DEFINING COMMAND, LEADERSHIP, AND MANAGEMENT SUCCESS FACTORS WITHIN STABILITY OPERATIONS

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PKSOI PAPER

DEFINING COMMAND, LEADERSHIP, AND MANAGEMENT SUCCESS FACTORS WITHIN STABILITY OPERATIONS

Dave Fielder

June 2011

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FOREWORD

I first met Major Dave Fielder, Royal Marines, in May 2010 when he became my liaison officer in Bagh-
dad, Iraq, as part of the Maritime Task Force provid-
ing defense for critical Iraqi national oil infrastructure, and also conducting the transition of these responsi-
bilities to the Iraqi Navy. He ensured that U.S. Forces Iraq (USF-I) were able to understand the many intri-
cate issues that the Maritime Task Force dealt with and to decode the naval language into “land-speak.”

It was during this time that USF-I transitioned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to Operation NEW DAWN on September 1, 2010, at a ceremony in the Al Faw Palace, Victory Base Complex, in Baghdad. General Raymond T. Odierno handed the reins of office to General Lloyd J. Austin III, while watched by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden. The location was very sig-
nificant as it represented the center of Saddam Hus-
sein’s power that was now being handed back to the Iraqi nation after many years of hardship. Although the work was not finished, there was a cautious op-
timism. USF-I’s purpose would now be Stability Op-
erations, rather than Combat Operations. The Iraqi Security Forces were now to come more to the fore and be responsible for Combat Operations, although my Command (Task Force Iraqi Maritime) still had Combat Operational Rules of Engagement (ROE) that gave United Kingdom (UK) and U.S. Naval assets the authority to engage with hostile forces in the Maritime environment. (Major Dave Fielder, Royal Marines, was in a unique position. He was the only UK service-
man and member of USF-I and he acted as the liaison officer for the only official Combat Operation that was continuing.)
This monograph has focused on Command, Leadership, and Management (CLM) within a stability operational environment, although many of the lessons throughout can be applied to generic situations. The monograph takes a hypothesis from Keith Grint (who has long studied CLM) and applies it to a number of case studies in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It then combines these results with qualitative interviews with a number of selected key players who have been involved in the delivery of Stability Operational effects. It does not end there—the conclusion provides a focus for further development of what is deemed to be an initial foray into this field of study.

The topic of this monograph is important. Issues such as the impact of globalization, the various causes of international instability, and the issue of whether to militarily intervene will resonate for at least the next decade or so. Where military intervention is deemed necessary, how this intervention is executed by those in power is vital to success. Any guidance that can be provided to the commanders, leaders, and managers within this operational environment can only help towards positive and successful end states. Major Fielder has produced a significant piece of work during his deployment in Iraq that hopefully will add important value to this field of study.

Commodore Tony Radakin Royal Navy Commander Task Force Iraqi Maritime Bahrain October 2010
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DAVE FIELDER is a major in the United Kingdom (UK) Royal Marine (Reserve) and has been on a variety of active and deployed service since 2002. He completed regular commissioned service with the Royal Navy where, after a brief flying career, he served as a Lieutenant Royal Navy with Commando Royal Marines; the Commando Training Centre, Royal Marines; and at HMS Collingwood in a variety of training and operational roles. Major Fielder has been deployed to Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina (as the European Forces (EUFOR) Press Spokesman), Afghanistan, and most recently Iraq. During his time in Bosnia, he had regular exposure to the highest levels of political and military command and thus began his interests in the link between Commander, Leadership, and Management (CLM) as they are implemented in stability operations. After Bosnia, Major Fielder returned to the Royal Navy Command HQ as a Military Aide to a Royal Marine Brigadier and completed his dissertation. Major Fielder recently returned from Baghdad, Iraq, where he was the LNO to a Maritime Component, representing a NAVCENT Bahrain based UK Naval One Star to the U.S. Forces-Iraq in the J3 lane of the Joint Operations Center. He witnessed the transition from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to Operation NEW DAWN. Major Fielder is a graduate of the Advanced Command and Staff Course at the UK Joint Command and Staff College.
SUMMARY

This monograph addresses the topic of Command-Leadership-Management (CLM) success attributes in Stability Operations and is intended to reach a wide audience of actors, including military and civilian deliverers of effect at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations. It was developed from a dissertation and updated while the author was deployed in Iraq at a time of transition from Combat Operations (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) to fully declared Stability Operations (Operation NEW DAWN).

It begins with some definitions of Stability Operations used to provide a framework upon which to base the study. The whole arena of Stability Operations suffers from disparate and wide-ranging definitions, doctrines, and methods of delivery; thus a baseline is provided. Concepts of State, based on the Westphalian Principle, are provided by Lord Paddy Ashdown, who has a wide degree of experience as both a military officer (Royal Marine), a politician (Leader of the United Kingdom [UK] Liberal Democratic Party), and also as the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)/European Union Special Representative (EUSR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ashdown also provides a very usable framework of Success Criteria based on his experiences. A recent monograph from Nicholas Armstrong and Jacqueline Chura-Beaver is also cited to show some excellent work on the components, types, and approaches to “Transition in Stability Operations.”

Next follows a key discussion about getting things done, using a conceptual framework of CLM based on a methodology from Grint. Grint talks about problem solving and his concepts of critical, wicked, and tame
problems are aligned directly to CLM styles of getting things done. The paper concludes with definitions of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations and how they may be useful to add depth beyond a 2-dimensional view of CLM. Some attributes of these levels are discussed in outline and are used throughout further discussions and analysis.

An analysis is provided of some organizations that are involved in stability operations (UK, the United States, and the United Nations[UN]) and also entities that conduct stability operations (European Union [EU], North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], and the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC]). The UK framework is identified as having both Ministry of Defence (MoD) and stabilization unit organizations that deliver stability effect. The UK doctrine is based on a comprehensive approach, and the problems of severe budgetary pressures are also discussed.

The U.S. approach to stability operations has changed significantly in the past 20 years, with the greatest changes occurring as a result of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Significant doctrinal improvements have occurred. Stability operations are now being built upon unity of effort; a comprehensive, collaborative, and cooperative approach; and a shared vision of a common goal, which takes the UK model a step further. The UN discourse looks at its history and reasons for conducting stability operations and also how it attempts to do this. Operational concepts are identified, and strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis is conducted. The entities of the EU, NATO, and the ICRC all receive a similar treatment identifying their mandates and methods and having SWOT applied. The NATO discussions are continued in the Balkans and Afghanistan case stud-
ies since they are examples of this particular entity in action.

Three case studies from the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan are provided to identify how CLM has been delivered. The Balkans is an example of how stability operations have progressed with closure and success being a strong theme. Iraq is a case study that looks at an initial combat operation that did not plan for an inevitable stability requirement, but which demanded it. The subsequent longer-term involvement and surge requirement outline how the United States and its coalition allies finally addressed the questions that were posed before the invasion. The transition to stability operations theme is covered. With a final end state yet to be seen, Afghanistan has a similar longevity to Iraq, with Afghanistan now being the longest war for the United States. There are still heavy demands on the creation of security space before the process of transition and stability can truly commence. Throughout, all of these examples of CLM are expanded upon, identifying both success and failure, some of them being significant in terms of public strategic problems.

It is recognized that the sample size in the questionnaire is not large; however, the richness of the sources outweigh the paucity of data (“never mind the size, feel the quality”). The development of the analysis of the raw data is conducted independently across the Command-Critical, Leadership-Wicked and Management-Tame concepts. The final identification of success attributes is seen as a two-dimensional set of criteria. However, thinking during the analysis suggests that these attributes need to be considered across strategic, operational, and tactical levels. A model for future research has been provided to identify a potential three-dimensional model, and a set of pilot ques-
tions has been created. These concepts and potential future research area are still embryonic; there is a recommendation that this be pursued.

A number of annexes that contain the raw data and the questionnaire used in the main body are also part of this analysis, recognizing that this level of detail may be of interest to only a small portion of readers. These are available at pksoi.army.mil.
DEFINING COMMAND, LEADERSHIP, AND MANAGEMENT SUCCESS FACTORS WITHIN STABILITY OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

This monograph addresses the topic of Command-Leadership-Management (CLM) success attributes in stability operations and is intended to reach a wide audience of actors including military and civilian deliverers of effect at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations. It was developed from a previous work and updated while the author was deployed in Iraq at a time of transition from combat operations (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM) to fully declared stability operations (Operation NEW DAWN).

As the whole arena of stability operations suffers from disparate and wide-ranging definitions, doctrines, and methods of delivery, a baseline is provided which includes a discussion about “getting things done” using a conceptual framework of CLM based on a work by Keith Grint.\textsuperscript{1} Strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations definitions are provided as well since they may be useful to add depth beyond a two-dimensional view of CLM. An overview of key organizations and entities that are involved in stability operations is presented.

Case study analyses are presented for the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan which describe how CLM has been delivered. Lastly, a summary is included which addresses findings and emerging information, and develops strategic leadership in stability operations beyond a two-dimensional model. Detailed methodology, questionnaires, and other considerations are available from pksoi.army.mil.
DEFINITIONS

Stabilization Definitions.

Stabilization: The process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support the preconditions for successful longer-term development.²

Many definitions surround the concepts of stabilization, peace enforcement, peace making, peacekeeping, intervention, and reconstruction operations as well as other similar concepts. They span time spectrums from prevention, intervention, and post-event perspectives.

At a conference at the United Kingdom (UK) Commando Training Centre in 2009, Colonel Stuart Birrell of the Royal Marines and a member of the (Royal) Naval Staff, identified and presented a Prevention-Intervention Curve. Derived from the UK Maritime military, it is a useful time domain tool that identifies where and how particular definitions exist. However, studies of other nations’ doctrine may show variations on this theme which, while similar, can cause confusion. The arena of stability operations is an organic environment difficult to define due to each intervention being different in nature. However, doctrines can emerge to assist and provide a tool box which commanders, leaders, and managers can draw from and make use of as required.
For consistency purposes, the term stability operations will be employed throughout, but it is noted that different nations and even organizations within nations use differing terms. Such operations can occur either with or without consent, from both the international and/or local communities. Many actors are involved which include single nation-states, coalitions, and international organizations such as the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Concepts of State.

Lord Paddy Ashdown, experienced in stability operations through a career that has spanned military service and United Kingdom (UK) political leadership as well as a senior leadership in the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) within Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), has outlined some useful definitions and criteria that help provide a baseline.

According to Ashdown, the Westphalian Principles are used to describe the exact criteria needed for a state to be a state. Namely, that it needs the attributes of a state and that it behaves like a state at home and fulfills the duties of a state abroad. Thus, it needs effective control of a delineated territory with state borders; it provides services to its citizens; and interacts with other states in an equal and reciprocal manner. This implies that to be a state (or member of the club) it must fulfill the criteria laid out above. When the alignment of a state’s aims and ambitions moves away from accepted international norms, then the potential for prevention and intervention actions arise, such as recent examples in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and this leads to the need for stability operations.

Ashdown’s Stabilization Success Criteria.

Ashdown has discussed stability operations success criteria that fall largely into two areas as outlined below. While lists of required tasks are provided, the order and sequencing of these will change depending on circumstances, and quite often they will occur in a nonlinear, concurrent, and overlapping manner. To prescribe a sequenced model that must be followed in order to achieve stability success will not be useful as
each intervention and stability operation has different characteristics that must be dealt with individually.

- **Dominate the Security Space and Ensure the Rule of Law**—a priority from day 1, speed being essential, perhaps a command function that will be defined later. Utilize your own security forces or existing security forces, co-opted immediately after a ceasefire. U.S. forces had planned to take 20 Military Police Companies (4,500 personnel) into Iraq in the 2003 invasion, but this was reduced to just three. In the later occupation phase, the number was increased to 20, but this was too late for the initial phase. It is important to provide this capability quickly so as to minimize any inrush of corruption and criminal activity which can easily destabilize stabilization and reconstruction efforts. In addition, it is important to maintain the rule of law, avoid a “bring them home by Christmas” culture, and ensure that a “there until the job is done” attitude occurs and is supported.

- **Holistic Approach**—known as a **Comprehensive Approach** in some quarters. This includes **economic regeneration**, one of the key components to follow once security and rule of law are established. Any state that has had intervention typically will have suffered from economic pressure. External funding to commence the process is essential which requires a financial assist from other countries, but the payback in stabilization and growth is worth the effort. Another area is **governance establishment** that includes **security sector reform (SSR)** for both defense and police forces; maintenance of
education or even establishment; and continuation of elections. A **Mission Implementation Plan** is needed with milestones and timelines defined. The milestones will need to include attention to infrastructure reconstruction, refugee return, property, repossession, humanitarian aid, transport infrastructure, human rights provision, defense and intelligence services, local government, customs, police, health, and education.

**Smith’s Utility of Force.**

General Rupert Smith (British Army Retired) has a rich background in intervention and stability operations, having served with the British Army, NATO, and coalitions—specifically in the Balkans and Iraq. He identifies as a useful concept **Utility of Force,** which in essence describes the prevention-intervention-stabilization curve in the current environment. The essential concepts from a stability operation context are identified below.

- **Analysis.** Current thinking is to assume industrial war where states are aligned against states; thus, there remains the potential for this ongoing globalization process—to generate more “wars amongst the people.” The application of military force alone will not achieve success, and a decision should be made on a desired outcome or end state (including political, military, economic factors) before applying any force. This is a strategic function that has impact on operational planning.

- **Law and Conflict.** The desired generic outcome of war is a “stable state, democratically
governed, in which the rule of law functions, society is developed, and the economy is run in a reliable way.” The UN Charter helps to explain when it is legal to go to war. However, this basis is for war between industrial states. “When operating amongst the people hold in mind that the military are there to impose order. When faced with violent disorder it is your duty to quell it.”7 Using force outside of legal or moral boundaries will not have utility. Sometimes the legal mandate may not be met, but the moral mandate can demand action. Interaction with civilian authorities is crucial. To ensure local (and other) support (or campaign authority), military measures must be focused on lawbreakers identified through good information and intelligence; precision in arrest or attack; and successful prosecution. If it backfires, then support will evaporate and strategic advantage can be lost. Leadership functions are required here that can solve difficult problems despite time constraints.

- **Planning.** A detailed program is not required here, but rather a broad outline; an intended pattern of events; allocation of responsibilities, authority, and resources; and coherent, focused, and networked effects achieved. Two sets of questions across different levels of war have been designed by Smith. The true institutional difficulty is in bringing the agencies together to answer all the questions. “It must never be forgotten that such planning is for the advantageous ending of a conflict emanating from a confrontation.”8
Law 29. Plan all the way to the end. The ending is everything. Plan all the way to it, taking into account all the possible consequences, obstacles, and twists of fortune that might reverse your hard work and give the glory to others. By planning to the end, you will not be overwhelmed by circumstances and you will know when to stop. Gently guide fortune and help determine the future by thinking far ahead.  

- **Institutional Thinking.** The difficulty is in harnessing the efforts of all the agencies in theater to a single purpose, thus creating a unity of effort. Civilian-military stabilization operational assets are responsible, but are often a secondary consideration in planning; therefore, when they become main effort (following or during the fighting), they are typically under-resourced and under-trained. Structures are needed to consider and manage all agencies. The UN has a wide mandate but no actual troops. NATO has military only but not other agency support. The EU has much potential as it has all the agencies, but they can be difficult to motivate across its current 27 nations. A campaign must be thought of as a whole: preparation, invasion, occupation, nation-building, and withdrawal rather than a series of discrete events, all getting discrete attention. War among the people is conducted best as an intelligence and information operation, not as one of maneuver and attrition.  

- **The News Media.** Media must be part of any planning and cannot be ignored. The media become the source of any context for playing out the acts in theater. Getting the story right from the start is important. To fight for the will of the
people without use of the media is a mistake. A narrator is needed who speaks with authority and who is in the mind of the commander.

Law 37: Create compelling spectacles. Striking imagery and grand symbolic gestures create the aura of power—everyone responds to them. Stage spectacles for those around you, full of arresting and radiant symbols that heighten your presence. Dazzled by appearances, no one will notice what you are really doing.11

- **War among the people.** The Iraq 2003 campaign aimed to achieve a democratic state operating to Western norms: open free trade, no internal or external safety or security threats. The military planning only allowed for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein but ignored the subsequent nation-building, thus exposing the limitations of military force. The effect was felt at the tactical and operational level, and hence the strategic aims listed above were not met until the correct effect was put into the operational theater. “The people are not the enemy. The enemy is amongst the people and the purpose of any use of military force and other power is to differentiate between the enemy and the people.”12 Correct analysis based on the planning questions is essential to identify the use and limits of military force and other aspects of stabilization operations.

Law 42: Strike the shepherd and the sheep will scatter. Trouble can often be traced to a single strong individual—the stirrer, the arrogant underling, the
poisoner of goodwill. If you allow such people room to operate, others will succumb to their influence. Do not wait for the troubles they cause to multiply, do not try to negotiate with them—they are irredeemable. Neutralise their influence by isolating or banishing them. Strike at the source of the trouble and the sheep will scatter.¹³

- **Utility of Force.** Military force is a valid option, among others, and must be used in conjunction with political, economic, and diplomatic levers of power. Forces have moved from defending territory to securing people and a way of life. To mount security operations, there are certain constraints. These constraints are that they will be *expeditionary; multinational;* will involve *nonmilitary agencies; and* will *last a long time.* Military headquarters provide a framework for multidisciplinary and multinational forces. Commanders at sub-strategic levels using military force also need to understand the powers of diplomatic, political, economic, and humanitarian organs, etc. This wider context is needed to achieve the strategic objective.

**FURTHER DEFINITIONS: TRANSITIONS WITHIN OPERATIONS**

Sustained pressure by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and U.S. Forces Iraq (USF-I) ensures that enemy capabilities are reduced. The moment that pressure is reduced, we will see an increase in enemy operations. This pressure must continue throughout transition.¹⁴

The full spectrum of operations as defined in *Field Manual (FM) 3.0, Operations* moves from peace to war
and back. Also, as shown in Figure 1, Prevention-Intervention Curve, there will be transitions between the war and peace. In the middle, there is a mixture of other operations that can be classed as stability operations. Thus, the process of transition(s) is integral to full spectrum operations. (See Figure 2.)

![Figure 2. Full Spectrum of Operations.](image)

There is a school of thought that has identified areas of transitions after or even during conflict:

Transition is a multi-faceted concept involving the application of tactical, operational, strategic, and international level resources (means) over time in a sovereign territory to influence institutional and environmental conditions for achieving and sustaining clear societal goals (ends), guided by local rights to self-determination and international norms. Transition is inherently complex, and may include multiple, smaller-scale
transitions that occur simultaneously or sequentially. These small-scale activities focus on building specific institutional capacities and creating intermediate conditions that contribute to the realization of long-term goals.15

In their recent publication, *Harnessing Post-Conflict Transitions: A Conceptual Primer*, Nicholas Armstrong and Jacqueline Chura-Beaver16 have defined the components of transition:

1. **Process**: “[Has] clear steps to measure progress at operational and tactical levels . . . well suited to military assets . . . specific guidelines to organize entities to deal with transitional activities.”

2. **Authority Transfer**: A strategic indicator that a host nation has capability and willingness to take on authority for all aspects of statehood.

3. **Phasing**: A strategic view of political, military, social, and economic activities measured over time domains and levels with transition points to gauge success.

4. **End State**: The ground conditions have changed to more normal standards of governance, economic stability, and security which have strategic value. Being used more as a benchmark for success and uses the products from process, authority transfer, relies on phasing as measurements at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Table 1 has been constructed from the characteristics described above and applied to the levels of operations in order to visually assist understanding.
Table 1. Transition Components in Context.

Armstrong and Chura-Beaver\textsuperscript{17} also defined types of transition:

- **War to peace transitions.** “The broadest form of transition . . . both interstate and intrastate conflict . . . [from] global, regional and domestic levels of analysis.” Because of the potential scope of this type of transition, it includes actors such as the UN, NATO, and the World Bank. “Leadership styles . . . play a key role in the collective decisions of groups to engage in violence or peaceful political processes.” Demilitarization, prevention of criminal violence, and generation of accountable security forces figure prominently in this form of transition, backing up Ashdown’s arguments earlier about dominating the security space and ensuring the rule of law.
• **Power transitions.** This pertains to the balance of power in the international and regional arena, with implications for both peace and security.

• **Social transitions.** Focuses heavily on humanitarian action and development of civil society, but must also avoid dependencies on intervention agencies. Cultural awareness is a key attribute.

• **Political and democratic transitions.** The largest body of work and perhaps one of the most difficult. This occurs at national and community levels. One important point to note is that political transition may not see a democratic transition; however, a democratic transition by nature is a political transition. Within the arena of stability operations, it is not always necessary to generate a complete western democratic system—often this imposition can result in a mere veneer of stability with corruption and a lack of true governance existing.

• **Security transitions.** Ashdown has been quoted earlier to the effect that this is a key area for intervention and stability operations. “A security transition is the turbulent process from a condition of insecurity to one of stability, with legitimate host-nation control over an effective security sector.” At the end of August 2010, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM transitioned to Operation NEW DAWN when the United States officially ended combat operations on the land. However, it was not the end of involvement, since the stability operation continued but in a different and evolving manner. This is discussed later in the Iraq Case Study.
• **Economic transitions.** Economic transitions center on nations that have experienced or are simultaneously experiencing internal conflict and social, political, and security transitions. Three phases are recommended: Financial Stabilization, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, and Long-Term Comprehensive Development. This strongly implies that transition (and stability operations themselves) must have a long-term view. A “troops home by Christmas” mentality will not work.

Figure 3 shows transition types and the level of analysis.

![Figure 3. Transition Types and Levels of Analysis.](image)
Armstrong and Chura-Beaver have also outlined approaches to transition.\textsuperscript{18}

- **Whole of Government Approach.** This includes collaborative efforts for defense, diplomacy, and development as delivered by military and civilian agencies. The U.S. Government has a common framework of tactical and operational activities that work toward a strategic goal—a strategic top-down approach.

- **Mentoring and Advising Approach.** Making use of military tactical and operational tools in a prominent role to support a strategic end state.

- **Comprehensive Approach.** Similar to the Whole of Government approach that spans all three levels but concentrates on operational and tactical activity typically employing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The key is in the strategic planning, which, if not properly conducted, will lead to a lack of focus and to potential “unity of command” problems.

- **Counterinsurgency (COIN) Approach.** Has a three-pronged strategy to Clear-Hold-Build. A unity of effort from transition forces is required to gain support and legitimacy for effective host nation institutions to grow. John Nagl suggests that concentrating solely on military effects will not achieve a satisfactory end state; all aspects such as social, political, and economic factors need equal attention.\textsuperscript{19}

- **Developmental Approach.** This looks at the position along the various phases (or lines of operations) and applies modulated effort as conditions improve. It does not consider an end-state to be only a localized effort. It is a
flexible and adaptive approach that can react to situations and is tactically focused.

GETTING THINGS DONE

Stability operations are about getting things done—achieving an end-state; improving security; and increasing or improving governance and economic capabilities, among many other priorities. This paper hopes to generate an understanding of CLM success attributes within stability operations. The span of the CLM constructs has provided rich ground for writers, thinkers, students, and researchers. It is useful to understand a few of these existing constructs and use them to help provide a framework for future discussions of stability operations CLM Attributes.

Major General Robison° (February 28, 2005), former Commandant of the Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, defines CLM as follows: command is the power or authority earned by rank, position, experience, or expertise—placing a person in charge of whatever happens; Leadership is the art, the application of personal qualities, knowledge, skills, and behavior to influence and inspire others to succeed; and Management is the science, the application of the functions necessary to achieve the aim. Command can be defined by the formula:

\[
\text{Command} = \text{Leadership} + \text{Management}. 
\]

The leadership qualities are listed in the Royal Marine Officer Training Syllabus as judgment, bearing, willpower, integrity, intelligence, confidence, courage, and knowledge. To complete the formula, Management functions are listed as planning, orga-
nizing, controlling, coordinating, supporting, communicating, evaluating, and encouraging. Both factors in the formula are vital and complementary. Without one, command will fall apart.

It is the ethos that ensures motivation in getting things done, and when the ethos is poor, then work streams suffer. In the context of stability operations, it is apparent that a healthy ethos and hence motivation, born from the trinity of command, leadership and management, are essential to ensure that projects and programs are effective.

Whilst personal qualities of the leader are undoubtedly important they are unlikely to be sufficient in themselves for the emergence and exercise of leadership.\textsuperscript{21}

Robison (February 28, 2005) proposes that the three factors—command, leadership, and management—can all be on the same side of the equation; for algebraic purists this would cause problems, but it is important to remember that this is an art rather than a science and the “art of the possible” has been applied. A view that suggests events or problems that need to have a solution will use a combination of all three factors. In formulaic terms this may be expressed as:

\[
\text{Problem Solving} = \text{Command} + \text{Leadership} + \text{Management}.
\]

The amount of effort required from each of the factors will vary, depending on the problems encountered and the type of solution applied. Grint\textsuperscript{22} suggested a link between the uncertainty of problems and the level of collaboration required to solve them. Within the military model, there is a definition of the levels
of collaboration as described above. The three areas of problems are defined within the following discrete discussions on command, leadership, and management.

**COMMAND CONSIDERATIONS — COMMANDING CHANGE**

Critical Problems are those that need a solution now. Grint proposed that command collaboration is best suited to this type of problem. It implies that minimum discussion is required and the “just do it” approach should be used. Quite often, this is a very simplistic approach and is best suited to those that have simple solutions to problems. For example, if a fire is raging in someone’s office, there does not need to be a discussion. The solution is simple—extinguish the fire. Within stability operations, the early stages can often require immediate intervention to avoid potentially catastrophic outcomes such as humanitarian or political disasters. Little time is left for complex diplomatic discussion to save or preserve life, but it can require a brave decision in favor of intervention. Areas of command are frequently dynamic and need decisive, interventionist actions—it is a time for change.

At strategic levels, critical problems can often have public or even political pressure applied to ensure the fire is out. However, operational or tactical constraints need consideration prior to successful intervention.

Military doctrine also talks about command. It is a key element of combat and is vital to ensure success for military operations, having a place in both peace and conflict. It alludes to the need for a command function within the arena of stabilization operations as part of
the spectrum of operations. It is the authority vested in an individual for the planning, direction, coordination, and control of military forces but can extend to nonmilitary resources. The exercise of command encompasses the authority, responsibility, and duty to act. We have an alignment of command solutions to critical problems which will be expanded upon as the paper progresses.

**LEADERSHIP CONSIDERATIONS – LEADING CHANGE?**

Leadership is a blend of persuasion, compulsion, and example, a combination that makes individuals do what their commander wants of them, even when the task is not essentially to their liking.\(^\text{24}\)

*Caveat emptor* (let the buyer beware): The discussions and study on leadership are vast in number and can lead along many paths; in this monograph, a simple set of statements is used to encapsulate the framework for further examination. This is to allow a defined and focused approach to a field of study riddled with academic minefields.

Grint\(^\text{25}\) defines **wicked problems** as those that are often ambiguous or very complex. Also, they may not be time dependent to the extent that critical problems impose. The solution requires a **leadership style** where collaboration is high. In the context of stability operations, this could involve high-level diplomatic intervention across a number of international boundaries, potentially involving the UN. This may require negotiations to generate the authority for intervention, typically in the form of a UN resolution. It requires drive and energy from a single focal point of leader-
ship to guide it through to the end state. Areas of leadership, similar to command, are dynamic. Charisma is often the required characteristic and again—change is requisite. A further topic to be treated in this analysis is the alignment of leadership solutions to wicked problems.

**MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS—MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO?**

Tame problems do not require urgent action, even if they may be complex, and Grint prescribes a management solution. The level of collaboration does not necessarily need to be extensive but still needs some consideration. Once a force is established in a theater of operation, there are many tasks that need completing, e.g., rebuilding infrastructure or establishing economic capability. While these may require specific expertise within stability operations, they are relatively easy. Areas of management are frequently viewed as having an even tempo and rhythm.

Lord Admiral Horatio Nelson felt that there was no difference between leadership and management. He saw these factors as being part of the same overall capability required from him (Problem Solving = Command + Leadership + Management).\(^{26}\) In the same document, a very recent Royal Naval First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, stated that leadership is about instigating change and that management is about maintaining the status quo (a horizontal relationship). Sir David Ormand\(^{27}\) has pointed out that sustained operational performance requires leadership at all levels, particularly in administration (a vertical relationship).
However one looks at the concept of management, whether as a singular characteristic, part of the command-leadership-management equation, or a vertical or horizontal component of leadership, it is clear that there needs to be maintenance of the status quo in certain aspects. Stability operations are about moving from chaos to stability, from danger to safety, and from poverty to prosperity. But it is important that some aspects within this change remain constant.

LEVELS OF OPERATIONS

So far, pure definitions of command, leadership, and management have been presented, but we have not explored at what levels these ways of getting things done can be applied specifically within the field of stability operations. These definitions of the levels of war or operations have been derived from both UK and U.S. doctrine.

- **The Strategic Level:** The strategic level concerns the application of the full range of national resources in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve policy and security objectives and guidance determining the strategic end state. This is the domain of the head of state and government. The military is one component of the national resources. Commanders base their theater strategic planning on this end state. To ensure that military strategy is consistent with national interests and policy, commanders participate in a strategic discourse with the national authorities, other relevant domestic actors, and also multinational partners. Although the changing nature of politics, economics, and technology has added to the com-
plexity of the strategic level, military strategists face the same challenges as their forbears: developing, deploying, sustaining, recovering, and redeploying military forces for the attainment of political objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.

— **Strategic Attributes.** Either as a combined effort or in isolation, the ability to create a vision or mission statement with intent and end state is perhaps the most important attribute at strategic levels. An understanding of the operational planning (“is this plan possible?”) and all the constraints are required.

• **The Operational Level.** The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. The operational level is about employment and provides the vital link between strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces. It links employing tactical forces to achieving the strategic end state. At the operational level, commanders conduct campaigns and major operations to establish conditions that define that end state. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. A major opera-
tion is a series of tactical actions conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. Major operations are not solely the purview of combat forces and are typically conducted with the other instruments of national power. Major operations bring together the capabilities of other agencies, nations, and organizations.

- **Operational Attributes.** Experienced operational commanders understand tactical realities and can create conditions that favor tactical success. Likewise, good tactical commanders understand the operational and strategic context within which they execute their assigned tasks. This understanding helps them seize opportunities (both foreseen and unforeseen) that contribute to establishing the end state or defeating enemy initiatives that threaten its achievement. Operational commanders require experience at both the operational and tactical levels. This experience gives them the knowledge and intuition needed to understand how tactical and operational possibilities interrelate.

- **Tactical Level.** The level at which actions actually take place. Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The
tactical-level commander uses combat power in battles, engagements, and small-unit actions. A battle consists of a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement. Battles can affect the course of a campaign or major operation. An engagement is a tactical conflict, usually between opposing, lower echelon maneuver forces. Engagements are typically conducted at brigade level and below. They are usually short, executed in terms of minutes, hours, or days.

— **Tactical Attributes.** This is where most of the human interaction occurs between those conducting the stability operation and those experiencing its effects. The attributes most in demand will be those assuring that skillful execution occurs across the command-leadership-management/critical-wicked-tame framework discussed here. Day-to-day interaction is essential. Commanders, leaders, and managers need to be comfortable in both the interpersonal and technical aspects of their duties.

The levels of operations can be expressed in terms of strategic, operational, and tactical as already outlined. As described by Christopher Kolenda,\textsuperscript{28} **vision** is formed from combined concepts of **telos** (end state) and **eidos** (ideas); **arete** is the moral virtue or excellence of an individual, defined as the moral order of the soul. **Paideia** is the education or learning process. Thus for commanders, leaders, and managers, it can be stated that in order to learn at all levels of operations, they need to have vision and moral virtue. Quite how this is manifested in practice requires further analysis.
ORGANIZATIONS AND ENTITIES

It seems necessary to discuss those organizations and entities that, by their nature, are involved in stability operations and thus require leadership well adapted to that role. Three organizations involved in stability operations are the UK, the United States, and the UN. While the first two are nation-states, in the context of stability operations they can be considered organizations. They have well-developed political, military, and economic capacities to deal with stability operations. Additional to the three organizations are three entities that conduct stability operations because of their organic capabilities as well as their mandates. These are NATO, the EU, and the ICRC. NATO and the EU are analyzed from a military perspective. The use of the terms organizations and entities is entirely arbitrary for the purposes of this paper and has no formal policy or doctrinal basis. The use of strengths-weakness-opportunities-threats (SWOT) analysis for both organizations and entities is shown. Though some may see this as a somewhat simplistic process, some interesting strategic and organizational discussions have arisen from this form of analysis.

The United Kingdom.

The UK has two foci for stability operations: The Ministry of Defence (MoD), which uses the term Peace Support Operations (PSO), and the Stabilisation Unit, which uses the term stability operations. The Stabilisation Unit (formerly known as the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit) is jointly made up of elements from the Department for International Development (DFiD),
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and MoD personnel. It provides “specialist and targeted assistance in countries emerging from violent conflict where the UK is helping to achieve a stable environment that will enable longer-term development to take place.” UK PSO/Stability Operations can be encompassed within the following:

An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peace keeping, peace building and/or humanitarian operations.

The UK emphasizes a comprehensive approach, and this is where planning and execution are coordinated across multiple government departments and any other potential participants. This approach seeks unity of effort across all involved departments, and it remains to be seen if this goal is indeed achieved. The UK and most NATO-oriented nations recognize the different levels of operations, which have already been outlined.

The following instruments of power are defined for UK national constructs, but where there are coalition operations in process, these definitions work just as well. The correct and appropriate mix is key to success but difficult to achieve.

- **The Diplomatic Instrument**: An ability to negotiate, to broker agreements, to massage relationships between allies/partners, and to achieve an acceptable end state by force of argument rather than other means.
• **The Economic Instrument:** It is multifaceted and needs to be used appropriately. Sanctions can be controversial as they are imprecise and often not timely. They are often used in conjunction with various forms of military power.

• **The Military Instrument:** It is a definitive instrument, often a last resort, and often employed in stability operations environments. In this case, the end state of the military instrument is the creation of a security space in order to allow the restoration of peace.

UK military power is generated from capabilities of the separate services, namely, Sea (the Royal Navy), Land (the British Army), and Air (the Royal Air Force). These forces invariably operate within a **joint** environment, meaning that they work together to accomplish a common mission and end state. They also operate at times with other national military forces in a **combined** manner. Single-service specialties are so narrow that when a service is working in isolation, it encounters problems in stability operations. The key success factor is generation of a force capable of conducting its mission; thus planning becomes essential. This can equally apply to the majority of Western military forces.

UK intent for stability operations is found within the [*United Kingdom National Security Strategy*](#) which states that:

The ultimate responsibility for our national security lies with the United Kingdom, but collective action—notably through the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)—remains the most effective way of managing and reducing the threats we face, and the only prospect of eliminating any of them completely.
The threats and drivers are increasingly trans-national, and demand a trans-national response.\textsuperscript{31}

This implies that the UK remains committed to the Prevention-Intervention Curve and has capabilities that are currently credible. However, at this time the UK suffers extreme budgetary deficits, and a new coalition government is conducting a Strategic Defence and Security Review. The focus for UK security is yet to be redefined following 13 years of a pro-expeditionary Labour Government. Fiscal pressures across all government departments have encouraged a debate as to whether there will be any appetite for a continuation of such policies in the near future. This could have an effect on future stability operations, either new or ongoing.

**The United States.**

"Be under no illusions, America is at war."	extsuperscript{32}

Brown, 2009

Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United States has increased its participation in international interventions leading to further stability operations. It continues to be involved in the Balkans (BiH and Kosovo), using a robust approach.

Although *FM 3-0, Operations*, provides the overarching authority for full spectrum operations, other doctrine exists that addresses specific stability operations management. On publication of *U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations*, in 2009, a mixed audience of military and political leadership co-chaired the event and included representatives from the U.S. Army, U.S. Department of State Office...
of Stabilization and Reconstruction, United States Institute for Peace (USIP), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). FM 3-07 was developed at the U.S. Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as a response to 7 years of persistent irregular conflict. FM 3-07, in conjunction with FM 3-0, and Field Manual (FM) 3-24 Counterinsurgency, provides a clear roadmap for the U.S. military to act in stability operations in coordination with political and economic agencies. Due to recent experiences such as the Balkans, Iraq, and even Afghanistan, there is now agreement that stability operations are essential in “winning the war” and more importantly the peace. Prior to 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) had undervalued the planning of stability operations, and Iraq is a glaring example of this lack of planning. New doctrine recognizes “complex human based contingencies around the world” demanding the participation of interagency, intergovernmental, international, and nongovernmental partners, all of whom must work together. FM 3-07 is designed to help leaders understand the formalized need for stability operations and optimum methods for conducting them.

The U.S. Army maintains a Center of Excellence for stability and peace operations at the strategic and operational levels whose purpose is to “improve military, civilian agency, international and multinational capabilities and execution.”

After the successful initial Iraq invasion followed by the embarrassing stability debacle in 2003, the DoD and DoS have moved closer in conducting cooperative planning at the operational level. There are now established principles that, if adhered to, will ensure a much more coherent approach to stabilization.
The United States is in the process of developing a civilian surge capacity to enhance and complement the military options. A Civilian Response Corps of 4,250 personnel is planned for deployments to crises overseas. It is planned that they will deploy in advance of the military. Ideally, the United States conducts its international dealings according to the three Ds—Defense, Diplomacy, and Development. These principles drive U.S. strategic level goals to ensure a world order that encourages mutual trade and a level of security sufficient to allow trade to blossom.

During a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) presentation, the following themes were broached: the contemporary and unconventional threat has changed; states are less inclined to engage in traditional warfare since the end of the Cold War, but are more inclined to compete in other ways; and non-state actors since 9/11 have grown in prominence and capability to employ violent and nonviolent methods outside of the traditional arena. The keynotes from the discussion provide a useful summary of the U.S. position on stability operations:

- The application of U.S. military power in isolation is increasingly less useful within stability operations—trying to solve a nonmilitary problem with military force. This makes way for a comprehensive, collaborative, and cooperative approach which ensures that all aspects are covered.
- A new strategic competency is required, whereby military and civilian leaders in DoD view their roles as one of risk management and conflict management as opposed to risk elimination and conflict resolution. Risks may not be eliminated but are managed so that there is
a level of strategic equilibrium. This demonstrates a move from complex leadership situations to tame management ones.

- A Whole of Government approach must be adopted. The DoD needs to recognize that it has a role in solving complex unconventional situations that are not necessarily military in nature. Military institutions are large enough to deal with state level stability operations and can use innovative methods other than the use of force.

- Current DoS planning for a post-2011 Iraq raises new questions that have not been posed in such an environment previously.
  - How will security be manifested? Who delivers security after the transition? How will security be delivered after DoD hands over command and control?
  - What level of risk is the DoS prepared to accept? If too risk averse, will the increased costs be acceptable?
  - What is the mission? Will clear intentions and a target end state be developed? Is the mission comprehensive in terms of all instruments of stability operations (political, military, and economic)? Does the DoS have the inherent capability to manage this requirement? Will it have to rely on borrowing DoD assets masquerading as the DoS?

**The United Nations.**

Following World War II, there was a broad realization that world peace without strife or tension was impossible. Zacarias elaborates on this perspective:
Peace is not a state of general tranquility, but rather a network of relationships full of energy and conflict which is nevertheless kept under societal control. Nor is peace either solely a matter of imposing order, or the achievement of any particular vision of justice for all. We need to think of peace not as a condition but as a process, a dynamic state of affairs in which the essential properties arise from how we do things, not what we do.\textsuperscript{36}

We therefore need to see conflict as an inevitable component of a “peaceful” world order. The key is the management of the conflict, which the UN saw as its original role. The UN was chartered in 1945 with several purposes; however, chief among them was to “maintain international peace and security . . . to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression. . . .\textsuperscript{37} Within the Charter, Article 55 expresses the expectation and obligation that the UN also exists to “create the conditions of stability . . . among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self determination of the peoples. . . .”\textsuperscript{38}

The UK, United States, and UN as organizations are compared in Table 2. The results of the SWOT analysis are found in Table 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Organization Comparison</strong></th>
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| **Stability Operations Authority** | UK doctrine recognizes that campaign authority is an amalgam of four factors:  
- Perceived legitimacy of the international mandate  
- Perceived legitimacy of freedom and constraints  
- Degree to which factions subjugate themselves  
- Degree to which PSO activities meet expectations  |
| **FM 3-0** | establishes the Army’s keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations. The doctrine also provides the ability to dominate any situation in military operations other than war. It provides overarching doctrinal direction for the conduct of full spectrum operations detailed in other Army manuals.  |
| **The UN Charter** | was signed on June 26, 1945 in San Francisco and in force on October 26, 1945. The charter provided a mandate and a purpose. Since its inception the UN Charter has developed and evolved and it now consists of a number of chapters that have articles within each chapter.  |
| **Stability Operations: Fundamentals, Doctrine, Policy** |  
- Creating, Sustaining, and Enhancing Campaign Authority  
- Credible and Reasonable Force  
- Perseverance  |
| **U.S. doctrine** | is built upon unity of effort; a comprehensive, collaborative and cooperative approach; and a shared vision of a common goal. All these require strong CLM traits as identified in Chapters 1 and 4.  |
| **The UN** | resulted from the chaos of the Second World War. It had strong motivational drives from all corners of the globe that did not want to see a regeneration of a toothless League of Nations as had come out of the First World War. The UN came into being as an organization set up to ensure peace in a world devastated by years of total war.  |
| **Stability Operations: Guiding Principles, Operational** |  
- Comprehensive campaigning that makes use of all the instruments of power (military, diplomatic, economic) defining strategic objectives.  
- Preventive Action – an enduring aspect of effective stability operations. Proportional, discriminate, and confined action is required for campaign authority.  
- Sensitized Action: Detailed understanding and respect for the law, religion, customs, and actions required.  
- Security: Self-defense, force protection and the space to produce political and economic effects.  
- Transparency: Easily understood and obvious campaign aims well publicized.  |
| **U.S. principles** | are very similar to the UK approach but take the process a bit further:  
- Building partner capacity  
- Strengthening institutions of legitimate governance  
- Establishing and maintaining rule of law  
- Fostering economic growth  
- Helping to forge a strong sense of national unity  |
| **Four operational concepts** | have been outlined:  
- Preventive Diplomacy  
- Peace Making  
- Peace Keeping  
- Peace Building  |

Table 2. Organization Comparison.
Table 3. Organization SWOT Analysis.

**The European Union.**

Until the 1990s, the EU was better known for its role in preventing conflicts between its own member states than among or within Third World countries. Since the 1990s, members’ military forces have become more expeditionary in nature, with recent experience...
in the southeastern European region and the western Balkans. The EU’s High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, asserted that the EU:

... came into existence as an exercise in conflict prevention. A half a century ago, we began the process of recovery from a global conflict of unprecedented dimensions. Today’s European Union was born from the determination of all our peoples that such a conflict should never happen again ... building stability and preventing conflict [are] at the heart of our endeavours.³⁹

**The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.**

The majority of the capabilities of NATO are depicted in Table 4. The case studies clarify these in much more detail.
### Table 4. EU-NATO-ICRC Comparison.

**International Red Cross.**

In 1859 at the Battle of Solferino in the hills of Northern Italy, one of the largest European land battles to that date occurred between France, Austria, and Piedmont (the fledgling Italian state). This bloody
battle was witnessed by a Swiss man, Henri Dunant, who was so appalled by the wounds and lack of effective aftercare that he felt compelled to set up an international organization with a neutral political basis aimed at assisting those who had suffered from war and general disaster. Adopting a reverse of the Swiss flag, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is a humanitarian organization and founding member of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (1863).

At the start of the 21st century, the ICRC is decidedly more professional than ever before in its long history. It is more thoughtful about maximizing as much as possible its independence, neutrality, and impartiality. It has set in place performance-based evaluations to try to capture—measure if you like—the substance of its humanitarian activity. But many policy choices require subjective situational judgment, not quantified data and guidelines.40

D. P. Forsythe alludes to the need to assume the leadership in complex situations, demonstrating the ability to make decisions. Although a single ICRC exists, it is made up of a federation of national cultural bodies such as the British Red Cross and the Red Crescent. As a result, it has suffered from a lack of cohesion. During the 2003 Iraq invasion, there was no unity of effort or centralized planning, lack of which weakened the overall effect. National bodies also have tendencies to remain true to their own national flag and not to the ICRC principles of strict neutrality and humanitarianism. This is a problem that still needs to be addressed in the current and long-term plan. The IRC conducts a multitude of tasks, many familiar to students of history, such as visiting prisoners of war and security detainees; transmitting messages to and
reuniting family members separated by armed conflict; helping find missing persons; helping to facilitate basic health care; and so on—all while respecting international humanitarian law. See Table 4 for entities comparison and Table 5 for a SWOT analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENTITIES SWOT ANALYSIS</th>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
<th>OPPORTUNITIES</th>
<th>THREATS</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>EU structures, although consensus based, are lighter and faster than NATO. EU military capabilities are similar to NATO. EU has strong political influence within Europe. EU can deploy fully integrated, high-capacity civilian reconstruction expertise. This capacity is superior to both the UN and NATO. EU has access to integrated and deployable police mission forces, providing non-military security capabilities. Long term policies exist for conflict prevention, intervention, and management. Short term operational capabilities exist across all requirements.</td>
<td>NATO has a high capacity to cope with difficult interventions being able to deploy large scale forces very quickly (66,000 in a matter of weeks in 1995 in BiH).</td>
<td>EU, NATO and UN must work closer together to ensure greater coherence in intervention/reconstruction work.</td>
<td>The NATO/EU relationship remains incomplete and uneven despite progress. There is no EU head for stabilization operations. EU Council and the EU Commission mean that reporting chains can be muddled. The EU remains less than muscular in terms of the apportionment of aid which can see wastage. Remaining behind events, lack of clear political will, lack of clear strategies, poor planning, over ambitious targets – all hinder current operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>The neutrality of the ICRC ensures a high degree of trust from all actors. Conservative cultural structure includes adherence to detail producing meticulous records that have great utility in many fields.</td>
<td>NATO is exclusively military and hence does not have direct access to a wide array of civilian assets required for reconstruction. NATO allows member states a high degree of influence over their forces. Definitions across conflict prevention and intervention within the EU, UN and NATO are sometimes incoherent and hence add to delays in operations due to lack of commonality. Inter EU pillar rivalry exists causing lack of coherency.</td>
<td>Same as for EU, NATO’s fundamentally changed role to a peacemaking/keeping force has positioned it to be one of the global organizations fully capable of intervention and reconstruction.</td>
<td>A lack of clear political goals could lead to indirection in its military missions. NATO funding mechanisms can undermine operations. Costs fall where they lie which leads to potential reticence in engaging in missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Historically slow to accept change and has lagged behind. Federation prone to national and cultural pressures damaging core principles.</td>
<td>Global presence (12,000 staff in 80 countries) potentially provides very rapid input to any situation requiring some sort of intervention and/or stability operation.</td>
<td>As with all NGOs, it puts itself in harm’s way due to the nature of its mandate. With its declared neutrality, it is unable to accept protection of security thus placing its members at risk.</td>
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Table 5. Entities SWOT.
CASE STUDIES

Three case studies were conducted. The first looks at the Balkans, which since 1992 has had a complex intervention and stabilization history. It is dealt with apart from the succeeding two studies, Iraq and Afghanistan, mainly due to geography—but also because of the mandate and coalition conditions. The second two have a strong degree of overlap as they occurred concurrently, involved very similar coalition actors, and had a number of similar rationales that caused their occurrence.

Yugoslavia and the Western Balkans (1992-?).

In 1992, a collapse of order occurred in the Western Balkans that incorporated the unravelling Yugoslavia and its neighbors. A war between Croatia and Serbia ensued, leading to the deployment of a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to Yugoslavia. This proceeded under a muddled and largely unworkable mandate that was seen to be neither peace-enforcement nor state-building. UNPROFOR assumed that its deployment alone, without resort to force, would be enough to stop warring factions, but this was not the case. A 3-year stalemate led to a Croatian-Serbian agreement to carve up the area now within Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). In 1995, strong declarations from the international community were not matched by credible force levels. A lack of follow-through from the main force suppliers, e.g., UK, France, the United States, and others, ensued. This culminated in massacres at Srebrenica when, in July 1995, the entire village was captured under the eyes of UN peacekeepers. Ap-
proximately 7,000 civilian Muslim men and boys were separated from the women, marched into the hills, and killed. Numbers remain vague as bodies continue to be found in the hills around Srebrenica. Grievances from this are still being felt, and it remains a focal point of current peace efforts within the region. This event evoked greater effort from the international community, and the Dayton Peace Accord was signed later in 1995. This led to the creation of BiH and also saw a large NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) of up to 65,000 troops deployed to create the security space so desperately needed for the rebuilding to occur.

One notable area of success in the region occurred from 1996 to 1998 when Eastern Slovenia was returned to Croatia after having been occupied by Serbia. However, a transitional intervention was required to ensure that this shift was peaceful with strong governance applied. The UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slovenia (UNTAES) can be assessed as a success due to a number of factors:

- **Command:** A unified military and civilian command existed which generated strong leadership and management within UNTAES, in spite of attempted interference from the UN Headquarters in New York that did not have local knowledge of events. This potential meddling, which was manifested in other interventions in the Western Balkans, could have diluted and weakened the mission.

- **Mandate:** The aims of the mandate were deliberately ambitious within the boundaries of a small geo-political area, which created a degree of command push, and hence the energy and drive to succeed was strong. The mandate was robust, leading to clear direction and guidance and little doubt as to the end-state.
• **Resources:** There were appropriate levels of resources and force deployed to implement the mandate. Enough military and civilian agency capability existed to conduct the work stipulated in the mandate.

• **Campaign Authority:** The support of neighboring states facilitated the conduct of the tasks and mission. This ensured that campaign authority and legitimacy existed throughout and were obeyed.

• **Closure:** There was an agreed end state, which once achieved led to the completion of the mission.

Stabilizing BiH has proved more difficult when compared to Eastern Slovenia. The war was largely inconclusive; the country was devastated with many being killed and displaced. BiH was partitioned across three state divides in addition to three religious divides.

In 1997, after the Dayton Peace Accord, a UN Officer of the High Representative (OHR) was established as part of the external intervention for BiH. He also received the additional appointment as EU Special Representative (EUSR) in which capacity he was responsible to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) made up from those who were prepared to commit resources, financial and otherwise. A separate military arm initially consisting of over 60,000 troops was deployed under the IFOR-NATO banner. A host of UN and other agencies deployed, all of which had overlapping, contradictory, and duplicative mandates which complicated the overall endeavor of intervention and stabilization. The OHR was tasked to coordinate all this effort, but had no real power to do so. In
addition, a UN Police mission deployed to BiH in an effort to carry out police reform. The main problem of police corruption was not addressed, and to date this still causes problems within BiH as police reform cannot effectively occur without judiciary reform.

In spite of all these problems, there has been some success within BiH as it is now pursuing membership in both the EU and NATO, the latter through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. IFOR’s Implementation Mission under NATO was later changed to stabilization and renamed SFOR. It is now an EU mission called EUFOR Operation ALTHEA. Military force levels have dropped dramatically from 60,000 to around 7,000 and the OHR UN (political/civilian) mission is preparing to hand over to an EU mission.

BiH has reorganized its government and is now displaying some attributes of true statehood, although there are many issues still to overcome. The best model of success is perhaps the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH). Now a fully integrated organization that intermixes all religions and cultures within units, they operate the NATO Peace Support Operations Training Center (PSOTC) in Sarajevo. Ironically, they are also participating in stabilization tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The following developments have led to the current status within the Balkans:

- **Command:** A commitment was made to long-term stabilization. In spite of the inherent problems in the intervention/stabilization command structures and dislocation between all agencies, the determination to succeed existed. This ensured that BiH would move progressively towards true statehood and away from mere concentration of effort on security. There
has been robust movement toward reform in politics, governance, defense, justice, and the economy.

- **Mandate:** The Dayton Peace Accord was a comprehensive document signed by all involved parties (some of whom were later prosecuted under the International Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia). The offer of EU membership via the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), which is a precursor status based on a set of criteria to be achieved prior to full EU membership, has strengthened the mandate of the Dayton Peace Accord and provided a natural progression.

- **Campaign Authority:** Agreement from within and without meant that there was a willingness to get the job done.

- **Closure:** The main problem is completing the mission rather than what the end-state is. The mix of agencies has slowed the process. BiH has been declared *safe and secure, calm and stable* in terms of its security and governance. But there are still areas of mistrust involving police reform issues.

“Strategy 22 (The Exit **Strategy**) **Know how to end things:** You are judged in this World by how well you bring things to an end. A messy or incomplete conclusion can reverberate for years to come, ruining your reputation in the process. The art of ending things well is knowing when to stop, never going so far that you exhaust yourself or create bitter enemies that embroil you in conflict in the future.”

41
There are many obstacles to overcome, but these are being conducted within an effectively peaceful environment and around the negotiating table. This has survived a test in early 2008, with Kosovo declaring independence from Serbia. Many pessimists had predicted this would bring instability to the region once again. This has not occurred, though there have been minor incidents.

**Iraq (2003-?).**

The first 6 to 12 weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord is often the period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers. Credibility and political momentum lost during this period can often be difficult to regain.42


The Iraq War and subsequent stability operation have been ongoing since 2003. Concurrently, operations are also being conducted in Afghanistan in a related effort. It will be necessary to refer to both theaters of operations. A U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq in 2003 with the aim of regime change and eliminating Iraq’s presumed WMD and capacity to produce them. Planning had begun in earnest in 2002, though concepts for this operation had been in existence since the George H. W. Bush administration. Disagreements over force levels occurred between the DoD and DoS. The invasion phase employed a force of 125,000, which made very rapid progress due its technological and professional superiority over Iraqi forces. However, once the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime occurred, the lack of a comprehensive plan for post-hostilities pacification or reconstitution became evident.
Iraqi security and military forces were dispersed or disbanded, and most governance infrastructures were dissolved. The occupation authority did not have the full range of required resources, and the resulting vacuum led to very serious issues in the region with potentially disastrous strategic implications. There was friction between the DoD and the DoS, primarily over primacy within operations, and disagreements over force levels for security operations following the successful invasion. U.S. military planning (DoD-led) in 2002 for the invasion of Iraq included little focus on humanitarian operations in the post-conflict phase and largely ignored reconstruction efforts. In 2003, despite earlier DoS experience in the Balkans, the DoD was given primacy for post-conflict operations. Secretary of Defense (2002) Donald Rumsfeld failed to plan for difficult and problematic phases within the total joint and interagency effort following the decapitation of the Iraqi government.

The DoS is the natural and logical lead for the Stabilization and Enablement phases, but its resources are not surge capable. It employs approximately 57,000 personnel. The DoD has 2.23 million active and reserve personnel. The U.S. military was not naturally configured for the complete range of phases within any joint operation. However, subsequent experiences developed a wide range of CLM capabilities as witnessed in the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and subsequent Operation NEW DAWN (OND) organizational structures. The Anthony Cordesman study (2006) on the importance of building local capabilities provides an excellent overview. It identified vital lessons learned by U.S. military forces from the initial invasion in 2003 to later stages and beyond. It was clear
that U.S. strategic planning failed to prepare fully for the intervention and occupation stages. Cordesman lists a series of Iraq-centered criteria that reinforce those that Ashdown provides; they have similarities to the comprehensive approach addressed in this paper. The intervention and occupation stages must provide for:

- Police capabilities.
- Local government.
- Infrastructure services.
- Courts.
- Legal institutions.
- Rule of law.

These were all ignored by the U.S.-led coalition in the initial phases. Ideological differences between Western and Islamic civil priorities may generate variance in emphasis, but when one recalls A.H. Maslow's famous hierarchy of human needs: basic needs, safety and security, social belonging, ego, self-esteem and self actualization, there are some priorities that cannot be ignored. Thus, to defeat extremism one must provide for popular security and economic opportunity without oppression.

The real “war on terrorism” can only be won if the religious, political, and intellectual leaders of Islamic countries and communities actively confront and fight neo-Salafi Sunni Islamic extremism at the religious and ideological levels. The “long war” will be lost if such leaders stand aside, take half measures, or compromise with enemies that seek to destroy them and what they believe in. It will be lost if they deny that the real issue is the future of Islam, if they tolerate Islamic violence and terrorism when it strikes at unpopular targets like Israel, or if they continue to try to export the blame for their own failures to other nations, religions, and cultures.43
It is clear from events in Iraq and Afghanistan that the United States (and others) cannot fight alone. They need extensive local support and interaction. Allies representing different values are needed to ensure overall success.

The U.S. does not simply need to transform its military forces to fight terrorists or insurgents. It needs to transform its national security structure to be able to fight civil-military warfare in the ways that rely far more heavily on the development of local forces and capabilities.  

On November 30, 2005, President George W. Bush promulgated a strategy that perhaps should have been implemented from the very beginning of the Iraq intervention. The strategy included three tracks—political, security, and economic—that add up to a comprehensive approach. Each track was given equal importance. Rather than posing a timeline for a declaration of success, these tracks became the measures of success itself, thus defining an end-state that had real value.

Many actors participate in the stability operations process to ensure that all aspects are considered. There are requirements for varying aspects of CLM to ensure that these different actors and agencies all work in accord. Without CLM, a witches’ brew of negative tendencies can coalesce: interagency rivalry, jealousies, mistrust, misunderstanding, and differing perspectives on end states. The Gulf War conflict of 1990-91 and the subsequent invasion in 2003 saw the demise of Saddam Hussein but opened a Pandora’s Box of stabilization needs. With Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM (combat operations) in transition to Operation NEW DAWN (stability operations) during 2010, there have been significant strategic improvements in this theater of operations. While there are many reasons for this success, perhaps the main reason is the commitment to the end-state.

General David Petraeus's achievement (January 2007-September 2008) in Iraq was to push his thoughts down to the lowest level so that everyone on the ground knew what was expected of them, leaving little doubt as to the mission and tasks. This charismatic leadership inspires personnel to achieve their goals. In addition, a strong strategy was put in place (eventually) which, when combined with such leadership, was a recipe for success. As noted, the United States now has an integrated doctrine within FM 3-07. It has salient integrated policies that recognize the potential for complex human-based contingencies around the world. The doctrine has several key principles—Unity of Effort; a Comprehensive, Collaborative, and Cooperative Approach; and a Shared Vision of a Common Goal. From bitter experience, mainly garnered in Iraq, the following lessons emerge.

- Early and balanced strategy is key, demanding a comprehensive approach.
- Strong political support locally and externally is requisite.
- Detailed operational planning is required.
- Resources must be committed that are equal to the tasks.
- Local capabilities must be taken advantage of, even if there are cultural differences to overcome.
- Wide publicization of the end-state is needed to gain support for the process.
• Preparedness to commit to long-term solutions is essential.
• Political, security, and economic solutions must be developed concurrently.

The United States and the coalition have learned from their experiences in Iraq, and major successes are now being witnessed. As this reconstitution of Iraq continues, the question remains whether these lessons can be transferred to Afghanistan.

**Afghanistan (2001-?).**

Over the 3 to 4 centuries preceding 2001, many interventions, with huge variations of success and failure, have occurred in this mountainous and difficult country. At present, the UN/NATO International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) mandate is, in effect, a dual approach of concurrent warfighting and state reconstruction. The 2009-10 Commander of ISAF, now retired U.S. Army General Stanley McChrystal, spoke in London in 2009 at the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS), emphasizing the complexity of the environment in which ISAF finds itself. He noted that patience, discipline, resolve, and time are needed, and further noted that loss of stability in Afghanistan would bring a huge risk of transnational terrorists operating there. Thus, in many ways Afghanistan is the key to stability in South Asia in General McChrystal’s view.45

In a recent 2009 update of his previous study, Cordesman complained, “What should be an integrated civil-military effort in Afghanistan is instead a wasteful mess. This is how we can fix it.” He went on to suggest an increase in military and civil capabili-
ties to overcome current issues, and then identified six centers of gravity for NATO/ISAF forces to deal with.

- Change strategy from defeating the Taliban tactically in the field to conducting shaping operations that can secure population areas, clear out insurgents, and hold cleared areas. This ensures security and then governance, economy, and justice. The strategy is termed Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build.

- Eliminate individual national rules of engagement and remove restrictions on troop numbers. This should lead to a troop surge based on enough resources rather than the current balance that creates a stalemate.

- Provide larger and more effective Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to permit local security control from within the country.

- Bypass corruption and incapacity currently within Afghan government structures to prevent them from creating adverse effects in the countryside.

- Enforce unity of effort and integrity from all external agencies and countries. Presently, pledges are not abided by; effort is not well directed; and locals do not have personal security, employment, education, health services, and other government services as discussed above.

- Limit threats from external sources such as Pakistan, Iran, and other states.

Cordesman concludes that the end-state, that is, a definition of victory within Afghanistan, may not match that required by Western cultures.

Afghanistan cannot become an instant model of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Victory
means a reasonable level of security and stability for the Afghan people; a decent standard of living by Afghan standards; and the end of Afghanistan as a sanctuary of international terrorism. That may not be much to most of the rest of the world, but for the Afghans it means real hope and an end to 3 decades of war and suffering.46

In December 2009 President Barack Obama announced a troop surge of 30,000 U.S. personnel to occur in 2010. Other NATO countries are being strongly encouraged to provide extra resources. In Afghanistan is an ongoing stabilization operation experiencing serious conflict across the board. McChrystal and Cordesman, among others, have identified how success can be measured. The key is to ensure that lessons from Iraq are implemented, that the international community continues to assist in maintaining the Campaign Authority (along with internal support), and that the end-state is based on success factors and not a prescribed timeline.

Change in Leadership—June 2010.

When General McChrystal became Commanding General of the ISAF Mission in Afghanistan in June 2009, he immediately set about defining a counter-insurgency strategy. He asked for and got a troop surge, which is still ongoing. He redefined the rules of engagement toward reducing collateral damage and engaged in a hearts and minds approach. He was determined to succeed and was able to make progress in spite of meeting stubborn Taliban resistance. But there was growing resistance from the U.S. public and politicians who complained that the pace of progress was insufficient and called for “the troops to come
home,” a typical response in all wars but more so in a campaign that by its nature is always going to require a long-term involvement. In June 2010, *Rolling Stone Magazine* published an article in which an embedded journalist reported disparaging remarks made by McChrystal’s command team about President Obama and his administration. The magazine reported that McChrystal’s team had dubbed themselves “Team America” and had taken on an aura of arrogance.

Throughout the U.S. Army, there was a consensus that McChrystal’s position was now untenable because of his lack of good judgment. McChrystal had allowed his team to openly question the President and his staff, in effect repudiating the cherished principle of civilian oversight of the military that the U.S. Army purports to honor. This incident occurred shortly after the U.S. Army celebrated its 235th birthday and reaffirmed its subordination to civilian authority, a foundational tenet, without which the U.S. Constitution itself stands at risk. McChrystal was quickly removed from office by President Obama and replaced by General Petraeus.

In a subsequent *Washington Post* editorial, an argument was made that the U.S. Army faced problems in its senior leadership during the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.47 General officers are typically groomed to command and fight wars and hence are imbued with a warrior spirit that anticipates, and may even relish, combat. However, in the senior theater commanders, there is a need during stability operations for them to possess a greater range of capabilities, like those of a viceroy. In addition to their purely military duties (typically counterinsurgent), they must also be able to undertake civil, political, economic, and governance responsibilities. Are the senior leaders at all levels of war and across the full spectrum of operations pre-
pared for this? Success factors for stability operations have been identified through qualitative research processes as listed below. However, the McChrystal affair has opened a debate on how to identify leaders who have attributes at all levels of war and across all spectrums of operations.

**Attributes and Types of Power.**

It is generally accepted that further research is necessary to pin down where and how these attributes are applicable; whether the levels of war generate different attribute requirements; and whether the changing nature of the spectrum of operations has an effect on this. Joseph Nye discusses concepts of power and leadership related to *hard* and *soft* power. His ideas are instructive.

**Hard Power** deals with threats, coercion, force, or inducements (payments) used to achieve end states or ensure completion of tasks. Often a masculine model of a hierarchical command and control system is used to illustrate hard power:

- **Organizational Skills.** Leaders must be Managers, using both the defined skill sets and knowing how and when to use them.
- **Machiavellian Skills.** These enable shrewd assessment of people and the bullying of them to get results. Possessors are great intimidators.
- **Contextual Intelligence.** Wielders of hard power must understand the situation, assessing when and how to act.

**Soft Power** is the ability to attract people, reducing the need for a carrot and stick approach. Often a feminine model employing a networked approach is used to define soft power:
- **Emotional Intelligence.** Meaning to have the temperament to inspire admiration or a desire to emulate or befriend.
- **Vision.** The ability to portray a picture of the future to inspire people.
- **Communication.** A mixture of both rhetoric (verbal) and actions (nonactions).

Law 9: Win through your actions, never through argument—Any momentary triumph you think you have gained through argument is really a Pyrrhic victory: The resentment and ill will you stir up is stronger and lasts longer than any momentary change of opinion. It is much more powerful to get others to agree with you through your actions, without saying a word. Demonstrate, do not explicate. 49

In recent years, America's defenses have shown confusion or ambivalence regarding both skill sets. In the case of Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld was quoted as saying that he “didn’t understand soft power.” In November 2008, his successor, Robert Gates, stated that the United States was spending $500 million on hard power capabilities as opposed to $37 million for projects identified as soft power. Obviously, more investment was needed to redress the imbalance and return the United States to the mixture of capabilities they developed and demonstrated during the Cold War.

**RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS**

As part of the examination into CLM success attributes, a series of interviews (personal or by way of electronic mail) was conducted. Those interviewed reflected a range of political and military experience from across a spectrum of the international community, including Bosnia and Herzegovina; the United
States (former members of Coalition organizations in the Balkans); and military and civilian personnel from the UK who have wide experience ranging from Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan to numerous African and Asian states.

Admittedly, there is a possible research bias because of the author’s military experience, but this has been mitigated by using a broad range of case studies and a cross section of entities and organizations. People possessing a wide range of experience over the CLM spectrum were interviewed for this monograph. Though the author had an intuitive sense of what aspects of CLM were best suited to stability operations, intuition has been refined into a set of common attributes that are specifically useful within such an environment.

As a result of the interviews, success attributes were generated, summarized as follows.

**Command Success Attributes:**
- Unified Action—Unity of Effort (across all agencies).
- Immediacy (enabled by resources and policy).

**Leadership Success Attributes:**
- Unified Action—Unity of Effort (across all agencies).
- Determination allied to a Strategic Vision.
- Inspiration (of personnel) and Flexibility (in employing intervention assets, i.e., people and materiel).
- Authority (to conduct stability operations) and Relationships (within and without the intervention organizations).
- Planning (of the intervention) and Training (of the personnel).
Management Success Attributes:
• Resource Level (for appropriateness).
• Resource Allocation (for sufficiency).
• Resource Management.

Where we found failure, it was used to reinforce concepts of success above by analyzing such actions and deciding if an alternate course of action would have generated success. For example, when there is lack of unified action, then both command and leadership suffers. Such criteria demonstrate that a lack of commonality of success attributes leads to failure. These attributes are perhaps not surprising to anyone who has studied CLM and applied it to practical situations, especially in the arena of stability operations. In essence, a liberal application of common sense applied to some qualitative research has generated a set of useful notes, either as guidance or confirmation of what was already known from theory or experience.

CONCLUSIONS

As shown at the beginning of this monograph, both Ashdown and Smith defined criteria that apply specifically to stability operations. These provide useful aide mémoire and planning tools. The attributes defined across a spectrum of CLM help to place, within a time frame, the key areas to ensure success. Command needs immediacy in order to solve critical problems; Leadership has wicked problems that are more complex to solve but also can have time constraints placed on them; and Management in this context handles tame problems, whose time constraints are less demanding but still need to be addressed. This research
project has identified gaps and generated thought for follow-on research as follows:

- The current stated principles are somewhat two-dimensional. The development of a three-dimensional model across the levels of war and also the spectrum of operations has strong merit. A proposed model is graphically outlined in Figure 4.

![Figure 4. Future CLM 3-D Model?](image)

- Table 6 shows a potential end-state development for future examination and subsequent analysis. It takes those concepts of CLM aligned to Grint’s critical-wicked-tame problems and spreads them across the levels of war and the spectrum of operations. These have been somewhat simplified purely to identify the oppo-
site ends of the spectrum, acknowledging that there are gradations between these points. The in-between will be an area that needs careful consideration as this is where the current senior leadership problems are being experienced.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of War</th>
<th>Strategic</th>
<th>Operational</th>
<th>Tactical</th>
<th>Spectrum of Operations</th>
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<td>Attributes</td>
<td>Attributes</td>
<td>Attributes</td>
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<td>Attributes</td>
<td>Attributes</td>
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<td>Attributes</td>
<td>Attributes</td>
<td>Attributes</td>
<td>War</td>
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**Table 6. Proposed Further Research.**

- The questions in Table 7 are suggested as a starting point. But as always, questions may evolve as information emerges that may redirect or refine the questioning.
Stability operations have been identified as wicked problems, those that are ambiguous and complex. Though in military quarters, stability operations seem to be the term de jour, the military has actually been doing them for a long time. In light of current operations, it does not seem that such requirements will disappear any time soon, and our leadership must be prepared to deal with them efficiently and effectively.

Table 7. Proposed Line of Questioning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Strategic Level</th>
<th>Operational Level</th>
<th>Tactical Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  Given the definitions of Grint’s Critical Problems (those that need a solution now) being aligned to Command solutions, what are the best attributes required for a Commander at:</td>
<td>Answers here please</td>
<td>Answers here please</td>
<td>Answers here please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Given the definitions of Grint’s Wicked Problems (often ambiguous or very complex, may not be time dependent) being aligned to Leadership solutions, what are the best attributes required for a Commander at:</td>
<td>Answers here please</td>
<td>Answers here please</td>
<td>Answers here please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Given the definitions of Grint’s Tame Problems (do not require urgent action, even if they may be complex) being aligned to Management solutions, what are the best attributes required for a Commander at:</td>
<td>Answers here please</td>
<td>Answers here please</td>
<td>Answers here please</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


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Dowell, P., Professional Distinctions, Email Funny, Microsoft, 2010.


Fielder, D. A., A Grounded Theory Qualitative Study based on the Commando Training Centre Royal Marines based in Devon, United Kingdom, Devon, UK: Exeter University, April 2006.


**Interviews with Military Staff.**


**Websites.**


**Pod Casts.**


GLOSSARY

AFBiH  Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
BiH  Bosnia and Herzegovina
CSIS  Center for Strategic and International Studies
Cdr RN  Commander Royal Navy
DfID  Department for International Development
DoD  (US) Department of Defense
EU  European Union
EUFOR  European Union Force
EUSR  European Union Special Representative
FCO  Foreign and Commonwealth Office
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
IFOR  (NATO) Implementation Force (in BiH)
ISAF  International Stabilization Assistance Force
MoD  (UK) Ministry of Defence
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO  Nongovernmental Organizations
OGD  Other Government Departments
PSO  Peace Support Operations
PSOTC  PSO Training Centre
RAF  Royal Air Force
<table>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Royal Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>(NATO) Stabilization Force (in BiH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWOT</td>
<td>Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSR</td>
<td>United Nations Special Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slovenia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENDNOTES


4. On October 12, 2009, Radio 4 broadcast a discussion on “Small States,” defining successful criteria as Macro-economic Stability; Market Efficiency; Social Development; and Good Governance.

5. Ashdown, p. 21.


10. R. Smith, p. 390.

11. Greene, p. 79.

12. R. Smith, p. 397.


14. General Raymond Odierno, June 7, 2010, during a command briefing on a minor resurgence of enemy activity. This is an example of Four Star Commanding General direction, ensuring that both operational and tactical effects are continued as a
theater of operations moves from combat operations to stability operations.


23. *Ibid*.


33. PKSOI, Mission Brief, available from pksoi.army.mil.

34. General (Ret.) David McKiernan, “Transitions,” Speech at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, November 16, 2010. The United States invaded Iraq in March 2003 without a good transition plan for what occurred after Saddam Hussein was removed. By September 2003, they had lost the window of opportunity.


42. Ashdown, *Swords and Ploughshare*.


44. *Ibid*.


48. Discussed at a meeting at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008.

DEFINING COMMAND, LEADERSHIP, AND MANAGEMENT SUCCESS FACTORS WITHIN STABILITY OPERATIONS

Dave Fielder