TO DETERMINE IF A COMBINED US AND AFGHANISTAN MILITARY-CIVILIAN COUNTER-NARCOTICS JOINT TASK FORCE SHOULD BE CREATED TO SUPPORT THE FIGHT AGAINST COUNTERINSURGENCIES IN THE AFGHAN THEATER OF WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Homeland Security

by

KEITH W. ALFEIRI, MAJOR, ARNG
B.A., University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Las Vegas, Nevada, 1996

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2011-02

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
To Determine if a Combined US and Afghanistan Military-Civilian Counter-Narcotics Joint Task Force Should Be Created to Support the Fight Against Counterinsurgencies in the Afghan Theater of War

Major Keith W. Alfeiri

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

This study explores whether a combined US and Afghanistan military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force should be created to support the fight against counterinsurgencies in the Afghan theatre of war. The use of a military-civilian joint task force is a viable solution to a complex problem in Afghanistan. As Afghanistan transitions to stability and security operations, the Afghan National Police (ANP) will assume the mission of counter-narcotics operations. My initial conclusion is that the ANP should be supported by a military-civilian joint task force which would include the Ministry of Defense, the Department of State, and Law Enforcement Agencies that will provide the required resources needed to combat counter-narcotics, thus defeating the counterinsurgency and allowing Afghanistan to achieve maximum success.

Colombia, Afghanistan, counterinsurgency, counter narcotics, DOTMLPF, case study
Name of Candidate: Major Keith W. Alfeiri

Thesis Title: To Determine if a Combined US and Afghanistan Military-Civilian Counter-Narcotics Joint Task Force Should be Created to Support the Fight Against Counterinsurgencies in the Afghan Theater of War

Approved by:

________________________________________________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Edward Robarge, Ph.D.

________________________________________________________________________, Member
John C Barbee, M.Ed.

________________________________________________________________________, Member
LTC Robert F Markovetz Jr., M.B.A.

Accepted this 10th day of June 2011 by:

________________________________________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The opium trade is a major funding source for the insurgency in Afghanistan. The Afghan counter-narcotics law enforcement agencies continue to target drug traffickers with counterdrug missions in order to break the funding source of the insurgents. This study explores whether a combined U.S. and Afghanistan military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force should be created to support the fight against counterinsurgencies in the Afghan theater of war.

The use of a military-civilian joint task force is a viable solution to a complex problem in Afghanistan. As Afghanistan transitions to stability and security operations, the Afghan National Police (ANP) will assume the mission of counter-narcotics operations.

My initial conclusion is that the ANP should be supported by a military-civilian joint task force which would include the Ministry of Defense, the Department of State, and Law Enforcement Agencies that will provide the required resources needed to combat counter-narcotics, thus defeating the counterinsurgency and allowing Afghanistan to achieve maximum success.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have to thank God, as it is an absolute miracle I was able to finish this thesis in the allotted time while attending the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). I have to thank my wife Patricia, and our three children Trevor, Matthew, and Amanda for all their encouragement and support while allowing me to leave our home in Reno, NV and travel to Fort Leavenworth, KS for a year while they struggled through many hardships throughout the year.

I would like to thank my instructors and classmates of Staff Group 24B who have provided me with what I have been told is the “best year of my life.” I would like to thank Mr. Jonathan “Mark” Williams, Staff Group Advisor (SGA) for Staff Group 24B. Without his “rule number one” and expertise, guidance, and editing, I would not have been able to finish this thesis on time without having a nervous breakdown. I would like to thank my MMAS committee for their support and guidance in the preparation of this thesis. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Anna L. Jones, for whom, without her encouragement and help, I would have never finished the MMAS thesis on time. Thank you all very much.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLES</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and Secondary Research Questions</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and Secondary Research Questions</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Design</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDY PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCE LIST ...........................................................................................................70
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ......................................................................................76
# ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASNF</td>
<td>Afghan Special Narcotics Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Counter-Drug (Synonymous with counter-narcotics (CN))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>US Army Command and General Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Criminal Justice Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>Counter-Narcotics (Synonymous with counter-drug (CD))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPA</td>
<td>Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counter Insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>Foreign-deployed Advisor Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIRoA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLS</td>
<td>Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ ISAF</td>
<td>Headquarters-International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>International Government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint-service Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LEA  Law Enforcement Agency
MoI  Ministry of Interior
NGO  Nongovernmental Organizations
NIU  National Interdiction Unit
NVG  Night Vision Goggles
U.S.  United States
ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.</td>
<td>Troops deployed to Afghanistan</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.</td>
<td>Map of Afghanistan</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.</td>
<td>Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan by Province, 2007-2008</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.</td>
<td>Expected Opium Cultivation Trends in 2011 (by province)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.</td>
<td>Opium production in Afghanistan from 1994-2008</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.</td>
<td>Map of Colombia</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7.</td>
<td>Coca Growing Regions in 2006</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8.</td>
<td>Estimated Colombian Opium Poppy Cultivation and Heroin Production, 2000-2007</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9.</td>
<td>Program Assistance Objectives in Colombia, 2000-2013</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Case Study Summary</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Case Study Questions</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

The goal and purpose of this study is to determine if a combined U.S. and Afghanistan military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force should be created to support the fight against counterinsurgencies in the Afghan theater of war. The drug trade has often been used to finance criminal or unlawful organizations. The sale of drugs continues to funnel money to drug cartels, terrorist networks, and insurgents. The fact remains that drugs fund terrorism and insurgents as the money flows between the drug trade and insurgents.

According to a United Nations (UN) report dated October 2009, Afghan opium is unleashing a devastating impact across the world, funding the Taliban and other terror groups and killing thousands in consumer countries. Alarming statistics reported in this report, released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), indicate that Afghanistan produces 92 percent of the world's opium in a trade that is worth some 65 billion dollars (43 billion Euros), feeds some 15 million addicts worldwide, and kills around 100,000 people annually (UNODC 2009). Western nations have 100,000 U.S.-led coalition troops in Afghanistan battling Taliban insurgents, but the report’s authors asserted that it is the failure to crack down on production of opium, the basis of heroin, that has allowed the militants to thrive (UNODC 2009). "The Taliban's direct involvement in the opium trade allows them to fund a war machine that is becoming technologically more complex and increasingly widespread," said Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Vienna 2009, 1).
The UNODC estimates the Taliban earned 90 -160 million dollars a year from taxing the production and smuggling of opium and heroin between 2005 and 2009, as much as double the amount they earned while in power nearly a decade ago (Vienna 2009, 1). Since 2007, there has existed a heavy presence and linkage between insurgents and narcotics powerbrokers, specifically within the Helmand Province (Biehl 2009).

Regardless of the presence of U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, insurgents continue to traffic narcotics in and out of the country. Despite the highest troop presence of anywhere in Afghanistan, the drug trade originating in Helmand Province is still a leading source of revenue for the insurgency. Approximately 100,000 U.S.-led coalition troops were present in Afghanistan as of December 2010 (Brookings Institute 2011). With a limited number of troops and resources, the hope for Helmand Province, and indeed for the entire region, rests on the ability to break down this relationship, known as the insurgent-narcotic nexus (Erwin 2009).

As a result of this insurgent-narcotic nexus, U.S.-led coalition troops have shifted their focus and resources to interdiction missions (Biehl 2009). Interdiction targets narcotics in the consolidation and transportation phases by raiding drug-processing laboratories and interdicting narcotics convoys (Erwin 2009). These strategies more effectively target insurgents and drug lords without directly affecting farmers’ livelihood. (Biehl 2009). A detail map of Afghanistan in Appendix B depicts the provinces, national capital, and province capitals with Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabul provinces located in the south where much of the poppy cultivation is concentrated.

Areas that lack security and U.S.-led coalition troops presence tend to be prime locations for growing poppy crops, yet many of these areas are far too dangerous for law
enforcement agencies to safely conduct counter narcotic missions. The opium cultivation map lists by province where security risks are extremely dangerous for counternarcotics operations compared to the locations of province where poppy cultivation is the highest in Afghanistan.

The opium cultivation map and the expected opium cultivation trends for 2011 map correlate those areas of high insecurity which lead to areas of high poppy cultivation in the provinces where insurgents are cultivating poppy crops with little or no government pressure or coalition efforts. The economics from the opium trade sustains the insurgency, typically offering protection to the farmers and traffickers in the area. The U.N. Office on Drug and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008, Afghanistan Winter Rapid Assessment, January 2009 suggests that the opium trade has funded insurgents fighting U.S.-led coalition troops, and it has corrupted the Afghan government. Afghanistan is labeled as the world’s top opium producer. Opium production has continued to increase almost every year since the U.S.-led invasion in 2001 (UNODC 2009). Details of this increase in production from the U.S. invasion in 2001 are shown as opium production in Afghanistan from 1994 to 2008, and the Afghanistan Opium Survey shows where production dramatically dropped off in 2001, but then resumed in 2002 as shown in the chart opium production in Afghanistan from 1994 to 2008.

Although Afghanistan’s government counter-narcotics efforts have resulted in a decrease in the amount of opium planted, the yield has increased pounds per acre (kg/ha). In 2007, it was 37.9 (42.5), and 2008, it was 43.6 (48.8) (UNODC 2009). In 2009, 2.4 million farmers were involved in opium cultivation with an average annual income of $1,997. The income per hectare for opium compared to wheat indicates opium at $4,662
and wheat at $1,625, making narcotics production a much more lucrative investment for an Afghan farmer (UNODC 2009). Nevertheless, Afghanistan is not the only place where this phenomenon exists.

Like Afghanistan, which borders five countries, the Republic of Colombia borders five countries—Panama to its northwest, Venezuela to its east, Brazil to its southeast, Peru to its south, and Ecuador to its southwest. Both countries grow poppies because of a general economic need. In addition, poppies are profitable and easy to grow. In the 1980s and early 1990s, drug traffickers became a catalyst for violence and criminal activity. By the late 1990s, violence from drug trafficking, insurgency, and autodefensas—Colombia’s Three Wars—threatened the existence of the state from an unholy trinity of non-state actors...perpetrating a level of corruption, criminality, human horror, and internal instability” (Ramsey, 2009, 2, 5).

Because of the shared similarities between Afghanistan and Columbia, Columbia has been chosen as the case study to Afghanistan. Both countries have parallels in the threat of non-state actors, reliance on financial support of illegal drugs, and a special relationship with the United States in the form of financial, military, and strategic support to each country. The similarity that Colombia has to Afghanistan may also provide beneficial insight on how to control the opium problem of Afghanistan based on the Columbia’s past experiences (Whittenburg 2009). The U.S. became involved in Colombia for multiple reasons which included a failing government which was vulnerable to communism getting a foothold in South America, and terrorist groups establishing a base of operations. In 2000, President Bill Clinton initiated a 1.3 billion dollar military assistance package known as Plan Columbia” Colombian President
Pastrana developed a new plan for peace in Colombia. This plan, called “Plan Colombia,” asked for over 7.5 billion dollars in three years to fight drug trafficking, insurgencies, and corruption within Colombia (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). LTC Matthew Redfern states in his Strategy Research Project, “The Flawed Strategy in Colombia”, that the “Plan Colombia” strategy consisted of ten elements:

1. An economic strategy that generates employment and supports the ability of the State to collect tax revenues, and allows the country to have a viable counterbalancing economic force to narco-trafficking;
2. A fiscal and financial strategy that includes tough austerity and adjustment in order to boost economic activity;
3. A peace strategy that aims at a negotiated peace agreement with the guerrillas on the basis of territorial integrity, democracy and human rights, which further strengthen the rule of law and the fight against drugs;
4. A national defense strategy to restructure and modernize the armed forces and the police, so that they will be able to restore the rule of law and provide security in the country, to combat organized crime and armed groups, and protect and promote human rights and international law;
5. A judicial and human rights strategy to reaffirm the rule of law and assure equal and impartial justice for all;
6. A counter narcotics strategy, in partnership with other countries involved in some or all of the links of the drug chain, production, distribution, sale, consumption, asset laundering, precursor chemicals, and arms dealing. And, at the national level, to stop the flow of drug money-the fuel of violence-to the insurgent and other armed organizations;
7. An alternative development strategy that will promote agricultural schemes and other profitable economic activities for peasant farmers and their families;
8. A social participation strategy aimed at collective awareness to develop more accountability in the local government, community involvement in anti-corruption efforts and continued pressure on the guerrillas and other armed groups to end the kidnappings, violence and internal displacement of individuals and communities;
9. A human development strategy to promote efforts to guarantee, within the next few years, adequate education and health, to provide opportunities to help the young and vulnerable groups in Colombia, and
10. An international oriented strategy to confirm the principles of shared responsibility, integrated action, and to balance treatment of the drug issue.
(Redfern 2002, 10-11)
The United States' primary focus in support for "Plan Colombia" was on the counter narcotic strategy in item six (Redfern 2002). Congress approved the initiative on July 13, 2000 (Redfern 2002). This was one of the largest and most comprehensive efforts by the U.S. to assist an ally in Latin America dealing with a national drug emergency and an insurgency. The U.S. Government has assisted Colombia with a comprehensive strategy using a combined approach to attack the growth and distribution of cocaine and heroin from Colombia. Of the 860.3 million dollars, 519.2 million went directly for military assistance for counterdrug operations. This included military training for newly created counterdrug brigade, 18 UH-60 Blackhawk, and 42 UH-1 H Huey helicopters (Center for International Policy 2001, 1).

The U.S. counterdrug strategy in Colombia had three goals: (1) to take down the drug trafficking leadership, (2) to reduce the amount of drugs through eradication, and (3) to strengthen legal institutions (Ramsey 2009, 20). Positives characteristics state that ten years later, Colombian and U.S. officials are proclaiming its success. "If you look at it from the point of aiding the Colombian government to fight against the FARC and other insurgents, it has worked," said Juan Carlos Hidalgo, Latin American analyst for the libertarian-leaning Cato Institute (Smith 2010, 1). "A decade ago, Colombia was close to being a failed state, with the FARC controlling large swathes of territory and threatening major cities. Today they are terribly weak and on the run, and much of their leadership has been killed," said Hidalgo (Smith 2010, 1). Experts have generally seen the positives of "Plan Colombia" as it evolved from an economic development plan to a more military security development plan. Vanda Felbab-Brown, a drugs and counterinsurgency expert at the Brookings Institution agreed, stating "that on the military side, the
counterinsurgency, there has been definite progress. The situation in the late 1990s was very bad. The FARC was in the hills above Bogotá, and the paramilitaries were highly organized. Today, the FARC is much weaker, land travel is more possible, and other security indicators also show progress” (Smith 2010, 2).

Eradication, interdiction, and organizational attacks have succeeded in creating stability and security for alternative development, judicial reform, and the establishment of democratic institutions, effectively expanding the State's authority into areas previously controlled by criminal narco-terrorist groups (The Office of National Drug Control Policy 2011). Unlike what has occurred in Columbia, Afghanistan continues to face staging difficulties in its drug enforcement efforts. On the tactical front, the U.S. has been fighting in Afghanistan for ten years with low to moderate success against the Taliban and growing insurgencies. One of the strategies the U.S. military began adopting was training the Afghan National Army (ANA) with Embedded Tactical Trainers (ETT) (Veggeberg 2009). After a few years, the U.S. Army began training the Afghan National Police (ANP) Force with Provincial Mentor Teams (PMT). Both the ETT and PMT are made of soldiers who trained for conventional warfare. However, the enemy in Afghanistan is fighting an insurgency war, and the ANA and ANP who have been trained by predominately conventionally trained soldiers, are unprepared for insurgency conflicts, which include anti-drug tactics (Veggeberg 2009).

Primary and Secondary Research Questions

The primary research question of this study is to determine if a combined U.S. and Afghanistan military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force should be created to support the fight against counterinsurgencies in the Afghan theater of war. By analyzing
Colombia as a case study, I will draw possible conclusions from the successes and failures identified while focusing on Colombia’s “Plan Colombia,” and applying them to Afghanistan. Secondary questions are: would a civilian joint counter-narcotics task force be more appropriate to conduct counter narcotic operations than a combined military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force? Does a civilian joint counter-narcotics task force have the necessary resources and support to effectively integrate with the military units? Lastly, what advantages, if any, would a military counter-narcotics joint task force provide in comparison to a civilian task force?

Assumptions

The first assumption of this study is that policy will allow the U.S. military to assist in conducting counter narcotic Law Enforcement operations overseas. U.S military support to Colombia will provide a good case study to be applied to the counter narcotic operations being conducted in Afghanistan. Another assumption is that counter narcotic Law Enforcement operations will continue to be conducted whether a counter narcotics joint task force is created or not. Finally, it is assumed that Afghanistan will continue to not allow/authorize aerial eradication spraying of poppy fields.

Limitations

This study will remain unclassified to protect the sensitive nature of ongoing law enforcement operations. This study will use only open source resources concerning military support to counter narcotic and counterinsurgency operations in both Afghanistan and Colombia.
Delimitations

This thesis will not assess poppy eradication as most of Columbia’s eradication efforts have been aerial spraying, even though the aggressive campaign of aerial eradication of coca crops is part of “Plan Colombia”, and Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai has for the fourth time since 2003 rebuffed the U.S. Department of State’s request to use aerial spraying as the U.S. did for “Plan Colombia”. Afghanistan will not authorize aerial spraying operations (Kirschke 2008).

Significance

The significance of this study is to determine if a military-civilian counternarcotics joint task force would be beneficial against the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Therefore, this study will compare Colombia’s counter narcotics strategy and analyze the positive and negative characteristics needed to determine if a combined U.S. and Afghanistan military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force should be created to support the fight against counterinsurgencies in the Afghan theater of war. As a conclusion, the effectiveness of “Plan Colombia” will provide the techniques that can be implemented in Afghanistan with some possible new insights in how to be more effective in fighting counterinsurgencies by creating a counter-narcotics task force that combines military, government, and law enforcement agencies that will share the goal of defeating insurgencies, terrorism, and providing stability and security for the country of Afghanistan. It is necessary to understand the complex relationships in military organizations that conduct training and provide support to law enforcement organizations conducting narco-trafficking operations as it relates to fighting a counterinsurgency war.
Summary

This chapter discusses the background of the study, primary and secondary research questions, significance, assumptions, definitions, limitations, and delimitations. Chapter 2 will discuss the literature reviewed to determine the relevance of a military-civilian combined counter narcotics joint task force in the Afghan theater of war.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides a review of the literature relative to this study and identifies the most important sources related to this thesis. An overview is presented of the dominant literature and representative information in considering the involvement of the combined U.S. and Afghanistan military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force in the fight against counterinsurgency operations. Subsequently, literature and research studies related to Colombia and "Plan Colombia" are examined vigilantly as the case study model in this thesis.

Resources consulted in this study include the following categories: books, government documents, periodicals, electronic sources, newspapers, and graduate-level publications including Military Masters of Arts and Sciences (MMAS) theses and School of Advance Military Studies (SAMS) monographs. As a case study, Colombia-related resources offer many studies and literature which help in comparing achievements and setbacks to Afghanistan. Due to the continually changing nature of the Afghanistan counter-narcotics strategy, there are few recently published books on the newest strategy of combining counterinsurgency and a nation building structure. To a large extent, the newest information published is in the form of websites and articles for law enforcement publications and professional articles.

An example of this dynamic nature of the Afghanistan counter-narcotics strategy comes from 2009, when the Obama administration’s decision to eliminate poppy eradication in Afghanistan in favor of increasing drug interdiction efforts (CRS 2009, 18). On July 28, 2009, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard
Holbrooke told reporters in Washington that the phasing out of crop eradication by U.S. troops and other members of the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF) is “one of the most important policy shifts of the United States” since President Obama assumed office January 20 (Kaufman 2009).

As the U.S. and Afghanistan governments work to create a solution to combat counternarcotics as a major problem, military and civilian collaborations will also remain continuing works in progress. Asked about the country’s national security forces, Holbrooke said Afghanistan’s current levels of army and police personnel “are not going to be sufficient” in the long term (Kaufman 2009, 1).

After the country’s August 20, 2009 presidential and provincial elections, he said, the United States and others who have been assisting with the training and equipping of the forces will work with the new government to “see what the needs are and then … how we can support them” (Kaufman 2009, 1). The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, created in May 2005, established the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) to bring justice to those involved in serious narco-crime within Afghanistan (CJTF 2011).

Mandated through the counter-narcotics law, CJTF’s mission is to investigate and prosecute all serious drug-related offences from across the country. The Afghan government’s National Drug Control Strategy continues to be challenged with combating a counterinsurgency that is funded by counternarcotics and trafficking conducted by drug cartels and insurgents (GAO 2010, 10).

The Colombian opium drug trade was used to finance criminal and illegal organizations. Similar to the Colombian opium drug trade, the Afghan drug trade of opium funds counterinsurgency and the Taliban. The Colombian opium drug trade has
funded multiple terrorist groups such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), and the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) which are fairly defunct now (The Library of Congress 2002, 50).

As the sale of drugs continues to funnel money to illegal organizations such as drug cartels, anti-governmental networks, and guerrilla organizations, the fact remains that drugs supports terrorism and insurgents and, in one way or another, the money flows between the drug trade and insurgents (Morgan 2007, 6).


The 1989 Act amended Chapter 18 of Title 10, United States Code, where the National Guard was given the Counterdrug mission since the units are in every State that can support local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies without having to stand up new units and build new facilities (JCP 3-07.4 2007). In order for the individual State’s National Guard to receive the funds for the counterdrug program, the Governor must submit an Annual State Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities Plan to Congress (NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801 2008).

With the United States entering its tenth year at war in both Iraq and Afghanistan, much of this conventional war has been fought with unconventional tactics. The U.S. military service has since long forgotten many of the past lessons in counterinsurgency (Cassidy 2004). The U.S. military strives to rebuild these two countries governments, the military and the Department of State work also at rebuilding the security forces and the
law enforcement system. The U.S. military and the Department of State has worked for many years with host nation military security forces and host nation law enforcement agencies to disrupt the insurgent organizations of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Since early 2000s, there has been an explosion of new counterinsurgency (COIN) books with many of the authors using the current insurgency wars going on in Iraq and Afghanistan for their research. In *How Insurgencies End*, published in 2010 by authors Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, the authors present their findings within the complex insurgency fight. Connable and Libicki (2010) identified and conducted a case-study approach of eighty-nine insurgencies. These authors accept the argument that the recent U.S. experience in COIN has been especially tangled. However, the authors believe there are ways that exist to mitigate negative consequences. It is possible to shape insurgency endings with sufficient forethought, strategic flexibility, and sustained willpower.

The data set presented by the Connable and Libicki (2010) study reinforces conventional wisdom and lends credibility to COIN advocates. In nearly all cases, Connable and Libicki assert that the direct and consistent application of basic COIN methodology leads to a favorable ending. They also suggest that a failure to heed the past fifty years of expert opinion on the subject almost guarantees an undesirable and possible disastrous, end. Connable and Libicki stress for a COIN campaign that should not make adjustments against the current insurgency, continuing to focus on the population that is shaped not by military action but by social, economic, and political change is what is needed in order to reach a favorable ending (Connable and Libicki 2010).
Similar to Connable and Libicki (2010), Seth G. Jones' and Arturo Munoz's (2010) *Afghanistan’s Local War, Building Local Defense Forces*, focuses on shaping not with military actions but with a combination of social and political actions (Jones and Munoz 2010). Jones and Munoz (2010) compiled a list of nearly two dozen tribal and other policing cases dating from 1880 and assessed their effectiveness. The authors met with dozens of tribal and community leaders across rural Afghanistan—especially the west, south, and east.

Jones and Munoz concluded that undertaking a top-down effort to establish security through the central government, the local defense force efforts will likely fail unless the local defense forces include a more effective bottom-up strategy that leverages local communities, especially in rural areas. An effective counterinsurgency strategy that secures the local population needs to focus on improving the competence of central government institutions, including the army and police (Jones and Munoz 2010).

The collaborative study between American scholar Michael E. O’Hanlon and Afghan-American entrepreneur Hassina Sherjan, called *Toughing it out in Afghanistan* (2010), concentrates its effort on outlining the tactics being used to protect the Afghan population and defeat the insurgents. The authors use a number of metrics such as Estimated Number of Afghan Civilian Fatalities As a Direct Result of Fighting between Pro-Government Forces and Armed Opposition Groups (AOG), 2006-2009, Details of Estimated 2008 Afghan Civilian Fatalities, by incident Type, Afghan Security Forces Fatalities since January 2007, Size of Afghan Security Forces on Duty, Annual Recruitment Figures for Afghan National Army (ANA), Quality of Afghan National Police (ANP) Capabilities, Insurgent Attacks by Month and Type, 2007-2009, and
Annual Opium Production in Afghanistan 1990-2009 that can be quantifiably measured to determine if the new strategy is succeeding in the course of 2010 and 2011 (O‘Hanlon and Sherjan 2010).

An aspiration they focus on requires a population-focused counterinsurgency strategy. This means patrolling, policing, protecting threatened individuals, gaining peoples‘ trust, asking for their help in tracking down criminals, terrorists, and insurgents, and otherwise protecting their communities (O‘Hanlon and Sherjan 2010). O‘Hanlon and Sherjan (2010) propose to enlarge and properly equip the Afghan Security Force. The authors argue that strengthening these forces will require embedding more mentors within them (O‘Hanlon and Sherjan 2010).

O‘Hanlon and Sherjan also include setting goals to promote a more successful collaboration between the Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police and Coalition Soldiers by ensuring a parallel effort occurs to strengthen the ministries that oversee both the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. Mentors should be embedded within them whenever possible, the mentors should be Afghans themselves, perhaps from abroad where possible, although a certain number of properly chosen western mentors may be useful as well (O‘Hanlon and Sherjan 2010, 90). In the conclusion, they find that even though opium production is a big problem in Afghanistan, it need not be eradicated to defeat the insurgency. Furthermore, O‘Hanlon and Sherjan conclude that Afghanistan does not need to be crime-free or drug-free to be relatively cohesive as a state (O‘Hanlon and Sherjan 2010).

In *Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges*, authors Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney (2010) present a comprehensive collection of
essays by some of the world’s leading experts on unconventional conflicts. The authors divided this study into three main sections: (1) Doctrinal origins, (2) Operational aspects, and (3) Challenges. The most beneficial section is the Operational aspects, as it covers the Army, Marine Corps, Airpower Naval Support, Special Forces, Intelligence, and Local Security Forces. The Local Security Force’s most influential section is “The Way Ahead” which can be summed up as “their success is our success”, with the single most important factor in the success of indigenous forces being the quality, training, and employment of American combat advisors (Rid and Keaney 2010).

Finally, Robert D. Ramsey’s III (2009), *From El Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque: The Colombian Security Force Experience, 1998-2008*, was published by the Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. This study provides an exceptionally detailed account of Colombia’s counternarcotics and guerilla struggles from 1998 to 2008. Ramsey informs the reader with comprehensive background information on the beginning of the FARC and ELN combined with a detailed understanding of the problems the government, as well as the issues the Colombian Security Forces, faced.

Ramsey’s study illustrated the numerous obstacles involved for the Colombian Military Forces (COLMIL) and the Colombian National Police (CNP) in trying to fight an insurgency and a drug war. In addition, Ramsey’s study recounts how the Colombian government tried to restore order and security with the assistance of Plan Colombia (Ramsey 2009). New inquiries are being generated in response to the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. A recent academic article on the subject of military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task forces in the fight against counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency operations are focusing on the dynamic nature of this issue. Major Reyes Z. Cole’s “Drug Wars, Counterinsurgency, and the National Guard” 2005 article in Military Review, writes about how to leverage the skills of the National Guard Counterdrug Support Program’s (NGCDSP) uniqueness to help support overburdened U.S. special operations forces (SOF) and combatant commanders. Reyes provides a strong link on how the NGCDSP mission supports LEAs while effectively using military personnel and equipment against counternarcotics.

His recommendations and analysis demonstrate that the NGCDSP missions and organization should be used to support combatant commanders in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan (Cole 2005). The specialized training that NGCDSP personnel have in practical field experience while conducting military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) relates to both the drug wars and insurgencies with the end state for success in terms of military goals is a valuable asset in COIN operations (Cole 2005).

Cole identifies the three areas the NGCDSP benefits the counternarcotics and counterinsurgency missions, which differ from the conventional forces doctrine of COIN, as specialized training, practical field experience, and joint-interagency problem-solving mindset. Cole suggests the creation of a new battalion task force consisting of a reconnaissance and security company, civil affairs company, and a headquarters company of five specialty platoons: intelligence analysis, language and translations, communications, engineers and subsurface divers (Cole 2005). Battalion leaders would provide operational planning support and coordination with host national law enforcement agencies and governmental organizations (Cole 2005). He concludes that as the NGCDSP supports LEAs in the U.S., the U.S. military should look at doing the same
type of military unit structure and conduct similar missions in Afghanistan to support the combatant commander in the support in COIN operations (Cole 2005).


These reports govern the policies and programs needed to conduct counter narcotics operations against drug trafficking organizations and their supporters. A goal outlined in many of the documents is conducting joint counterdrug operations with international partners. These strategies intend to focus on countering the international drug trafficking flow to many of the drug and insurgent organizations. Several MMAS theses have included the National Guard Counterdrug program, but none have addressed the question of whether a unit could be viably created to conduct or train the same missions in Afghanistan. Major Larry Wilbank’s (2002), MMAS thesis, The Use of National Guard Assets for Counterdrug operations in the War on Drugs, sought to determine if the National Guard should continue to conduct counterdrug operations in the war on drugs.
He sought to determine if the effectiveness of the National Guard’s effort in providing counterdrug support to Defense support, Law Enforcement Agencies (DLEA), and Community Based Organizations (CBO) is working. Wilbanks’ study is an analysis of military involvement with a comparison and contrast of the civilian organizations involved (Wilbanks 2002). He indicated that the National Guard counterdrug mission is relevant and should be continued (Wilbanks 2002).

The author believes the National Guard is well suited to perform the counterdrug mission and provides real-world experience unobtainable in training exercises. However, Wilbanks also suggests the National Guard must change its approach and use the specialized equipment to perform routine missions rather than using labor-intensive methods of support (Wilbanks 2002).

Major Elizabeth E. Dreiling’s (2002) SAMS Monograph, *The National Guard: A Future Homeland Security Paradigm*, focuses on answering the question, is the National Guard (NG) Counterdrug (CD) support program a suitable model to design an NG Homeland Security (HLS) force also capable of fulfilling the National Guard’s role as a first military responder and maintaining a war-fighting capability as a federal reserve force? (Dreiling 2002).

Dreiling’s study suggests a break down within the National Guard Counterdrug Program, and provides an analysis of the capabilities of the counterdrug program against the doctrine, training, leader development, organizational, materiel, and soldiers (DTLÖMS) model. The comparative analysis led her to answer the question as a qualified yes. The author believes that the NG can play a major role in military operations both at home and abroad. The author also recommends making a NG HLS program
modeled after the CD support program, which will offer the most cost-effective, yet responsive, capabilities–based military structure for combating terrorism in the homeland. In addition, the author also believes that there are many parallels between drug trafficking and the ongoing U.S. contingency operations, including the “War on Terrorism” (Dreiling 2002).

The similarities of the drug trafficking organizations and an insurgency war are also described in Major Eric Reid’s (2009), MMAS thesis: Reconsidering Military Support to Counterdrug Operations along the U.S.-Mexico Border. Reid’s research was predominately qualitative with some historical analysis, limited case studies, and some oral interviews with law enforcement and military personnel involved with counterdrug operations. The author’s analysis covers the Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) Fire Triangle and the inability of MSCLEA to attack it (Reid 2009).

The Mexican DTO insurgency fire triangle model includes resources, sanctuary/autonomy and manpower as required capabilities. Reid’s research indicates that—though sincere and well intentioned—the justification of the continued MSCLEA as a valuable training opportunity is a tired and tenuous rationale (Reid 2009).

The author’s conclusion is that citizen behaviors cannot be addressed with military power. Declaring war on DTOs is much like counterinsurgency. Drug traffickers have the same basic fire triangle requirements as insurgents. Reid’s study supports that the military is simply unprepared for domestic counterdrug missions. Tactical interdiction successes will result in further adaptation by DTOs (Reid 2009).

The military is not prepared for domestic counterdrug MSCLEA operations. Military training is inadequate to meaningfully assist law enforcement within the U.S.
Training for expeditionary combat operations cannot, and should not, include the same level of emphasis on force avoidance and de-escalation, as does civilian law enforcement training. The military lacks doctrine on border security and smuggling interdiction (Reid 2009). Overall, Reid’s conclusion corroborates the central hypothesis of this current study, that only a unit with the expertise and skills should train civilian law enforcement in counterdrug support operations (Reid 2009).


The author’s focus was the comparison of CD capabilities and HLS requirements. Wilkinson (2004) believes NG CD resources should be made dual-use for HLS activities leveraging existing resources to provide a responsive and cost effective HLS solution. She suggests the National Guard needs to focus more on leveraging three existing CD capabilities for the prevention of terrorist attacks: Full Spectrum Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (FSIVA) teams to conduct vulnerability assessments participate in state intelligence fusion centers, and interagency coordination to provide a synergistic multi-agency effort to HLS. In addition, the author points out that except for counterdrug, the
NG does not currently provide for interagency coordination with law enforcement agencies (Wilkinson 2004).

Summary

The literature review discussed how military-civilian counter-narcotics are intertwined in counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations, both in military counterinsurgency missions and law enforcement counter narcotics missions within the U.S., Colombia, and Afghanistan. The links between these two missions reveals a collaborative relationship that could exist between military and civilian law enforcement that can enhance each others’ missions. The end state for both military and civilian law enforcement is to disrupt, deter, and dismantle Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) that support and fund criminal and insurgent activities in order to create a stable and secure government and country of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Professionals in both the military and civilian counter narcotic agencies strive to build a joint collaboration of personnel and assets devoted to countering drug trafficking operations and the current insurgency in Afghanistan to ensure the safety of the United States and International Community. The elucidation to winning the conflict in Afghanistan is a balanced unity of effort approach involving both the military and civilian law enforcement efforts. For these purposes this study adopts a case study methodological approach with “Plan Colombia” as the model to examine the question of should there be a combined U.S. and Afghanistan military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force in the fight against counterinsurgency operations.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study is to determine if a combined U.S. and Afghanistan military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force should be created to support the fight against counterinsurgencies in the Afghan theater of war. Chapter 3 presents the research design and the methodology used in this study. This chapter also describes the data collection process of the methodology used to present the case study and explains the analytical tools used to organize the information for analysis and presentation. Columbia and Afghanistan both have tribulations with counterinsurgency funded by counter narcotics drug trafficking. Colombia’s implementation of “Plan Colombia” represents a successful case study in combating an insurgency fueled and funded by counter-narcotics. This case study approach seeks to determine if the lessons from Columbia translate to support the creation of a military-civilian counter-narcotic joint task force for Afghanistan.

During the literature review, this study explored what, if any, elements of Colombia fight against an insurgency and illegal drug trafficking would be applicable to other countries dealing with similar issues of illegal armed groups, ungoverned spaces, and drug trafficking such as Afghanistan. This study now proceeds by using those previous lessons learned in Columbia to analyze current operations in Afghanistan to see if there is any relevance, and to examine how its alignment to U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine might justify the creation of a similar military-civilian counter-narcotic joint task force for Afghanistan. This study will also look specifically at how Colombia conducted
Plan Colombia” for areas of relevance and potential alignment with current U.S. tactics and strategies in Afghanistan.

According to Creswell, case study research is a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system or multiple bounded systems or time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information (Creswell 2007). Creswell describes two ways to approach a case study. One way is to use the case study to build a theory. The process uses the analysis of a case study to create the insight while reconciling the evidence from the study (Lewis 2008). The second approach, the one that this thesis subscribes to is to build a theory, or hypothesis, first, and then use the case study to validate the theory (Lewis 2008). This approach is for when the researcher has a well-supported thought or opinion and is looking to verify it. This approach is more influenced than the initial approach. The researcher is able to scale the case study to certain points and avoid too broad of a study (Berg 2007).

Using a framework of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) for comparative analysis of Columbia and Afghanistan this study makes it possible to identify certain criteria essential for effective counter-narcotics missions in Columbia and use that criteria to analyze potential course of similar actions in Afghanistan as shown in table 1.

Does the military need to be involved in counter narcotics (CN) operations in Afghanistan? The Literature Review in chapter 2 examined military involvement in both CN law enforcement missions and military COIN missions. The current drug war is international; every country has some type of drug related strategy. The author will review the “What” components of counterinsurgency (COIN), and compare and contrast
them with Colombia’s military and police capabilities that were developed and have been maintained. The “Why” is to determine if a combined U.S. and Afghanistan military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force conducting missions in Afghanistan is needed.

### Table 1. DOTMLPF Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materiel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Primary and Secondary Research Questions**

The primary research question is there a need of a military counter-narcotics joint task force between US and Afghanistan that bridges the gap between the Afghan law enforcement efforts and current military operations fighting counterinsurgencies in the Afghan theater of war.

My secondary questions are as follow: (1) would a civilian joint counterdrug task force be more appropriate?; (2) Would a civilian joint counterdrug task force have the
necessary resources and support to effectively integrate with military units?; and (3) In addition, what advantages would a military counter-narcotics joint task force provide in comparison to a civilian task force? The answers will provide the framework for the authors’ subsequent analysis.

**Research Design**

This exploratory study will examine data collected using an analysis of Colombia and the U.S. initiative –Plan Colombia”. Investigating the main problems and solutions of Colombia’s counter narcotic war and insurgency will allow a direct comparison to similarities found in Afghanistan. The research also evaluates data by conducting an analysis of counter narcotics strategies from Colombia to identify factors that will determine if there is a need to create a U.S. and Afghanistan military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force. The evaluation criteria is presented in chapter 4, with analysis examining the case study and using my theory or hypothesis. The author will complete information tables and charts in a matrix of objective based assessments. The deductive interpretation made from the data collected gives the author conclusions and recommendations.

The body of the thesis will follow the below format. Chapter 1 introduces background information on Afghanistan and Colombia drug trafficking trade and insurgency-narcotics nexus. By understanding the links, we can ask the primary and secondary research questions for this thesis. Chapter 2 reviews the literature needed to conduct both a holistic and embedded analysis of data collected, thus allowing the comparative study. This is not a complete review of all available information on this topic, but it does provide considerable preponderance evidence on this topic. Chapter 3
explains the methodology that has been detailed above. Chapter 4 will elaborate on the analysis using the methodology outline in chapter 3. Chapter 5 culminates with conclusions and recommendations as they apply to the creation of a U.S. and Afghanistan military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force to support the fight against counterinsurgencies in the Afghan theater of war.
CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Colombia’s —Plan Colombia‖ is a case study that focuses on both counter-narcotics and counter insurgency lessons learned. Using the author’s questions in the DOTMLPF table referenced in chapter 3 as a framework, Chapter 4 presents the analytical information for this case study. The analysis is organized in the following manner: First, analytical information from the author’s DOTMLPF questions is presented with information from —Plan Colombia‖ and current operations in the Afghanistan theater of war. Next follows analysis of both situations based on criteria of DOTMLPF as shown in table 1.
## Table 2. Case Study Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Doctrine</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Materiel</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Facilities</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a result of the significant decline in funding of guerrilla and terrorist groups by ideologically motivated state sponsors since the end of the Cold War, these groups have become increasingly reliant on drug trafficking as a principal funding source (Library of Congress 2002). The sale of opium from both Colombia and Afghanistan has helped to support drug traffickers, terrorists, and insurgents. Indigenous guerrilla and terrorist groups operating in drug-producing regions of Afghanistan, Colombia, Peru, and elsewhere are heavily involved in the drug trade (Library of Congress 2002).

Colombia‘s “Plan Colombia” focuses on both counter-narcotics and counter insurgency lessons learned. Many of these lesson learned could likely be applied to the situation that is currently going on in Afghanistan where the U.S. is fighting both a counter-narcotics and counterinsurgency. Colombia, like Afghanistan, struggles with armed groups, ungoverned spaces, and drug trafficking which has forced the creative solutions of military and police capabilities to be developed and maintained, the military to create specific counter-narcotics units at the brigade and battalion level, and the creation of a helicopter force that was capable of both day and night operations.

The U.S. initiative in Colombia’s counter-narcotics strategy has three goals: (1) to take down the drug trafficking leadership, (2) to reduce the amount of drugs through eradication, and (3) to strengthen legal institutions (Ramsey 2009). The strategic theory behind “Plan Colombia” is simple, linking economic development and security to the extension of peace process (Warren 2001). Similar to Colombia, Afghanistan‘s current strategy focuses resources on those programs that will contribute directly to (1) breaking the narcotics-insurgency-corruption nexus and (2) helping to connect the people of Afghanistan to their government (USDoS 2010). This seems to be a process of taking the
funding away which then takes away the ability to fight. If the money dries up, so does the ability of these groups to wage war (Grotke 2001).

**Doctrine**

Because this case study uses data from “Plan Columbia” as a comparative reference for similar situations in Afghanistan, data from both countries will be presented for analysis throughout this chapter. The first criterion of analysis in the DOTMLPF rubric is that of doctrine. More specifically, the criterion is delineated into two core questions: (1) Is there existing doctrine that addresses the issue or relates to the issue?, and (2) Are there operating procedures in place that are not being followed that contribute to the issue? (CGSC 2010, F102AC-4).

The current U.S. doctrine that addresses both Colombia and Afghanistan in regards to the counterinsurgency and counter narcotics issue is FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, and JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*. The Army creates its Doctrine using a process that begins with Vision. Leadership develops the framework on how the vision will be implemented as Concepts. The Army then translates these concepts into approved standards of conduct tasks known as Doctrine. FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* was published in December 2006 to fill a doctrinal gap for more than twenty years. Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan have been fighting insurgents for the last eleven years, so an update to counterinsurgency principles and guidelines was needed. General David Petraeus, who has had tremendous success in both Iraq and now in Afghanistan dealing with an insurgency, authored *Counterinsurgency*. The manual covers a large mix of offense, defense, and stability operations within various lines of operations.
FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency’s* key principles that apply to this thesis are Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities and Developing Host-Nation Security Forces. Chapter 2 stresses the importance of relationships and working toward a common goal and end state for both military and civilian leaders. Military actions when dealing with stability operations sometimes are not the main effort. Military operations will be more effective when integrated with the strategy of support intergovernmental organizations. Military organizations may support nonmilitary efforts just as commanders and leaders of other U.S. Government organizations should collaboratively plan and coordinate actions to avoid conflicts or duplication of effort (FM 3-24, 2-6).

Because counterinsurgencies operate in ungoverned places, Chapter 6 stresses developing host-nation security forces by providing discussions of the resources needed and organizing the development efforts of the police in counterinsurgency operations. To allow host nations to achieve a stable and secure country, tremendous effort must be made in order to bring a functioning government and justice system that will have the ability to protect the populations. Success in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations requires establishing a legitimate government supported by the people and able to address the fundamental causes that insurgents use to gain support” (FM 3-24, 6-1).

JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*, dated June 13, 2007, is an updated doctrinal manual that has not changed much over the last twenty years. The summary of changes discusses some policy and guidance, but the primary missions remain the same. The key section that applied to this thesis is Chapter 3, Planning Counterdrug Operations, where the strategic goals and objectives that have been designated by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) are clearly outlined. The President signs the
National Drug Control Strategy that provides broad direction and establishes the counterdrug strategy, policy, objectives, and priorities that allow the military to participate in counterdrug operations. The Department of Defense conducts ten primary counterdrug support missions: Detection and Monitoring, Drug Interdiction, Support to Other Nations, Host-Nation Support to US Forces, Planning Support, Logistics, Training, Manpower, Technology Transfer, and Aerial and Land Reconnaissance Support. Under the Support to Other Nations primary mission, the sub-category of Security Assistance Program, Training, and Civil-Military Operations provides the best linkage to counterinsurgency operations. Furthermore, this manual addresses the current doctrine that is being used across the board for all services conducting counterdrug operations. The existing doctrine addresses the key issues that relates to both counterinsurgency and counter narcotics. Although Colombia’s “Plan Colombia” specified that the U.S. Military would help by providing equipment, training, and mentorship to the counter narcotic military units and counter narcotic law enforcement agencies, the U.S. Military advisors/mentors were restricted by from conducting operations on their own. The U.S. military doctrine does allow the U.S. military to conduct counter narcotic operations independently. Afghanistan’s current policy has limited military-civilian collaboration that allows for a transition of counterinsurgency operations to counter-narcotic operations that will allow Afghanistan to maintain security and stability (Blanchard 2009).

Organization

The second criterion of analysis in the DOTMLPF rubric is that of organization, with further differentiation into four critical questions: (1) Where is the problem or issue occurring?, (2) What organization is the problem or issue occurring in?, (3) What is the
mission/management focus on those organizations?, and (4) What are the organization’s values and priorities? (CGSC 2010, F102AC-5).

Colombia

“Plan Colombia” presents an example of the need to create a military-civilian joint task force in order to combat the insurgency being funded by the narcotics drug trafficking in Colombia. Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) did not have the personnel, equipment, or training necessary to battle the insurgents. “Plan Colombia” initiated the creation of specialized LEA units and military in the form of Counternarcotics Brigades Headquarters, Counternarcotics Support Battalions, Army Aviation Infrastructure Support, and Organic Intelligence Capability units that disrupted Colombia’s insurgency and disrupted the counter narcotic drug trade that was funding the insurgency. Colombia’s military had conducted limited operations in a counterinsurgency in the beginning, but with the creation of large counternarcotics Brigades, the military worked in joint operations with law enforcement operations in order to bring security and stability to Colombia. The estimated appropriated U.S. funding for counter narcotics to Colombia was 1.3 billion dollars that funded interdiction and development assistance (Veillette 2005). This funding allowed the security forces’ strength to increase approximately thirty percent from 2002 to 2006. Both the Army grew close to thirty-two percent and the Police force grew twenty-six percent (Ramsey 2009). “Plan Colombia” enabled the creation of many new military counter narcotic units and joint military law enforcement units to support the counter narcotic effort that led to the improvement of the counter insurgency war. Seventy five percent of the military are counter narcotics military newly-created units conducting counter narcotics (Ramsey 2009).
Colombia’s strategies of promoting peace, economic development, and ending drug trafficking that funded an insurgency received an estimated two billion dollars from the U.S. through Congressionally appropriated funding in order to defeat counterinsurgency in Colombia. Although the military created several military counter narcotics units, the military also created regular military and police units to help in the security and stability of Colombia by fighting the insurgency, building facilities, and providing equipment and training to these new units. In Colombia, seventy-five percent of the military were conducting counter narcotics operations specifically, while the remaining twenty-five percent of military conducted security and stability operations throughout Colombia (Ramsey 2009). “Plan Colombia” increased the number of security forces to 143,000, which represented a thirty percent increase (Ramsey 2009, 124). The focus of the U.S. effort was not tactical, but organizational in nature, and centered at the Minister of Defense level and the uniformed services of Colombia (Newberry 2011). The organizational priorities were to continue to secure Colombia; this is since the FARC continues to fight an insurgency campaign that is still a threat to Colombia. Colombia’s military special task forces and counter narcotic law enforcement agencies’ main priority continues to be the security of Colombia. By expanding the police force into smaller cities, the “Vigilance by Block” plan will continue to prevent the small gangs and drug cartels from funding the insurgency with counter narcotic funds (Pachico 2011).

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is continuing to improve security forces in both the military and police organizations. As the U.S. Military, Afghan Military, and Afghan Law Enforcement Agencies transition from Full Spectrum Operations, counter insurgency
warfare, to stability and security operations, there is a lack of joint military and civilian law enforcement collaboration to fight the counter narcotics drug trade that is funding the insurgency. Law enforcement organizations currently lack the personnel, equipment, and training necessary to conduct effective counter narcotic operations in Afghanistan. Afghanistan currently has a very small number of specialized counter narcotic law enforcement agencies that are being mentored by U.S. and British Law enforcement agents which are having limited impact in the overall country’s drug trafficking trade. In 2005, the Afghanistan Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) was set up as an Afghan process to bring to justice those involved in serious narco-crimes within Afghanistan (CJTF 2011). The CJTF was set up in 2005, but has yet to publish their Policies and Strategies even after six years.

Training

The third criterion of analysis in the DOTMLPF rubric is training, which asks the following four questions: (1) Is the issue caused, at least in part, by a complete lack of, or inadequate training?; (2) Does training exist which addresses the issue?; (3) Is the training being delivered effectively?, and (4) Is training properly staffed and funded? (CGSC 2010, F102AC-5).

Colombia

Colombia’s Military and Police personnel were initially woefully unprepared to fight insurgents. This was due to a lack of an institutional training program. The establishment of various training institutions was supported with funding for both military and law enforcement organizations to ensure that doctrine, tactical, and technical
lessons were taught to the forces. Colombia continues to ensure soldiers and police officers receive annual training and additional advance training to ensure both the military and police forces do not lose their institutional knowledge base. –Plan Colombia” funded 1.7 million dollars in 2010 for two major training activities: training for tactical operations, and training on new equipment used by Colombian counternarcotics battalions, which included fumigation and police aid, intelligence gathering, and interdiction (Beittel 2011, 32). Training focused on the Counternarcotics Brigades of the Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police (CNP). Congress has prohibited U.S. personnel from directly participating in combat missions, and has capped the number of U.S. military and civilian contractor personnel that can be stationed in Colombia in support of –Plan Colombia” at 800 and 600 respectively (Beittle 2011, 25). The training the Colombia units received was sufficient and effective as is seen by the results of success against the insurgency. Between 2002 and 2008, one study estimated that army attacks cut FARC’s offensive capabilities by seventy percent. FARC military units, which in the 1990s were able to overwhelm Colombian army battalions, were by 2008 unable to function in larger than squad-sized units (Haddick 2010).

Training institutions were established in order to train the newly-recruited military and police personnel in basic and advanced counter narcotic skills. The DoD also funded Technical Assistance Field Training Teams (TAFT) that continued their assistance in the training and readiness of both COLAR and COLAF helicopters and crews.

Colombia continues to be well-funded by the U.S. for Colombia counter narcotic operations. Coordination between the Colombian Armed Services and the Colombian
National Police has improved, as evidenced by the successful eradication operations currently being conducted in the Putumayo region (Newberry 2011).

**Afghanistan**

Afghanistan’s military continues to receive funding and training for mostly conventional warfare. Training institutions have been established for the Afghan National Army, and these institutions conduct doctrine development and training and provide advising services for the Army. The NATO training Mission-Afghanistan operates as both a U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan which provides higher-level training for the ANA. CSTC-A receives funding through the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to equip, train, and sustain the ANSF. The fiscal year (FY) 2008 ASFF request totaled approximately $2.7 billion, including $1,711 billion for the ANA, $980 million for the ANP, and $9.6 million for detainee operations (Report to Congress 2008).

This training is conducted in coordination with NATO partners, international organizations, donors and non-government organizations (NGO) in order to support the GIRoA, which also sustains the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The training is focused on developing leaders and ensuring accountability of Afghan-led security. Each ANA HQ above battalion level has an embedded Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) of NATO trainers and mentors acting as liaisons between ANA and ISAF. The OMLTs coordinate operational planning and ensure that the ANA units receive enabling support (Report to Congress 2008). Afghan Police priorities are a mix of existing training programs and capacity development programs that work with European Union police and the International Police Coordination Board.
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in conjunction with INL and the U.S. Embassy's Counter-Narcotics Task Force, is the lead U.S. agency for counternarcotics planning and operations (Report to Congress 2008). There are a few special programs featuring joint collaboration, but these are very small and limited to about 2600 personnel (Radin 2010). Current joint DoD-DEA programs have resulted in the construction of the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) training compound, the installation of equipment for the Sensitive Investigative Unit, the Technical Investigations Unit, and provided advanced training for the CNPA (Report to Congress 2008).

ANP recruits receive Initial Entry Training (IET), which is the individual training objective for all ANP officers. In this eight-week program, Patrolmen complete training courses at one of multiple locations throughout Afghanistan including the Central Training Centre at Kabul, Regional Training Centres at Bamiyan/Kabul (500 capacity), Gardez, Herat (Shouz), Jalalabad, Kandahar, Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif. Each of these locations offers space for approximately 200 students. In addition, there are also five mini-training centers throughout Afghanistan (Radin 2010).

**Materiel**

The next criterion for analysis is materiel, and this category includes the following questions: (1) Is the issue caused by, at least in part, by inadequate systems or equipment?, (2) What functionality would a new system provide that currently does not exist?, and (3) Who would be the primary and secondary users of the proposed systems or equipment (CGSC 2010, F102AC-5)?
Colombia

Colombia overall received 4.5 billion dollars in FY 2006 to continue the counter narcotics mission (Veillette 2005, 2). The DoD continued with resources that will fund counternarcotics operations in multiple Areas of Responsibility (AOR) including training, regional planning assistance, operational planning support to partner nations and interagency partners, and equipment support (NCS 2010). Military and Police received protective and utility personal equipment, night vision systems, communications, navigation, radar, photo equipment, river boats, helicopters, landing crafts, wheeled vehicles, and spare parts components (Ramsey 2009).

Afghanistan

The DoD continues to upgrade and update both the Afghan military and Afghan Police in all aspects of equipment and facilities. The Afghan military has been equipped with a mixture of U.S. and NATO equipment as part of a force modernization effort, but much of the past equipment and facilities are older 1970-era Russian equipment and weapons systems (Tan 2008). New highly technical equipment is needed along with mentors who are needed to train Afghan personnel to use new equipment such as radars, communications, and other various intelligence gathering equipment. As Afghanistan transitions to stability and security operations, much of the operations will fall to the Afghan National Police in the form of counter narcotics missions.

Leadership

The next criterion on the DOTMLPF rubric is leadership, and includes the following three questions for analysis: (1) Is the issue caused, at least in part, by inability
or decreased ability to cooperate, coordinate, and/or communicate with external organizations?, (2) Does Command have resources at its disposal to correct the issue?, and (3) Has Senior Leadership identified interservice/agency cultural drivers and barriers which hinder issue resolution (CGSC 2010, F102AC-5)?

Colombia

Colombia suffers from a weak national leadership, and an overloaded, often corrupt, judicial system, due to the ineffectiveness of its security forces (Ramsey 2009). Leadership is very unpredictable with corruption of government, military, and police leaders due to the large amounts of money and power associated with the drug trafficking. Many of the leaders are subject to the influence of gangs and drug cartels; they are especially vulnerable in smaller far away outposts where security is lacking. There is still limited cooperation between the Colombian Army and the Colombian Police with shortcomings and deficiencies that need to be changed in order to reflect a unity of effort for both the Army and Police. Many of the government’s senior Army and Police leadership have had conflicting strategies from the commanders and leaders in the field fighting the counterinsurgency war. Former Ambassador to El Salvador, Dave Passage, commenting on Colombia, acknowledged the long-term challenges of moving beyond the “professional critiques” of the Army that indicated “examples of incompetence and corruption at virtually every level of leadership” (Ramsey 2009, 60).

Afghanistan

The GIRoA is one of the weakest governments in the world. It is hampered by pervasive corruption and a lack of sufficient leadership and human capital (Report to
Congress, January 2009). A lack of education and an entrenched bureaucracy make it
difficult for leaders at lower levels to feel they are making a difference and to take a more
active role in combating an insurgency and drug traffickers. NATO continues to enforce
standards and use funding to influence the enforcement of laws and policy. Leaders at the
lower levels of the Army and Police are haphazard. Afghan leaders have been fighting for
years, first against the Russians, and then against the Taliban and insurgency. Many of
the leaders within the Afghan government agencies compete for status, power, and
resources, and such a competitive environment creates barriers to any collaboration
between the different agencies of the ANSF. These barriers cause the ANA and ANP to
have issues working jointly on counterinsurgency missions and counter narcotics
missions. NATO continues to mentor leaders in both the ANA and ANP in order for both
organizations to be able to operate independently conducting counterinsurgency
operations while being nationally respected by the citizens of Afghanistan.

Personnel

The criterion of personnel is sub-divided into three questions for further analysis:
(1) Is the issue caused, at least in part, by inability or decreased ability to place qualified
and trained personnel in occupational specialties?, (2) If issue resolution is likely to
involve new materiel, systems, or equipment, are different occupational specialty codes
needed to properly staff new systems?, and (3) Do new training programs need to be
developed for newly recruited personnel (CGSC 2010, F102AC-5)?
Colombia

Colombia’s “Plan Colombia” creation of new organizations required an increase in personnel to staff these new units. Although Counterinsurgency and Counter narcotics operations are similar in some aspects, they are different in many others. The creation of these new Army and Police units also created new specialized units to fight counter narcotic trafficking and guerrillas in high-risk scenarios. The need to vet the personnel being recruited before they could begin caused the process to be slow and weeded out unqualified or corrupt personnel. In addition, with special units, special training is required that takes an educated person to be able to grasp the highly technical level of expertise. In a report to Congress dated April 2004, an estimated 160 more pilots and 193 maintenance personnel still need to be trained (Report to Congress 2004). The educational levels for personnel being recruited was very minimal to none, finding the right personnel to meet the high educational requirements is difficult. The small amount of personnel that were educational qualified needed to be qualified and trained in these occupational specialties In order to make the specialize units operational. Colombia received new combat systems that required advance education and training to operate. Many of the Colombian recruits would likely need additional advanced training in order to operate many of these systems. U.S. mentors were sent to Colombia to train the Military and Police forces on the newly-acquired equipment for counter narcotic and counter insurgency warfare.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan saw high tech ways of recruiting and retaining for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. These included state-of-the-art biometric
collections and database programs that would positively identify all Afghan Soldiers and Police Officers, and incentives for enlistment and re-enlistment for particularly hard-to-fill units such as Commando and Afghan Border Police (ABP) (Report to Congress January 2009). The average soldier enlisting in the ANA and ANP has little education, and is required to complete Initial Entry Training (IET) before being sent to a more advanced training, depending on the personnel qualifications and aptitude scores. NATO has set up and provided mentors for the Army training and Police training, but there is a limited amount of joint training and counter narcotics training outside of special counter narcotic units.

Facilities

The next criterion for analysis in the DOTMLFG rubric is that of facilities, and this criterion includes two questions: (1) Is the issue caused, at least in part, by inadequate infrastructure?, (2) Is the issue caused, at least in part, by inadequate roads, main supply routes, force bed down, facilities operations and maintenance, field fortification support (CGSC 2010, F102AC-5)?

Colombia

Colombia’s Army and Police expansion also required a place for these new units to be based. The funding allocated new facilities and infrastructure along with maintenance needed to support these new structures and additional costs for upgrading them in the future. New airfields need to be build along with all the support systems to maintain these new aircraft. Colombia has very constricted terrain. Much of the country is inaccessible by ground transportation. Roads and other infrastructures need to be built
in order to support the needs of the military and police in the security and stability of Colombia.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a third world country that has limited infrastructure outside the major cities. Much of the infrastructure that has been built is temporary construction, and repairs have to be continually updated due to the decaying structure and services. Funds have been allocated for upgrading garrisons and support facilities that will enhance the capabilities of the ANA and ANP. Many provincial and district level facilities are slow in being developed and built (Report to Congress 2008). These facilities must be built to withstand attacks by insurgents, and many of the small outlying Police stations are repeatedly attacked, causing significant damage. Even if the facilities are built, they are at risk of being damaged or destroyed, and will need additional funding to repair or rebuild them. Construction practices are also a concern, since many of the local construction practices are not very good, and U.S. funding requires the facilities to be built to U.S. specifications.

Summary

Using the DOTMLPF rubric as a framework, chapter 4 has presented information for comparative analysis from Columbia and Afghanistan. Each criterion was examined individually and relevant examples were included in most cases. Chapter 5 presents a discussion, comparative analysis, future recommendations, and summary of these findings as they relate to the DOTMLPF framework and this study’s guiding research questions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 3. Case Study Questions</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analysis questions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Doctrine</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Materiel</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Facilities</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: US Army Command and General Staff College, F100, *Managing Army Changes* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Government Printing Office, 2010), F102AC-4 - 5*
CHAPTER 5
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCLUSION SUMMARY

Chapter 5 discusses the analysis material presented in chapter 4 turning a more detailed and comprehensive manner. Further discussion is framed by the DOTMLPF rubric followed by the results of my analysis within the context of my primary research question. Following that, the chapter then concludes with recommendations for further research studies in the future.

Should a combined U.S. and Afghanistan military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force be created to support the fight against counterinsurgencies in the Afghan theater of war? What do the results mean? As stated previously by many of the authors in Chapter 2’s literature review, counterinsurgency warfare is not an all military effort. In counterinsurgency warfare, the military is not, and should not be, the lead effort. But what exactly does that mean? Both in Colombia and in Afghanistan, the military is the initial force that battles the insurgency while the host nation’s government Police Force is either unwilling or unable to fight an insurgency battle. During the initial fighting in Colombia, the military capabilities were needed to disrupt the insurgency, and as the Police Force increased in strength and in capabilities, the military began to transition into a support role to the Police and LEAs in order to allow the LEAs to provide security and stability to Colombia. The security and stability missions allow LEAs to fight the counter narcotic battle. Counter narcotic drug trafficking is one of the support functions that fuels the insurgency. As LEAs are able to reduce the funding supporting the insurgency through capabilities such as weapons and logistical supplies, the insurgency cannot sustain a campaign against Colombia’s government and the population.
Afghanistan is currently fighting an Afghan insurgency, although there is some support coming from outside sources in the Arab world to the insurgents of Afghanistan. The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda forces to prevent them from returning to Afghanistan and taking over the government of Afghanistan. As the military is able to transition to stability and security operations in Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Police forces will have a large role in providing security to the Afghan Government and its population. The military will still be needed, but they should transition to support the Police force and other LEAs in their fight to provide security to Afghanistan. Drug trafficking is one of the biggest funding sources to the insurgency, and as the justice system evolves and drug traffickers are arrested and convicted, the insurgency will lose the leadership and capabilities necessary to support a protracted war against the Afghan government and its population.

Recommendations

The results of this study indicate that a combined U.S. and Afghanistan military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force should be created to support the fight against counterinsurgencies in the Afghan theater of war. Generally speaking, the military should create a military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force that utilizes both military personnel, civilian law enforcement personnel, and nongovernmental personnel that would allow for a collaboration of military assets with the legal justification to enforce the laws of the government of Afghanistan. Further recommendations follow in the DOTMLPF format.
Doctrine

The current U.S. doctrine that addresses both counterinsurgency and counter narcotics operations offers good guidelines rather than hard and fast rules. The Army recently updated their counterinsurgency doctrinal Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* with lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. The counter narcotic doctrine that enables all services to utilize it in their operations is JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*. These two manuals are not all inclusive for doctrinal manuals that should be used, but they cover a wide range of information that offers a starting point for these operations, as they include additional policy and guidance to combatant commanders that facilitates mission support operations at lower levels. Additional legal and regulatory considerations may limit or impose restrictions by law as well as any appropriations that could contain provisions to both counterinsurgency and counter narcotics efforts.

A counterinsurgency effort requires military effort when necessary, but it will only be effective when it is integrated into a unity of effort strategy with the host nation’s government. To achieve unity of effort, military efforts and civilian law enforcement efforts are integrated as the host nation transitions to stability and security operation. Multi-national commands working with U.S. forces have adopted much of the U.S. doctrine and procedures for counterinsurgency and counter narcotic operations. The doctrine being used is a guide for planning and executing counterinsurgency and counter narcotics operations. As with all procedures, it does not apply to every situation. Counterinsurgency deals with military forces fighting guerrilla warfare, counter narcotic targets all aspects of the illicit drug trafficking business. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*,
Chapter 6, developing host nation security forces addresses the fundamental causes of funding insurgents. By understanding the relationships of the line of operations, military units will be better prepared to support law enforcement agencies in the fight against counter narcotic operations. With the creation of a military-civilian joint counter narcotic task force, a standard doctrinal reference will be needed, JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations* will be a good beginning for all agencies involved. Additional sub-manuals are available and should be used to reference the different mission categories of counter narcotic missions. The main reason for using U.S. doctrine opposed to the host nation’s doctrine is that U.S. military personnel will be the mentors and trainers to the military units and law enforcement units. Colombia’s counter narcotic initiative has been supported with U.S. equipment, weapons, and military trainers who teach the U.S. doctrine. FM 3-24 and JP 3-07.4 are the foundation for lower level doctrine and training manuals. Area-specific doctrine will be used to incorporate specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP’s). Each insurgency will have small differences that will require modified tactics to be employed. Applying these tactics will require the U.S. mentors to collaborate with the host nation’s military and law enforcement leaders to employ the tactics using their judgements of the circumstances and terrain. Doctrine is used as a common framework, and U.S. military trainers can use the intellectual tools they already have to train the host nation’s military and law enforcement units using their practical-based experience as fundamental principles with an understanding that doctrine can be evolved to be synchronized to the current situation in the specific area or region.
Organizations

Colombia demonstrated that if you do not have an organization that can do a mission, create one. Because the law enforcement agencies did not have the capability to defeat the insurgency and drug traffickers, funding was provided to create military units to help support the LEAs. The current force management structure only has limited support from the military to LEAs conducting counter narcotic operations in Afghanistan. LEAs require direct military support because they do not have the equipment necessary to protect the Police officers conducting CN missions, such as heavy weapons and helicopters to provide lift to remote locations. LEAs would also benefit from the use of Close Air support (CAS), but policy and training limits the LEA’s use of CAS during CN operations unless it is directed by military personnel and approved by the combatant commander. Insurgents and drug trafficking organizations are very complex and require acquired intelligence; assets that the military possesses which can assist LEAs in building legal cases against these organizations. The development of a military-civilian counter narcotics joint task force organization needs to begin with the approval of the force design directorate. CN operations have two missions, interdiction and demand reduction, and Afghanistan’s government has chosen to focus the priority of effort on interdiction missions in which the newly created units will need to be organized around the interdiction mission. Interdiction units should be capabilities and materials based, with the specialty schools created to support them once the design is approved. Demand Reduction operations are conducted with limited eradication missions, and because Afghanistan does not authorize aerial spraying, many of the eradication missions being conducted by the ANP are done manually with sticks by beating down the poppy plants.
Because many of the poppy fields are being moved further away from U.S.-led coalition troops, the ANP conducting these operations are at greater risk of being ambushed and killed from significantly more heavily armed drug traffickers whose main objective is protecting their poppy crops. Currently, the small amount of CN units are not allowed to conduct these missions without military support which utilizes the military’s combat power to protect the LEA’s. The organization created should benefit from having many military and civilian agencies incorporated into the joint task force to form a coalition of capabilities.

Training

Because the conflict in Afghanistan is a hybrid threat, that is a combination of conventional and irregular forces with a mixture of non-state actors and criminal activities taking place, the battlefield can be a very complex place. Training for both military personnel and police forces is critical. Many rules of law will apply depending on the enemy and the situation of the mission being conducted. The military training should focus on insurgency and counter narcotic missions; LEAs should focus on counter narcotic and criminal activities associated with it. As Afghanistan transitions to security and stability operations, LEAs will have increasingly larger roles as the lead effort. The military training and support will support and enhance the LEA’s missions to enforce the Afghan policies and laws. Much of the Afghan training is U.S. based, allowing the trainers and mentors of both the military and law enforcement units to utilize the knowledge of tactics being emphasized. Many current Afghan military general officers have been trained in U.S. tactics and doctrine while attending U.S. military schools which runs the risk of the training being implemented to be U.S. institutionalized. The joint
counter narcotic training needs to take the Afghan soldier's experience and previous combat lessons learned into consideration when developing what and how to train them best. Afghans' combat experiences over the last twenty years using Soviet weapons and doctrine proved to have limited success and should be considered when training tactics and techniques. Systematic instruction in joint operations will enhance the knowledge needed to work in a collaborative environment. Afghan military and law enforcement training programs for Afghan or host nation soldiers and police officers will be critical as NATO transitions to allow Afghan ANSF to train independently from U.S. trainers and mentors. The Afghan National Army Training Command was created to U.S. standards with retired military soldiers acting as contractors who write much of the Afghan doctrine. The implementation of training the host nation's military and police force needs to include TTP’s that are currently working in that region. The Afghan soldiers should have a common understanding of the tactics developed by the Afghan field commanders or Afghan field experts which is then recommended by an Afghan committee and then approved by the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Training should be topics-focused on joint operations at the lowest level. As the U.S. conducts the force modernization and replaces much of the existing Soviet weapons and equipment with U.S. weapons and equipment, such as the AK47 to the M4, and RPG to Javelin and Russian Jeeps to U.S. Humvees, training implementation should reflect the doctrinal changes. Afghan soldiers’ culture and norms have stark differences from the U.S. soldiers, and should be taken into consideration. TTP’s should be incorporated into all training, concentrating the training on the basics of the missions being performed by soldiers’ occupational specialty which
should be Afghan doctrine based from Afghan lessons learned with the assistance of the U.S.-led coalition trainers and mentors.

Materiel

The analysis suggested in Colombia that new units needed to be created and additional equipment was needed to support those units. Much of the equipment received by the Colombian military and LEAs was current or displaced U.S. equipment. Afghanistan is currently using both older style Russian equipment and displaced U.S. equipment for both the military and LEAs. Afghan LEAs need to modernize the current equipment being used. The guidance of the development, maintaining, and new equipment plans for the military-civilian joint task force should be standardized, and should be based on the requirements of the new JTF created. The specialized equipment needed to conduct counter narcotic missions should be identified for both the mission requirement and instructors/mentors of the new equipment. Funding considerations will have to be factored in for the procurement of new equipment as well as the maintenance costs associated with the required equipment systems. Much of this new equipment and facilities is because NATO and mainly the United States are funding the ANA and ANP. The pro’s and con’s of this show that the Afghan military and law enforcement have not reached a level of standardization. A benefit for the force modernization will be the logistical support that is being offered while NATO is funding it. The drawback is that much of the equipment is too technically sophisticated for the standard Afghan soldier to maintain, and without continuous training repair, parts for this sophisticated equipment will fall into disarray and become inoperable rather quickly. The reasons stated why Army logisticians chose the U.S. weapons and equipment is for their reliability while
meeting the needs of the Afghan missions. Considering the current modernization of Afghanistan is challenging for the U.S.-led coalition, and these factors should be considered when the responsibility is turned over to the GIRoA.

Leadership

Colombia, like Afghanistan, has suffered from weak leadership. This weakness is entrenched culturally and socially, which makes Afghanistan vulnerable to corruption. Afghanistan’s ranking in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index states that Afghanistan fell from a ranking of 117th out of 159 countries covered in 2005, to 172nd of 180 countries in 2007, and finally, to 176th out of 180 countries in 2008 - the fifth most corrupt country in the world (USAID 2009, 4). Bribery, nepotism, and extortion in government leadership positions is a way of life, and a way of survival for many of the positions that need to accept bribes and offer bribes. This systemic corruption links commanders, government officials, and criminals together in a cycle that threatens the survival of each one of them (USAID 2009). The programs that have been put in place by the U.S. to facilitate a change in the Afghan culture are slowly working. The many programs of oversight, prevention, education, and enforcement are a positive direction for the Afghan Military and Police leadership. The creation and implementation of the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) that will help prosecute and punish anyone suspected of corruption who violates the laws, regulations, and policies of the Afghan government will strengthen the leadership from the top down, requiring accountability of all leaders at every level. The traditions and cultural influences are tremendous; many U.S. leaders who are writing doctrine and training leaders, soldiers, and police officers are failing to recognize is how important it is when developing Afghan leaders. Tribal
structure is a concept that needs to be understood by the U.S.-led coalition trainers and mentors. By forcing Afghan Soldiers and Police Officers to adopt the U.S. military’s concept of leadership, it puts a direct conflict with the Afghan Soldier and Police Officer who will have to adopt a fundamental exodus from his Afghan tribal culture. The commander in charge of training the Afghan army into a force capable of taking over for coalition troops, Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, has ordered that development of leadership skills be a top priority (Michaels 2010). The new Afghan leader will offer a combination of his past guerrilla experience and his new skills acquired from the new U.S. based institutional leadership education, which may seem unorthodox to U.S. trainers and mentors.

Personnel

The creation of new units requires personnel to recruit for those units. Recruiting personnel who possess the education and aptitude necessary will be a challenge. Many of the population of Afghanistan have little formal education. The literacy rate is about ten percent (James 2010). Afghan soldiers and Police officers are fully willing to join the ranks, but they will lack the skills needed to be able to complete the required training without additional training and education. Afghanistan is dominated by the connections of the people. The diverse connections from tribal affiliations to family loyalties have a tremendous impact on the customs and beliefs with admiration to leadership and respect for religious elders. Afghans have a very poor health services system. For the last twenty years, the Afghanistan population has been subject to conflicts and war that did not allow for a health system to be developed. This is compounded by the living conditions of the population who are subjected to a wide array of disease without medical services to treat
the population. The U.S. should continue to mentor the Afghan military and Police Forces to continue to ensure the best-qualified personnel are available to serve. The reality is that there are not enough Troops and Police Officers available to reach all areas of Afghanistan. Insurgents thrive in ungoverned spaces, and the lack of available personnel resources makes the counter narcotic effort even more critical. These areas should be developed using both civilian support and civil-military approaches to encourage local leaders and tribal elders to build a community coalition, but care must be taken to prevent the Afghan influence of corruption that could be counterproductive to the personnel issues being solved.

Facilities

Afghanistan remains a third world country with much of the infrastructure recovering from over twenty years of war and conflict. Many of the facilities are inadequate, and will need to be upgraded or built from the ground up. Construction standards need to be enforced to ensure the funding allocated to the facilities is not squandered. Afghanistan suffers from poor utility services such as electrical, sewer, and water. Many of the communication systems are amplitude modulation and frequency modulation with phone systems primarily local cell phone systems. Tremendous levels of funding will be necessary to rebuild and support Afghanistan infrastructure over the next decade. The current effort by the U.S.-led coalition is to develop many business sectors of Afghanistan in order to allow the country to operate as a self-sustaining country. The projects that are being developed range from road construction, to mining and agricultural projects. The goal should be to provide the infrastructure necessary to allow Afghanistan to not be dependent on poppy cultivation and drug trafficking as the
country's main economic resource. Military-civilian counter narcotic joint task force demand reduction eradication mission should focus on educating Afghans on resources that will be developed within the local economies. Many of the projects include building grain mills, planting a new version of wheat seeds, building factories to process the fruits and vegetables farmers are growing, and building cool storage facilities and livestock management programs in order to break the dependency of the poppy farmer economically to insurgents.

Further Research Topics

Future research topics that may have an impact on the military-civilian counter-narcotics joint task force created to support the fight against counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan's theater of war.

1. The force management structure of this new military civilian counter narcotic joint task force.

2. Would this be a good additional mission to be supported by the National Guard Counterdrug support program?

3. What impact on the Afghan economy will the counter narcotic campaign cause?

Summary

At this moment in time, I hope this study will benefit the combatant commander in Afghanistan by identifying and disrupting the funding support to the insurgency. The lessons extracted from the Colombia case study have identified similar characteristics in Afghanistan. In addition, these lessons provided valuable insight into the types of
collaboration needed in Afghanistan with the military and civilian law enforcement agencies in order to combat the counterinsurgency supported by counter narcotic criminal activity.
APPENDIX A

Troops Deployed to Afghanistan

Figure 1. Troops deployed to Afghanistan

Figure 2. Map of Afghanistan

APPENDIX C

Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan by Province, 2007-2008

Figure 3. Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan by Province, 2007-2008

APPENDIX D

Expected Opium Cultivation Trends in 2011 (By Province)

Figure 4. Expected Opium Cultivation Trends in 2011 (by province)

Figure 5. Opium production in Afghanistan from 1994-2008

APPENDIX F

MAP OF COLOMBIA

Figure 6. Map of Colombia

Figure 7. Coca Growing Regions in 2006

APPENDIX H

Estimated Colombian Opium Poppy Cultivation and Heroin Production, 2000-2007

Figure 8. Estimated Colombian Opium Poppy Cultivation and Heroin Production, 2000-2007

Figure 9. Program Assistance Objectives in Colombia, 2000-2013


Dreiling's, Elizabeth E. 2002. The National Guard: A future homeland security paradigm. Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, K.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Dr. Edward Robarge
DJIMO
USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. John C Barbee
DTAC
USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

LTC Robert F Markovetz Jr
SALT
USACGSC
290 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301