USSOUTHCOM: Aligning Organizational Structure to the Range of Military Operations

David W. Simpson

Paper Advisor (if Any): Professor George Oliver

Joint Military Operations Department
Naval War College
686 Cushing Road
Newport, RI 02841-1207

Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.

A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

In October 2008, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)—under the leadership of Admiral James G. Stavridis and with the approval and support of the Secretary of Defense—transitioned to a new model of headquarters organizational structure. A functional directorate system replaced traditional J-codes, common to most geographic and functional combatant commands. The purposes behind this new arrangement were to increase interagency collaboration and invigorate a more mission-oriented, strategy-focused outlook, tailored to the Latin America and Caribbean regions. In spite of its much-heralded start, the functional directorate system would be short-lived. Approximately fifteen months after implementation, on 12 January 2010, a massive earthquake struck just outside of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. In a matter of days, overwhelmed by circumstances and the great number of military and civilian augmentees, the new SOUTHCOM commander appropriately directed a reversion to J-codes to improve unity of effort. But, with the end of the Haiti operations and the redeployment of forces long since passed, SOUTHCOM continues to operate by J-codes. This paper will argue that given the emphasis of U.S. strategic guidance on a whole-of-government approach to national security, the unique opportunities that exist for cooperation and partnership with countries in the region, and the generally stable security environment of the theater, SOUTHCOM should return to a permanent functional directorate organizational construct. When a crisis arises that is sufficiently complex, SOUTHCOM could temporarily employ a J-code construct for the duration of military operations. Upon transition and re-deployment, the command would return to functional directorates. Such an arrangement is best described as an alternating or interchangeable organizational structure.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

USSOUTHCOM:
Aligning Organizational Structure to the Range of Military Operations

by

David W. Simpson
Civilian, U.S. Department of State

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ____________________________

4 May 2011
## Contents

List of Figures/Annexes  iii  
Abstract  iv  
Introduction  1  
Background  2  
Functional Directorates: Allow Strategic Guidance to Drive Operational Structure  4  
Functional Directorates: Theater-Strategic Context Presents Unique Opportunities  6  
Functional Directorates: Perceived Shortcomings in Time of Crisis  8  
Best of Both: Interchangeable Organizational Structure  11  
Counter-Arguments and Rebuttals  12  
Recommendations  14  
Conclusion  16  
Annex A  18  
Annex B  19  
Notes  20  
Bibliography  23  

### List of Figures/Annexes

#### Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Range of Military Options (ROMO)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Annexes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>USSOUTHCOM Functional Directorate Structure</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>USSOUTHCOM J-code Structure</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

In October 2008, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)—under the leadership of Admiral James G. Stavridis and with the approval and support of the Secretary of Defense—transitioned to a new model of headquarters organizational structure. A functional directorate system replaced traditional J-codes, common to most geographic and functional combatant commands. The purposes behind this new arrangement were to increase interagency collaboration and invigorate a more mission-oriented, strategy-focused outlook, tailored to the Latin America and Caribbean regions. In spite of its much-heralded start, the functional directorate system would be short-lived. Approximately fifteen months after implementation, on 12 January 2010, a massive earthquake struck just outside of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. In a matter of days, overwhelmed by circumstances and the great number of military and civilian augmentees, the new SOUTHCOM commander appropriately directed a reversion to J-codes to improve unity of effort. But, with the end of Haiti operations and the redeployment of forces long since passed, SOUTHCOM continues to operate by J-codes. This paper will argue that given the emphasis of U.S. strategic guidance on a whole-of-government approach to national security, the unique opportunities that exist for cooperation and partnership with countries in the region, and the generally stable security environment of the theater, SOUTHCOM should return to a permanent functional directorate organizational construct. When a crisis arises that is sufficiently complex, SOUTHCOM could temporarily employ a J-code construct for the duration of military operations. Upon transition and redeployment, the command would return to functional directorates. Such an arrangement is best described as an alternating or interchangeable organizational structure.
Instead of historic J-coded directorates suited solely for military operations, we have organized directorates reflecting the kinds of missions we want to undertake in the 21st century, namely, Partnering, Stability, and Security & Intelligence. More will follow as our priorities and skill sets adapt and transform.

--ADM James G. Stavridis, CDRUSSOUTHCOM, 2006-2009

Introduction

In 2008, U.S. Southern Command (USOUTHCOM) transitioned to a new model of headquarters organizational structure, with great hopes for future growth and adaptation. The new structure—alternately termed functional directorate or enterprise system—supplanted SOUTHCOM’s traditional organization by J-code directorates. The implementation of functional directorates was but one manifestation of Admiral Stavridis’s visionary outlook: “The dawn of the 21st century presents the U.S. Southern Command with an unprecedented opportunity to define and shape new means and capabilities that will achieve U.S. national security objectives in an age of adaptive, nontraditional, and transnational threats, challenges, and opportunities.”1

A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessed that the functional directorate system would allow SOUTHCOM to “collaborate proactively with U.S. government agencies and partner nations in the region and improve collective responses to regional and transnational security challenges.”2 In spite of such positive assessments, the new organizational structure was short-lived. The beginning of the end was January 12, 2010, some fifteen months into implementation, when a massive 7.0 earthquake struck the outskirts of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The actual shock waves were limited to the island of Hispaniola, of course, but their effects were felt in Miami.
SOUTHCOM headquarters was quickly inundated with the requirement to support enormous humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts. According to 2010 congressional testimony by Dr. James Schear, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, “up to January 11th, SOUTHCOM, which is about 800 headquarters staff, had very few…operational boots on the ground anywhere in its area of responsibility. Three to four weeks later it [was] up to 26,000…deployed in Haiti. That was a major stress test, to put it mildly, for the command.”

As these forces began to deploy, SOUTHCOM soon reverted to the traditional J-code headquarters structure. This was deemed essential to eliminate any undue confusion from the relatively immature and untested functional directorate system. Furthermore, it was crucial to ensure efficient interoperability between SOUTHCOM and its supporting commands. To this day, SOUTHCOM continues to be organized along J-code lines, even though the security environment of the region would permit otherwise. This paper will argue that because U.S. strategic guidance emphasizes a whole-of-government approach to national security and because unique opportunities exist for cooperation and partnership with Latin American and Caribbean nations, SOUTHCOM should return to a permanent functional directorate organizational construct, with the capability to temporarily employ a J-code construct when joint, intra-theater military operations are sufficiently complex.

Background

In 2008, ADM Stavridis acknowledged that SOUTHCOM was striving to “create an organization that can best adapt itself to working with the interagency, with our international partners and even with the private-public sector.” But the process of transformation actually
started before that. In 2006, General Craddock first assembled a special team to study command organization, internal processes, and strategy in light of mission.⁵ As successor to GEN Craddock, ADM Stavridis embraced and improved upon the initial ideas. He eventually took his implementation concept to Defense Secretary Gates, who “gave the plan a green light, putting SOUTHCOM’s reorganization on his list of 25 transformation priorities for the Defense Department.”⁶ Of note, a similar command organization was envisioned for US Africa Command (AFRICOM), which began to stand up in 2008. SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM were thus both structured for interagency operations effective 1 October 2008.⁷

In testimony before the 111th Congress in March 2009, six months after implementation of the functional directorate system, Admiral Stavridis stated: “U.S. Southern Command has realigned our internal headquarters structure to better support our interagency partners and to be more agile and comprehensive in our approach to engagement in the region.”⁸ This internal alignment was responsible for producing an entirely new organizational chart (see Annex A). Four major directorates emerged in place of J-codes: Policy and Strategy, Security and Intelligence, Stability, and Partnering. Also included were Resources and Assessment, Enterprise Support, and a Partnership Center. By design, the J-code staff structure—a “constraint better suited to large troop movements than current operations in the region”—was transformed into a “strategy-focused organization.”⁹

As mentioned, this new model only survived until January 2010. A Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) report, released in June of that year, provides insight on its undoing. Apparently, General Douglas Fraser, successor to Admiral Stavridis, became concerned with the effectiveness of the organization and its ability to plan.¹⁰ The report states: “Less than a week prior to the disaster [earthquake] such concern
would appear prophetic, but the changes discussed had not been put into place by 12 January. So when the crises began, the traditional primary and special staff organizations and functions necessary to deal with the response—especially crisis action planning—were not in place and ready.”¹¹ The crush of demands greatly strained the organization. Only five days from the outset of the crisis, the SOUTHCOM Commander directed an “in-stride re-organization” and the headquarters returned to its former J-code structure.¹²

**Functional Directorates: Allow Strategic Guidance to Drive Operational Structure**

In the aftermath of the Haiti operation—designated Operation Unified Response—what has emerged at SOUTHCOM is actually a combination of J-codes with an interagency overlay (see Annex B). This is a compromise between functional directorates and a pure J-code arrangement and is sometimes referred to as a hybrid structure. As such, the command maintains a Civilian Deputy to the Commander (double-hatted as the Foreign Policy Advisor), a J-9 Partnering Directorate (to oversee interagency, non-governmental, and public-private partner relations), and a large presence of non-DOD civilians (about 27 by recent count). In a reference to its peculiarities, a senior SOUTHCOM official acknowledged that “although SOUTHCOM has gone back to the J-codes, the current structure is a bit unusual by combatant command standards.”¹³ Unusual or not, this arrangement still benefits interagency and international cooperation, given the significant number of non-DOD representatives and the inclusion of the J-9 Directorate (formerly a Joint Interagency Coordination Group, JIACG). However, it is less interagency-centric than the former functional directorate system, the main purpose of which was to maximize unity of effort amongst the elements of national power embodied in the headquarters staff.
That same SOUTHCOM official also advised that the former organization “was better suited to do what we [SOUTHCOM] do 98% of the time—security assistance and engagement and small operations and humanitarian projects.”\textsuperscript{14} Aside from questioning if it makes sense to use the J-code structure for security assistance, small operations, and humanitarian projects, the official notes that “all planning is done in the same template as complex kinetic warfare and hence is very labor intensive.”\textsuperscript{15} Add to this concern that the J-code system has increased stove-piping.\textsuperscript{16} In light of these perceptions and insights, the question of ideal organizational structure naturally arises.

Perhaps the answers to operational-level of command dilemmas are to be found in strategic-level guidance. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states: “Just as maintaining America’s enduring defense alliances and relationships abroad is a central facet of statecraft, so too is the need to continue improving the Department of Defense’s cooperation with other U.S. departments and agencies.”\textsuperscript{17} It also mentions that the “Department will therefore continue to work with the leadership of civilian agencies to support the agencies’ growth and their operations in the field, so that appropriate military and civilian resources are put forth to meet the demands of current contingencies.”\textsuperscript{18} The QDR is clear that the Department of Defense will support a “whole-of-government, whole-of-nation” approach to operations.\textsuperscript{19}

The QDR is not a lone voice. The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) devotes two pages to a section entitled “Strengthening National Capacity—A Whole of Government Approach.”\textsuperscript{20} The NSS claims that “We [the U.S. Government] are improving the integration of skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly.”\textsuperscript{21} But the document goes on to note that there are still shortcomings to fostering coordination across departments and agencies.\textsuperscript{22} To the extent that functional
directorates fully integrate civilians into the organizational structure, it is a step in the direction of promoting unity of effort and interagency collaboration. This aligns with current thinking on the subject, which recognizes the consensus that “many national security problems require interagency solutions.”

Even the Department of State’s first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)—an attempt to emulate the successes of strategic-level planning in Defense—underscores the need for interagency collaboration. The 2010 document is replete with examples of whole-of-government solutions to complex problems and the need to adequately prepare personnel to work in the interagency environment, primarily through training and detail assignments. These include attendance at war colleges, State-Defense exchanges, State Department exchanges with other departments and the private sector, and even the recent broadening of available political advisor positions at military commands.

In the words of Admiral Stavridis: “We in the Defense Department must undertake no task without first considering the valuable synergy of the State Department, USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], and the entire cast of national security agencies, nongovernmental bodies, and the private sector, working together. We must also be equally inclusive of our international partners.” This outlook is no less relevant today than it was in 2008. The functional directorate system continues to be the most robust solution yet devised for cross-agency synergy at the operational level of command.

**Functional Directorates: Theater-Strategic Context Presents Unique Opportunities**

Southern Command’s vision to prioritize interagency cooperation by way of functional directorates was a bold undertaking. But it was not done in a vacuum. It was the theater-
strategic context that permitted the change to take place. A recent scholarly text on Latin America rightly notes that the region is one of the most exciting for the comparative study of social, economic, and political transformation. Additionally, “on a host of new, hot issues—drugs, trade, immigration, tourism, pollution, investment, the environment, democracy, human rights—the United States and Latin America have become increasingly intertwined and interdependent.” Add to this the fact that large sections of the U.S. have become “Latinized” by south to north migration and it is hard to overlook the deepening ties. All of this is in the context of a half century or more of significant transition, as the region has moved from authoritarianism to widespread democratization, economic development, and free trade.

In the arena of military conflict, former President of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, points out, “aside from Colombia, no country in Latin America faces an ongoing or imminent armed conflict.” Lamentably, he adds, “the enemies of the people in the region are hunger, ignorance, inequality, disease, crime, and environmental degradation. They are internal, and they can be defeated only through smart public policy.” Of course public policy depends on governments in the region, not SOUTHCOM. But, the opportunities for interagency cooperation are particularly relevant to current regional challenges. Yet again, the most prominent strategic documents make this clear.

The 2010 QDR states: “Our defense posture in the Western Hemisphere will support interagency capabilities to address critical issues including control of illicit trafficking, detection and interdiction of weapons of mass destruction, border and coastal security, and humanitarian and disaster relief.” In like manner, the 2010 NSS asserts: “In the Americas, we are bound by proximity, integrated markets, energy interdependence, a broadly shared commitment to democracy, and the rule of law. Our deep historical, familial, and cultural ties make our
alliances and partnerships critical to U.S. interests.” Finally, the 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS) points to the opportunity for the Joint Force to promote regional security cooperation to enhance both stability and security in the Western Hemisphere.  

The aforementioned documents acknowledge the presence of ongoing security and humanitarian challenges in the region. But, the general trend in Latin America is “toward greater political freedom, economic development, technological expansion, cultural individuality and regional integration.” In this context, strategic and operational planners must aim to synchronize the elements of national power to match the uniqueness of the region.

Admiral Stavridis asserts: “We need to continue to recognize that the real thrust of 21st century national security in this region is not vested in war, but in intelligent management of the conditions of peace in a volatile era.” Recognizing the Geographic Combatant Commander’s unique position to “balance the instruments of national power at the theater level,” combined with the nature of the theater itself (non-kinetic, largely democratic, rapidly developing, and possessing strong regional, cultural, and linguistic identities), SOUTHCOM is ideally positioned to reinvigorate a functional directorate organization.

Functional Directorates: Perceived Shortcomings in Time of Crisis

National strategic guidance and regional context aside, the chief hindrance to the return of functional directorate organization is its perceived deficiencies during time of crisis. Brigadier General (BG) David Garza, SOUTHCOM Chief of Staff in January 2010, makes this clear through his praise of the J-code structure:

The in-stride decision by GEN Fraser to re-align to a J-code structure was the pivotal decision for USSOUTHCOM. This decision allowed us to quickly organize around a well-understood organizational methodology designed for
coordinated planning across essential planning functions necessary for any event on the spectrum of conflict. This alignment gave us the ability to speak a common language, quickly facilitate the infusion of staff augments, employ operational planning teams effectively, communicate better internally and with external stakeholders like the Joint Staff, Components, JTFs, JTF-Haiti, and other partner nations, agencies, and the interagency. It also had the effect of invigorating the work force, and it gave us better teamwork in support of this crisis. The model we were under did not survive the crucible of the crisis.  

As BG Garza points out, there are clear advantages to a J-code system, particularly for crisis response and beyond. But are these relative advantages or absolutes? Without proper implementation and maturation of the functional directorate model, it is difficult to establish a basis for comparison between the two systems. Without that, it is likely the J-code structure will remain the default choice for complex military operations.

A Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) report highlights some of the most significant problems relating to implementation of the functional organization at SOUTHCOM. These included a failure to update key plans to reflect the transition from J-codes to the functional directorate system and the disaggregation of key deployment and logistics expertise. The GAO made similar findings, noting that the directorate structure was untested in a major crisis and some of the core functions for contingency response had been sub-optimized.

GAO reporting also cites the lack of a proper augmentation plan for military personnel in the event of a large-scale contingency. According to SOUTHCOM officials, the command was staffed at about 85 percent of it authorized staffing level of 960 military and civilian personnel, and did not have the necessary personnel depth to support a large scale military operation. While augmentation was required, the command had not identified the military personnel augmentation requirements necessary for a large contingency and had not developed a plan to integrate military augmentee personnel into the existing directorate structure.
Ultimately, over 500 extra staff were required, plus some 26,000 additional military personnel. Again, congressional testimony from Dr. James Schear speaks to the difficulty of managing this issue: “The problem we [DOD] face…is the balance between steady-state daily engagement in an economy-of-force theater versus these big plus-ups.”

Ultimately, the functional directorate model at SOUTHCOM did not rise to the challenges, whether through unsuitability of the structure to crisis response, inadequate implementation, or some combination thereof. Until such issues are resolved, J-codes will be the preferred structure for crisis response. However, many believe that functional directorates are still preferable for military engagement and security cooperation, at the low end of the Range of Military Operations (ROMO), as conceptualized below. This begs the question: Can a balance be struck between the two models—J-code and functional directorates—so as to maximize interagency collaboration on the low end of the ROMO and to minimize military risk as operations increase in size, intensity, and complication?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations</th>
<th>Major Operations and Campaigns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1:** Range of Military Operations (adapted from Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 22 March 2010), I-8.)
Best of Both: Interchangeable Organizational Structure

As GAO reporting on the subject notes, “While a combatant command should be organized and manned to meet its daily mission requirements, it must also be prepared to respond to a wide range of contingencies identified in DOD’s Unified Command Plan, including disaster relief operations, when directed by higher authority.” Clearly, functional directorates were not sufficiently robust to meet the demands imposed by Haiti operations. General Fraser rightly reverted to J-codes. However, what should have been a stopgap measure became permanent.

The JFCOM Joint Warfighting Center (JFCOM-JWC), in its 2008 report entitled “Joint Operations Insights and Best Practices,” addresses the move by some combatant commands to implement functional organization structure. The report highlights perceived advantages of such a structure, which include a better focus on specific mission areas (e.g. security cooperation) and an atmosphere that better fosters unity of effort with our partners. When set against Brigadier General David Garza’s insights on J-codes in time of crisis, it is clear that the commander is faced with a difficult decision on how best to structure for and manage risk.

In the case of SOUTHCOM, a best-of-both organizational structure could potentially achieve the right balance amongst competing demands. Such an arrangement contemplates functional directorates for steady-state, routine military operations (primarily military engagement and theater security cooperation) and J-codes otherwise (for crisis response and beyond). As military operations escalate from the low end of the ROMO, the commander could at any time order an in-stride re-organization to J-codes. Then, as operations return to the low-end of the ROMO, and forces redeploy, functional directorates would return as well.
Thus, an alternating movement from one organizational structure to another and back could occur on order. A consistently smooth and orderly transition is possible if the mechanisms for an interchangeable organizational structure are in place and thoroughly exercised. No doubt there could be unanticipated challenges to alternating between systems. Joint Publication 1 (JP-1), *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, speaks to some of the related issues:

The interagency process is described as ‘more art than science,’ while military operations tend to depend more on structure and doctrine. However, some of the techniques, procedures, and systems of military C2 [command and control] can facilitate unity of effort if they are adjusted to the dynamic world of interagency coordination and different organizational cultures. Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome discord, inadequate structure and procedures, incompatible communications, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations.44

**Counter-Arguments and Rebuttals**

The concept of an alternating organizational structure will inevitably meet resistance, given that SOUTHCOM stakeholders tend to have a strong preference for either functional directorates or J-codes. In general, DOD military and civilians tend to prefer the J-code structure, based on familiarity, track record, and assured military interoperability. But, there may be downsides for the theater context, as GAO recently reported in the aftermath of SOUTHCOM’s 2010 in-stride re-organization: “SOUTHCOM officials expressed concerns the command was directing its manpower resources towards contingency-based organizational structure, the skill sets of which would only be utilized every 4 to 5 years when responding to a major crisis such as Operation Unified Response.”45 A best-of-both solution would avoid this by effectively calibrating the structure to the demands of the security environment, while minimizing operational risk to the commander.
Those at SOUTHCOM from outside DOD—State Department, USAID, others—tend to favor full-time employment of functional directorates, since they focus on mission areas over military tasks and better align with civilian skill sets. In their view, temporary reversion to J-codes in times of conflict is perceived as sidelining critical civilian participation. But, recent Congressional testimony from Susan Reichle, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID, seems to dispel this argument. Testifying before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee in July 2010, she said: “…for our people [USAID], who were the lead agency with the supporting agency being DOD or other interagency players, whether they [SOUTHCOM] were in an interagency sort of function within SOUTHCOM or they switched to a J-code, as we actually ramped up in SOUTHCOM, it had absolutely no impact.”

This same group of non-DOD civilians might also point to the recent experience of AFRICOM as proof that functional directorates do not need to be replaced in times of crisis. AFRICOM—an interagency-style command, much like SOUTHCOM was under the functional directorate system—was intended to train and assist armed forces in 53 African nations and to work with the State Department and other agencies in bolstering regional social, political and economic programs. But recent events in their region forced it to set aside security engagement in order to lead Operation Odyssey Dawn, the initial phase of operations against Muammar Gaddafi’s forces. Though the situation in Libya is fluid, initial reports from the Foreign Policy Advisor confirm that there was no in-stride re-organization, as there was in SOUTHCOM in 2010. Additionally, DOD elements were integrated in the form of the JTF, as needed, but initially there was no change in how the command spoke to itself.
Although this is a step in the right direction for the viability of functional directorates across the ROMO, it is premature to suggest that that time is now. From the outset, the U.S. Government announced that its involvement would be limited in scope and would exclude boots on the ground. Such restrictions, combined with few augmentees and rapid transfer of leadership to NATO, created a dynamic very different from Operation Unified Response. Ultimately, it was not necessary for AFRICOM to temporarily modify its organizational structure. But, had U.S. participation been protracted or events more complex, this may have been a case where an alternating organizational structure would have been prudent. Time will tell.

**Recommendations**

Recognizing that combatant command organizational structure is at the discretion of the commander, GAO reporting makes no determination as to the best organizational structure for SOUTHCOM. Instead, their reporting focuses on promoting operational efficiencies. As such, two recommendations emerge, which will “improve SOUTHCOM’s ability to conduct the full range of military missions that may be required in the region, while balancing its efforts to support interagency and other stakeholders in enhancing regional security and cooperation.”

Relatively short-term in nature, the first is a revision of SOUTHCOM’s Organization and Functions Manual, which will align organizational structure and manpower resources to meet approved missions. The second is the identification of personnel augmentation requirements for a variety of contingency operations. Clearly, such recommendations would have benefited SOUTHCOM in January 2010 and thereafter. Consequently, SOUTHCOM should press on with these recommendations.
A medium to long-term recommendation concerns the utilization of outside expertise to help shape SOUTHCOM’s organizational structure. A recent National Defense University (NDU) article on the subject of interagency contributions to defense, citing the work of Harvard Kennedy School of Government professor Steven Kelman, notes that “it is odd that more effort is not made to exploit social science disciplines for national security benefit.”53 NDU’s Center for Strategic Research (CSR), part of the Institute for Strategic Studies (INSS), is one such entity in DOD that employs social science researchers for the core mission of “providing objective, rigorous and timely analyses that respond to the needs of decision-makers in the Department of Defense and other policy audiences.”54 CSR could be called upon to assist in refining command arrangements and leveraging current best practices in light of theater challenges. Naturally, CSR should not impose its will upon SOUTHCOM. Rather, this would be a consultative, joint approach stemming from SOUTHCOM’s initial decision to promote an alternating organizational structure, as this paper proposes from the outset.

The Project on National Security Reform also delves into this line of work. Their vision for the national security in the 21st century calls for a “collaborative, agile, anticipatory and resilient system, capable of horizontally and vertically integrating all elements of national power to successfully meet the nation’s most critical challenges and opportunities.”55 They possess the resident expertise to guide such organizational reform and could be consulted.

A final recommendation involves the preservation of critical subject matter expertise (SME) when operating in functional directorate mode. Both GAO and JCAO reporting on the functional directorate system address complications that arose when transitioning from functional directorates back to J-codes. SOUTHCOM leadership would need to consider some alterations to the functional directorate construct, to ensure no loss of SME proficiency, such as
logistics or operations planning. Such modifications would have minimal to no impact on the nature of the functional directorate system yet would serve to repair seams between structures.

As Admiral Stavridis points out, it is essential to “more fully incorporate the political, military, economic, humanitarian, ecological, and diplomatic dimensions of regional operations into a single, coherent strategy.” Clearly, there is much work to be done, and additional recommendations may surface, but the above are the most relevant refinements.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of an alternating organizational structure is to maximize unity of effort across the ROMO. At the low end of the spectrum, where military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence reside, robust interagency participation is both appropriate and desired. At this level, functional directorates are best suited to unifying the efforts of all the elements of national power. This is especially relevant in SOUTHCOM, given the absence of force-on-force threats, strong U.S. bilateral and regional relationships, and U.S. national interests. Also, the number of agencies represented in SOUTHCOM is larger than in any other Geographic Combatant Command. But, as operations elevate in intensity and begin to move across the ROMO, as witnessed in Haiti, the focus naturally shifts to an increasingly predominant military role. As outside forces flow in, unity of effort then implies first and foremost synchronizing the complexities of the military element of national power. Headquarters interagency support necessarily shifts to a predominantly supporting role. This is precisely where the interchangeable organizational model is useful in that it is able to surge unity of effort and match organizational structure to shifting demands.
Dr. Doug Orton, subject matter expert currently collaborating with NDU’s CSR, believes that AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM will succeed if they see themselves as national security organizations and will fail if they see themselves as national defense organizations. He believes that the in-stride re-organization that SOUTHCOM conducted in January 2010 took the command back to a national defense organization, which ultimately subordinates interagency partnering under military control, where it cannot be very successful. If this assessment is correct, our national interests demand better organizational structures in SOUTHCOM.

In conclusion, a recently published article, addressing constraints on human and monetary resources, advocates for a balanced U.S. strategy of diplomacy and foreign aid undergirded with traditional military forces. This argument addresses strategic issues of defense, diplomacy, and development. But, these themes are no less applicable at the operational level, especially in SOUTHCOM, where a range of diplomatic, development and other interagency partners stand shoulder-to-shoulder with their military colleagues, ready to fully integrate. The only limiting factor is the current, military-centric J-code structure in a relatively low-risk theater. The time for change is now. Recognizing the unique dynamics of the SOUTHCOM region, a return to full-time employment of functional directorates—with J-codes in time of crisis—would be the appropriate mix.
Annex A

USSOUTHCOM Functional Directorate Structure

Note: Admiral Stavridis implemented the functional directorate structure (also referred to as the enterprise system) in October 2008, thus replacing J-codes. The traditional J-code functions were then subsumed across the various directorates.

Source: Headquarters, USSOUTHCOM
Annex B

USSOUTHCOM J-code Structure

Note: As discussed, General Fraser conducted an “in-stride” re-organization of SOUTHCOM headquarters in January 2010, which returned the command to J-codes, with some modifications. This arrangement includes a State Department Civilian Deputy to the Commander, double-hatted as Foreign Policy Advisor, and a J-9 Partnering Directorate to coordinate interagency affairs (formerly a JIACG). Based on these arrangements, SOUTHCOM’s J-code structure differs from most other combatant commands, and is sometimes referred to as a hybrid system.
Notes

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
9 Miles, “SOUTHCOM Transformation Promotes New Approach to Regional Challenges.”
10 U.S. Joint Forces Command, “USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti…Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force” (analytical study, Suffolk, VA: Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 2010), 2.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 7.
13 SOUTHCOM official, various e-mail messages to author, 22 February 2011 through 25 February 2011. Note: The SOUTHCOM official did not wish to be identified.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 70.
21 Ibid., 14.
22 Ibid., 14.


26 Ibid., xii-xiii.


29 Ibid.


35 Walter S. Morgan, “Pushing a Rope: Balancing the DIME within Geographic Theaters” (research paper, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2007), 1.


39 Ibid., 27.

40 Ibid., 27.


48 Foreign Policy Advisor, HQ U.S. AFRICOM, e-mail message to author, 15 April 2011.

49 Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Dr. James Orton, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, e-mail message to author, 21 March 2011.

Ibid.


