GREEK NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION’S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: CONSENSUS OR DIVERGENCE?

by

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One of the most important yet insufficiently researched dynamics of the European Union (EU) concerns its effectiveness in accommodating the security concerns of its members. With NATO dominating the collective security market of the old continent, the launch of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in 1999 generated an interesting security option, and silently partitioned the NATO members of the EU into a “euro-atlanticist” and a “euro-continentalist” group, with the nonduplication of NATO being the point of contention. With Greece’s major security concern deriving from Turkey, a fellow NATO member, Athens holds a firm position in the latter group, seeking to turn the evolving European defense project into a counterweight to NATO in guaranteeing Greek national security. While Greek security priorities have remained remarkably consistent, the ambitious European defense project has undergone various fluctuations, reflecting the awkward development in its evolution. As a consequence, Greece’s anticipations of a CSDP commitment in its national security concerns have oscillated accordingly: periods of positive signs succeeded periods of disillusionment and vice versa. Against this background, this paper attempts to elucidate Greek perceptions of its security providers and aims to give an answer to the following question: Are Greek security concerns reflected in the CSDP? In other words, is the EU an adequate security provider for Greece? This thesis argues that the territorial security concerns of the EU’s member-states, especially those of Greece, cannot be fully assuaged under the CSDP auspices. More specifically, the CSDP does not adequately address Greek national interests, if defending these interests entails a European military response.
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ABSTRACT

One of the most important yet insufficiently researched dynamics of the European Union (EU) concerns its effectiveness in accommodating the security concerns of its members. With NATO dominating the collective security market of the old continent, the launch of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in 1999 generated an interesting security option and silently partitioned the NATO members of the EU into a “euro-atlanticist” and a “euro-continentalist” group, with the nonduplication of NATO being the point of contention. With Greece’s major security concern deriving from Turkey, a fellow NATO member, Athens holds a firm position in the latter group, seeking to turn the evolving European defense project into a counterweight to NATO in guaranteeing Greek national security. While Greek security priorities have remained remarkably consistent, the ambitious European defense project has undergone various fluctuations, reflecting the awkward development in its evolution. As a consequence, Greece’s anticipations of a CSDP commitment in its national security concerns have oscillated accordingly: periods of positive signs succeeded periods of disillusionment, and vice versa. Against this background, this paper attempts to elucidate Greek perceptions of its security providers and aims to give an answer to the following question: Are Greek security concerns reflected in the CSDP? In other words, is the EU an adequate security provider for Greece? This thesis argues that the territorial security concerns of the EU’s member-states, especially those of Greece, cannot be fully assuaged under the CSDP auspices. More specifically, the CSDP does not adequately address Greek national interests, if defending these interests entails a European military response.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1  
   A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION ............................................................................. 1  
   B. IMPORTANCE ........................................................................................................ 2  
   C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES ...................................................................... 3  
   D. LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................... 5  
   E. METHODS AND SOURCES .................................................................................. 9  
   F. THESIS OVERVIEW ............................................................................................. 9  

II. GREEK SECURITY CONCERNS ..................................................................................... 11  
   A. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 11  
   B. THE “THREAT FROM THE EAST” ......................................................................... 12  
      1. Greece’s Sovereignty Over a Number of Islands, Islets and Atolls in the Eastern Aegean .......................................................... 14  
      2. Greek Territorial Waters .................................................................................... 17  
      3. National Airspace—Athens Flight International Region (FIR) .................................................................................. 19  
      4. Military Status of the Aegean Islands ................................................................ 20  
      5. Continental Shelf ................................................................................................ 21  
   C. FYROM AND THE “MACEDONIAN QUESTION” .................................................... 22  
   D. THE ALBANIAN QUESTION .................................................................................... 26  
   E. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ......................................................................................... 29  

III. ATHENS’ QUEST FOR SECURITY PROVIDERS: THE ROAD TO CSDP ................. 33  
   B. 1974–1990: MAKING PEACE WITH NATO .......................................................... 38  
   C. 1990–PRESENT: THE POST-COLD WAR ERA .................................................... 40  

IV. THE RISE OF THE EUROPEAN ALTERNATIVE: THE CSDP ................................ 45  
   A. THE EARLY YEARS ................................................................................................. 45  
   B. SAINT-MALO AND THE FRANCO-BRITISH COMPROMISE: THE BIRTH OF ESDP .................................................................................. 47  
   C. UNVEILING THE CSDP: THE HEADLINE GOALS AND THE CSDP STRUCTURE .................................................................................. 49  
      1. The Headline Goal ............................................................................................... 49  
      2. The CSDP Structure ......................................................................................... 50  
   D. (RE) AFFIRMING NATO’S PRIMACY: THE BERLIN PLUS AGREEMENT .......... 51  
   E. THE EU MUTUAL DEFENSE CLAUSE ................................................................. 54  
      1. European Security Strategy (ESS) ....................................................................... 58  
      2. Frontex ................................................................................................................ 61  

V. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................. 65  

LIST OF REFERENCES ..................................................................................................... 69  

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................... 79
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.  Current Territorial Sea Distribution in the Aegean (six nautical miles) ................................................................. 18
Figure 2.  Possible Territorial Sea Distribution in the Aegean (twelve nautical miles) ................................................................. 19
Figure 3.  Albanian Map Depicting the Borders of “Great Albania.” ................. 27
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. CSDP-Related Provisions of the Lisbon Treaty .......................... 56
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFSP:</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOD:</td>
<td>Chief of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP:</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC:</td>
<td>European Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPC:</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>ERRF:</td>
<td>European Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>ESDI:</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
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<td>ESS:</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU:</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUMC:</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS:</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIR:</td>
<td>Flight International Region</td>
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<td>FYROM:</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICAO:</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
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<td>NAC:</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO:</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NOTAM:</td>
<td>Notice to Airmen</td>
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<tr>
<td>PESCO:</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PfP:</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC:</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR:</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCE:</td>
<td>Treaty on the Constitution of the European Union</td>
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<td>TEU:</td>
<td>Treaty of the European Union</td>
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<td>UN:</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>WEU:</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<td>WMD:</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

“Στους γονείς μου οφείλω το ζην και στον δάσκαλό μου το εύ ζην.”
“Life I owe to my parents, virtuous life I owe to my tutor.”
Alexander the Great, referring to his tutor, Aristotle (356–323 BC)
I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

One of the most important yet insufficiently researched dynamics of the European Union (EU) concerns the organization’s effectiveness in accommodating the security concerns of its members. With the North Atlantic Treaty Organization dominating the collective-security market of the old continent, the launch of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)\(^1\) in 1999 was greeted differently within the EU family, ultimately partitioning members into a “euro-atlanticist” and a “euro-continentalist” group, with the primacy of NATO as the point of contention.\(^2\) With Greece’s major security concern deriving from Turkey, a fellow NATO member, Athens holds a firm position in the second group, seeking to turn the evolving European defense project into a counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in guaranteeing Greek national security.

While Greece’s expectations regarding the CSDP have remained unaltered, the dynamics of the CSDP have fluctuated, reflecting the awkward developments in its evolution.\(^3\) As a consequence, Greece’s expectations of the CSDP’s commitment to its national security concerns oscillated accordingly: Periods of positive signs succeeded spells of disillusionment until the cycle

\(^1\) It was the Lisbon Treaty that renamed the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The ESDP was the successor of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) under NATO, but differs in that it falls under the jurisdiction of the European Union itself, including countries with no ties to NATO.

\(^2\) For more on the Atlanticist and the Continentalist states within the EU and their position regarding NATO, see Arunas Molis, “The Role and Interests of Small States in Developing European Security and Defence Policy,” Baltic Security and Defence Review 2006, no. 8, ed. Tomas Jermalavicius (2006): 86.

started again. Are Greek security concerns reflected in the CSDP? In other words, is the EU an adequate security provider for Greece? The main argument of this paper is that the territorial security concerns of the EU's member states, let alone Greece, cannot be fully assuaged under the CSDP auspices. More specifically, the CSDP does not adequately address Greek national interests, if defending these interests entails a European military response.

B. IMPORTANCE

From the early development of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) to the formation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which provided the overarching framework under which the CSDP was established, member-state policies have followed a process of adaptation to a structure of common approaches that has allowed for enhanced cooperation. Although the pace and extent of this adaptation process has been relatively high in the economic and political fields, the security realm lags demonstrably. The relevant literature asserts that the basic element that hinders common European security thinking is that the degree to which this adaptation process is influenced by the differing threat perceptions that each state holds for itself versus the spectrum of threats that the CSDP undertakes to address collectively. As Morten Kelstrup suggests, this observation is particularly valid for small states (such as Greece), which, "[being] not in command of power resources sufficient to pursue dominant power politics" within the EU, lack the comparative capacity to project their national security priorities, however pressingly felt, at the CSDP level.

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4 The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was introduced in 1970 and was the synonym for EU foreign policy coordination until it was superseded by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty of November 1, 1993. The CFSP itself has its origins in the formation of the EPC.


With the examination of the Greek case, this thesis intends to test the validity of what Tsakonas and Tournikiotis identified as “the reality-expectations gap”—that is, the gap between Athens’ expectations of its security providers and their security providers’ effectiveness in addressing these expectations. In the process, the present work draws some conclusions about whether smaller states just have to accept a certain disconnect between what they want and what they get out of alliances—and, as a corollary, whether the big states run the risk of losing their smaller partners. Within this context, the importance of the research question derives from both the theoretical and practical approach to the problem. From a theoretical standpoint, this thesis will distinguish between the indicators that measure the success or failure of “security communities”7 in reconciling their members’ respective concerns. From a practical vantage, it suggests some models for states that seek to effectively safeguard their national security interests within collective security structures.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

Within the broader context of Greece’s security policy, the following components can be identified:

1. A problematic relationship with fellow NATO member Turkey, the implications of which reach well beyond simple inter-state frictions. In the context of its disputes with Greece, Turkey uses its membership in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to block the “Berlin Plus” process, whereby the EU might have access to NATO military

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7 Term coined by the prominent political scientist Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (New York, NY: Archon Books, 1957). Deutsch was, of course, writing about formal alliances; however, his theory is by nature applicable to entities such as the EU, which, albeit not an alliance, aspires a security and defense role.
assets and structure. The shift of the Greco-Turkish tension from the bilateral to the international level, *de facto* renders the Greek case a vital link in the CSDP evolution chain because, unless the EU obtains autonomous military capabilities or Turkey withdraws its veto, the ambitions for a strong CSDP could be permanently jeopardized.

2. An exposed geographical location in the Balkans, as well as the fact that Greece is not connected by land to any other EU countries, except for Bulgaria. Both these elements contribute to Greece’s insecurity, as all the country’s Balkan neighbors are still undergoing a period of political and economic transition that, in the words of Thanos Dokos “could spin out of control under certain circumstances.” Such issues as border security, refugees, and irredentism well may eventuate, especially in the aftermath of the recent Balkan wars, which, to a great extent, (re)generated the economic stagnation and ethnic tensions in the area.

3. A strategic history as a small state amid great-power antagonisms. Located at the crossroads of three continents (Europe, Asia, and Africa) and situated in close proximity to the Black Sea and the oil-rich regions of the Middle East and the Caucasus, the modern Greek state has, since its establishment in 1830, been—and to a certain extent still is—subject to foreign intervention in its domestic

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8 “The “Berlin Plus” arrangements refer to the agreed framework in the NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management operations. Under these arrangements, the EU enjoys “assured access to NATO’s planning,” “presumed access to NATO’s assets and capabilities,” and a pre-designed European-only chain of command under the Deputy Supreme Commander Europe (SACEUR), a European General, in: Howorth, *Saint-Malo Plus Five: An Interim Assessment of ESDP*, 102.

9 Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) are not currently EU member-states.

affairs.\textsuperscript{11} As a consequence, national policies have occasionally been shaped more in accordance with foreign aims than with Greek national interests.

As entrenched and central as these Greek security concerns are, however, the most fundamental problem for advancing them on the CSDP level seems to be that the national interests of EU members diverge, or even conflict, in certain areas.\textsuperscript{12} The 1999 Balkan wars, where the Franco-German dispute limited a unified European armed response, provides an eloquent example of the EU’s lack of a common security orientation. Within this organizational, political, and historical problems, Athens finds itself dependent on alliance structures that, to Greek eyes, address imperfectly its national security priorities.

The hypothesis of this study is that Greece’s reality-expectations gap regarding the CSDP is shaped by two major elements. The first pertains to the distinctiveness of the Greek security concerns, that is, the aspects of the Greek security environment that the rest of the EU member-states do not share. The second refers to the potential of the CSDP itself, namely its conceptual and structural limits as a whole.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The quest for an autonomous EU policy covering defense and military aspects has received significant scholarly attention; however, the existing analyses approach the issue from a collective perspective and not from the


\textsuperscript{12} In a similar manner, Constantine Stephanopoulos asserted that: “National aims are still pursued at the expense of common European aims, and the divergent interests of the member-states often come into conflict,” in Constantine Stephanopoulos, “Issues of Greek Foreign Policy,” in \textit{The Greek Paradox- Promise vs. Performance}, ed. Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nikolaidis (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), 135–143.
member-state’s point of view. For example, such analysts as Tamir Sinai,\textsuperscript{13} Trevor Salmon and Alistair Shepherd,\textsuperscript{14} Frédéric Mérand,\textsuperscript{15} and Jolyon Howorth\textsuperscript{16} provide useful insights on the potential and dynamics of the European security project, but their research views the CSDP from the EU angle. A solid analysis of the role of EU integration in shaping its members’ defense policies is provided in an earlier work of Jolyon Howorth with Anand Menon;\textsuperscript{17} however, apart from well out of date,\textsuperscript{18} their study does not include small member-states. Subsequent studies of the EU’s quest for security and defense autonomy followed along the same line, analyzing the impact of the CSDP either as a sole actor within the EU\textsuperscript{19} or from the security standpoint of one or more of the “Big Three”: Britain, France, and Germany.\textsuperscript{20} The only scholarly efforts addressing the effect of the CSDP on the individual EU member-states’ security were part of broader projects, seeking to identify converging security interests within geographic or territorial-populace contexts—thus unavoidably downplaying the


\textsuperscript{15} Frédéric Mérand, \textit{European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).


\textsuperscript{17} To provide an insight into the different national factors that condition the impact of EU action, the authors dedicate the second part of their book to the four larger member-states: France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. For more, see: Jolyon Howorth and Anan Menon, \textit{The European Union and National Defence Policy}, ed. Jolyon Howorth and Anan Menon (New York, NY: Routledge, 1997).

\textsuperscript{18} Their work was published two years prior to the launch of the CSDP; Ibid.


national perspective for the sake of focusing on the group under examination. Although the road from Saint-Malo via Cologne, Helsinki, Nice, and Laeken to Skopje and Bunya is well known, neither specialists in security issues nor scholars of European integration have been able to put forth a comprehensive research agenda concerning the benefits of the CSDP from the member-state point of view.

An analogous gap exists in the literature dealing with Greek security apprehensions. Athens’ security policy is extensively discussed by Athanasios Dokos, Yannis Vallinakis, Athanasios Platias, Alexis Heraclides, Moustakis and Sheehan, and Dimitri Constanas and Charalampos Papasotiriou, but their research aims at elucidating its elements—especially in the context of the tensions with Turkey—and not the role of the EU in supporting it. A more comprehensive view of Greek security issues is presented in the papers of Monteagle Stearns and Stephen Larrabee, but even their analyses, although


22 Dokos, Greek Defense Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era.

23 Yannis Vallinakis, Greece’s Security in the Post-Cold War Era (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1994).


thorough in specifying all elements that accentuate Greece’s insecurity, does not address the role of the CSDP in assuaging it. There is some scholarly work linking the two variables together, but it approaches the EU in its political dimensions and not as a reliable security provider in the old-fashioned conception of defense. In fact, “plain old defense” rarely registers in scholarship studying the post-Cold War security environment. For example, the works of Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris Passas;\textsuperscript{30} and Kevin Featherstone and George Kazamias,\textsuperscript{31} although pioneering in analyzing the relationship between Greece and the EU, conceptualize security in the context of the economic-political benefits deriving from EU membership. In their more narrowly focused analyses, Ioannis Grigoriadis\textsuperscript{32} and Ronald Meinardus\textsuperscript{33} deplore the role of the European factor in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle, but their views also exclude the CSDP pillar.

In sum, despite the volume of academic work dealing individually with either the CSDP, or Greece’s security profile, the association between them has been neither systematically nor cumulatively researched. This thesis undertakes to fill this lacuna and establish just what the CSDP means to Greece and, by implication, what modern alliances do for, to, and about small states today. It analyzes in detail the security perceptions that the Greek state holds for itself and the respective areas that the CSDP covers or fails to address.

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E. METHODS AND SOURCES

In effect, this thesis presents its findings through a case study of Greece, specifically the security domain of Greek foreign policy. To this end, it synthesizes literature from several fields: security and defense planning, comparative politics, defense economics, and international relations. To analyze Athens’ contemporary security apprehensions, the causal mechanisms of each major concern or consideration are presented within their broader historical context, that is, in tandem with a socio-political analysis. Relevant scholarly effort by security analysts and official statements by diplomats and high-ranking statesmen provide additional insights. By identifying the reasons behind Greek insecurity, even within the EU, and evaluating the potential of the ambitious European security project, the present study lays bare the areas of strategic convergence or divergence between Athens’ concerns on the one side and the CSDP’s assurances on the other.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

The paper commences its analysis with an overview of Athens’ threat perceptions. Detailing Greece’s security environment in Chapter II, it tests the first hypothesis element—that is, the particularity of Greek concerns—and concludes that Athens’ major security apprehensions are, contrary to the European norm, territorial in nature, with Turkey chief among them. On the basis of these territorial concerns, Chapter III elucidates Athens’ disappointment with the security mechanisms in which it has participated so far, namely NATO and, until its recent demise, the Western European Union (WEU). Placing the analysis in its historical context, Chapter III demonstrates that Greece’s skeptical attitude toward its security guarantors has been determined by their actions—and inactions—regarding Turkish-Greek tensions. In doing so, it provides the basic framework for comprehending Greece’s support and expectations of the CSDP. Chapter IV addresses the evolution of the CSDP and its potential in covering

34 The WEU’s activities ceased in June 2011.
Greek territorial insecurities. To test the validity of the second hypothesis element, Chapter IV examines the conceptual and structural characteristics of the CSDP. It argues that, contrary to a promising defense dimension, ambitiously proclaimed within its very acronym, not only is CSDP not a defense alliance, but it also does not aspire to become one. Chapter V wraps up the data of the previous chapters and concludes that the current CSDP structure will only deal with the Greek case if its involvement does not stipulate a European military response to its territorial issues.
II. GREEK SECURITY CONCERNS

History may not repeat itself, but it sure teaches us lessons. We should learn from our past experiences and set our priorities right. At this moment, our country faces three open fronts: Albania, Skopje, and Turkey.35

A. INTRODUCTION

In their assessment of the post Cold-War security priorities of Greece, four distinguished Greek diplomats identified their country’s three major security concerns to be Albania, FYROM, and Turkey. Despite the obvious differences in population size, economic power, and military strength compared to each other and to Greece, these three states bear a common characteristic: the insecurities that they cause to Athens are, contrary to the European norm, territorial in nature.36 In other words, Greece feels that its internationally accepted territory is being challenged by Albania, FYROM, and Turkey. Although the magnitude of the perceived threats deriving from the former two states is evaluated by Greek officials as controllable, if not negligible, the same assessment does not apply to Turkey, which outnumbers Greece in both population and military size.37 The Turkish factor is critical in understanding the security mentality of Greece, and consequently the perceptions that Greece holds for its security providers: Turkey is not only greater in absolute numbers, but also, by being a NATO member, it co-exists, at times tendentiously, with Greece in the very organization that Athens has chosen as the guarantor for its collective defense.

Along with the territorial concerns that Greece seeks to address within collective defense schemes, there is an extra parameter that occupies Greek


36 With the exception of Finland and its perceptions of Russia, Greece is the only EU member-state whose major security interests are territorial.

37 The population of Turkey is approximately 75 million people compared to 12 million in Greece, and its military is the second largest in NATO with 402,000 personnel.
security thinking: the issue of illegal immigration, which has developed a significant security dimension, especially during the last 15–20 years. The uncontrollable waves of illegal immigrants stretch the Greek capacity to organically integrate the newcomers into the existing domestic structures. The issue is not of Greek interest only; however, due to its geographical position at the southeastern border of Europe, Greece ultimately functions as the gateway for immigrants wishing to enter the EU territory, mainly through the Greek-Turkish borders near Evros river.

In this context, Chapter II explores the distinctiveness of the security concerns of Athens, compared to its EU counterparts. The analysis demonstrates that Ankara is Athens first security priority as, along with the territorial threat it poses to Greece, it is also interlinked to the non-territorial issue of illegal immigration.

B. THE “THREAT FROM THE EAST”

Although the end of the Second World War and entry into NATO initiated a promising period of collaboration between Greece and Turkey, the issue of the Cyprus’s status was reflected in bilateral relations, even as far back as the early 1950s. Paying the price of Turkish reaction to the struggle of the Greek-Cypriots, on 6 September 1955, an organized attack on ethnic Greek residents of Constantinople, ended in numerous casualties and extensive damage to Greek property; this pogrom led to the gradual departure of ethnic Greeks, a process that culminated in 1964, with the official deportation of the Greek community.

The Turkish invasion and military occupation of Cyprus in 1974, and the following unilateral extension of Turkey’s air traffic area of responsibility up to the

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39 By secret decision (6/3801) made by the Turkish Ministerial Council on November 2, 1964, all real property belonging to Greeks was attacked and Greeks were barred from legal transactions involving the transfer of property.
middle of the Aegean, asserted Turkish aggressiveness and re-orientated the Greek security doctrine from the “menace from the North”\textsuperscript{40} to a “threat from the East.”\textsuperscript{41} The two countries have been brought to the brink of armed conflict twice since then: in March 1987, when Turkish attempts to conduct underwater research on the Greek continental shelf prompted a full deployment of the Greek armed forces; and in January 1996, when Turkey’s challenges of Greek sovereignty over the islets of Imia escalated in military mobilization from both countries. The latter crisis was only defused with the intervention of the United States. However, Athens’ concerns had been triggered even before the Imia crisis. In 1995, Turkey raised an official \textit{casus belli} in the event of Greece exercising its right to extend its territorial waters from six to twelve nautical miles from the coastline.\textsuperscript{42}

Such concerns were validated after the disclosure of the Turkish operational plans “Balyoz” and “Suga” on January 2010. According to these plans, the Turkish armed forces were planning the creation and escalation of a military crisis with Greece, which, revealing the incompetence of the Turkish civilian government, would justify its overthrow by the military and the subsequent invasion of Greek territory in Thrace and the Aegean.\textsuperscript{43} Although the Turkish military officers involved in the planning are currently facing charges for attempting to overthrow the government, Turkey continues to challenge established Greek sovereignty over the Aegean.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Term coined in the context of the Truman Doctrine to illustrate the communist threat; see Dimitris Tsarouhas, “Explaining an Activist Military: Greece until 1975,” \textit{Southeast European Politics} VI, no. 1 (2005), 8.}
\footnote{Dokos, \textit{Greek Defense Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era}, 245.}
\footnote{Territorial waters give the littoral state full control over air navigation in the airspace above, and partial control over shipping (foreign ships, both foreign and military are normally guaranteed the right of innocent passage. As a signatory member of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS III), Greece reserves the right to claim a twelve nautical mile limit.}
\end{footnotes}
With the political issue of Cyprus maintaining its shadow on bilateral relations, the points of friction between the two countries can be summarized as follows:

- Greece’s sovereignty over a number of islands, islets, and atolls in the Eastern Aegean
- Greek territorial waters
- National Airspace and Athens’ Flight International Region (FIR)
- Military status of the Aegean islands
- Continental shelf

1. Greece’s Sovereignty Over a Number of Islands, Islets and Atolls in the Eastern Aegean

Although Turkish claims on the sovereignty of the islands of the Aegean Sea were not systemized until after the Imia crisis of 1996, official statements following the invasion of Cyprus were for Athens the first signals of Ankara’s revisionist aims. Asserting the centrality of Cyprus in achieving these aims, Turkish Foreign Minister Melih Esenbel declared in 1975:

> In the Aegean, one must necessarily pursue a dynamic policy. The conditions today are different from the conditions in 1923. Turkey's power has grown. When we talk of the need for dynamic policy, we do not mean that the army must act at once and that we should occupy the islands. Our financial interests need to be safeguarded in the Aegean. Cyprus is the first step towards the Aegean. (Foreign Minister Melih Esenbel, January 22, 1975)\(^{45}\)

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Successive statements by leading Turkish political figures have been viewed with analogous alarm:

The group of islands situated near the Turkish coasts, including the Dodecanese, must belong to Turkey. Among these we cite Samothrace, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Kos, Rhodes, and all others, small or large within a distance of 50 km. (Vice-Premier Mr. Turkes, March 3, 1976)\(^{46}\)

Other assertions include, “Do not call these islands Greek islands but Aegean islands. It is preferable to call them Aegean islands.” (Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, August 19, 1976)\(^{47}\) and “For six hundred years the Aegean islands were ours and in the hands of the Ottomans” (Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, August 24, 1976).\(^{48}\)

Greek security analysts’ assessment of Ankara’s intentions were confirmed in 1996, when Turkish challenges over the sovereignty of the islets of Imia developed into a general questioning of Greek rule on a number of islands, islets, and atolls of the eastern Aegean, formally known as the “grey zone theory.”\(^{49}\) The unfolding of events that led to the Imia crisis is of specific importance as, for the first time after the invasion in Cyprus, it confirmed Greek concerns of Turkish intentions to use military force at an opportune moment.

On December 26, 1995, a Turkish freighter ran aground on one of the islets of Imia, and its captain initially declined the assistance offered by the Greek authorities, claiming that he was within Turkish territorial waters. Ultimately he accepted the offer to be towed to Turkey by a Greek tugboat, but a dispute over the salvage fees between the Turkish freighter captain and the Greek tug captain

\(^{46}\) Cited in Tsilikas, *Greek Military Strategy: The Doctrine of Deterrence and its Implications on Greek-Turkish Relations*, 17.


\(^{48}\) Ibid.

\(^{49}\) According to this theory, Turkish diplomats claim that several islets, while not explicitly retained under Turkish sovereignty in 1923, were also not explicitly ceded to any other country, and their sovereignty has therefore remained objectively undecided.
led the former to submit a routine request to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asking to whom the Imia belong. This Turkish inquiry into Greek territory was picked up by the Greek media, and the mayor of a nearby Greek island sailed to Imia and raised a Greek flag on his own initiative, in order to stress that the islets are Greek territory. On 27 January 1996, a team of journalists from the Turkish newspaper *Hurriyet* rented a helicopter, flew to Imia, removed the Greek flag and replaced it with a Turkish for the benefit of the cameras of a private Turkish television channel. The following day the Greek Navy lowered the Turkish flag and hoisted the Greek standard. Turkey responded by concentrating warships in the sea around Imia, violating Greek territorial waters. The Turkish provocation culminated in the landing of Turkish troops on the second islet, which, for all intents, was a militarily occupation of Greek territory. Several days later, after the intervention of the United States, both sides agreed to withdraw their forces from the area and not raise flags on the islets again, for the purposes of de-escalating the crisis.50

In the aftermath of this event, the Turkish foreign ministry verbally stressed Turkish sovereignty over the Imia islets and demanded—in practical application of the grey zone theory—wholesale negotiations on the islands, islets, and atolls in the Aegean, maintaining that their status is legally undetermined:51

Turkey said from the beginning that the issue was not merely the ownership for Imia (Kardak) rocks, which Turkey claims as its own under international law. There are hundreds of little islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean that their status remains unclear, due to the absence of a comprehensive bilateral agreement between the two countries. (Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Omer Akbel, January 31, 1996)52

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51 A comprehensive analysis of the Turkish and Greek views on the legal issues regarding the sovereignty over the islets, is provided on the websites of the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs. [www.mfa.gov.tr for Turkey, and www.mfa.gr for Greece].

2. Greek Territorial Waters

With both countries maintaining a six-mile territorial sea limit since 1936, the actual conflict over territorial waters emerged when proposals about extending its breadth to twelve miles were submitted during the first United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS I) in 1958. Fearing that potential use of such a right on the Greek islands would essentially turn the Aegean into a Greek lake, Turkish statements explicitly stressed that an extension would lead to war:

It has often been said that should Greece attempt to extend her territorial waters to twelve miles Turkey would consider this act as a cause for war. Greece would not risk such a thing. (Message from the Turkish Foreign Minister I. Caglayan to the Greek Premier, Constantine Karamanlis, October 24, 1979)

The issue officially entered the Greek-Turkish agenda after November 1994, with the entry into force of UNCLOS III, which would formalize the twelve-mile limit as the maximum breadth of a State’s territorial Sea. As signatory member of the convention, the Greek Parliament ratified UNCLOS III on May 31, 1995, reserving its conventional right to make use of the relevant provision. In response, on June 8, 1995, the Turkish Parliament raised an official casus belli and authorized its government to take any necessary measures, including military ones, if Greece exercised its right. Subsequent Turkish statements

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53 The first conference, held in 1958, produced four treaties: on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, on the Continental Shelf, on the High Seas, and on Fishing and the Conservation of Living Resources on the High Seas. That conference, however, could not reach agreement on the maximum breadth of the territorial sea or the seaward extent of national jurisdiction over the continental shelf. The second conference, held in 1960, aimed to standardize the breadth of the territorial sea, but also failed to reach an agreement, mainly because the United States and other maritime countries refused to countenance a territorial sea broader than six miles.

54 See maps, p. 18–19.

55 Cited in: Arapoglou, Dispute in the Aegean Sea–The Imia/Kardak Crisis, 13.

underlined Ankara’s determination to go to war over the depth of the Greek islands’ territorial sea: “Turkey would seriously consider seizing some of the Greek islands close to the Turkish mainland” (Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces, Admiral Govan Erkaya).57

Turkey maintains the position that extension of the territorial seas is unacceptable as all shipping to and from Turkey’s Aegean ports and, indeed, that any transiting of the Turkish straits to and from the Black Sea requires one to pass through Greek territorial waters. Pointing out that Turkey itself has extended its territorial seas to twelve nautical miles off its Black Sea and Mediterranean coasts, Athens stresses the fact that the navigation rights, covered by the right of “innocent passage” laid down in the 1982 UN Convention, would not be threatened by an extension of Greek territorial waters to twelve nautical miles. As the breadth of the territorial waters impacts the ownership claims of the continental shelf beneath them and the airspace above them, Greek security analysts consider this challenge part of Ankara’s overall revisionist aspirations in the Aegean.

Figure 1. Current Territorial Sea Distribution in the Aegean (six nautical miles).58

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3. National Airspace—Athens Flight International Region (FIR)

Greek national airspace is established with the Presidential Decree June 18, 1931, which maintains a coastal zone of ten nautical miles serving aviation and air policing requirements. As with territorial seas, Turkey rejects any suggestion that Greek national airspace extends beyond six nautical miles from its coasts in the Aegean; in fact, although Turkey recognized and respected the above rule of ten nautical miles for forty-four consecutive years, since 1975 it contests it with persistent violations of Greek airspace: Turkish fighter planes, often armed with missiles, not only violate the section of Greek air space contested by Turkey between ten and six nautical miles, but also penetrate deeply beyond six nautical miles, sometimes overflying Greek islands; in other words they enter portions of Greek air space which Turkey has recognized.

The conflict over the national airspace is linked to airspace jurisdiction (FIR) as it constitutes part of the latter. The legal framework ruling international aviation in the Aegean was set in 1952 by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)—to which both countries had been party—which ruled that

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59 Martin and Schofield, *The Imia Dispute in the Aegean Sea*, 64.

except for a narrow strip of national airspace along the Turkish coast, responsibility for Aegean airspace should fall to the Athens FIR.

In August 1974, Turkey issued Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 714, unilaterally extending its area of responsibility up to the middle of the Aegean, refusing, from that point on, to report the flight schedules of its military aircraft to Athens FIR. Athens responded with the issuing of NOTAM 1157, which declared the Aegean air routes to Turkey unsafe due to the conflicting orders. In 1980, Turkey withdrew its demand and immediately afterwards Greece recalled its notification as well. However, Ankara’s refusal to submit the flight plans of its military aircraft continued uninterrupted, resulting in Greek aircrafts being scrambled to intercept and identify Turkish military flights over the Aegean. Additional diplomatic initiatives undermining Greek jurisdiction on the Aegean were taken in 1989 with the entry into (domestic) force of an arbitrary Turkish law establishing a Turkish Search and Rescue (SAR) area of responsibility that includes a large part of the Black Sea, half of the Aegean, and a part of the eastern Mediterranean that included the militarily occupied northern part of Cyprus.61

4. **Military Status of the Aegean Islands**

The status of the majority of the Greek and Turkish islands and coastal areas was initially set by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which not only settled sovereignty issues, but also demilitarized most of them, with the exception of police forces, gendarmerie, etc. The following Treaty of Montreaux (1936), which revised the Treaty of Lausanne, allowed the partial remilitarization of certain islands near the Dardanelles (Limnos and Samothraki). Similarly, restrictions on the militarization of the Dodecanese islands were included in the provisions of the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. In the aftermath of Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the law was published in the Turkish Government Gazette on January 7, 1989. 

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61 The law was published in the Turkish Government Gazette on January 7, 1989.
1974, fearing another possible Turkish invasion, Greece subsequently remilitarized both sets of islands, citing its right to self-defense under the United Nations (UN) Charter Article 51.

The remilitarization of the islands was used as a justification for the formation, in 1975, of Turkey’s Fourth Army, the so-called “Army of the Aegean,” deployed in southwestern Anatolia. This force is not assigned to NATO and is equipped with the largest non-ocean-going landing force in the world.62 Coupled with its amphibious capabilities, and in close proximity to Greece’s outermost islands, the Fourth Army has proved a source of great concern to Athens and has provided a rationale for reinforcing Greek forces there as a first line of defense against Turkish attack.63 Also standing by Article 51, Ankara claims that the IVth army constitutes a protective shield against attack from fortified Greek islands just a few hundred meters from the Turkish mainland. The real dimensions of the issue, though, are arguably best highlighted by Monteagle Stearns:

Whether the Turkish Fourth Army numbers 30,000 troops, as the Turks claim, or 150,000, as the Greeks claim, whether it is a training command, as Ankara insists, or an amphibious assault force, as Athens says, these are forces deployed in the wrong place at the wrong time. They are certainly not needed to defend Turkey from a possible military thrust from the Greek islands, which would be suicidal from the Greeks to contemplate.64

5. Continental Shelf

The issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf, which Greece recognizes as the only legal difference between the two countries, is generated

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63 Martin and Schofield, *The Imia Dispute in the Aegean Sea*.
by Turkey’s attempt to acquire continental shelf rights to the west of the Greek islands of the Aegean, an act that would essentially ensnare them in an area under Turkish jurisdiction.

The dispute over continental shelf rights emerged in 1973, when the Turkish Government Gazette published a decision to grant the Turkish national petroleum company permits to conduct research in underwater areas close to the Greek islands. Repeating the same practice after the invasion in Cyprus, the Turkish Government extended the areas already under license in 1974. The same year, the Turkish survey ship Candarli, accompanied by no less than thirty-two warships, spent six days cruising along the western limits of the Turkish claim; a further voyage was made by the Hora in 1976, which conducted oceanographic research on the Greek continental shelf west of Lesbos for three days.

Turkey’s refusal to solve the issue in the International Court, led the deadlock unaltered until March 1987 when the Turkish vessel Sismik-1, escorted again by Turkish warships, set out for the Aegean to conduct underwater research just off the coastal zone of the Greek islands, bringing the crisis to the verge of armed conflict. The crisis, which was defused after the rapid mobilization of the Greek Navy and an exchange of messages between the two Prime Ministers, also provided Greece with the opportunity to reiterate her constant stance on delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf; a stance that remains unaltered to this day.65

C. FYROM AND THE “MACEDONIAN QUESTION”

The traditional “Macedonian Question”—spanning from the last decades of the nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century—was mainly a contest over territories, and as such, an issue of regional and international security. During the latter part of the twentieth century and up to this day, it has evolved

chiefly as an issue of identities, systematically categorized by Dr. Evangelos Kofos into three distinct groups: identity of the land, identities of the people connected to the land, and identity of heritage. According to Kofos, the core of the controversy lies within the first group, because “[t]he names ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedonians’ are claims for title deeds to the Macedonian land, its peoples and their historical/cultural heritage.”

Indeed, the idea of a unified Macedonia closely associated with irredentist claims against Greek territory, traces back to WWII, when Josip Broz Tito separated the area then known as Vardar Banovina (now the FYROM) from Serbia, and granted it the status of a republic within the new Yugoslav federation, under the name Socialist Republic of Macedonia. In tandem with promoting the “Macedonianism” doctrine, a concept that supported the existence of a separate “Macedonian” nation, Tito cultivated the notion of reunification of all Macedonian territories, ultimately aiming at Yugoslav access to the Aegean Sea. Greek fears were kept alive during the Cold War by Skopje’s complaints regarding the treatment of a “Macedonian minority” in northern Greece. Athens choice to downplay the issue, mainly out of desire to maintain good relations with Yugoslavia, kept the diplomatic pace low, but did not hinder the emergence of an otherwise unsubstantiated “Macedonian question.”

66 The legal term “title deed” refers to a deed or document evidencing a person’s legal right or title to property, especially to real property.


69 Geographically, the term Macedonia refers to a broader region that includes portions of the territories of various Balkan countries (mainly Greece, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bulgaria). However, the greater part of geographical Macedonia coincides with the area covered by the ancient Greek Macedonia, which lies within the boundaries of modern Greece (55% in Greece, 35% in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 9% in Bulgaria and 1% in Albania). Currently, approximately 2.5 million Greek citizens live in the Greek part of Macedonia, whose inhabitants have called and considered themselves Macedonians since time immemorial.
In its contemporary dimensions, the “Macedonian question” arose in 1991, when, following the collapse of the Yugoslav federation, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared its independence under the name “Republic of Macedonia”, dragging Athens in a dispute over the official name of the newly independent state. More alarming to the Greeks is the fact that FYROM refers to Greek Macedonia as the “Egejski del na Makedonija pod Grcija” (the Aegean part of Macedonia under Greece.)70 As both the formal area of the Republic and the wider geographical/ethnic map transcending three states (Greece, Bulgaria and FYROM) are identified by FYROM as Macedonia, the inference is clear that the two parts in Greece and Bulgaria are “unjustly” under foreign rule.

Recent initiatives in FYROM have certainly embroiled the “name issue” with elements striking sensitive chords of the Greek people. By nurturing the notion that the country’s citizens are the descendents of the ancient Macedonians via schoolbooks and propaganda, FYROM’s political leadership cultivates the concept of a United Macedonia, opening the way to claims on “occupied” territories. The latest examples of this conduct include the renaming of the airport of Skopje to Alexander the Great and the European corridor X to Alexander the Macedonian, and the launch of the “Macedonian Encyclopedia” full of inaccuracies of the region’s history, as well as the revelations of a statue of Alexander the Great, placed at Skopje’ s central square.

For Greek security thinking, apart from history and historical heritage, the issue at stake is the emergence of revisionist claims.71 Given additional expression in a constitution that affirmed the existence of a Macedonian people, allegedly inhabiting the wider Macedonian area and envisaging its eventual unification, these claims intensified Greek fears of FYROM’s revisionism. That such fears were not unfounded was proved by Skopje’s decision to include in its

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70 Emphasis mine; a similar treatment is reserved for the Bulgarian part, which is identified as “Pirinska del na Makedonija pod Balgarija” (The Pirin part of Macedonia under Bulgaria); Evangelos Kofos, National Heritage and National Identity in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Macedonia, 4.

71 Dokos, Greek Defense Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era, 250.
national flag the emblem of the Macedonian dynasty, the star of Vergina. The adoption of such a symbol as the state’s flag was yet another gesture with devastating impact on Greek public opinion. Since the symbol had not been widely known before Manolis Andronikos excavated Philip’s tomb in Vergina (a small town southeast of Thessaloniki) in 1978, FYROM’s President Gligorov could not claim that this had been a symbol that stirred patriotic feelings among his people. Baiting the Greeks turned out to be a highly effective political exercise addressed to his parliament’s nationalist gallery.\(^72\)

Nevertheless, outside Greece, the reasons for Greek passion were poorly understood and, worse, poorly explained by Athens. An eloquent interpretation of Greek vehemence on the issue of the new republic’s name is provided by Monteagle Stearns:

> Those in the United States in particular, who have criticized Greece for being swept away by nationalism, might reflect on how American public opinion would react if the northeastern states of Mexico declared their independence under the name ‘the Republic of Texas’ and raised a flag emblazoned the Alamo.\(^73\)

While militarily the threat to the Greek security posed by Skopje is negligible, the sensitivities of the Greek people, and especially of the inhabitants of Greek Macedonia, to any challenge to their identity are acute.\(^74\) The magnitude of this threat is further implicated by the Turkish factor. As Yannis Valinakis observes, Turkey’s quick recognition of FYROM in February 1992

\(^72\) The constitution of FYROM contains a preamble that refers to the founding document of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) of August 1944, which reads as follows: “Macedonians under Bulgaria and Greece… the unification of the entire Macedonia people depends on our participation in the gigantic Anti-Fascist front.” As Thanos Veremis notes: “The irredentist heritage of state born under a communist star was paradoxically enshrined in the constitution of a democratic entity that appealed for recognition”; in Thanos Veremis, “Greece and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era,” vol. VII, in *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades and Andre Gerolymatos (New York: Pella Publishing Company Inc., 1999), 35–37.


\(^74\) Larrabee, *Greece & the Balkans: Implications for Policy*, 34.
rekindled Greek fears of Turkish encirclement. Stephen Larrabee’s 1997 counter-argument that such fears “appear[ed] highly exaggerated” is considered obsolete after the recent publication of Ahmet Davutoglu’s book, *The Strategic Depth*, which introduces the notion of neo-Ottomanism. According to the Neo-Ottoman dogma, Ankara should pursue a more active policy in the Balkans, exploiting the religious factor as the vehicle for Turkish intervention, in and among the Muslim ethnic groups of the Balkans: FYROM, Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia. Thus, in an otherwise remarkable exhibition of geopolitical and geostrategic vision, the Turkish Foreign Minister stokes Greece’s—Orthodox— insecurities of a Muslim encirclement.

D. THE ALBANIAN QUESTION

Another crucial effect of the dissolution of Yugoslavia for the security concerns of Greece was the fact that it rekindled the Albanian question, a traditional “national question,” centered on redrawing territorial borders to form a new ethnic nation-state, encompassing all the Albanian communities in the Balkans. The central theme of the Albanian question is the notion of “Greater Albania” or “Great Albania.” This term refers to an irredentist concept of lands outside the borders of Albania, which, based on the present-day or historical presence of Albanian populations in those areas, are considered part of a greater national homeland by some Albanians. Although the contemporary core of the Albanian national question is considered Kosovo, Athens remains concerned

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as part of this agenda seeks political control over part of Epirus—the northwestern region of Greece—claiming it to comprise an organic part of the Great Albania.\footnote{According to the \textit{Gallup Balkan Monitor} 2010 report, the idea of a Greater Albania is supported by the majority of Albanians in Albania (63 percent), Kosovo (81 percent), and FYROM (53 percent). See: Besar Likmeta, \textit{Balkan Insight}, Nov 17, 2010, \url{http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/survey-greater-albania-remains-popular} (accessed 3 December 2010).}

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In addition to irredentist claims, Tirana’s reluctance to grant the large Greek minority on the Albanian side the internationally recognized rights of ethnic minorities—at least not in full measures—is perceived as an attempt to de-
Hellenize the southern part of Albania. Greek concerns were intensified after Albanian maneuvers regarding the recent Albanian national inventory: initially programmed to take place in April 2011, Albanian authorities postponed it for November, officially claiming that the local elections of May would conflict with the inventory procedure. As Albanian nationalist circles yearn for the removal of questions regarding ethnicity from the questionnaire, Athens views the postponement as a reaction to the Greek minority’s demand of freely declaring their ethnicity and religious views, in accordance with international and European legislation. As the spokesman of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted, this postponement, in tandem with Albanian extreme nationalistic exultations, creates grounded suspicion of questionnaire alteration.

Greek skepticism is further fused through specific events that, although isolated, have significant political symbolism: apart from the controversial local election in October 2000, when Greek minority leaders reported widespread ballot-rigging and violence against ethnic Greek voters, particularly in the district of Himara, the recent murder by Albanian nationalists of an inhabitant of Himara, because he was speaking in Greek, reaffirmed Greece’s concerns regarding the respect for human rights of the Greek minority in Albania. Far more upsetting was the reaction of Tirana. Although the Prime Minister of Albania condemned the event, speaking of “an action of blind fanaticism,” a large portion

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80 The most fundamental of these rights include native-language schools and religious freedom; the latter involving the recognition and unhindered functioning of the Orthodox Church, to which the Greek Minority belongs. For a well-researched documentary account of the history of Albania’s Greek minority, see The Greek Minority in Albania, A Documentary Record (1921–1993), Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1994.

81 Within the same circles, there is a demand that such questions should be included in the inventory of the neighboring FYROM.

82 The coastal Himara region of Southern Albania has always had a predominantly ethnic Greek population. There are seven villages in the Himara district, including two that speak mainly Greek and the rest are bilingual. For more, see “Albania: State of the Nation,” ICG Balkans Report, no. 111 (Tirana/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011).

of the press downplayed it, rekindling suspicions in Athens that the notion of Great Albania essentially never faded away.

Even so, for Greece the potential of an Albanian offensive against it is, as in the case of FYROM, connected to Turkey’s actions in the Balkans. In this context, Turkey’s recent action to undertake the cost and construction of an Albanian naval base resonates in Greek security circles not only as another indication of Ankara’s attempt to establish a Turkish-dominated Muslim Arc in the Balkans, but also as a potential military lever against Greece.

E. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Situated in the southeast part of the Mediterranean Sea, Greece’s geographical position assigns it the role of EU’s gatekeeper. Whereas, until the late ‘80s, Greece was a largely homogeneous country, after the fall of communist regimes, a mass influx of illegal immigrants took residence in Greece, mostly from the neighboring countries of the north. In the last decade, the wave of illegal immigrants from the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa has increased considerably, comprising approximately half of the annual inflow to Greece—the other half originating mainly from Albania. Monitoring the illegal border crossing in the EU, Frontex, the EU’s agency for external border security, provides striking comparative data: in its risk assessment of 2010, Frontex concludes that all Greek external borders of the EU—including land (with Albania, FYROM and Turkey), air and sea borders—account for 90 percent of all illegal border crossing along the EU external borders.85

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84 The population consisted mostly of Greek Orthodox (98%), with a minority of Greek Muslims situated mostly in the northern area of Thrace, and some smaller communities of Catholics and Jews.

85 Frontex, “Frontex Press Kit-Current Migratory Situation in Greece,” (2010), accessed March, 18, 2011, http://www.frontex.europa.eu/rabit_2010/background_information/. Frontex's mission is to assist EU member states with the implementation of EU rules on external border controls and to coordinate operational cooperation between member states in the field of external border management. While it remains the task of each member state to control its own borders, the Agency is vested with the function to ensure that they all do so with the same high standard of efficiency.
These increases did not occur fortuitously; increased maritime patrols and bilateral deals to deport illegals, such as Italy’s with Libya and Spain’s with Senegal and Mauritania, have largely closed down the western and central Mediterranean routes into the EU, essentially stemming the illegal immigration flow to the east.\footnote{Ibid.} As a consequence, the main irregular migration route from Asia to Europe, goes into Greece through Turkey, crossing either the narrow straits that divide mainland Turkey from several of the Greek islands of the Aegean (e.g., Mytilini or Chios) or—mainly—the Evros River on the northeastern part of the border in Thrace, on small boats.\footnote{Anna Triantafyllidou, Michaela Maroufof and Marina Nikolova, *Immigration Towards Greece at the Eve of the 21st Century—A Critical Assessment.*, Working Paper No 4, ELIAMEP (IDEA, March 2009). The analysis indicates that the Greek-Turkey border has become for many a safer and cheaper route to the EU rather than crossing the Mediterranean.}

Greek attempts to negotiate an agreement with Turkey have stalled. Although the two countries have signed a bilateral agreement concerning organized crime and illegal immigration (December 17, 2005), Turkey does not conform to its obligations under the convention, such as re-acceptance of expelled people from Greece that have previously left the Turkish coastline.\footnote{As Frontex Deputy Executive Director Gil Arias-Fernandez asserts: “The main problem for tackling this flow of illegal immigration in Greece is on one hand the little, not to say lack of, cooperation from the Turkish side.” The Telegraph, “Sharp Rise in Illegal Immigrants Entering Europe Through Greece,” *The Telegraph*, December 1, 2010 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/8172321/Sharp-rise-in-illegal-immigrants-entering-Europe-through-Greece.html (accessed March 17, 2011).} Skepticism in Athens regarding Turkish motivation behind this non-cooperative stance has been underscored by video footage confirming that the Turkish Coast Guard deposits immigrants in the Greek islands. The latest major incident took place on August 19, 2008, in the vicinity of the island of Lesvos, one of the easternmost Greek islands and has raised serious questions on Ankara’s role in the huge illegal immigration problem the Greek authorities are facing.\footnote{A Greek Coast Guard vessel on patrol originally spotted the Turkish boat in the vicinity of Cape Korakas, well inside Greek waters, carrying an unknown number of illegal immigrants. Footage published by the Greek newspaper *To Ethnos* shows a man on board the Turkish vessel throwing life jackets overboard for the soon-to-be castaways. *To Ethnos*, March 8, 2008.}
The continuing waves of illegal immigrants has compelled the Greek government to commence a costly program for the construction of new acceptance facilities in the eastern borders of the country, as the already existing infrastructure has proven inadequate. Recent Greek thoughts of building a fence along part of its borders with Turkey, to prevent illegal immigrants from crossing, have been dealt with skepticism from EU officials, who view it as short-term measures, which will not allow tackling illegal immigration in a structural manner.90 After an official Greek request, the EU’s border protection agency Frontex sent a two hundred-member force to the Greek-Turkish border areas to provide Athens with emergency assistance in patrolling one of the main points of entry for illegal immigrants into the EU.

Despite its professionalism, Frontex’s practical results are washed away by the existing EU legal framework governing undocumented immigrants. Once these individuals enter the EU borders, their future is regulated by what is known as the Dublin II procedure, a European Council (EC) regulation, which establishes that undocumented immigrants found anywhere in the EU must be returned to their country of entry.91 Under these provisions, if immigrants who pass through Greece apply for asylum in any EU member-state, their fingerprints show up on what’s called the “Eurodoc system,” and they are sent back to Greece. As the majority of undocumented immigrants in the EU enter European soil through Greece, Dublin II essentially targets Greece, generating a feeling among officials in Athens that faraway Brussels requires them to be gatekeepers for the whole of the EU, without the organization having to deal with the Greek security tensions. This feeling of resentment was confirmed after the Tunisian


revolution of December 2010, which temporarily shifted the main immigration flow to the Italian island of Lampedusa. Responding to Italian threats to “grant temporary permits” to Tunisian migrants willing to join family in other EU countries—in essence violating the Dublin II regulation for the sake of its own internal security—the European Commissioner responsible for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, rapidly mobilized EU funds and published a statement asserting that immigration is a matter of great importance for the EU as a whole, not just for Italy.\textsuperscript{92} Nevertheless, despite pompous statements of EU solidarity, Greece continues to carry the weight of Dublin II, and, along with it, the main volume of illegal immigrants entering EU territory.

III. ATHENS’ QUEST FOR SECURITY PROVIDERS:
THE ROAD TO CSDP

A historical profile of the Greek political scene reveals a certain mentality regarding the role of foreign powers and institutions. Maneuvering in a state that was for years the object of blatant foreign intervention and, at the same time, foreign protection, a sizeable part of the Greek elite appears inclined to see the outside world in the role of either the “interventionist” or the “protector power.”

In the post-World War II years, Greece approached both protector powers available in the collective security market of the West, namely NATO and, later, the WEU. Despite being an active member of both, Athens also enthusiastically supported the concept of an autonomous European Defense Project since its launch in 1999. This choice raises several questions regarding Athens’ perceptions of its security guarantors: Was this preference a mere indication of European solidarity? Or does it reveal a deeper skepticism of—if not disappointment in—the current security-providing schemes? In order to answer these questions, this chapter proposes to assess the role of NATO and the WEU in Greece, and how this partnership developed during and after the Cold War. Placing the analysis in its historical context, this chapter also demonstrates that Greece’s attitude toward its security guarantors has been determined by its problems with Turkey. By doing so, this chapter provides the basic framework for comprehending Greece’s support and expectations for the CSDP.

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94 Although the efforts for a common European Security and Defense Policy can be traced in the WW II years, no substantial autonomous Defense Project was undertaken by European states until the birth of the CSDP in 1999. For more on the evolution and development of the CSDP see Chapter IV.

Being a member of NATO since April 18, 1958, one would expect that Greece would have been able to concentrate on internal reconstruction after the civil war of 1946–1949. However, other security factors came to dominate its foreign and domestic policy: at a time when other NATO members orientated their security policy toward collective defense, Greece shifted its attention to divisive regional issues, which both implicated and imperiled the Greek relationship with NATO. The first signs emerged as early as 1955, when, Cypriot efforts to unify the island with Greece sparked anti-Greek riots in Turkey and caused Greece to withdraw from NATO exercises for the first time. The issue of enosis, or union, between Greece and Cyprus, held a prominent position in the post–war Greek political agenda, as it lay in the intersection of strategic interests and the demands of public opinion and national aspirations. The issue had festered at least since the UN General Assembly in 1954, where Athens first raised the issue of self-determination and union (enosis) of Cyprus to Greece. Britain, which was still in control of the island, introduced Turkey into the matter, to provide a counterweight to Greek demands and maintain its presence on the island. As the Turkish government assumed responsibility for the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots and eventually tried to promote and safeguard Turkish-Cypriot affairs, an anti-colonial struggle gradually developed into a confrontation between Greece and Turkey.95

This confrontation further solidified after the NATO-imposed compromise solution of bifurcated Cypriot independence in 1960, where instead of enosis, a fundamentally unworkable constitution was proposed. Under the auspices of the

95 Turkish direct involvement in the Cyprus dispute was triggered “by the consequent inter-communal bloodshed (about 100 people of each side had been killed by June 1958)” in: Raouf Denktash, “The Crux of the Cyprus Problem,” Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs IV, no. 3 (1999): 2. For the Turkish perspective on the current Turkish-Cypriot stance see; Ergun Olgun, “Cyprus: A New and Realistic Approach,” Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs IV, no. 3 (1999); also: Clement Henry Dodd, The Cyprus Imbroglio (Beverley, North Humberside: Eothen Press, 1998). A comprehensive analysis of the Greek perspective can bee found in: Thanos Veremis, Greek Security: Issues and Politics (Adelphi Papers) (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982).
Zürich and London Agreement, which drafted the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Cypriot people were divided into two communities on the basis of ethnic origin. The president had to be a Greek-Cypriot elected by the dominant Greek-Cypriot community (more than 80 percent), and the vice-president a Turkish-Cypriot elected by the Turkish-Cypriots. An additional Treaty of Guarantee, also agreed upon in Zürich, constituted the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Greece as the guarantor powers of the Republic of Cyprus, whereby all parties promised to prohibit the promotion of “either the union of the Republic of Cyprus with any other State, or the partition of the Island.”

After fighting broke out between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus in late December 1963—over the disputed plans for constitutional revision proposed by the island’s president, Archbishop Makarios—Turkey threatened invasion in a number of instances. NATO preserved its neutral stance; it was U.S. President Lyndon Johnson who warned Turkish president İsmet İnönü in June 1964 of dire consequences should Turkey choose to invade the island. When, in November 1967, intercommunal fighting reoccurred, it was again American diplomatic pressure that averted battle between the two NATO allies while the alliance itself remained aloof from the conflict or its resolution.

Earlier that year in Greece, on April 21, 1967, military conspirators implemented a NATO contingency plan, designed in the event of serious internal disorders, and took over political power imposing a harsh dictatorship.96 Although public opinion and some governments in Western Europe regularly criticized the Greek junta, the military dictatorship never experienced serious pressure from NATO or the United States. The “Colonels” carefully fulfilled Greece’s obligations under the NATO alliance and appeared to serve American interests during a

96 Papacosma, NATO, Greece and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era, 49. The NATO contingency plan did not specifically call for a dictatorship as such a move would violate the Alliance’s first principle for accepting a state as a member, namely established democracy. However, as the primary objective for the Alliance was securing its southeastern flank from the communist threat, the Greek junta could be tolerated on the basis of its anticommunist politics. Fotios Moustakis, The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003).
period of constant turmoil in the Middle East and of an augmented Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. To the Greek public, particularly those citizens who felt the brunt of the junta’s domestic repression, NATO’s acceptance of the junta made the alliance part of the problem.

Born of the struggle in and about Cyprus, the junta also faltered over the island. The Greek dictatorship crumbled at the height of national crisis in the immediate aftermath of its 15 July 1974 attempt to replace Archbishop Makarios with a coup carried out by the pro-

enosis Greek-Cypriot politician Nikos Sampson. Isolated at home and abroad, their support of the destabilization of the Cypriot government weakened President Makarios’s bargaining position even further, vis-à-vis the Turkish-Cypriot. As a Turkish diplomat stressed:

The Greeks committed the unbelievably stupid move of appointing Sampson, giving us the opportunity to solve our problems once and for all. Unlike 1964 and 1967, the United States leverage on us in 1974 was minimal. We should no longer be scared off by threats of the Soviet bogeyman.97

Aware of the weak bargaining position of the Greek dictators, Turkey exploited the opportunity to execute policy it was denied during the 1960s and invaded Cyprus on 20 July 1974. Unable to handle the crisis, the dictatorship collapsed and democracy was restored under the conservative government of Konstantinos Karamanlis. The latter’s attempts to resolve the crisis at the Geneva peace talks collapsed when Turkey launched a broad offensive on 14 August 1974. More than a third of the island fell under Turkish control, concurrently creating about 180,000 Greek-Cypriots refugees who fled to the south.

Inflamed by NATO’s indifference to Turkey’s actions on Cyprus and by charges that NATO acted to limit Greece’s response to Turkish invasion, merely four hours after Turkey launched its offensive, Karamanlis announced the withdrawal of Greece’s armed forces from the NATO military command. The

97 Quoted from Moustakis, The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO, 12.
prime minister later divulged that only two choices lay before him: to declare war against Turkey or to limit links with NATO. The former was not feasible due to the fact that the army was ill-prepared to confront a Turkish attack. Karamanlis chose the lesser of the two evils. Athens now needed full control over Greece’s armed forces during a time of threatening war.⁹⁸

Greek thinking, up to today, holds that NATO bore much of the responsibility for the invasion of Cyprus and, indeed, for the whole dispute. As the Greeks see the matter, NATO allowed one of its members, using NATO weapons, to take thirty-five thousand of its forces out of the NATO structure in order to occupy part of another democratic European country. On top of this, Turkey effectively colonized another member of the western community; it was the first time in post-war European history that colonization, invasion, and occupation of a western European country by another had occurred. Turkey’s aggressive attitude resulted in the occupation of thirty-seven percent of Cyprus, fifty-two percent of the island’s coastline, seventy percent of its natural resources and sixty-five percent of its tourist infrastructure, not to mention the fact that all of the Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of Cyprus fled to the south.⁹⁹

To Greek eyes, although the Alliance had both the means and the opportunity to act positively and avoid tragedy, by its neutrality it allowed Turkey to aggressively advance its interests on the troubled island. This stance, which has left its footprint on Greek political life up to the present day, not only severely damaged Greek perceptions of NATO’s willingness to address its interests, but also furnished the occasion for Turkey to challenge long-standing practices and internationally recognized Greek sovereign rights on still another front: the Aegean Sea.


B. 1974–1990: MAKING PEACE WITH NATO

With its strategic position enhanced after the military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus, and taking advantage of Greece’s withdrawal from the NATO military command, Turkey found the opportunity to contest Greece’s mineral exploitation rights in the Aegean continental shelf and dispute Athens’ control of the Aegean FIR and long-established policy of a ten-mile territorial airspace for its Aegean islands. Sensing that Turkey could better advance its claims in the Aegean with Greece out of the military command, the Greek government announced, in October 1975, that it would consider returning its armed forces to the NATO fold. Ankara responded by raising the issue of operational control of the Aegean, creating one contentious dimension of the Aegean disputes between the two states.

With both states vetoing NATO-mediated proposals for a solution to Greece’s reintegration, it was not until the aftermath of the Turkish military’s coup d’etat on September 12, 1976 that progress was made. In light of momentous domestic problems and after intensive efforts by NATO’s supreme allied commander, General Bernard Rogers, the Turkish military declared that it would consider Greece’s re-entry, under the condition that, following the establishment of a Greek-NATO headquarters in Larissa, there would be cooperation with the Turkish command in Smyrna for air defense and radar coverage of the Aegean Sea. Although the two states agreed to begin negotiations to delimit the command and control boundaries, years of deadlock ensued: Athens called for a resumption of the 1974 operations status quo ante (before the establishment of the Greek-NATO headquarters in Larissa), while Ankara responded that it could not consider restoration of the earlier conditions. As expected, Turkey was not willing to give up the unexpected gift of operational say it was granted in the Aegean by Greece’s withdrawal form NATO.

The electoral victory of the socialist Andreas Papandreou in October 1981 enhanced the skeptical stance of Greek society vis-à-vis NATO. The new prime
minister, who had persistently harped on the negative roles and influence of both in Greek affairs, pressed Greece’s positions more shrilly than his predecessors, declaring that Greece’s relations with NATO passed through Ankara. Repeatedly stating to the Alliance that the danger to Greece’s security came from Turkey to the east, and not from the Soviet Bloc to the north, Papandreou stressed that NATO should extend a security guarantee for Greece’s frontiers against potential Turkish aggression. Alliance partners denied this request for the first time (as they would again in later years) in December 1981, at the meeting of Defense Ministers, intensifying Greek grievances over airspace and operational command problems in the Aegean. Disappointed by NATO’s indifference, Athens adjusted its national security doctrine accordingly. In January 1985, the Greek Ministry of Defense announced its new defense doctrine, which, officially declaring that Greece’s primary threat came from the east, confirmed what had been an actual policy since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

Despite his political rhetoric and posturing while in opposition, Papandreou’s tenure brought no major shifts in Greece’s broader relations with NATO. Aware that a falling-out with the Alliance would only improve Turkey’s diplomatic influence and military posturing in Cyprus and the Aegean, Papandreou, now Prime Minister, returned Greek armed forces to the NATO fold in 1981. Nonetheless, Athens continued to express its grievances over Brussels’ inattention to Turkey’s occupation of Cyprus and to the challenges Turkey posed to Greek sovereignty on several Aegean fronts. The post-1974 period rendered it obvious that Greek and NATO defense doctrines did not simply diverge, but, essentially, they were antithetical. Trying to avoid resonances of the Greek-Turkish tension on the alliance’s operations and planning, NATO avoided addressing the issue directly and disparaged its importance. As a result of this neglect, Greek confidence in the Alliance’s actual efficiency to address the bilateral conflict was severely damaged. Seeking to deal with the discrepancy between its inability to deal alone with the Turkish threat and NATO’s indifference

to support its interests, Greece initiated a process of examining other security alternatives, a process that in the mid-1990s culminated in its membership in the WEU.

C. 1990–PRESENT: THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The cataclysmic event of the nineties, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, was less disorientating for Greek security thinking than for NATO. Unlike their counterparts in Brussels, Greek defense planning did not require doctrine adjustment, order of battle reformulation, or new missions to carry out its purpose; in Greek eyes, when NATO reluctantly announced the end of the Cold War, the main threat to Greece’s security remained where it had always been, in the east.\footnote{Conservative Greek governments had begun to cultivate cordial relationships with the Warsaw Pact states since the 1970s. Prime Minister Karamanlis paid an official visit to Moscow in 1979. In the 1980s, Greek socialist governments continued the process of rapprochement. Stearns, op. cit., 63.} It was the collapse of Yugoslavia, not of the Soviet Union, that disorientated Greece, and upset the regional balance at the expense of Greek security.

The most alarming effect of the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation was the emergence of an independent “Macedonian” state with potential territorial aspirations against Greece. Some recent analyses conclude that Greek policy responses to the perceived threat emanating from Skopje were exaggerated; however, it is a common knowledge that Athens had legitimate concerns, as even the literature that finds the Greeks to be overreacting at least acknowledges a threat in Macedonian irredentism.\footnote{Larrabee, \textit{Greek Security Concerns in the Balkans.}} As discussed in Chapter II, the idea of a unified Macedonia had historically been closely associated with irredentist claims against Greek (and Bulgarian) territories. The challenge, for Greece, thus arose when the old Yugoslav federal entity turned suddenly into an aspiring independent state without shedding its irredentist claims. When the old federal entity appealed to the international community for recognition under the...
name the “Republic of Macedonia,” without a prefix that would differentiate it from the Macedonian region in Greece, Athens was caught unprepared. The Greek public was abruptly alerted to the fact that the recognition of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia as an independent entity could legitimize its irredentist claims as well.103

A second security problem that the dissolution of Yugoslavia triggered was the Albanian question. The main concern for Athens was Kosovo: Potential unrest in the Albanian-speaking part of Serbia could spill over into the large Albanian minority of FYROM, leading to secessionist tendencies, with dramatic consequences for Greece. At the same time, the collapse of communism led to the reemergence of long suppressed nationalist feelings in Albania, which the government of Sali Berisha skillfully manipulated for its own purposes. Manifesting themselves in particular over the treatment of the Greek minority in southern Albania, and combined with increased problems posed by the flood of—economic—Albanian refugees into Greece, these nationalist differences led to a sharp deterioration in Greek Albanian relations.

On top of these issues, Turkey’s new activism in the Balkans stirred fears in Athens that Ankara was trying to create an “Islamic Arc” on Greece’s northern border, encircling and isolating Greece. In Greek eyes, Turkey’s conclusion of major agreements with Sofia, Skopje and Tirana, as well as its recognition of FYROM in February 1992, were perceived as part of a calculated effort by Ankara to create a “Turkish network” of clients throughout the Balkans at Greece’s expense. In particular, with an eye on Greece’s Muslim population in Thrace, Greek politicians worried that the calls for greater autonomy and separatism elsewhere in the Balkans could encourage Turkey to play the “Islamic

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103 Veremis, Greece and the Balkans in the Post-Cold War Era, 35.
card” in Greece’s northeast region. Regardless of whether such fears were exaggerated, it is a fact that Athens consistently accorded higher priority to its eastern defenses that to its northern borders. Even the cataclysmic event of Yugoslavia’s breakup was not evaluated in strict regional terms, but in the context of Greece’s troubled relationship with Ankara.

With NATO failing to address Greek concerns, even those rising from the Yugoslav disintegration, Athens considered the option of WEU in 1995, only to receive an analogous disappointment. The Greek disillusionment that WEU could cover Greece’s insecurities is stressed by David Yost, who, explaining the reasoning behind the very existence of the WEU, noted: “the WEU served primarily as a mechanism to reassure West Germany’s neighbors and Alliance partners that Bonn’s military capabilities would respect agreed constraints”.

Although Yost refers to the Cold War functions of the WEU, his observation highlights the organization’s limitations in addressing Greece’s major security concern. The breadth of these limitations would be signaled even prior to Greece’s accession, when a declaration of the heads of state and government of the WEU, issued in June 1992 at St. Petersberg, imposed restrictions on the security warranties, in case a member-state’s rival was a NATO member. The additional protocol that WEU members attached to the article of Greek accession made clear that the Brussels Treaty’s mutual defense commitment would not apply in the case of a conflict between Greece and a fellow NATO member (i.e., Turkey).

Less than a year after Greece’s accession, this protocol would be put to the test when, in 1996, Turkey contested Greece’s sovereignty over the rocky


106 WEU Charter, Article V guaranteed the security of its member-states through collective action.
islets of Imia. Once again, it was a case of American intervention rather than that of NATO or European allies that averted a military confrontation. The Imia crisis not only demonstrated the minimal role that NATO could play in crisis management, but also highlighted the inability of the WEU to act as a mediator in a crisis or as a guarantor of borders. Disappointed by its allies’ lack of solidarity in the face of Turkey’s aggressive acts, Greece called again for the inclusion of a “clause of solidarity and guarantee of external borders” at the EU’s 1996 Intergovernmental Conference in Amsterdam, yet the request was again rejected by the WEU.

Ironically, the WEU’s failure to become the EU’s military arm was for Greece a most promising sign, because this failure shifted the EU toward the development of a—hopefully—fully autonomous European Defense Arm. In this context, the CSDP represents one of the more recent entries in a list of highly expected solutions. The following chapter will address the evolution of the CSDP and its potential in covering Greece’s security apprehension.

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IV. THE RISE OF THE EUROPEAN ALTERNATIVE: THE CSDP

The European integration process did not lack for security aspirations during its early years in the 1940s and 1950s, but these were rapidly overtaken by the onset of the Cold War and the subsequent organization of the U.S.-dominated NATO—the only viable body through which to meet those challenges. The end of the Cold War, however, sparked a new debate on the future of European security, raising concerns about whether Western European states, lacking the (common) threat from the outside, would fall back into security competition. Undergoing a change towards further integration, the European security architecture decided to supplement (though not replace) its existing transatlantic framework of security cooperation, NATO, with a new institutional construct embedded into the European Union: The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

A. THE EARLY YEARS

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the destabilization arising from the Balkan Wars that followed, altered the security balance and heightened the stakes for European security. On the one hand, the United States manifestly did not wish to be involved in Balkan security; on the other hand, the EU lacked the competence to intervene with any real effect. With regional security requiring urgent attention, two solutions emerged: The first was to give greater institutional and political influence to the WEU, a body whose sole raison d’être in the first place was to coordinate its member-states in the fields of security and defense. In an effort to cope with the potential destabilizing of Eastern Europe, WEU adopted in 1992, alongside its Article V (common

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110 ESDP is the former name of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP).
defense) role, a set of humanitarian, peacemaking and peacekeeping tasks. However, the “Petersberg tasks,” as this set was later called, remained a promise on paper: dependent on cooperation between its members and lacking a standing army, WEU was never involved in the Balkan security and an alternative had to be examined. The second solution was to permit European forces to utilize, under special procedures, military assets and infrastructure from NATO. The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), as this solution was later named, aimed at passing over WEU’s structural deficiencies by creating a European “pillar” within NATO, partly to allow European countries to act militarily where NATO wished not to, and partly to alleviate the United States' financial burden of maintaining military bases in Europe, which it had done since the Cold War.

Both solutions proved unsatisfactory: the former (WEU) not only lacked political clout, political legitimacy and political credibility, but also staked its military capacity on borrowing assets from the United States, assets that were “either jealously guarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (especially after 9/11) or simply not available because they were urgently needed by the U.S. military itself.” The latter (ESDI) proved problematic both practically and institutionally, because not only it was dependent on WEU for political direction, but it also was predicated on a re-organization of NATO’s command chain that the United States was not prepared to accept; not to mention the absence, as in the case of the WEU, of a standing military force. The failure of both options to address the European security in a comprehensible manner, intensified European attempts to maximize their own security and defense capability. However, the realization of such a project was halted by one serious impediment: the respective positions of France and the UK regarding the likely impact in Washington of the advent of

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112 Howorth, Security and Defense Policy in the European Union, 44.
serious European muscle. As long as the “Euro-Atlantic security dilemma”\textsuperscript{113} divided Europe’s greater military powers, a robust European Security and Defense Policy could not flourish.

**B. SAINT-MALO AND THE FRANCO-BRITISH COMPROMISE: THE BIRTH OF ESDP**

The Euro-Atlantic security dilemma essentially reflected the differing perception that Paris and London maintained of the role of the United States in European security. On the one hand laid traditional British reluctance that if Europe demonstrated a genuine ability to take care of itself militarily, the USA would revert to isolationism; not to mention British doubts that Europeans on their own could not forge a credible military defense mechanism. On the other hand, Paris insisted that USA could not respect allies who would not take themselves seriously. It was not until 1998 in Saint-Malo that traditional British hesitation about a European defense plan changed into endorsement. The bilateral declaration issued by French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair spurred the formulation of a common European Security and Defense Policy: “[T]he Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”\textsuperscript{114} This declaration, which laid the political foundation between France and Great Britain in European security and defense, facilitated the launch of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and, along with it, the formulation of the Headline Goal, a timeline setting the goals for the newborn European Project.

The change of British attitude is widely attributed to two factors. The first, was the rising storm-cloud in Kosovo and the reappearance of military conflict in


the Balkans, which dominated the entire decade of the 1990s. The second, which essentially galvanized British security thinking, was a clear messages from Washington that a greater European defense capacity could lift part of the security weight from NATO’s—and essentially U.S.—shoulders. The “part of” element of this equation is critical in understanding the essence behind the Saint-Malo declaration, and consequently the laying foundations and limits of its offspring, the ESDP. Despite French expectations, the actual issue at stake at Saint-Malo was not the emergence of a European defense presence per se, but the way to achieve it without upsetting the American role in European defense. In this context, the Saint-Malo declaration represents more of a Franco-British compromise than an actual agreement; concurring in NATO’s primacy for European defense, France accepted a limited role for the ESDP that would not duplicate NATO structures and Britain smoothed its traditional pro-atlanticist stance.

The political will shown at Saint-Malo appeared to Greece as a promising choice. Based on the ambitious bilateral declaration, the potential of a—strictly—European autonomous force projection capability could give the EU a role in defense and perhaps even cover the territorial security interests of Greece that NATO and WEU failed to address. This possibility seemed especially promising as Athens’s territorial concerns derive mainly from Turkey, a state that is not a member of the EU, and therefore outside the EU decision-making process. Greek diplomacy could thus retain some hope of influencing—or at least prevailing upon—such an entity to account for its security interests, particularly those related to Greece’s non-EU neighbor.

Nevertheless, Greek enthusiasm was short-lived. As the Franco-British declaration evoked American insecurities regarding whether an independent European Defense Project might result in a declining importance of NATO as a

\[115\] In June 1991 Serbia and Slovenia fought a brief war, which was followed by a much longer war between Serbia and Croatia.

\[116\] The EU had incorporated the Petersberg tasks within its realm at the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, but at the time a defense domain was outside the EU structure.
transatlantic forum, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put forth her famous “three Ds,” outlining American expectations toward ESDP: (i) no duplication of what was done effectively under NATO, (ii) no decoupling from the United States and NATO, and (iii) no discrimination against non-EU NATO members. Essentially picturing Turkey, Albright’s last “D” reminded Athens that Ankara, although not an EU-member, would not be left outside the CSDP. The same obstacle that Greece had been encountering within NATO, namely the uneasy symbiosis with its primary security concern, was replicating itself in the infant CSDP: using the NATO backdoor, Turkey could have a say in a project that was initially envisioned to be comprised of EU members only.

C. UNVEILING THE CSDP: THE HEADLINE GOALS AND THE CSDP STRUCTURE

1. The Headline Goal

Built on the Saint-Malo declaration, the Helsinki Headline Goal was the CSDP military capability timeline set by the European Council during its December 1999 meeting at Helsinki. Under this timeline, the EU pledged itself to be able to deploy sustain military forces capable of fulfilling the full range of Petersberg tasks, in operations up to corps level,\(^{117}\) to be capable of intervening in any crisis that could occur in an area where European interests are affected by the year 2003. The aim was to make those forces self-reliant, deployable within sixty days and over a radius of six thousand kilometers around Brussels, and sustainable in the field for a year.\(^{118}\) Despite speculations that the CSDP

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\(^{117}\) This meant up to fifteen brigades or approximately sixty thousand persons. The final decision was for eighteen EU Battle Groups (BG) composed of approximately fifteen hundred troops; plus command and support services, and intended to be deployed on the ground within five to ten days of approval from the Council. Each BG must be sustainable for at least thirty days, which could be extended to a hundred and twenty days, if resupplied. European Union, “EU Council Secretariat–Factsheet,” Consilium Europa, November 2006, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/91624.pdf (accessed June 14, 2011).

architects at Helsinki were aiming at the creation of a “Euro-Army,” the strength and scope of the “Rapid Reaction Force” (ERRF), the official name of the Headline Goal force, indicate otherwise. Apart from its limited military strength, compared even to national armies—far more to NATO—ERRF was designed to be formed on a voluntary basis from assets of the participating members’ national armies. Each mission mounted by the CSDP would have a specific lifetime, and upon termination, its resources, both human and material, that were initially assigned to it, would revert to their national owners. The critical issue for Greece was not the ERRF’s standing or ad hoc nature, but the range of missions that it encompassed: by explicitly stating its intentions to restrict itself within the Petersberg crisis management tasks’ realm—and thus outside of any kind of territorial defense—Helsinki shattered Greek expectations of a European defense shield. Despite proclaiming a defense dimension in its very name, the CSDP orientation established in Helsinki was clearly rejecting the defense dimension Greece was hoping for.

2. The CSDP Structure

Along with the announcement of the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force, the EU decided at Helsinki on the CSDP chain of command. The first—in hierarchy—body established at the Helsinki Summit was the Political and Security Committee (PSC) or Comité Politique et Sécurité (COPS). Comprised of representatives of the political directors and a representative of the Commission, the PSC was designed to be a permanent, ambassador-level group. Its task would be to exercise under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the operation and deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CSDP.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{120} Presidency Reports to the Helsinki Council, Annex IV, December 10–11, 1999.
The second body was the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the highest military body within the EU. The EUMC is composed of national military representatives to the EU, namely the Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) in permanent session. Its primary function is to give military advice and make recommendations to the political bodies of the EU, first and foremost to the PSC and the Council. Its secondary function is to provide military direction to a third body, the EU Military Staff (EUMS), acting as the interface between the Member States and the Council in military matters.

The EUMS is comprised of candidates nominated by the Member States under the command of the Director General of the EUMS (DGEUMS), a three-star general. Its task is to provide military expertise and support to the CSDP, including early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning of EU-led military crisis management operations.

D. (RE) AFFIRMING NATO’S PRIMACY: THE BERLIN PLUS AGREEMENT

Within only two years after Saint-Malo, CSDP had set up a basic framework for the scope and synthesis of its embryonic military force, and had established a fundamental chain of command to guide it: under the political supervision of PSC, and the military expertise of the EUMC and the EUMS, the ERRF would undertake the tasks described in the Petersberg declaration. The CSDP equation was lacking, though, two elements to be complete: the specialized military equipment necessary for the successful accomplishment of its high risk operations—such as peacemaking missions—and a reliable infrastructure to support them. The solution was given by NATO: under the Berlin Plus Agreement, signed between NATO and the EU on 16 December 2002, CSDP was allowed to draw some of NATO’s assets for its own peacekeeping operations. Under these arrangements, the EU enjoys assured access to NATO’s planning, presumed access to NATO’s assets and capabilities, and a

121 The CHODs are represented on a day-to-day basis by their military representatives (MILREPs).
pre-designed European-only chain of command under the Deputy Supreme Commander Europe (SACEUR), a European General. However, the implementation of the Berlin Plus arrangements did not come without restrictions for the CSDP: not only does NATO maintain the “right of first refusal”; that is, NATO must first decline to intervene in a given crisis, but also, the approval of the use of assets has to be unanimous among NATO members.122

The Berlin Plus agreement, asserted Greek fears that CSDP’s autonomy was merely a verbal promise. On the one hand, NATO’s “right of first refusal” limited CSDP’s action only to cases where NATO did not wish to be involved, essentially downgrading the EU to a second class security provider, that is, eligible only for the missions NATO would allow it to undertake. On the other hand, CSDP’s dependency on NATO introduced the very parameter that Greece was hoping to avoid: its frictions with fellow NATO-member Turkey. The repercussions of the Turkish-Greek frictions on the CSDP project became evident when Ankara’s attempt to negotiate a seat at the PSC was rejected by the EU: Turkey then used its membership of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to veto the “Berlin Plus” arrangement and thus block the CSDP’s right to use NATO capabilities.

The deadlock created in EU-NATO relations after the Turkish veto, was initially treated by EU guarantees to Turkey on both nonaggression and consultation. Greece responded by vetoing these agreements and it was not until December 2002 that a solution to the dispute was finally negotiated: Ankara settled for the fullest possible involvement in the EU’s security and defense decision-shaping process and automatic involvement in the event of an EU mission using NATO assets. In addition, it was given a formal guarantee that (i) CSDP missions would not be deployed in the Aegean, (ii) Cyprus, being not a

122 For example, Turkish reservations about Operation Concordia (the peacekeeping mission of the EU in FYROM) using NATO assets delayed its deployment by more than five months.
PfP member, would not be allowed to participate in EU operations, and (iii) the EU force would not attack a NATO member state. With an eye toward Cyprus and its path towards EU membership, Greece managed to negotiate a reciprocity of this clause, that a NATO member would not attack an EU member state; however, one of the major operational theaters that Athens was hoping to shield under the CSDP was lost: the ERRF would not deploy in the Aegean, leaving the defense of the Greek islands exclusively on Greek hands.

The agreement that was finally reached—formally known as the “Ankara Document”—abruptly foiled Greece’s hopes by highlighting Greece’s misguided expectation that its national interests could be defended by a European military organization. The Ankara document was undoubtedly successful in putting an end to the two-year stand-off over the Berlin Plus arrangement; at the same time, however, it declared the EU’s determination to remain outside the politics of the Greek-Turkish tensions. Its proposal that “under no circumstances, nor in any crisis, will the CSDP be used against an Ally” was, to Greek eyes, a political assurance to Turkey that no EU force would intervene in “political disputes” between NATO allies. At the Brussels European Council of October 24–25, 2002, the Ankara text was replaced by the “Brussels Document,” which stated that “under no circumstances, nor in any crisis, will CSDP be used against an (NATO) Ally, on the understanding, reciprocally, that NATO military crisis management will not undertake any action against the EU or its member-states.” Greece also

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123 PfP stands for Partnership for Peace, a NATO program aimed at creating trust between NATO and other states in Europe and the former Soviet Union. Turkish objections regarding Cyprus were claimed on the basis of the agreement signed on information sharing between the EU and NATO; Cyprus being not a PfP member should not participate in EU operations, where sensitive NATO information would be shared.

secured a—practically redundant—written pledge that no action would be undertaken that could violate the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{125}

E. THE EU MUTUAL DEFENSE CLAUSE.

Greece’s expectations for CSDP had been reawakened earlier that year. On July 18, 2002, a letter from the Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt to his British and French counterparts reiterated the traditional Greek line of reasoning that embraced the need to “develop the solidarity between the member-states of the European Union, [which] could be done by means of a mutual security guarantee in the event of an attack calling for a collective response.”\textsuperscript{126} Although the letter on its own did not generate any related discussion in the EU, the critical—for Greece—issue of a mutual assistance clause aroused fierce passions within the 2003 EU’s Convention Working Group, which discussed the future of Europe in regards to defense and external action.

Despite the clear disparity of views, the Group decided upon the introduction into the Constitutional Treaty draft of the EU\textsuperscript{127} (TCE) of both a solidarity clause, outlining procedures in the event of a terrorist attack, and an “opt-in,” whereby those member-states who wished to take over the mutual assistance commitments on the WEU Treaty should be authorized to do so within the framework of the Union.\textsuperscript{128} The proposals for a new formulation of the TCE paragraph on common defense that followed (re)affirmed the supremacy of NATO and suggested that those members that did not wish to await the


\textsuperscript{126} See Guy Verhofstadt’s letter to Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and to S.E.M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République Française (Brussels, GV/PM/vv 14 1807 02)

\textsuperscript{127} The EU Constitutional Treaty was an unratified international treaty intended to create a consolidated constitution for the EU. It would have replaced the existing EU Treaties with a single text, given legal force to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and expanded Qualified Majority Voting into policy areas that had previously been decided by unanimity among member states.

\textsuperscript{128} Article I-40(7) of the Constitutional Treaty draft.
European Council’s decision on mutual defense should be allowed to anticipate it. Along with the detailed arrangements for participation in this cooperation, the convention proposals heightened Athens’ interest as they explicitly brought up the issue of armed aggression against EU soil. At the same time, though, the proposals drew intense opposition from both the euro-atlanticist and the euro-continentalist member-states, as not only they lacked a robust framework, but also they remained unacceptable to both sides.\textsuperscript{129} The former group was suspicious of possible implications for NATO’s supremacy and the latter feared unwanted involvement despite the guarantees deriving from the “opt-in” mechanism. It thus came as no surprise that in the final Convention plenary process, twenty-four members from both groups, sponsored amendments to delete the mutual assistance clause altogether.

Although promising for Greek interests, the proposals had more political symbolism than practical value, as three major elements remained prominently contentious: the voluntary nature of the participation, the vagueness covering the role of NATO, and the principle of anticipating the EU’s decision on common defense.\textsuperscript{130} In light of the disagreements between the euro-atlanticists and the euro-continentalists regarding the implications for NATO, the subsequent Italian presidency completely scrapped the detailed arrangements, along with the article itself. However, the solidarity clause—in the event of a terrorist attack or a natural man-made disaster, along with its detailed implementation arrangements—remained unaffected in the August 2004 text, highlighting the EU’s hesitation to concentrate its focus on defense issues. This hesitation became more prominent in the body of the EU Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on December 1, 2009. Among the various CSDP-related provisions, Greek interest was spurred by TEU Article 42 (7) on “Mutual Assistance Clause,” which

\textsuperscript{129} The main point of contention between the euro-atlanticist and the euro-continentalist states is the primacy of NATO. For more on the euro-atlanticist and the euro-continentalist states within the EU and their position regarding NATO see: Arunas Molis, \textit{The Role and Interests of Small States in Developing European Security and Defence Policy}.

\textsuperscript{130} Howorth, \textit{Security and Defense Policy in the European Union}, 122.
specifically brought up the issue of EU action in case a member state is the victim of armed aggression against its territory\textsuperscript{131}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Essential Content of the Provision</th>
<th>The Main Reference in the Treaty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Permanent Structured Cooperation</strong></td>
<td>“Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TEU, Art. 42 (6); TEU, Protocol 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mutual Assistance Clause</strong></td>
<td>“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TEU, Art. 42 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solidarity Clause</strong></td>
<td>The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TEU, Art. 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Possibility to entrust a Task to a group of member-states</strong></td>
<td>“The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests … a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TEU, Art. 42(5); TEU, Art. 44(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enhanced cooperation</strong></td>
<td>“Member States which wish to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves within the framework of the Union’s non-exclusive competences may make use of its institutions and exercise those competences...”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TEU, Art. 20; TEU, Art. 326-334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. CSDP-Related Provisions of the Lisbon Treaty\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{131} The CSDP-related provisions of the Lisbon Treaty are summarized in Table 1.
With Greek insecurities deriving mainly from a potential offensive military action, a Clause on Mutual Assistance naturally arouses interest in Athens. Under TEU auspices, fellow member-states are now *obliged* to assist the victim of armed aggression by *all the means in their power*.\(^{133}\) On its face, the clause appears to address a large portion of Greece’s security concerns, particularly the territorial threat. A more thorough study of its phrasing, however, reveals that among the five CSDP-related provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, the Mutual Assistance Clause has the lowest implementation potential. The use of such abstract expressions as “obliged to assist” and “by all the means in their power” leaves vital semantic gaps in its interpretation. Does “obliged to” imply that a member-state that is not willing to assist a counterpart in need will face consequences? And what is the breadth of “all the means in its power”? Do these means include diplomatic mobilization, military assistance, or both? Without a legal framework precisely describing either the level of obligation or the extent of a member-state’s involvement in a fellow member-state’s armed dispute, the Mutual Assistance Clause remains deceptively promising.

More important than the semantic gaps in its body, the potential of TEU Article 42 (7) is limited by two elements. The first pertains to the Petersberg tasks, according to which CSDP does not undertake missions related to collective defense. Thus, the resulting conflict between the CSDP framework and the Mutual Assistance Clause essentially cancels the latter. The second refers to the non-duplication of NATO guideline, set by former U.S. Secretary of the State Madeleine Albright. Practically declaring collective defense to be the exclusive domain of NATO, the non-duplication guideline denies the EU the potential of collective defense action—which further renders the Mutual Assistance Clause an inactive provision.\(^{134}\) It is therefore not a coincidence that EU countries,

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\(^{133}\) TEU Article 42 (7), emphasis mine.

\(^{134}\) This is even more the case as 21 of the EU members are NATO members as well; out of 27 members, only Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Austria, Malta and Cyprus are not NATO members.
especially the older NATO-members, have hardly noted the Mutual Assistance Clause.\textsuperscript{135} What is more, for Athens, as long as the Brussels document casts its shadows on Greek hopes for a European response to a potential Turkish offensive, the Mutual Assistance Clause shall remain a dead letter.

In this context, the fact that the current focus of the CSDP is the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Solidarity Clause is indicative of EU’s determination to abstain from developing the defense dimension of an initially otherwise promising CSDP. PESCO, on the one hand, is not related to any aspect of defense; in essence, it aims at bringing together European defense suppliers and strengthening the European defense markets and research, development, and industrial base against competition from the United States. The Solidarity Clause, on the other hand, refers exclusively to terrorist attack and natural or man-made disaster—in other words to the security dimension of the CSDP.

The EU’s choice to focus its military and civilian capacity on security and not defense is further manifested in two major domains of EU policy. The first refers to the security doctrine of the CSDP, the European Security Strategy (ESS), which essentially declares defense, in its traditional concept of military confrontation, to be outside the CSDP mindset. The second pertains to the EU’s decision to deploy Frontex, the border-control security body of the CSDP, along the Greek-Turkish borders in Thrace to counter the increasing illegal immigration waves entering Greek mainland.

1. European Security Strategy (ESS)

The first official EU document dedicated to formulating a common European security strategy is not a single document. It comprises of a 2003 document entitled \textit{European Security Strategy—A Secure Europe in a Better...}

\textsuperscript{135} Antti Kaski, \textit{The CSDP after Lisbon: Lost Opportunities or Changed Interests?}, 2.
World\textsuperscript{136} and the 2007 report on the implementation of it,\textsuperscript{137} which reviews the effectiveness of the 2003 ESS, particularly in the light of lessons learned from missions conducted in the framework of the ESDP. This documentational dyad constitutes the first written attempt of the EU to identify in a single document the global challenges and key threats to the security of the Union and clarify its strategic objectives in dealing with them.

The 2003 document comprises of three parts. The first describes Europe’s perception of its security environment and lists five issues that the EU identifies as key threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts—both worldwide and at the borders of the EU, state failure, and organized crime. The second part sets the framework for CSDP’s strategic objectives, namely building security in the European neighborhood and establishing an international order based on “effective multilateralism,” that is efficient cooperation with the international community.\textsuperscript{138} The third part addresses the policy implications for Europe: more capability, further coherency, and effective cooperation with partners.

The implementation report of 2008 constitutes exactly what its name promises: an assessment of the ESS efficiency during the six-year period since its launch. The report is also structured in three chapters: the first, which shares a title with the 2003 document, brings into the CSDP realm the issues of cybersecurity, energy security, and climate change. The next chapter evaluates the ESS stability-building project “in Europe and beyond” and introduces the elements of piracy and small arms and light weapons. The report concludes by


asserting the need to develop greater engagement with neighbors and partners in the rapidly changing environment of the globalized world.

Contrary to the traditional format of analogous documents, the ESS sets no clear outline with regard to a realm of responsibility for the EU to defend. At the same time that it identifies its vital area as the “European neighborhood,” it explicitly states its aim to “share responsibility for global security.”139 Limited in breadth within the Petersberg tasks framework, the ESS focuses its rhetoric on the internal, rather than external security of the EU. The key threats listed in the 2002 document are indicative of this orientation. Out of the five key threats listed, only regional conflict could potentially constitute a direct external hazard requiring defensive measures; however, the ESS explicitly identifies the hazard for Europe not in the form of military confrontation, but by means of regional instability spilling over into Europe. The very introductory phrase of the key threats paragraph reads: “Large-scale aggression against any member-state is now improbable…. Europe faces new threats, which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable.” The defensive insecurities of Athens, deriving mainly from a potential Turkish aggression, are clearly outside the ESS scope.

The security orientation in the spirit of the 2002 document is preserved in the implementation report, which asserts not only the non-combative nature of Europe’s threat environment, but also its determination to address it with soft-power means. Among them, the ESS recognizes “effective multilateralism” as the heart of its policy. As a result, the CSDP does not view the use of military power, even for defense reasons, as the default instrument for short-term prevention and crisis management, although the Strategy does not explicitly declare it an instrument of last resort. Aware of its limited military potential, and careful not to upset the delicate Euro-Atlantic balance, the ESS remains skillfully vague, essentially asserting that collective territorial defense continues to be the exclusive domain of NATO.

2. **Frontex**

Established in 2004 by Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004, and operational since 2005, Frontex is a coordinating mechanism of the European Union, under the jurisdiction of the CSDP. The official mission of Frontex is “to help EU member-states implement EU rules on external border controls and to coordinate operational cooperation between member-states in the field of external border management.” It is responsible for co-coordinating the activities of the national border guards to ensure the security of the EU’s borders with non-member-states. To this end, Frontex combines in a single body tasks and activities that most EU member-states have kept separate. There is an intelligence service component, actively monitoring the external borders of the EU, so that predictions to movements of migration can be made.\(^{140}\) A separate research division cooperates with military industries and universities on projects such as enhancing the real-time surveillance of the borders or the introduction of biometric identity checks at all border crossings. Another project is the introduction of biometric identity checks at all border crossings.

Since the agency became operational, Frontex has organized “joint operations,” in which an EU member-state can invite other EU member-states to send border guard personnel and equipment for joint border policing. Because the closure of other routes to Europe (i.e., West Africa to Spain, Libya to Italy/Malta) has presently made Greece the presently last remaining gateway to the EU, Greece officially requested Frontex assistance in 2011. EU response was rapid. Merely five days after receiving the request, Frontex finalized arrangements for human and technical resources to be deployed to the Greek-Turkish land border in the region of Orestiada and neighboring areas.

Frontex has thus far attempted to assist Greek authorities with illegal immigration on two levels. The first included efforts to integrate Turkey into the border regime by involving the Turkish coast guard and the Turkish border

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\(^{140}\) This task, which is referred to as risk analysis, is the object of a whole department at Frontex’s headquarters in Warsaw.
authority in joint maneuvers. The EU has been negotiating a readmission agreement for many years with Turkey—so far without success. Such an agreement could force Turkey to readmit not only nationals, but also all irregular migrants who can be proved to have entered Greece and the EU via Turkey. However, Ankara is not complying with the already existing bilateral readmission agreement with Greece, so it is highly improbable that negotiations with the EU will prove fruitful. On a second level, Frontex aims to reinforce the border controls between Greece and Turkey, both at the land border in the Evros region as well as between the Turkish coast and the Greek islands of Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Rhodos. While maintaining its focus on intercepting and detaining illegal immigrants, Frontex attempts to establish a chain of evidence (e.g., footage from helicopters, portraits of those intercepted, protocols of interception) for all migrants to be able to present to the Turkish authorities an irrefutable claim that they did actually come from Turkey and are thus eligible for deportation under the readmission agreement.

Regardless of its actual efficiency, the deployment of Frontex in the Greek-Turkish borders shows the EU’s determination to deal with the civilian aspects of its members’ security considerations. By applying broad-based socio-technical intervention techniques in the countries of origin and transit, the EU declares its perception of illegal immigration as a moral obligation. This view, prominent throughout the ESS, also fits seamlessly into the EU’s activism in the realm of human rights: although the image of the boat refugees could serve to justify a certain degree of militarization of the borders, the CSDP rejects militant approaches. Instead of permitting or enforcing close border rules, the EU chooses to integrate border management into a larger concept of “migration and development” policy. This choice, which affirms the humanitarian orientation of

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141 Reports from Frontex suggest that there has been a 44 percent decrease in crossings in this region since the additional border patrol agents were deployed in November 2010; on average two hundred forty five persons a day were reported crossing in to Greece in October 2010.
the CSDP, is reflected in the EU’s negative stance on Greek proposal of building a fence along its land borders with Turkey.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{142} Initially, Greece had planned for a 206 kilometers fence along the entirety of the border with Turkey; however, criticisms from the EU and human rights groups apparently necessitated a drastic change of plans.
V. CONCLUSIONS

A thorough assessment of the CSDP project renders clear that it was not created to address territorial concerns—of Greece or any other EU state. Its emergence owed, in large part, to the absence of suitable existing alternatives for European security and defense. On the one hand the WEU was politically, militarily and institutionally too weak to act as a functional interface between the EU and the Atlantic Alliance; on the other hand, NATO had failed to convince its European partners that it remained the key security instrument for a world rapidly unfolding after the end of the Cold War. Unlike NATO, however, CSDP is not a response to a sense of existential threat hanging over Europe. Consequently, its spirit and instruments are crafted for the task of “crisis management” rather than military deterrence or robust armed intervention. Although the term “crisis management” does not exclude the deployment of combat troops, the reasoning for such a deployment would—according to the ESS auspices—be strictly firefighting in nature, to suit the Petersberg tasks framework. In this context, the CSDP can be more accurately described as a policy area akin to risk management and not to countering any territorial threat.

With the CSDP lacking a conceptual point of reference to define itself around, analogous to the one NATO identified in the communist threat during the Cold War, it comes as no surprise that the CSDP’s strategic document, the ESS, resembles more a description than a strategy. Yet, although ESS is indeed more a concept than a security doctrine, it does not lack the essence of the latter. Because the EU has no clear adversary, the ESS is not—and could not be—an actual security strategy in the narrow sense of the term. As the essence of strategy, however, boils down to a question of the extent to which any instruments of power—military or non-military—further a strategic actor’s perceived interests, military power cannot be perceived as strategic per se. It is

the linking of military power to political purpose that defines the strategic element. Hence, ESS’s focus on soft-power and civilian-orientated operations, rather than classical power politics, does not render it necessarily less strategic than the manifestly more defense orientated national doctrines.

Either way, what matters in strategic terms for Athens, is (i) whether the CSDP embraces Greek security interests, and (ii) whether it has the capacity to generate relevant capabilities (means), to defend these interests. The first part of the query is answered in the very introduction of the ESS: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, so free.” Contrary to the aggressive image that Greece holds of its neighbors, the strategy explicitly declares that large-scale aggression against any member-state is improbable. Naturally, the policy document that guides the European Union's security strategy cannot reflect the security considerations of each of the twenty-seven member-states. However, the rift between the security concerns of Greece and the spirit of the ESS is not merely linguistic, but deeply structural. As Chapter II shows, Athens’ apprehensions are territorial in nature and thus completely outside the ESS scope. Beyond the documents, this strategic rift is also echoed in the broader CSDP project.

The second part of the query—that is, whether the CSDP has the actual capacity to cover Greek expectations—has three interdependent elements. The first is the CSDP’s dependency on NATO assets and structures. Reflected in institutional terms by the Berlin Plus Agreement, EU’s reliance on NATO is not limited to structures, mechanisms, and assets; it extends to the level of initiative. Under the auspices of Berlin Plus, not only will any military operations envisaged

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144 This definition of a strategic actor reflects the central ends-means instrumentality of strategy and corresponds to Gunnar Sjöstedt’s general definition of an international actor as one that has the capacity for goal-oriented behavior towards other international actors. See Gunnar Sjöstedt, The External Role of the European Community (Westmead: Saxon House, 1977).


146 Ibid, 3.
by the EU be conducted consistent with NATO policy and doctrine, but also, in accordance with NATO’s right of first refusal, the EU may act only if NATO first decides not to. The situation for Greece is further complicated by the fact that Athens’ major security concern (Turkey) is a member of the very organization with which the CSDP is supposed to cooperate. In this context, Turkey’s blocking of the Berlin Plus process in Laeken, serves as a reminder that unless the EU obtains adequate autonomous military capabilities, Greek expectations of the CSDP or any similar European security scheme can be permanently jeopardized.

The second element refers to the military tasks that the EU is empowered to take. Contrary to Greek hopes, the Petersberg tasks do not address collective security, but cover tasks of strictly humanitarian, peacekeeping, and peacemaking nature. Athens’ resentment does not imply any kind of neglect for the nature of the Petersberg tasks. Quite the opposite is true, as Greece is a strong supporter of all initiatives in this direction, a support proven by its enthusiastic support of all operations of this nature. Its disappointment is generated by its unfulfilled quest for a security provider determined to embrace the territorial nature of its national security concerns. With its northern neighbors (FYROM and Albania) cultivating irredentism and its Eastern neighbor (Turkey) openly coveting part of its land, Athens seeks a security community that is determined to assist in defending its interests. So far, it has found none.

The third element pertains to the actual military potential of the EU. The structure and strength of the ERRF set at Helsinki confirm that the CSDP does not aim to become a military superpower, or a “European Army” responsible for the territorial defense of the European landmass—far more, that of Greece.

Among the major Greek security concerns—Albania, FYROM, Turkey, and illegal immigration—CSDP has the capacity to address only the latter. Regardless of their real or perceived magnitude, the first three issues do not fall

147 Out of the twelve ongoing CSDP operations Greece takes part in the following: Operation EUFOR-Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Anti-piracy naval operation off the coast of Somalia (ATALANTA), EU Mission on the Rule of Law in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo), Police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan), EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia).
under the Petersberg tasks and are therefore not eligible for CSDP action. On the other hand, EU’s initiative to deploy Frontex along the Greek-Turkish borders demonstrates eloquently the civilian nature of the CSDP, as the nature of Frontex is non-military. The rapid deployment of the force (merely five days after receiving the request from Athens) as well as its border-police nature, confirm the paper’s initial claim that the CSDP will only address Greek national security concerns that do not entail a European military response. Contrary to a promising defense dimension, ambitiously proclaimed within its very name, CSDP is not, and does not aspire to be a defense alliance. Rather, it can be perceived as a capacity, mostly political and civilian, whose infant military dimension simply extends the range of instruments at the EU’s disposal for essential crisis management operations.\textsuperscript{148} With Greece’s defensive concerns requiring mainly deterrent, and not crisis-management actions, the current CSDP design proves insufficient to play the role of security provider for Athens.

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