Strategy Research Project

STABILITY OPERATIONS CHALLENGES

BY

COLONEL BRIAN J. TEMPEST
United States Army

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

STABILITY OPERATIONS CHALLENGES

by

Colonel Brian J. Tempest
United States Army

Colonel Gregory L. Cantwell
Project Adviser

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

Historically, stability operations are not a new mission for the U.S. military. Based on the identified historical familiarity of the Army with stability operations, one would assume that the Army, being an adaptive and learning organization, would be better prepared or capable of conducting stability operations. However, these missions present significant challenges to the Army. This strategy research project examined two Operations (OPERATION JUST CAUSE, Panama1989 and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 2003) and identified three challenges to the Army in conducting stability operations. Specifically, they are challenges in: 1) doctrine; 2) culture; and 3) interagency coordination. This research project concludes that the Army must maintain the current doctrinal focus of stability operations as a core mission; the Army culture must inculcate stability operations; and the Army must continue the refinement of interagency coordination.

STABILITY OPERATIONS CHALLENGES

Conducting stability operations is not a new operational concept for the United States Army. In fact, the majority of the missions that the Army has conducted can be categorized as a form of stability operations. US Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations (6 October 2008) states:

> During the relatively short history of the United States, military forces have fought only eleven wars considered conventional. From the American Revolution through Operation Iraqi Freedom, these wars represented significant or perceived threats to national security interests, where the political risk to the nation was always gravest. These were the wars for which the military traditionally prepared; these were the wars that endangered America's way of life. Of the hundreds of other military operations conducted in those intervening years, most are now considered stability operations, where the majority of effort consisted of stability tasks. Contrary to popular belief, the military history of the United States is one characterized by stability operations, interrupted by distinct episodes of major combat.[1]

According to Dr. Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese in their book, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The Unites States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003-January 2005,* the Army has categorized these hundreds of other military operations using various names, for example, "small wars, contingency operations and low intensity conflict."[2] For the purposes of this paper the term stability operations will be used to encompass all of the different types of operations currently defined in US Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations, October 2008 as:

> …various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.[3]

Based on the identified historical familiarity of the Army with stability operations, one would assume that the Army, being an adaptive and learning organization, would be

better prepared or capable of conducting stability operations. However, according to Dr. Wright and COL Reese in *On Point II*, "The Army's attitude toward stability and support operations has been complex, ambivalent, and subject to change based on a myriad of external factors…."[4] Doctrine, culture, and interagency coordination are three specific challenges the Army faces in the conduct of stability operations.

This strategy research project examines two operations - (OPERATION JUST CAUSE, Panama1989 and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 2003) - and identified three challenges to the Army in conducting stability operations. Specifically, they are challenges in: 1) doctrine; 2) culture; and 3) Interagency coordination. These three issues have each hindered the Army's ability to conduct stability operations. The lack of stability operations doctrine during OPERATION JUST CAUSE left little to no guidance for planning post-conflict operations. While the newly developed doctrine for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM was adequate, it was provided too late for Army planners. The culture of the Army lends itself to the dogma of combat operations; little of the Army's culture reflects the inherent secondary missions of stability operations in war. This statement is supported by Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews in their book, *The Future of the Army Profession* where they stated:

> …resistance to stability operations is more of a cultural and intellectual challenge than simply an organizational one. The sentiment "we don't do windows" all too often captures the profession's attitude toward these "fringe" operations.[5]

Finally, interagency coordination is a required element for the successful accomplishment of the political-military operation of war. The military cannot be solely responsible for stability operations missions. Even if the military is the lead organization

in some stability operations, the Army lacks the expertise required in many stability operations.

The methodology used to explore these three challenges will be organized chronologically by operation. The impact of doctrine, Army culture, and interagency coordination will first be examined as it relates to OPERATION JUST CAUSE, and second followed by OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Third, this paper will provide a doctrinal review demonstrating the steps taken by the Army to address the doctrinal challenges associated with stability operations. Fourth, utilizing Schein's mechanisms for culture change, as a model, this paper will examine the steps taken to change the Army culture related to stability operations. Fifth, this paper will explore the policy and directives that were established to standardize the process under which the Army conducts stability operations. Finally, this paper will provide a conclusion and recommendation for the Army concerning stability operations.

OPERATION JUST CAUSE, Panama 1989

Examining OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the invasion of Panama in 1989, three challenges associated with stability operations are clearly identified. The challenges the Army faced were a lack of doctrinal focus on stability operations, a culture singularly focused on the combat phase of the operation, and inadequate interagency coordination. OPERATION JUST CAUSE was a resounding military success. General Stiner stated in an Army Times interview 26 February 1990,

> JUST CAUSE…validated that what we are doing is right…that the training program…is exactly as it should be…. Our training program paid off in spades in Panama and that's the reason you saw the discipline, the efficiency, the effectiveness and the proficiency that was demonstrated by our troops.[6]

The above citation demonstrates a positive view of the military activities conducted

during OPERATION JUST CAUSE. However, Stiner's assessment is incomplete

because it only addresses the combat phase of the operation. General Stiner does not

explain what the short falls of OPERATION JUST CAUSE were in regards to the

stability operations phase.

Dr. Conrad Crane and W. Andrew Terrill in their monograph entitled,

Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post

Conflict Scenario echo GEN Stiner's opinion with a caveat:

> Operations in Panama leading to the overthrow of the Noriega regime
> have been touted as a model use of quick and decisive American military
> force, but post-conflict activities did not go as smoothly.[7]

Exploring this statement in more detail illustrates some of the challenges to the Army in

conducting stability operations during OPERATION JUST CAUSE. Dr. Crane and

Terrill's findings reflect the three identified challenges of OPERATION JUST CAUSE as

the Army's culture of focusing primarily on combat operations, inadequate doctrine

available to planners, and a lack of interagency coordination as contributing to poor

post-war/stability operations outcomes. Dr. Crane and Terrill propose the following as

several of the challenges to the stability operation portion of OPERATION JUST

CAUSE:

> A focus on conducting a decisive combat operation…. Planning for the
> post-conflict phase…was far from complete…. and Political-military
> interagency cooperation was poor….[8]

Having linked Dr. Crane and Terrill's findings with the stability operations phase of

OPERATION JUST CAUSE to the three challenges identified within this paper, next the

impact of each challenge on OPERATION JUST CAUSE will be explored.

Impact of Doctrine. While the majority of operations conducted by the military have been stability operations, it is important to note that the volume of stability operations doctrine has been minimal when compared to combat operations doctrine. Therefore, the Army went into OPERATION JUST CAUSE with a doctrinal base that did not focus on stability operations, but rather focused on combat operations. This deficiency in post combat doctrinal guidance manifested itself in planning OPERATION JUST CAUSE. The primary planning effort was devoted to planning combat operations. The lack of planning effort placed on stability operations provided the tactical commanders on the ground a very clear understanding of the tasks associated with the combat phase, but an unclear understanding of post combat tasks and responsibilities.[9] As a result of this, Dr. Wright and COL Reese in *On Point II* stated:

> Perhaps the most glaring problems caused by SOUTHCOM's lack of attention to the planning were the shortages of military police, CA (Civil Affairs), and other specialized units in Panama that are critical to the posthostilities phase of a campaign.[10]

The above quote demonstrates the effect that a lack of planning had on the stability operations phase of OPERATION JUST CAUSE. Additionally, it showed a direct link to the lack of doctrinal focus on stability operations preceding OPERATION JUST CAUSE. Joint Publication 1-02, dated 12 April 2001: amended through 30 Sept 2010, defines doctrine as the "Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their action…."[11] Applying this definition to OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the doctrinal principles that guide the actions of the military were not present in doctrine to sufficiently guide the planning and conduct of stability operations for OPERATION JUST CAUSE.

Impact of Culture. The second challenge to the Army associated with stability

operations in OPERATION JUST CAUSE dealt with the Army's culture. Dr. Wright and

COL Reese stated in *On Point II*:

> Remarkably, since 1798 the American military forces have also conducted approximately 320 operations that cannot be characterized as conventional wars….These conflicts, taken as a group, have dominated the Army's historical record, even though they have not dominated its culture and training focus.[12]

The above quote demonstrates that despite the preponderance of stability operations

conducted by the Army, the Army culture has been dominated by a focus on

conventional operations. This focus on conventional operations, from a cultural

perspective, had a direct impact on the stability operations phase of OPERATION JUST

CAUSE.

The Army's cultural bias towards combat operations in 1989 created an

environment that ensured the success of the combat phase, yet created challenges to

conducting stability operations. Culture affected the planning process as evidenced by

the time and focus spent on the combat phase of Operation Just Cause. In their work on

On Point II, Dr. Wright and COL Reese highlight this lack of emphasis:

> The staff of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the joint headquarters responsible for the planning, devoted few resources to developing a detailed concept for that final phase of the campaign, and when the overall plan for JUST CAUSE changed in the fall of 1989, the new commander, General Maxwell Thurman, focused solely on combat operations. In the period leading up to the US intervention, Thurman never received a briefing on the plan for stability and support operations.[13]

MAJ Louis W. Morales in his thesis for his Master of Military Art and Science entitled,

Post Conflict Stability Operations and the 1989 United States Invasion of Panama,

provided further evidence supporting the impact of service culture on stability

operations:

GEN Thurman admitted that he did not see post conflict stability operations as his concern….He did not provide command emphasis on this phase of the operation and he should have been more attentive to the transition from combat to post-conflict operations….That this oversight is not uncommon…. That the military was not good at implementing the post-conflict termination phase and this flaw was an institutional shortcoming…. That [w]e do not teach [post-conflict operations] in our school system, or include it in our doctrinal work.[14]

These comments by GEN Thurman demonstrate that the senior leadership of OPERATION JUST CAUSE displayed a cultural bias towards the combat phase of the operation. The Army's cultural focus on combat operations ensured success of the fighting phase, but this cultural focus on combat also led to shortcomings in the stability operations phase due to minimal planning and a lack of command emphasis.

Impact of Interagency Coordination. Morales also argued that a third challenge to conducting stability operations in Panama was interagency coordination. Due to excessive focus on Operational Security concerns, Army planners failed to include governmental agencies in the planning effort.[15] These agencies are critical to the successful completion of political-military operations such as OPERATION JUST CAUSE. However, this lack of coordination hampered the transition from combat to stability operations. Excluding other governmental agencies from the planning phase, the Army planners ensured that the Army would be forced to lead the stability operations without the benefit of the other elements of national power.[16]

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq 2003

Fourteen years after OPERATION JUST CAUSE the Army's ability to conduct decisive combat operations is evidenced by the swift overthrow of the Iraqi regime during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003. As was shown in the OPERATION JUST CAUSE overview, the combat phase was not the greatest challenge to the Army.

Rather, the Army faced its greatest challenges in the post-conflict or stability operations phase of military operations. The same three challenges associated with stability operations are clearly identified once again in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. The challenges the Army faced were: a doctrinal focus on stability operations that was newly published and not trained, a culture still singularly focused on the combat phase of the operation, and continued inadequate interagency coordination.

Impact of Doctrine. The Army had published doctrine in 2003 focused on the conduct of stability and support operations.[17] With this in mind, the question to answer is, how did doctrine affect stability operations during OIF? In this operation doctrine was not lacking - but rather, the doctrine was so new (published in February 2003) that the Army had not had sufficient time to incorporate it into its educational institutions and training organizations prior to the invasion of Iraq in April 2003.[18] This is not to say, however, that the Army had not educated or trained on stability operations prior to 2003. In fact, the Army collected many lessons learned about stability operations from the numerous stability operation missions of the 1990s.[19] Examples of this training focus are demonstrated by the establishment of training centers, specifically, The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) located at Fort Polk, LA, which focused on training the nonmechanized Army units to conduct numerous types of missions to include stability operations.[20] This training was expanded in 1997 to include the US Army Combat Maneuver Training Center, located in Hohenfels, Germany primarily to train units rotating into the Balkans.[21] In *On Point II* Dr. Wright and COL Reese provide a summation on the state of the Army's stability operations capabilities prior to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003:

There were, of course, major gaps in the Army's preparation for stability and support operations. Doctrinal guidelines for these operations were not perfect or comprehensive. For example, few units had conducted counterinsurgency operations since the Vietnam War, and until 2003 the Army committed relatively few resources to the updating of doctrine or training for counterinsurgency. Overall, the largest practical shortcoming was that despite the training and doctrine, individual and unit experience with stability and support operations across the Army was uneven at best.[22]

The above quotation demonstrates that despite current doctrine and training facilities the Army that entered OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM was not fully trained on the new doctrine. Further, the Army as a whole did not have the opportunity to train on this new doctrine at the Combat Training Centers.

Impact of Culture. The impact of the Army's combat focused culture once again asserts itself as a hindrance to the conduct of stability operations during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. According to Anthony H. Cordesman in his book *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons:* "The U.S. military culture has failed to look beyond war fighting in defining the role and responsibility of the U.S. military."[23] The significance of this statement is seen once again in the effort, or emphasis, placed on the planning of the combat phase versus the stability operations phase. According to Cordesman, this singular focus on combat operations was obvious in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM:

Military commanders do not seem to have fully understood the importance of the peacemaking and nation-building missions. They often did not provide the proper support or did so with extensive delays and little real commitment.[24]

This lack of understanding and commitment to stability operations correlates with the Army's focus on combat operations as opposed to stability operations. This is supported

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by statements from some of the planners from GEN Franks' command in Michael R.

Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainors' book *COBRA II.* They quote Major Ray Eiriz,

> From an operational perspective our main focus was on the first three
> phases and Phase IV is something we were planning but there were many
> intangibles and we didn't focus as much time on it as we should have.[25]

Once again, even with improved doctrine and numerous stability operations conducted

since Panama, we see the concept of stability operations still subordinated to the

Army's cultural bias towards combat operations. Dr Wright and COL Reese in *On Point*

II provided a thorough summation of this affect:

> Despite the importance of PH IV (Phase Four) in successfully achieving
> the strategic objectives of a military campaign, the Army and the US
> military's tendency in general has been to spend the lion's share of its
> resources on the first three phases of a campaign. In the past, this
> inclination has had two related and detrimental consequences for the
> planning of PH IV. First, planners have often lacked the time and
> personnel to focus on the final phase of the campaign and thus left it
> undeveloped; and second, because of the understandable emphasis on
> combat operation, campaign planners, like those that designed Operation
> Just Cause, allowed PH IV plans to develop in isolation, thus hindering the
> establishment of critical linkages and smooth transitions between combat
> and postcombat operations.[26]

A summation of the above quote shows how the Army's cultural focus on combat

operations led to a lack of emphasis and effort being applied to the stability operations

phase of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and proposes that stability operations must

become an inherent part of the Army's culture.

 Impact of Interagency Coordination. During OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM the

interagency coordination was hampered by an unclear understanding of the chain of

responsibility for the post conflict stability operations portion of the mission. Michael R.

Gordon and GEN Bernard E. Trainor in their book, *COBRA II*, use a quote by John

Agoglia, one of the CENTCOM planners, to support this unclear understanding of

interagency coordination:

> We knew there was a void in our ability to deal with Phase IV, the post-hostilities piece, unless we clearly had an interagency link…We kept on getting told that 'oh yeah, it's coming.' We're asking for policy on who is going to be in charge? How do we interact with them?[27]

The above quotation shows not only a lack of coordination effort, but also a situation

where the Army was not clear as to who was actually responsible for the planning of the

stability operations for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. According to Anthony H.

Cordesman in his book *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons:*

> The United States failed to develop a coordinated interagency approach to planning and executing peacemaking and nation building before and during the war. A State Department-led effort called the Future of Iraq Project began in April 2002 and produced many of the needed elements of a plan. Much of the results of the State Department's planning efforts for nation building were lost or made ineffective, however, because of the deep divisions between the State Department and Department of Defense over how to plan for peace-making and nation building. When President Bush issued National Security Directive 24 (NSD 24) on January 20, 2003, he put the Office of the Secretary of Defense in charge of the nation-building effort, evidently because the problem of establishing security was given primacy. The result, however, was that the State Department and other interagency conflict termination and nation-building efforts were dropped, ignored, or given low priority.[28]

Issuing the National Security Directive 24, President Bush placed the responsibility for

execution of Phase IV (stability operations) back onto the military. Again, the combat

phase of the operation was the primary focus of the Army, not stability operations. This

resulted in the Army struggling through the transition from phase III (combat) to phase

IV (stability) operations.

This brief overview of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM has demonstrated that

fourteen years after OPERATION JUST CAUSE the Army still faced challenges with

doctrine, culture and interagency coordination. This realization led the Army to once

again address stability operations from a lessons learned perspective. This strategy

research project now turns its focus on how the Army has addressed each of the three

challenges highlighted in the previous overviews of OPERATION JUST CAUSE and

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.

<u>Stability Operations Doctrinal Review</u>

Being a dynamic organization the Army consistently collects lessons learned and

takes steps to rectify all issues. Having established doctrine as a challenge to the

conduct of stability operations, this section will begin a doctrinal review of actions taken

by the Army in addressing stability operations through doctrine. This review will

encompass the timeframe after the completion of OPERATION JUST CAUSE to current

Army doctrine addressing stability operations. After OPERATION JUST CAUSE the

Army produced several documents to address the concept of stability operations.

The first attempt to codify the Army's position regarding stability operations after

OPERATION JUST CAUSE came in 1993 when it published US Army Field Manual

100-5, *Operations.*[29] An entire chapter (chapter 13) was devoted to the concept of

operations other than war. This chapter clearly laid out the principles to guide the Army

in conducting operations other than war (stability operations). These principles were:

> Objective: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective; Unity of Effort: Seek unity of effort toward every objective; Legitimacy: Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions; Perseverance: Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims; Restraint: Apply appropriate military capability prudently; Security: Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.[30]

US Army Field Manual 100-5 further identified the following activities as components of

operations other than war (stability operations):

Noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control, support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement, show of force, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and finally attacks and raids.[31]

The Army in 1994 also published US Army Field Manual 100-23 *Peace Operations* which provided greater understanding of stability operations.[32] In the introduction of US Army Field Manual 100-23 it stated:

This manual provides the basis for planning and executing peace operations. As doctrine, this manual guides the Army in how to think about peace operations and provides fundamentals for these operations.[33]

The above quotes show the Army developing the doctrinal concepts of how to conduct stability operations. With the publication of US Army Field Manual 100-5 (1993) and US Army Field Manual 100-23 (1994) the Army continued to be involved in operations other than war (stability operations) in several locations; Such as: Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994) and later in the Balkans (1995) with varying degrees of success in conducting stability operations. This continued involvement in stability operations led to the next major doctrinal update regarding stability operations in 2001 with US Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations.*[34]

US Army Field Manual 3-0 (2001) was a pivotal document for stability operations from a doctrinal perspective. It focused on full spectrum operations that encompassed offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations as missions a commander may have to perform.[35] However, it continued to separate offensive and defensive operations into the category of war, and stability operations and support operations as two distinct types of operations within the category of military operations other than war (MOOTW).[36] However, US Army Field Manual 3-0 began to address stability operations

as vital to mission success. US Army Field Manual 3-0 devoted two entire chapters

(chapters 9 and 10) to the concepts of stability and support operations.[37] The following

passage from US Army Field Manual 3-0 (2001) clearly defined the purpose of stability

operations and support operations and reinforced that they are two separate and

distinct operations within the full spectrum of operations.

> Stability operations promote and protect US national interest by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis.
>   Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering.[38]

US Army Field Manual 3-0 set the stage in acknowledging the importance of stability

operations to the Army. However, a more definitive document soon followed. US Army

Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations* was published in

February of 2003.[39]

US Army Field Manual 3-07 was the most definitive doctrine published since

OPERATION JUST CAUSE concerning the topic of stability operations and

encompassed planning principles and guidance on a variety of different missions

associated with stability operations.[40] Despite this fact, US Army Field Manual 3-07 does

not address the "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof

guide their actions in support of national objectives," [41] as stated in Joint Publication 1-

02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Army Field

Manual 3-07 stated in the preface:

> Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations and Support Operations, is tier 1 (principal) doctrine…. FM 3-07 is conceptual, aiming more at broad understanding than at detailed operations.[42]

This quote demonstrates that as of Feb. 2003, just prior to the invasion of Iraq, the Army had a stability operations doctrine that was focused more conceptually than detail oriented. It also supports the premise that despite having doctrine, the Army had not sufficiently inculcated this doctrine prior to the beginning of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM in April of 2003. After OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM the Army once again focused effort on addressing the identified challenges associated with stability operations doctrine.

US Army Field Manual 3-0 *Operations* dated Feb 2008 took the first definitive step towards closing the gap as to how stability operations are viewed by the Army from a doctrinal perspective. US Army Field Manual 3-0, Feb 08 quoted GEN William S. Wallace:

> …we will achieve victory in this changed environment of persistent conflict only by conducting military operations in concert with diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts. Battlefield success is no longer enough; final victory requires concurrent stability operations to lay the foundation for lasting peace.[43]

The most significant contribution of US Army Field Manual 3-0 is that it placed stability operations as a core mission on par with the offense and defense, and as part of full-spectrum operations. Stability operations were no longer considered to be activities associated with operations other than war.[44] For the first time written doctrine established the primacy of stability operations to the Army. US Army Field Manual 3-0 further defined stability operations as:

> …various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief.[45]

Additionally, US Army Field Manual 3-0 defined the multitude of missions that were placed under the heading of stability operations. The following is a list of tasks now doctrinally considered part of stability operations: Civil Security, Civil Control, Restore Essential Services, Support to Governance, Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development.[46] US Army Field Manual 3-0 further defined the purpose of stability operations for the Army as:

> Provide a Secure Environment, Secure Land Areas, Meet the Critical Needs of the Populace, Gain Support for Host-Nation Government, and Shape the Environment for Interagency and Host-Nation Success.[47]

With the establishment of stability operations as a core mission for the Army, the Army went a step further and published a separate manual: US Army Field Manual 3-07 *Stability Operations*, dated October 2008.

US Army Field Manual 3-07 is the Army's definitive doctrinal publication that addressed the challenge of doctrine associated with the Army in conducting stability operations. From a doctrinal perspective it placed stability operations as a core mission on equal par with offensive and defensive operations.[48] This one manual is the culmination of a process that spans the entire history of US Army operations. Stability operations are now considered a core mission of the Army. In order for this change in doctrine to be effective, the culture of the Army also needed to change.

<u>Culture Review</u>

The Army culture, focusing on the combat phase of war, has been detrimental to the military's ability to perform stability operations. Developing and implementing doctrinal changes concerning the conduct of stability operations has been a significant step in fixing Army culture. However, whether or not the Army can inculcate stability

operations into its culture as a primary mission will require time and effort from Army

Leaders.

According to Edgar H. Schein in his book entitled, *Organizational Culture and*

Leadership there are six primary embedding mechanisms and six secondary articulation

and reinforcement mechanisms that can be utilized to analyze an organizations ability to

change its culture.[49] The six embedding mechanisms are:

> 1) what leaders pay attention to, measure and control on a regular basis;
> 2) how leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crisis; 3)
> observed criteria by which leaders allocate scarce resources; 4) deliberate
> role modeling, teaching and coaching; 5) observed criteria by which
> leaders allocate rewards and status; 6) observed criteria by which leaders
> recruit, select, promote, retire, and excommunicate organizational
> members.[50]

Schein's six mechanisms can be used to analyze the Army's cultural change. The first

three embedding mechanisms clearly demonstrate that the Army is taking steps to

effect culture change, while the last three are less easily recognizable and require

leadership support.

The fact that stability operations are included in the National Security Strategy

(NSS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and

Army doctrine demonstrates Schein's first mechanism of what leaders pay attention to,

measure and control on a regular basis. The second mechanism shows that critical

incidents overtime have focused the Army on stability operations. The third mechanism

is demonstrated by how the Army has allocated resources supporting stability

operations through the establishment of training centers and focusing some rotations on

stability operations as opposed to combat operations. The fourth, fifth, and sixth

embedding mechanisms are areas which require leaders at all levels to implement.

These mechanisms are not easily recognized as being implemented, but may be more apparent over an extended period of time.

According to Schein real change in an organization is only achievable through the establishment of the embedding mechanisms and the utilization of reinforcing mechanisms. Implementation of reinforcing mechanisms alone will not change the culture of an organization.[51]

Schein's six secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanisms are:

1) organizational design and structure; 2) organizational systems and procedures; 3) organizational rites and rituals; 4) design of physical space, facades, and buildings; 5) stories, legends, and myths about people and events; 6) formal statement of organizational philosophy, values, and creed.[52]

Schein's first reinforcing mechanism has occurred in the Army as demonstrated by the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. However, the Army has yet to develop a specific unit or mission designed to focus on stability operations. Instead the Army has opted to make stability operations a core mission that all units should be able to perform. Systems and procedures have changed in that stability operations are now a part of the curriculum of the Army schools and are now a rotational scenario that is being trained at the Combat Training Centers. The third and fifth reinforcement mechanisms cannot be readily identified as having been implemented in the Army as of yet. However, in 2003 the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) was established with the following mission:

The Institutes charter and structure are designed to meet the future needs of the U.S. Army and the U.S. military across a broad range of peacekeeping and stability operations.[53]

The establishment of PKSOI demonstrates Schein's fourth reinforcement mechanism. Finally, Schein's sixth mechanism is demonstrated in the development and

implementation of documents and policies such as the NSS, QDR, NDS, and Army doctrine.

As these examples show, the Army has taken some of the necessary steps to begin the process of changing the Army's culture regarding stability operations. What remains to be seen is whether the Army will continue to maintain the focus and dedicate the scarce resources in the coming years to ensure that stability operations become a part of the culture, or will it allow it to be written in doctrine and not inculcated as a core mission? Interagency coordination has also advanced since 2003.

Interagency Coordination Review

Interagency coordination is a significant challenge for the Army as demonstrated in the overviews of OPERATION JUST CAUSE and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. This strategy research project will chronologically highlight steps taken by government – policies and directives - that are currently in place to rectify the challenge of interagency coordination. The need for a comprehensive civil-military approach to stability operations became apparent following OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. The publication of DOD Directive 3000.05, dated 28 November 2005 *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations* (SSTR) was a response to lessons learned from this operation.[54]

DOD Directive 3000.05 established policy and guidance to the military concerning stability operations.[55] In section 3 of the document it defined stability operations as, "Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions."[56] It further defined military support to SSTR as, "Department of Defense activities that support U.S. government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations,

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which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests."[57] More important than

the definition of stability operations was the establishment of policy. Section 4 of the

directive, entitled Policy, clearly stated:

> Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.[58]

This policy clearly established the requirement to integrate stability operations across all

DOD activities. Further addressing the interagency coordination challenge associated

with stability operations it stated:

> Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations. Whether conducting or supporting stability operations, the Department of Defense shall be prepared to work closely with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional international organizations…U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations…and private sector individuals and for-profit companies….[59]

It additionally addressed some of the specific challenges that this research has

identified by establishing policy that:

> Assistance and advice shall be provided to and sought from the Department of State and other U.S. Departments and Agencies, as appropriate, for developing stability operations capabilities.[60]

Finally, it addressed the need to integrate stability operations planning through all

phases of the operation.[61] *DOD Directive 3000.05* also assigned responsibility and

defined roles across the DOD from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to the

Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations

Command for the implementation of this policy regarding stability operations.[62] Because

DOD Directive 3000.05 is a DOD document only, it could not ensure successful

interagency coordination; this required a policy from the President to ensure success.

The President issued National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* 7 Dec 2005. NSPD-44 addressed the issue of which agency is to be in charge of the overall administration of reconstruction and stabilization (stability operations), DOD or DOS. NSPD-44 clearly stated,

> The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.[63]

Not only did NSPD-44 establish the lead agency, it also addressed the issue of coordination as a requirement by directing the Secretary of State to:

> Coordinate United States Government responses for reconstruction and stabilization with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations, including peacekeeping missions, at the planning and implementation phases; develop guiding precepts and implementation procedures for reconstruction and stabilization which, where appropriate, may be integrated with military contingency plans and doctrine.[64]

NSPD-44 further identified responsibilities of the other executive departments and agencies in support of DOS lead efforts regarding reconstruction and stabilization (stability operations).[65] Following shortly after NSPD-44 was issued, stability operations were discussed in the *National Security Strategy* (NSS) of the United States published by President George W. Bush in March of 2006.

The 2006 NSS in section IV, part C, number 3 addressed Post Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction:

> …Military involvement may be necessary to stop a bloody conflict, but peace and stability will last only if follow-on efforts to restore order and rebuild are successful.…The Administration established a new office in the Department of State, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and

Stabilization, to plan and execute civilian stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The office draws on all agencies of the government and integrates its activities with our military's efforts....[66]

The significance of this topic being placed within the NSS, which is the document that reflects policy and strategy for the US military, demonstrates how the challenges of stability operations have gained awareness at the highest echelons of the US Government and therefore have affected policy development. As a result of this increased awareness of stability operations and the requirement for interagency coordination the DOD in June of 2008 published *The National Defense Strategy* (NDS).

The 2008 NDS highlighted this increased attention to the issue of interagency coordination during stability operations on page 17 where it addressed integration and unity of effort:

Our efforts require a unified approach to both planning and implementing policy. Iraq and Afghanistan remind us that military success alone is insufficient to achieve victory.... Beyond security, essential ingredients of long-term success include economic development, institution building, and the rule of law, as well as promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training, and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications.... The Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens.... Long-term reconstruction, development, and governance. The U.S. Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these capabilities, but this is no replacement for civilian involvement and expertise.[67]

This quotation emphasizes that the military, who have taken on many of these security tasks, cannot succeed without a unified civil-military approach to stability operations. NSD 2008 is nested with the 2006 NSS in reference to its approach on integration of all agencies of government.

The most telling document to address the topic of stability operations however is the May 2010 *National Security Strategy* which stated:

> We are improving the integration of skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly…. We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats, while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military operations.[68]

As these examples show, stability operations are now a part of the primary documents of our government that establishes the national priorities of the military and guidance to forces in the conduct of military operations, specifically stability operations.

The above chronological discussion of policy and directives outline the steps taken by government to address the challenge of interagency coordination associated with stability operations. Policy has addressed the issue and all parties acknowledge the requirement for coordination. The question remains, will interagency coordination remain an area of emphasis for the military along with the conduct of stability operations? On the surface it seems obvious that interagency coordination is an integral part of the successful conduct of stability operations. However, the future is unpredictable and future military operational requirements may change. This question requires further research and analysis, not only in reference to stability operations but also in reference to the civil-military and political approach to interagency coordination, and exceeds the scope of this research paper.

Conclusion and Recommendation

As demonstrated in the first two sections of this strategy research project, the Army has been challenged in the conduct of stability operations. A review of OPERATION JUST CAUSE and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM reveal that the challenges to stability operations lie in the areas of doctrine, culture, and interagency coordination. Examining the evolution of stability operations doctrine since OPERATION

JUST CAUSE revealed a significant change in the Army's philosophy regarding stability operations.

Doctrine has progressed from virtually no mention of stability operations to the Army having adequate doctrinal guidance. At present the US Government has established stability operations policy. DOD also has established stability operations policy, and the US Army has developed doctrine for stability operations.

Recent initiatives show an increased focus from all levels of the government and the military towards the improvement of stability operations. From policy to doctrine, to interagency coordination, the military has taken the necessary steps to place stability operations on an equal footing as a core mission right along with offensive and defensive operations. Fortuitously, the Army now has written doctrine that provides very clear and detailed guidance to the military in, not only what stability operations consists of, but also how to conduct stability operations. This, by definition, is what doctrine, is supposed to do for the military.

By definition doctrine is the fundamental principles by which the Army guides its actions. Therefore, adjusting doctrine to emphasize stability operations as a core mission is a major step in changing the Army culture.[69] Army leaders rely on doctrine to guide their training and overall preparedness for war. The Army has made significant and potentially lasting steps in changing its culture. Utilizing Schein's mechanisms these steps are clearly seen in half of the embedding mechanisms and in a third of the reinforcing mechanisms. Army leaders must continue to place emphasis on stability operation missions for these changes to last. Soldiers at all levels of the Army must embrace these operations as being an important part of their culture.

Doctrine and governmental policy have also addressed the challenge of interagency coordination. Stability operations inherently require political-military-civil coordination. Army leaders must continue to focus training on developing soldier skills in areas that enhance the Army's ability to work with other agencies.

In summary, the Army must maintain the current doctrinal focus of stability operations as a core mission of the Army. Army culture must inculcate stability operation and continue the refinement of interagency coordination. The Army cannot allow stability operations training to attrite at the conclusion of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. History indicates that stability operations are the majority of the Army's missions; logically, the Army will conduct stability operations again in the future and must therefore be prepared for success.

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