DOES THE ARMY NEED A HOMELAND SECURITY SKILL IDENTIFIER?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Homeland Security

by

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2011-01

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Does the Army Need a Homeland Security Skill Identifier?

This thesis answers the question “Does the Army Need a Homeland Security Skill Identifier?” It uses a qualitative discussion format that incorporates literary data from historical Homeland Security documents, current National Strategies, DOD Joint Publications, and Army Regulations and Field Manuals. This research is augmented by reviews of Congressionally-mandated panel reports, Homeland and National Security panels, and journal articles regarding the DOD role in Homeland Security. Further, subject matter experts from U.S. Army North, National Guard Bureau, and Department of the Army-Human Resources offer relevant and contemporary analysis of interview questions offered by the researcher. The study analyzes what a skill identifier is and what it does; what are Homeland Security educational competencies; and where are the requirements and authorizations for these competencies distributed throughout the Army. Additionally, a holistic analysis of the current DOD definition of Homeland Security demonstrates the fallacy of current Army doctrine in regards to Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Selected screening criteria are applied to this data as analytical metrics to provide objective, factual analysis and to develop themes to support recommendations and conclusions.
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Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

DOES THE ARMY NEED A HOMELAND SECURITY SKILL IDENTIFIER?, by
Major Jeffery M. Daigle, 96 pages.

This thesis answers the question “Does the Army Need a Homeland Security Skill Identifier?” It uses a qualitative discussion format that incorporates literary data from historical Homeland Security documents, current National Strategies, DOD Joint Publications, and Army Regulations and Field Manuals. This research is augmented by reviews of Congressionally-mandated panel reports, Homeland and National Security panels, and journal articles regarding the DOD role in Homeland Security. Further, subject matter experts from U.S. Army North, National Guard Bureau, and Department of the Army-Human Resources offer relevant and contemporary analysis of interview questions offered by the researcher. The study analyzes what a skill identifier is and what it does; what are Homeland Security educational competencies; and where are the requirements and authorizations for these competencies distributed throughout the Army. Additionally, a holistic analysis of the current DOD definition of Homeland Security demonstrates the fallacy of current Army doctrine in regards to Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Selected screening criteria are applied to this data as analytical metrics to provide objective, factual analysis and to develop themes to support recommendations and conclusions.
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<td>Area of Concentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNORTH</td>
<td>United States Army North (U.S.5th Army)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASI</td>
<td>Additional Skill Identifier</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, &amp; High-Yield Explosive</td>
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<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Support of Civil Authorities</td>
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<td>FA</td>
<td>Functional Area</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>HD</td>
<td>Homeland Defense</td>
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<td>LTG</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

To preserve the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, the Nation must have a homeland that is secure from threats and violence, including terrorism. Homeland security (HS) is the Nation’s first priority, and it requires a national effort. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a key role in that effort.

— Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to determine if the U.S. Army needs to develop and implement a skill identifier (SI) to represent officers and with formal education, training, or experience in Homeland Security (HS). The term skill identifier (SI) and additional skill identifier (ASI) are used interchangeably in the Army and thus will be used similarly throughout this thesis.

Background

“Call out the National Guard!” is a phrase that can be heard during a natural or man-made disaster by both citizens and civil authorities. In fact, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin called for the U.S. Marine Corps by name during a 30 August 2005 press conference that aired on Fox News regarding the federal government’s response, or perceived lack thereof, to Hurricane Katrina. It appears to the casual observer that most municipal and state governments have only modestly developed emergency response or disaster relief capabilities. Who has the capacity to assist citizens and civil authorities when all essential services are destroyed by a tornado, flood, wildfire, earthquake, or a
terrorist attack on U.S. soil? It seems that all too often the U.S. military is called upon to provide capabilities that are beyond the reach or technical expertise of local, state, and federal agencies. The problem is that current U.S. Code (law) very closely governs and limits DOD actions in the homeland. Additionally, military rules that govern how the U.S. military does those missions are fundamentally different from how they conduct traditional military operations. The bigger problem is that not all military officers understand this difference and have little or no training in how to deal with these instances. Those that do are randomly distributed throughout the force with no real means of identifying them to the military at large.

The other side of this problem is the current Department of Defense (DOD) definitions of key terms like Homeland Security (HS), Homeland Defense (HD), and Civil Support (CS). The most recent, prevailing opinion in the defense community these days is that the “DOD supports Homeland Security and conducts Homeland Defense” (Department of the Army 2010b, 1-11). This is certainly a nuanced version of the intent expressed by the authors of Joint Publication 3-26, *Homeland Security*, as noted in the epigraph to this chapter (Department of Defense 2005, v).

In early 2002 Colonel Steven Tomisek, then a senior military fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU), wrote that “In these DOD formulations, the threats at issue in the homeland defense are specified as emanating from foreign sources, and the precise scope of the term critical infrastructure . . .remains vague” (Tomisek 2002). What he was referring to was the disconnect in terminology between Presidential Executive Order 13228 (established the Office of Homeland Security) and DOD definitions adopted thereafter. The executive
order used the verbs: detect, prepare, prevent, protect against, respond, and recover. The DOD used the verbs: preparation, prevention, defense, and response. Arguably, the DOD picked the portions of the mission that it was most familiar with. Although, since these were nascent doctrinal concepts it is hardly surprising that there were very few precise definitions at that time.

Presumably, the current distinction flows from an effort to not duplicate services and capabilities that are the purview of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and from certain laws like the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). However, the U.S. Army continues to be called upon to do these missions in support of DHS. An examination of how the U.S. Army is contributing to HS is articulated in terms of conducting HD and providing Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) (Department of Defense 2007a, v) as distinct but interrelated mission areas in various regulations. However, more often than not, this distinction is nebulous at best when referenced in national strategies. This therefore creates further confusion amongst military personnel who are struggling to determine how to execute the task that they are called upon to complete with each new major domestic incident.

Figure 1 represents the notional interaction of the various missions and the distinctions between the areas. This figure also demonstrates the lead and supporting roles of the different mission areas. However, this is typical of the DODs’ high level view of this paradigm. It neglects to address other aspects of HS, HD, and CS such as border security, domestic counterterrorism, and domestic intelligence support.
Figure 1. Notional Relationship Between HD, CS, and HS Missions

Figure 2 is one of the original graphic representations of the DOD role in HS. This graphic is extracted from 2005 version of Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security. It identifies not only the mission areas that the DOD has responsibility for but also identified the importance of emergency preparedness. This concept is slightly more inclusive than in the 2007 publication of JP3-28, Civil Support. The observer will note that the HD and CS spheres do not occupy common space in this depiction; indicating no overlap in mission areas. This is different from the 2007 depiction in figure 1, where the missions themselves as shown to overlap both mission areas.
Figure 2. Relationship of Emergency Preparedness to Homeland Security Mission Areas


Figure 3 is the author’s attempt to graphically represent how the DOD participates in HS. Under the whole of government approach the DOD works with other supporting and supported government agencies to secure the homeland. Each of those organizations has specific missions that they are responsible for. Within the DOD, HD, CS, and Domestic Counterterrorism are the major mission areas that support HS. The domestic counterterrorism aspect is often overlooked and is omitted from most illustrations of the interrelationship of HD and CS as it applies to HS. However, “Domestic CT operations
are considered part of homeland security under the lead of Department of Homeland Security” (Department of Defense 2009a, xx) and “CT is one of the core tasks of the US special operations forces (SOF), and their role and additive capability is to conduct offensive measures within Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) overall combating terrorism (CbT) efforts” (Department of Defense 2009, v). Therefore this thesis will include DOD domestic CT efforts as a part of HS. Additionally, since defense intelligence support (typically covered under HD) is fast becoming one of the primary requested capabilities from federal, state, and local authorities it should also be considered under DSCA. The states, through the office of the governor and their respective National Guard organizations, also contribute to HS, DS, and DSCA. Since National Guard forces are a part of the DOD, they too contribute to the overall DOD effort for HS.

Figure 3. How DOD contributes to Homeland Security
Source: Created by author.
The 2005 version of Joint Publication 3-26, *Homeland Security* identified the operational framework for DOD support to HS through the following tasks: prepare, detect, deter, preempt, defend, and respond (Department of Defense 2005, I-10). “DOD prepares and responds” when conducting both HD and CS. DOD primarily focuses on “detect, deter, preempt, and defend” when they conduct HD missions” (Department of Defense 2005, I-10). One of the key elements of distinction for the different missions is who has the lead. Figure 4 illustrates this distinction of lead agency graphically. What this demonstrates is that while DOD takes the lead in HD; they still conduct HS missions, just in a supporting role.

![Figure 4. Lead Federal Agency/DOD Relationships](source: Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-26, *Homeland Security* (Suffolk, VA: Government Printing Office, 2005), II-17.)
Research Questions

Does the U.S. Army need a method to readily identify officers with Homeland Security education, training, and experience; such as a skill identifier (SI)? This is the primary research question that this thesis will attempt to answer. Conversely, does a means already exist to identify officers with this skill set that is perhaps less formal than a skill identifier? The secondary questions that follow are germane to what an ASI actually is or does, what are the qualifications necessary to conduct HS, and where are the requirements and authorizations in existing duty positions. Of course, all of these questions will presumably lead to a reasoned and supported answer to the primary research question.

Chief among the secondary questions is: what is an ASI and what does it do? In support of this question this thesis will answer the following questions. What type of skills (theme) does an ASI denote? How does one create an ASI? Are there any current ASIs that encompass themes similar to the knowledge, skills, and attributes necessary to conduct homeland security operations?

The next of the secondary questions is: what knowledge, skills, and attributes are needed or qualify one to conduct Homeland Security operations? Tertiary, yet supplemental, questions follow within the logical context of where one acquires these qualifications. What source documents justify these qualifications? What education, training, or experience would qualify for “Homeland Security” credit? Would constructive credit for previous jobs or education qualify someone retroactively for an ASI?
Following the explanations of the ASI and the relevant knowledge, skills, and attributes this study must then review where the requirements and authorizations are for such training and education. How to find a requirement or authorization for a position requiring homeland security training is the third of the supporting research questions. Are there specific billets within either modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE), tables of distribution and allowances (TDA), or joint manning documents (JMD) that require homeland security specific skills? Supplemental to this question are the following questions. How are these billets currently filled? Is there any emphasis on qualifications? What method is used by the U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) to find qualified officers to fill these billets? Do these officers get these assignments as a result of a deliberate selection process where their unique qualifications are matched against job-specific requirements? Are they assigned to these jobs and then spend a significant portion of that assignment in the education process earning the qualifications needed?

Finally, this thesis must address if this topic was previously studied. Has anyone in the U.S. Army studied this topic before and what were the conclusions of that study? Since time, technology, and conditions constantly evolve, a follow up question is in order. Are those conclusions still valid in the contemporary operating environment?

Assumptions

The key assumption for this thesis is that the U.S. Army, as a part of the Department of Defense, will continue to be called upon to conduct not only Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions, but Homeland Security missions as well. Additionally, this thesis assumes that the skills required to successfully perform these
missions are partially taught in the formal Army education system and therefore already fall within the parameters of Army regulations regarding duration of training and specifications for the creation of an additional skill identifier. Finally, this thesis assumes that the totality of the skills and education is finite enough to be fully quantified by an ASI and is not so large as to require the creation of a new Functional Area (FA), Area of Concentration (AOC), or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).

**Definitions of Key Terms**

Terms defined as part of this thesis are described below. The definitions listed are the manner in which these terms are used within the context of this thesis. Definitions other than the intended meanings listed here are specified in the text, as appropriate.

**Civil Support (CS)**—Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, for designated law enforcement, and other activities as directed (Department of Defense 2007b, GL-6).

**Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)**—Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, National Guard forces performing duty in accordance with Title 32, United States Code, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, and DOD component assets, in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for special events, domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other domestic activities. Support provided by National Guard forces performing duty in accordance with Title 32, United States Code is considered DSCA but is conducted as a State-directed action. Also known as civil support (Department of Defense 2009b, 12).
**Homeland**—the physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, United States possessions and territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace (Department of Defense 2007b, GL-8).

**Homeland Defense**—the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. Also called HD (Department of Defense 2007a, GL-8).

**Homeland Security**—A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur. Also called HS (Department of Defense 2005, GL-8).

**U.S. Army**—the organization comprised of Active Duty, the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard of the several states, and civilian components.

**Skill Identifier**—Two characters, in either numeric-alpha or alpha-numeric combinations, which are used to identify the skills required in combination with an AOC, of a position as well as the skills in which officers may be classified. SIs identify specialized occupational areas which are not normally related to any one particular branch, FA or AOC but are required to perform the duties of a special position. SIs may require significant education, training or experience; however, SIs do not require repetitive tours and do not provide progressive career developmental assignments. SIs are authorized for use with any AOC unless expressly limited by the classification guidance contained in DA Pamphlet 611–21. SIs include aircraft qualification, specialized
maintenance, medical and veterinary duties and other required skills that are too restricted in scope to comprise an AOC. More than one SI may be used to denote the requirements of a position or to identify the qualifications of an officer (Department of the Army 1997, 8).

**Limitations**

This thesis is limited to the creation of an SI within the U.S. Army. This thesis will however acknowledge the fact that the research will include reviews of national level policy and DOD doctrine. As a result of confining this study to the U.S. Army this thesis used the metric of a skill identifier (SI)-additional skill identifier (ASI) as outlined in Army Regulation 611-1, *Military Occupational Classification Structure Development and Implementation*. The reason for this limitation is that not all services within the DOD use “skill identifiers”, per se; rather they have codes by other names. Therefore, the recommendations contained herein will be based on doctrinal publications, scholarly journal articles, information from discussions with subject matter experts, and the authors’ own analysis and interpretation as it relates to the U.S. Army.

**Scope and Delimitations**

This study will focus the implications of the conclusions and recommendations to the assignment of officers to key billets within organizations whose mission, either in part or in whole, is the defense and security of the U.S. homeland. Additionally, this study will not address the application of such an SI across all services within the DOD. Further, this study will not address the validity of the various laws or rules that limit the use of U.S. military forces on the homeland. It will merely address the restrictions imposed and
the means by which military forces can work within those restrictions. While U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is predominantly the organization charged with securing the homeland, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) also shares this responsibility in terms of the approaches; Pacific islands like Hawaii. However, this study will confine its scope to the NORTHCOM area of responsibility. Finally, this study will address, but will not make a recommendation toward the issue of which organization within the U.S. Army should have proponency over this SI if it is determined to be necessary.

**Significance of Study**

The reason this topic is important is simply because NORTHCOM is the executive agent of the Department of Defense for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Under NORTHCOM the U.S. Army North (ARNORTH) is the lead for all land matters involving the homeland and we currently have, at best, an ad hoc method of assigning officers to these critical duty positions.

A quick review of the case study of the 1992 Los Angeles Riots is demonstrative of the fact that a military lack of understanding of the nuances of conducting operations within the United States can potentially have significant adverse consequences in terms of both cost to infrastructure, and more importantly, intensity of human suffering and loss of life. This case study is compelling as it is specifically centered on the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). Misunderstanding of this act, and others, by state and national officials slowed the federal response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005. The critical elements of this case study are that neither the California Army National Guard on-scene commander nor the later commander of Joint Task Force–Los Angeles (a federal Title 10, regular Army general officer) understood the environment in which they were conducting
operations. Major General James Delk of the California Army National Guard, then the acting commander of all National Guard forces in Los Angeles and the Deputy Adjutant General of the State of California was quoted as, “I frankly did not know until several months after the riots that Posse Comitatus did not apply. Did MG Covault make the same assumption I did, did he make a mistake (or his JAGs), or was he given guidance?” (Matthews 2006, 47).

The commander of U.S. Army North is currently designated as the Joint Force Land Component Commander of US Northern Command for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Department of Defense 2005, II-8). As such, ARNORTH has been and continues to be used as an instrument of national power to conduct both Homeland Defense and Homeland Security missions. The ARNORTH commander feels that we need some form of specialized training or education to successfully perform these missions (Swan 2010). This study is important to military professionals, civil authorities, and citizens alike in that the implications of having a properly trained and educated military officer assigned to an organization charged with securing the homeland during a crisis is in all of our best interests.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

During emergencies the Armed Forces may provide military support to civil authorities in mitigating the consequences of an attack or other catastrophic event when the civilian responders are overwhelmed. Military responses under these conditions require a streamlined chain-of-command that integrates the unique capabilities of active and reserve military components and civilian responders.

— General Richard B. Myers
2004 National Military Strategy of the USA

This literature review is intended to illustrate that the U.S. Army has both a tangible need for and an already, partially established framework within which to build a skill identifier for Homeland Security. As reflected in General Myers’ comments in the 2004 National Military Strategy of the USA; it might appear that he is hinting that DOD forces responding to natural or man-made disasters inside the United States may require some form of specialized training or operational skill set; at least the ability to integrate the active component, reserve component, and the interagency aspects.

Background

The majority of the relevant literature available on Homeland Security was published over the past ten years. Despite this short time period there are multiple revisions and re-writes of several of these references indicating that it is still a somewhat emerging concept. With that in mind, the literature review for this thesis focused on various types of sources in an effort to properly present the current research. The organization of this review, and of the entire study, is focused around the primary and
secondary research questions. Since no precedents for this particular topic were found, the literature review will focus on related topics.

The national strategies all discuss the interrelation of the DOD and DHS, as well as the role the DOD will play, albeit with their own nuances and distinctions. From the 2011 National Military Strategy Admiral Mullen offers, “We will defend the homeland and play a critical role in supporting homeland security” (Department of Defense 2011, 10) and “We will continue to dedicate, fund, and train a portion of the National Guard for homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities” (Department of Defense 2011, 11). In the 2010 National Security Strategy, President Obama offers his vision of a collaborative DOD and DHS; “To initiate this effort, the White House merged the staffs of the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council” (President of the United States 2010, 14). Secretary Gates offers, “It is essential that DOD improve its capabilities for contributing to civilian-led activities and operations, supporting “unity of effort” in homeland security” (Department of Defense 2010, 70) and “To support the NSS and provide enduring security for the American people, the Department has five key objectives: Defend the Homeland, Win the Long War, Promote Security, Deter Conflict, and Win our Nation’s Wars” (Department of Defense 2008a, 6) from the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report and the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS), respectively. Additionally, these sources address multiple instances where the U.S. military is supporting HS by virtue of conducting HD and CS missions. Ironically, the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) Report only mentions the partnership of DHS and DOD a few times. Therefore, an examination of the primary research question is the starting point.

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Does the Army Need It?


The U.S. Army also published a Field Manual (FM) for Civil Support, FM 3-28 in 2010. However, a review of all active Army field manuals on the U.S. Army Publishing Directorate website yielded no results for a field manual for Homeland Defense. While FM 3-28 is typically specific to individual facets of the larger topic, there are instances where Homeland Security is addressed by its constituent parts: homeland defense and civil support. As evidenced by these revisions in doctrinal texts and their contradictions, the DOD is apparently struggling to grasp this new paradigm.

The “Intellectual Center of the Army” at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas is made up of organizations such as the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), the Command and
General Staff College (CGSC), the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and the Combined Arms Doctrine Development (CADD); to name a few. Within that institution, at least two organizations are of the opinion that the U.S. Army needs specialized training and education to prepare Soldiers for the complexities of responding to incidents in the U.S. homeland. The CALL published a handbook in December of 2010 oriented toward disaster response for Army staff officers at the operational and tactical levels. This handbook is but one tacit acknowledgement by the U.S. Army that response to natural or man-made disasters within the United States requires a special set of skills that is not currently taught within the traditional Army training construct. In fact, it states that the U.S. Army tactical units are wanting in this understanding.

Defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) within the United States is not a new mission for the military. Despite this, Center for Army Lessons Learned collection and analysis teams routinely report that tactical units do not understand the constraints placed upon them by the body of statutes, regulations, and presidential orders pertaining to responding to disasters and incidents at home. This is because the primary mission of tactical units is expeditionary warfare, and that has been their focus for the past eight years in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the Philippines. (CALL 2010, 1)

The potential answer to that concern was the Department of the Army publication of the DSCA Handbook: Tactical Level Commander and Staff Toolkit as a graphic training aid (GTA) later in 2010. This handbook “provides overarching processes and recommended planning factors to enable tactical level Commanders and their Staffs to properly plan and subsequently execute assigned DSCA missions for all-hazard operations, excluding Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, high-yield Explosives (CBRNE) or acts of terrorism” (Department of the Army 2010a, v). This document, which expires in January 2012, is what, if not yet another tacit acknowledgement by the
DOD that operating in the United States is more foreign to DOD personnel than operating on foreign soil?

In 2008 the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) initiated a HS graduate certificate program. Additionally, shortly thereafter, the CGSC Foundation secured a “Congressionally-directed grant in the amount of $250,000 to enable curriculum and course development related to Homeland Security” (Meier 2011, 32). In conjunction with that course development the CGSC Homeland Security Studies Program (HSSP) faculty requested creation of an ASI for the HSSP and equivalent education and training through the Department of the Army (Cupp 2010). These organizations, from within the Army itself, clearly believe that it is time to define the criteria in terms of requirements for trained personnel.

The U.S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership published some concerns that a blue ribbon defense panel observed in their discussions regarding DSCA. The “defense liaison workshop group recommended improvements in the selection and screening process for these billets; in the education and development programs designed to strengthen and sustain them; and in the career opportunities made available to personnel who fill them” (Tussing 2009, 3). The specific improvements, or the deficiencies they sought to correct, were unavailable. However, in email communication with Professor Tussing he confirmed that he supports the creation of an SI for HS and, in fact, he has communicated with the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense–Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs regarding this concept. He further stated that the Assistant Secretary’s office is potentially supportive of this initiative (Bert Tussing, 12 May 2011, email to author).
In a lecture given at the Lewis and Clark Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas on 2 December 2010, the commanding general of U.S. Army North (ARNORTH), Lieutenant General (LTG) Guy Swan, expressed his support for the creation of a HS related skill identifier. He further stated that due to the complexity of the homeland operating environment, traditionally educated military officers are typically not adequately prepared to be successful in that environment (Swan 2010).

Below are excerpts from the transcript of an exchange between the author of this thesis and LTG Swan from the December 2010 presentation at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. When questioned specifically about codifying the skills and education requirements for Soldiers operating within the confines of the United States, through the creation and use of an additional skill identifier, he answered:

Yes! Yeah, I do. I do, and we are working with DA and to a lesser degree with the other services. But certainly within the Army I think that this requires some additional skill to operate in this environment. . . . I believe that about the homeland. Any well trained unit can do that, but it’s got to have some specialized training. It is, if nothing else; just to understand the operating environment. It is not a foreign country. You do not operate in this country the way you operate in another country. . . . the world changed over the last 10 years and we have to play a part in this unique operating environment. (Swan 2010)

The 2010 findings from The Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support of Civil Authorities After Certain Incidents, a congressionally mandated review under public law 110-181; noted several instances where DOD is lacking in either the ability or the will to meet the established goals and requirements of congress and the administration with regard to DSCA. Many of these findings center on the DOD’s inability to provide ready, trained, and knowledgeable personnel to perform these missions (The Advisory Panel 2010, vi-xiv). Of the 24 findings the panel enumerated, 10 had something to do with inadequate personnel, training, or force
generation (The Advisory Panel 2010, vi-xiii). A few of the findings and recommendations deserve special emphasis as they are completely germane to this topic.

The findings most applicable to this topic were that the “level of training for military and civilian leaders is response planning and operations is inadequate” and “there is no sustainable pool of military personnel trained for the CBRNE response mission” (The Advisory Panel 2010, viii). The subsequent recommendations for these findings were that the “Secretary of Defense require the inclusion of instruction related to DSCA, the National Response Framework, and the National Incident Management System in the Officer Education Systems of all military services . . . direct the services to establish within their personnel systems a means of identifying enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers, and commissioned officers who possess particular skills and experience in DSCA for CBRNE, in order to develop a sustainable pool of CBRNE response personnel (The Advisory Panel 2010, viii). These findings and recommendations certainly point to some familiar ground with regard to this paradigm. This research study is predicated on the very points that are brought out here by this panel and can be reviewed in Appendix A of this thesis. Additional findings and recommendations highlight the perceived inadequacies of individual, unit, and leader training for HS and the overall disjointed nature of doctrinal references published over the past ten years.

The intersection of defense intelligence and HS is also noted in the 2008 Defense Intelligence Strategy. One of the missions outlined in this document is to “Facilitate Homeland Defense through all-domain (maritime, air, space, land, and cyber) awareness, integration and collaboration with national, homeland defense, law enforcement and
international partners” (Department of Defense 2008b, 12). As this requirement is outlined it appears to be limited to HD; which indicates protection of national sovereignty. However, the current use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets along the U.S. border with Mexico seems to lack a nexus to our national sovereignty. Therefore, one can conclude that U.S. defense intelligence has crossed into the realm of DSCA as well. This is potentially very dangerous for DOD since there are various laws that constrain and guide the domestic use of military intelligence. Seemingly, this emerging mission set would require specialized education.

Finally, the President of the United States, Barak Obama, stated in the 2010 *Nation Security Strategy* that “we must integrate our approach to homeland security with our broader national security approach.” and “To initiate this effort, the White House merged the staffs of the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council” (President of the United States 2010, 14). He further stated “We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats, while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military operations. This includes . . . and defending the United States and supporting civil authorities at home” (President of the United States 2010, 14). It appears that the President is offering guidance that the DOD, as well as other cabinet departments, should follow his lead and recognize that Homeland Security is equal to National Security. Recognizing that we need full spectrum warriors who really do know the full spectrum; which includes HS, HD, and DSCA is an incomplete task that the U.S Army should engage in immediately.
What is an SI and what does it do?

The focus of the first of the secondary research questions is to define what an SI is and what it does. These sources were mainly limited to Department of the Army Human Resources doctrinal publications since the scope of this study is confined to the U.S. Army. As appropriate, this study also reviewed how previous, but separate, ASI recommendations were presented in scholarly writings.

A skill identifier (also known as an additional skill identifier) is essentially a code that denotes a special skill. It can be used as a means of identifying a person with a specific or discreet skill set, a duty position on an authorization and requirements document, or both. The Army defines an SI as:

Two characters, in either numeric-alpha or alpha-numeric combinations, which are used in combination with an AOC, to identify the skills required of a position in requirements and authorizations documents as well as the skills in which officers may be classified. SIs identify specialized occupational areas which are not normally related to any one particular branch, FA or AOC but are required to perform the duties of a special position. SIs may require significant education, training or experience; however, SIs do not require repetitive tours and do not provide progressive career developmental assignments. (Department of the Army 2009, 1)

A very important note about skill identifiers (SIs) is that they do not dictate or guarantee repetitive tours or progressive career developmental assignments for personnel who hold the SI. Therefore, a commissioned officer possessing the skills of an Army parachutist would have the SI of 5P (Department of the Army 2009, table 4.3). This Soldier will not necessarily always be assigned to a duty position coded as a parachutist position. However, if a duty position is coded as 5P, meaning the position requires a commissioned officer with the skills of an Army parachutist, typically it will be filled by
such a person. Therefore, an SI is a discriminator when it is on an authorization or
requirement document but it is merely a classification for a person.

SIs are authorized for use with any AOC unless expressly limited by the
classification guidance contained in DA Pam 611–21. SIs include aircraft
qualification, specialized maintenance, medical and veterinary duties and other
required skills that are too restricted in scope to comprise an AOC. More than one
SI may be used to denote the requirements of a position or to identify the
qualifications of an officer. (Department of the Army 1997, 8)

The preceding quote from AR 611-1 validates the assumption made in chapter
one of this thesis. A functional area, while potentially an option for the HS skill set, is
still too broad in scope in that it groups officers into functional categories in an effort to
align functional competencies. These functional categories are: maneuver, fires and
effects; operations support; and force sustainment. Furthermore, FAs are designed for
progressive developmental assignments and therefore each officer is only allowed to hold
one FA (Department of the Army 2009, 4). This would be counterproductive to the
concept of HS, since HS encompasses many competencies that support full spectrum
operations.

The process for creating an SI is outlined in the 1997 edition of Army Regulation
(AR) 611-1, *Military Occupational Classification Structure Development and
Implementation*. An SI can be created by simply submitting a request through the
appropriate branch, functional area (FA) manager, or proponent for concurrence or non-
concurrence.

The following criteria for a new skill identifier are as follows:
(1) Qualification for an individual to be awarded the SI must include two or more
weeks of formal training or equivalent as established by the skill proponent.
(2) There must be a requirement for 20 or more positions to be identified by the
proposed new skill. (3) The advantage to be derived from a more precise
occupational classification must be clearly evident. (Department of the Army
1997, 10)
While the first two criteria are objective and quantifiable, the third criterion is significantly more subjective. The concept of “clearly evident” is rather vague and certainly open to the interpretation of the individual. Therefore, this criterion is likely to be the most often cited for non-concurrence.

Presently, the only SI that bears any similarities to the same skill set needed to conduct HS mission is 5Y-Civil Defense Officer. This SI requires the completion of several Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) independent study courses that pertain to “analysis, planning, implementation, and management of indigenous emergency service assets in the preparation for or conduct of civil defense or disaster relief operations” (Department of the Army 2009, table 4-3). Historically, this SI was restricted to the Civil Affairs branch, AOC 38A (Department of the Army 1999, 55). However, the 2009 update of DA Pamphlet 611-21 no longer contains this restriction. While the requirements for this SI are a good start, they are in no way sufficient to prepare someone for the complexities of the contemporary homeland operating environment since the FEMA courses listed were all designed prior to 2001; and therefore predate the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the development of current DOD HS policy.

An additional SI that has some relevance for HS education is the R1-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Responder. This SI is awarded to commissioned officers who successfully complete the CBRN Emergency Responder Training Course conducted at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. As a requirements code, it is restricted to any officer AOC on a WMD CST authorization document (Department of the Army Pamphlet 611-21 2009, table 4-3). WMD CST authorization documents are
exclusive to the Army National Guard (FMSWeb 2010). The National Guard Bureau Domestic Operations Directorate initially requested this code as a skill qualification identifier (SQI) for both officers and enlisted personnel (Frank Hudoba, 5 October 2010, email to author). An SQI is a single digit number or letter that identifies a skill derived from formal schooling or a minimum of six months of on-the-job training. What is unique about an SQI is that when it is used in conjunction with a 4 digit military occupational specialty (MOS) it changes the MOS (Department of the Army 1997, 19). For this reason, the SQI did not fit the intent of the National Guard for the WMD CST program for officers. Conceivably, this is the reason it was accepted as an SI for officers and an SQI for enlisted Soldiers.

These, and many other SIs, can be awarded retroactively for previous education or training. Likewise, there are SIs that can be awarded via constructive credit where someone has worked in a skill or duty position for an amount of time. Most SIs require a formal education or training process. Also, some SIs are awarded to a person by virtue of that individual holding an academic degree in a certain discipline and or having civilian acquired skills. The SI 6H-Public Safety Officer, is awarded to an officer if that officer possesses a”Bachelor degree in criminology, fire science, police science, corrections management, or public administration and/or 3 years practical experience in a supervisory or management position in a government related public safety field or equivalent private industry position” (Department of the Army Pamphlet 611-21 2009, table 4-3). This example would also work in a HS SI. The ever increasing number of HS curricula from the associate through Ph.D. level would provide a means to quantify degrees which could then be used to code officers possessing these degrees.
What are Homeland Security Skills?

DOD planning and training guidance offered in the past ten years was reviewed due to the fact that this guidance partially shaped the missions areas and capabilities that constitute the DOD role in HS. However, the resource focus for this question was academic reviews of emerging Homeland Security curricula in private, public, and military educational institutions. The Homeland Security/Defense Education Consortium’s (HSDEC) Core Common Competencies spreadsheet, attached to this thesis at Appendix B, proved to be the single most comprehensive source.

With regard to the competencies that are required for a HS professional, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD-HD) published a memorandum in 2007 addressed to the presidents of the military service war colleges and universities; the Director of the Joint Staff; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness regarding the professional competencies required. These competencies were the result of a collaborative effort between DHS, DOD, and academic community representatives. In this memorandum the Assistant Secretary outlines the need for both defining these competencies and the subsequent need to educate and train military personnel in these competencies (available at Appendix B).

What the Assistant Secretary did was to codify, in broad terms, those competencies that a HS curriculum should include in order to produce professional HS planners and practitioners. The second paragraph of the memorandum is instructive in that it discussed the need to identify these skills and competencies for the eventual requirements of duty positions demanding these competencies. This portends the need, at
least from the U.S. Army perspective, to create a means to identify special educational or skill requirements of select duty positions on authorization and requirement documents.

Attached to the memorandum was the table of competencies and brief descriptions of the elements of those competencies. These competencies range from management of various content areas and leadership dimensions, such as ethics, to operational and functional expertise. These competencies were then “cross walked” against skills trained or taught at institutions that have answered the call to prepare the future HS and HD leaders in both our military and the whole of government. This crosswalk will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 4. The table of competencies is attached to this thesis at Appendix C. A limiting aspect of these competencies, as presented by this table, is the broad thematic titles. These themes are perhaps too broad and therefore must be distilled further.

The Assistant Secretary went one step further and grouped these competencies into HD and HS Knowledge Areas/Domains. Table 1 is the grouping of these competencies by domain or area. These domains are broken into their perceived, relative importance: high and medium. Since all three domains are represented with a minimum of medium importance one can safely assume that the Assistant Secretary felt both a need to codify these competencies, as well as denote their importance to HS and HD professionals. What this represents, essentially, is that the HS education paradigm has shifted at the highest levels of the Department of Defense. Recognition by the Assistant Secretary that metrics were needed to gauge the emerging curricula and doctrine was indicative of the fact that the DOD will play a much larger role in HS than currently
envisioned by DOD’s military leaders; since metric development is typically the first step in an analysis and measurement initiative.

Table 1. Homeland Defense and Security Knowledge Areas/Domains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In-Depth Knowledge</th>
<th>Understanding</th>
<th>Awareness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threats to national security</td>
<td>Medium Importance</td>
<td>Medium Importance NCTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Infrastructure Protection</td>
<td>Land, Air, Maritime, Space and Cyber Domains</td>
<td>Contract/Acquisition operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Policy, HLS policy, national strategies</td>
<td>Information sharing and Intelligence Analysis</td>
<td>State &amp; Local Fusion Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC/HSC</td>
<td>Domestic Counterintelligence</td>
<td>Strategic Missile Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency Coordination, Interagency Relationships</td>
<td>CBRNE Consequence management</td>
<td>Goldwater Nichols/ Beyond Goldwater Nichols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept of Defense/Homeland Defense Policy</td>
<td>Congressional Oversight/Understanding of authorities/laws</td>
<td>Resiliency of social, political and economic processes, infrastructure and institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government and Strategic Communications</td>
<td>International Affairs and Cooperation/Assistance</td>
<td>Operational programs and capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of National Guard</td>
<td>15 National Planning Scenarios, NRP/NIMS/CS</td>
<td>Continuity of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD Organization, Role of J NORTHCOM/NORAD, Role of USPACOM/USSOUTHCOM, Use of military forces in CONUS</td>
<td>All Hazards: Natural Disasters &amp; Hazards, Infectious Diseases &amp; Health Affairs, Domestic Nuclear Detection, WMD/Proliferation, Terrorism/Counterterrorism</td>
<td>Human capital and resources operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic planning process</td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>Research and education networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local/Tribal/State/Federal Government Relationships &amp; Coordination (HS Field)</td>
<td>Systems of Government (fed, state, county, local, municipal) Executive/Legislative/Judicial</td>
<td>Risk/Crisis planning and management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-Military Relationships</td>
<td>Risk/Crisis planning and management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>Cyber Security; Transportation Security, Agriculture &amp; Food Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS DSCA EXORD</td>
<td>Roles and capabilities of NGOs and the private sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS Organization &amp; Roles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One attempt by U.S. Joint Forces Command (U.S. JFCOM) to codify and teach these competencies was the 40-hour Homeland Security Planners Course taught through the National Defense University (NDU). The course “provides homeland
security/homeland defense/civil support education for planners from the Combatant
Commands and other U.S. government agencies and departments in the grades of 0-4 to
0-6 and civilian GS equivalents” (O. Shawn Cupp, 1 December 2010, email to author).

The authority to conduct this course was derived from “CJCS directed the
development of HLSPC in October 2002 at the request of the Commander,
USNORTHCOM to meet the education requirements of his newly forming staff and in
support of Department of Homeland Security” (O. Shawn Cupp, 1 December 2010, email
to author). The 2010 revision of the NDU course fact sheet revealed that 945 students
attended this course from its creation through 2010 (O. Shawn Cupp, 1 December 2010 email
to author). However, with the planned abolition of U.S. Joint Forces Command,
one can only wonder if this course will continue.

One estimate by a Military Times writer in March of 2011 was that there were
“about 320 and 350 homeland security-related programs at schools across the country,
from associate level to Ph.D.s” (Lawson 2011, 20). She was quoting the director of the
Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS),
Glen Woodbury. One of the many noteworthy programs at CHDS is their collaboration
with the University and Agency Partner Initiative (UAPI). This program leverages the
DHS vetted curriculum from NPS as a tool for other, partner institutions to create or
improve their curriculum (Supinski 2007). This prevents redundancy and facilitates an
enterprise wide academic collaboration which can provide greater access to potential
students. This type of collaboration produces curricula that support the exact type of
educational experience that could qualify someone for constructive credit for an SI.
The Homeland Security/Defense Education Consortium (HSDEC) developed content areas to codify the themes that the academic, government, and military representatives of the consortium believe should be part of graduate-level HS curricula. These content areas are: current and emerging threats; context and organizations; policies, strategies, and legal issues; processes and management; and practical applications (HSDEC 2007, 2-5). Building on the HSDEC Core Common Competencies table, Kansas State University and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College collaborated at a January, 2008 workshop to correlate the DOD and HSDEC competencies and codify them into Core Common Areas. Table 2 represents the initial DOD core competencies published by the Assistant Secretary of Defense-Homeland Defense, the 2008 Workshop Core Common Areas, and the HSDEC Content Areas and their areas of convergence. This is illustrative of the fact that a consensus exists amongst academics, practitioners, planners, and policy level actors alike. Therefore, it is a fairly safe assumption that any educational institution within the consortium will have a curriculum that is peer approved and is consistent with other, similar level programs nation-wide. These content areas, along with the knowledge domains listed in table 1, were cross referenced against each other and against the 4 January 2008 HSDEC Workshop Core Common Areas by the faculty of the Homeland Security Studies Program at Fort Leavenworth. The CGSC faculty then correlated these content areas and competencies to the HSSP elective courses that satisfy those content areas and competencies. Those results are displayed later in this thesis in chapter 4, “Analysis.”
Table 2. Alignment of Workshop Core Common Areas with HSDEC Recommended Content Areas and DOD Competencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HSDEC Content Areas</th>
<th>Workshop Core Common Areas</th>
<th>DoD Core Competencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content Area 1: Current and Emerging Threats</td>
<td>Historical aspects of domestic incidents</td>
<td>Critical expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human factors and psychology of domestic incidents, sociology, needs of people (resiliency)</td>
<td>Cultural Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Understand and identify characteristics of domestic threats (manned and natural, accidental and purposeful) and hazards (chemical, biological, natural, terrorism, domestic threats, etc.)</td>
<td>Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content Area 2: Context and Organization</td>
<td>Policy, roles, and responsibilities at National, Tribal, State and Local organizational levels (including preparation, preparedness/protection, response, and recovery)</td>
<td>Critical expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy, roles, and responsibilities of non-profits, volunteers, and private sectors (within crisis continuum preparation, preparedness/protection, response, and recovery)</td>
<td>Critical expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Common language, understand and learn acronyms, TEN code common terms, Homeland Security terminology</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Role of military in domestic incidents</td>
<td>Critical expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Core focus on state and local level structures</td>
<td>Crisis Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal aspects of domestic incidents</td>
<td>Critical expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Common national plan and emergency systems (NRF and NIMS)</td>
<td>Ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content Area 3: Policies, Strategies, Legal Issues</td>
<td>Infrastructure protection, critical infrastructure and impact on homeland functions</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Understanding and identify assets for use in domestic incidents</td>
<td>Science and Technology Expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content Area 4: Processes and Management</td>
<td>Leadership in crisis situations from the local, state, tribal, and federal levels (communication with the public)</td>
<td>Management and Planning Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exercises, training, practicum as part of course (table top, exercise, training scenario, vignette-based practical exercise)</td>
<td>Strategic Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adaptability, Creativity and Critical Thinking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Homeland Security Affairs Journal 6, no. 2 (May 2010).

At the tactical level, the Army published Appendix J, Comparison of Stability and Civil Support Tasks in FM 3-28 Civil Support Operations. This table takes tasks from the FM 7-15, The Army Universal Task List from all of the war fighting functions, excluding fires, and does a comparison of tasks for stability operations that also apply to civil support. Of several hundred tasks, only 5 of these tasks apply only to civil support operations. Additionally, several of the tasks involving the collection, assessment, processing, and integration of intelligence have simple caveats such as “according to
intelligence oversight laws for civil support” (Department of the Army 2010b, J-12).
These remarks are critical, since there are a litany of laws, and exceptions to these laws, that govern the use of military intelligence in civil support operations.

Where are the Authorizations and Requirements?

Research areas for the third supporting research question regarding duty positions that require homeland security specific skills are largely confined to the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency’s (USAFMSA) Force Management System website, FMSWeb. This resource documents all requirements and authorizations for personnel within the Army’s personnel structure. Authorizations and requirements are derived from the need to conduct a specific mission made up of collective tasks that require personnel to perform individual tasks. These individual tasks require various training and education. A means of identifying these skills and education is a Personnel Requirement Code (PRC): “The identification of the skills or qualifications required by an officer of the appropriate grade to effectively perform the duties of a position” (Department of the Army Pamphlet 611-21 2007, 51). This code also determines AOC, functional area, language, and any skill requirements. Therefore, this PRC would require a skill identifier that codifies the HS education and training needed by an officer in order to properly reflect that need in an authorization document.

The research for this particular topic proved quite difficult in that there is no one definitive way to define these duty positions; since an SI does not exist. Therefore, the author conducted a review of mission statements from the narrative portion of Army authorization documents. The sample selected organizations within U.S. Forces Command, U.S. Army North, National Guard Bureau, and the Army National Guard of
the many states. The sample was further narrowed in scope by limiting the search to organizations that are constituted on tables of distribution and allowances (TDA). The screening criteria was the presence of the words “homeland defense,” “homeland security,” “civil support,” or “DSCA” in the mission statement of the organization.

It was interesting to note that within ARNORTH there are augmentation headquarters units that are specifically designed to deploy from ARNORTH headquarters to manage crisis incidents on the ground in support of DSCA (FMSWeb 2010). Also interesting was the discovery of authorizations for Special Operations Detachments resident within state National Guard organizations with HD and DSCA mission sets (FMSWeb 2010).

Not surprisingly, the National Guard and ARNORTH had the highest concentration of instances where HS, HD, or DSCA appeared in mission statements. One example of this is that each Army National Guard (ARNG) headquarters element in every state has this mission set and, consequently, personnel on this authorization and requirement document responsible for the planning, resourcing, and training of the required competencies. However, there was no way to determine which duty position(s) on that document should have those competencies since an SI does not exist. These findings are presented in more detail in chapter 4.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Design

The research methodology for this study followed a design known as qualitative description. This methodology is similar to traditional naturalistic inquiry in that it is designed to study something in its natural state. Since this topic involves the realities of Army Human Resources as they typically exist, this approach is well suited for the research methodology due to the inherent flexibility afforded and the inductive and interactive nature of the data analysis (Creswell 2007, 38).

Typically, however, qualitative description will not follow any predetermined variables for study and is therefore flexible enough for the researcher to use various methods in conjunction with each other (Sandelowski 2000, 336). This thesis breaks with this construct in the design of the data collection and analysis as it focused on the primary and secondary research questions as the basis for both data collection and analysis. Hence, the specific design of this chapter is demonstrated both in the steps taken to answer the primary and secondary research questions and analytical criteria.

The strengths of this research method lie in its flexibility and its comprehensive nature. It does not restrict the researcher to a specific framework, which allows for a “fundamentally interpretive” (Creswell 2007, 38) study where both the researcher and the reviewer can envision how the recommendations address the elements of the findings. The weakness of such a method is that it is typically viewed as the “lowest rung” of academic research (Sandelowski 2000, 334).
This study blends in the elements of grounded theory research as it attempted to identify emergent themes and apply them to the theoretical application of the recommendations and how they will impact upon the thing itself (Army Human Resources policy). This is accomplished through answering the secondary questions with the final intent of those answers informing the answer of the overall research question.

Therefore, this study used a multimode effort involving the “simultaneous collection and analysis of data whereby both mutually shape” (Sandelowski 2000, 335) the other. Since this particular topic was not researched before now, direct literature was unavailable. Consequently, the researcher focused on similar research projects and related materials. Additionally, the study collected and analyzed both historical, doctrinal references and subject matter expert input.

Analytical Criteria

The analytical criteria are the credibility of sources, relevance to the topic, and currency of the data. The rubric used was that an interview source must be a subject matter expert, a literature source must be both current and germane to the topic, and associated sources (e.g. national strategies) should be the most current available. The only exceptions to this rubric were literature sources that held contradictions or major thematic differences to current doctrine. This exception was allowed in an effort to demonstrate the evolving nature of this paradigm. As such, this research design also incorporated elements of the traditional narrative design.
Methods

While several methods were used to glean knowledge, the primary approach used to answer the main research question was to review past and current doctrinal principles of HS, HD, and DSCA. Formal professional reviews of those current doctrinal principles and practices provided an additive benefit, in terms of context, since so many of these doctrinal publications have undergone numerous revisions in such a short time span. Literature reviews of doctrinal manuals and national level policy provided a background on the current, and recently superseded, DOD position regarding Homeland Security, Homeland Defense, and Civil Support. This policy review also revealed how the U.S. military is performing these missions and the demand for officers with the requisite competencies to be successful. In addition to providing historical context and providing a policy framework, the literature review shaped many of the introductory interview questions.

While the fundamental means of answering the primary research question was to answer the secondary research questions through literature and policy reviews, formal and informal interviews of subject matter experts in the field significantly aided the research. In these interviews subject matter experts were asked to give their professional analysis of whether or not the U.S. Army needs an SI for HS. Their answers to those questions then provided the impetus for follow on questions and for more narrative (discussion) analysis.

The follow on approach to the primary research question was to answer the secondary and tertiary supporting questions through the investigation of the predetermined theme areas: what a skill identifier is and what it does; the education or
training requirements and competencies required conducting HS missions; and the
current requirements and authorizations for people trained in these competencies. These
secondary research questions were developed by the author to objectively confirm or
deny the existence of this need. The themes that emerged from these questions informed
the overall theoretical construct of the recommendations. As with the primary question, a
review of current literature and doctrine was necessary as the starting point. Much of this
research was conducted via email inquiries with subject matter experts in those respective
areas due to the travel limitations of the researcher.

Army Human Resource Management Regulations were the primary sources for
the first of the supporting research question. Additional information was derived from
e-mail communications with current DA G1 personnel. Since the primary document
regarding skill identifiers, Department of the Army Pamphlet 611-21, is no longer in
print; the research for the most current data was conducted online via the Army Human
Resources portal. This type of broad use of resources is typical of qualitative discussion
design.

The next supporting research question was addressed by querying the faculty of
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to
determine what guidance is generally accepted as the list of educational and professional
competencies required to perform HS missions. Additionally, reviews of historical
documents from within the DOD yielded the perceived need by several high-ranking
people to codify these competencies and to ensure that current and future HS
practitioners are sufficiently trained in these competencies. Documents from the
Homeland Security/Defense Education Consortium (HSDEC), provided by CGSC faculty, served as the base resource to determine the HS specific competencies.

The third research method used mission statement requirements to determine Army organizations that currently perform duties that are related to HS, HD, or DSCA (based on those duties being specified in the organizations’ mission statements). This approach required an exhaustive review of the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency’s Force Management System Website (FMSWeb). While the majority of these organizations were found in the Army National Guard, many organizations within the U.S. Army North Command structure also met this screening criterion. This thesis attempted, unsuccessfully, to definitively quantify the number of officer duty positions, referred to as billets, Army-wide that require HS, HD, or DSCA specific education. This was meant as a secondary criterion to answer the third research question.

With regard to the final supporting research question about previous efforts to create a HS skill identifier, the author conducted email inquiries with representative from U.S. Army North, the National Guard Bureau, the CGSC faculty, and the DA G1. The Chief of the Classification and Structure Branch of the DA G1 office, the office responsible for staffing ASI and SI requests through the Army Staff, offered some historical references and documents for a previous, failed attempt by ARNORTH to create an additional skill identifier for DSCA.

Throughout the research process various sources were consulted to clarify points of understanding and often dated, contradictory information. Various email communications to subject matter experts were necessary to aid in the clarification of points and, true to the design, spawned new questions. These new questions were then
posed to the entire group of subject matter experts for comment. As such, this research methodology was intended to create a discourse about this topic that would ultimately extend beyond the academic and into the application and operational realms.

Finally, in an effort to get current, relevant feedback from the field on this topic, this thesis presented several interview questions to various subject matter experts. These questions were presented to primary actors within their respective organizations. This approach is common to narrative, phenomenological, and ethnographic research designs; demonstrating the strength of this data collection method (Creswell 2007, 120-121). Therefore, the feedback from these sources was reflective of either the organizational policies or of the opinion (command climate) of the command. The themes derived from these answers led the decisions for follow on interview questions. The next chapter, Analysis, will review and attempt to draw inferences from the themes; either confirmatory or otherwise, emerging from the literature review and interview responses. Additionally, the objective analysis offered by the author points out both positive and negative feedback from the field.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

This chapter will focus on the analysis of the literature reviewed and will also draw information from research findings derived from survey data and email communications between subject matter experts and the author. The format of this chapter’s subsections will present the author’s analysis of the literature reviewed, presentation and analysis of additional information discovered either in print or online, and the presentation and analysis of subject matter expert input.

Does the Army Need It?

The information presented in the literature review seems to support that the Army, and the DOD on the larger scale, needs to implement some form of formalized training and identification method for HS related competencies and skills. As the commander charged with the planning and execution of DSCA within the United States, LTG Swan is a credible source of information pertaining to the training and identification of HS, HD, and CS skills. The fact that he advocates for the creation of an SI indicates that the need is tangible.

LTG Swan’s assertions aside, the U.S. Congress mandated report, summarized in the findings and recommendations of the Rand Corporation report, Before Disaster Strikes, Imperatives for Enhancing Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Report of the Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support of Civil Authorities After Certain Incidents, recommends the codification of these competencies and a means to identify both the personnel possessing these skills and the duty positions requiring
them (The Advisory Panel 2010, vi). This perspective is credible as it is an independent, external view based on measures of effectiveness and performance. The recommendations contained in this report certainly point to a need for an SI, or some sort of codified means of identification.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned 2010 Disaster Response Staff Officer’s Handbook goes a long way toward updating its 2006 publication of Catastrophic Disaster Response Staff Officer’s Handbook. It provides updated references to the national level policies, such as the National Response Framework. Additionally, presumably in recognition of the current lack of DSCA experience in the force, it adds templates for mission orders, planning guides, and reference charts. Overall, it provides the uninitiated with a near-single resource for DSCA. The mere existence of this publication points to a need for specialized knowledge.

Similarly, the fact that the a blue ribbon defense panel convened at the U.S. Army War College or the congressionally-mandated Advisory Panel on DOD Capabilities for Support of Civil Authorities After Certain Incidents find fault with the manner in which the DOD and the Army performs these missions contributes to the perception of the need for course corrections. It is not inconsistent with nascent, evolving doctrine that these advisory panels make recommendations about how to improve military performance. What does seem inconsistent with evolving doctrine is when the senior commander, a general officer, for the organization charged with the planning and execution of that doctrine recognizes a need for such an action and is denied. This comment is based on information gleaned from telephonic and email communications with members of the ARNORTH staff.
The ARNORTH Human Resources Officer (G1) submitted an unsuccessful request to create an SI for DSCA in May, 2010 through the U.S. Army Human Resources Office (hereafter referred to as DA G1). ARNORTH tried to codify the competencies and have some form of identification for personnel with the competencies on multiple occasions. The ARNORTH G1 provided feedback that as well as the requested SI, an attempt was made to “identify commissioned officer positions within U.S. Army North (USARNORTH) that will qualify for advanced degrees in Homeland Defense/Security with subsequent tours” (Joel Williams, 15 February 2011, email to author).

What ARNORTH did was to attempt to have certain key staff positions on their authorization and requirements document coded with the Army Educational Requirements System (AERS) code “96”; which denotes a master’s degree requirement for commissioned officers (Department of the Army 2007, 2). The intent was to “build a cadre of individuals with the knowledge, skills and insights required of homeland defense/security professionals to complete our mission. To train this cadre, the command must identify key positions that require homeland defense/security advanced civil education” (Thomas Bright, 17 February 2011, email to author). ARNORTH identified six field grade officer positions deemed to require this code. The short but ultimately very descriptive outcome of this request was simply “action died at DA G1” (anonymous).

Formal and informal email and telephonic communication with senior subject matter experts at ARNORTH provided further insights into their need for an SI. Multiple themes emerged as answers to questions generated by their discussion of why they submitted a proposal for a formal SI. Soldiers arriving at ARNORTH with no specialized training are then enrolled in the appropriate DSCA course or are trained on site. The costs
of this training, and associated travel and lost productivity, are presumably borne by the operational budget of the command. Perhaps a more efficient model is to have personnel trained prior to their arrival?

A dissenting opinion was offered by a senior officer from within ARNORTH stating that “there are no special skills required for assignment to ARNORTH” (Senior Officer at ARNORTH, 17 February 2011, email to author). The officer went on to cite Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations description of the Army conducting offense, defense, and “stability (Civil Support) operations” (Senior Officer at ARNORTH, 17 February 2011, email to author). While the officer did concede that some advanced civil schooling could be potentially beneficial, provided the recipient was tour stabilized, the gist of the argument is that professional staff officers are professional staff officers. The final comment from this senior officer was quite paradoxical. “The larger issue is to progress “stability ops in CONUS” education in Army institutions (CCC, ILE, and SSC)” (Senior Officer at ARNORTH, 17 February 2011, email to author).

CCC is the Captains Career Course for each specific branch of the Army. ILE is the Intermediate Level Education course for Army majors such as CGSC. SSC is the Senior Service College for Army Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels, such as the U.S. Army War College. This comment is paradoxical in that FM 3-0 defines the simultaneous conduct of offense, defense, and stability operations in a foreign country as Full Spectrum Operations (FSO). Additionally, it further defines FSO as the simultaneous conduct of offensive, defensive, and civil support operations within the United States (Department of the Army 2008, 3-1). Stability operations are defined as “missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments
of national power” (Department of the Army 2008, 3-12). “Civil support includes operations that address the consequences of natural or manmade disasters, accidents, terrorist attacks, and incidents in the United States and its territories” (Department of the Army 2008, 3-15 thru 3-16).

What is an SI and what does it do?

Communications with several ARNORTH subject matter experts provided more insights to the difficulties in getting officer personnel with the appropriate education into those key jobs at ARNORTH where that education is critical. When queried about the assignments process for new personnel directed to ARNORTH from HRC the first of a few themes began to emerge. “Those who are assigned generally lack homeland defense education and/or experience . . . there is not a process to get homeland defense specialists assigned to ARNORTH” (Robert Townsend via Joel Williams, 15 February 2011, email to author). The G1 further revealed that the “lack of an ASI limits” their ability to track trained Soldiers and the only option they have is to “surf ORBs and ERBs to look for DSCA mission assignments” (Joel Williams, 15 February 2011, email to author). When asked what they look for on an ORB or ERB the response was similar to previous answers about the lack of an SI. “These do not generally provide much insight into homeland defense skills or education except for assignment history” (Robert Townsend via Joel Williams, 15 February 2011, email to author).

What the ARNORTH representatives are describing here is a similar process used during chapter 2 of this thesis. A complete review of an officer record brief (ORB), Department of the Army Form 4037-E, or a complete review of the duty descriptions on an authorization and requirements document is needed to determine if the officer and the
duty position have or require HS education. Either an SI on the ORB or an AERS code of 96 on a requirements document would be more efficient and would likely yield an entire pool of officers available for assignment at any given time, as well as a selection of positions in need of fill. Certainly such a scenario could only improve the experience for the assignments officer, the gaining command, and the officer in question.

Despite the ARNORTH comments about “surfing” ORBs, a full review of an Officer Record Brief would not definitively identify an individual with HS education or training. An ORB is a single sheet qualification record and information data sheet on officers. There are ten total data fields on an ORB. The only four fields that would assist in determining someone’s qualifications are section I, assignment information; section V, military education; section VII, civilian education; and section IX, assignment history (Department of the Army 1996, 1). Section I, “Assignment Information” contains a data field titled “ASI Data.” This is the only definitive portion of this form to identify an officer’s qualifications. Sections VI and VII, military and civilian education, would require the G1 to interpret what every course and degree qualifies an officer to do. Section IX, assignment history, is equally nebulous. Making the assumption that an officer is qualified to perform a specific function (e.g. parachutist) just because that officer was assigned to an airborne unit is basically the same as assuming that he speaks fluent German because he served in Germany. While that assumption may prove true, it is certainly not the most efficient and effective way to make key duty position assignment decisions.

ARNORTH submitted a request for the creation of the DSCA SI in compliance with Army Regulation 611-1 and provided partial justification. This submission serves as
a good example since it highlights the fact that the operating environment is unique and that there are no current SIs that cover the same broad range of legal complexities. This is presumably intended to meet the criterion of “clearly evident advantage.” Throughout this justification one might simply replace DSCA with HS and have, arguably, the same intent. Of course, the depth and breadth of HS education is significantly greater than that of DSCA, simply because DSCA one of many constituent parts of HS. However, that requirement can be satisfied via any of the HSDEC approved curricula currently offered in public, private, and military educational institutions. The ARNOTH justification provided to DA G1 is shown below verbatim.

The establishment of an additional skill identifier for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) is imperative in identifying Soldiers who are trained in consequence management and support of federal authorities during natural disasters and national emergencies. The mission of the Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Course is to educate military staff personnel to plan, coordinate, execute and support DSCA operations. This course introduces government personnel to national, state, local and DOD statutes, directives, plans, command and control relationships, and capabilities with regard to DOD support for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Military operations in a DSCA environment are inherently different than combat operations. The sensitive nature of allowing Title 10 military personnel to operate in support of civil authorities requires a mechanism to identify those personnel who possess the specific training and skills necessary to operate within DSCA. There are currently no skill identifiers or special qualification identifiers that accurately describe the unique characteristics involved with DSCA. Although identifiers exist for operations conducted outside the United States within the Civil Affairs community, these identifiers do not require the same level of training in the specific circumstances unique to operating within US laws and regulations. (Randy Newman, 27 April 2011, email to author)

The ARNOTH submission was only intended to identify officers possessing DSCA education. It was not designed to denote positions requiring that education. This is illustrated in figure 5 (extracted from a draft of DA Pamphlet 611-21) by the lack of any restrictions. While this serves as a good start it really would only solve half of the overall
problem. It would provide a code for personnel, but it would not aid an assignment officer since it does not identify duty positions in which to place those Soldiers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code: 7X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title: Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proponent: U.S. Army North</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Description of positions. Identifies personnel only who are trained in consequence management and support of federal authorities during natural disasters and national emergencies.

b. Qualifications.
(1) Must have successfully completed the DSCA Phase I (completed online) and;
(2) Must have successfully completed the DSCA Phase II (completed at Fort Sam Houston or by Mobile Training Team).

c. Restrictions. Any officer AOC.

Figure 5. Proposed DSCA Specialist SI 7X Specification Entry

Conversations and emails with the chief of the office responsible for SI and ASI creation at DA G1 revealed that the approach ARNORTH used, an SI for personnel identification only, is typically the shortest route to getting an SI approved. It is the fastest route since it does not rely on requirements documentation within authorization documents, such as restrictions in the SI specifications. It is, however, susceptible to funding limitations and reductions which can ultimately override the continued use of the SI due to lack of formal requirements. Therefore, requesting an SI as a “personnel only” submission can be a partial solution to an undocumented problem.

There are good sides to this as a “Personnel Only” ASI doesn't require as much supporting documentation as a “Positions and Personnel” ASI but on the down side training funding is at the whim of Army G-3 and the SMDR process depending on available funds. Even though it's an ASI, the training does not
provide an inventory of qualified personnel to meet a documented authorization requirement thus when the budget gets tight, they are a prime target to be cut. (Randy Newman, 27 April 2011, email to author)

This ARNORTH request for the creation of the 7X SI was ultimately rejected by DA G1 on the grounds that the formal training noted in the request failed to satisfy the 2-week minimum educational requirement and because the proposal failed to enumerate the number of personnel that required this action (Randy Newman, 27 April 2011, email to author). A minimum of 20 personnel are needed for this action to satisfy the regulatory requirements (Department of the Army 1997, 10). What apparently was not at issue was the requirement for the “advantage to be derived from a more precise occupational classification must be clearly evident” (Department of the Army 1997, 10). Perhaps this denotes tacit agreement by DA G1?

Of particular note in this case is that the DA G1 went to the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) database to determine how many personnel attended the DSCA courses taught by ARNORTH and discovered that only 7 personnel were on the ATRRS attendance record for both 2008 and 2009 (Randy Newman, 27 April 2011, email to author). Despite having 840 planned training seats in this class for the fiscal year, only 64 Soldiers were signed up (with only 16 having initiated training) in the ATRRS reservation system (Randy Newman, 27 April 2011, email to author). The painful irony here is that these courses are typically registered through the ARNORTH G7 website link to the Joint Knowledge Online Learning Management System, and as such, the application must then be entered into ATRRS separately (U.S. Army North 2011).
A curious response provided by ARNORTH regarding the SI proposal for DSCA was that it was “Not supported by DA G1because it would constrain assignment flexibility” (Joel Williams, 15 February 2011, email to author). What is curious about this response is that SIs “do not require repetitive tours and do not provide progressive career developmental assignments” (Department of the Army 1997, 8). Therefore, one must assume that whoever provided ARNORTH that answer was either mistaken or was basing that judgment on actual practice rather than the Army’s regulatory guidance. With regulations and rules there are always exceptions. However, when the regulation is extant it can be enforced by virtue of its existence. Hence, there should be no concerns about constrained assignment flexibility due to a complete lack of constraints from the regulation.

In terms of HS, HD, and CS-related SIs currently in force; skill identifier 5Y-Civil Defense Officer is the most similar. This SI was discussed briefly in chapter 2 as an example. The requirements to be awarded this SI are listed in Department of the Army Pamphlet 611-21 in table 4-3. The education requirements for this course are somewhat similar to the proposed 7X SI from ARNORTH. The requirements are listed below verbatim.

Requires the completion of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) independent study instructions courses at http://www.fema.gov/about/training/emergency.shtm. Courses are: IS-1 Emergency Program Manager; IS-22 Are You Ready? An In-Depth Guide to Citizen Preparedness; IS-3 Radiological Emergency Management; IS-5a An Introduction to Hazardous Material; and IS-7 A Citizen Guide to Disaster Assistance or equivalent experience as a Regional Civil Defense Director; or Certification as an Emergency Manager (CEM) through the International Association of Emergency Managers at http://www iaem com/certification/generalinfo/cem.htm; or a degree in Emergency or Disaster Management through an accredited teaching institution. (Department of the Army 2009a, table 4-3)
The initial list of courses appears to be sufficient as the educational requirement for award of the SI due to the presence of the word “or.” Therefore, the experience and certification requirements appear to be alternative ways to be awarded the SI. A review of the FEMA Independent Studies website shows that each of these courses is worth 1 continuing education unit (CEU) (FEMA 2011). Additional information is presented regarding the calculation of 0.1 CEU being equivalent to one contact hour and “CEU calculation is based on the International Association of Continuing Education and Training (IACET) standards” (FEMA 2011). Therefore, these five courses qualify for 5.0 CEUs, which is equal to 50 contact hours. Consequently, this SI can be awarded for completing what equates to a little over a week of formal classes. This seems paradoxical since the DA G1 denied ARNORTH’s request for SI 7X, in part, for not meeting the two week formal education threshold.

What are Homeland Security Skills?

ARNORTH provided further feedback to several survey questions posed regarding an SI for HS education and training. While these responses are purely representative of ARNORTH, they can almost certainly be extrapolated across the Army since any other command would have similar difficulties with the lack of a standard method to quantify the education and skills. The senior human resources officer at ARNORTH also related that the problem is not necessarily the process, but a “lack of expertise” and that “there is very little official Homeland Defense expertise in DOD” (Joel Williams, 15 February 2011, email to author). These comments echoed one of the critical themes addressed in the HSDEC Core Common Content Area. Ostensibly, this lack of expertise was the impetus for the ARNORTH submission for the DSCA ASI.
In terms of metrics, ARNORTH looks for “DSCA Phase I and II and certification for the Defense Coordinating Element . . . we look for 2nd tour planners when we bring (FA) 59s to ARNORTH” (Joel Williams, 15 February 2011, email to author). These skills are in addition to “Army skills and education level commensurate with the TOE positions” (Robert Townsend via Joel Williams, 15 February 2011, email to author). These comments hint at some of the required skills and competencies that ARNORTH looks for in its key HS-related billets that are lacking today. Additionally, the responses point out that the majority of the HD and CS mission training is provided by ARNORTH once the individuals arrive there, which indicates that there is a cadre of HS, HD, or DSCA professional there who teach. However, there is no way to formally identify them since there is no SI.

Since, under current doctrine, HS consists of HD and CS one could assume that it makes sense that HS skills (or knowledge or competencies or education or training) would be those tasks that encompass the full range of probable missions. Fortunately the Army has a roster of these, as it presently exists, in the form of the Army Universal Task List or Field Manual 7-15, as discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis. This task list is partially adequate for tactical tasks, excluding the five poorly defined civil support unique tasks discussed in chapter 2. This validates the assumption made in chapter 1 that a good portion of these skills are already taught in the Army’s formal education system; as well as the author’s assertion that the Army already has a partially established framework within which to build a skill identifier for HS. However, this list is completely insufficient for operational level planning and strategic level concepts. In contradiction of that, the current U.S. Army literature indicates that these skills are all available from the
current DOD and the Army training system in the form of Appendix J of FM 3-28. While this may be true for HD, it is certainly not the case for DSCA. If it were true for DSCA there would be no need for the 2006 or 2010 DSCA handbooks from the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the DSCA I and II courses taught by ARNORTH, and the U.S. Joint Forces Command HS Planners Course.

LTG Swan addressed this in his lecture with the following comment:

“Unfortunately there are many senior leaders in our own Army, who think anything I’ve described here today can be done by any well trained unit” (Swan 2010). What LTG Swan was describing was the ability to operate in a complex environment that is always interagency, potentially multi-national, litigious, potentially infrastructure compromised, where your actions are constrained by both criminal and civil law, and where you will typically have little or no command authority but will have a disproportionate amount of assets and responsibility. When viewed through that comprehensive lens the complexity of this operational environment begins to come into focus.

Therefore, the list of required DOD core competencies, coupled with the HSDEC’s professional education content areas must then be point of embarkation for defining these competencies. Taken in conjunction with the work that the faculty at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College has done to create a Homeland Security Studies Program (HSSP), it is apparent that the Army truly does have the beginnings of, and possibly the right answer to, an educational framework within which to build a professional cadre of officers who could earn an SI for HS competencies.

Table 3 is an excerpt from the elective course review from phase one of the Homeland Security Studies Program development. It correlates the elective classes
offered at CGSC to the HSDEC Content Areas, the academic Core Common Areas, and the DOD Core Competencies first proposed by the panel convened under the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense in 2007. This table takes the competencies listed in tables 1 and 2 one step further and correlates them to an existing curriculum at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Table 3. HSSP Comparison of Homeland Security Common Core Competencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HSSP Elective</th>
<th>Workshop Core Common Areas (Jan 4, 2008)</th>
<th>HSDEC Core Competencies</th>
<th>DOD Core Competencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A504 Homeland Defense and Civil Support Planning</td>
<td>Exercises, training, practicum as part of course (Table Top Exercise, training scenario, vignette based practical exercise)</td>
<td>Content Area 1 - Current and Emerging Threats historical context of terrorism</td>
<td>Adaptability - able to operate in an ambiguous environment while learning from experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(under development)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Responsive to ideas, concepts, innovation with a willingness to change. Resilient and flexible in the face of adversity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A648 Homeland Security: American Historical Perspective</td>
<td>Historical aspects of domestic incidents</td>
<td></td>
<td>Creative and Critical Thinking – Able to perform analytical and intuitive assessment of problems or situations, applying future analysis, planning and simulation models/tools, methods, and innovation from disparate sources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dr. O. Shawn Cupp, “Phase I HHSP Development Process,” Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 28 April 2011.

In addition to the HS-related competencies, the officers who successfully complete the HSSP at Fort Leavenworth are also educated on many joint service concepts.
and are considered Joint Professional Military Education level one certified upon graduation. This joint certification can potentially become the gateway to expanding the HSSP, as well as a potential SI equivalent, across all of the services, resulting in a much larger community of trained military officers prepared to support HS. Such a scenario would be answer the call that Secretary of Defense Gates stated in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review report, “It is essential that DOD improve its capabilities for contributing to civilian-led activities and operations, supporting “unity of effort” in homeland security” (Department of Defense 2010, 70).

This program at CGSC and the multitude of HS graduate education programs being developed and refined as a result of the University and Agency Partner Initiative from the Naval Postgraduate School, under the oversight of DHS, may well prove to be the requirement for graduate education of military officers. The Director of the U.S. Army War College Homeland Defense and Security Issues Group, an academic proponent of both the educational requirement and the SI, stated “As I think of it now, there is currently no homeland defense/civil support "community" in the Army (or any other service) at this time. This initiative, and the training and education involved in building and maintaining it, could serve as the foundation for that community” (Bert Tussing, 12 May 2011, email to author).

Where are the Authorizations and Requirements?

As stated in the literature review and in the research methodology of this thesis the only formal, authoritative source for U.S. Army authorizations and requirements is the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency’s Force Management System Website (FMSWeb). Mission statements are the essential building block of authorizations
and requirements. The authorizations are derived from requirements for Soldiers to perform certain collective tasks. These collective tasks are the aggregate efforts of Soldiers’ individual tasks. The individual tasks are performed by Soldiers who received training and education at some point in their careers. Therefore, the function of the organization dictates its form.

This study conducted reviews of authorization documents in an effort to quantify how many organizations in the Army have HS, HD, or DSCA as part of its mission statement. This methodology was intended to show that a unit with one of those elements as its mission must have personnel to perform the mission. If the organization needs personnel, they should be educated and trained. The study confined the sample organizations to Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) units due to the fact that these units are fewer in number, and typically, smaller than Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units. Additionally, TDA units tend to be headquarters units where operational and strategic planning is conducted, thus requiring a greater number of senior officers with broad skill sets. The sample size was deliberately small in an effort to demonstrate that even within the smallest segment of the Army, the need for officer personnel with HS-related education is greater than the 20 personnel threshold established by AR 611-1 for the creation of an SI. Further refinement of the sample was done by limiting the search to U.S. Forces Command, U.S. Army North, National Guard Bureau, and the State Army National Guard organizations.

U.S. Forces Command headquarters has “Conduct homeland security operations.” (FMSWeb, UIC: W3VBAA 17 October 10) in its mission statement. The headquarters is authorized 173 officers. Even if only 10 percent of these officers require HS education
and training, then there are 17 requirements in this headquarters alone. Within ARNORTH alone, a single authorization document exceeded the SI creation threshold of 20. The Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) Activity of ARNORTH has an authorization for 35 officers (FMSWeb, UIC: W6RMAA 1 October 10). This is the organization that supports federal, state, and local civil authorities via DSCA operations. These 35 officers do not even include the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) or the State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (SEPLOs); of which there are over 50. The Civil Support Training Activity is responsible for training, readiness, and oversight of the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. This organization is authorized 4 field grade officers (FMSWeb, UIC: W6RAAA, 1 OCT 10).

Within the National Guard there are 54 “state” headquarters that all have the mission of planning for and executing HD and DSCA operations. Each of these organizations has an office that is in responsible for coordinating military support, the Director of Military Support (DOMS). Just counting the primary officer in these offices and no staff officers yields another 54 requirements. The National Guard has 57 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams with a total of 1254 personnel; 17 CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages with 3162 total personnel, and is presently standing up 10 Homeland Response Forces with a projected authorization for 5660 personnel (Bert Tussing, 12 May 2011, email to author). While all of these personnel are clearly not officers nor will each necessarily equate to a requirement for an SI, the fact that 10,000 personnel from the National Guard will be involved in HS operations will surely generate some requirements for educated and trained leadership.
These assessments do not take into account the federal defense forces dedicated, either full time or part time, to HS, HD, of CS operations constituted as TOE units. Also excluded is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Their mission is typically engineering centric, but as the only U.S. Army organization with lead responsibility for an Emergency Support Function under the National Response Framework (Department of Homeland Security 2008, 58) it certainly should have a requirement for HS education.

Table 4 is an estimate of the number of Army officers who would require HS education and would be eligible for the award of a HS SI. This table is by no measure a comprehensive review of the need. Since the sample population was intentionally limited, it excluded the majority of the force. While this thesis is only intended answer the question of need for an SI in the U.S. Army, it is apparent that if this table were extrapolated across the DOD, the potential need would be several times larger.
Table 4. Potential Duty Billets Requiring Specialized HS Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency / Organization</th>
<th>Duty Position(s)</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
<td>Military Advisor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard Bureau</td>
<td>JDOMS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief, Domestic Ops Branch</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J-35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State National Guard</td>
<td>DOMS / POMSO</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JTF Commander</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HRF Commander</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HRF Dep Commander</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CERFP Commander</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CERFP S3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CERFP XO</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WMD CST Commander</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WMD CST Deputy Commander</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WMD CST Operations Officers</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCMRF</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G3</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Support Command</td>
<td>G3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. NORTHCOM</td>
<td>J3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. NORTHCOM JTF-CS</td>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J6</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. NORTHCOM DCO/DCE</td>
<td>FEMA Region DCO</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FEMA Region DCE Staff</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Army North</td>
<td>DOMS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G4</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>G5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>397</td>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL Requiring Training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.
Prior Research

This study has slight potential to affect a re-examination of the doctrine and paradigms under which the U.S. Army conducts HS, HD, and CS missions. However, it may just provide enough of an impetus for the Army to finally codify the skill set as an SI. Since no precedents could be found that relates to the specific research question, perhaps one could question why not. Nine years after the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. is finally adopting a whole of government approach to national security strategy and the Homeland Security Enterprise.

Perhaps the reason that no codified means of identification for these skills and educations exist is that the Army has simply not completely examined it. The past ten years have been a very busy time for the Army. The Army accomplished a major force restructuring, increased manpower authorizations, re-defined its force generation model, and introduced dozens of new technologies to the force, all the while conducting combat operations in two theaters of operation. Perhaps the impetus has been present but the time has not. After all, the primary mission of the U.S. Army is to conduct combat operations as an expeditionary force.

The question of proponency must be raised at some point. A proponent agency for such an action would be the action agent for the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). This action agent could then do a thorough Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis. The DOTMLPF analysis is one of the first steps in the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA). It determines if a non-material approach is required to fill the capability gaps identified in Functional Need Analyses (Beck 2010). A recommendation
for the U. S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) to be this action agent was proposed by Major David King in his 2006 Master of Military Art and Science thesis (King 2006, 75). However, this analysis and the issue of proponency are beyond the scope of this study and therefore are suggested as an area for further study.

The U.S. Army War College’s Director for Homeland Defense and Security Issues Group at the Center for Strategic Leadership noted that this initiative (a codified means of identifying HS, HD, and DSCA education requirements and its qualified practitioners) has the attention of the Assistant Secretary of Defense-Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs (ASD-HD/ASA), “they commented that the initiative, and others likely to follow, are indicative of the proper... and required direction... if we are going to have an officer corps that is as professional and competent in domestic security issues as other national security issues (my words, not his)” (Bert Tussing, 12 May 2011, email to author). This comment and the visibility of the Assistant Secretary’s office indicate that there has clearly been some additional research done on this subject, but nothing that the author could find beyond that referenced herein.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

So, does the Army need to create and implement a skill identifier for Homeland Security? That question, and its supporting secondary and tertiary questions, is the focus of this thesis. Chapter 1 offered background on the paradigm of HS and the interrelationships of HD and CS. Chapters 2 and 3 provided context and framed the question in terms of methodology and thematic analysis. Chapter 4 provided facts, subject matter expert analysis, conceptual design ideas from ARNORTH, and the author’s analysis of that information and synthesis of the themes. This chapter will present the conclusions of the author based on the research results gleaned from the primary and secondary research questions. Despite being, at times, contradictory and overall unsynchronized, the literature provided regulatory and policy guidance on this topic, as well as informing the study of the constraints and requirements for the creation of an SI.

Chapter 5 is designed to present conclusions reached from that data, four recommendations offered by this study, and additional items for research that were beyond the scope of this study but could ultimately assist in definitively answering this question. Additionally, this chapter will note an unexpected finding and the implications of that finding to this research. Finally, a summary of this thesis will highlight a single unifying concept that every HS or HD or CS professional should embrace.
Question Generated by Findings

An obvious question that may emanate from this analysis is, “why an SI for Homeland Security rather than for DSCA?” The answer to that lies in the fact that the U.S. Army acknowledged and adopted the DOD definitions of HS, HD, and CS by its publication of those definitions in its doctrinal publications. However, the Army continues to have difficulty in effectively codifying the fundamentals of HD. While there are those who feel that “For most of the uniformed services, homeland defense is a function of national defense” (Bert Tussing, 12 May 2011, email to author), the subject matter experts and literature consulted in this study did not reveal that to be the case. The absence of an Army field manual discussing HD is certainly a glaring omission in terms of doctrine.

The Army adopted the DOD doctrine and terms and has effectively backed away from HS ever since. A prime example is in one of the Army’s foundational manuals, FM 3-0, Operations. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the Army’s recent action to eliminate the term HS from its mission sets.

Figure 6 illustrates the Army’s operational concept, Full Spectrum Operations, graphically. The HS portion of the box (bottom half) depicts HD on the left and CS or DSCA on the right. This construct works and it replicates both of the current, foundational publications for joint DOD HS doctrine found in JP 3-27, Homeland Defense and JP 3-28, Civil Support. It is also consistent with Field Manual 3-28, Civil Support Operations.
The February 2011 change (Change 1) to FM 3-0 made a noticeable change in the graphic representation of the operational concept. The change notice transmittal sheet states that the operational concept was changed to “emphasize mission command, the civil support tasks, and the discussion of operational art” (Department of the Army 2011, vii). That notwithstanding, chapter 3 still states “Army forces conduct civil support operations as part of homeland security. Homeland security provides the Nation with strategic flexibility by protecting its citizens, critical assets, and infrastructure from conventional and unconventional threats. It includes three missions” (Department of the Army 2011, 3-18 thru 3-19). The three subheadings under this text are: Homeland Defense, Civil Support, and Emergency Preparedness Planning. However, the operational concept graphic omits the HS and the Emergency Preparedness Planning; illustrated below in figure 7.
The operational concept graphic still depicts HD on the left and CS on the right; it just does so now without HS in the center as the heading. Why was this unifying concept, that is still extant in DOD Joint Publications, removed? The real question ought to be why not an SI for both DSCA and HS?

Therefore, the answer to the question of “Why an HS SI?” is predicated on DOD and Army doctrine. HS is supported, doctrinally, by equal parts HD and CS. Each of these requires special skill sets that are distinct. HD competencies are, arguably, the strength of the U.S. Army. CS or DSCA competencies are lacking, according to the numerous literature sources consulted for this study. If, as Professor Tussing posits, HD is essentially national defense, then is DSCA the new civil defense? There are several references to “civil defense” in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review in terms that are remarkably similar to defense support of civil authorities’ missions that the U.S.
Army is currently engaged in (Department of Homeland Security 2010, viii). According to section III of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review report, Homeland Security can “trace its roots to traditional functions such as civil defense, emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border control, and immigration” (Department of Homeland Security 2010, 11). Of the six examples given in this quote, the U.S. Army is currently engaged in support of civil authorities in five.

Conclusions

The first conclusion from this research is that the need for this SI is tangible and real. The numerous comments in literature from sources such as the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicate that the DOD will continue in its support of DHS and absolutely requires a formal educational process for Homeland Security support. This is evidenced by comments in the National Defense Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and several reports to the U.S. Congress regarding the lack of any current means to identify either requirements or personnel qualified to fill those requirements. Perhaps the most compelling need is expressed by the commanding general of ARNORTH, LTG Swan.

The second conclusion reached from the survey responses and the mission statement reviews on the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency Force Management System website is that without a codified means to identify requirements, there will be no demand from the Army for an SI to identify personnel with this skill set or education. However, while there is a noted need for both a personnel and position requirement, the order of creation will most likely dictate success or failure. The information derived from this study leads the author to believe that because the Army is a
requirement-driven organization the creation of the SI must be both duty position
requirement generating and personnel identifying. Otherwise, without a tangible,
documented, Army approved need for this SI, the longevity of such a construct for
personnel identification only would not last beyond the first few bi-annual SI reviews.

The third conclusion derived from this research is that the U.S. Army, as an
institution, has an underdeveloped understanding of Homeland Security. The fact that the
Army accepted DOD doctrine and definitions for this paradigm and has then
systematically attempted to marginalize its role through the failure to publish any
doctrinal references for Homeland Defense, the removal of the term “Homeland
Security” from foundational doctrinal publications (e.g. FM 3-0, Operations), and reduce
its roles in CS is indicative that this concept is not fully understood by Army senior
leaders. Obviously the operational tempo, global expeditionary demand, and
Geographical Combatant Commander requests for forces over the past 10 years have
probably been the primary focus of senior Army leaders. Regardless of the reasons, the
Army has not embraced this mission, and consequently, is potentially postured for failure
for the next catastrophic natural or man-made disaster. The predominant impetus for
force development and has come from the U.S. Congress, the President, U.S. Northern
Command, and the National Guard. This is evidenced in the number of force
development initiatives that were compelled by NORTHCOM and congressional support
to the National Guard force structure increases, such as the Homeland Response Forces
(HRFs).

The final conclusion is that it is entirely possible for the Army to create and
implement this SI because the framework already exists. The tenets of Homeland

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Defense are essentially tied to national sovereignty which is the same fundamental mission that the Army conducts routinely. Those missions and related tasks are codified in prodigious volumes of regulations, field manuals, and directives. The tenets of Civil Support are somewhat less defined for the Army. However, the DOD and DHS have similarly voluminous data on how to be successful in this area. Similarly, through the work of the U.S. Army CGSC faculty, the academic standards and rigor required in professional HS education are codified by the collaborative efforts of the DOD, DHS, and the academic community through the HSDEC curriculum and core competency guidelines; as well as the Naval Postgraduate School’s involvement in the University and Agency Partner Initiative. Consequently, the U.S. Army CGSC Homeland Security Studies Program is compliant with those academic standards and rigor; as accepted by DOD, DHS, the whole the U.S. academic community. The final piece of this framework puzzle is the simple recognition that HS is simply the combination of HD, CS, domestic CT, and intelligence support. The Army already has the competencies defined for these broad content areas. It simply must accept that fact and move to work within the existing construct that is universally accepted by DOD and the U.S. Homeland Security enterprise. Rewriting manuals to exclude the term Homeland Security is simply the wrong direction.

**Unexpected Finding**

The comments of the ARNORTH senior officer regarding Stability operations in the homeland were unexpected. The reason is, if an officer who serves within a command has a dissenting opinion and is willing to voice that freely, it calls into question if the
command itself is synchronized on what it needs to be successful. Perhaps that officer was just opining from their particular perspective.

**Recommendations**

The first recommendation is to have each command in the Army with a mission requirement to conduct HS support, HD, or CS operations to analyze their authorization and requirement documents (e.g. TDA, MTOE, or JMD) to identify duty positions that would benefit from either a position requirement code (PRC) for HS education or the classification as a multiple skill position (MSP). The criteria for this analysis are the HSDEC and DOD professional competencies and commander input. Field grade officer positions identified as key planners and commanders for these organizations should be coded with AERS code 96 to denote a requirement for HS graduate education. However, more emphasis should be on the HS vice graduate level. This caveat is due to the relative proportion of serving officers with HS graduate level education. This recommendation is designed to formally identify these requirements in order to provide impetus to the creation of SIs.

The second recommendation is to create an SI for HS as a senior level SI for field grade officers (both commissioned and warrant). This SI will be, initially, tied to the completion of the HSSP at CGSC, and then later to any similar HSDEC compliant HS curriculum at other DOD education centers (e.g. U.S. Army War College, U.S. Naval War College, U.S. Air War College, National War College, National Defense University, Naval Postgraduate School, etc). Since a combination of certain electives from the CGSC HSSP are already certified by ARNORTH as equivalent to the DSCA Level II course (Cupp 2011), the HS SI would be a senior level SI in much the same manner as current
SIs have a scaled qualification (e.g. 1X-Green belt in Lean Six Sigma, 1Y-Black belt in Lean Six Sigma, 1Z-Master Black belt in Lean Six Sigma) (Department of the Army 2009a, table 4-3). The author recommends 7Z for the SI code and Homeland Security Strategist as the title of the SI. This design is consistent with the SI 6Z-Strategic Studies Graduate, which is awarded for completion of the CGSC Strategic Studies Electives program (Department of the Army 2009a, table 4-3).

The third recommendation is to create an SI for DSCA as the entry-level SI for company grade officers, as well as an ASI for warrant officers and enlisted personnel. As envisioned by ARNORTH, this SI should continue to be tied to the completion of the DSCA I and DSCA II classes. However, in addition to those classes, add the U.S. Joint Forces Command HS Planners Course and FEMA courses IS-100.b, IS-200.b, IS-700a., and IS-800.b. These courses will meet the 2 week training requirement and, more importantly, will provide a baseline of HS education for early career practitioners. Additionally, these courses are additive and will contribute greatly to an officer’s success once in attendance in a graduate-level HS curriculum. The author recommends 7X as the code and DSCA Operations as the title of the SI. The similar, ascending code is specifically to highlight the relationship between the two SIs and the progression to the senior level.

The fourth recommendation is to make graduate-level HS education from public and private universities and colleges eligible for constructive credit toward the award of the HS SI, based on university membership and compliance with HSDEC or UAPI curriculum standards. The concept for this recommendation is similar to SI 6Y-Public Safety Officer; whereas the only requirement for award is the possession of a bachelor’s
degree in one of the specified disciplines. This will provide the Army with greater access to HS educated professionals who are perhaps unable to attend resident DOD graduate-level courses (e.g. reservists and special branch officers).

**Area for Further Study**

Chapter 4 of this thesis discussed the need to cover the issue of proponency for this SI. However, since the intent of this study was to determine if a valid need existed, the proponency issue is beyond the stated scope. However, in order for the SI to be validated it will require a proponent to vet all requests and to ensure compliance with the educational requirements. The author defers to MAJ King’s 2006 MMAS thesis, “How Can the United States Best Prepare Army Federal Troops to Respond Quickly to Future National Emergencies Within the United States?“ on this topic. This deferral is not an acceptance of his recommendations, but merely a starting point to discuss the complexities of his arguments.

**Summary**

The initial intent of this study was to determine if the U.S. Army needs a skill identifier for Homeland Security education and training. Through the review of current, relevant literature published by governmental and private sources and through feedback from subject matter experts in the field, the answer is a resounding yes. The review of the secondary research questions provided background and context while framing the question and the answer alike.

One additional benefit of this research is that the research and analysis revealed that the framework for such an SI already exists within the Army in terms of availability.
of training and educational programs. A graduate-level Homeland Security Studies curriculum is in place at the U.S. Army CGSC. Similarly, the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School offers a program with variations on this theme. While this study did not weigh in on the need for an agency within the Army to act as the proponent for the recommended SIs, it acknowledged that this is a critical issue that is unresolved.

The recommendations offered by this study are to build the formal requirements first, then execute the SI creation and implementation. Once implemented, expand the eligibility to provide the Army with greater access to the absolute best National and Homeland Security professionals that the Army can train. The recent integration of the National and Homeland Security Councils by President Obama (President of the United States 2010, 14) is indicative of future initiatives toward greater interagency collaboration and capability exploitation. For the U.S. Army to not engage in this enterprise by, in the words of Secretary of Defense Gates, “contributing to an appropriately sized and shaped portfolio of homeland defense and civil support capabilities integrated with U.S. homeland security activities” (Department of Defense 2010, 14) would be a terrible mistake.
GLOSSARY

Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) (enlisted). A two digit alpha-numeric or numeric-alpha code which identifies specialized skills that are closely related to and in addition to those required by the MOS. (Department of the Army 2009a, 47)

Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) (warrant officer). A two digit alpha-numeric or numeric-alpha code used to identify additional skills possessed by personnel or required by a position. (Department of the Army 2009a, 47)

Area of Concentration (AOC) (officers). Identifies a requirement and an officer possessing a requisite area of expertise (subdivision) within a branch or functional area. An officer may possess and serve in more than one area of concentration. (Department of the Army 2009a, 49)

Counterterrorism (CT). Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. (Department of Defense 2009, vi)

Functional Area (FA) (officers). An interrelated grouping of tasks or skills that usually require significant education, training, and experience, possessed by officers who are grouped by career field other than arm, service or branch. Officers may serve repetitive and progressive assignments within the functional area. An officer may not be accessed into or be assigned to more than one functional area. (Department of the Army 2009a, 49)

Military Occupational Classification System (officers). It provides the officer branch, functional area, immaterial, area of concentration, skill, language identification, and reporting classification used to classify officer positions, and to identify individuals qualified to perform in those positions. (Department of the Army 2009a, 50)

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) (enlisted). The grouping of duty positions requiring similar qualifications, and the performance of closely related duties. (Department of the Army 2009a, 50)

Military Occupational Specialty (warrant officer). Designates separately definable qualifications within an AOC due to major systems or skill differences. The MOS is represented in the fourth character of the warrant officer MOSC. The use of a skill qualification identifier (SQI) in the fifth character of the MOSC creates another MOS that carries the title of the SQI. (Department of the Army 2009a, 50)

Multiple Skill Position (officers). A position which requires more than one skill identified by branch/functional area, skill and/or LIC. (Department of the Army 1997, 50)
Position Requirement Code (PRC). The identification of the skills or qualifications required by an officer of the appropriate grade to effectively perform the duties of a position. It is represented by a data chain which includes either a branch/functional area or LIC code for the principal position requirement, the AOC required within that branch/functional for the secondary position requirement, if any, and any skill or language requirements. (Department of the Army 2009a, 51)

Skill Identifier (SI) (officers). Identifies a requirement and an officer possessing specialized skills to perform duties of a specific position which may require significant education, training and experience. A skill can be related to more than one branch or functional area. An officer may have more than one skill. Progressive assignments and repetitive tours are not required. (Department of the Army 2009a, 51)

Special Qualifications Identifier (SQI) (enlisted). Special qualifications identifiers are authorized for use with an MOS and skill level character, unless otherwise specified, to identify special qualifications of personnel who are capable of filling such positions. Use of these identifiers in individual classification will be in accordance with AR 614–200. (Department of the Army 2009a, 52)

Special Qualifications Identifier (SQI) (warrant officer). Designates significant qualifications which require, as a minimum, successful completion of a formal service school or at least 6 months on-the-job training. The SQI is represented in the fifth character of the warrant officer MOSC and may be used to represent functional career tracks with an MOS. When no special qualifications apply, the digit "0" (zero) is recorded in the fifth position. The use of an SQI in the fifth character of the MOSC creates another MOS that normally carries the title of the SQI. (Department of the Army 2009a, 52)
APPENDIX A

FINDINGS OF THE ADVISORY PANEL ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CAPABILITIES FOR SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES AFTER CERTAIN INCIDENTS

DoD Guidance for Civil Support
There are at least seven key DoD Directives that relate to DSCA. Only one is dated later than 2000. A critical one is dated 1986. Importantly, civil authorities who may seek support from DoD will likely have to search multiple directives to determine what conditions may apply in a specific case.

Finding: DoD guidance for all forms of Defense Support of Civil Authorities is fragmented, incomplete, and outdated.
Recommendation: That the Secretary of Defense immediately consolidate all directives dealing with Defense Support of Civil Authorities into a single source document.
(The Advisory Panel 2010, vi)

Forces for Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Insufficient forces have been allocated or apportioned to USNORTHCOM, especially for potentially catastrophic CBRNE incidents. Despite the advent of the new National Guard Homeland Response Forces (HRFs), given the potential magnitude of a catastrophic CBRNE incident, general purpose Title 10 forces that may be required for DSCA should be identified, at least by type.

Finding: Sufficient military forces have not been identified for DSCA. Furthermore, domestic military deployments generally are not conducted in accordance with the comprehensive processes used for overseas deployments. This results in difficulty in tracking responding units and effectively employing their corresponding capabilities.
Recommendations: That the Secretary of Defense—
1. Allocate or apportion additional Title 10 forces to U.S. Northern Command for CBRNE response.
2. Direct that the Joint Staff and U.S. Northern Command develop Time-Phased Force Deployment Data for additional forces for domestic military deployments based on specific CBRNE Defense Support of Civil Authorities plans.
(The Advisory Panel 2010, x)

Training Authority and Requirements
It is essential to an effective response that forces are properly trained and exercised. There is significant room for improvement in this area. Although DSCA is a significant priority in the latest QDR, there is no systematic process to ensure that forces that could be given a DSCA mission are trained appropriately.

Findings:
1. There is a lack of training authority to ensure that forces with a CBRNE response mission are consistently and properly trained.
2. Training that does exist for CBRNE response is often inconsistent, fragmented, or lacking fully developed standards.

Recommendations: That the Secretary of Defense—
1. Direct a lead entity to serve as training authority for Title 10 and Title 32 forces with a designated CBRNE response mission.
2. Direct the development of a joint mission essential task list for Title 10 and Title 32 forces with a designated or potential CBRNE response mission, including but not limited to general purpose forces, CCMRF, CBIRF, CERFP, CST, and HRF.

(The Advisory Panel 2010, vii)

**Leadership Training and Professional Development**

Improved training opportunities are essential to promote better understanding of response strategies, plans, and operations. All leaders should be proficient with the National Response Framework and the National Incident Management System, but few military leaders have been trained specifically for DSCA.

Findings:
1. The level of training for military and civilian leaders in response planning and operations is inadequate.
2. There is no sustainable pool of military personnel trained for the CBRNE response mission.

Recommendations:
1. That the Secretary of Defense require the inclusion of instruction related to DSCA, the National Response Framework, and the National Incident Management System in the Officer Education Systems of all military services.
2. That the Secretaries of Homeland Security and of Defense jointly offer personal training on response planning and operations, to include the role of DSCA, to all Governors.
3. That the Secretary of Defense direct the services to establish within their personnel systems a means of identifying enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers, and commissioned officers who possess particular skills and experience in DSCA for CBRNE, in order to develop a sustainable pool of CBRNE response personnel.

(The Advisory Panel 2010, viii)
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL & READINESS)
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
PRESIDENT, AIR UNIVERSITY
PRESIDENT, ARMY WAR COLLEGE
PRESIDENT, MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY
PRESIDENT, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
COMMANDANT, U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

SUBJECT: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Professional Competencies

Today the United States faces innumerable challenges and threats to the homeland. Throughout the government, various efforts are underway to better prepare the nation to meet those challenges and secure ourselves from such threats. One such effort gaining momentum is the creation of a national security workforce, to include homeland security and homeland defense professionals whose education and professional development arm them with the knowledge and expertise needed to best prepare the nation in advance of and for responding to catastrophic events, be they manmade or natural, within the homeland.

Before Homeland Defense/Homeland Security (HD/HS) professionals can be educated and prepared for leadership positions, there must be a general understanding and acceptance of what these positions mean and what knowledge and/or experience such persons should possess. To that end, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and representatives of the academic community have worked together to develop an approved set of competencies and knowledge areas.

The attached competencies are provided for your use in the formation of National Security/Homeland Security/Homeland Defense program goals and curricula – curricula used by the very students who will become HD/HS professionals. These competencies and knowledge areas should assist in providing a better understanding of broad-based HD/HS professional objectives.
This memo is provided for information, and is not directive. It is intended to supplement your resources with feedback from operators and educators with a sense of what competencies HD/HS practitioners need. Questions relating to this memo may be directed to CAPT Larry Zelvin, USN, at 703 697-6514 or lawrence.zelvin@osd.mil.

Peter F. Verga  
Principal Deputy

Attachment: 
As stated

## APPENDIX C

### DOD HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY COMPETENCIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHICS</th>
<th>Instills trust and confidence in customers, subordinates and superiors. Does not alter judgment, word or deed based on social and political pressures and inspires others to remain resolute against influences of such pressures. Understands moral boundaries or values within any environment. Subscribes to values consistent with the US Constitution and Public Law.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COLLABORATION</td>
<td>Establishes personal and professional relations and networks that persist over time, with different kinds of people and organizations that may be consulted as needed, to promote mutually beneficial outcomes through conscientious outreach and coordination. Understands the importance of negotiation and influence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMMUNICATION</td>
<td>Able to receive and clearly articulate information (e.g. ideas, facts, messages, and situations). Able to effectively share the organization’s message with any audience (e.g. leadership, the public, the media) and to effectively manage expectations of diverse parties or groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CREATIVE AND CRITICAL THINKING</td>
<td>Able to perform analytical and intuitive assessment of problems or situations, applying futures analysis, planning and simulation models/tools, methods, and innovation from disparate sources. Able to assess and challenge assumptions and to offer alternative solutions. Able to fuse diverse information elements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CULTURAL AWARENESS</td>
<td>Understands and appreciates the interests and behavior of diverse stakeholders and their environments (e.g. institutions and people).</td>
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<td>STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP</td>
<td>Visioning, formulating and articulating a new end state; articulating ways, ends and means in the pursuit of that end state. Ability to alter processes and practices in organizations in response to an evolving environment. Ability to employ effectively the talents of subordinates and peers, and to support senior leaders within and outside the organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING SKILLS</td>
<td>Able to manage efficiently and effectively human, material and information resources, manage programs and processes, and measure success, to include prioritization and high-stress allocation of resources in volatile climates and circumstances. Understands fiscal and human resource functions and processes. Able to plan ahead and allocate resources to achieve a mission, e.g., is able to conduct crisis, deliberate and adaptive planning in an interagency environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ADAPTABILITY</strong></td>
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<td>Able to operate in an ambiguous environment while learning from experience.</td>
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<td>Responsive to ideas, concepts, innovation with a willingness to change. Resilient and flexible in the face of adversity.</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>CRISIS MANAGEMENT</strong></th>
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<td>Able to apply available resources and capabilities under conditions of extreme duress while remaining cognizant of the changing situation.</td>
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<th><strong>CRITICAL EXPERTISE</strong></th>
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<td>Command of critical areas of knowledge that apply to mission success. Understands the roles, responsibilities, systems and authorities of organizational peers and interagency, international and intergovernmental counterparts.</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>SCIENCE / TECHNOLOGY EXPERTISE</strong></th>
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<td>Understands interplay between people and science/technology while possessing a working knowledge of web-based systems, technology assessment and management. Stays abreast of and considers current and future technological innovations as potential force multipliers.</td>
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<th><strong>RISK MANAGEMENT</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Understands threats, vulnerabilities and consequences of man-made (intentional and accidental) and natural events and incidents. Understands the tenets of risk theory and methodologies and can identify/distinguish optimal approaches for risk evaluation and risk mitigation. Able to prioritize and allocate resources based on risk-based information.</td>
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REFERENCE LIST


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
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