ORGANIZATIONAL FRICTION: URBAN CRIME CONTROL
DIMINISH EFFECT THEORY

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General Studies

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Organizational Friction: Urban Crime Control Diminish Effect Theory

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In the early 1990s the Belize Defence Force (BDF) was instructed to provide manpower support to the Belize Police Department’s (BPD) crime control efforts in Belize City. This resulted in a drastic reduction in criminal activity; followed by a gradual resurgence that surpassed the pre-combined era, both in quantity and severity. This study explores the diminishing crime control effect of BPD and the BDF in Belize City with a view to determine whether the BDF should continue to provide manpower support to the BPD.

The research methodology is a qualitative narrative with a descriptive research design that embodies theory development from a phenomenological approach. The data collection strategy is a triangulation of a survey, interviews, and opinion polls. The research concludes that not only is the protracted military manpower support to the BPD an ineffective one, but it is also a contributing factor to the quantity and severity of crimes being committed in Belize; as well as the attrition of the crime control competency of both organizations. Findings of the study were applied to the development of a theory and an accompanying model, titled, the Urban Crime Control Diminish Effect Theory

Belize Defence Force, Belize Police Department, interoperability, crimes in Belize City, urban crime control, diminishing effect, military manpower support, urban crime control diminish effect theory
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


In the early 1990s the Belize Defence Force (BDF) was instructed to provide manpower support to the Belize Police Department’s (BPD) crime control efforts in Belize City. This resulted in a drastic reduction in criminal activity; followed by a gradual resurgence that surpassed the pre-combined era, both in quantity and severity. This study explores the diminishing crime control effect of BPD and the BDF in Belize City with a view to determine whether the BDF should continue to provide manpower support to the BPD.

The research methodology is a qualitative narrative with a descriptive research design that embodies theory development from a phenomenological approach. The data collection strategy is a triangulation of a survey, interviews, and opinion polls. The research concludes that not only is the protracted military manpower support to the BPD an ineffective one, but it is also a contributing factor to the quantity and severity of crimes being committed in Belize; as well as the attrition of the crime control competency of both organizations. Findings of the study were applied to the development of a theory and an accompanying model, titled, the Urban Crime Control Diminish Effect Theory.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The streets of Belize City are running red, while residents are paralyzed by fear. Even the sanctity of homes has been breached by home invaders, who rob and rape and murder with abandon. Business owners now operate with full knowledge that any minute may be their last. Apparent fearless and coldblooded gangs rule our streets, and the death toll is rising steadily. Innocent blood has been shed by bullets which missed their targets. Belizeans are living in a city that is totally out of control, and there seems to be nowhere to turn.

The Police Department which should provide sanctuary and stability in this storm of lawlessness has lost the trust of the Belizean people because of its evident inability to protect and apparent powerlessness in the face of relentless violence. As if that were not bad enough, members of the Police Department have recently been implicated as the shooters in a series of murders. The “rogue element” of the Police Department has joined the criminal element as public enemy #1.

— Belize Times

Background of the Study

In the late 1980s the residents of Belize City were confronted with a spike in violent crime. The situation deteriorated to the point where there was a general sense of belief that the civil police were overwhelmed and, therefore, could no longer maintain law and order in the city. The validity of that assumption was neither formally nor informally asserted. There was, however, an informal divide, a divide inspired by fear. On one side of the divide there were citizens living in fear and on the other side were citizens living on fear. Eventually public outrage and outcry influenced the central government of Belize to take the path travelled by other post-colonial Caribbean nations to address somewhat similar situations. From all indications, the measures taken by our sister nations, particularly Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, was very effective. Subsequently, the government of Belize made the decision to utilize its military to
support the civil police to combat crimes in Belize City. Like the other Caribbean
countries that did the same, there was an almost instant reduction in the number and
severity of crime followed by a resurgence which now seems to be overwhelming to both
the civil police and the military.

Statement of the Problem

Considering the initial favorable outcome and the continued military support to
the civil police, why has crime resurged to the point where now, even the military seems
to be overwhelmed? In my mind, the governments of these Caribbean nations did not
realize, or realized and choose to ignore the fact that by using their military to combat the
increase of criminal activity, they were departing from a stance of fighting crime, to one
of fighting criminals. The actions taken--fighting criminals--yield instant benefit, a
marked reduction in crime, albeit short lived. The reaction--the criminals adjusted to the
new climate and crime gradually increased, both in quantity and severity.

Like our other sister Caribbean nations, not only have we returned to our starting
point, but we are now in a worst position than when we started. We are now at a point
where the rules of criminals as opposed to the rule of law seem to prevail. The protracted
use of the military for urban crime control proved to be a short term benefit at the cost of
a long term detriment. What is even more troublesome, however, is that since we have
been using our last resort--the military--for the past twenty years as a crime control
measure, the only thing left in our crime fighting tool box, is hope. A hope that things
will get better, unfortunately “hope, is not a strategy” (Page 2001, cover).

There are considerable and growing numbers of studies on the use of the military
to conduct civil law enforcement functions (Quinney 1974; Kraska 1984; Kraska 1993;
Dandeker 1995; Bunker 1996; Maguire 1997; and Kraska and Kappeler 1997). However, all of these studies examined the “police-ization” of the military or the militarization of the civil police. They investigated the police or the military independently of each other, and not as a conjoint entity. None of the studies examined circumstances involving protracted military support to the civil police. Subsequently, there is at this moment no known study which examines the resultant relationship of protracted military manpower support to civil police within the context of urban crime control. It follows, therefore, that an examination of the interrelation between military and civil police organizations may provide a source of valuable information for present, as well as future crime control policy makers, and administrators.

Hanson et al. (2004) attributes the deterioration of law and order in Belize to a variety of factors including the lack of resources. On the other hand Crooks (2008) posits that although a shortfall exists in terms of material, the notion of manpower shortage in the Belize Police Department is far from the truth. According to Crooks, the citizens of Belize City enjoy a police to citizen ratio that is among one of the best in the world.

A May 2010 Press Release informed the residents of Belize that “Cabinet is aware and accepts that the crime situation in Belize has reached crisis proportions, both in terms of the increase in violent crime, especially in urban areas, and the lack of confidence in the Police Department created by the rash of incidents in which Police personnel have themselves allegedly acted illegally causing injury to the innocent and in some cases loss of life” (Cabinet Release). The release further stated that “these social ills of crime, violence and social degradation are of priority concern to our citizens, whose right to live in a secure environment is being eroded daily” (Cabinet Release). Based on this release, I
gather that the Government will be seeking a holistic approach to determine the reasons for the current state of affairs in an effort to develop practical solutions to the problems.

This study seeks to provide a logical answer to the question as to why the effectiveness of Belize’s urban crime control measures continues to diminish despite the protracted military manpower support to the Belize Police Department.

**Research Questions**

**Primary Research Question**

Is there a genuine need for the Belize Defence Force to continue to provide manpower support to the Belize Police Department for the purposes of urban crime control?

**Secondary Research Questions**

1. Is the employment of the military in protracted crime control duties in line with a democratic form of government?

2. Is the employment of the military on the streets of Belize City still an effective crime control measure?

3. Is supplementing the civil police with military manpower an effective crime control strategy?

**Objective of the Study**

The primary objective of this research is to determine whether there is a genuine need for the Belize Defence Force to continue to provide manpower support to the Belize Police Department for the purposes of urban crime control. In order to achieve the
primary objective, the examination of the following issues is deemed necessary. These are:

1. To identify the system of government in Belize and discuss the extent to which such a government should go in the interest of crime control,
2. To identify the benefits and/or detriments of employing the military in routine urban crime control duties,
3. To identify weakness in the current approach and make practical recommendations to enhance the overall crime control efforts of Belize, and
4. To make practical recommendations for the development of an effective and efficient crime control strategy for Belize.

**Purpose of the Research**

The purpose of this study is to provide a logical reason why the military manpower support to the civil police for the purposes of urban crime control did not produce the long-term effect the government of Belize hoped to have attained from such a measure. The study seeks to accomplish this by exploring the protracted interrelationship between the Belize Defence Force and the Belize Police Department with a view to discover what if anything, has influenced the diminishing crime control effect of the combined effort.

**Research Hypothesis**

This research hypothesized that there is a correlation between the increase in the quantity and severity of crimes in Belize City, and the protracted military manpower support to the civil police in that municipality.
The following null hypotheses are deemed essential to the development of the foregoing general theory:

1. There is no correlation between the drastic decrease of urban crimes and the initial military involvement in urban crime control;
2. There is no correlation between the diminishing effect of military presence and the resurgence in urban crimes;
3. There is no relationship between the duration of military involvement in urban crime control and the diminishing effect of such an involvement;
4. There is no relationship between a sense of ineffectiveness and the emergence of frustration and demoralization;
5. There is no correlation between frustration and demoralization; and corruption of the law enforcement officers, and
6. There is no correlation between corruption of the law enforcement officers and the increase in the overall quantity and severity of crimes.

Significance of the Study

Although this research is geared to a specific problem, it is envisaged that the results could lead to the development of a general theory which may be applicable to other problems of a similar nature by simply replacing the subject of the study with others. Moreover, the study has the potential to provide a new perspective on the impact of military effectiveness in protracted support to civil authorities in general. It is also envisaged that the knowledge produced when combined with that of other studies will provide a stimulus for further research on this subject.
It is expected that this research will yield practical recommendations to the Government of Belize in regards to its approach in curbing the current crime situation in Belize City. This study is timely and relevant because it infuses new knowledge, perspective, and dimension into the current debate on the crime-control problem in Belize.

Furthermore, this study advances general knowledge since it explores an uncharted sector of crime control as it examines a combined military and civil police urban crime control effort from a tactical, operational, and strategic level. It is envisaged that the findings of this study will also be relevant to other post-colonial nations in the Caribbean that are also experiencing crime control challenges similar to those of Belize.

**Theoretical Framework**

In an attempt to explain the relationship between the increase of crimes in Belize City and the protracted military manpower support to the civil police in that municipality, this study uses a composite of the aforementioned research questions and null hypotheses to guide the collection of information. The information collected was analyzed and synthesized to produce a theory that is grounded in a set of real-world data that lead to the construction of a model. However, due to time constraint, neither the model nor the theory will be tested during this study. Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the Urban Crime Control Diminish Effect model. The model predicts that whenever the military is employed as part of an urban crime control strategy, there will be an instant and noticeable decrease in criminal activity; however, when that military participation becomes protracted, its effectiveness in controlling crime will gradually diminish in direct proportion to the duration of its involvement.
The blue line represents little or no criminal activity. The yellow line represents the point which the level of criminal activity becomes a concern to some people. The red line represents the point at which the level of crime becomes a concern to everybody.

The brown line represents the civil police. The angle indicates a decrease in crime control effectiveness on one side, and a corresponding increase of criminal activity on the other. The green line represents the infusion of the military and reflects an instant and drastic decrease in criminal activity followed by a gradual increase which surpasses pre-military involvement.

The dashed brown line shows that if the military is removed there will be a gradual increase in the civil police crime control effectiveness and a consequent reduction in criminal activity.

**Organization of the Study**

This research study is presented in five chapters. Chapter 1 is comprised of the background of the study, statement of the problem, research question, research objectives, purpose of the research, research hypotheses, significance of the study,
theoretical framework, limitations, delimitations, definition of terms, and assumptions of the study.

Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature, which consists of the ideology of democracy; an overview of Belize; the crime situation in Belize; Policing in Belize; and a military civil police role convergence theory. Chapter 3 describes the selection of participants and research methodology used for this research study. It also discusses the data collection strategy, interpretation, and analysis procedures.

Chapter 4 presents the findings of the study, the testing of the research questions, and null hypotheses, results of the data analyses and syntheses of the survey, interviews, and opinion polls. Chapter 5 provides a summary of the entire study, discussion of the findings, implications of the findings for theory and practice, recommendations for further research, and conclusions.

Limitation

The study has the following limitations:

1. Due to time constraint this research will be limited to the development of the theory and model only, and not the testing of them.

2. In terms of official crime statistics, the research is limited to a non-independent source since the nation’s current official source is a subunit of the Belize Police Department.

3. From the initial 200 samples only 133 or (66.5 percent) indicated interest in the study. Furthermore, because all incomplete questionnaires were discarded, only 110 of the 133 respondents were deemed useful for the purposes of this research. This represents a 55 percent rate of response. Moreover, since only
200 samples were targeted the extent to which the findings can be taken to infer the views of the entire population of Belize City is limited.

4. Another limitation of the study was the use of the telephone directory as a means of sampling. Although a significant majority of the households in Belize City has either a fixed and or cellular phone; it would be reasonably safe to state that not each and every resident have a phone, and that not everyone who owns a phone is listed in the directory. Therefore, the survey and subsequent interviews were limited only to those residents whose names were listed in the telephone directory.

5. A further limitation of the study was the use of the researcher as participant observer. This is because there is a possibility that the participant observer’s rank and or status may alter the behavior of those being observed once they become aware of his presence.

**Delimitations**

This study is concerned with the interrelationship between the military and civil police within the context of urban crime control. It focuses on the relationship between the Belize Defence Force and the Belize Police Department within the context of crime control in Belize City. With this in view, the study only sought participants who are or have been residents of Belize City during the past 15 years.

**Assumptions**

This study included the following assumptions:
1. The military manpower is provided to the civil police under the auspices of Military Aid to Civil Powers.

2. The drastic reduction in crime when the military became involved was as a result of the effectiveness of that crime control measure, and

3. The current crime control approach in Belize City is ineffective.

**Key Definitions**

For the purposes of this research the terms listed will assume the following meanings:

**Civil unrest.** A form of protest against major socio-political problems; the severity of the action coincides with public expression(s) of displeasure which may include but are not necessarily limited to: illegal parades; sit-ins and other forms of obstructions such as riots, sabotage, and other forms of crime.

**Effective crime control.** Criminal activity is at the level where the citizens can go about their normal business without any undue apprehension of becoming a victim of crime.

**Martial law.** Use of military force as an extreme and rare measure to control society during war or periods of civil unrest or chaos which calls for the suspension of certain civil liberties.

**Phenomenology.** In philosophy, the science or study of phenomena, things as they are perceived, as opposed to the study of being, the nature of things as they are.

**Protracted.** Lasting or drawn out for a long time. For the purpose of military manpower support - a period similar to that which the laws of Belize requires a further proclamation of an initial declaration of state of emergency.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

For several decades behavioral science researchers have studied the construct of the militarization of civil police as well as the employment of members of the military in civil police duties. The militarization of civil police and the employment of soldiers as civil policemen have been reviewed within the framework of urban crime control. Notably, all the previous studies concentrated on the military and civil police interrelationship were based either upon the civil police assuming a militaristic approach or the military assuming civil police roles. Study of the military and civil police as a conjoined unit appears to be non-existent. This study sought to fill this gap by building on the body of research surrounding the convergence of military and civil police roles by exploring the interrelationship resulting from the long-term military manpower support that the Belize Defence Force has been providing the Belize Police Department for the past two decades for the purposes of urban crime control.

The militarization of civil police and the employment of soldiers as civil policemen is an active area of research, and as a phenomenon within the context of urban crime control, this issue has gathered substantial mass and is subsequently the focal point of several behavioral science based research. In this era of heightened human rights awareness coupled with societal pressures for crime control, the importance of well balanced, effective law enforcement measures has assumed increased importance. Crime control or the lack thereof is generally considered as the number one concern of the residents of Belize City. Despite the fact that the Belize Defence Force has been
providing manpower support to the Belize Police Department for the past twenty years, crimes in Belize City have escalated to the point where the residents have lost confidence in the security forces’ ability to maintain law and order. It is hypothesized that the protracted military support has eroded the core competency of the Belize Police Department as a crime control institution as well as the deterrent effect of military presence in such operations. With this in view, this study seeks to explore the crime control effects of protracted military manpower support to civil police as a crime control strategy.

This chapter reviews related literature concerning the use of military for civil police functions within the context of a democratic society. By way of background and to foster an understanding of the Belizean society and the system of administration that governs their conduct; the literature review commences with an examination of literature on the ideology of democracy in general followed by the system of government in Belize in particular. With the intent of addressing the issue of crimes in Belize, the review examines contemporary literature on the crime situation in Belize City. The chapter then examines literature on the response to the escalation of crimes in Belize by reviewing the government of Belize response in general, followed by an examination of literature on the Belize Police Department in particular.

The review then examines literature surrounding role convergence of military and civil police, as well as literature on the concept of militarization of the civil police. The chapter then reviews literature on issues arising from military and civil police collaboration and then looked at factors which are deemed to have hindered crime control success of the conjoint military and civil police efforts in Belize.
The chapter concludes with a summary of the literature reviewed in an effort to encapsulate the main ideas of the chapter. This chapter is subsequently organized into sections along the following general themes: (1) Ideology of democracy, (2) overview of Belize, (3) the crime situation in Belize City, (4) policing in Belize, and (5) role convergence.

**Ideology of Democracy**

Democracy is a political system that is institutionalized under the rule of law. This is government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented (The Jamaica National Heritage Trust 2007). As such, democracy’s core principle is equality. It tends to give equal rights and power to every person in a nation.

One of the core principles of democracy is the “democratic minimum.” This principle has emerged as a claim to democracy, as a means to global justice. In a research study on democracy, Bohman (2005) defines democratic minimum as the achievement of a democratic arrangements sufficient for citizens to exercise their creative powers to reshape democracy according to the demands of justice--that is, a capacity to initiate democratic deliberation. It therefore follows that democratic minimum implies that for a democratic country to achieve justice, its conduct of democracy must also be just in the views of its citizens. Analysis of Bohman’s work seems to suggest that the concept of justice is inherent to democracy, in that it enables the citizens to demand to be treated justly, as free and equal persons.

In order to promote justice, a democratic government must be able to fulfill the democratic minimum. In particular, this minimum is indispensable for the people’s claim of freedom and equality especially in case of potential domination that results from the
democratic deficit of representative democracy. As such, this minimum will serve as a basis for democratization of various governmental institutions and relations of interdependence. With this in view, justice in the context of democratic societies is equated to human rights, specifically, the rights against tyranny and domination (Bohman 2005).

Indeed, the democratic minimum is a necessary tool for the successful conduct of a democratic political system. With the advent of the modern and globalized society, different trends have emerged causing the principles of democracy to be endangered if not substantially shaped according to the flow of the society.

For instance, democracy is threatened when there are unattended needs of the disenfranchised population. As a result, it polarizes the society, erodes the state, and threatens the nation. In a nutshell, the social juxtaposition of technological development and illiteracy around the world is also interwoven with issues like corruption, incompetence as well as the outright despotism in the government (Bradley 2004).

Even in democratic societies, people will still allow the abuse of power by governments. Studies show that desperate times call for desperate measures even in times of peace, and or the absence of declaration of a “state of emergency” people will support a government’s decision to employ its military against its own citizens; especially when success in doing so for a public good seems evident (Schifferle 2003). The greater issue in this phenomenon is that whether modern nation-states will sustain this practice regardless of reason or price.
Overview of Belize

Facts about Belize

Belize (formerly British Honduras until the name of the country was changed in 1973) is the only English-speaking nation in Central America. Belize lies to the east and northeast of Guatemala, south of Mexico and west of the Caribbean Sea. It is the only country in Central America without a Pacific coastline. The country’s greatest length is from north to south which measures a total of 208 kilometers, and its greatest width is 109 kilometers.

Figure 2. Map of Southern United States, Caribbean, and Central America with Travel Routes to Belize

On 21 September 1981, when Belize achieved Independence from Great Britain; a written Constitution was introduced as the supreme law of the land. Belize was then admitted as a member of the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth of Nations, the Organization of American States and the Association of Caribbean States. Diplomatic relations have been established with many countries. Belize is also a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and related institutions. Today Belize’s population is estimated to be at approximately 320,000. The country is a melting pot of many races and over the years the multi-racial make-up has risen through the influx of many people of Central America, Asia, Europe and the Caribbean. Males outnumber the female population only by 1 percent (Government of Belize official website).

Belmopan is the capital of the country. Built in 1970, it is the seat of Government and has been classified as the Garden City of the country. It is geographically located at the centre of the country, some 80 kilometers to the south-west of Belize City on higher ground. Its population today is estimated at 11,100 and is increasing as more people relocate to the Capital. However, Belize City still remains the hub of commercial activity and one of the most urbanized centers of Belize with a population of 78,000 persons. With a population density of 14 persons per square kilometer Belize fall within the top 25 percent of the worlds least populated areas, ranking at 180 of 237 countries (Worldatlas 2010). It is worth noting however, that just about 25 percent of Belize’s total population resides in Belize City which is about 5 square miles. It follows reason therefore to conclude that urbanization is potentially a significant influence to many of the issues in Belize City.
System of Government in Belize

The Government of Belize operates on the principles of Parliamentary Democracy based on the Westminster System. The country is a sovereign, democratic state. A Prime Minister and Cabinet make up the Executive Branch, while a thirty-one-member elected House of Representatives and a twelve-member appointed Senate form a bi-cameral legislature. The laws of Belize are based on the English Common Law legal system. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II is the titular Head of State. However, since Belize’s independence in September of 1981, the Queen has been represented in Belize by a Governor-General who must be a Belizean. The Cabinet consists of a Prime Minister, other Ministers and Ministers of State who are appointed by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister; the person commanding the support of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The country’s current head of government is Prime Minister Dean Barrow and the current Deputy Prime Minister is Gasper Vega. The leader of the opposition is John Briceno.

The Political System of Belize

Parliamentary democracy is a political system that is based on a parliament that is considered supreme or the sovereign. The primary reason behind this is the fact that it is the parliamentarians as a collective body that can make or unmake the laws that governs the conduct of the citizens. In Belize, as is the case, in so many other countries around the world, parliament is the only body that can make amendments to the supreme law of the land--the Constitution.

Parliamentary democracy entails a representative chosen by the majority of the people during a regular election. Representatives play a vital role in the formation of the
government, the passage of legislation and with the scrutiny and monitoring of the executive government, the public service, and other authorities and institutions which are created by the Parliament (Australian Politics 2010). In general, a parliamentary government consists of a majority rule, protection for the right of the minority to be heard, equal rights to participate in the proceedings and the orderly consideration of matters brought before the legislature (The Jamaica National Heritage Trust 2010). The next section of the literature review discusses the crime situation in Belize.

The Crime Situation in Belize

According to United States Department of State reports, the most significant problems which the central government of Belize has to contend with are the high rate of crime in Belize City. The report stated that the prevalence of street gangs remains an integral part of the problem. The report further claimed that in addition to perpetuating robberies and assaults, criminal elements within Belize have been linked to the South American drug trade. The report submits that Belize is a major transit point for cocaine bound for the United States (Country Watch 2010).

This view appears to be in tandem with an August 2010 American Bar Association article relating to a Rule of Law Initiative for Latin America and the Caribbean. According to this article, although Belize has greater income equality than its neighbors, due to its healthy tourism industry, it has not managed to escape the challenges that confront much of the rest of Latin America. The article claimed that Belize is continuously plagued by violence, crime, and corruption. It further states that the country’s strategic location on the Caribbean coast between Colombia, Mexico and the United States is a major contributing factor to the situation, in addition to factors such
as the long unprotected coastline; innumerable unprotected islands and waterways; and a weak rule of law. According to the article, violent crime, money laundering, and drug trafficking continue unabated in part due to insufficient countermeasures and government corruption. It further states that the scourge of drugs and transnational crime has heavily contributed to the rising crime rate and social decline in Belize (ABA Rule of Law Initiative–Belize 2010).

From all accounts, the government of Belize has acknowledged that there is a serious crime situation in Belize City. This is evidenced in the 11 May Cabinet Release which states that:

Cabinet is aware and accepts that the crime situation in Belize has reached crisis proportions, both in terms of the increase in violent crime, especially in urban areas, and the lack of confidence in the Police Department created by the rash of incidents in which Police personnel have themselves allegedly acted illegally causing injury to the innocent and in some cases loss of life. (Cabinet Release)

The Press Release further claimed that, “the Government of Belize recognizes the crisis of crime, violence and social degradation in which we find ourselves. These social ills are of priority concern to our citizens, whose right to live in a secure environment is being eroded daily” (Cabinet Release). The Release further stated that in response to this crisis and to the citizens’ call for action, the Government of Belize will be embarking on a coordinated initiative to combat crime and violence and restore the quality of life for all Belizeans. The Press Release submits that “this situation did not begin today or yesterday. What we are experiencing today is the result of many decades of social and economic changes, the problems will not be solved today or tomorrow but will only be fully secured over decades” (Cabinet Release).
Although the Government has promised to take action to restore a safe and secure environment for the residents of Belize; for many, this promise seems to be, “too little-too late.” A news article appearing in a San Pedro news outlet suggests that Belizeans do not trust their government to protect them. The article claimed that almost 15 percent of the population of San Pedro turned out to protest the crime rate and lack of safety in that resort town. The article argues that “residents’ loss of a sense of security fueled the event,” and contends that “with the increasing numbers of home invasions, burglaries and armed hold ups, many no longer feel safe and secure in their homes and businesses. Robberies and carjacking, often injuring the victims, also heighten their insecurity” (Ciego 2010). Similar marches, public protests, and demonstrations against crime have also taken place in Belize City. As a matter of fact there is an organized group of parents and or relatives who have lost a family member to crime that seems to be leading the charge. This organization which operates under the umbrella of “Belizeans for Justice” has held several public forums and marches in Belize and has gone as far as advocating for the dismissal of the Commissioner of Police (Parks 2010). Most recently, Belizean for Justice has successfully organized and executed a shutdown of Belize Business District in protest over the frightening violence in Belize City (Ical 2010).

However, according to Michael Young, the Chairman of Belize’s Crime Control Council, “Having marches everyday or every Sunday in protest against crime is not going to help the situation.” The chairman contends that the spike in violence is nothing new, and submits that, “The outbreak of violent crime has been from about 2000, so what we’re seeing here is a phenomenon that has been affecting Belize for some years. It is
extremely difficult but we need to understand that getting hysterical about it is not going to help anybody” (Young 2010).

A July 2010 research, titled “Male Social Participation and Violence in Urban Belize” by social violence anthropologist Dr. Herbert Gayle and Nelma Mortis along with Jamuna Vasquez; Raymond J. Mossiah, Melvin Hewlett, and Alindy Amaya seems to support the Chairman of the Crime Control Council assertion that escalation of crime in Belize City is nothing new. Gayle et al. (2010) posits that Belize “joined the top ten most violent countries during the shift of the drug trans-shipment route from the Caribbean to the Central American corridor. Gayle contends that at the turn of the decade Belize had only 16 murders per 100,000 and that by 2002, the number of murders in Belize almost doubled to 29 per 100,000. He claimed that “the numbers declined somewhat in 2003, but gradually rose to 32 per 100,000 by 2007, crossing the civil war benchmark, and achieving the status of being the second (behind Jamaica) most violent region in the Caribbean,” and concludes that in “2008 Trinidad exploded, shifting Belize to a ‘not much better’ position of third in the region” (Gayle et al. 2010). Of significance to note here, is that the top three are the only countries that have employed their militaries as criminal law enforcers for a protracted period.

The central purpose of “Male Social Participation and Violence in Urban Belize,” according to Gayle, was to conduct an intensive study that examines as close as possible “every critical area of life that produces the violent response of the male youth of Belize” (Gayle et al. 2010).

The authors argued that “the degree of stability of a country depends to a large extent on the degree of central political authority being exercised to organize and control

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the actions of the people in that society” (Gayle et al. 2010). Gayle posits that “central political authority is the compliance machine of a country and therefore it is very critical.” The research concludes that “weak central political authorities contribute to high levels of social violence” (Gayle et al. 2010). Although not expressly stated in the findings, Gayle implies that there are weak central political authorities operating in Belize. It is the view of this author, that it is as a result of “weak central political authorities” so far as it relates to a comprehensive crime control strategy, that the military has been, and continues to be employed as criminal law enforcers; a counterproductive measure, in the view of this author.

Gayle et al. (2010) also found that the police was the “hostile face of the state” in Belize. The findings of the research suggest that there is a war between the police and the youth of poor urban communities in Belize. Gayle contends that, “the police do not treat the youths with respect and hence they have no legitimacy,” and further stated that “the youths do not share information with the police, they views them as their enemies at war” (Gayle et al. 2010). This view appears to be in tandem with that of Crooks (2008), who spoke of the need for the military to retain the respect of the public. He warned that “having them engaged in policing function is one of the surest way to lose it” (Crooks 2008, 81).

According to Gayle, “88 percent of the youth who participated in the research described their relation with the police as ‘poor,’ ‘horrible,’ ‘bad,’ ‘non-existent,’ and say they cannot trust them” (Gayle et al. 2010). He further asserted that the youth described the police as being corrupt, and the police maintain close association with the gangs. The research found that in Belize, there exists “a deeply rooted structural breakdown between
Gayle argues that “the level of corruption in the Police Department removes social distance between youth involved in criminal activities and the police” (Gayle et al. 2010). Alarmingly, or not, the findings of the research revealed that “interviews and group sessions with over 70 police officers did not change any of the accusations that the public and gang members leveled at them; rather the police officers interviewed face to face validated the horrible things said about them with brutish honesty” (Gayle et al. 2010). The question therefore, is that with a self admitted culture of corruption; to what extent can one really rely on the accuracy of the answers the police provided in those interviews?

Gayle argued “that based on the way they are treated by the state, the police are also victims of the nasty structural violence caused by economics and class” (Gayle et al. 2010). As examples of the tribulations faced by members of the Police Department, the research cited the following: Poor and defective equipment, interfering politicians, promotion by favor rather than merit, costly and stressful transfers, frighteningly low salaries, no full time chaplain or counselor, and no health insurance (Gayle et al. 2010). The next section of the literature review provides further analysis of the Belize Police Department.
Policing in Belize

In an effort to fill a gap which existed in 2004, Robert Hanson, Greg Warchol, and Linda Zupan conducted an exploratory field research on the state of crime and policing in Belize. The research project, titled “Policing Paradise: Law and Disorder in Belize,” had two main objectives; (1) to describe the structure, function, and state of the Belize Police, and (2) to identify the extent and causes of crime in Belize.

Hanson et al. (2004) concluded that Belize was plagued by a poorly funded police department, high crime rates, and slow economic growth. The study showed that although the Belize Police Department was exhibiting modern organization, training, and ideas, the major hindrance to the department was a lack of adequate funding that manifests itself in a severe lack of basic resources for crime control, investigations, and the provision of quality service. Hanson argued that the lack of adequate funding led to low morale among officers. He contended that this resulted in an increased fear of crime and lack of confidence by the public; fostered in part by the media. The study highlighted that the Belize Police Department have responded with a variety of innovations to overcome these difficulties; but suggested that those actions were mostly stop-gap measures (Hanson et al. 2004, 255).

In regards to the causes of crime in Belize, the researchers posit that crime was attributed to a variety of unique social, political, and natural causes. Hanson attributes the causes of crime in Belize as; “impacts of civil wars in neighboring nations, illegal and legal immigration, Belize’s geographic location facilitating cocaine trans-shipments from Columbia, population demographics, street gangs, and natural disasters” (Hanson et al. 2004, 255-256).
Hanson commented that the “contributors to crime are far more difficult to correct than the above-mentioned budget deficits,” and concluded that the causes of crime in Belize are “problems that can at best be managed as opposed to solved” (Hanson et al. 2004, 256). The researchers further stated that although “the situation with crime and policing in Belize seems rather dire, some problems identified in the study are more amenable to solutions” (Hanson et al. 2004, 256). The researchers indicated that, “aside from the obvious and most challenging need for additional funding for law enforcement, police administrators need to take a far more proactive approach in using the media to promote their successes in crime control” (Hanson et al. 2004, 256).

The researchers claimed that “at the time of the study, crime in Belize had declined from the previous years, yet the public perception was just the opposite, mainly as a result of the media focusing on violent crime as their lead stories” (Hanson et al. 2004, 256). The study further suggested that, “simple changes to police personnel practices such as ending weekly rotating shifts, mandatory transfers, and modifying the current structure of the gratuity system may help improve police morale, job satisfaction, effectiveness, and public image” (Hanson et al. 2004, 256).

There are elements of similarities as well as elements of discrepancies between the findings of Hanson et al. (2004) and a 2008 study conducted by Harold Crooks, a police consultant contracted by the Government of Belize to conduct an evaluation of the Belize Police Department. The Crooks Review draws attention to the fact that at a ratio of 1 police to every 263 citizens, Belize enjoys one of the best police to citizen ratio in the world. This finding goes against the general perception that the Belize Police Department
is undermanned. Research indicates that the standard UN recommended ratio lies between 450 and 500 persons per police officer.

The Crooks Review revealed that there was “a weakness of quality assurance in the Belize Police Department; weak follow through in difficult cases, and a chronic underdevelopment of human capital in the Criminal Investigation Branch” (Crooks 2008, 4). The author contends that “growing urban criminality supported by counter cultural responses such as the glamorization of violence and the instrumental and symbolic use of fear has led to a decline in the cooperation of witnesses in criminal investigations” (Crooks 2008, 5). The author further claimed that, “declines in arrests, prosecution and convictions for murders are associated with increases in murders,” and stated that “while this is a function of the entire Criminal Justice System it is also a sign of overload and increasing ineffectiveness of criminal investigations and supporting intelligence and analytical processes” (Crooks 2008, 6). The Crooks Review also revealed that in Belize City the conviction ratio is 1 for every 46 murders reported. Crooks argued that reduction of murders is achieved through deterrence or prevention. He further claimed that deterrence and prevention of murders in Belize City is relatively ineffective because “the criminal fraternity is well able to estimate the risk of imprisonment for murders or other serious crimes since they know many of those offenders who have escaped justice for one reason or another” (Crooks 2008, 9). The author contends that the criminal fraternity “also knows how effective the use of fear and intimidation is,” and concludes that “this dangerous cohort of criminals is becoming less deterred by police action as the arrest and conviction of murderers decline” (Crooks 2008, 9). The review found that the Major Crimes Investigation Unit of the Belize Police Department efforts are mostly reactive,
and that there is very little or no collaboration with other governmental agencies and departments. The author commented that “as a consequence, they cannot use the tax laws, questionable bank transactions and property ownership along with persistent surveillance to prosecute and imprison organized criminal kingpins” (Crooks 2008, 14).

Crooks argue that a significant and contributing factor to the overall failure of the entire crime control measures in Belize is the “insufficient mechanisms enabling the Cabinet and [National] Assembly to create a clear performance framework and Strategic Targets for the Belize Police Department” (Crooks 2008, 19). He further suggested that, “the Ministry of National Security should be exercising greater control over public safety policies and holding the Commissioner of Police accountable” (Crooks 2008, 19). The author concludes that since this is not the case, “there is a wide gap between the police rhetoric of modernization and real deliverables” (Crooks 2008, 19).

Another alarming discovery of the Crooks Review was the noticeable absence of any means or methods of measuring performance. The review drew attention to the lack of key performance indicators, bench marked, or any other form of measurement which could be applied to individuals within the organization. He also noted the nonexistence of performance indicators for critical policing tasks within the entire national crime control strategy. The Crooks Review further suggested that “few outputs and people expected outcomes are measured or evaluated” (Crooks 2008, 24).

The 2008 Crooks Review also concluded that the Commissioner of the Belize Police Department was too involved in the everyday management of the Departments’ function and as a result enough attention was not being given to areas which a Commissioner ought really to be focusing upon; such as strategic and policy level
policing functions. Crooks argued that majority of the Belize Police Department are being underutilized. In support of this claim the author advanced the fact that although Belize is privy to one of the best police to citizen ratios in the world, a significant portion of the department are engaged in administrative functions such as clerks, drivers, and court orderlies; functions which Crooks claims can more cost effectively be carried out by civilians and thus free up the trained officers for their primary function of crime prevention and control (Crooks 2008, 30).

Although many seem to believe that there is a direct correlation between the increase in crime and a manpower deficiency in the Belize Police Department, the findings of the Crooks Review seems to indicate the contrary. The data presented by the Crooks Review indicates that Belize City, which has the highest crime rate in the entire country, also enjoys the highest concentration of policemen. In the interest of comparison the ratio of police to citizens for the six districts of Belize are as follows: Corozal district, 1 policeman to every 648 citizens; Orange Walk district, 1 policeman to 1024 citizens; Belize district, 1 policeman to 181 citizens; Cayo district, 1 policeman to 552 citizens; Stann Creek district, 1 policeman to 402 citizens; and Toledo district, 1 policeman to 948 citizens. Interestingly, Belize City where the most crimes occurs the ratio is 1 policeman to 132 citizens.

In regards to training, the Crooks Review found that a noticeable lack of focus on areas of vital importance to the concept of maintaining peace, law, and order in the community. The review highlights the lack of adequate attention or emphasis, “in preparing police officers to successfully mediate and resolve everyday street conflict, and to apply the law with good judgment and discretion with regards for the rights of victims,
offenders, the community and the state” (Crooks 2008, 54). It is alarming to note that whilst “graduation preparation” accounts for 4.23 percent of the total time allocated for police recruit training; crime prevention training accounts for a mere 0.28 percent of the total allocated time. The review also examined the “question bank” from which the exams and tests of policing knowledge of recruits are generated. The findings reveal “an absence of emphasis on conflict resolution skills as well as a noticeable lack of focus on the development of good judgment and discretion, knowledge of community beat policing and more unfortunately of ETHICAL behavior and leadership” (Crooks 2008, 56). The Crooks Review further revealed that, “not one question could be discovered which tested the recruits’ judgment in diffusing street conflict or using appropriate force in difficult situations” (Crooks 2008, 54).

The Crooks Review concluded that the military obedience methodology of drills plays a central role to instill obedience in the Belize Police Department trainees. He cautioned however, that “unlike the military, it is in rare cases that drill is required during the remainder of the officers’ career after graduation” (Crooks 2008, 80). The author further stated that, “The highly militarized nature of police training stresses continuous close over the shoulder supervision and group discipline which are proven military techniques which serve the central mission and organization of military forces” (Crooks 2008, 80). He then drew attention to the fact that the level of supervision associated with militaristic style of training becomes non-existent once the trainee departs the training installation and becomes engaged in actual policing. Crooks pointed out that “s an Officer of the Peace at Common Law; the new Constable is singularly responsible for his acts to enforce the laws” (Crooks 2008, 80). He contends that “immediately upon graduation, the
Constable becomes legally required to act with good judgment and discretion, qualities spoken about but not developed during training” (Crooks 2008, 80). The author then stated that even though the Constable training was militaristic in nature “when he is accused of wrongful action, the Constable cannot advance as a reasonable defense that he was complying with the instructions of his superiors” (Crooks 2008, 80). On the other side of the coin, Crooks cautioned that “despite the need for close police/military collaboration, the continuous engagement of military forces in the arena of the criminal law can degrade their preparedness and inclination to use overwhelming force when required to use different rules of engagement in military encounters” (Crooks 2008, 81).

Of particular relevance to this study is the portion of the Crooks Review which found that “sustained employment of the police in military operations will easily pervert their service role and undermine public estimation of their professional standing as keepers of the peace” (Crooks 2008, 81). The author contends that “it is for these reasons that many democracies have created para-military ‘Third forces’ designed to confront violence on a continuum above that which the entire police department should not be trained and armed to confront and below which the military should not be involved” (Crooks 2008, 81). He then warned that, “The management of violence requires the threat of overwhelming military force be BACKGROUNDED in such a way that it often reduces the need to be FOREGROUNDED” (Crooks 2008, 81). So far as it relates to urban crime control in Belize, it is Crooks view that “the Belize Defence Force must be held in respectful dread, awe and admiration by the Belizean public.” He contends that “the arena of policing is the surest place to lose this” (Crooks 2008, 81). The next section
of the literature review looks at ways on how the turnaround of some ailing police
departments enabled them to regain the trust and confidence of the citizens they served.

Regaining Confidence

Is there really a need for military involvement in routine police duties in Belize? It
is envisaged that the answer to this question resides in a 2003 research article, titled
“Tipping point leadership,” by W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne. The article
explicates how several failing police organizations were catapult into high performance.
Tipping point leadership concerns a case study of William Bratton who was able to
transform no less than five police organizations and led them to regain control of crime
ridden cities even in circumstances when time and money were scarce. According to the
study “when Bratton took over Boston Police District 4 in 1977; assaults, drug dealing,
prostitution, public drinking, and graffiti were endemic to the area” (Kim and Mauborgne
2003, 63). Kim contends that, “the Boston public shield away from attending baseball
games and other events and from shopping in Fenway neighborhood for fear of being
robbed or attacked or having their cars stolen” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 63). The
research revealed that by the time Bratton departed Boston Police District 4 in 1982,
“crime throughout the Fenway area was dramatically reduced. Tourist, residents, and
investment returned as an entire area of the city rebounded” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003,
63).

The next case showed Bratton taking charge of the Massachusetts Bay Transit
Authority in 1983, where subway crime had been on the rise for the past five years. The
authors claimed that the crime situation led the media to dub the Boston subway the
Terror Train. The article drew attention to the fact that the Boston Globe published a
series on police incompetence in the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority. The findings of the case study revealed that crime on the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority “decreased by 27 percent; and that arrests rose to 1,600 per year from 600” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 63).

The next case shows that Bratton took charge of the Boston Metropolitan Police at a time when it lacked modern equipment, procedures, and discipline. The article further suggested that “the physical facilities of the police department were crumbling and accounting, discipline and morale were low in the 600-person workforce” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 63).

The authors claimed that employees’ morale rose as Bratton instilled accountability, protocol, and pride. In three years, the Metropolitan Police changed from a “dispirited, do-nothing, reactive organization with a poor self-image and even worse public image to a proud, proactive department” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 63).

According to the article, Bratton then took control of the New York Transit Police in 1990. The researchers stated that Bratton became Chief of Police at a time when “crime had risen 25 percent per year in the past three years. Subway use by the public had declined sharply; and the polls indicated that New Yorkers considered the subway the most dangerous place in the city” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 63). The study found that within a matter of two years Bratton was able to realize a 22 percent reduction in crime, including a 40 percent decline in robberies. This new atmosphere of “increased confidence in the subway, led to increased ridership and subsequently fare evasion was cut in half” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 63).
The article further revealed that Bratton became the Commissioner of the New York Police Department in 1994. The authors contend that Bratton intervention came at a time when “the middle class was fleeing the suburbs in search of a better quality of life; when there was public despair in the face of the high crime rate; and when the budget for policing was being cut by 35 percent; it was also at a time when the staff was demoralized and relatively underpaid” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 63).

The researchers claimed that “overall crime fell by 17 percent, felony crime fell by 39 percent, murders fell by 50 percent, and theft fell by 35 percent. Robberies were down by one-third and burglaries by one-quarter. There were 200,000 fewer victims a year than in 1990” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 63). The study found that by the end of Bratton’s tenure, the New York Police Department had a 73 percent positive rating; up from 37 percent four years earlier.

The challenges highlighted in all five of the above cases are very similar to the current crime landscape of Belize City. For instance, criminal activity was rampant and on the increase. Law abiding residents were paralyzed with fear of becoming a victim of crime. This resulted in lost of the public’s trust and confidence of the police departments. The article suggested (and as in the case of the Belize Police Department), in each case of the study, the police lacked discipline, morale, and appeared to be merely reacting to the actions of the criminals. A further similarity is that promotion had little relationship to performance, as there was little or no accountability for performance or the lack thereof. Nonetheless, against all odds as the research article shows, William Bratton transformed each and every one of these ailing police departments, into high performing organizations
time and again, thus regaining control of the streets as well as the public’s confidence and trust.

As the study further revealed, prior to Bratton’s tenure with the New York Police Department; “crime had gotten so out of control that the press referred to the Big Apple as the Rotten Apple. Many social scientists had concluded, after three decades of increases, that New York City crime was impervious to police intervention” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 61). With this in view it would be reasonable safe to conclude that for all intent and purposes, as is currently the case in Belize City, crime had become a social norm. Having lost faith and confidence in the police, it would appear that the people of New York had nowhere to turn. That of course was until they turned to William Bratton, “In less than two years, and without an increase in his budget, Bill Bratton turned New York into the safest large city in the nation” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 61).

The authors contends that “Bratton had successfully turnaround all these police departments in record time, despite facing all four hurdles that managers consistently claim block high performance: an organization wedded to the status quo, limited resources, a demoralized staff, and opposition from powerful vested interests” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 62). According to the article, the researchers reasoned that “if time and again Bratton could succeed against all those odds, other leaders could learn a lot from him” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 62). This belief motivated them to “systematically compare the strategic, managerial, and performance records of Bratton’s turnarounds” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 62). The authors concluded that Bratton’s turnarounds were all text book examples of what is known as tipping point leadership.
The researchers contends that the theory of tipping point leadership “hinges on the notion that once buy-in is obtained from the critical mass of any organization, conversion of a new idea will spread like an epidemic, bringing about fundamental change very quickly” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 62). According to Kim, “the theory suggest that such a movement can be unleashed only by agents who make unforgettable and unarguable calls for change, who concentrates their resources on what really matters, who mobilize the commitment of the organization’s key players, and who succeed in silencing the most vocal naysayers” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 62). The study revealed that Bratton did all of these things in each and every one of his turnarounds.

Kim posits that “most managers only dream of pulling off the kind of performance leaps Bratton delivered, most managers, even those attempting relatively mild change–are soon daunted by the scale of the hurdles they face” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 62). The results of the study suggest, however, that such a dream can indeed become a reality. Kim mentioned that what made Bratton’s approach especially exciting to them, was that “in each case, he used a remarkably consistent approach to overcome the hurdles that confronted him” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 62). The researchers therefore concluded that Bratton successes “are not just a matter of personality, but also of method which suggests that they can be replicated” (Kim and Mauborgne 2003, 62). According the researchers tipping point leadership is learnable.

The authors then gave details of the approaches which enabled Bratton to overcome the forces of inertia and reach the tipping point in each of his turnarounds. Because it is envisaged that the Government of Belize stands to benefit from these approaches, and coupled with the fact that this study is classified as “unlimited
distribution,” the author feel that it would be best not to discuss those approaches here. For obvious reasons, these approaches will be submitted in a separate document classified as “For Official Use Only.” Subsequently, any further reference to these approaches in this study will be limited to the comment “Tipping point leadership would be relevant to this area.” The next section of the literature review looks at the shift in policing culture.

Role Convergence of Military and Civil Police

In 2009, Donald and Kathleen Campbell conducted a series of studies in an effort to provide the answer to two questions concerning role convergence of the military and civil police. The first was whether or not the conventional roles of the military and the civil police are converging, and if so, is this tendency in tandem with the observance of other researchers? The second question depended upon the findings of the first, in that it sought to explore circumstances in which convergence was found to exist, and ask whether such convergence would bring about any occupational implications. The authors drew attention to what they claimed to be a highly authoritative and widely used vocational reference work, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles which revealed that the “police and the armed services shared the common occupational category: protective services” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 327). As evidence of this Campbell remarked that “as a protective service organization, the police function to shield the public from harm and maintain law and order; and as a protective service organization, the armed services function to defend the nation from external enemies and to maintain peace and order during times of martial law and civil unrest” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 328). The authors highlighted that the two organizations have numerous other surface and
substantial characteristics in common, such as: “distinctive uniforms, emphasis on hierarchical organizational structure, heavy reliance on command and control, explicit and easily identifiable ranking relationship among members, and a greater than average concern for physical ability and strength” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 328). The researchers argued that the most substantial similarity is the fact that “society has granted both occupations the authority to use physical force (including lethal force under specific circumstances) to carry out societal mandates” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 328).

According to Campbell, it is “because the two professions have broadly comparable job and role functions and share some organizational and relational characteristics, conventional discussions often assume an occupational link between the two” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 327). The authors observed that “in spite of these many shared characteristics and the general tendency to treat these two occupations interchangeably,” and although “the military and police share a number of common facets and surface similarities; the two professions are significantly different” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 328). Campbell then drew attention to evidence which indicated that the line which traditionally separates the primary role of the two organizations is becoming blurred. They claimed that ample evidence suggests a growing convergence between the police and the military and asserted that “such a convergence has substantial ramifications, since this change involves fundamental, political, legal, and occupational considerations” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 328). They then declared that “the mounting evidence indicating a convergence of the primary aspects of the two roles presages an important societal development, with substantial implications on several levels” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 327).
According to Campbell they discovered that “both popular press K. Berger, *You Can’t Camouflage the Military-Cop Convergence*: Editorial Comment, *Seattle Weekly*, 10 May 2000, and academic circles P. Kraska, *Militarizing the American Criminal Justice System: The Changing Roles of the Armed Forces and the Police* Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001; recorded a change in the nature of American policing” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 328). The review observed that in both instances the studies concluded that this change in policing had the potential to alter the traditional relationship between the police and the policed. The authors claim that this finding fits analytical evidence from military analyst Huba Wass de Czege, as evidenced in his 2006 magazine article, titled, “Policing the Frontiers of Freedom.” Campbell further claims that their findings were also in tandem with the position of D. Zimmerman as evidenced by his views in a 2005 article, titled “Between Minimum Force and Maximum Violence.”

Whilst there seems to be no disagreement that a shift in the culture of traditional policing was occurring; the findings of Campbell and Campbell (2009) suggests that there was conflicting point of views among some scholars. According to Campbell, this conflict was centered on “which of the two emerging diametrically opposed model of policing was pervasive and thus characterized current policing” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 331). The competing models being on the one hand, the “hard” “no questions asked” collective, militarized approach; and on the other hand, the “soft,” “community partnership,” individual “beat,” community policing approach. The review referred to scholars (Kraska and Kappeler) who were associated with the “hard approach.”

According to Campbell, Kraska and Kappeler claimed that “community policing” was
more rhetorical than substantive, and further asserted that unlike the soft evidence regarding community policing, their position was empirically based on two national-level surveys (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 329). The next section of the literature looks at evidence of the changing culture.

Evidence of Role Convergence

Campbell declared that in addition to the empirical evidence provided by Kraska and Kappeler; other indications of increased military collaborations also presented indirect support to the concept of “police militarization.” The researchers further claimed to uncover “evidence which centers on the military’s increased involvement in collaborative constabulary activities and in police training” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 330). Campbell then commented that “military collaborative involvement is not limited to the development and transfer of useful military skills, tactics, and procedures, but also often involves the transfer of military attitudes and orientations” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 330). The authors further highlighted concerns “that if certain situations demand that the police employ military type tactics and behaviors, these situations will also lead the police to adopt military type attitudes and orientations--attitudes and orientations completely unsuitable for dealing with citizens and likely to be unproductive in the long term” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 344).

The authors further drew attention to U.S military participation in U.S. Border Patrols to illustrate that “collaboration has changed from simply providing loans and equipment in the early 1980s, to providing advisors and training in the late 1980s, followed by a further creep of providing ground troops and substantial integration of military and law enforcement efforts in the 1990s” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 330).
Campbell opined that civil police and military collaboration “has often entailed serious cultural adjustments, in that law enforcement agencies are supposed to think in terms of legal procedures and due-process rights; while military agencies think in terms of overwhelming force and destroying and adversary” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 331). They further argued that military involvement in civil law enforcement has somewhat resulted in an evolution of civil police adopting a militaristic attitude “oriented toward the elimination of an enemy threat” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 331). Campbell then asserted that this notion is also supported by other researchers. As evidence of this Campbell cited T. Dunn, “Military Collaboration with the Border Patrol in the U.S.--Mexico Region,” as well as, A. Isacson, J. Olsen, and L. Haugaard, *Blurring the Lines: Trends in U.S. Military Programs with Latin America*. 

**Rising Concerns of Role Convergence**

As pointed out by Campbell, it is worth noting that other scholars such as M. Janowitz also expressed concerns of military involvement in civil affairs. This is evidenced in his research titled *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960). It appears that these scholars all shared the opinion that military participation in activities which are more aligned with police work is becoming a growing concern. In view of this, the authors concluded that “this growing tendency provides the basis for provocative questions regarding the appropriate role of the military in the twenty-first century” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 331).

Campbell submits that “some analysts have argued that on the practical level, any attempt to constabularize the military (i.e. require troops to assume policing duties) are ultimately likely to fail” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 331). This particular line of
argument seems to be based on the footing that “an army’s ability to win wars rests on its ability to use maximum coercion, including lethal violence; and this requirement is diametrically opposed to the constabulary commitment to the use of minimum force” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 331). The authors went on to argue that “given the military’s historical propensity to use overwhelming might in fulfilling its responsibilities, reorienting the armed forces to the use of minimum power requires such a fundamental change as to be unrealistic (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 331).

Proponents for Military Involvement in Criminal Law Enforcement

Campbell also drew attention to the other side of the coin regarding military engagement in police duties. To that end, the authors made mentioned of Eric Shinseki a retired four-star general and former chief of staff of the U.S. Army who claimed that U.S. military experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo provides empirical evidence that the military is capable of conducting police functions if necessary. Note however, that Campbell drew notice to the fact that Shinseki qualified his position by stating that “the traditional war fighting capabilities, because they are essential to a nation’s continued survival, must always remain the primary focus of the armed forces” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 332). According to Campbell, Shinseki further commented that “any evolution too far from this war-fighting core threatens national security, in that a military organization can adequately conduct constabulary operations, but a constabulary organization cannot adequately carry out military operations” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 332). This author does not agree with that conclusion, and offers the dissenting view that any
organization can adequately carry out the functions of any other organization, given the appropriate training. In the mind of this author, it is merely a matter of training.

Focus was also brought to bear on the views of another military analyst, Huba Wass de Czege, a retired brigadier general and founder of the U.S. Army’s School of Advance Military Studies. According to Wass de Czege (as pointed out by Campbell) “field results have provided ample evidence that, with appropriate training, the same military units can do both war-fighting and policing equally well” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 332).

It is worth noting that although Wass de Czege expressed the belief that the military can adequately handle both functions, as indicated by Campbell, he cautioned that “policing and warring are fundamentally different and require individuals who can readily switch from a warring to a policing mentality and back again, perhaps even in the same tactical operation” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 332). Wass de Czege further emphasized that the “ability to switch mentalities obviously requires a more complicated and flexible soldier than the military has traditionally produced” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 332). As noted by Campbell, “Wass de Czege argued that the real question is not whether the military can perform policing functions effectively, but whether politicians fully understand the difference between policing and warring” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 332). Wass de Czege further opined, as indicated by Campbell, that “constabulary work usually requires an enormous commitment of resources, first to pacify and then restore order, and then to rebuild the corollary institutions critical for sustained success” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 332). According to Wass de Czege, this type of undertaking can win the confidence and the
cooperation of the local population, however, he warned that “such initiatives have no technological shortcuts; and politicians must have a realistic understanding of how much constabulary operations will likely cost and how long they will likely take” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 332 - 333). According to Campbell, “Wass de Czege concluded that the military can do the job, but only if the politicians are willing to pay the costs” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 333).

As we can see from the foregoing paragraphs, the experts who believed that the military can adequately perform policing functions qualified their positions with having the appropriate training, suitable soldiers (which the military has not traditionally produced), and significant political support in terms of commitment and resources. It is worth noting that neither of the two military expert made mentioned of the military in support of the civil police. Furthermore since they gave Bosnia and Kosovo as the evidence upon which their conclusion was based, it would be reasonable safe to deduce that they were only contemplating situations where the military is the lead agency in the crime control measure; and in a country outside of their own; and most significantly not against their own citizens. Furthermore it should be noted that in Bosnia and Kosovo some civil liberties were suspended by the competent authority which granted the U.S. military the legal basis to engage in civil control. The next and final section of the literature review provides a summary and conclusion of this chapter.

Summary and Conclusions

According to Bohman (2005) the notion of justice, that all citizens are treated equally and that nobody is above the law, including the government; is inherent in the concept of a democratic society. It is further noted that justice within the context of a
democratic society also means that the government will respect the human rights of those it governs. More specifically, Bohman drew attention to the citizens’ rights against tyranny and domination. With this in view, it is posited that within the context of a democratic form of government, the use of the nation’s military against its own citizens, outside a declared state of emergency, can be viewed as an inclination towards, if not, domination.

It is common knowledge in Belize that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. This adds rigidity to our system of government which operates on the principles of parliamentary democracy. The Constitution brings rigidity in that although the parliamentarians can make or unmake laws that govern the society; those laws must be in tandem with the Constitution. If not, they will be deemed to be null and void to the extent of the conflict. It follows therefore, that any existing laws that are in conflict with the Constitution in any form or fashion, has no validity.

Unlawful acts are undoubtedly the most serious concern to the citizens of Belize. As indicated in the aforementioned press release, the Government of Belize is aware of and is taking steps to address this. However, as a demonstration of their belief that Government’s actions are “too little, and too late” a number of citizen groups have taken to the streets and other public places across the country in the form of marches and protests. This is a clear indication that the citizens genuinely believes that those whose function it is to control crime, has the capacity to do so, but are underperforming.

On the other hand, the criminals seem to be over performing. Therefore very few residents of Belize were startled when the results of a study conducted by Gayle et al., (2010) revealed that Belize City is one of the three most violent places in the Caribbean.
It is worth noting that both of the other two; Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, have also been employing their militaries as part of an urban crime control measure during the past two decades. It is also worthy to note that the preponderance of the perpetrators of these acts of violence are less than 20 years old. The correlation here is the fact that the presence of military on the streets has little or no deterrent effect on this cohort of criminals, since they have seen the military on the streets from the moment they were born. It follows therefore, that in reality, military presence is no deterrence to them; it is a norm. It is something they have grown to live with; they have so far, no experience of anything different.

Adding injury to the level of disregard for the security forces is the troubling degree of omnipresent corruption. As revealed in study conducted by Gayle et al. (2010) a youth expressed the opinion that crime will never go down if the police themselves are the criminals. According to Gayle, “the more than 70 police officers interviewed validated the horrible things said about them with brutish honesty”. He noted however, that the police themselves were victims of internal and external vested interests, deficient or defective equipment, frightening low salaries, and no health insurance. This view confirms the findings of an earlier study conducted by Hanson et al. in 2004.

In that study, Hanson concluded that the major hindrance to crime control in Belize was “a lack of adequate funding which manifested into a severe deficiency in basic policing equipment, investigations, and provision of quality service” (Hanson et al. 2004, 255). The researchers commented that although the crime situation seems dire, some of the problems can be solved. They argued that “apart from the obvious need for additional funding, the administrators needed to take a far more proactive approach
particularly in media relations, and the targeting of predatory street criminals” (Hanson et al. 2004, 256). Hanson further contends that “some simple changes to police personnel practices can go a long way in improving morale, job satisfaction, effectiveness, and public image” (Hanson et al. 2004, 256).

In an effort to improve public image, a Police Consultant Harold Crooks was commissioned by the Government of Belize to conduct a review of the Belize Police Department in 2008. Majority of his findings are in line with those discovered by Hanson et al. (2004). A significant issue not drawn out by Hanson et al (2004) but highlighted by Crooks was that Belize’s police to citizen ratio is one of the best in the world. Crooks further drew attention to the fact that the areas in Belize which has the highest concentration of policemen; coincidently has the highest crime rate. According to Crooks, a significant portion of the police manpower is employed in administrative posts which can be more cost effectively held by civilians. With this in view, he concluded that the trained crime control workforce is grossly underutilized. The review further identified “a weakness in accountability, quality assurance, weak follow through in difficult cases and a chronic underdevelopment of human capital” (Crooks 2008, 4).

Crooks also expressed concerns regarding the use of the military as part of the urban crime control measure. He commented that in an effort to avoid the need to use their militaries in such a fashion, “many democracies have created para-military ‘third force’ (a hybrid between a military and a civilian police force) which is designed to confront violence on a continuum above that which the regular police should be trained and armed for, but below that which the military should not be involved” (Crooks 2008, 81).
According to a study by Campbell and Campbell (2009), some people are of the opinion that the roles of the military and the civil police are interchangeable and one body can adequately conduct the function of the other. They argued however, that “although the military and civil police have some common surface as well as substantial characteristics, the two professions are significantly different” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 327). Campbell concluded that one of the major difference is their training and thus second nature or reflexive tendency in regards to the use of force; minimum use of force in terms of the police, but on the other hand it is the use of overwhelming force for the military.

It should be mentioned however, that some people do believe that the military can adequately perform policing function. According to Campbell and Campbell (2009), two such persons are retired four star general and former Chief of staff of the U.S Army, Eric Shinseki; and a retired brigadier general and founder of the U.S Army School of Advance Military Studies, Huba Wass de Czege. Campbell stated that both of these military experts claimed that the military is well capable of conducting policing functions. Campbell observed that they both referred to the U.S. Army experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo as empirical evidence. It should be noted however that Shinseki tempered his view by stating that the military should remain focused on its core war-fighting function in the interest of national security, and Wass de Czege qualified his views on the need for appropriate training. Wass de Czege (as stated by Campbell) also cautioned that the two functions are fundamentally different and highlighted the need for individuals who can readily switch from a warring to a policing mentality and back again. Wass de Czege, as noted by Campbell, further emphasized that the “ability to switch mentalities obviously
requires a more complicated and flexible soldier than the military has traditionally produced” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 332). The deductions drawn from this is, that even to the casual observer it would be clear that Wass de Czege is suggesting that the functions are so fundamentally different that the concept to “plug-and-play” the military into policing functions is an ill conceived one.

In conclusion, by examining the system of democracy the literature review provided background information on the system of government used to govern the conduct and behavior of the people of Belize. The examination of the democratic principles demonstrated that in the interest of justice, the conduct of the government ought to remain within the confines of the laws, regardless of their motives. It also shows that the citizens have a right to a safe and secure environment, but such a right must be balanced with the right against tyranny and domination.

The literature review further revealed that although the Belize Defence Force has been providing military manpower support to the civil police for the past two decades; the crime situation in Belize has reached crisis proportions. It further illustrated that both the government and people of Belize are in desperate search for a sustainable solution. The review showed that although there have been studies on the Belize Police Department in terms of crime control, none of those studies examined the impacts of the interrelationship between the police and the military. Furthermore, although there is an abundance of study on the militarization of the police and the impacts of that phenomenon, the literature search did not discovered any study that focused on a conjoint civil police and military organization. This adds weight and significance for the need of
this study. It is therefore submitted that this study is a step toward the bridging of an existing gap. The next chapter will discuss the methodology employed in this study.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Chapter 1 presented the background and purpose, as well as the central and secondary questions of the study. In chapter two a literature review of studies pertaining to the issue under examination was presented. The primary aim of this chapter is to present the methodology employed to examine the questions of this research. Specifically, the research philosophy, approach, design, and strategy will be discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, the chapter will describe the data sources and conclude with a brief discussion of the ethical considerations of the study.

As previously indicated, the purpose of this research is to provide a logical answer to the question as to why the effectiveness of Belize’s urban crime control measures continues to diminish despite the continuous military manpower support to the Belize Police Department. In view of this the primary research question seeks to determine whether or not the Belize Defence Force should continue to provide manpower support to the civil police for the purposes of urban crime control.

The research philosophy employed in this study is scientifically classified as phenomenology. According to Dr. Prisco Hernandez, “Phenomenology is a philosophical outlook that attempts to explain the nature of knowledge and how we can know reality.” He stated that it deals with what is known as epistemology. Hernandez submits that “phenomenology has become accepted as the basis for a type of qualitative research.”

The Phenomenological method was selected because it is deemed to be the most suitable approach for this type of study which ventures into unchartered territory. The
reason behind this statement is the fact that Phenomenological study involves the
description of basic information, action, behaviors, and changes of phenomena in our
world as we see it. The description is about what the phenomena “look like” from the
perspective of the researcher and the participants in the research; it is not about how the
phenomena function. The study proceeded along the line of an inductive approach that
was supported with a descriptive narrative which facilitated a theory development
research design. The method of data collection is comprised of a combination of closed-ended
questionnaire, open-ended interviews, and literature research. Both primary and
secondary sources were used.

Research Philosophy

According to Hussey and Hussey (1997) paradigms or philosophies offer a
framework comprising an accepted set of theories, methods and ways of defining data. In
conducting a research it is very necessary to take into account the researcher’s basic
beliefs, which will be reflected in the way the research is designed. Research philosophy
depends on the way that researchers think about the development of knowledge. And the
way the researchers think about the development of knowledge affects, albeit
unwittingly, the way they go about research (Saunders et al. 2003).

This research will adopt the philosophy of phenomenology. Generally speaking,
positivism and phenomenology are two widely acknowledged research philosophies in
the literature of social research. However, since the researcher only needs to adopt one in
this project; this research will embody the views of the phenomenologist.

In phenomenology, the researcher deals with the subjective part of the study.
However, it does not mean that its subjectivity will invalidate the claims or the arguments
made. In fact, the phenomenological approach is now considered as a significant part of research. In this world, phenomena and events cannot be categorized; cannot be viewed only from the positivist’s perspective. (Positivists operate from the objective viewpoint while the phenomenologists operate from the subjective point of view).

Phenomenologists argue that society is far too complex to be able to observe and form laws that describe it adequately and reliably (Saunders et al. 2003). Studies suggest that researchers who prefer phenomenology argue that rich insights into this complex world are lost if such complexity is reduced entirely to a series of law-like generalizations. Hence, the phenomenological approach is a descriptive, interpretative approach to research.

Probably, the strongest argument the phenomenologist could mount is the necessity to discover what Remenyi et al. (1998) called the details of the situation to understand the reality or perhaps a reality working behind them. This follows from the phenomenologist position that it is necessary to explore the subjective meanings motivating people’s actions in order to be able to understand them (Saunders et al. 2003). Creswell (1994) describes phenomenological studies as those in which human experiences are examined through detailed descriptions of the people being studied. This view recognizes that the researcher is part of the research being undertaken and therefore the research will be largely subjective.

Research Approach

The research approach taken in this study is known as the inductive research approach method. The primary reason behind this choice is the fact that the inductive
research approach method involves the building of theories as oppose to the testing of them.

According to (Saunders et al. 2003), induction approach is the way that researchers collect data and develop theory as a result of their data analysis. He also expressed the view that in social science, researchers should be critical of an approach that enabled a cause-effect link to be made between particular variables without an understanding of the way in which humans interpreted their social world. Saunders then pointed out that it is the development of such an understanding that reinforces the strength of an inductive research approach. Since the researcher is or was directly involved in the process under review, he has firsthand knowledge and understanding of the issues, there will be no need to generalize the findings of the investigation. On the other hand, deductive research is a study in which theory is developed from the observation of empirical reality, thus general inferences are deduced from particular instances (Hussey and Hussey 1997). In contrast, the inductive approach involves qualitative research that seeks to understand the context in which events are taking place and to provide an interpretation of complex social situations (Saunders et al. 2003).

Research Design

As indicated earlier, this study employed the descriptive research design. This particular research design was chosen for its proven history of unearthing facts in various different forms. It is deemed that the descriptive research design offers the most favorable probability of discovering latent operating factors, new relationship, and novel concepts surrounding the issue under review. This particular research design allowed me to perform both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Qualitative by way of the surveys,
opinion polls, and desk research; and quantitative through interviews, and the
examination of theories, paradigms, and models relating to current developments and
trends of military involvement in criminal law enforcement.

It is envisaged that depth will be achieved through the quantitative aspect of the
data collection and analysis. This is arguably the most significant portion of the study in
that it is on this aspect that the majority of the researcher’s personal involvement resides.
This is where the proverbial “fine teeth comb” is used to sieve through the data in order
to conduct sound analysis and reasoned interpretation. In sum, it is envisaged that the
quantitative analysis will support the findings, arguments and conclusions which are
gathered from the qualitative analysis.

Research Strategy

A mixed-approach strategy was used to collect data for this research. It consisted
of a survey, interviews, participant observation, and literature review. For the survey the
Belize City telephone directory was used to gather a sample. The telephone directory was
used primarily as a means of obtaining the address of potential respondents. It is
relatively safe to say that well over 90 percent of the households in Belize City either
have a fixed phone or a cellular.

A short letter of introduction and request for participation was then mailed to the
address of the randomly selected residents of Belize City. In the letter the residents were
informed that a follow-up call would be made to determine their interest to participate in
the survey. The survey questionnaire was then mailed to all those who indicated an
interest to partake in the study. At the end of twenty-one days, a second letter was sent to
those who had indicated interest but did not return the questionnaire at that point. Inquiry
was made in the second letter as to whether the resident had received the original questionnaire. They were informed that for good measure a second questionnaire was attached to the second and final letter. They were then reminded of the closing date of the survey.

A request was then sent to three purposely selected respondents; soliciting further participation in the study in the form of an interview. All three agreed to be interviewed. The three individuals were selected on the basis that they each had direct involvement in crime or crime control in Belize City. One is an ex-convict who is allegedly in a leadership position of one of the most ruthless gangs in Belize City. One is a serving member of the Belize Police Department and the other is a retired member of the Belize Defence Force. Apart from their direct involvement in crime or crime control the three interviewees also represents a cross-section of the Belize City society. One is single and unemployed, one is a single mother of two children, and the other is a divorcée who is now in a common-law relationship.

**Data Source**

As indicated above, data was collected from a survey, interviews, participant observation, opinion polls, and literature review. The survey, interviews, observation, and the opinion polls all served as the source of primary data. Information gleaned from print materials such as books, journals, magazines, reports, and non-print or online articles were classified as secondary source data.

The primary source data gathered via the survey, interviews, opinion polls, and personal observations formed the core of this research study. As a result, this was the activity that consumed majority of the available time, effort and resources.
Secondary sources data was collected through the desk research method. The information gathered through this method provided the opportunity to compare and contrast, as well as to identify similarities and or differences that supported or disproved claims and arguments. The information deriving from the secondary sources data also provided indicators, guidance, conditions, limits and criteria upon which the information from the primary sources data was tested. In sum, information from secondary sources of data served as the basis for analyzing and interpreting the information gathered from primary sources, thus allowing for both depth and breadth.

**Ethical Considerations**

In a country with a population as small as Belize, where most people generally know and frequently comes in contact with each other, the need for confidentiality when providing sensitive information cannot be underscored. With this in view and in an effort to protect the interest of the participants, particularly in terms of their livelihood, those who participated in the study were presented with the option to remain anonymous. A significant number choose to do so. It was also on the condition of anonymity that the three interviewees agreed to participate. In consideration that it was only on the promise that strict confidentiality will be exercised that the researcher was able to persuade some of the respondents to participate in the study; their desire for confidentiality will be respected.

**Summary and Conclusion**

This chapter discussed the condition of anonymity upon which the interviewees and some of the participants agreed to participate in the study. The chapter also provided
an explanation on how the participants were selected, the response rate, the data
collection process and the classification of the data and source. The research philosophy,
approach, designs, and strategy were also discussed in this chapter. The chapter restated
the purpose of the study as well as the primary research question. The next chapter will
present the results and implications of the study.
CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

This study is intended to determine whether the Belize Defence Force should continue to provide manpower support to the civil police for the purpose of urban crime control. This chapter presents, interprets, and discusses the results of a survey conducted on the population of Belize City. The purpose of the survey was to glean the respondents’ perception of crime and the crime control efforts in that municipality. Using the telephone directory as the sampling frame, 200 samples were randomly selected. Of these initial samples, 133 showed interest to participate in the survey. The questionnaires were then dispatched along with a self-stamped, return-addressed envelope to the individuals of interest through the Belize Post Office mailing system. At the end of the forty-five days period, 110 respondents completed and return the questionnaires. This chapter also presents the results of the interviews with the three purposively selected interviewees, and the opinion polls.

Profile of the Respondents

There is an unequal distribution of gender among the respondents of the survey. Fifty-eight percent (64 persons) of the respondents are males whilst 42 percent of the respondents were females. Figure 1, illustrates the distribution of gender among the respondents.
Twenty-seven percent (n = 30) of the respondents were aged 26-35 years; 22 percent (n = 24) were in the age range 36-45; 18 percent (n = 20) were age between 46 and 55; 14 percent (n = 15) of the respondents were aged 56-65; 11 percent (n = 12) belonged to the 16-25 age range; and finally, 8 percent (n = 9) of the respondents were age 66 or above. Figure 2, illustrates the age distribution of the 110 respondents.
Seventy-one percent (n = 78) of the respondents were married or in a long-term relationship (referred to as common-law marriage); whilst 22 percent (n = 32) were single. Seventy-six percent (n = 84) of the respondents were employed at the time of the survey while 24 percent (n = 26) of the respondents were unemployed. Finally, all 110 respondents (100 percent) claimed that they have access to mass media.

Since the three interviewees requested not to be named, they will be referred to in this study as Luanne, Gregory, and Paul. Luanne is a 34-year-old mother of two who is a serving member of the Belize Police Department. Gregory is a 48-year-old father of three and is a retired member of the Belize Defence Force. He is currently engaged in part-time self-employment in the tourism industry. Paul is 27 years old, single, and is currently unemployed.

Principles of Democracy

The substantive part of the study began by examining the respondents’ awareness on the principles of democracy: citizen participation; equality; political tolerance; accountability; transparency; regular, free and fair elections; economic freedom; control of the abuse of power; human rights; multiparty system; and the rule of law.

The respondents were provided with a set of control responses which ranges on a sliding scale between unaware, to very aware. Table 1 shows the results of this part of the survey.
Table 1 indicates that over 95 percent of the citizens surveyed were aware of the democratic principle of human rights, while less than 5 percent of those surveyed were unaware. The table also showed that 94.5 percent were aware of the principle of equality, while 5.5 percent were unaware. Table 1 further show that less than 1 percent of those surveyed were unaware of the democratic principle of regular, free, and fair election. The respondents also demonstrated a high level of awareness regarding the principle that democracies, such as Belize, strive to protect and respect the human rights of its citizens.

The three interviewees also expressed high level of awareness on the aforementioned democratic principles. According to Luanne, people in democratic societies should have freedom of association, and that it is the right of every citizen to have access to education and basic services, including the right to a safe and secure environment. Gregory, on the other hand, expressed the opinion that citizens of a democratic society should be governed by laws and not by men. He further stated that whilst everyone should have the right to be treated by the government in a just, fair, and
equal manner; he warned that those “rights” also comes with responsibilities. Lastly, Paul stated that accused persons in a democracy have the right to treated as innocent until proven guilty and that the government should recognize freedom of assembly.

The results also indicate that the respondents are very aware that in a democracy, all people are equal. Equality, in this sense means that all individuals have equal opportunities, are valued equally, and are not discriminated against because of their gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, or religion. The three interviewees also demonstrated awareness that, in a democracy, citizens and groups or people have the right to have different personalities, cultures, beliefs, and languages.

In a democracy, officials are chosen and peacefully removed from office in a free and fair manner. The respondents generally reflected a high level of awareness on the issue of regular, free, and fair elections. In many democratic societies in the world, the military and police have a huge influence on the processes and outcomes of elections. Corruption, intimidation, and threats to citizens before, during or after an election are against democratic principles. In the interview, Luanne and Gregory both said that they had not experienced intimidation or received threats during election periods. Paul, on the other hand, said that he knew of someone who was intimidated as well as someone who conducted intimidation on behalf of a certain political party.

Ninety-two point seven percent of the respondents are aware that a major principle of democracy is citizen participation in government, while 7.3 percent indicated unawareness of this principle. Similarly, all three interviewees said that they are very aware that citizen participation in government is an important part of being a good citizen of a democratic society. Gregory said that it is his responsibility to instill in his children,
colleagues, family and friends the importance of voting and standing for election, debating issues, and becoming informed. As a Police Officer Luanne, said that people should engage themselves in private voluntary organizations, attend community or civic meetings, and pay taxes. Paul said that citizen participation in a democracy can also be in the form of dissent or protest. In many societies across the world, people are protesting military interventions which are often the influence of many internal problems. For him, participation is not only a right, but it is also a duty, particularly to ensure that he is not disenfranchised by “the system.”

More than 90 percent of the respondents are aware of their economic freedom, while less than 10 percent are unaware of this democratic principle. The interviewees also demonstrated awareness of the right to private ownership of property and businesses, and that they are allowed to choose their own work and establish labor unions. Paul, as a matter of fact, is a member of the Christian Workers’ Union. He believes that labor unions ensure that workers and employees are protected and their rights exercised. Ninety percent of the respondents are aware that control of the abuse of power is a democratic principle, while 10 percent were unaware of this principle. Proponents of democracy make every effort to prevent any elected official or group of people from misusing or abusing their power. As mentioned by Gregory, one way to prevent the ill effects of corruption is citizen participation.

Furthermore, over 83 percent of the respondents expressed awareness regarding the characteristic of democratic societies as politically tolerant, while less than 17 percent were unaware of this characteristic. In the interview, Luanne, Gregory, and Paul all agreed that while the majority rules in a democracy, the rights of the minority must be
respected and protected. The result suggests that the respondents are aware that a
democratic society recognizes diversity as it is composed of people from different
backgrounds in terms of culture, ethnicity, religion, and ideology.

Additionally, 70 percent of the respondents are aware that, in a democratic
society, officials (either elected or appointed) must be accountable to the people. On the
other hand, 30 percent of those surveyed were unaware of this democratic principle.
Along this line, it can be said that the security forces in a democracy should make
decisions and perform their duties according to the authority granted to them by the
legislature, not for themselves and the will of particular politicians. Next to accountability
is the principle of transparency. Table 1 show that over 70 percent of the respondents are
aware that for government and officials to be accountable, the people must be aware of
what is happening in the country. Fewer than 30 percent of the respondents were unaware
that transparency is a democratic principle. The three interviewees however, were all
aware. Paul said that it is the duty and responsibility of the government to supply the
general public with the real information about the real situation in the country. Gregory
expressed that information should not be censored in the country. For him, information
should be regulated, but not censored.

Finally, over 58 percent of the respondents are aware that no one is above the law
in a democracy, whilst a significant portion of the respondents, more than 41 percent
were unaware that even government bodies are amenable to the laws of the nation.
According to the rule of law, everyone must obey the law and be held accountable if they
violate it. Democracy insists that the law be equally and fairly applied. The problem,
according to Paul is the question of: Who makes the law? Who or what groups influence
the making and passing of the law? Here, one can ask to what extent the police and military are influencing the creation and implementation of the law?

Table 1 indicates that more than 55 percent of the respondents are not aware of the democratic principle of separation of powers. On the contrary, all three of the interviewees expressed high level of awareness on the separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary. The separation of powers is of particular importance to the administration of justice in our legal system. In order to administer justice impartially, the Constitution of Belize provides that judges are independent, impartial and separate from political interference and from the political arm of the government.

It is of significance to note that 82 percent (182 persons) of those who participated in an opinion poll indicated their belief that the independence of the judiciary is at risk. Eight percent or 41 voters did not believe this to be the case (News 5 opinion poll 24 June 2010). On a separate but somewhat related opinion poll, 94 percent of the participants indicated that they were of the opinion that the justice system is not working for them. Six percent or a total of 14 voters indicated otherwise (News 5 opinion poll 15 June 2010).

**Military Involvement in Crime Control in Belize City**

The respondents were also asked for their opinion on the issue of joint military and police crime control teams. The aim of this part of the survey was to determine whether the respondents agree or disagree that the employment of the military as part of an urban crime control effort is still an effective crime control measure. This part of the survey also inquired into their experience of unwarranted physical abuse, level of comfort
in passing information to the joint crime control teams, satisfaction of service, adequacy of training, and government’s right to use the military for criminal law enforcement.

Table 2 presents the results. The participants were given a set of control responses along a sliding scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

Table 2. Military role in crime control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statement</strong></td>
<td><strong>Range of possible responses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strongly agree</strong></td>
<td><strong>Agree</strong></td>
<td><strong>Disagree</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strongly disagree</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of the military to adjudicate and enforce civil law represents a shift from a democratic system of government</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of the military on the streets of Belize City is no longer an effective crime control measure</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The joint military police teams are providing satisfactory crime control service in Belize City.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of the military for routine police duties amounts to government’s abuse of power.</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel confident that my identity will not be revealed if I decide to pass information of criminal activity to the joint military and police crime control team discreetly.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It appears that members of the military in Belize are adequately trained to conduct normal policing work.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By virtue of their training the military are more inclined than the police to use excessive force during normal police duties.</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid to Civil Power is meant for times of riots, organized crimes, or terrorism not for normal police duties.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Either I or someone I know has been the subject of unwarranted joint military and police brutality.</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author. Note: (n = 110).

Table 2 indicates that more than 70 percent of the respondents agreed that the use of the military to conduct routine criminal law enforcement represents a shift towards a
“Police State” of governing. Less than 30 percent of those surveyed expressed a contrary belief. This inclination, although only at its embryonic stage represents an extremely dangerous turn for the governed since history has linked this type governing with the beginning of tyranny and dictatorship. The data in table 2 shows that 45 percent of the respondents agreed, 26 percent strongly agreed, while 18 percent disagreed, and 11 percent strongly disagreed. The results also show that over 63 percent of the respondents also agreed that the use of the military to support the civil police in the streets of Belize City is no longer an effective crime control measure. However, having said that, it is worth noting that 25 percent disagreed and a further 12 percent strongly disagreed with this statement; suggesting that there still might be some value of military participation in urban crime control, albeit, perhaps not in the current manner.

In tandem with the views of the respondents; Luanne referred to an incident which was widely reported in the local media regarding a weapon that was relieved from a member of the military who allegedly fell asleep while on crime control duties on the south side of Belize City. Gregory and Paul also noted a growing sense of disregard for the military as a crime fighting entity. It is worth noting from the literature review, that the 2008 Crooks Review warned about such a possibility.

Table 2 also shows that more than 77 percent of those surveyed agree that the use of the military for routine police duties amounts to government abuse of power. Again, it is also notable that about 18 percent of the respondents disagreed with the statement. This suggests that quite a few people believe that government is acting within the law to employ the military as criminal law enforcers.
Luanne and Gregory remarked that the government is only trying its best to control the growing crime situation and this means that there is some public good in what they are doing. Paul on the other hand is of the opinion that it is an abuse of power. He believes that the primary purpose is the interest of political gain; to give the people false hope that the government is genuinely addressing the problem. When asked whether he believed that policy makers should be given some leeway to ignore the law if they are doing so for some public good; Paul responded that if the state is breaking the laws, there is no reason for the citizens to obey them. He further commented that wrong is wrong whether it is committed by a criminal or the government. He concluded that if the government is engaged in unlawful acts they cannot truly expect those who they govern to behave in a lawful manner.

When asked to agree or disagree with the statement: The joint military police teams are providing satisfactory crime control service in Belize City, only 9 percent strongly agreed whilst 33 percent expressed agreement. A huge majority (45 percent) expressed disagreement and a further 14 percent expressed strong disagreement. An opinion poll indicated similar results. In that poll, 9 percent of the participants expressed confidence in the work of the police force; whilst 91 percent or 268 of the voters indicated a lack of confidence. (News 5 Opinion Poll 7 April 2010).

According to Luanne, most of the time when the military turns up at the police station to begin a shift, majority of them appears to be disinterested. Gregory on the other hand stated that during his time in the military, it was brought to his attention on several occasions that due to shortage in policemen, sometimes up to a dozen soldiers were left
un-tasked and subsequently spends the entire day at the police station doing absolutely nothing.

When asked to provide his opinion on the effectiveness of using the military as part of a crime control strategy, Gregory responded that he is of the view that such an arrangement is a total waste of time and assets. He further stated that in his view, the presence of Belize Defence Force on the streets of Belize City contributes nothing towards the reduction of crime in that municipality. He went on to comment that the skills of the Belize Defence Force are being degraded and that the arrangement is only postponing the day when the police will regain the respect and trust of the public. Gregory then mentioned that the only function of the Belize Defence Force is to provide deadly force. He highlighted that this is very rarely used, and warned that if used frequently, that would cause the situation to deteriorate further. When asked if given the freedom of action, what if any different approach he would take to address the troubling crime situation in Belize City, Gregory responded by stating that he would purge the Police Department of corrupt policemen, remove the Belize Defence Force from the streets, and create jobs and educational opportunities for impoverished families and youths.

The author as participant observer also noted the same organizational and operational issues of the conjoined crime control teams as expressed by the results of the survey, the opinion poll and the interviewees. From all indications, it would appear that the use of the military as part of an urban crime control measure has seen its better days.

Further on, the results of the survey suggest that the respondents are very concerned about the likeliness of their identities being preserved if they give information
of a crime to the joint military and police crime control teams. Only 5 percent of the respondents expressed strong agreement and 10 percent showed agreement over the statement: I feel confident that my identity will not be revealed if I decide to pass information of criminal activity to the joint military and police crime control team discreetly. Twenty-six percent disagreed and a huge majority (59 percent) strongly disagreed that they can rely on the joint military and police crime control teams to preserve their identities. In many circumstances, people who give information on criminal activity are targeted and in most cases either they, or their family members eventually become victims as a direct result of the information they provided to the authorities. Of the three interviewees, Paul was the most passionate against providing information to the authorities. He said that he knew for a fact that some of the very members of the military and police are in some of the gangs and so once they become aware of the informant details they passed it on to their gang members, for action.

Less than 40 percent of the respondents agreed that members of the military in Belize are adequately trained to conduct normal policing work. As the table shows, about 13 percent strongly agreed and 26 percent agreed that members of the military are adequately trained to maintain peace in the community. Most of the respondents thought otherwise--36 percent expressed disagreement and the remaining 25 percent strongly disagreed. According to Paul, the brutal force and ignorance often displayed by the military in the community is a reflection of their lack of training in non-confrontational conflict resolution. Both Luanne and Gregory agreed that appropriate community interaction training is lacking. This was also highlighted in the literature Crooks (2008) who drew attention to the negligible time allocation for community base policing training.
for Police trainees. It is also significant to note, that as indicated in the literature review, one of the military experts (Wass de Czege) who believed that the military can perform both military and policing functions adequately well, qualified his position by expressing the need for adequate training.

In addition to the negative responses regarding the need for adequate training, more than 90 percent of the respondents agreed that by virtue of their training the military are more inclined than the police to use excessive force during normal police duties. Fifty-three percent or about fifty-eight respondents strongly agreed whereas 38 percent of the respondents agreed. However, the remaining 9 percent either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that the military is more likely than the police to use excessive force. The three interviewees all agreed that the propensity to use excessive force more lies with the military. This is in line with the views of those in the academic circles on this subject such as Campbell and Campbell (2009), Huba Wass de Czege (2006), D. Zimmerman (2005), and Kraska and Kappeler (2001) as indicated in the literature review of this study.

Further on, the respondents strongly agreed that either they or someone they knew had been the subject of unwarranted joint military and police brutality. Specifically, 55 percent of the respondents expressed strong agreement and 39 percent expressed agreement. However, 5 percent disagreed and a further 1 percent strongly disagreed. Both Luanne and Gregory stated that while they know of people who allegedly have been wrongfully brutalized, they themselves have no such personal experience. Paul on the other hand, stated that he and several of his friends have been on the receiving end of unwarranted physical abuse from the security forces on numerous occasions. This is in
line with the literature of Gayle et al (2010) which found that “approximately 60 percent of the respondents reported to have known of or witnessed police brutality directly” (Gayle et al. 2010).

The results of an opinion poll also indicated that 85 percent of the participants were of the opinion that the shooting of a civilian by a conjoined crime control patrol was no accident as claimed by the authorities. On the other hand 15 percent or a total of sixty-nine voters indicated their belief that the shooting was an accident (News 5 opinion poll 31 August 2010).

This rather high incidence of excessive force and brutality is probably best accounted for as one of the occupational ramifications of role convergence explicated by Campbell and Campbell in their 2009 research study. As indicated in the literature review, Campbell contends that “a protracted interaction of the military with the civil police presages an important societal development, with substantial implications on several levels” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 327). Campbell identified the cultural evolution that was occurring within civil law enforcement agencies as one of the most significant implications. He explained that “law enforcement agencies are supposed to think in terms of legal procedures and due-process rights; while military agencies think in terms of overwhelming force and destroying an adversary” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 331). They found that military involvement in civil law enforcement has somewhat resulted in an evolution of civil police adopting a militaristic attitude “oriented toward the elimination of an enemy threat” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 331). This position, as drawn out in the literature review is support by other prominent scholars such as military analyst Huba Wass de Czege, as evidenced in his 2006 magazine article, titled, “Policing
the Frontiers of Freedom” and D. Zimmerman as evidenced by his views in a 2005 article, titled, “Between Minimum Force and Maximum Violence.” With this in view, it is submitted that the high incidence of police brutality in Belize City has a direct correlation with the protracted military involvement in urban crime control in that municipality.

Finally, the respondents agreed that military Aid to Civil Power is meant for times of riots, organized crimes, or terrorism; and not for normal police duties. As indicated in the table, 32 percent strongly agreed, 48 percent agreed, while 15 percent disagreed, and about 5 percent of the respondents strongly disagreed. Gregory stated that the military support currently being provided to the Police Department merely waste the military resources and provide the police with a scapegoat for their poor performance by claiming that the military did not do “x,” “y,” or “z.” He then drew attention to the fact that the more manpower the police gets, the more crime increases. He concluded that the military should only be used in cases of riot or to aid civil authorities in times of natural disasters. According to Paul, the military should focus on guarding the borders and let other agencies handle their own responsibilities.

The Approach to Crime Control in Belize City

The respondents were also asked about their views on the crime control approach of Belize City. Approach generally sets the conditions for success or failure. Success is normally driven by an approach which incorporates all the essential factors in its planning, preparation, and execution. Just as how the design of steps leading to a door must at least incorporate basic factors such as the general height and weight of the people who will be using it, so too, must the crime control approach, take into account the
intangibles of the environment, and the behaviors of those it seeks to control. A crime control approach which reacts to the situation rather than shaping the conditions to which the criminals must react; is destined to be ineffective. Majority of the respondents agreed that solving crimes, removing criminals from the streets, and punishing illegal behaviors are all necessary, but ought not to be given a higher priority than preventing the crime in the first place. Table 3 shows the result of this part of the study.

Table 3. Crime control approach of Belize City.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Range of possible responses</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The crime control approach of Belize City is generally a reactive, after-the-fact, policing approach</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>It appears that the crime control approach of Belize City fails to appreciate the fact that removing criminals from the streets is a means to reducing crime, not an end in and of itself.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The crime control approach of Belize City would be more effective if it is adjusted to a mindset of preventing crimes rather than one of trying to solve them.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There needs to be some sort of indicator to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of all elements of the crime control measures so that necessary adjustments can be made where appropriate.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The joint military and police crime control approach has lost its deterrence effect and as a result a considerable level of disregard for the joint patrols.</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the current crime control approach, there appears to be no means to objectively measure the performance and effectiveness of the joint military and police teams.</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author. Note: (n = 110).
As indicated in table 3, almost 92 percent of the respondents agreed that the crime control approach of Belize City is a reactive, after-the-fact, policing approach. This suggests that the respondents believe that the crime control workforce is always at least one step behind the criminals. As indicated in the literature review, a citizens group “Belizeans for justice” organized and executed a shutdown of the Belize business district in protest over the troubling spate of violence in Belize City. It is also worthy to note that 87 percent of those who participated in a related opinion poll, indicated support for the shutdown as a signal of dissatisfaction for Belize’s crime control approach. Thirteen percent (42 voters) indicated that they were not in support of the shutdown (News 5 opinion poll 15 September 2010).

The respondents also expressed strong agreement that the joint military and police crime control approach has lost its deterrence effect and as a result a considerable level of unprofessionalism is being displayed by the joint teams. Sixty-three percent of the respondents strongly agreed while 37 percent agreed to this statement; none of the respondents disagreed. This shows that, indeed, the desired effect of the joint crime control teams is no longer being achieved. If this conclusion is correct, then the significant issue is that the current crime control measure is lacking an important element of crime control, that of deterrence. The facts suggests, as evidenced by the situation in which a weapon was relieved from a soldier who was sleeping on duty as mentioned by Luanne, that indeed the military has lost its deterrence effect on urban crime in Belize City.

The troubling spate of crime in Belize City seems to indicate that the often prescribed reaction of more police officers, more soldiers, more courts, and more
correctional facilities is an ineffective one. More than 80 percent of the respondents agreed that such a crime control approach fails to appreciate the fact that removing criminals from the streets is a means to reducing crime, not an end in and of itself. Furthermore, almost 70 percent agreed that it would be more effective if an approach of preventing crimes rather than trying to solve them is adopted. Little over 30 percent expressed a contrary belief.

The table also shows that almost 82 percent of the respondents agreed that there is no apparent method of assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of any particular element of the current crime control approach. This indication reinforces the view that if there are no means to indicate that the approach is going astray, you will only know when you have arrived there and by that time it will certainly be too late. Along this line, over 67 percent of those surveyed agreed that there needs to be some method of measuring the performance of sectors, groups, or teams within the crime control workforce so that corrective measures can be taken where or when the need arise. The 2008 literature of Crooks also drew attention to this essential factor. Furthermore, it is submitted that this loophole is a contributing factor to the admittedly high incidence of corruption in the police department, as indicated in the literature of Gayle et al. (2010).

When asked what is the measure of performance and effectiveness of the joint crime control teams, both Luanne and Gregory stated that as far as they are concerned, it was based on the combination of the number of persons arrested, crimes solved, and men deployed in the streets. This suggests that no consideration is given as to the individuals or groups that habitually make arrests and the others that do not. This concern was also noted by the author as participant observer.
**Governmental Input**

The study also examined the essential role of the central government in terms of crime control in Belize City. In particular, this portion of the survey sought to determine the awareness of the respondents in terms of the strategic guiding principles, directions, and policies required from a central government in the pursuit of an effective and efficient crime control strategy. Table 4 presents the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Range of possible responses</th>
<th>Very aware</th>
<th>Aware</th>
<th>Unaware</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For crime prevention to be effective and efficient, it needs to be designed and managed with a sophistication and maturity of vision that sees it planned and delivered in a systematic and integrated fashion.</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The central government needs to provide the crime prevention workforce with the appropriate training and resources to do their job properly and the freedom to do so without undue administrative interference.</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The central government needs to incorporate all sectors of government into a unity of effort aimed at crime prevention in Belize on a whole.</td>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much more attention needs to be given to the apparent absence of a skilled and professional crime prevention workforce.</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies that will hold the crime prevention workforce accountable for their action or inaction need to be developed, implemented, and enforced.</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author. Note: (n = 110)

As indicated in the table, the respondents are very aware that if central government is to achieve an effective and efficient crime control strategy for Belize; it is imperative that all sectors of government be incorporated into a unity of effort aimed at crime prevention throughout the country. Sixty percent of the respondents are very aware,
more than 35 percent express awareness; while less than 5 percent are unaware of the requirement for such a policy from central government.

Crime affects all sectors of society, it follows logic therefore that all sectors should be actively engaged in the prevention thereof. Gregory remarked that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and therefore, it is essential that a policy be developed, implemented, and enforced that will see the active participation of all instruments of national power focused on the common goal of crime prevention. Luanne commented that the effectiveness of crime control in Belize City would improve significantly if the police had a better working relationship with other departments such as Income Tax, National Land Registry, Customs, and the Belize City Traffic Department. Paul stated that as in any effective organization the “left hand must be working in coordination with the right hand, left foot, and right foot.” He said that the most essential thing though, is to have “a head that directs, commands, and controls, the movement of the parts.” The literature of Gayle et al. 2010 also shed light on this issue by reference to “weak central political authorities”.

Table 4 also shows that over 76 percent of the respondents are also aware that in order for crime prevention to be effective and efficient, it needs to be designed and managed with a sophistication and maturity of vision that sees it planned and delivered in a systematic and integrated fashion. Of the 110 respondents, almost 41.9 percent are very aware, 34.5 percent are aware, and about 23.6 percent were not aware. During the interview, Gregory expressed the opinion that given sufficient direction and guidance, the Belize Police Department as it presently stands, can reduce crime in Belize significantly. He further commented that with the benefit of the positions he held, he is intimately
aware of the lack of an adequate crime control strategy and direction from central government. He remarked that similar to “Alice in Wonderland” if you do not know where you are going, any road will get you there.

The availability of a workforce that seeks to further the interest of the organization, and is not merely there for the paycheck is essential to the success of any organization. The crime control sector is no exception, and in this regard, the respondents expressed awareness that much more attention needs to be given to the apparent absence of a skilled and professional crime prevention workforce in Belize City. Forty-one percent of the respondents are very aware. Over 36 percent expressed awareness and less than 23 percent of the respondents are unaware of the need for central government to provide policy that will assess, train, and monitor such a workforce.

The respondents are also aware of the need for policies that will hold the crime prevention workforce accountable for their action or inaction. Twenty percent of the 110 respondents showed a high level of awareness, just under 45 percent expressed awareness; while a significant portion of the respondents (more than 35 percent) are unaware of the need for central government input in the form of specific guidance, directives, and stipulations.

Paul stated that the police should not be left to police themselves because we all know too well what has been happening and will continue to happen there. Luanne said that indeed there is a significant number of members of the department who seems to hardly care whether Monday falls on a Thursday or not; to them every day is business as usual – which is to twiddle their thumbs until the end of the shift. She stated that from her observance, there is an equal if not greater number of the military who seems to have that
same attitude when they show up for duty at the station. Paul stated that he knows when his “peeps” (members of the police or military who are in his gang) will be on duty and that if his organization (gang) is desirous of a certain event, he, Paul, can coordinate for the absence of security forces at that particular time and place. The results of an opinion poll revealed that 91 percent of the participants (460 voters) believed; whilst 9 percent or 47 voters did not believe, that corruption in the Police Department is pervasive (News 5 Opinion Poll 8 April 2010).

Almost 82 percent of the respondents also indicated awareness of the need for central government to provide policies and direction that will facilitate the appropriate training and resources of the crime control workforce, and allow them to do their job properly without undue administrative interference. Also along this line, a recent opinion poll shows that 85 percent of the total participants did not believed that the investigation by the Minister of Police and the Minister of Immigration into the human smuggling ring will lead to the arrest of the ring leaders. Fifteen percent or a total of 102 participants indicated their belief that the investigation by the Ministers will lead to the arrest of the ring leaders (News 5 opinion poll 14 October 2010).

In terms of adequate resources, Luanne commented that she has experienced cases where there is a call for urgent police presence at a particular location, but although they have the manpower available there is no available vehicle to respond. She also remarked on instances when they would be patrolling and turn up to a filling station to refuel the vehicle only to be told by the gas attendant that no more fuel will be issued to the police until government has settled its outstanding bills. Gregory said that as a result of the lack of supportive policies, he had to decline very relevant training that was being offered,
both inside and outside the country, by international organizations at very little or no cost to the government.

In response to the question as to whether Government should invest more to solve crime, 92 percent or 351 of the voters who participated in an opinion poll said yes, while the other 8 percent or 37 voters differed (News 5 opinion poll 19 March 2010).

**Citizen Involvement**

As indicated in the literature review, numerous citizens groups participated in a series of marches and protests in an effort to demonstrate their loss of sense of security in regards to crime in Belize. When asked who was responsible to provide a safe and secure environment for the residents of Belize City, Gregory responded that the Government, the City Council and the residents themselves are collectively responsible for a safe environment. He continued by stating that any concept of law and order is only practicable to the extent that the majority of citizens want law and order. That extent he concluded is determined by the degree of consent to the presence of law enforcement officers, and the level of active engagement of the citizens with the officers who operates in their community.

The respondents were asked for their opinion on the significance of community participation in crime prevention. Specifically, they were asked to agree or disagree whether or not neighborhood watches in Belize City were effective; whether not doing or saying anything despite being a witness to a crime facilitated an environment that is conducive to illicit activity; whether the consent and active participation of members of the community was essential to an effective crime control strategy; and whether community opposition to law enforcement cripples the ability of the law enforcement
personnel to provide a safe and secure environment. Table 5 presents the results of this part of the survey.

Table 5. Citizen Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Range of possible responses</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-help schemes such as ‘neighborhood watch’ are generally effective in Belize City.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whenever members of the community witness a crime and do or say nothing they are indirectly contributing to an unsafe community.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without the consent, and active involvement, of the people among whom the police operate, it is almost impossible to control crime.</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even fairly small degrees of community opposition can cripple law enforcement efforts and provide aid and encouragement for illegal activity.</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author. Note: (n = 110).

Table 5 shows that almost 60 percent of the respondents agreed that self-help schemes such as neighborhood watch are generally effective in Belize City, whilst a significant portion, just over 40 percent believed otherwise. The table also indicates that just under 65 percent of those surveyed agreed with the statement that: whenever members of the community witness a crime and do or say nothing they are indirectly contributing to the development of an unsafe community. Almost 80 percent of the respondents also agreed that without the consent, and active involvement of the people among whom the police operate, it is almost impossible to control crime in Belize City. Furthermore, a total of 80 percent of the respondents expressed agreement with the statement that that: even fairly small degrees of community opposition can cripple law
enforcement efforts and provide aid and encouragement for illegal activity. It is significant to note that 75 percent of those who participated in an opinion poll indicated that they did not believe that the police have the support of the community to rid the street of crime. Twenty-five percent or a total 65 of the voters indicated a contrary belief (News 5opinion poll 8 June 2010).

According to Luanne, a significant number of criminals were caught in the act as a direct result of some active neighborhood watch program. She also observed that in a number of areas across the city the only semblance of a neighborhood watch was an odd neighborhood watch sign posted here and there. She stated that in such areas where the neighborhood watch program is merely a sign; apart from generally having no effect on criminal activity in that area; they also reduce the effect of the signs in areas where the program is active. In her view, an effective neighborhood watch program is not merely putting up a couple of signs.

Gregory commented that contrary to popular belief, neighborhood watch program should not be “self-help.” According to him, these initiatives should receive maximum support from the central government. He concluded that such schemes could make a significant contribution to the reduction of crime, if properly administered.

Luanne further stated that in reality a crime very seldom occur with at least one member of the community not hearing or seeing something. With this in view, she commented that in too many instances members of the public have information that would greatly assist a police investigation but instead of providing that information they choose to withhold it.
Gregory said that in his view, those who witness a crime and choose not to provide information to the police, mainly do so to protect themselves or their family. He stated that witness intimidation is one of the major reasons why many cases do not stand the test of time in the courts. He further stated that there have been several instances where witnesses have been murdered within days of their indication to provide evidence in court. In his view, until some robust witness protection scheme is established, this problem will continue to persist. The result of an opinion poll shows that 90 percent (348 voters) of those who participated were of the opinion that Belize should invest in a witness protection scheme (News 5 opinion poll 17 August 2010).

According to Paul, there is indeed a great deal of witness intimidation in Belize City. He claimed however, that contrary to popular belief; it is not the criminals who are intimidating the witnesses; it is the very police to whom they provide the information. To support this statement Paul said that it is the police attitude, approach, and corruption that cause members of the public to be reluctant to provide information to them. He stated that generally, the moment a person gives any type of information to the police about a crime, you can bet your last dollar that it is at that very moment that they will become, and will be treated, as a suspect of that crime. He said that the amount of harassment witnesses have to go through from the police to provide follow up information is no joke. Paul believes the reason for this is that the police ability to solve a crime without eyewitness evidence is generally nonexistent and therefore witness intimidation by criminals is merely a second order effect of the absence of a skilled and professional police department.
Paul continued by asking the question: How do you think the criminals become aware of the particulars of a witness within such a short period of them providing information to the police? He offered that for the most part, it is the police who provide that information back to the criminals; be it intentional or unintentional, directly or indirectly. For this reason, he stated that by keeping quiet the citizens are not merely contributing to an environment that is conducive to illicit activity; they are effectively protecting themselves, not only from the criminals but also from the police who cannot or choose not to protect them. It is significant to note that 92 percent (315 voters) of those who participated in an opinion poll indicated a belief that there is a high level of collusion in a human smuggling ring that was recently exposed. 26 voters or 8 percent indicated a contrary belief (News 5 opinion poll 7 October 2010).

**Accountability**

Some people argue that no matter what version of crime prevention is chosen and what strategies are selected to implement it, no law enforcement organization is likely to succeed in reducing crime unless those whose function it is to control crime is held responsible for doing so. This portion of the study concludes by examining the importance of, and need for the crime control workforce to be held accountable.

Table 6 shows that almost 80 percent of the respondents agreed that in the interest of transparency, the government should be able to provide the general public with crime statistics and the crime rate taken from a source other than the police. Interestingly, the results of an opinion poll revealed that 90 percent of those who participated in the poll (634 voters) indicated that they did not feel any safer despite the fact that the official statistics indicated crime was down (News 5 opinion poll 22 April 2010). In light of this,
it is recommended that responsibility for the official crime statistics be transferred from
the police to the Statistical Institute of Belize.

Table 6. Accountability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Range of possible responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Police should be held strictly accountable for all the resources provided to them for the purposes of crime control.</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The crime control workforce needs to be held accountable for any offence they commit regardless of their rank.</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The crime control workforce needs to be held accountable for their negligence, particularly through their omission to act when they are duty-bound to do so.</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the interest of transparency, the government should be able to provide the general public with crime statistics and crime rate taken from a source other than the police.</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be some method of measuring the effectiveness of the crime control workforce so that necessary adjustment can be made when and where it is required.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There needs to be some objective means of measuring the performance of the crime control workforce, in order to facilitate adequate corrective measures when it becomes appropriate to do so.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author. Note: (n = 110).

Table 6 also indicate that almost 63 percent of those surveyed agreed that the crime control workforce needs to be held accountable for their negligence, particularly when they fail to act when they are duty-bound to do so. The table further shows that over 70 percent of the respondents agreed that the crime control workforce should be held accountable for any offence they commit regardless of their rank, appointment, status or political affiliations. Results of the survey also revealed that more than 66
percent of the respondents agreed that there needs to be some objective means of measuring the performance of the crime control workforce, in order to facilitate adequate corrective measures when it becomes appropriate to do so. Interestingly, a significant portion (almost 44 percent) of those surveyed did not agree that such a need exists. On the other hand, more than 65 percent agreed that there should be some method of measuring the effectiveness of the crime control strategy so that necessary adjustment can be made when and where it is required. Finally, next to 80 percent of the respondents agreed that the Police should be held strictly accountable for all the resources provided to them for the purposes of crime control.

In the interview, Gregory noted that accountability is very essential if there is to be an efficient and effective crime control strategy. He stated that in the absence of stipulation and means to take corrective measures for accountability there will be none. He further stressed the importance of utilizing the limited resources for maximum effect. Gregory also raised concern about the inappropriate use of the limited resources for unrelated and personal activities. He drew attention to situations in which members of the Police Department were involved in embezzling the very fuel that they were supposed to use for patrolling and then claimed that they cannot patrol due to fuel shortage. He commented that such activities cannot be accomplished without the active participation of the citizens who facilitate them. He suggested that in such cases the citizens should also be held accountable.

When asked for his opinion on the accountability of the police department, Paul’s response was, “which accountability.” He stated that in his view, the notion of accountability in the Police Department is a joke. In support to this comment he stated
that on numerous occasions and for various durations, he had been able to use impersonators to infiltrate the Police Department simply by gaining access to their uniform. He further commented that with his internal connections this is easier done than said. Paul further contends that the Police Department shows no interest in investigating those crimes in which members of the department have been implicated. He suggest that there is an active culture of brotherhood in which the department closes ranks to protect their members, and that the public would be more than naïve to expect the police to do any comprehensive investigation on their own members. He stated that it is for this reason why it is well worth the risk to recruit as much policemen and or obtain as much of their uniforms as you can for your organization (gang).

It is common knowledge in Belize that a civilian infiltrated the police system and was able to successfully impersonate a genuine member of the police department for a considerable period of time. An opinion poll was conducted following the discovery of the impersonator. The results of that poll showed that 89 percent of those who participated in the opinion poll were of the opinion that the fake cop was aided and abetted from within the Police Department. Eleven percent of the total participants, or 44 voters thought otherwise (News 5 opinion poll 22 July 2010).

Luanne agreed that the crime control workforce should be held accountable for their action or inaction. However, she believes that inaction is more pervasive in the Police Department. She remarked that when people get paid whether they perform or not, is one of the major causes for inaction. In her view, 20 percent of the department is carrying the burden for the other 80 percent. She remarked that apart from making up total figures in terms of strength, a significant number do not bring any benefit to the
department. She said that it was for this reason she fully support the idea of some sort of means to measure the performance and effectiveness of all members of the department. She stated that her only hope is that such an evaluation is done by an external entity because if done internally, the possibility of that responsibility is given to one of the aforementioned 80 percent, is far too high for comfort.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter presented, interpreted, and discussed the results of the research. In brief, the results show that the participants are generally aware of the major principles of democracy, and agreed that the crime deterrence effect of the military has been eroded to a point of insignificance. There was also general agreement that the current crime control approach of Belize City is inadequate to meet the challenges it currently faces. The chapter also examined the significance, role, and need for central government’s wholehearted participation in the crime control efforts of Belize City. The chapter also looked at the importance of the consent and active participation of members of the community in crime control activities, and discussed issues of accountability in terms of allocated resources, action or inaction, and ends, ways, and means of measuring performance and effectiveness of the crime control workforce. The next and final chapter summarizes and concludes the study.
CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

In the proceeding chapter, the interpretation and analysis of the data collected was presented. This chapter begins with a summary of the purpose and structure, which is followed by a discussion of the major findings, implications for practice, and recommendations for further research. Conclusions from the findings of this study are discussed in relation to the purpose and objectives of the research. The purpose of the latter sections of this chapter is to expand on the major concepts that were examined during the study in an effort to provide further perceptive on the diminishing crime control effect of the conjoined military and civil police strategy in Belize City. This chapter, as well as the entire study, concludes by offering a synthesizing statement aimed at capturing the substance and scope of the theory which has been developed in this research.

Summary of the Study

The purpose of this study is to provide a logical reason why the military manpower support to the civil police for the purposes of urban crime control did not produce the long-term effect the government of Belize hoped to have attained from such a measure. The research pursued this aim through the collection, presentation, interpretation, and analysis of primary and secondary data. A total of 200 residents of Belize City were randomly selected from a telephone directory for the qualitative sample. From this number, 133 individuals indicated an interest to participate in the study,
however in the end, only 110 actually completed and returned the questionnaire within the specified time.

The questionnaire examined the participants awareness of the system of government which makes (and thus can change) the policies, laws, and guiding vision of the crime control strategy for Belize City. It also solicited their perception on the effects of the conjoined military and civil police crime control teams; the approach to crime control in Belize City; central government’s role in crime control; citizens involvement; and the need for accountability of the crime control resources.

The construct of the survey included a series of questions with a requirement for the participants to make a selection from a set of controlled responses (for each question) along a continuous scale of strongly agree to strongly disagree. In pursuit of validity, the data collected from the survey was cross-referenced with data collected from a series of nation-wide opinion polls conducted by one of the nation’s leading news outlet.

Three individuals who were purposely selected from among the respondents agreed to provide qualitative data through a follow-up interview. The information gathered from the interviews supplements as well as provides a cross-reference for the data collected by the author as a participant observer. Since the interviewees provided information on the condition anonymity, I am only at liberty to state that one is a serving member of the Belize Police Department; one is a retired member of the Belize Defence Force, and the other holds a position of control in one of the notorious street gangs of Belize City.
The primary research question examines whether there is a genuine need for the Belize Defence Force to continue to provide manpower support to the Belize Police Department for the purposes of urban crime control?

Secondary questions are: (1) is the employment of the military in protracted crime control duties in line with a democratic form of government? (2) Is the employment of the military on the streets of Belize City still an effective crime control measure? (3) Is supplementing the civil police with military manpower an effective crime control strategy?

The findings of the secondary questions provided the answer to the primary question. Data gathered from the survey, interviewees, and opinion polls were used to answer the secondary questions.

**Discussion of the Findings**

Previous researchers (Kraska 1984 and 1993; Dandeker 1995; Bunker 1996; Kraska and Kappeler 1997) conducted extensive studies on the involvement of military in civil police functions. These researchers also examined and accounted for the phenomena affecting the landscape of traditional policing; as more and more civil police departments began to adopt a militaristic attitude and approach. Research has also been conducted on the Belize Police Department (Hanson et al. 2004; and Crooks 2008) as well as factors which contribute to the increase of crimes in Belize City (Gayle et al. 2010). The goal of this study was to develop a theory that would provide a logical explanation for the decreasing effect of the crime control strategy that has been employed in Belize City for the last two decades. This section presents the results in relation to the four secondary
research questions and examines the six null hypotheses and then concludes by discussing the findings as they relate to the research hypothesis and prediction model.

Research Question One

Is the employment of the military in protracted crime control duties in line with a democratic form of government?

The findings resulting from research question one indicates that the protection of human rights is an essential element in the concept of democracy. The literature of Bohman (2005) speaks to the duty of the government to protect the human rights of its citizens. One of the most relevant human rights, in regards to crime control, is the citizens’ rights to a safe and secure environment. The finding of the study reveals that the Government of Belize recognizes this right as evidence in the press release discussed in the literature review. The relevant section of that release is the portion which reads: “These social ills are of priority concern to our citizens, whose right to live in a secure environment is being eroded daily” (Cabinet Release). On the other hand, Bohman’s literature also speaks to other human rights such as the right to be treated as innocent until proven guilty, the right to freedom of assembly and association, and the right against tyranny and domination.

When this is applied to the question under examination the implication is that crime control is a complex matter which requires a delicate balance between the restrain of unlawful actions and the preservation of human rights. For all intent and purposes these are two competing interest which are inherently at odds with each other. Add the military to that equation and the matter becomes even more complex. According to the literature of Campbell and Campbell (2009) military involvement in policing brings
about substantial ramifications for the policed. Campbell highlighted that because the police and the military share some characteristics, conventional discussion often assume there is an operational link. Campbell warned however that the two functions are significantly different. To illustrate this Campbell pointed out that “as a protective service organization, the police function to shield the public from harm and maintain law and order; and as a protective service organization, the armed services function to defend the nation from external enemies and to maintain peace and order during times of martial law and civil unrest.” He went on to note that one of the major differences is the use of violence. He pointed out that while constabulary function demands minimum force, military requires the use of overwhelming force.

Attention is drawn to the foregoing paragraph, particularly the portion relating to the armed services function to defend the nation from external enemies and to maintain peace and order during times of martial law and civil unrest. Of specific interest to the argument of this study is the texts “martial law.” The author of this study interprets the use of these particular texts to mean the suspension of civil liberties. If this interpretation is correct, then it would be reasonable safe to conclude that what the academia is saying is that military involvement in the maintenance of peace and order ought only to happen during those periods of time when civil liberties have been suspended.

It is submitted that in instances where civil liberties have been suspended; the general populace will be well aware as the law requires this to be done through a declaration by the Head of State. As indicated in the literature review, the Governor-General is the Head of State. If follows logic therefore, that in the absence of such a declaration by the Governor-General it would be unlawful for the military to be engaged
in the maintenance of peace and order. If this interpretation is correct then the current practice would be in contrivance of the law as well as the principles of democracy which requires even the government to abide by the law as indicated in the literature review, the results of the survey and the interviews.

From another point of view, the literature of Crooks (2008) also expressed concerns regarding the use of the military as part of the urban crime control measure. He commented that in an effort to avoid the need to use their militaries in such a fashion, “many democracies have created para-military ‘third force’ (a hybrid between a military and a civilian police force) which is designed to confront violence on a continuum above that which the regular police should be trained and armed for, but below which the military should not be involved” (Crooks 2008, 81).

As the literature review shows, the generally accepted view is that the military by purpose and training is design to destroy its adversaries, and to that end will not hesitate to unleash maximum violence without consideration for restraint. With this in view, it would be reasonable safe to conclude that the employment of the military in an urban crime control setting is a demonstration of government’s intent to use force, or at the very minimum a threat to use that force. It could be argued that this degree of intimidation has the equivalent effect of domination, which as highlighted in the literature review would also offend the principles of democracy.

Furthermore the results of the survey showed that the respondents were of the impression that the use of the military to conduct routine criminal law enforcement represents a shift towards a “Police State” style of governing. It is submitted that such a state of affair would offend the principles of democracy. The findings also showed that
the respondent were of the opinion that use of the military for routine police duties amounts to government’s abuse of power. This is another affront to the principles of democracy.

The salient points gleaned from the results in relation to secondary research question one is that Belize is governed by a system of democracy, and as such should be governed by laws not by men. It is submitted that the use of the military amounts to government coercing the conduct of the governed by the use of force as opposed to the use of laws. This effectively means governing by men and not by laws, a practice which offends the principles of democracy as indicated in the literature of Bohman (2005). In sum, the data supports a conclusion that the employment of the military in protracted crime control duties is not in line with a democratic form of government.

Research Question Two

Is the employment of the military on the streets of Belize City still an effective crime control measure?

The findings for research question two revealed that there is a growing degree of disregard for the military presence on the streets of Belize City. Ample evidence of this is the fact that the criminals had enough courage to relieve a soldier of his weapon whilst on duty. When asked to provide his opinion on the effectiveness of using the military as part of a crime control strategy, Gregory responded that he is of the view that such an arrangement is a total waste of time and assets. He further stated that in his view, the presence of Belize Defence Force on the streets of Belize City contributes nothing towards the reduction of crime in that municipality. He went on to comment that the
skills of the Belize Defence Force are being degraded and that the arrangement is only postponing the day when the police will regain the trust and confidence of the public.

Nonetheless, it is worthy to observe the sizable amount of the respondents, (37 percent–table 2) who impliedly indicate their belief that use of the military is still effective. However, upon deeper analysis, it was noted that the preponderance of those who indicated a belief that the employment of the military is still effective were in the age group 46 and above. Those from the other age groups were all females. Of relevance here, is the findings of Crooks (2008), and Gayle et al. (2010) which indicated that the preponderance of those who are committing violent crimes in Belize City are males below the age of 20. It appears therefore that the military presence is more effective on individuals from the age group that would not ordinarily be committing crimes. If this interpretation is correct, then it would also be reasonable safe to conclude that the employment of the military on the streets of Belize City is no longer an effective crime control measure.

Furthermore, as eluded to in the answer to research question one, the value of the military as a deterrence to crime is the use of force or the threat thereof. It follows therefore; that the moment the targeted audience realizes that the threat is a farce, all semblance of deterrence is lost. On the other hand, as pointed out by Gregory, if military force is used too frequently, it would only lead to a further deterioration of the situation. With this in view, it is submitted that if the military engagement becomes so protracted to the point where the criminals have adopted to it, all value of military presence have been lost. A reasonable conclusion therefore, would be that the use of the military in urban crime control functions should be limited to short periods of time, as our laws provide for
when civil liberties are suspended. It other words the military is best used as a quick fix, since protracted use will bring it in parallel with or analogous to the use of an aspirin for a toothache, which after prolong use loses its effect.

In the final analysis perhaps the greatest testimony to the effect that employment of the military on the streets of Belize City is no longer an effective crime control measure, is the spate of crime despite their presence. With this in view, the data supports the conclusion that the employment of the military on the streets of Belize City is no longer an effective crime control measure.

Research Question Three

Is supplementing the civil police with military manpower an effective crime prevention strategy?

In the words of Gregory, as indicated in the answer to the above question, “such an arrangement is a total waste of time and assets”. The findings relating to research question three indicates that the significant issues which impede crime control in Belize City are restated in the table 7.
Table 7. Impediments to crime control in Belize City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. A weak rule of law</td>
<td>American Bar Association (see page 20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Insufficient countermeasures.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lack of confidence in the Police Department</td>
<td>Government of Belize (see page 20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Police involvement in the commitment of crime</td>
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<td>5. Weak central political authority</td>
<td>Gayle et al. 2010 (see page 23)</td>
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<td>6. The police is the ‘hostile face of the state’</td>
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<td>7. The police have no legitimacy</td>
<td>See page 23</td>
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<td>8. Police corruption</td>
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<td>9. Police inadequately resourced</td>
<td>Hanson et al. 2004 (see page 25)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Low Police morale</td>
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<td>11. Police inadequately resourced</td>
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<td>12. Low Police morale</td>
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<td>13. Weak quality assurance</td>
<td>Crooks, 2008 (see page 27)</td>
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<td>14. Weak follow through in difficult cases</td>
<td>See page 28</td>
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<td>15. Chronic underdevelopment of human capital in C.I. B.</td>
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<td>16. Increasing ineffectiveness of criminal investigations</td>
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<td>17. Ineffectiveness of supporting and analytical processes</td>
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<td>18. Major Crimes Investigation unit mostly reactive</td>
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<td>19. Little or no collaboration with other government agencies</td>
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<td>20. No clear framework or strategic target from Cabinet</td>
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<td>21. Absence of means to measure performance</td>
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<td>22. Commissioner engaged in tactical as opposed to operational and strategic level policing</td>
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<td>23. Significant portion of workforce engaged in administrative function as opposed to core policing</td>
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<td>24. Inadequate training in community base policing</td>
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<td>25. Inadequate training in ethical behavior and leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>26. Reactive, after-the-fact policing approach</td>
<td>Survey, interviews, opinion polls (see page 75)</td>
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<td>27. Focused on capturing criminals rather than preventing crime</td>
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<td>28. Lack of measurement of effectiveness and efficiency</td>
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<td>29. Lack of policy which unity of effort with other government departments</td>
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<td>30. Absence of skilled and professional workforce</td>
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<td>31. Absence of accountability measures</td>
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<td>32. Little or no support from central government for neighborhood watch programmes</td>
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<td>33. Lack of community participation</td>
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Source: Created by author.

Apart from a reference to insufficient manpower suggested by the 2004 study of Hanson et al. There is no other reference to insufficient manpower as a hindrance crime control in Belize City. On the contrary the literature of Crooks (2008) revealed that
Belize’s police to citizen ratio is one among the world’s best. Crooks results suggest that the ratio for Belize district is 1 police to 181 citizens, and an even greater ratio for Belize City at 1 police to 132. For ease of comparison, the recommended U.N. ratio lies in the vicinity of 1 police to 450-500 citizens.

In view of the issues identified in table 9, coupled with the police to citizen ratio, it is rather easy, even for a casual observer to conclude that supplementing the police with military manpower is not an effective crime control strategy.

The finding suggests that a policy be developed; implemented and enforced that will see the active participation of all instruments of national power focused on the common goal of crime prevention. In the interview, it was submitted that effectiveness of crime control efforts in Belize City would improve significantly if the police had a better working relationship with other departments such as Income Tax, National Land Registry, Customs, and the Belize City Traffic Department. The literature of Hanson et al. (2004), Crooks (2008), and Gayle et al. (2010) all speaks to the need of a holistic approach involving all arms of government.

The above findings support a reasonable safe conclusion that merely supplementing the civil police with military manpower is not an effective crime control strategy. The mere fact that crime is rampant in Belize City, adds validity to this conclusion.

Examination of the Research Hypothesis

This research hypothesized that there is a correlation between the increase in the quantity and severity of crimes in Belize City, and the protracted military manpower support to the civil police in that municipality. The sustainment of this hypothesis will
lead to the development of the research theory which is:--whenever the military is employed as part of an urban crime control strategy, there will be an instant and noticeable decrease in criminal activity; however, when that military participation becomes protracted, its effectiveness in controlling crime will gradually diminish in direct proportion to the duration of its involvement.

The following null hypotheses are deemed essential to the development of the foregoing general theory:

1. There is no correlation between the drastic decrease of urban crimes and the initial military involvement in urban crime control. As the findings indicate, the initial military presence brought about a drastic decrease in criminal activity. Although there is no scientific evidence to prove that the initial military presence was the operating cause of the instant reduction in crime, there is also none that proves that it did not play a part, and that is sufficient grounds for a safe conclusion that the statement continues to be null. A further argument if the fact that the government continues to employ the military as part of the crime control strategy almost two decades later. If the measure did not produce remarkable results initially, then what is the reason for their continued engagement?

2. There is no correlation between the diminishing effect of military presence and the resurgence in urban crimes. As is generally accepted the initial military involvement produced a drastic reduction in crimes. The fact that this was not sustained is an indication that the effect of the military presence was diminishing. Furthermore, the fact that crime continues to resurge, pasting the level it was prior to military involvement, as evidenced by the pronouncement of the government that it has now reached “crisis proportion” (Cabinet Release). The argument therefore is that if the notion that the initial
military presence was an effective crime control measure is correct; and the notion that crime is now out of control is correct; then it must also be correct to conclude that the measure is no longer effective; for if it was effective, crime would not have resurged. The conclusion therefore, is that there is a correlation between the diminished effect and the resurgence. With this in view and the absence of any evidence which proves that there is no correlation between the two, it would be safe to state that the statement continues to be null.

3. There is no relationship between the duration of military involvement in urban crime control and the diminishing effect of such an involvement. The findings of the study show that the initial military presence brought about a drastic reduction in crimes. It also shows a resurge in crime. This indicates that there was a point in time when the crime control measure became ineffective. For convenience, that point herein after will be referred as the “point of return.” It is submitted that it was the point of return that the reversed trend began and instead of continuing to go down or remain constant it started to move in an upwards direction. As the findings indicate, despite the military presence, the resurgence in terms of quantity and severity continues in an upward motion to the point where it has now reached crisis proportion.

In referring to the statement that crime have now reached crisis proportion, the government press release also indicated that “What we are experiencing today is the result of many decades of social and economic changes” (Cabinet Release). Note also that the Chairman of the Crime Control Council contends that, “The outbreak of violent crime has been from about 2000, so what we’re seeing here is a phenomenon that has been affecting Belize for some years.” (Young) It is also worthy to note that the literature
of Gayle et al. (2010) suggests a spike in 2002 as evidenced in almost twice the number
of murders than in 2000. With these data in view, it would be reasonable safe to conclude
that the effectiveness of the conjoint crime control measure was eroding with time. It
would certainly be useful knowledge if it could be determined where in terms of time was
the point of return, i.e. the point where the military presence lost its effectiveness. The
value of such a data for future planning purposes renders it a worthwhile subject for
further research.

It is offered that if the military was withdrawn prior to reaching the point of
return, then according to all indications a redeployment if and when the need arise would
have been effective. Had the withdrawal occurred and a resurge of crime also occurred, at
least in such a circumstance the government would have had the military as a resort to
redeploy and regain control as transpired in the initial deployment. (Tipping point
leadership would be relevant here)

However, the fact that the military did remained engaged; when the resurge did
occurred, there was nothing to resort to. In other words, the crime fighting tool box was
empty and as a result the people and government were left at the mercy of the criminals;
with nowhere to turn. It follows therefore that the protracted engagement turned the
initial success into a disastrous failure. Put another way, the positive effect, with time,
became no effect, and is now producing negative effect. With this in view, it would be
reasonable safe to conclude that there is a relation between the duration of military
involvement and the diminishing effect of such an involvement. In the absence of
evidence to prove that there is no relation, the statement continues to be null.
4. There is no relationship between a sense of ineffectiveness and the emergence of frustration and demoralization. As shown by the results of the study, the effectiveness of the conjoined crime control measure began to fade over time. In regards to null hypothesis four, it is submitted that the initial success of the militaristic approach influenced those involved as well as those observing to the false conclusion that such an approach which was providing substantial results should be pursued. It follows therefore that the traditional method of policing which was based upon community participation, proper investigation, and evidence gathering, was replaced with the militant version of detain, arrest, and question. The literature of Crooks (2008) speaks to the “chronic underdevelopment of human capital in the Criminal Investigation Branch,” as well as the “increasing ineffectiveness of criminal investigations and supporting intelligence and analytical processes” (Crooks 2008, 6).

It is further submitted that the militant approach resulted in an expanding gap between the community and the police as innocent people were being detained for several hours and released after the questioning found nothing to charge them with. This practice although on the face of it may look minor, has a huge rippling effect as family and friends of the person, who was wrongfully arrested and detained, also began to dissociate themselves with anything to do with the police. So not only was the militaristic presence and approach adding no value to the investigative and evidence gathering part of policing; but it was also driving a wedge between the community and the police. It follows therefore, that since the investigative element was abandoned for the militant one, very little or no evidence was being gathered. As a result heavy reliance had to be place on eyewitnesses. The problem with this however was that the divide between the police
and the community was getting wider which as alluded to resulted in the community reluctance to assist the police. The criminals quickly realize that where there is no eyewitness there is also no case. As a result they began to intimidate the few who decided to assist the police in providing eyewitness evidence. Therefore eyewitnesses would not turn up to court, and without eyewitness the police case invariably fell apart and the criminals walks free.

The fact that the criminals are not convicted they end up right back on the streets, which for all intent and purpose is a mockery of the entire system. The literature of Crooks also shows that “this dangerous cohort of criminals is becoming less deterred by police action as the arrest and conviction of murders decline” (Crooks 2008, 9). It can easily be argued that such a state of affairs would lead to frustration of the police who as pointed out in the literature of Gayle et al. (2010) was making ridiculously low salaries. With this in view the nexus between ineffectiveness, frustration and demoralization is established. In the absence of evidence to prove that there is no relation, the statement continues to be null.

5. There is no correlation between frustration, demoralization; and corruption of the law enforcement officers. It is offered that frustration is fueled by the fact that the law enforcement officer come in contact with the same set of criminals over and over again since the criminals walk free as a result of insufficient evidence in court. The effect of this is that the law enforcement officers are putting in all this effort without any substantial results. Having done so much, for so long, with so little result, eventually there will come a point in time where doing little or nothing at all becomes a viable option. The findings of the study indicate a significant degree of that option being
exercised in the Belize Police Department. As indicated by Luanne she is of the opinion that 20 percent of the department is carrying the load for the other 80 percent. She further mentioned that most of the time when the military arrived at the station to start a shift, majority of them appears to be disinterested. She mentioned that if Monday should ever fall on a Thursday, it would not matter to them, since everyday is business as usual; just twiddling around until the end of the shift. Evidence of this was the soldier who fell asleep and was subsequently relieved of his weapon.

The fact that little or no accountability occurs certainly adds to this. As indicated in the findings a civilian was able to infiltrate by simply putting on the uniform and “reporting to work” as if he was a genuine policeman. However to give credit where credit is due, it is worthy to note that the policemen themselves are victims to lack of support as evidence by the unserviceable and insufficient policing equipment as found by Gayle et al. (2010). With mounting frustration coupled with low morale and morals the locomotive for corruption is set in motion; and from all indications most of the seats are taken. With this in view, it is fairly easy to see the link between frustration, demoralization and corruption. In the absence of evidence to prove that there is no relation, the statement continues to be null.

6. There is no correlation between corrupted law enforcement officers and the increase in the overall quantity and severity of crimes. As evidenced in the Government of Belize Press Release, the police have themselves been implicated in a significant number of the violent crimes. The mere fact that the law enforcement officers are committing crime adds to the number of crimes being committed and therefore increases the quantity. It is further submitted that if there is one clique of corrupt law enforcement
officers competing against the criminals or another clique of corrupt officers for illegal gains, any increase in the severity of crimes can hardly ever be surprising; for if that is the case, then the concept of surprise is well overrated. With this in view, it is submitted that the link between corrupted officers and an increase in quantity and severity of crimes being committed is established. In the absence of evidence to prove that there is no relation, the statement continues to be null.

In the final analysis, it has often been said that once you remove everything that is impossible, whatever remains must be possible. In light of this, it is hereby submitted that the findings of this study, nor the findings of any known study for that matter, have revealed any evidence to indicate that any of the six null hypotheses should be removed. Therefore, as recorded at the end of all six null hypotheses; the statements continue to be null.

It would be reasonable safe to conclude therefore that: (1) possibility exist that there is a link between the drastic decrease of crime in Belize City and the initial military involvement in urban crime control; (2) possibility also exist that there is a link between the diminishing effect of military presence and the resurgence of crimes in Belize City; (3) possibility also exist that there is a link between the duration of military involvement in urban crime control and the diminishing effect of such an involvement; (4) possibility also exist that there is a link between a sense of ineffectiveness and the emergence of frustration and demoralization; (5) possibility exist that there is a link between frustration, demoralization; and corruption of the law enforcement officers, and (6) possibility exist that there is a link between corrupted law enforcement officers and the increase in the overall quantity and severity of crimes in Belize City.
When this is all linked together they sustain the research hypothesis :- that there is a correlation between the increase in the quantity and severity of crimes in Belize City, and the protracted military manpower support to the civil police in that municipality.

Furthermore, the sustainment of the hypothesis leads to the development of the research theory that whenever the military is employed as part of an urban crime control strategy, there will be an instant and noticeable decrease in criminal activity; however, when that military participation becomes protracted, its effectiveness in controlling crime will gradually diminish in direct proportion to the duration of its involvement.

This theory which is titled, Organizational Friction: Urban Crime Control Diminish Effect Theory further led to the construction of the associated model, titled Urban Crime Control Diminish Effect Model, to depict the theory. The term “organizational friction” signifies that if the two separate organizations are not task organized and sufficient consideration is not given to organizational factors, then friction will emerge. The other portion of the title signifies that protracted military involvement will diminish the effect of the urban crime control effort.

Figure 5. Urban Crime Control Diminish Effect Model

Source: Created by author.
The blue line represents little or no criminal activity. The yellow line represents the point which the level of criminal activity becomes a concern to some people. The red line represents the point at which the level of crime becomes a concern to everybody.

The brown line represents the civil police. The angle indicates a decrease in crime control effectiveness on one side, and a corresponding increase of criminal activity on the other. The green line represents the infusion of the military into the equation and reflects an instant and drastic decrease in criminal activity followed by a gradual increase which surpasses pre-military involvement.

The dashed brown line shows that if the military is removed there will be a gradual increase in the civil police crime control effectiveness and a consequent reduction in criminal activity.

Assessment of the Findings in Regards to the Stated Objectives of the Study

The primary objective of this research was to determine whether there is a genuine need for the Belize Defence Force to continue to provide manpower support to the Belize Police Department for the purposes of urban crime control. Based on the findings of this research the short answer is no. The following provides the reasons behind this answer:

The need for manpower support can only truly be as a result of two reasons; (1) There is a personnel shortage that result in the need for the additional manpower; or (2) the available manpower is inappropriately trained and as a result additional manpower is required in terms of knowledge to bridge the gap between what is available and what is required.
It is submitted, that regardless of what the reason for the Police Department initial requirement for additional manpower was; 20 years is far more than enough time to have resolved that issue. This finding alone provides sufficient grounds for a safe conclusion that there is no genuine need for the military to continue to provide manpower support to the Belize Police Department.

Nonetheless in the interest of analysis if reason one above was the cause, then the findings of the study as revealed in the literature of Crooks (2008) and confirmed by Luanne during the interview, shows that the manpower of the police is grossly underutilized. Furthermore Crooks pointed that the police to citizen ratio of 1 police to 132 citizens in Belize City is among one of the greatest in the world. Even at that crime has still escalated to “crisis proportion.” It is significant to note that the ratio mentioned for Belize City do not take into account the additional military manpower. However even with the additional manpower crime continues to escalate. A reasonable conclusion therefore would be that the military manpower support adds little or no value to crime control in Belize City. With this in view it is submitted that there is no genuine need for the military to continue to provide manpower support to the police.

On the other hand, if reason two above was the purpose of the initial requirement for additional manpower then it is submitted that the decision of obtaining that additional manpower from the military was an ill conceived one. The reason for this statement is the fact that the military has no investigative or evidence gathering knowledge or expertise in routine civil law enforcement. As the literature of Wass de Czege shows, the military can only perform the function of policing if given the appropriate training. The only usable knowledge the military can bring to bear is their expertise in civil control. Civil control is
fundamentally different from routine criminal law enforcement. In civil control civil liberties are suspended and therefore brutal force and ignorance is used to coercive disorderly conduct into order. It follows logic that the same approach ought not to be used during routine criminal law enforcement. As indicated by Wass de Czege, it is vital that the Politian understand the difference between policing and warring.

Furthermore the literature of Campbell and Campbell indicates that military involvement in policing will influence a cultural adjustment that leads the civil police agencies adopting a militaristic attitude approach to routine policing. As indicated above the militaristic approach is brutal force and ignorance with no consideration for proper investigation and evidence gathering. With this in view it is submitted that military involvement derails the elements of investigations and evidence collection which are very essential for crime control. On this ground, it would be reasonable safe to conclude that there is no genuine need for the military to continue to provide manpower support to the civil police.

The findings also suggest that the detriments of employing the military in routine urban crime control duties far outweigh the benefits. Apart from boosting the civil police with manpower the only next potential benefit that was identified in this study was the element of deterrence which is ordinarily inherent in military presence. As indicated in the results of the survey, there is a growing disregard for the military presence on the streets of Belize City. The same sentiment was expressed by the interviewees and is further manifested in the incident where the soldier was relieved of his weapon. Furthermore, the fact that crime continues to increase in quantity and severity despite the military presence, suggest that the element of deterrence have faded. If this interpretation
is correct then logic would support a conclusion that there is no genuine need for the military to continue to provide manpower to the police.

The result speaks to the current crime control strategy which appears to be centered on the removal of criminals from the streets of Belize. The findings suggest that while this is certainly necessary, it is by no means sufficient as this approach is only effective against those criminals who are caught and convicted. As the literature of Crooks (2008) reveals the conviction rate in Belize City is 1 in every 46 for murders. It would fall within reason to draw from this that the focus needs to be realigned to those elements of policing that would influence desirable conviction rate. It is offered that the primary deficiency in the current approach is the absence of skilled and professional investigators. As revealed in the literature review by Crooks (2008), there is a blame game between the Police and the Courts for the low conviction rate. To the credit of the prosecutors it should be brought to bear that they can only work with the evidence presented to them by the investigators. It follows therefore that if the evidence the police provides to the prosecutors are weighted with the need for eyewitnesses, notwithstanding the fact that the eyewitnesses often times fails to show up due to intimidation; then if the prosecutor is not a magician there is not much he can do to persuade the court that the accused is guilty as charged. The conclusion therefore, is that since the focus ought to be on the investigative and evidence collection element and the military have no expertise in that area; it follows reason that the military there is no genuine need for the military to continue to provide manpower support to the police.

It is also significant to note that with a low conviction rate the criminals will be more inclined to continue to commit crimes since they realized that the chances of being
convicted is slim. In reference to this, the literature review shows that “declines in arrests, prosecution and convictions for murders are associated with increases in murders” (Crooks 2008, 6). This state of affairs means that another element of deterrence that of being convicted and sentenced is being eroded by the protracted military presence which has influenced the adjustment of the traditional policing culture from an investigative one, to one of being judge, jury, and executioner.

As eluded to earlier, charges of brutality is commonplace. It is offered that the reason for this is that the few policemen who are working become frustrated of meeting the same set of criminals over and over again after having arrested, detained, and charged them, they are back on the streets having been found not guilty in the courts. Based on this it is fairly easy to understand why the police would be so inclined to administer their own form of justice when given the opportunity to do so. Again it leads right back to investigation and presentation of evidence, an area to which the military has no training, which means their presence derail rather than support routine policing. For this reason, it is submitted that there is no genuine need for the military to continue to provide manpower support to the police.

The final objective of the study was to make practical recommendations for the development of an effective and efficient crime control strategy for Belize. For obvious these recommendations will not be listed here.

**Implications for Practice**

The issue of crime and crime control should be near and dear to humanity as a whole in that it impacts our lives in some way or the other. Greater concern should however be emanating from the Caribbean which is deemed to be among the most violent
region of the world (Gayle 2010). Utmost concern, however, should be coming from the
government and people of Belize in response to the well documented and paralyzing
crime endemic in Belize City.

The findings of this study have far-reaching implications particularly on issues of
human rights, constitutional law, as well as crime control policy makers and
administrators in Belize. The study identified several links between the diminishing effect
of the current crime control strategy and the protracted military involvement.

Since a crime control measure can only be effective to the extent of the support it
receives from the people it seeks to protect; this study offers policy makers valuable
insight into the need for a strategy which involves the active participation of individual
citizens, private and non-governmental organizations, religious and professional
associations, and the private sector in determining how to make Belize City safer.

In particular, the finding of the study provides crime control administrators with a
good idea of the issues that are impeding high performance. This information should have
a direct effect on the way policy makers view the issue of crime control in terms of
military inputs.

The data suggest that even though some people believe that military presence on
the streets of Belize City is still an effective one, the preponderance of those who holds
that belief are way outside of the age group found to be involved in violent crimes in
Belize. The study also found that those military experts, who believed that the military
can execute both warring and policing function equally adequate, qualified this position
with the need for adequate training. It further found that these proponents were
completing the use of the military in a policing function outside of their country, and not against their own citizens.

Another important finding was the need for the government’s involvement by way of sound strategic directives and effective crime prevention policies that would foster the development of a strategic plan that embodies channels of communication and platforms of exchange aimed at active citizen participation through civic commitment, democratic participation, and civil courage.

**Recommendations for Further Research**

The goal of this study was to determine whether there is a genuine need for the Belize Defence Force to continue to provide manpower support to the Belize Police Department for the purposes of urban crime control. Data was collected with a view to answer three research questions. This information also facilitated the achievement of research objectives. The findings, though significant has some limitations. One limitation is that data was collected from a very small percentage of the residents of Belize City. This fact effectively eliminated persons outside of Belize City who might have a genuine interest in crime reduction in Belize City who may have very valuable ideas to contribute to that end. Another limitation of the study was the phenomenological approach taken which means that data collected and the conclusions derived there from is based on how things appears to be, and not necessarily how they actually are.

This study has found that the military will lose its crime control deterrent effect when engaged for prolong periods of time. This highlighted a further limitation in that it did not identify the point at which the military involvement becomes ineffective. Determining the point at which this occurs could be a viable subject for further research.
Another avenue of research could be a study designed to test the theory that was developed during this research.

Examination of the laws governing the employment of the military against its citizens would also add value to the current argument and therefore provides another area for further research. Another area for further research would be an investigation into factors of group dynamics such as collective efficacy, group potency, group performance, task interdependence, and interoperability issues which may have an impact on the success of a conjoined crime control unit.

Conclusions

The findings of this study expanded the work of previous researchers in the behavioral science area concerning military involvement in crime control. This investigation revealed that military involvement in routine criminal law enforcement activity has the equivalent effect of domination and that such an effect is not in line with the principles of a democracy. The study further found that the employment of the Belize Defence Force as criminal law enforcers is no longer an effective crime control measure. Although a sizable portion of the sample (37 percent) expressed belief that the employment of the military as criminal law enforcers is still effective, a further assessment indicated that those who had such an opinion are well outside the predominant age bracket of those found to be committing crimes in Belize City. The study also found that although military presence will have a positive effect upon criminal activity, such an effect will deteriorate in direct proportion with the duration of the military presence. Therefore, a positive effect, with time will transgress into no effect and then into negative effect.
The role convergence literature indicate that military involvement in criminal law enforcement influenced a cultural adjustment of the crime control landscape which resulted in criminal law enforcers adopting a more militaristic attitude and approach. As the literature of Campbell and Campbell suggested that “if certain situations demand that the police employ military type tactics and behaviors, these situations will also lead the police to adopt military type attitudes and orientations—attitudes and orientations completely unsuitable for dealing with citizens and likely to be unproductive in the long term” (Campbell and Campbell 2009, 344). This study found that such an approach which is centered on the use of force to bring about rapid results, leads to the neglect of essential elements of core policing such as investigation and evidence collection.

This finding extends the literature of Campbell and Campbell (2009) which indicated that the militaristic approach had substantial ramifications on several levels. One of those ramifications discovered by this study was a widening gap between the police and the community. It is submitted that the wedge causing this gap is the militaristic attitude and approach of the police to arrest, detain, and then question to find evidence of unlawful behavior. As a result of such an approach many innocent and law abiding citizens are being arrested, detained, and released after the questioning reveals no evidence of unlawful acts.

Apart from being a blatant violation of the citizen’s human rights to be treated as innocent until proven guilty, such a practice is also an affront to the dignity of the law abiding citizen. This fuels a second order rippling effect in that the family and friends of the law abiding citizen begins to disassociate with, and become reluctant to, cooperate with the police. It is further submitted that the only element of society to benefit from this
practice, are the criminals as it becomes more difficult for them to be caught without the community cooperation.

As alluded to above, another impact of the militaristic approach discovered by this study is the neglect for proper investigation and evidence collection. This resulted in a heavy reliance on eyewitness evidence. This sets the condition for a weak judicial system since as indicated earlier the militaristic approach has resulted in un-cooperating community. The impact of this is yet another benefit to the criminals as with time they come to realized that whether they are found guilty or not depended on the availability of eyewitness evidence. The second order effect of such state of affairs is that effectively, the criminals become the accused, judge, and jury at the same time as they are able to decide the faith of their case even without going to court; merely by arranging the unavailability of any potential eyewitness. This give rise to an increase in crime as those who do not succumb to intimidation and dare to provide incriminating evidence sooner or later succumb to some other means. This in turn gives rise to retaliation and therefore the cycle of violence is set in motion.

In sum, the study found that military involvement influences the civil police to adopt a militaristic approach, which is centered on the use of force to bring about rapid results and therefore neglects the traditional policing element of investigation and evidence gathering. This result in many innocent citizens being arrested, detained, and then released, with no regards for their human rights. The neglect of proper investigation and evidence gathering also give rise to a heavy reliance on eyewitness evidence. With a community that is already reluctant to cooperate, the threat of or use of violence to dissuade potential eyewitness, becomes extremely effective. Those who dare not to
succumb to the threat of violence will eventually succumb to actual violence which oftentimes results in retaliation.

It is hereby submitted that the purpose of the study which was to provide a logical reason as to why the military manpower support to the civil police for the purposes of urban crime control did not produce the long-term effect the government of Belize hoped to have attained from such a measure has been established. For instance the findings of the null hypotheses from the null hypotheses show that there will be an instant and markedly reduction is criminal activity when the military enters the criminal fighting arena. However this will influence an adjustment of the policing culture that neglects essential elements of crime control such as investigation and evidence gathering. The militaristic approach will also drive a wedge between the community and police who are now heavily reliant on eyewitness evidence. In the absence of eyewitness then results in a resurge in crime as the criminals realize that where there is no eyewitness there is no case. The second order effect is that apart from committing the initial crime there is now a need to commit a secondary one if eyewitnesses are present. It goes with saying that this results in an increase in overall crimes. The third order effect is that since criminals are committing crimes and getting away in the court, others are motivated to also commit crime; including ordinarily law abiding citizens who now believes that the justice system is not working for them and therefore they need to take matters into their own hands. With this new surge of crime despite the fact that the police are putting so much effort, to arrest and detain so many people, with so few conviction; frustration and demoralization steps in. When this is coupled with inadequate resources, low salaries, and unjust promotions and opportunities, the conditions for corruption is set. As a result the police
themselves become engaged in criminality which brings about an increase in crime, a subsequent increase in demoralization for those who are not yet corrupt, which means that as time progress the balance shift in favor of the corrupted.

In closing, the study concludes that the employment of the military as criminal law enforcers will eventually result in an increase in the quantity and severity of crimes as well as attrite the crime control competency of the police, and therefore result in a diminish crime control effect. With this in view, it would be reasonable safe to conclude that the data sustains the research hypothesis to the effect that there is a correlation between the increase in the quantity and severity of crimes in Belize City, and the protracted military manpower support to the civil police in that municipality.

If this conclusion is correct then it would also be correct to conclude that the answer to the research question as to whether there is a genuine need for the Belize Defence Force to continue to provide manpower support to the Belize Police Department for the purposes of urban crime control; is a resounding no. This finding concludes this chapter as well as the entire study.

**Recommendations**

1. Develop a national crime control strategy that incorporates all sectors of government into a unity of effort aimed at crime prevention that is planned and delivered in a systematic and integrated fashion;

2. In the interest of transparency transfer responsibility for the official crime statistics from the police to the Statistical Institute of Belize;

3. Organize the department into precincts in order to facilitate a means of objectively measuring their performance and effectiveness, and develop
implement, and enforce policies that will hold members accountable for their actions and/or inactions;

4. Establish a third force, and withdraw of the military from criminal law enforcement activities;

5. Foster a culture that is centered on the attitude and approach of preventing crimes rather than trying to solve them;

6. Refocus on core competency skills such as investigation and evidence gathering;

7. Establish a unit within the department with the function to assess, train and monitor the quality of policing service being offered to the public, and;

8. Develop and implement initiatives aimed at fostering community participation.
REFERENCE LIST


Hernandez, Prisco. 2010. Guidance provided as Associate Professor Graduate Degree Programs. Department of Graduate Studies. U.S Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth Kansas. 14 October 2010.


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