religious, there are no Protestant churches, let alone Buddhist temples. In California, by contrast, no one can keep count.
  - Degree of orthodoxy. How rigidly are the rules enforced? By whom?
    - Tolerance?
    - Degree of importance in daily life?
    - Separation from other aspects of life?
    - Do people control their own lives or is it divine or magical control?
  - Driver of ethical behavior? Do the religions form the basis for a code of ethical behavior, as do Christianity, Judaism, and Islam? Or is it not tied to an ethical code, like some forms of polytheism or...
ancestor worship? Or are they somewhere between, as with some forms of Buddhism?

- Trust and government.
  - How much do the people see the government as representative?
  - How much do the people trust government to be good?
  - How much do they trust other people to be good?
  - Reliance on self and family versus reliance on government?
- Corruption
  - Degree and type of corruption?
  - How much do ordinary people tolerate corruption and accept it as natural?
  - How much do they resent it?
- Welfare and wealth.
  - Wealth redistribution. Does the government reappropriate money from the well-off to the poor? Does someone else (church, etc.)?
  - How much inequality is acceptable?
Societies vary widely in how much they accept vast disparities in income, power, privileges, etc. What is the case here?
  - How does inheritance work? Who inherits what?
  - How are the poor treated?
  - What happens when someone gets sick or injured?

Social Interaction

- Community involvement.
  - Professed? How much do people say they participate in the community?
  - National service? Is there a draft or something similar? Is service expected?
  - Participation in emergency services?
- Who fights fires?
  - Loyalty to employer?
- Language. Is there a common language?
  - How are nonspeakers treated? What do people speak at home?
  - Frankness. How direct is spoken communication? Do they tend to come right out and say what is on their minds or do they talk around it in the name of politeness? How big a role does nonverbal communication play?
  - Force for common identity or for separateness? (In Bosnia, there is one language—everyone can easily understand everyone else—but the three groups each insist that theirs is different, that there are really three distinct languages. [In 50 to 100 years, they will probably succeed in making it so.] In China, by contrast, there are at least eight major, distinct languages, each with many dialects. Yet because they share a system for writing, the government is able to insist that the country shares one language.)
- Art. What are the major art forms?
  - How widespread is participation? Does everyone sing and draw and dance? Or only a talented elite?
  - Public art. How common? What kinds?
  - Literary traditions?
  - Major subjects? What is the art about?
  - What’s important?
  - How important do people see art in their lives?
  - Music?

Some Observations

Answering these questions is not something that can be done overnight. Many may take weeks or months, and answers to some of the more obscure questions may continue to be refined over years.
Fuller answers tend also to come from groups of people engaged in debate than from single individuals. “What does the evidence mean? Why do you think that? What have you observed that points in that direction? Well, then, what about this?”

Commanders might find it useful to have an occasional session with key advisors to work through the model and see what level of consensus they have and how deeply they think they understand the answers to each question. This can be tied to a “so what?” review of their campaign plan, or to an assessment of metrics for progress (including a look at whether the metrics are really measuring the right things), but it need not be formally tied to anything. The questions can stand alone. The mere act of asking and answering them will shape the way users think about the society and the way they look at it, thus influencing everything they do. It will also cause the participants to reach consensus, to share a more explicit and more detailed view of the society than they otherwise would.

Of course, answering these questions, even answering them thoroughly, will not solve the problem of how to work successfully within a given culture. It may not even be clear which answers are most important. Neither questions nor answers can substitute for judgment. If turned into nothing more than a checklist, the model can quickly become just another administrative burden, one of many “synchronization” tools that form a headquarters’ daily task list. However, used properly to focus observation and analysis, the model will certainly inform judgment, adding color and nuance. Time and effort devoted to getting answers will pay off in increased chances of being able to predict how an action will unfold. It will thus help the users to develop solutions with a higher probability of succeeding and a lower probability of doing harm. MR

NOTES
1. The author was present.

2. An example of this is the initial “reconstruction” effort in Iraq, begun by the Coalition Provisional Authority and CJTF-7 in 2003-2004. It focused on building water treatment plants, sewage treatment plants, and electrical generation plants (the only three options, in order to keep the design process simple), many of which were poorly conceived, and some of which never ended up working. In one memorable instance, a water treatment plant, constructed in a Sunni town with very high unemployment, was built entirely by outsiders from the contractor’s tribe. For several months, the outsiders tore up the town streets, spent money that caused local inflation, and behaved in ways the townspeople found jarring. They left when the project was “complete”—but the roads were still a mess, the economy was in shambles, there was no immediate prospect of jobs at the plant, and worst of all, there were no pipes connecting anyone’s house to the plant. No local citizen could turn on a tap and drink safe, clean water. The results were not the hoped-for improvement. The author was present.

3. A good example is the Federation Army in Bosnia, the organization and training of which was led by MPRI, under an American government contract. When U.S. subsidies to support the Federation Army ended late in 2003, the whole apparatus became unaffordable and was seen by Bosnians as unworkable. Much of the army began quietly rusting away. The author was present.

4. Research suggests that the evidence is mixed for using prior experience as a predictor of future success at coping with cultural differences. It may be just that those with more experience here also have more experience in other areas which help. See Allison Abbe, Lisa M.V. Gulick, and Jeffrey L. Herman, “Cross-Cultural Competence in Army Leaders: A Conceptual and Empirical Foundation.” Study Report 2008-01, United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (October 2007), 9-10.

5. Dr. Marcus Griffin, who served as one of the first members of a human terrain team, described several incidents where this happened. Interview with author.

23 February 2009.


7. Daniel Chirot, How Societies Change (Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press, 1994). In this excellent book, Chirot credits Talcott Parsons with developing the original model on which his is based.

8. The reader with experience in the field of sociology will notice that the questions and the model include all five of Geert Hofstede’s cultural index dimensions—individual vs. collective (IDV), power distance index (PDI), uncertainty avoidance index (UAI), masculinity (MAS), and long-term orientation (LTO). However, while Hofstede’s index is quite helpful in classifying societies, it is less than adequate in understanding how a particular culture works. Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1980).


10. This phenomenon is sometimes jokingly referred to as “the Christmas Tree Disease.” When someone notices a bare patch in the tree’s branches, he covers it up with ornaments—but then that leads to too many ornaments in that spot, which must be balanced by more ornaments elsewhere. Soon the tree sags dangerously, and if the process is not stopped, the tree topples. Examples abound. Three were already mentioned. METT (mission, enemy, terrain, and troops available) became METT-T (with the addition of “time”) and then METT-TC (with the addition of “civil considerations”). Joint Forces Command developed PMESII (political, military, economy, social, infrastructure, and information) as a framework for analyzing an operational situation. Shortly afterward, the Army added —PT (physical environment and time). The Civil Affairs acronym SWET (sewage, water, electricity, and telecommunications) kept expanding: the most common current form is SWEAT-MS (security, water, electricity, academics, transportation, medical, and sanitation (which includes sewage and trash disposal)). While it is true that models are incomplete, we often lose sight of the fact that a model’s usefulness can stem as much from what it omits as what it includes.


15. Ibid.
ON 19 AUGUST 2010, the last combat unit—the 4th Stryker Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division—left Iraq as Operation Iraqi Freedom became Operation New Dawn. Already our troop strength is below 50,000 in Iraq. It’s premature to say that we have won, but we are leaving an Iraq that is “not perfect, but good enough to leave,” as the Washington Post’s chief Iraqi correspondent Ernesto Londoño put it recently.1

This is a remarkable turn of events from just a few years ago. Yet, we do not clearly understand just what we did that pulled a potential victory from the jaws of defeat. Conventional wisdom claims that we prevailed because of the American surge between 2007 and 2008 and an aggressive shift in tactical operations to effective counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. These COIN principles included changing our focus from killing and capturing insurgents to protecting the population and liberally funding economic development projects plus essential services.

The additional manpower of the surge and placing small combat outposts among the population were critical to our success. The “Awakening” in 2006 removed a large pool of Sunni insurgents. Partnering with Iraqi Security Forces and the “Sons of Iraq” militia was also very effective. However, our nonlethal effects were far less important than is usually credited. This is especially true of the billions of dollars we spent on projects and services.

The most important requirement for protecting the population was removal of the criminals and insurgents who were causing the problems. The most effective means to remove them was through combat operations designed to kill or capture them. To defend the Iraqi people, we built thousands of barriers and berms to separate the insurgents from the population. “Good fences make good neighbors,” was how one battalion commander put it.2 We conducted relentless lethal operations against the insurgent enemy. For a time, we sustained high casualties as the price of eliminating a much greater number of insurgents. The Iraqi Security Forces slowly became more professional, not as good as us, but good enough to handle their enemy. Economic incentives were useful to reinforce success, but not before taking down the insurgents. Our experience in Iraq verified
Our experience in Iraq verified that lethal operations remain the decisive element of combat power.

that lethal operations remain the decisive element of combat power.

Ever since the release of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in 2006, official and unofficial military publications have been filled with articles extolling the virtues of nonlethal operations—the “lines of effort” of governance, economic development, essential services, reconciliation, and so forth. Many COIN enthusiasts advocated an immoderate focus on economic development over combat operations—more Greg Mortenson and less Curtis LeMay. Very quickly, the legitimate need to consider other lines of effort shifted to a primacy of nonlethal operations. The emphasis on COIN turned a popular philosophy into a reigning, almost myopic, orthodoxy. A field commander’s competence became a perception of his mastery of the nonlethal aspects of COIN, not his effectiveness in reducing violence in his area of operations. Those officers who did not demonstrate enough enthusiasm for nonlethal operations were often dismissed as not “getting” COIN.

We seem reluctant to admit that killing the enemy actually worked. Author and frequent Iraqi embed Bing West noted this reluctance and suggested a reason for it. In the March-April 2009 edition of Military Review, West wrote—

The theories espoused in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, persuaded the mainstream media that General Petraus’s forthcoming [surge] campaign in Baghdad was righteous. The FM appealed to liberals because it posited the concept of war without blood. Enemies were converted rather than killed. It was the only FM ever accorded a New York Times book review, written by a Harvard professor.3

However, FM 3-24 did not restrict lethal operations. Instead, it broadened the Army’s horizons by explaining that other potentially effective strategies, both lethal and nonlethal, were available to defeat an insurgency. A commander was free to choose from a smorgasbord of options to achieve success in his assigned area. Lethal operations were still on the menu.

Projects and Services Overrated

In the summer of 2008, my Jordanian-American interpreter told me that a few years earlier the American unit to which he was assigned had spent more than $6 million to build a student union for Mustansyriah University in Baghdad. He had served with several American units over a five-year period and he knew the recent history of the area better than anyone in the squadron. I asked him what the U.S. got for its money. Without hesitating, he replied, “IEDs” (improvised explosive devices).

This interpreter had experienced our economic development endeavors close-up and over time. Like others with lengthy experience working with Americans, he admired our efforts but lamented that we were hopelessly naïve when it came to spending money in Iraq. He was particularly appalled with the hundreds of millions of dollars spent in the Baghdad slum of Sadr City. He explained that there was no letup in the violence and the militias took both the money and the credit for the projects anyway.

Just because we provided, for example, a micro-power generator to an impoverished community and put its grand opening “storyboard” into a local newspaper does not mean the project was effective. It just meant that we spent a lot of money, completed a project, and perhaps felt good about it. As another battalion commander commented, “200K gets you a
roof and paint job on a school house and a few Stars and Stripes pictures.” Did violence drop as a result? Did we get more tips or more involvement from the local government? Did we provide more jobs for the local population? Was the generator even working a week or a month later? Those would be much better indicators of a project’s effectiveness. The only “metrics” monitored, however, were the amount of money spent and the number of completed projects. These statistics gave the illusion of progress. The prevailing wisdom of nonlethal primacy is based on a kernel of truth: the intuitive connection between completed projects and drops in violence. The problem is that we have accepted the theory without reviewing the results that are right in front of us.

As a general rule, the further one is from executing such projects and services, the more enthusiasm one has for the effort. This largely explains the eagerness many think-tank intellectuals outside of the Army, and even some senior officers within it, have for this aspect of COIN. They rarely, if ever, encountered the frustration that those of us executing this line of effort experienced. Indeed, when we first arrived in Iraq the squadron staff officer responsible for coordinating our projects and microgrants was a true believer. However, midway through our 13-month rotation he became thoroughly disillusioned with the way we were wasting money and energy on pointless projects.

Too often, the feeling at a project’s grand opening was not satisfaction for doing something worthwhile for the Iraqis but frustration at being badly ripped-off by contractors. In spite of inspections over the course of the project, often by other Iraqis vetted by us, the quality of most Iraqi projects fell short of expectations. We heard repeatedly that Iraqi contractors took advantage of the lack of oversight to pocket a handsome profit.

Our interpreters, our informants, our Iraqi Security Force and Government of Iraq counterparts, and our own intelligence officers told us that our project money was funding the insurgency. The question was not whether it was happening but how much of our money found its way into the insurgents’ pockets.

Occasionally we witnessed this firsthand. During one mission outside Samarra in the spring of 2006, an Iraqi soldier handed his American partners a wad of hundred dollar bills and pointed to a captured insurgent being held in a temporary detainee holding area. The insurgent gave him the bribe in exchange
for his freedom. We traced the bills’ sequential serial numbers ($10,000 still in the wrapper) to an adjacent unit’s civil-military operations center. The unit had apparently given the money to an Iraqi contractor for some project or service.

Nonlethal enthusiasts of COIN orthodoxy claim that combat operations, even if successful, bring only a temporary dip in violence. They contend that projects and services provide more long-term benefits. The problem with that claim is twofold. First, there is no actual proof that it is true, other than anecdotal evidence and some polling results. Second, it rests on the assumption that Iraq has an endless supply of potential enemies waiting to be recruited by deep-pocketed insurgents.

This endless supply of potential enemies was not my experience. Although few Iraqis wanted us there, only a very small minority of the population were willing to attack us, at any price. Even if there were such limitless numbers of potential insurgents, removing the small number of insurgent recruiters was far more effective than trying to eliminate the much larger pool of potential recruits.

Lethal Missions Effective

Combat operations are often cast in the worst possible light, with images of killed innocents, damaged property, and detained military-age males. However, most of the combat operations we executed by 2006 were “soft-knock” missions. We only conducted “hard knock” operations on those occasions when we had particularly good or fleeting intelligence about the location of known, dangerous insurgents. While executing combat operations did entail some risk, the payoff—capturing or killing an insurgent—outweighed the risk of alienating the population. The drop in violence was often profound and permanent after we removed a criminal from the population he was terrorizing.

The overwhelming majority of missions we conducted were nonlethal: patrolling in markets, visiting potential project sites, etc. Many commanders dutifully conducted nonlethal operations but often preferred to execute lethal missions. Killing or capturing an insurgent consistently and quantifiably had a more positive impact than anything else we did.

A few examples follow. In May 2008, a group of insurgents ambushed one of our platoons during a mission just east of Sadr City. Our Soldiers fought back, called in other platoons, and chased the insurgents through several neighborhoods. Eventually we cornered them in a house, which we destroyed with the help of Apache gunships. The firefight killed 15 to 20 insurgents. Afterward, the owner of the destroyed house approached the unit commander and actually thanked him for eliminating the gang that had been terrorizing the community for months. Shortly after that event and other successful lethal operations in the area, local community leaders approached us about getting assistance. Since the neighborhood gang of thugs had been removed, they felt safe coming to both us and the Iraqi government, something they had never done before.

In July 2008, the squadron sniper team shot an insurgent laying an IED in downtown Baghdad. He fit the description of a bomb-maker we were tracking who built and laid his own explosive devices. Through attrition, he was the last remaining member of his cell. After his removal, we never saw evidence of that particular roadside bomb technique again.

There are many more examples of the effectiveness of lethal operations and the ineffectiveness of focusing on economic development. The theory that economic development money poured into an area will effectively dry up the insurgent swamp remains a theory without empirical verification.

The best indicator of whether an operation was successful usually came from the Iraqis themselves. Businessmen overwhelmingly credited improved security for their increase in commerce and profits. Iraqis frequently thanked us and our Iraqi Security Forces counterparts for removing criminals from their midst. The locals rarely called the bad people “insurgents.” “Gangsters” was the preferred local term, and it was a precise description of the type of adversaries we faced.

The best way to understand much of the violence in Iraq was through the lens of a mob boss. It was mainly about money, influence, and power. The enemy were insurgents when it was convenient to be insurgents: when it paid better and the payoff was worth the risk. They almost always refused to stand and fight, preferring to attack us with roadside bombs or the occasional sniper. They were not going to be dissuaded from their lifestyles by offers of economic
assistance. They were only interested in our projects and services for the money they extorted from contractors. Since we carpet-bombed Iraq with economic development money and little oversight, we provided a lucrative environment for corruption and extortion.

Until we eliminated the insurgents causing most of the problems, success in the other lines of effort was limited. Remove the cancer, don’t just treat the symptoms, was how one former successful brigade commander put it. A more effective use of the $9 million spent by 3-89 Cavalry in 2008 on projects and microgrants would have been to take half the money and use it to train and equip another sniper team. The amount of money we spent on projects and the number of cups of tea we drank with local leaders was irrelevant as long as the ruthless neighborhood gang remained at large.

The majority of casualties we suffered occurred while traveling on Iraqi roads. It did not matter whether Soldiers were going to inspect a project or raid an insurgent hideout. Combat operations were actually safer by comparison. Soldiers spent a great deal of time and put themselves at considerable risk accomplishing nonlethal missions. It would be interesting to know if the risk and expense were worth the effort.

The Army takes pride in its self-assessments and ability to adjust quickly. Virtually every officer in the Army has been on the receiving end of a brutally honest, “no thin skins” after action review (AAR) at one of our Combat Training Centers. The value of learning after each mission is so much a part of the Army’s culture that we routinely conduct AARs after real missions while deployed. That is why it is so disappointing that this type of AAR is missing for our economic development efforts in Iraq.

Since we carpet-bombed Iraq with economic development money and little oversight, we provided a lucrative environment for corruption and extortion.
We do not know how much of our economic development aid was effective and how much was lost to corruption or funded the insurgency. We could have spent far less money on projects and essential services because removing insurgents and criminals from the environment by itself led to dramatic improvements in security and economic development. Regardless of the current popularity of the nonlethal approach, we have to be willing to thoroughly examine the possibility that a significant amount of the money we spent in Iraq found its way to the insurgents. Perhaps the billions of dollars we spent on economic development in Iraq was, in the final analysis, counterproductive.

It was certainly far less important to our success than our 2007-2008 refocus on killing and capturing the enemy.

A strategic AAR identifying what really worked in Iraq is overdue. The prevailing narrative is that a holistic effort emphasizing nonlethal effects led to our tentative success. Economic development may have played a role, but our lethality was the most important factor.

In the final analysis, attrition matters. We should not feel ashamed that traditional combat operations worked in Iraq. After all, we put an awful lot of effort into ensuring that our Soldiers are the most lethal on earth. MR

NOTES

2. Author’s personal conversation with LTC Tim Watson, commander, 2-4 IN, 2008.
4. Personal email from LTC Dan Barnett, commander, 1-2 IN (Stryker) (1 September 2009).

A convoy of Stryker fighting vehicles on its last patrol in the early morning hours of 16 August 2010. The 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team of the 2d Infantry Division was the last combat brigade to leave Iraq.
TO ADDRESS MYRIAD ISSUES in foreign engagements across the range of military operations, numerous federal agencies are required. Military members who operate in this interagency environment may well think they have traveled to a foreign land where their cultural norms are deemed impertinent. However, the interagency environment is a cultural reality they must understand and successfully navigate to accomplish the mission. For the most part, military organizational culture is characterized by a strong hierarchy with almost absolute adherence to orders. Indeed, the first step of the Army’s military decision making process is “receipt of mission,” which, of course, supports the notion that higher headquarters knows best.

The interagency culture takes an antithetical slant. The interagency environment is usually one in which there is no single, distinct chain of command. It is not a monolithic hierarchical organization. It is a loose conglomeration of agencies on the same road at the same time, but all going to a different destination. In this culture, the way to accomplish the mission is to employ the “six Cs”—comprehend, coordinate, cooperate, compromise, consensus, and communication.

Comprehend

The Joint Forces Staff College conducted a needs assessment in 2002 to determine the skills and knowledge needed for an effective Joint-qualified officer. It found that the most critical requirement was an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the military services. Working in an interagency environment is no different. Officers must know about what each participating agency “brings to the table.” In a long-standing organization such as Southern Command’s Joint Interagency Task Force South, agencies share offices and use procedures that involve all agencies so that participants can see the whole picture and determine what their agency can contribute. In an ad hoc or crisis situation, dialogue among the participants is critical to unveiling the capabilities and limitations of each agency. In these situations, a physical space shared by all representatives from the various agencies (to include the military) and an open and inquisitive approach from the military is necessary. As a staff member, you do not take the initiative to communicate with other agencies, do not
assume that they will provide information of their agency’s capabilities. In addition, do not assume that they are familiar with your capabilities and limitations. The most important dynamic that agency or military representatives can establish is open dialogue. Understanding can only be gained through such dialogue.

**Coordinate**

Military officers often interpret “coordination” to mean “deconfliction,” but a dictionary definition tells us that the word means “to work or act together harmoniously.” This does not mean that each agency stays out of the other’s way, but that all agencies plan each action to maximize the effect of all other actions taking place. For example, military efforts to rebuild medical care in Mogadishu in Somalia during the early 1990s focused on the military providing free medical care to Somali nationals. However, the military failed to coordinate with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which was working to ensure that Somali doctors returned to Mogadishu. Because the military and USAID did not coordinate their efforts, Somali nationals went to the free hospitals set up by the military, but Somali doctors lost clientele and left Mogadishu.

**Cooperate**

According to Webster, to cooperate is “to act jointly or in compliance with others.” While one can argue that cooperation is a military value displayed throughout the chain of command, the cooperation the military most often exercises takes place within a single service. At one time, cooperation was so lacking among the military branches of service that Congress had to enact the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to force U.S. military services to sufficiently cooperate. There are those who argue that a similar act would force cooperation among the various agencies of the government. However, until that happens, success in the interagency environment requires agency representatives to work with each other of their own volition.

**Compromise**

Although the word “compromise” may have a negative connotation within the military culture,
willingness to compromise is essential for success in the interagency environment. A common definition is “a settlement of differences reached by mutual concessions.” The military lives with compromise every day. For example, most leaders would like to have more ammunition for live-fire training, but they compromise on the allocation of ammunition for the good of the other units who also need ammunition. Military commanders probably would like more time off for their personnel after a deployment, but commanders compromise this desire for the good of the real-world mission. Compromise does not mean conceding individual values or those of an organization.

Consensus

The ability to have everyone agree—to build consensus—is a significant talent that must be mastered for the interagency environment. Going to Webster once again, we find that consensus is “a collective opinion.” Consensus building is a skill that, for the most part, is foreign to military culture. A common mantra of military officers is that “it is fine to challenge the boss, but once the decision is made, you need to follow the order as if it were your own.” Interagency decisions do not work like that. If an agency does not think a consensus has been reached, the agency may not participate in the proposed solution. Consensus is probably the most critical aspect of accomplishing national objectives during an interagency operation.

Communication

Having to communicate effectively to convince an individual or organization to do something is foreign to military personnel. The military’s hierarchical design is based upon the assumption that one will do what one is told by those higher in the chain of command. However, positional authority is not enough to convince agency representatives. To persuade them, one must have evidence and a sound argument to prove that what is proposed will actually contribute to solving identified problems. As an example, a commander of three multinational divisions in Bosnia had to visit each division commander after an operations order was published to convince them that the order would be good for the overall mission and their particular stake in it. Perhaps this commander may have avoided such visits by applying the six Cs before the order was published, but regardless, he recognized the need to effectively communicate.

Conclusion

We must take an interagency approach in the complex contingencies that the United States enters—no single agency has the knowledge, resources, or talent on its own. Such operations present unique challenges. The assumptions made when operating within one’s own organizational culture are often invalid or impractical in the interagency environment. When working with the various organizations responding to an international crisis, military members should apply the “six Cs” to ensure the optimum response to complex operations across the globe. MR

For a technologically savvy generation, what good reason could there be to pick up a classic translation of ancient Roman history? The answer is in understanding the timeless elements of the history of warfare, and of professional study of its master practitioners, such as Hannibal and Scipio Africanus. The War with Hannibal is an account of the Second Punic War (which lasted for 17 years) and of its many battles, sieges, and campaigns in Spain, Sicily, the Italian peninsula, and ultimately in North Africa. The book details Carthage and Rome as states at war more than it studies Hannibal’s generalship, although the elements of his generalship are woven into the narrative. Principally, the book defends the staying power and character of Rome. One is overwhelmed by the length and reach of the conflict, of its total nature, involving politics and economics, and its joint character, with interlocking battles on land and sea. The outcome of the war hinged as much on decisions in Rome itself, and on campaigns in Spain, Sicily, and Greece, where Hannibal was not present, as it did on Hannibal’s actions in Italy.

Livy’s account has become a classic over time, and there are two editions currently in print. This review is based on the Penguin edition, which has been in print for over three decades and thus qualifies as a classic revisited. The newest release of Livy is Hannibal’s War: Books Twenty-one to Thirty, by Livy, John Yardley, and Dexter Hoyos (Oxford University Press, 2009). Again, this review cites the Penguin release.

The weight of the book is not to battle accounts, though those accounts are vivid enough to give the reader a sense of the magnitude, flow, and catastrophic scale of each battle. Livy tells the story of several events that rank among those most famous in antiquity: Hannibal’s unexpected crossing of the French Alps, his first decisive victory over the Roman Army at Lake Trasimene, and the Carthaginian slaughter of the Romans at Cannae. Cannae, as the serious student of military history will know, represents the classic battle of annihilation. To Livy, the battle demonstrated the failure of Hannibal’s will to overcome the plundering tendencies of his army and to proceed to conquer the city of Rome while he could. Time, the drag of additional years of campaigning in city-by-city conquests in southern Italy, and the desultory effects of winter quarters wore Hannibal’s army down until his soldiers were shadows of their former selves. The Romans forced a decision after 17 years by invading Carthage itself, where Hannibal, after being recalled from the Italian peninsula, was defeated by Scipio at Zama in 202 BCE.

The book does not recount battles in tactical detail, as a military reader might expect. Each of these major events is treated in just a few pages of text: the crossing of the Alps, Lake Trasimene, Cannae, and Hannibal’s defeat at Zama. Those who look for red and blue arrow diagrams might be disappointed, but what Livy richly recounts is the human impact of a commander in battle, both by example and word. He often includes the orations of commanders prior to major battles. From these we glean a psychological and motivational element to this long war, one that may be instructive given the current circumstances of lengthy international engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hannibal could not defeat Rome after such decisive battles as Lake Trasimene and Cannae, and psychological will and long-term strategy were the decisive elements.

This book is as much about Roman politics and generalship as it is about Hannibal. To Livy, the war with Hannibal had to account for the evolution and resilience of the Roman state under Hannibal’s onslaught. Livy’s account becomes a character analysis of Roman leadership, both senatorial and military. His portrayal of Quintus Fabius Maximus’ delaying actions against Hannibal after Cannae, where Roman military power was preserved and gradually rejuvenated, is noteworthy. “Fabian strategy” has become an aspect of cultural literacy. The interplay of battle with the decisions of Roman leaders, reinforced by the will of the Roman people in a city-by-city failed conquest, proved decisive in creating Hannibal’s long-term strategic defeat.

Livy’s character studies captivate. He wrote his histories long after they occurred by using a combination of sources, and he has been criticized for historical inaccuracy. However, the value of Livy is in his flow of writing. His capture of leader orations, whether to soldiers before battle or to motivate a doubting citizenry at home, are a window for Livy to display the character of the men who spoke them. Even more, they illustrate the character of the Roman nation that survived because of such men.

Hannibal learns, too, and reveals the lessons of life and desire for peace, as he said on the eve of his final loss to Scipio at Zama:

“As for myself, an old man returning to the homeland I left in boyhood, the years with their burden of success and failure have so taught
that the war fell apart around him. His allies did not provide needed resources or manpower, the peripheral theaters of Sicily and Rome became decisive, and Hannibal was ultimately recalled home to fight—and lose—to Scipio. Livy teaches the importance of strategy through his character analysis of the Second Punic War’s strategists.

Notes

1. One can learn of the importance of Livy’s War with Hannibal from the repetitive release of translations of the Latin over time. Each edition carries an introduction, which reveals how Livy stands in that time and generation. A 19th century edition is available from Google Books Online. This Google book is Livy, Books XXI-XXV, The Second Punic War, Translated into English with Notes by Alfred John Church and William Jackson Brodribb (London: Macmillan and Co, 1883). Also available in print is a reprint of Livy: The War with Hannibal, edited by Edward Ambrose Bechtel (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1905), which is the original Latin text with an English introduction.


COL Dean Nowowiejski, Ph.D., USA, Retired, is associate professor of Joint operations at CGSC. Professor Nowowiejski has taught American history at West Point and served as an Army senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
According to Couch, these subcultures usually exist due to one or two influential moral “pirates” within a small unit. Such pirates commandeer a unit, using the strong ties of loyalty which bind members to one another to either convert other members to their cause or keep them quiet.

Why do moral pirates plague our operational military, despite the robust ethics-related education they received at initial military training? The answer to this question, Couch says, has a lot to do with an American pop culture that increasingly glorifies violence, which promotes a “win at any cost” mentality via “reality” programming, and which makes heroes of thugs like Jack Bauer. New recruits bring harmful values with them into military service, and without frequent and effective reinforcement training, the thin veneer of military values they acquire in initial training wears off.

Amplifying the challenge for our military, Couch observes, is the tendency among so-called “millenials,” the current generation of recruits, to try harder to “fit in” than the members of previous generations. Any American who has volunteered for military service has done so in part because he wants to be a valued member of a team. But millenials need to fit in even more than previous volunteers, increasing the likelihood that they will go along with an amoral small unit culture.

Couch presents two training models to assist us in defeating our moral pirates. The first is that of the U.S. Marine Corps. Couch builds a convincing case that new Marines receive a stronger ethical imprint at boot camp than do other military service members during their initial training. Couch also points out that the U.S. Marine Corps does a better job of reinforcing ethics training than other services, largely powering down this responsibility to the small unit leaders who should own it.

Despite Couch’s assertions, there exists little published empirical evidence, such as psychological surveys or comparative studies of service misconduct, to support the idea that the U.S. Marine Corps has performed more ethically than other military services during the Global War on Terrorism. This may be due to counterbalancing weaknesses of the Marine Corps in other areas, such as a culture which can promote loyalty to fellow Marines at an excessive price (witness the revenge-motivated misconduct of Marines at Haditha and Shi'ra). Still, certain strengths of the Marines’ system may be worth emulating.

The second model, Couch says, is the Close Quarters Defense® Training System, a business that has been training special operators for two decades. The company excels at incorporating practical ethical decision making in its individual and team battle drills. Moreover, it takes the “train as you fight” idea one step further by preaching the virtue of the “complete warrior.” Trainees are taught that living a balanced, moral life at home makes them far more effective warriors. If they love their country and their families, the company believes, they will fight at least as hard as their enemies on today’s battlefields.

Whatever the ethics training model, Couch says, there are key rules this model will need to implement. These rules, which Couch calls his “Rules of Ethics,” deserve to be read and digested by all military leaders. One especially important rule is “The Loyalty Rule”—loyalty before all else, except honor. “Small unit leaders,” Couch says, “must make it unmistakably clear to their men that wrong action on the battlefield is a form of disloyalty—to their nation, to their service, to their team brothers, and to those fallen warriors whose honor they stain.”

In the final analysis, A Tactical Ethic is not just an insightful study, it is a brave book. Pointing out that our military is not adequately addressing its deep cultural issues will not win Couch friends in certain quarters. Couch, who has written several popular works of history and fiction, clearly would not have written this book if he were not troubled by the current ethical state of our military. Thus, like the captain who told him the story of the murdered detainee, Couch has related a tale of which he, too, must unburden himself—the sad story of the inadequate state of ethics training today for most U.S. military service members.

Couch is right. We must do better. And reading A Tactical Ethic is a superb place for us to begin.


In Shakespeare’s Henry V, soldiers remark on the eve of Agincourt that “if the cause be not good, the king himself hath a heavy reckoning to make.” Craig White’s recent book asks that timeless question of the 2003 Iraq War decision. Though a veteran of diplomatic circles, White writes as a private citizen, seeking to answer the question by impartially applying the six traditional just war criteria. As part of his approach, he outlines the limits of his work. It is not a narrative of the politics and personalities who shaped the decision for the war; nor is it a discussion of jus in bello. White limits his evaluation to the Western just war framework (as developed in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas) and uses only the analysis and information available at the beginning of the war (with minimal exceptions). White sets out the six criteria as sovereign authority, just cause, right intention, proportionality of ends, last resort, and reasonable chance of success. In White’s estimation, the Bush administration failed to meet five out of these six principles.

White argues that President Bush’s 2003 decision was the valid exercise of sovereign authority, meeting the first criterion. The author spends more time on just
cause, since he believes it forms the moral core of just war theory. He contends that the administration failed this standard because it inflated the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and terrorist threats, misinterpreted UN Resolutions 678 and 687, and usurped the Security Council’s prerogative for enforcing UN policy. On the criterion of right intention, White follows the Thomistic argument that an intention can be seen by the means used to achieve that end. Improper or inadequate means (i.e. low troop numbers, poor contingency planning, and a naive belief in the power of democracy) show an ultimately unjust intention. This led the United States to commit the unjust act of destroying a government without adequate or realistic plans to deal with the powerful social, religious, and ethnic forces unleashed by that action.

Therefore, he believes the administration did not carefully weigh the question of proportionality in debating the merits of a stable dictatorship against the problems of a nascent democracy torn by internal and regional power struggles. The United States also did not use force as a last resort, since UN inspections had made progress, the United States had aggressively provoked Saddam at times, and there was no imminent threat. The failure to account for the challenges of replacing Saddam’s regime violated the final criterion, reasonable chance of success.

White handles this extremely controversial topic in a fair, thorough, and nonpartisan manner, reaching logical conclusions. While many will disagree with the author, he takes the courageous step of calling for a serious debate on the value of the moral core of just war theory into their decision making processes. Military and civilian leaders, clergy, political theorists, and concerned citizens will all gain a deeper moral understanding of conflict by engaging the questions that White raises and refining their own ethical framework for determining justified force.

While well-written, the book would benefit from cleaner formatting and the correction of some noticeable proofreading errors. However, these errors do not detract from the overall importance of the concerns raised by White’s analysis and the moral implications about the Iraqi conflict.

1LT Jonathan E. Newell, USAR, Amherst, New Hampshire


With the exception of Desert Storm and the initial stage of Operation Iraqi Freedom, war since 1990 has not followed the Western model of understanding armed conflict. This is the claim made by Richard H. Schultz, Jr., and Andrea J. Dew, who provide some superb insights into why and how nonstate actors fight. If you are interested in either irregular warfare or counterinsurgency, you should add this book to your reading list.

Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat focuses on anthropological study and analysis. One of the first points it makes is that, unlike the West, many cultures view conflict positively. Rather than seeing it as immoral or abnormal, they view warfare as a normal state of affairs, one that is often desirable. To fully understand why this is the case and the ramifications that follow from this state of affairs, one must study the foe’s history, culture, norms, and values. The study of culture is just as important as intelligence work focused on enemy numbers, location, and capabilities. Unless we focus on the cultural aspects, we run the risk of misunderstanding our enemy’s motivations and methods, and of losing despite our advantages in technology and conventional capability.

As part of their anthropological analysis, the authors focus on tribes and clans. Until the recent past, both of these terms have been viewed by the West as anachronistic. While much of the world has long focused on the supremacy of states as the key actors on the international stage, large numbers of the world’s population identify far more with their clan and tribe than they do with the state they live in. Loyalty is first and foremost to the clan and blood line. Decentralization and autonomy are the norm, and, partially because of this, conflicts with outside groups are likely to occur. Additionally, the relatively small size of clans and tribes necessitates that all male members take on the role of warriors to protect their clan and tribe’s interests. In such a system, martial ability is prized.

The authors focus on four case studies: Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Each of these sections is well written and researched and provides a succinct account of the history of these areas. After the historical account, each case study is examined using the following format: concept of warfare, organization and command and control, area of operation, targeting and constraints on the use of force, and role of outside actors.

The book ends with a short chapter on lessons learned, which can be summed up in Schultz and Dew’s exhortation to remember Sun Tzu’s advice to “know your enemy.” Their book offers an excellent model for doing this.

LTC Brian Ioniola, West Point, New York


America does not listen, so America cannot win. Middle East expert Mark Perry’s Talking to Terrorists: Why America Must Engage With Its Enemies provides a critical view
of American foreign policy in the Middle East. More than that, the book offers a lesson about how gaining an Islamic perspective on American policies and understanding the real nature of one’s opposition are the keys to achieving stability in the Middle East.

Perry reveals the real problems America must address in order to achieve a long-term peaceful resolution to ongoing conflicts in the Muslim world. The book has implications for achieving acceptable conflict termination in Afghanistan and discusses what transformations are necessary for the United States to prevent future hostile engagements in the Middle East.

Talking to Terrorists highlights a number of issues relevant to military leaders and policymakers. Following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, civil-military relations were further complicated by the rivalry between the Department of State and Department of Defense over who would lead the effort in Iraq. The argument between use of hard power (fixing the problem with bullets) and soft power (providing opportunities for economic development) illuminated the major disconnect between how America viewed its Iraqi enemy and how Iraqi insurgents saw themselves.

The United States does not distinguish between terrorists and national resistance movements. Members of the Muslim community view insurgents participating in national resistance movements as political, legitimate, and constituent-based organizations. Terrorists are interested in the radical transformation of society. In that light, Muslims may perceive U.S. actions in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan as terrorist activities. Perry debunks Western concerns about talking to terrorists and provides the bottom line: “Not talking to them will not end a conflict.” He suggests America should begin by talking to political Islamic organizations that already have constituent support and have agreed to participate in democratic processes, like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.

The United States must take the time to listen to these groups and allow them to define themselves in order to better understand how they see themselves and how they see us and our allies, especially Israel.

While Perry’s book is relevant in light of continued U.S. military presence and national interests in the region, his presentation lacks cohesion. The book’s major ideas are more implicit than explicit and often buried in narrative accounts of the author’s encounters in the Middle East. Perry devotes four chapters of his book to the transformation in Anbar, Iraq, between 2004 and 2006. He then transitions to chapters on his experiences with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran that are less about talking to terrorists and more a way to show the “other side” of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. His final chapter is a collection of Perry’s personal experiences that makes no explicit point related to his topic.

Despite the organization of the book, Talking to Terrorists is interesting, insightful, easy to read, and offers some critical lessons for military and civilian leadership looking for a way ahead in resolving conflict with the Muslim world.

MAJ Patricia E. McPhillips, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

---


Since the end of the Cold War, changes in the world order have strained America’s traditional resource assumptions. These have been accompanied by the development of new overseas military bases and base closures or realignments under the Base Realignment and Closure Commission and the Global Defense Posturing Review. In the same time frame, base-related crime and accidents have fueled anti-American or anti-base demonstrations outside bases in Okinawa, Korea, and other areas.

What factors do host governments consider when statesmen try to negotiate short-term access into conflict areas through adjacent countries (i.e., through Turkey to Iraq or through Pakistan to Afghanistan)? What influence do traditional power politics, economic and business interests, domestic political infighting, and local politics play in the decisions of host governments to allow or sustain U.S. bases within their borders?

Through comparative political analysis on case studies of ten countries’ U.S.-base experiences, Alexander Cooley provides a model to examine and explain “base politics” historically and to predict these politics in future basing decisions. His research is valuable to policymakers, diplomats, lawyers, political scientists, and military planners involved in negotiations regarding bases, status of forces agreements, and regional stability issues.

Cooley examines the political history of American military bases in Spain, the Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, Okinawa and mainland Japan, the Azores, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. He also mentions bases in several other countries through a series of comparisons and contrasts with the bases and domestic politics in each country above. Such a large coverage might suggest that the book spreads itself too thin, but this is not the case. Cooley’s research includes a series of balanced interviews worldwide, searches of local and international newspapers, and consultations with an eclectic mix of sources.

The most important contribution is Cooley’s modeling of authoritarian regimes, those transitioning between authoritarian and democratic governments (either way), and those of mature democracies. He examines these governmental forms as predictors of the credibility of base contracts and their basis in jurisdictional stability. Cooley notes that the establishment of American bases can serve to support authoritarian regimes, both domestically and internationally (i.e. Franco in Spain in 1953), and that geopolitical realities may
pit the necessity of prime base locations against other U.S. government interests, namely promoting diplomatic institutions. In Central Asia, Cooley shows that rather than stabilizing domestic political situations, U.S. bases instead became pawns in regime survival politics.

While Cooley’s model may be predictive of the long-term success of base stability, its greater service may be as a tool to consider the pressures on governments with bases on another sovereign nation’s soil. One nation’s strategic geopolitical goals may not be another nation’s priority, although this may not be obvious without considering the international and domestic equities of the parties involved.

Base Politics is the first latitudinal study to focus on local host politics of foreign bases across the world. It is useful as a history of U.S. bases throughout the world (for example, France, Great Britain, and Russia), as a guide for policymakers and diplomats involved in base negotiations, and as a guide in understanding sovereignty issues for lawyers and military administrators involved in status of forces law and precedence.

John Dyson,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas


The title of Seth G. Jones book suggests a warning. Empires as powerful as Alexander’s Greece, Victoria’s Great Britain, and Brezhnev’s Soviet Union came to grief in Afghanistan. Today we ask, “Will 30,000 additional U.S. troops be enough to salvage a war many now see as unwinnable?” Seth Jones, a political scientist and adjunct faculty member at Georgetown and the Naval Postgraduate School, believes that between 2002 and 2005, the United States had an opportunity to achieve a better outcome than those who invaded Afghanistan in the past.

Jones believes the opportunity was lost in 2006 as U.S. efforts to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan faced resistance in five areas: insurgent groups like the Taliban and the Hezb-i-Islami, criminal groups, tribes allied with the insurgents, warlord militias, and corrupt elements of the government. The Taliban, in particular, made good use of sanctuaries inside Pakistan and the support they received from senior members of the Pakistani intelligence service as they rebuilt their strength. The resurgence of the Taliban was also built on weak governance from Kabul and an enduring religious ideology that enabled the “true believers” among the insurgents to weather the hard times that followed the U.S. invasion. Yet, Jones argues that even when the situation became critical (the author calls it a “perfect storm”), the United States kept its focus on the war in Iraq.

Along with an assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan, the book offers five chapters of historical background, thumbnail sketches of key insurgent leaders, and a structural analysis of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their allies. He recommends attacking government corruption, denying sanctuary to the insurgents, and providing effective governance and security to the Afghan population.

The book’s tone and focus are more journalistic than scholarly and, in two or three years, it is likely to seem dated. If a reader opens the “Early Bird” news service every morning and pays attention to the news coming out of Afghanistan, that reader would already be aware of much of what Jones has to say. The war in Iraq has dominated our attention and drained our resources in time, blood, energy, and treasure. Now, Afghanistan demands our attention, and Jones’ In the Graveyard of Empires offers a readable and reasonably concise account of how it came to be the seemingly intractable problem it is today.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE WAR FOR KOREA, 1950-1951: They Came from the North, Allan R. Millett, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2010, 644 pages, $45.00

When most Americans think of the Korean War (that is, when they remember the so-called “forgotten war”), they think of June 1950 to July 1951 (the North Korean invasion to the allied restoration of the 38th parallel), which make up the two years of battlefield stalemate that lasted until 1953. This is the focus of Allan Millett’s second volume in a projected trilogy on the Korean conflict.

Volume One, published in 2005, is about the almost completely forgotten part of the forgotten war, the Korean civil war pitting pro- versus anti-communist factions headquartered, respectively, in Pyongyang and Seoul. Volume Three, scheduled for publication in late 2012, will cover the conclusion of the conflict: deadly small unit “king of the mountain” combat (the communists take Pork Chop Hill at night; the United States/United Nations/South Korean coalition takes it back in the morning) and prolonged negotiations, primarily over the voluntary repatriation of POWs. If the third volume matches the first two, Millett will produce for the Korean War something equivalent to Rick Atkinson’s trilogy on the U.S. Army in World War II Europe and Douglas Southall Freeman’s trilogy on the Army of Northern Virginia in the U.S. Civil War.

Most books about the Korean War fall into one of two broad categories. On the one hand, there are stories of personal courage, cowardice, insight, and arrogance. Among the best are Joseph Goul-den’s Korea: The Untold Story (1982), Clay Blair’s The Forgotten War (1987), Max Hastings’s The Korean War (1987), John Toland’s In Mortal Combat (1991), and David Halberstam’s The Coldest Winter (2007). On the other hand, there are the workman-like studies coming out of the military service history offices: Roy Appleman’s...
MILITARY REVIEW • September-October 2010


J. Todd Moye offers a detailed history of African-Americans as they sought to defend their nation from tyranny and oppression at the hands of the Axis during World War II, while facing the tyranny and oppression of Jim Crow-era segregation at home. Initially denied the right to fight alongside their white counterparts, these aviation pioneers broke new ground, proving their mettle in combat, leading to the eventual desegregation of the Armed Forces, silencing many of their critics in the process.

Moye’s research covers more than the “experiment” that created the Tuskegee Airmen; his research spans more than 70 years, from the days following the end of the First World War to contemporary times. It is this comprehensive assessment that provides the book’s greatest drawback, namely that the title implies a scope much less broad than the content therein. Scant details are given about the actual combat experiences of the “Red Tails” and the difficulties they faced in a wartime environment. Most of the manuscript focuses on the national policies, infrastructure, and organization in the United States that simultaneously sought to liberate and constrain the nascent attempt to train African-Americans to fly.

Many of the personal recollections of events are decidedly one-sided. By Moye’s account, there appears to be little that any senior Army Air Corps leader did that was not portrayed as a thinly veiled attempt to induce failure of the Tuskegee Airmen at every turn; Tuskegee Airmen are likewise portrayed as innocent yet valiant protagonists. This is likely because much of Moye’s research is garnered from first-hand interviews conducted during the National Park Service’s Tuskegee Airmen Oral History Project and few, if any, of the white officers mentioned in the book were interviewed, or even still alive. For their side of the story, we are forced to rely on writings from the day, inferring intent and evaluating character based on what was undoubtedly the product of collaborative thought via the staff process. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that these battles waged on the home front were every bit as important as the battles that raged over the skies of North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Germany.

Despite this, Freedom Flyers provides detailed insight into the strategic mindset of a nation on the cusp of war, executive-level decision making, and the attempt to fundamentally change the pervasive, discriminatory culture of the day, both in the military and in the civilian populace. The author successfully brings to life the idea that many Tuskegee Airmen waged battle against a tough and determined foe in an inhospitable environment, without ever leaving the United States.

Robert A. Leonard, Ed.D., Fort Gordon, Georgia


After nearly four and one-half years of brutal occupation, the German Army in August 1944 quickly evaporated, leaving behind stores of fuel, equipment, and food. In the twilight zone before the Allies’ arrival, chaos ensued. Widespread looting reminiscent of Baghdad in April 2003 broke out as underfed civilians descended upon German facilities in acts of necessity and revenge. The marquis began rounding up collaborators. For days, the population navigated this lawless “Wild West” while waiting for their liberators.

Then, almost unbelievably, the longed-for moment occurred. Cautiously, Allied columns streamed into the towns and villages of Belgium. Pictures slapped across the pages of newspapers worldwide captured the breathtaking Allied rush across France and the push into Belgium—crowds surrounded vehicles and piled on, soldiers swigged wine from the bottle and were kissed by adoring women, gaggles of children tugged at G.I. fatigues in hope of a reward of candy or gum. The four-and-a-half-year brutal occupation was at an end—it was finally over! Yet lurking behind the jubilation was the grim reality of the future. The war still remained to be won, the country to be rebuilt, and a shattered society reconstructed.

After liberation, Belgians continued to celebrate. But, the Allies’ struggle to provide adequate amounts of food and coal was exacerbated by the unexpected German attack in the Ardennes. Resentment began to set in. Stealing from the Allies became
rampant. Belgian rations were less under the Allies than they had been under the Germans. That the German POWs were better fed than the Belgian civilians was a bitter pill. On top of all of this, V-weapons rained down on cities, especially Antwerp, until March 1945 when 6,500 lives were lost.

Resentment bubbled to the surface in the spring of 1945 over the large number of Belgian women who seemed so easily seduced by Allied soldiers and by the resultant epidemic of venereal disease and the increase of illegitimate children. Many Belgians, their pride wounded by defeat and occupation, now feared economic and cultural domination by their liberators. The end of the war in May touched off another round of celebrations, but by the summer hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers were temporarily billeted in Belgium. Discipline deteriorated and the crime rate—including everything from drunken brawls to big-time theft, racketeering, and rape—increased dramatically. Many Belgians now asked “who would liberate them from their liberators.” War’s end restored the Belgian’s gratitude to the Allies. Belgium, despite some trepidation, had been transformed and was on the road to becoming a modern consumer society built on the American model.

In a long epilogue, Schrijvers reviews much of the literature and the various historical interpretations of this traumatic time in Belgian history. His argument is based on extensive research in French, Flemish, German, and English documents as well as a large number of secondary sources. Liberators is highly recommended for general readers as an important and little understood aspect of the end of the war in Europe. It will also provide insight for those participating in the societal transformations being undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Hal Elliott Wert, Kansas City, Missouri


Andrew Wheatcroft’s The Enemy at the Gate encapsulates the centuries-long struggle between the Habsburgs and Ottomans, which symbolized physically and spiritually the conflict between Christendom and Islam between the 15th and 18th centuries. As Wheatcroft aptly illustrates, the Siege of Vienna went into the collective consciousness of the West as a decisive victory over the Turks, and Islam in general.

For the political reader who would like to grasp the enduring negative image of the Turk and the modern European resistance to Turkish membership in the European Union, the author demonstrates how the image of the cruel and barbarous Turk propagated by the media of the 17th century still lingers in the collective perceptions of Europe.

For the military historian and officer, the book provides an excellent insight into the Ottoman Army of the period and its high degree of field organization, sanitation, and logistical excellence. This contrasts greatly with the often fragmented and slovenly armies assembled by the Holy Roman Emperor and his allies. Nevertheless, the advent of drill and training among the European soldiery of the era began the ascendancy of the West over the warrior armies of the East, of which the Ottoman military was paramount. The European soldiers served as part of an integrated team on the battlefield, while the Ottoman janissary continued to fight as a highly trained, but individual warrior.

Wheatcroft’s research is impeccable, and his vibrant style takes the reader into the era—it’s politics, society, and media. The only significant flaw to the book is the lack of detailed maps depicting the campaigns and battles surrounding the Siege of Vienna. The three diagrams provided were insufficient for the task and text. I strongly recommend this book for all military and foreign service officers dealing with the Middle East, Turkey, and the Balkans.

Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., Zurich, Switzerland
Unit of Action

LTC Jason A. Carrico, Harker Heights, Texas—I just read “Unit of Action: Organizing a Brigade Combat Team for Future Wars” by Colonel Scott Efflandt (July-August 2010, Military Review). I have heard the same counterarguments in reference to fires discussed in logistics circles. Some think a brigade support battalion (BSB) is not truly needed in a BCT and that the Army would be better served falling back on the Divisional concept of sustainment without the FSB/BSB. This would force us to rely solely on forward support companies (FSCs) with sustainment brigades giving reinforcing and in some cases direct support to BCTs. There is no way that structure would remain flexible and responsive enough to support a BCT during full spectrum operations. Also, I argue that the degradation of logistics skills (particularly low density) is due to OPTEMPO and theater specific adaptations and requirements. It is not an inherent flaw in the BCT design as some logisticians argue and will be self-correcting as the OPTEMPO changes and the current operating environment evolves.

The Revolution in Military Affairs

Charles Trudell, Miamisburg, Ohio—Lieutenant Colonel Scott Stephenson’s article, “The Revolution in Military Affairs: 12 Observations on an Out-of-Fashion Idea” (May-June 2010, Military Review) is an excellent and informative piece of writing in reference to our present military situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our armed forces will be facing many new challenges in the future.

What are these challenges? Restoration of balance between military intellectual theory and the practical experience of warfare. The realization that human, scientific, and technological progress needs to have a systems view that can reveal natural patterns that can provide answers as well as logic and wisdom.

Our strategic or futuristic thinking patterns can be acquired through experience, observation, and study as well as speculative forecasting or prediction because change is the one constant that we must deal with in human affairs. And despite any gulf between visionary rhetoric and practical reality, we shouldn’t feel sorry for ourselves when we don’t get everything we want, fulfill the need to get on with life, work reasonably hard, and make do with what we have. Sometimes we have to pull back and regroup before any meaningful forward or persevering progress can be established and maintained in government and military affairs.

From his teens until his death, the maps George Washington drew and purchased were always central to his work.

Inspired by these remarkable maps, historian Barnet Schecter has crafted a unique portrait of our first Founding Father, placing the reader at the scenes of his early career as a surveyor, his dramatic exploits in the French and Indian War (his altercation with the French is credited as the war’s spark), his struggles through the American Revolution as he outmaneuvered the far more powerful British army, his diplomacy as president, and his shaping of the new republic. Beautifully illustrated in color, with twenty-four of the full atlas maps, dozens more detail views, and numerous additional maps (some drawn by Washington himself), portraits, and other images—and produced in an elegant large format—George Washington’s America allows readers to visualize history through Washington’s eyes, and sheds fresh light on the man and his times.

From the Publisher.


Outnumbered chronicles fourteen momentous occasions on which a smaller, ostensibly weaker force prevailed in an epochal confrontation. Thus, Alexander, undaunted, devised a brilliant and daring plan that disoriented and destroyed the Persian force and, consequently, its empire. Likewise, during the U.S. Civil War, Confederate General Robert E. Lee, despite being out-positioned and outnumbered more than two to one by Union forces at Chancellorsville, Virginia, hatched an audacious and surprise strategy that caught his enemy completely unawares. Other equally unexpected, era-defining victories are shown to have derived from the devastating deployment of unusual weaponry, sheer good fortune, or even the gullibility of an enemy, as when Yamashita Tomoyuki, commander of 35,000 ill-supplied Japanese troops, convinced the 85,000-strong British Commonwealth army to surrender Singapore in 1942.

From the Publisher.


Almost seventy years since Spitfires, Merlins and Hurricanes fought to protect Britain’s skies, it is surprising how little is publicly known about the Battle of Britain. Many people may not even be aware that the RAF’s triumph in this battle was integral in saving Great Britain from German invasion in the Second World War. What collective memory exists at all undoubtedly features a soaring Spitfire as the hero of this epic battle, with little more detail than the faint sound of air-raid sirens. However, in the 1980s and 90s, scholars began to counter this image, publishing works which devalued Churchill’s leadership and the quality of the Spitfire’s engineering. Not sure who to believe, Stephen Bungay set out to discover the truth behind these myths. The result was The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain, a tome described as “the most exhaustive and detailed account of the Battle of Britain.”

From the Publisher.
IED

Improvised explosive device.
How curious and technical, this description of death.
A simple acronym, mentioning the words,
an instant depiction of death.
Mental images stirred and conjured horrors realized.
Such a curious and strange term, resonant with such graphic,
crystal-clear depiction, of the desert affliction.
IED, the horror, the signature weapon,
of the desert war.

— Major Edward Lee Bryan, U.S. Army, 2010
ANNOUNCING the 2010 General William E. DePuy Combined Arms Center Writing Competition

★ Winners ★

1st Place Major Douglas Pryer - “Taming the Beast Within: the Key to Success on 21st Century Battlefields”

2nd Place Captain Joseph Larson - “Training the Forward Command Post for Counterinsurgency Operations”

3rd Place Captain Benjamin Summers - “Widening and Flattening: The Case for Decentralized Thinking”

4th Place Lieutenant Colonel John Nolan - “Learning to Fight the Enemy by Learning the Language and Culture”
100 Years of Being Prepared. 1910-2010

Military Review

salutes 100 years of Boy Scouting in America

The Scout Law:
Trustworthy
Loyal
Helpful
Friendly
Courteous
Kind

Obedient
Cheerful
Thrifty
Brave
Clean
Reverent

The Seven Army Values:
Loyalty
Duty
Respect
Selfless Service

Honor
Integrity
Personal Courage

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, himself an Eagle Scout, addresses 40,000 Boy Scouts and their leaders at the National Scout Jamboree, Fort A. P. Hill, Virginia, 28 July 2010.

Though they share many of the same core values, The Boy Scouts of America has no affiliation with the United States Army or the Department of Defense.
English archers and knights led by King Henry V face the French Army at the Battle of Agincourt on St. Crispin's Day, 25 October 1415.

“We few, we happy few, we band of brothers.
For he today that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother; be he ne’er so vile,
This day shall gentle his condition.
And gentlemen in England now abed
Shall think themselves accursed they were not here,
And hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks
That fought with us upon St. Crispin’s Day.”

William Shakespeare
Henry V
Act IV, Scene 3, Lines 60-67