THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA:
OPERATIONALIZING THE HUMAN SECURITY STRATEGY

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The European Union in the Horn of Africa: Operationalizing the Human Security Strategy

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BIOGRAPHY

Lieutenant-Colonel Kurt A. Didier is a Reserve officer serving in the United States Army’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps. He previously served ten years on active duty from 1989 – 1999 in a variety of assignments. LTC Didier left the active component to join the United States Department of Justice, where he still works as an Assistant United States Attorney.
To be secure, in today’s world, Europeans need to make a contribution to global security. Europe needs military forces but they need to be configured and used in quite new ways. They need to be able to prevent and contain violence in different parts of the world in ways that are quite different from classic defence and war fighting. They need to be able to address the real security needs of people in situations of severe insecurity in order to make the world safer for Europeans. At present Europe lacks such capabilities.¹

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has embarked on an ambitious plan to establish itself as an influential, global power in the post Cold War era. Its motivation for this new role comes from many sources: freedom from the threat of the Warsaw Pact’s invasion; a desire to assert its policies to protect its diplomatic, economic and security interests; and the recognition that it has a responsibility to enhance the security of (and development in) other regions of the world. Its commitment to global security, articulated in the 2004 Barcelona Report on Europe’s Security Capabilities, describes how Europe’s internal security is bolstered by improving the living conditions of individuals beyond its borders.

Modeled after the United Nation’s human security paradigm, the EU’s strategic approach is to restore the security of individuals residing in poorly governed or ungoverned areas. Ineffective governance leads to many adversities such as poverty, starvation, lawlessness and terrorism. Desertification and resource mismanagement can exacerbate these adversities, causing illegal migration, refugee flows and arms and drug trafficking into neighboring countries, regions and continents. These problems are particularly acute in Africa, and Africa’s many human security dilemmas produce a significant impact on Europe and other countries covered by the EU Neighbourhood Policy.

The EU’s stated approach to ameliorating Africa’s human security issues is preventive engagement and effective multilateral diplomacy. To this end, it recently created its strategic partnership with the African Union (AU) for peace, security and development. This new strategy emphasizes diplomatic and economic measures to help Africa achieve its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but will also include a military component for peacekeeping and conflict resolution. While the new human security strategy states the EU’s goals or “ends”, it still lacks a clear statement of the methodology or “ways” with which it will achieve those ends.

This omission is particularly relevant for the military component of the EU’s civil-military force, which may be required for stabilization before civic humanitarian assistance is even feasible. This paper argues that military force still has a key role, and that the EU’s “way” to achievement is by employing the United States Army’s doctrine for “full spectrum operations.” This doctrine directs military commanders to use “offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously” in conjunction with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts. This paper illustrates the argument by citing examples from the Horn of Africa

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2 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent the world community’s effort to reduce the disastrous effects of extreme poverty. In 2000, the international community pledged (in the Millennium Declaration) to improve the socio-economic conditions of over 190 countries in ten regions. To measure this effort, the community agreed upon eight categories (goals) to accomplish by 2015. The eight MDGs are as follows: 1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2) Achieve universal primary education; 3) Promote gender equality and empower women; 4) Reduce child mortality; 5) Improve maternal health; 6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 7) Ensure environmental sustainability; and 8) Develop a global partnership for development. United Nations, The Millennium Development Goals Report, New York, August 2008.

3 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-0 Operations, Washington, D.C., 27 February 2008, p. 3-7. Full spectrum operations include a fourth type of operation, civil support. The U.S. Army, however, conducts civil support operations in conjunction with domestic emergencies and homeland defense. Because these operations pertain to the United States and its territories, this category is omitted from discussion. The category of stability operations includes the mission set relevant to EU human security interventions.
region—one of the poorest and most conflict prone regions in the world—and the region the EU has identified as its test case for its new EU – Africa Strategy. 4

**Background**

The end of the Cold War presented Europe with a new set of security challenges and priorities. With the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the United States and Europe achieved their strategic purpose of safeguarding Europe from Soviet aggression. Both the United States and Europe spent the following decade exploring whether and how to reorient their military capacity towards new or underserved security concerns. For the United States, this meant reallocating its instruments of national power away from Western Europe and towards those regions that could benefit from President George H. W. Bush’s New World Order vision of expanding democracy, market based economies and international peace. 5 President Bush’s successor, Bill Clinton, stated a similar vision of spreading market based democracies and peace. 6

European states meanwhile, focused inward, building the architecture for a larger and more integrated Europe. At the end of the Cold War, the trade cooperation among the then twelve members of the European Community soon expanded beyond eliminating trade barriers among themselves. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht formed the foundation for European

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cooperation in defense, economics, foreign policy and internal and judicial affairs, which later culminated in the formation of the European Union (EU).\textsuperscript{7}

The EU’s formation created the mechanism by which Europe could assert greater influence in global affairs. Its statement of strategic goals included themes from the United States’ vision of the New World Order: expanding prosperous and peaceful democracies, market-based economies and international peace. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, significantly changed the way the EU and United States chose to pursue their vision of the New World—although as discussed later, their approaches began to converge early in President George W. Bush’s second term.

Europe’s common security strategy, published as the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS),\textsuperscript{8} stated two important conclusions affecting the implementation of its strategic goals. First, that the primary global security threat in the post 9/11 environment is asymmetric.\textsuperscript{9} Second, asymmetric threats pose more of a “soft power” challenge than a “hard” or military challenge.\textsuperscript{10} Accordingly, the EU’s security strategy is to apply soft power—diplomacy, economic assistance and strategic communication—in lieu of, or in coordination with its military forces.\textsuperscript{11} The EU’s emphasis on soft power is linked to the human security paradigm first articulated within the United Nations’ Development Program in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{12} Armed with


\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 3-5.

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 11-13.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{12} For a thorough discussion of the evolution of human security from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and other influences, see, Liotta, P. H. and Owen, Taylor, “Sense and Symbolism: Europe Takes On
its new strategy, the EU began exploring new security arrangements not previously embraced within NATO to address the geographic areas Europe identified as presenting its greatest threats. Africa is one of those areas.

Africa was a strategic choice for several reasons. First, poor governance and widespread conflict on the continent hampered efforts to fight poverty and disease.\textsuperscript{13} Much of the continent is characterized by “lawlessness, impoverishment, exclusivist ideologies and the daily use of violence.”\textsuperscript{14} Second, the resulting instability was threatening not only other African countries, but also the security of adjacent areas including, the European continent. The 1998 bombings of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and attacks against Israeli tourists in Kenya exemplify the “spillover” danger of African events to citizens abroad, while the 9/11 terrorist attacks on Washington, D.C. and New York, and later in London and Madrid, demonstrated that “no citizens of the world [were] any longer safely ensconced behind their national borders.”\textsuperscript{15}

The nature of contemporary conflict and the terrorist attacks described above exposed the large gap between Europe’s security capabilities and the security problems on its doorstep. For the EU, it was a call to action; a recognition that Europe “has a historic responsibility to

\textsuperscript{13} The Barcelona Report, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. The terrorist attacks damaged or destroyed the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The attacks against Israeli tourists occurred in 2002, in Mombassa, Kenya. Ploch, Lauren, \textit{Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa}, CRS Report for Congress, Updated August 22, 2008, p. 16.
contribute to a safer and more just world.”¹⁶ The ESS is Europe’s responsive security policy, designed to protect it against the threats emanating from insecure regions in the world, brought close to, and into Europe by population migration, increasing global interdependence and terrorism.¹⁷ Significantly, the ESS, and its implementing architecture, the 2004 Barcelona Report, do not repudiate NATO and its collective security apparatus, but rather, represent a Euro-centric security strategy to cover internal and external threats more asymmetrical and regional in nature.

The 2004 Barcelona Report proposes a “Human Security Response Force”, composed of 15,000 civilian and military members to deploy and execute the human security mission.¹⁸ At least one third of the force would be civilian, serving as police officers, “human rights monitors, development and humanitarian assistance specialists, etc.”¹⁹ The Report maintains a regional focus, which made Africa a prime potential EU security partner.²⁰ Recognizing this potential, the EU and African Union (AU)—the successor organization to the Organization of African States—followed years of consultation by forging a partnership in December 2007 encompassing the full range of economic and human security activity.²¹ From the outset, this partnership rejected state-centric security models, focusing instead on the security of the individual from both external and internal threats.

¹⁶ The Barcelona Report, Executive Summary.

¹⁷ Ibid, pp. 7-8.

¹⁸ Ibid, Executive Summary.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ European Security Strategy, pp. 18-19.

In Africa, and in the Horn of Africa, individuals face both external (interstate conflict) and internal (intrastate) threats. The most prominent sources of human insecurity at both the continental and regional levels, however, are intrastate. An example of an external threat is a country using armed force against another, such as in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, or against non-state actors of another state, such as Ethiopia’s deployment of forces into Somalia. An internal threat occurs when the state is the cause of the individual insecurity, such as in Sudan, or is unable to secure its people against threats or privations, such as in Somalia. In response, the AU created the structure designed to handle both types of security challenges. Its Constitutive Act and Protocol contain the process for evaluating conflict and determining the best method for its resolution. This includes deploying security forces to deal with the multi-phases of conflict: pre, ongoing and post. Currently, the AU is building this capacity with substantial funding and training from, among others, the EU.

By 2009, Europe was significantly resourcing its human security strategy capability. And while Europe recognizes the need for military forces to project its foreign policy, it is still calculating how to configure those forces. This is a difficult transition. Having relieved its military from responsibility to counter the Cold War’s massive conventional threat on its borders, Europe now must prepare an order of battle that is civilian intensive and soft power predominant. Still in the development stage, the EU – AU strategic relationship continues to mature as mutual aspirations transition to proven, coordinated capabilities, particularly with respect to the use of military force. For both the EU and Africa, their approach to building their strategic relationship is influenced by their respective Cold War experiences.
Post Cold War Europe and the ESS

Europe’s mid-20th century concept of self-defense, through the conclusion of the Cold War, was based on the threat of a Soviet invasion. With the demise of the Soviet threat, Cold War fatigue faded into what Robert Kagan calls a “strategic pause”, a period of reflection during which both the United States and Europe could independently define and pursue their version of a “New World Order” without the omnipresent threat of thermo-nuclear war. Realpolitik would yield to a renewed idealism, and for Europeans, this inspired an agenda of “international norm setting and institution building.”

Soft power reunified Germany and integrated Western and Eastern Europe into a peacetime union of states. The Europeans created the EU using multilateral diplomacy to achieve reunification and integration, build institutions serving individual and collective needs, and agree upon the EU’s security strategy. The EU’s model for further harnessing its members’ individual will and developing its collective capacity for internal as well as foreign policy had become apparent. It is a multilateral, soft approach. One author describes the European mindset as such: “The European countries, overshadowed by two major wars as well as the permanent confrontation during the Cold War and encouraged by the peaceful experience of European Integration, have developed a strong interest to set up rules and institutions to govern international behavior.”

As stated earlier, after the Cold War, the United States and EU stated similar visions of the New World Order. By the early years of the new century this common view diverged,

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however, particularly concerning the application of force to support the vision. Differences in military capacity were self-evident, the difference in willingness to employ those forces less evident until 9/11. The United States’ post 9/11 efforts at building a counter-terror partnership with the EU stalled when it came to the role of military force.

Many Europeans disagreed that a unilateral, predominantly military response was the best approach to international terrorism. Instead, the European leaders preferred “the use of diplomacy, law enforcement and international intelligence cooperation, [and] emphasized the need to focus all available resources to tackle the sources of terrorism, such as finances, fanatical and destructive ideologies, and conflicts or crises that provide human resources to the terrorists.” Reducing the conditions that foster terrorism is, no doubt, an essential contributor to human security.

Preventive engagements, however, can be long campaigns. And to be successful, they must be able to withstand and control violence. This requires a defensive and offensive military capability. The current European mindset towards military operations suggests an intent to use them sparingly. If a terrorist act warrants a military response, the Europeans stress the need to justify the response by determining the responsible actors(s), building multilateral support and then limiting the scope of the military response as narrowly and precisely as possible. The shortcoming of this approach is that it can limit and delay the EU’s responsive options.

Merely apprehending individual perpetrators following a terrorist attack will not eliminate the hardened core of terrorists to which the perpetrators belonged and for which a


diplomatic and economic humanitarian plan would be futile.\footnote{27 Al Qaida is an example of an organization committed to violence. Its Training Manual illustrates how this commitment is irreconcilable with negotiation or compromise. Its goal is to reestablish the Islamic government following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The Manual’s introduction describes the Al Qaida believer’s methodology for reestablishing the post-Ottoman Empire Islamic government: “These young people realized that an Islamic government would never be established except by the bomb and rifle. Islam does not coincide with or make truce with unbelief, but rather confronts it. The confrontation that Islam calls for with these godless and apostate regimes, does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun.” \textit{The Al Qaida Training Manual}, Introduction, reprinted in Military Studies in the Jihad Against Tyrants, Post, Jerrold M., Editor (2004), p. 18, the USAF Counterproliferation Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.} In failed or failing states, there may not be any credible government or leadership with which to negotiate. Even if there is a functioning government, diplomacy may never achieve cooperation. Or, the delay in achieving cooperation may spoil the opportunity for decisive action against egregious abusers of human rights. Opportunity is fleeting. “Unless commanders are willing to accept risk and then act, the adversary is likely to close the window of opportunity and exploit friendly inaction.”\footnote{28 \textit{FM 3-0 Operations}, p. 3-3.} 

Unilateral military action, including preemptive action, may be the only way to apprehend violent actors or resolve armed conflict.

If the EU approach is to succeed, EU military forces must be organized, trained, and equipped to perform offensive operations in support of planned missions as well as in response to hostile attack. In civilian settings, where terrorists intentionally operate within the population to create surprise or confusion, the ability to discern when to apply lawful force requires clear authorities and training. The asymmetric threat, like the conventional threat, thrives in an environment that is volatile, uncertain, chaotic and ambiguous.\footnote{29 Clausewitz, Carl von. \textit{On War}. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 119-21.} European human security missions will inevitably encounter these circumstances and, therefore, must be prepared to operate within them. The discussion concerning “full spectrum operations” as a methodology for
operationalizing the human security strategy is discussed more fully in the section entitled “Vital Interests and Full Spectrum Operations”.

At this juncture, an American and European military cooperation in asymmetric warfare and in smaller regional conflicts is still developing. Europe’s discourse with Africa and recent security partnership presently does not include the United States. The NATO alliance is available for conventional warfare although it may take time before the members are willing to extend its interest to smaller scale conflict. Also, the Africa - EU human security partnership provides a regional security capability that may be a better suited to some African security crises than the larger NATO military alliance. This may be evident where consensus is not achievable within the larger NATO membership or where a political solution is more viable for a political and an economic engagement. If such a situation causes controversy between alliances, one solution may be a system whereby NATO “gets the first right over a future mission, and NATO doesn’t want to take on a mission, the EU may.”

A better American partner for the Africa - EU strategic partnership may be the new United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). Fully operational since October 1, 2008, AFRICOM is the newest of the United States’ geographic combatant commands, and oriented on the African continent. It is a military organization, but has an organizational structure and mission priorities that reflect Africa’s strategic environment. Composed of military and

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30 Fletcher Forum, “NATO’s Past, Present, and Future: A View from Europe, An Interview with Radoslaw Sikorski”, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2008), p. 9. Regarding whether NATO and the EU are competing or complementary organizations, former NATO defense minister Sikorski stated: “In the security sphere, I think NATO should remain the bedrock, because in security terms the United States and Europe should be one strategic area.” Minister Sikorski’s “NATO’s right of first refusal” suggestion seeks to preserve NATO’s bedrock status. Ibid, pp. 9-10.

civilian personnel, its mission priority is primarily “soft” and is, in many ways, closely analogous to the human security strategy. Africa and AFRICOM present the Obama Administration a great opportunity to fulfill its commitment of reinvigorating multilateralism in American foreign policy. The possibility for future combined African, American and European security efforts in Africa is compelling and should be explored. It may be, of course, that some global security threats are entirely Euro-centric, best handled by the EU.

The European Strategy: Human Security

The European Security Strategy reflects the conclusion of European leaders that large conventional aggression against any EU member state is unlikely. Europe faces, instead, an unconventional, asymmetric threat from within and without. The ESS identifies five principle threats to its security, describing them as “more diverse, less visible and less predictable.” They are: terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts; state failure; and organized crime. Taken together, these threats confront Europe with a “very

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33 As part of its effort to implement the Africa – EU security partnership, the EU is proposing a regional political partnership focused on the Horn of Africa. To this end, the Commission of the European Communities prepared a communiqué to the Council and European Parliament outlining the strategy for a political partnership for “peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa.” In this communication, the Commission identifies several proposals the EU would undertake to enable the Africa – EU partnership’s success. One of the proposals is to increase “dialogue and coordination on the Horn of Africa with the USA, Norway, Japan, Canada, Russia and China.” Strategy for Africa: an EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa, Brussels, 20 October 2006, p. 11.

34 European Security Strategy, p. 3.

radical threat indeed.” The task then, is to “promote a ring of well governed countries” on the EU’s borders with which it can “enjoy close and cooperative relations.”

With emergence of the new threats, the Europeans intend that their responsive action often will be preventive and abroad. Threats cannot be ignored as they are prone to grow in severity and consequence over time. The EU has concluded, accordingly, that “we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict . . . and threat prevention cannot start too early.” And, in contrast to the Cold War threat, “none of the new threats is purely military: nor can any be tackled by purely military means.” Instead:

Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The [EU] is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.

The ESS and Barcelona Report both emphasize early intervention to prevent crises from developing or escalating out-of-control. The Barcelona Report argues that conflict appears at multiple points along a continuum, particularly in settings where human security remains in jeopardy. Planners and ground forces—civil and military—can expect difficulty differentiating conflict’s many phases. The Barcelona Report states: “The conditions that cause conflict—fear

36 Ibid, p. 4.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
and hatred, a criminalized economy that profits from violent methods of controlling assets, weak illegitimate states, the existence of warlords and paramilitary groups, for example—are often exacerbated during and after periods of violence and there are no clear beginnings or endings.\footnote{The Barcelona Report, p. 14.}

Thus, while the EU’s security policy applies “to a continuum of phases of varying degrees of violence that always involves elements of both prevention and reconstruction”, early prevention may help avoid becoming ensnared in the continuum of phases.\footnote{Ibid.}

The emphasis on crisis prevention infers that the EU response will occur in Africa, at the crisis’ point of origin. The Barcelona Report assumes that insecurity in one region of the world imperils the security of other regions on the world: “Many people in the world lead intolerably insecure lives. In many cases, insecurity is the consequence of conflicts in which civilians are deliberately targeted with impunity. In an era of global interdependence, Europeans can no longer feel secure when large parts of the world are insecure.”\footnote{Ibid, Executive Summary.} And, in order to make the world safer for Europeans, the EU recognized that it had to “address the real security needs of people in situations of severe insecurity.”\footnote{Ibid, p. 7.}

The predominate focus of global security, therefore, targets human—individual—security issues, rather than state security. As explained further below, human security means freedom from insecurities such as genocide, torture, crimes against humanity, disease, poverty and lack of economic opportunity. This means the EU “should contribute to the protection of every individual human being” and not only on defending its own borders.\footnote{Ibid, p. 9.} Europe’s rationale for

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42 Ibid.

43 Ibid, Executive Summary.


adopting the human security approach is threefold. It has a moral responsibility to help others to “live with dignity and security”; a legal right and obligation to promote “peace, security, and the sustainable development of the earth”; and pursuing its own “enlightened self-interest” of building security for others as a means of increasing its own security.46

At its core, human insecurity occurs when governments fail to provide their citizens with public goods and services. These goods and services protect the important social conditions of freedom from fear and want. Perpetrators of fear come in many forms. They include an oppressive regime violating its citizens’ human and legal rights, non-state actors committing violent acts against the state and its people, and conflict between armed combatants.47 Thus, the perpetrators may include the government’s soldiers, police or security apparatus; insurgents, warlords or criminals; or even foreign armies. The typical victim of this violence is the individual civilian.48 A state’s failure to protect against these threats may be intentional, as in the case of ethnic or tribal rivalries, or in combination with neglect, incompetence or inability.

Freedom from want concerns the availability of adequate, food, health, housing and employment opportunities. Environmental factors such as desertification, disease, famine and natural disasters can destroy these freedoms and produce population migrations that create turbulence in other regions, and worst case, the vicious cycle of poverty, governance breakdown and conflict.49 Once conflict occurs, economic stability is imperiled: “Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment

46 Ibid, pp. 9-10.
48 Ibid.
49 European Security Strategy, pp. 2-3.
and makes normal economic activity impossible. The effect of these unresolved insecurities has significant consequences within Europe.

For Europe, the effects include the migration of large numbers of dissatisfied or displaced persons from Africa and other locations, challenging the receiving state’s ability to effectively process or integrate them into European society. Open or porous borders facilitate this movement as has criminal human smuggling operations. Displaced persons tend to migrate to larger cities in search of jobs and social stability. Once there, however, they “often face insecurity, youth gangs, drugs, violence, and fundamentalist Islam.” Social programs may be unable to counteract these conditions, which if not remedied, can produce isolation, susceptibility to radical teachings and ultimately, acts of terror. These conditions can renew the cycle of poverty, an unresponsive government and conflict. Only this time, the cycle operates within Europe’s borders.

Human security prevention abroad thus serves the important function of protecting individuals in Africa, as well as the European countries facing the influx of large numbers of migrants and refugees. It can also serve an economic purpose that benefits both Africa and Europe: the ethical management of vital natural resources and their delivery to the market. Locating, extracting and producing these resources are capital and infrastructure intensive. As stated above, human security is a precondition to economic development. Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe—it is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. “[In 2003],

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50 European Security Strategy, pp. 2-3.


52 The Shifting Face of Violence, p. 33. The author also points that migration usually proceeds in stages, whereby displaced persons migrate to intermediary collection points (states and cities) where their presence creates demands for social services beyond the host nation or city’s capabilities. A further negative by-product of the migration flows is that it is often illegal, and therefore facilitated by criminal enterprises in human smuggling.
imports account[ed] for about 50% of energy consumption. . . . This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most [EU] energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa."53

Implementing EU’s human security strategy is the responsibility of the Human Security Response Force. The composition of this force is designed to be at least one third civilian and the remainder military personnel and configured to handle the “continuum of phases of varying degrees of violence.”54 The Barcelona Report contemplates the application of military force, but explains that traditional forms of military power in response to asymmetric violence may be counterproductive. It explains that military power—even if technologically and conventionally superior to asymmetric or insurgent forces—will not restore stability unless accompanied by other, softer instruments of power.55

The reasoning is straightforward. Advanced technology and superior conventional military forces cannot ensure that troops achieve or maintain order or protect citizens.56 The state’s coercive agencies are inadequate for “coping . . . with suicide bombers who have relatively unsophisticated technology, or preventing ethnic cleansing.”57 When smart bombs “kill civilians or [cause] material destruction either because of technical or intelligence failures” the collateral damage may coalesce opinion against the military intervention.58 Infrastructural


54 See text accompanying notes nos. 18 - 19.

55 The Barcelona Report, pp. 9-10.


57 The Barcelona Report, p. 9.

58 Ibid.
damage and disrupted livelihoods during conflict oblige the population to rely on “the criminal economy that is a source of finance for warring groups.”59

Simply put, conventional military forces cannot on their own achieve or maintain security. The particular human security mission will, of course, determine the kinds of resources (including military forces) required. The Barcelona Report offers its prescription for making the EU more capable in these different environments. It is a “holistic” approach, capable of handling several types and phases of conflict and categorized as “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization.”60 The configuration of any intervention will also depend upon the limitations or requirements imposed by the Africa - EU’s strategic partnership, described in the next section.

The Africa - EU Strategic Partnership

Like Europe, the Cold War left Africa with security dilemmas requiring resolution.61 Many of Africa’s insecurities, however, were deep-seated, complex and difficult to resolve. During the Cold War, some African countries proved particularly vulnerable to the destabilizing effects of proxy conflicts. Cold War confrontation between the super powers, especially in the Horn of Africa, had “precipitated crises, thereby effectively destroying the conditions necessary

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid, p. 10.

for transnational [security and stabilization] initiatives.” The number and severity of these crises exceeded the international community’s will and capacity to resolve.

By 1998, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General had acknowledged that the UN lacked the “capacity, resources and expertise” to effectively intervene in African crises. The UNSG concluded that this critical shortfall required the “establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that would enable the UN to work with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable partnerships.” With the exception of a few African nations supporting regional peacekeeping efforts in West and Southern Africa, existing African peacekeeping capability and organization had proven inadequate.

While the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had established the “Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution” in 1993, the mission of this organization was oriented towards eliminating the remaining vestiges of colonialism and apartheid, rather than addressing the emerging problem of internal armed conflict. The OAU recognized the new threats in its 2000 “Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa and in the Constitutive Act, which implemented the AU in 2001”

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64 Promises and Challenges, p. 172.

65 Progress with the African Standby Force, p. 1. The authors identify Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe as the countries showing “much greater willingness and capacity to launch peace operations when no action was forthcoming from the UN or OAU.”


67 Protocol, Recitals, p. 2.
As the AU came on the scene in 2000, a Constitutive Act incorporated the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, but with a revised structure, procedures and working methods. The “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)” established the Peace and Security Council (PSC) within the AU as “a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, . . .” and as a “collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.”68 The PSC is guided by the principles of preventive responses and “peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts”, but the AU is authorized by charter to intervene in a member state in both a consensual and nonconsensual setting.69

Upon the AU Assembly’s approval, the AU may intervene upon a member state’s request to restore peace and security, or unilaterally in cases involving grave breaches, “namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”70 The AU made provision for applying collaborative coercive power and a wide variety of “softer” power missions by creating the African Standby Force (ASF), a rapidly deployable group of civilian and military personnel.71 The ASF’s current configuration provides five standby brigade sized elements, one for each of Africa’s five regions. Once fully resourced, a standby brigade will be able to deploy and

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69 Ibid., Arts. 2, paragraph 2, and Art. 13, the African Standby Force.


perform within the timeline and mission set of six scenarios.\textsuperscript{72} On an increasing scale of complexity, the missions range from scenario one—deploy within 30 days of a PSC mandate to provide military advice to a political mission—to scenario six—deploy within 14 days to intervene against genocide and crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{73}

Depending on the scope of the mission, the ASF may perform these missions in conjunction with the “UN and its Agencies, other relevant international . . . and regional organizations, as well as with national authorities and NGOs.”\textsuperscript{74} The Protocol requires the PSC to harmonize and coordinate activities with these potential partners, “determining the modalities of such partnership[s according to] the comparative advantage of each and the prevailing circumstances.”\textsuperscript{75} As an example, the Africa – EU Strategic Partnership, will help guide future joint missions between the two partners.

The EU-AU summit in 2000 in Cairo was the important first step in institutionalizing the parties’ partnership.\textsuperscript{76} The millennium year was historically significant for both partners, with Europe approaching its 50th anniversary of European integration and Africa the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the beginning of African independence.\textsuperscript{77} The AU’s creation in 2000-2001 produced a more integrated and viable organization with which the EU could discuss and implement common security issues.\textsuperscript{78}


\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, Article 13(4), African Standby Force – Mandate.

\textsuperscript{75} Protocol, Articles 16(1)(b) and 17.

\textsuperscript{76} The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{77} Lisbon Declaration – EU Africa Summit, Lisbon, 8-9 December 2007.

After 2000, African security issues became more prominent in European security decision making because of the: 1. 1998 terrorist bombings of the United States’ embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; 2. Terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, D.C., London and Madrid; 3. AU’s “own security and peace architecture which changed official European public opinion of the matter; and 4. Agreement between the EU and AU to participate in a series of summits helped mitigate the Europeans’ colonial legacy and led to the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. 79 Cooperation between the AU and EU developed rapidly over the next seven years, culminating in the adoption of the Africa – EU Strategic Partnership in December 2007 at the second Africa - EU summit. 80

By this point, the ambition was to “take the Africa – EU relationship to a new, strategic level with a strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation at all levels.” 81 The partners announced strategic objectives in the areas of “peace and security, democratic governance and human rights, trade and regional integration and other key development issues.” 82 A new joint strategy provided an “overarching long-term framework for Africa – EU relations,” containing a number of short and mid-term Action Plans designed to implement the overall strategy and provide metrics for measuring progress. 83

In their “First Action Plan (2008-2010) for the Implementation of the Africa – EU Strategic Partnership” the two parties established eight distinct partnerships for implementing

79 Ibid.

80 The Africa – EU Strategic Partnership.

81 Ibid, p. 2.


83 The Africa – EU Strategic Partnership, p. 2.
and measuring the strategic objectives mentioned above. The Africa and the EU are still building the requisite “institutional architecture and implementation modalities” for these partnerships according to the “priority actions” assigned to each. The Africa – EU Partnership on Peace and Security, the partnership relevant herein, is still largely in the planning, coordination, staffing and funding stages. Priority actions for implementing the Partnership on Peace and Security are to “Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security,” achieve “full operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture,” and establish “predictable funding for African-led Peace Support Operations.”

This partnership is founded on the assumption that “peace and security are the foundation of progress and sustainable development.” Both parties expect the Joint Strategy to empower mutual efforts by Africans and Europeans to address security threats in Africa and elsewhere. This is an ambitious global strategy extending beyond the African continent. The partners have concluded that a continental strategy is best achieved by a regional focus, so the EU has proposed establishing a “Regional Political Partnership with the Horn of Africa as a test case for applying the [Joint Strategy].” As discussed below, the Horn of Africa presents a complex and an insecure strategic environment. If EU planners develop the partnership and the forces that can operationalize human security in the region, they will almost inevitably be obliged to configure

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84 First Action Plan (2008-2010), p. 2. The eight partnerships are as follows: Peace and security; Democratic Governance and Human Rights; Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure; MDGs; Energy; Climate Change; Migration, Mobility and Employment; and Science, Information Society and Space.

85 Ibid, pp. 6-9.

86 Ibid, p. 5.

87 Ibid.

88 Strategy for Africa: an EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa.
military forces capable of conducting full spectrum operations—offensive, defensive and stability—in conjunction with the civic and humanitarian assistance mission they are supporting.

**The Horn of Africa**

The proposed Regional Political Partnership in the Horn of Africa (Regional Partnership) highlights the EU’s approach to conflict resolution in Africa. This approach provides that the EU “should increasingly use regional and national development strategies and instruments to address structural causes of conflict.”\(^\text{89}\) Defined in the Regional Partnership as the region comprising Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, the Horn of Africa contains several states on the 2008 Failed State Index.\(^\text{90}\) Somalia and Sudan rank numbers one and two on the Index, Ethiopia and Uganda rank in the top twenty, while Kenya ranked 26th and Eritrea 44th.\(^\text{91}\)

The region is beset by interstate and intrastate conflict and caught in an unrelenting cycle of poverty, ineffective governance and conflict. These circumstances facilitate transnational lawlessness, terrorism and population migrations. Substantial external interventions in the Ethiopia – Eritrea conflict, Somalia and Sudan have not yielded enduring results. The insecurities are complex and present challenging conditions for human security efforts. A primary consideration for human security planners is the stability of government. This impacts the most basic requirements for freedom from want and fear and impedes any ability to coordinate assistance efforts with governing officials and agencies. The spectrum of government

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\(^{90}\) Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, *The Failed State Index 2008*, Foreign Policy (July/August 2008), p. 64. The Index uses the following indicators of instability for its rankings: demographic pressures; refugees and displaced persons; group grievance; human flight; uneven development; economy; delegitimization of state; public services; human rights; security apparatus; factionalized elites; and external intervention. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

\(^{91}\) *Ibid.*
coherence in the region spans from the collapsed state of Somalia to the stable nation of Djibouti, the only Horn country not on the Failed State Index.

In between these extremes lie the countries with some form of central government, though each struggles to fulfill modern western norms of governance. The result is ungoverned space caused by either government neglect and/or government abdication.\textsuperscript{92} Governing by neglect, or “incomplete” government characterizes those states where the government has the intent to exert influence and provide public services, infrastructure and security for its populace, but lacks the resources to do so.\textsuperscript{93} Citizens living in these areas are faced with the choice to leave the area for opportunities elsewhere or to stay and get by without the public services. If the leaders within these populations are weak, they and their communities may be co-opted by insurgents seeking to build an ideological base, criminals building a criminal enterprise, or both. Insurgents and criminals both present dangers to a central government. Insurgents threaten existing regimes and criminals divert state wealth and sometimes violently oppose government forces seeking to reestablish control of an ungoverned area.

Government abdication characterizes those situations where the political leadership purposefully denies governance and services to areas populated by groups with which the central government has no religious, ethnic or other affinities.\textsuperscript{94} It may also be the case, as in the Sudan, where a central government allows proxies to wage violence against a segment of its population under the rubric of counterinsurgency. Intervention in abdication cases such as Sudan present additional challenges of gaining access to afflicted populations and attendant access burdens.


\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
Denying or limiting access aggravates human insecurity, and even where granted, may be subject to government manipulation for political or military purposes. International aid can encourage a government to further abdicate its responsibility for delivering goods and services (and diverting those resources to policies that created the insecurity), is susceptible to looting, and as a commodity, may generate conflict by parties seeking to control it.\textsuperscript{95}

The international community is also confronted with the dilemma of enforcing compliance of a state that fails to abide by a mediated settlement. This was the case with Ethiopia in its dispute with Eritrea after rejecting the decision of a boundary commission despite earlier assurances to accept the outcome. Human security crises in the Horn of Africa are myriad and likely exceed international capacity and will to resolve entirely. In some cases, the pragmatic and viable approach in a challenged region such as the Horn of Africa may be simply preventing a crisis in one nation from destroying a stable, neighboring nation.

Djibouti’s stability is attributable to its relatively peaceful transition of power from colonial France to an independent nationhood, and the consequent benefit of a defense pact with France against external aggression, backed by the presence of elements of the French Army, Air Force and Navy. Since 2002, additional military security has come from an American military presence, the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, and since 2008, the hard and soft power capability of AFRICOM. Economically, the country enjoys a substantial income from shipping and commerce through the Port of Djibouti. Significantly, its political stability, port infrastructure and potential for economic development make Djibouti an attractive venue for direct foreign investment. Replicating Djibouti’s stability throughout the Horn of Africa is a desirable, but ambitious goal. Advancing human security to this level is more likely if the

security efforts are closely linked to the Africa-EU partners’ vital strategic interests and backed by adequate military force.

**Vital Interests and Full Spectrum Operations**

Preliminary to the decision to execute the human security mission is whether the mission supports the Africa – EU security strategy. The Barcelona Report acknowledges a pragmatic approach given the EU members’ potential differing views on the efficacy of a particular operational mission. The Report states: “Chances for success, degrees of risk, and levels of commitment vary.” Reaching a consensus among the 27 member body concerning the capacity and will to perform a mission will challenge the intervention decision-making process. To facilitate this process, the Report offers a decision template to “prioritise certain situations over others.”

The decision-making template lists five factors for consideration: “gravity and urgency of the situation; practicality of the mission, risks, chances for success and availability of other actors; special responsibility for neighboring countries; historic ties and historic responsibilities; and public concern and public pressure.” These factors are broad, but arguably, perhaps necessarily so given the nature of human security. The factors are based on the three reasons underlying the human security strategy—morality, legal obligations and protecting vital interests—themselves broad in scope. Nonetheless, because the contemplated Human Security Response Force is two-thirds military, the potential for friction and violence generally between

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96 The Barcelona Report, p. 11.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid, pp. 11-12.
EU military forces and hostile actors may be greater. And, given the elements of full spectrum operations—offensive, defensive and stabilization—potential armed conflict should be assumed. It may, therefore, be advisable to weigh factors supporting the EU’s vital strategic interests more heavily than the moral and legal factors.\textsuperscript{100}

Once the EU concludes a human security mission meets its security strategy criteria, it should then precisely define the mission’s desired end state. In other words, what is the mission seeking to accomplish and what conditions, once achieved, fulfill the end state.\textsuperscript{101} An articulated end state helps ensure that planning and execution are focused towards that end. This approach assists planners to determine what methodology (ways) and resources (means) are necessary to accomplish the mission (ends). Each element should be defined and integrated to maximize the possibility for success. Such a coordination process requires a “thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment.”\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{100} The consensus building process itself may well be the greatest restraint on executing the appealing, but broad human security mission. A different, but potential scenario involves the necessity of using offensive military force from the outset. The test case will eventually arise, when in the case of a non-cooperating state, the AU has to determine whether the crisis warrants a nonconsensual expeditionary intervention. If asked to join the intervention, the EU would then have to determine whether and to what degree to participate in that endeavor. The decision-making process in this situation is military focused. An example of a useful decision-making template for such a case comes from Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense for President Ronald Reagan. Following the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, Weinberger drafted a set of guidelines designed to analyze “when and when not to commit United States military forces abroad.” Weinberger had opposed the deployment of troops to Beirut while Secretary of State George Schultz had supported the deployment. This had caused friction between the two cabinet officials as Weinberger believed Schultz was too eager to commit troops merely to display American military power. As a result of this friction and the political fallout of the disaster, Weinberger identified six prerequisites for deploying American combat forces abroad. The criteria are as follows:
\begin{enumerate}
\item Commit only if our or our allies’ vital interests are at stake.
\item If we commit, do so with all the resources necessary to win.
\item Go in only with clear military and political objectives.
\item Be ready to change the commitment if the objectives change, since wars rarely stand still.
\item Only take on commitments that gain the support of the American people and the Congress.
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{101} Headquarters, Department of the Army, \textit{FM 3-07 Stability Operations}, Washington, D.C., 6 October 2008, pp. 4-6.

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{FM 3-0 Operations}, p. 3-1.
Regions such as the Horn of Africa are mired in persistent conflict, making it difficult to distinguish between the beginning and end of conflict, and thereby frustrating the EU’s preference for preventive interventions.\[^{103}\] The authors of the Barcelona Report anticipated this condition, acknowledging that the “European security strategy should therefore apply to a continuum of phases of varying conflict.”\[^{104}\]

The Report also stresses the importance of unifying ends, ways and means in its human security strategy. This is a critical aspect of planning, and if not conducted properly, will produce unsatisfying results:

> [I]n actual situations where international capabilities have been deployed, there is often a disjuncture between the aims set out by politicians for security operations, and the means and mandate given to the military and civilian agencies. In some instances, mandates have been too restricted and the failure to protect people on the ground has undermined the legitimacy of the international effort. In other cases, excessive force has exacerbated instability.\[^{105}\]

The EU’s human security strategy emphasizes the fundamental principles of operating in a continuum of conflict and designing ways and means that will produce the desired end state. Missing, however, are the details of an operational approach that can actualize these principles, and here is where America’s allies could profit from America’s hard-won insights.

Recent United States military doctrine offers an applicable operational model. This doctrine is a revolutionary change and germane to the EU’s human security strategy. Previously, American military strategy sought to separate civilians from the battlefield so conventional

\[^{103}\] United States Army doctrine defines persistent conflict as a “period of protracted confrontation among states, nonstate, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.” *FM 3-0 Operations*, Forward.


armed forces could “engage and destroy enemies and seize terrain.” Current doctrine, stated in Field Manuals 3-0 Operations (2008) and 3-07 Stability Operations (2008), stress a role for conventional military capability but recognize the new operational environment as predominately asymmetric and requiring application of all national instruments of power—diplomatic, informational, economic and military. Like the Barcelona Report’s phased continuum of armed conflict principle, American doctrine envisions an environment of persistent conflict that is “complex, multi-dimensional, and increasingly fought ‘among the people.’” On this asymmetric battlefield, the people are not separated from the terrain, but rather targeted with “non-kinetic” soft power to provide security and stability and garner their support.

The military is the centerpiece to this operational concept. Only the military can achieve the physical security of persons and property frequently missing from the environment that allows the soft power forces to operate. The spectrum of conflict in this environment ranges from stable to unstable peace, insurgency to general war. The types of conflict are not always easily defined, and may move quickly from one conflict intensity to another. Armed forces suited to this environment are, therefore, organized, trained and equipped to rapidly shift among defensive, offensive and stability operations.

106 *FM 3-0 Operations*, Forward.

107 United States Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates writes: “What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign—a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists. But over the long-term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies.” *A Balanced Strategy*, p. 29.

108 *FM 3-0 Operations*, Forward.

The mission and threat level will determine the military force package’s allocation of
defensive, offensive or stability oriented capabilities. Events on the ground, however, will
always predominate the weighting of capabilities. In defensive operations, military forces
prevent hostile forces from disrupting or defeating on-going human security efforts, while in
offensive operations, forces seek out and attack known hostile forces. Both types of operations
are intended to defeat the hostile actors’ capability and will to violently oppose the human
security mission.\textsuperscript{110} Success requires armed forces trained to be flexible and capable of adapting
to a change in the operating space, an operational concept known as full spectrum operations.
And while a military doctrine, its purpose limits military operations only to those conducted in
concert with diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts: “Battlefield success is no longer
enough; final victory requires concurrent stability operations to lay the foundation for lasting
peace.”\textsuperscript{111}

The stability operation described in the US Army doctrine is analogous to the human
security mission described in the Barcelona Report. Army doctrine, though, is clearer on the
application of force in the stability operation and in the definition of defensive and offensive
operations. Stability and security operations center on the individual whose security is in
jeopardy and essential to achieving mission support. Efforts to establish security will ultimately
become a contest between friendly and unfriendly forces for the individual’s support. And
though military force “cannot, by itself, restore or guarantee stable peace, . . .  [it is indispensable

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid, p. 3-3.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid, Forward.
for establishing] global, regional, and local conditions that allow the other instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, and economic—to exert their full influence. . . .”112

Conclusion

The EU regional security arrangement in Africa emphasizes diplomacy and economic development over military force. This may be an adequate starting point, but to be more confident of success, the EU must be prepared to apply military power to achieve its strategic ends. In the Horn of Africa, persistent conflict will challenge EU forces throughout the spectrum of conflict. In a region containing large areas devoid of both security and development, military capability is paramount. The military may be called upon to restore and maintain security before development projects can begin. Other situations may require the military to protect a completed

112 Ibid, pp. 2-1 – 2-2. Army doctrine cites the following examples: “Multinational forces may separate warring factions to stop a civil war that threatens regional peace. Their actions allow international aid organizations to reach masses of refugees and an international commission to seek some sort of equitable settlement. On a local level, a [military] task force suppresses terrorism and lawlessness so other government agencies can work freely with host-nation officials to restore self-sustaining governance. In each case, achieving stable peace requires expertise and capabilities beyond those developed in the military force. Every use of military force to restore stable peace requires the other three instruments of national power. Conversely, diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts to restore a stable peace are usually futile unless backed by effective military power, military power with global reach and endurance. In every campaign and major operation, success, as characterized by a stable peace, depends on unified action involving concerted efforts by multinational military and civilian partners.”
development project and its civilian beneficiaries against attack. In a cycle of violence, civil military personnel will find themselves in occasional armed conflict with insurgents or terrorists. Other human security missions may be as compelling as humanitarian assistance but much more dangerous.

In the Horn region particularly, EU forces may find themselves in continuous hostile contact against large conventional military forces such as Sudan’s. Alternatively, Sudan may threaten conventional military force against EU forces to deter or compel cessation of a human security mission. Will the EU and other partners be willing to test such coercive diplomacy? Exercising coercive diplomacy in its own right to either deter or compel an adversary’s behavior requires a credible military capability and commitment to employ that capability. All these factors require the EU to maintain a credible military capability to accomplish its human security mission. This means building its own and the AU’s military forces. It can also mean partnering with countries not currently in the Africa – EU strategic partnership.

Given the interdependence of soft and hard power for mission success, maximizing military capability may be the best way for minimizing its actual application. Human security is a noble, responsible and strategic vision. But in practice, it can be exceedingly complex. Because of this complication, EU leadership would be well advised not pursue human security in a particular case unless they agree it is worth fighting for.


Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, *The Failed State Index 2008*, Foreign Policy, (July/August 2008).


