GIVEN THE ABSENCE OF ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE, ARE THERE CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINAL GUIDANCE AVAILABLE FROM VARYING SOURCES, WHICH ARE RELEVANT TO SHAPING THE CAPABILITIES OF THE JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE TO ACHIEVE ITS MISSION IN THE 21ST CENTURY?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

RADGH MASON, MAJ, JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE
B.S., University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, West Indies, 1998
M.S., University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, West Indies, 2003

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2010-02

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The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) is desirous of establishing written doctrine for the organization. This paper seeks to review the doctrine of the British, Chinese and US armed forces with a view to extracting and composing considerations for the JDF in its establishment of doctrine at the strategic level. Doctrine comprises strategic, operational and tactical guidance to the various levels of leadership within military organizations. This document focuses on the tenets of strategic level doctrine. The formulation of doctrine is based on historical lessons learned in combat, culture, interests (as stated generically in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of states), the constitution, environment, and all aspects of organizational development. Doctrine is characterized by a unique nature and its relevance is constantly threatened by a changing environment. It is acknowledged that despite the unique nature of doctrine to a country, there are considerations which are relevant and can be sufficiently adapted to serve the local conditions of the Jamaican environment. This will serve to provide a framework upon which strategic level doctrine can be established and institutionalized in the JDF. This is with a view to achieving the mandate of synchronizing all available resources in safeguarding the political and territorial sovereignty of the island nation.
Name of Candidate: Maj Radgh Neville Mason

Thesis Title: Given the Absence of Established Doctrine, Are, there Concepts and Doctrinal Guidance Available from Varying Sources which are Relevant to Shaping the Capabilities of the Jamaica Defence Force to Achieve its Mission in the 21st Century?

Approved by:

__________________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Kenneth C. Ferris, M.M.A.S.

__________________________________________, Member
Richard S. Faulkner, Ph.D.

__________________________________________, Member
Bernard F. Harris, Jr., M.S.

Accepted this 10th day of December 2010 by:

__________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

GIVEN THE ABSENCE OF ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE, ARE THERE CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINAL GUIDANCE AVAILABLE FROM VARYING SOURCES, WHICH ARE RELEVANT TO SHAPING THE CAPABILITIES OF THE JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE TO ACHIEVE ITS MISSION IN THE 21ST CENTURY? by Radgh Neville Mason, 125 pages.

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<td>BDD</td>
<td>British Defence Doctrine</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td>CADD</td>
<td>Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate</td>
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<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Staff</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Chinese Military Commission</td>
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<td>CTOG</td>
<td>Counter Terrorist Organization Group</td>
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<td>DB</td>
<td>Defence Board</td>
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<td>DCDS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Defence Staff</td>
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<td>DCS</td>
<td>Department of Correctional Services</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Commands</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>Jamaica Constabulary Force</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command</td>
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<td>JP</td>
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<td>Ministry of National Security</td>
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<td>ODPEM</td>
<td>Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management</td>
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<td>OE</td>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
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<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>SDR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Review</td>
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<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>US Southern Command</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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CHAPTER 1
JAMAICA IN CONTEXT

Introduction

Given the absence of established doctrine, are there concepts and doctrinal guidance available from varying sources, which are relevant to shaping the capabilities of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) to achieve its mission in the 21st Century? This thesis is in search of the best available doctrinal guidance available and applicable to the Jamaican environment.

Background or Context of the Problem/Problem Statement

The research question examines how to extract the relevant components of doctrine from that of the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom (U.K.), and China, in order to shape the considerations for the strategic doctrine of the JDF to meet the security mandates of the Jamaican people. We will examine the brief history of the country and the JDF. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of Jamaica, promulgated in 2006, will also be examined in its context as being the official representation and the governments’ perspective of the strategic environment of Jamaica. This will set the stage for the examination of the JDF and the doctrines of the U.S., U.K. and China in subsequent chapters.

The JDF was constituted on 31 July 1962 from the West India Regiment (WIR), a British colonial regiment just prior to the country gaining its independence on 6 August 1962. The organization dates back to 1795 when the first WIR was formed in the Windward Islands of the Eastern Caribbean (Jamaica Defence Force 2009). The nature of
the environment has changed markedly over the years. The post-independence period was characterized by a highly charged political climate during the 1970s. The primary cause of this climate related to tensions created by the perceived relationship between the government of the ruling People’s National Party (PNP) and Fidel Castro, communist leader of Cuba. The opposition party at the time was the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). The major political parties were at either ends of the political ideological spectrum of socialism/communism versus capitalist/democracy (The Gleaner Company of Jamaica n.d). The country was also faced with social tensions caused by poverty, criminality (drug dealers), inequality, injustice, rural migration, corruption and capital flight. The regional environment was also pervaded with significant incidents of political instability. This is evidenced by JDF interventions in Grenada, Haiti and Trinidad as part of a stabilization force (Jamaica Defence Force 2009). The JDF arguably provided a stabilizing presence and deserves commendation for its role in a deeply troubled environment. Notwithstanding, the continued economic challenges have fueled debates with respect to the development and investment in the JDF.

The organization (JDF) has depended largely on military assistance programs to provide training and equipment. The organization is therefore composed of officers and soldiers trained in the U.K., U.S., Canada, India and China. There has been no written doctrine at any level over the years and hence command is largely influenced by the origin of training of the officer in charge. The armed forces of the named countries have found great benefit in guiding their leadership through doctrinal development. The JDF is poised at a critical stage of its development and can also structure its growth and development by establishing its strategic level doctrine. The Defence Act and standing
orders at various levels primarily adopted from Britain though not packaged as doctrine has provided some degree of guidance towards development of the operational capabilities of the force.

The organization has also developed a number of policies relating to education and training which has served to provide guidance at all levels. In 2006 the Chief of Staff of the JDF was instrumental in facilitating a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) for the organization. The SDR process aimed at providing direction with respect to its mandate(s), structure, manning, equipment and capabilities. The process sought to identify the capability gaps which needed to be closed. The process was highly participative as it aimed to resolve the deficiencies identified. It is clearly acknowledged by all stakeholders that the development of doctrine was the next fundamental step required to address the security mandates of the island nation. The operational environment has changed with respect to social, economical, technological and other factors. The crux of this paper is that the absence of a written strategic level doctrine speaks to issues of unity of effort, unity of command and force structure development. Doctrine provides stability and a base point for the growth of military organizations. All stakeholders must be informed about the mandates and command relationships of the organization.

This thesis will provide the base and points to be considered for a draft doctrine for the JDF. The research will provide insights into the capability gaps and doctrine as one of the elements in resolving and reconciling these gaps. The hierarchy of command structure and the various levels of guidance from the ministerial level are issues which are in the forefront of the implementation of the review. This document will provide
some level of guidance as the research develops. There is a clear hierarchical planning and ordering of business that takes place within leading military organizations. In the U.S. for example, guidance is provided at the strategic and operational levels by the NSS, National Defense Strategy (NDS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and National Military Strategy (NMS). The Jamaican experience is limited in fully articulating this structure. The evidence of this inexperience is that the Jamaican NSS was first established in 2006. To achieve the objectives defined in these documents, a capability analysis then takes place leading to the description of a capability gap. The resolution of the capability gap must be done by reviewing compliance with doctrine or expand doctrine. Doctrine provides the role of stabilizing the entity and aids its adjustment to new environmental changes. Doctrine describes the “fight” with existing resources; it is this missing link that is all important in the development of the entity.

Jamaica must seek out an existence in a competitive internal, regional and global environment. The government is mandated to provide for its citizens a high standard of living and a safe environment. This is necessary to facilitate productive activity in an environment filled with actors fighting to meet conflicting agendas. Globalization and technology are but two factors which have greatly influenced the “field of play.” The survivability of the Jamaican state is dependent on the efficiency of the leadership to effectively analyze the environment, forge a strategy, exploit opportunities and establish a competitive advantage. It may be argued that the state level represents a macro view of the environment. A micro level analogy and perspective can be characterized by businesses competing across varying industries and transcending borders to secure a
niche market. States must function similarly and leverage global and regional relationships in order to survive.

There are other actors in the form of regional bodies such as the United Nations, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund which effectively perform the role of referees, mediators and safety nets for failed states. Non-state actors display tremendous influence by transcending borders and different cultures in pursuit of meeting varying ideologies. They have dominated world attention since the tragic attacks in the U.S., labeled worldwide as “9/11.” Jamaica is a small state of only 2.825 million residents with a wider Diaspora comprising of approximately one million (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010). The size of the state is immaterial as expectations of economic prosperity and justice are universal needs of a people. There are issues of ideology and nationalism which are factors to be considered. The process by which states define its competitive advantage and pursue programs and policies to close gaps identified are universal in nature. At the strategic level the focus is to identify and concentrate national power to meet national goals. It is a joint and collaborative effort aimed at maximizing all the available resources to a state.

The possible variables include diplomatic, informational, military and economic considerations. Diplomatic leverage speaks to the political influence and status of the country. This is often influenced by the economic standing and political ideology of the state. Informational refers to that intangible resource with the most tangible impact. The management of information is especially powerful to shape the climate and influence the outcome on any disputed interest between states and non actors in the strategic environment. Notwithstanding the absence of any central control on the wide variety of
media resources, governments must use information and communication techniques to achieve and defend their national interests. How this is done will largely depend on the political system in a country. Military power refers to the capability of a force to defend diplomatic pursuits. Economic power manipulates productive capacity, distribution and consumption of resources.

The Jamaica Defence Force Operating Environment

Jamaica is an island state comprising an area of 10,991 square kilometers. The land area is 4,244 square miles, 146 miles long and 51 miles wide. The island of Jamaica is located in the Caribbean Sea. It is approximately, 145 kilometers (90 miles) south of Cuba. Its coastline extends for 1,022 kilometers (634 miles). Jamaica practices a constitutional parliamentary democracy, having been a former colony of the British Empire. Services account for 70 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The country continues to derive most of its foreign exchange from tourism, remittances, and bauxite/alumina. The economy is characterized by: high interest rates, sliding exchange rates, a sizable merchandise trade deficit, unemployment (14.5 percent in 2009), and growing internal debt. The ratio of debt to GDP (11.92 US$ Billion in 2009) is 131.7 percent as at 2009, ranking 11th in Latin America (2008). The national external debt was recorded at US$ 11.55 billion at the end of 2009. The country now ranks 5th highest debt to GDP ratio in the world. The island is prone to natural disasters particularly hurricanes and earthquakes. The people are culturally diverse comprising, 91.2 percent Black, 6.2 percent mixed, 1.3 percent East Indian, and 2 percent Chinese and white (Central Intelligency Agency 2010).
Despite its economic standing, the island maintains a key leadership role in the region. Interventions in neighboring troubled states have demonstrated its regional security responsibilities and perspectives. The island is considered a major transnational point for the drug trade destined for the U.S. The power of drug gangs perpetuating criminal activity, corruption of public officials, and a weak civil support infrastructure are among the issues which features highly on the political agenda. The islands’ location in the Caribbean exposes the territorial space to hurricane conditions particularly during the established hurricane season which extends from June to November each year. The island has suffered historically from hurricane damage which has served to retard its economic and infrastructural growth over the years.

The JDF falls under the charge of the Ministry of National Security for its administration and budgeting. The Prime Minister (PM) assumes charge as the Minister of Defence or Commander in Chief. There is no separate Ministry of Defence coordinating defense matters. The PM heads the Defence Board (DB) comprising the minister of national security and the Chief of Defence Staff (Government of Jamaica 2006). The DB deals with administrative functions of commission boards and promotions (The Defence Act 1962).

The role of the JDF has been characterized by internal security operations in support of the police (anti-narcotics, civil disturbance/disobedience), disaster relief, anti-terrorism, ceremonial duties, search and rescue, community development projects and regional deployments in support of Caribbean states often under the umbrella of the United Nations (U.N.).
The JDF is a brigade sized organization with a projected strength of approximately 6,500 personnel (regular and reserve). The entity is comprised of the traditional Army (Infantry), Air, Coast Guard and Support (Engineers, Intelligence, Medical and Logistics) groupings. There are two regular and one reserve infantry battalions organized as per the traditional British eight-man sections and 30-man platoons. The supporting units are comprised of intelligence, engineers, ordnance, combat support and logistics elements. The reserve force mirrors the regular units of the infantry, air wing and coast guard.

The Defence Act 1962 governs the fundamental, investigative, disciplinary, terms of service and other administrative procedures and policies. This provides a very broad framework of the components to be put together in the formulation of doctrine. The most pertinent secondary question pertains to the role of doctrine. This consideration will set up the context and direct us to extract the relevant guidelines for the formulation of JDF strategic level doctrine. The strategic direction of the government is reflected in the NSS of the country. This national planning document represents the political directorates’ statement of its analysis of the environment, course of action, and national strategic objectives. The doctrine of the JDF must note the capabilities and extract the organizational relationships required to achieve the set goals and mission. The NSS sets outs the end state in broad terms relevant to the respective national agencies charged with its execution. The JDF strategic doctrine formulates the ways and means guidelines for the defense agencies, leadership and stakeholders.
National Security Strategy and Policy of Jamaica

The Government in 2006 embarked on an undertaking to formulate a national security strategy for the island. The institutionalization of a review and updating process for this national planning document has not yet been implemented in Jamaican law. This 2006 NSS therefore represents the most up to date statement by the Government of its view of the environment (strategic and operational) and objectives to be achieved. This is relevant in the pursuit of JDF doctrine since it positions the security mandates of the country. It is this mandate that the doctrine of the JDF must satisfy. The command relationships, capabilities and modus operandi must be reflected in the doctrinal guidance to all stakeholders. The NSS of Jamaica was confirmed in 2006. The mandate of the document was to define the national interests and the security objectives to be achieved in pursuit of this strategy (Government of Jamaica 2006, iii-vii). The NSS represents a statement by the political directorate as to what the interests and threats are composed of and the tasks the JDF are expected to undertake. The document outlines the end state and the policy objectives of the government.

Strategic Environment

The island is categorized as a developing state with the attendant challenges of competing in a global environment. The Jamaican NSS list the national interests as follows:

1. Traditional partners include U.S., U.K., and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). These relationships are important to facilitate economic development and security cooperation efforts.
2. The air and sea ports are critical to support trade. These facilities are the primary mediums used for the perpetuation of the illicit drug trade.

3. Regional security support for the CARICOM countries.


5. External economic threats.

6. Jamaica, like other nations, has a role in participating in global war on terrorism.

7. Refugees and illegal immigrants from Haiti.

8. Transnational narcotics trade.


10. Environmental hazards and disasters (natural and manmade).

11. Civil disturbance and disobedience.

12. Disruption of essential services and critical infrastructure.

13. Traditional military threats.

14. Unsustainable exploitation and loss of natural resources.

15. High unemployment and poverty.

Strategic level doctrine must therefore define military/defense relationships with our defined partners (U.S., U.K., and CARICOM). The reality is that no state will have all the resources to meet its security objectives. The JDF must be familiar with the Geographic Command structure of the U.S., in particular SOUTHCOM. The JDF must also seek to strengthen its role and establish a planning and contingency framework with
CARICOM. Command relationships, when deployed within the U.N., must also be defined within our doctrine under the umbrella heading of multi-national forces. It is most likely that the JDF will play a supporting role in multinational deployments. The caveat must refer to the supreme authority of the commander in chief in deciding not only the stage of involvement but also the extent to which troops are involved in the fight for external deployments. Parallel command structures may be desirable as they afford the protection of sovereign objectives but at the same time lends itself to fulfilling the likely mandates of a coalition grouping. The political objectives are key determinants of this issue and hence an open-ended commitment to the mission is most desirable. The security imperative of the ports speaks to issues of the contingency planning, mobility and coordination mechanisms with other government agencies. These agencies include the police, immigration, and the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM). The drug trade, terrorism and organized crime require a global intelligence network and cooperation. Intelligence therefore will be a key element of doctrine.

**Strategic Security Goals**

The following are the strategic goals identified in the NSS (Government of Jamaica 2006, 29):

1. To reduce violent crime and dismantle organized criminal networks.
2. To strengthen the justice system and promote respect for the rule of law.
3. To protect Jamaica from terrorism.
4. To protect and control Jamaica’s sovereign territory.
5. To strengthen the integrity of institutions of democratic government.
6. To increase Jamaica’s contribution to regional and international security.

7. To provide the environment for a stable economy and an effective delivery of social services.

8. To protect Jamaica’s natural resources and reduce the risks of disasters.

The strategic security goals have doctrinal implications pertaining to interagency cooperation and coordination. Doctrinal elements must include defining command relationships, contingency planning frameworks and mobility. National power will be enabled by this pooling of resources and a reaction capability to cover the territorial space. All stakeholders must be alerted of the necessity to coordinate resources. Unity of command and unity of effort will be critical especially in light of the scarcity of resources. Parallel command relationships may be ideal to preserve the integrity of each entity involved in the fight. This is a practical short to medium term approach given the absence of legislative support that would clearly identify lead agencies in countering the myriad of threats. In the long term the government is afforded the time and space to implement permanent coordinating mechanisms to mandate all agencies to work together. This will achieve the unity of command and effort to pursue defense mandates.

Capabilities

The following capabilities were defined by the Jamaican NSS:

1. Control entry and exit through ports of entry and coastline/land of Jamaica.

2. Monitor, regulate and control the use of Jamaica’s airspace, coastal waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

3. Ensure an effective justice system.

4. Prevent crime (including armed groups and insurgents).
5. Counter corruption to ensure public ownership and confidence in the justice system.

6. Regulate and control arms.


8. Gather, assess and use effective intelligence (major cross-cutting priority).

9. Limit vulnerability and respond effectively to disasters and unsustainable degradation of resources.

10. Maintain a stable and healthy economy.

11. Address social and economic causal factors of alienation and crime.

12. Develop measures for a public education campaign (important overall cross-cutting issue).

13. Ensure adequate health care and education.

14. Influence regional and international policies and activities (important cross-cutting priority).

15. Deter, counter or defeat ‘traditional military threats’.


Special Security Initiatives

The NSS outlined special security initiatives which will have doctrinal implications for strategic doctrine development. The initiatives include the formation of a National Security Council (NSC), National Intelligence Consultative Group (NICG), and National Strategic Intelligence Agency (NSIA). The purpose of these agencies is cited as strengthening the intelligence apparatus of the country. The concept being copied pertains
to the establishment of a national intelligence hierarchy. This framework exists in many countries as a central coordinating point for the “islands of intelligence databases” that tends to be formed in the police, armed forces, immigration and correctional services. The NSS identifies the need to coordinate these sources and achieve unity of effort and command. These proposals have not been sufficiently developed to be considered in the development of JDF doctrine. There will no doubt be an established command relationship among the agencies but this cannot be sufficiently addressed in this thesis.

The NSC is the agency of note that will impact on our considerations. The NSC performs a critical role in the U.S. defense system and hence there is an established track record that can be instructive for our strategic view. There is a clear relationship and mapping of the threats, goals and capabilities. The responsibility for carrying out the security mandate rests with the Ministry of National Security (MNS). The agencies falling under the umbrella of the MNS include Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), JDF, Immigration Department, and the Customs and the Forensic Investigations Department (FID). There is no separate and autonomous Ministry of Government which is in charge of Defense. The JDF rightly falls under the purview of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) given that the PM is the Commander in Chief. The PM therefore has executive control over the JDF. The JDF however falls under the purview of the MNS for administrative matters.

The budget of the JDF forms a part of the budget of the MNS. The Minister of National Security takes decisions on behalf of the JDF and also makes budgetary representation. This separation of executive and budgetary control is worthy of note at this juncture. This relationship between the JDF, MNS, and OPM may have been so
constructed to facilitate the ease of management. The relationship inherently has a negative effect on the planning and resourcing of the JDF. The absence of a dedicated ministry of defense creates an institutionalized split in focus on defense matters. This is exacerbated by the scarcity of resources which results in the insufficient funding of the JDF. The PM’s far reaching responsibilities of government causes an institutional limitation on the executive management of the JDF. The Chief of Defence Staff and the Minister of National Security is therefore charged with making representation for budgetary allocations. Also there are instances where the Minister of National Security makes representation on defense matters.

Both the MNS and the Defence Board function in a supporting role to the PM on Defense matters. The NSS clearly recognizes this issue and as such the formulation of a National Security Council (NSC) has been recommended. The composition roles and job description of the representative will form a significant component of doctrine for the JDF. This is in keeping with the established model of the U.S. mentioned earlier. There are two sequels available at this juncture. The first is to pursue recommendations which will see the recommended job descriptions, roles and fit of the NSC. On the other hand the doctrine can be recommended in the absence of this entity. The emphasis of this view will be to explore the possibility of the current structure, namely the defense board to fill the roles which would have otherwise been filled by the NSC. This will be further discussed in the analysis chapters following the literary review. The NSS, though dated 2006, still demonstrates relevance and sufficiently lays doctrinal guidelines for the formulation of JDF strategic level doctrine.
Subordinate Questions and Areas of Research

Subordinate questions include:

1. What is the current doctrine of the JDF?
2. What doctrinal guidance is provided by the SDR, 2006?
3. What is the proposed doctrine if none exists in writing?
4. If there is no NMS, what are the objectives to be met by the JDF?
5. In the absence of a NMS, Is there any other government related documents which might outline the defense related objectives?
6. Who are the actors and what are the respective agendas?
7. What are the current and future threats to sovereignty?
8. What is the capability gap?
9. What are the force development implications to resolve the capability gaps?

Assumptions

The review of the doctrine of other states assumes that the guidance therein is based upon the lessons learnt from their own and other conflicts. The endeavor seeks to benefit from the corporate knowledge of these entities. This introduces the risk of perpetuating faulty doctrine or outdated doctrine. The risk is also that the elements of doctrine may not be applicable to the Jamaican environment. These risks must be mitigated by an in depth analysis of the Jamaican environment and deriving a mechanism of measuring the effectiveness of the doctrine reviewed.
Definitions

Doctrine defines the ends, ways and means of a military organization. It is base level guidance aimed at describing the internal and external relationships among the stakeholders of the armed forces.

Scope

This thesis is bounded to the considerations of military doctrine at the strategic level. Strategic level doctrine is defined by the command relationship between the JDF, the political directorate and internal and external stakeholders. This relationship is focused on meeting defined political objectives and guides operations, training and administration.

Limitations

The key guidance to the formulation of doctrine (in the U.S. armed forces) traditionally derives from the NSS, NDS, NMS, and current doctrine. No NMS currently exists in Jamaica and hence a substitute document, the SDR, will be examined. The annual budget debate exercise and manifesto of the ruling political party will provide some guidance. Secondly, notwithstanding the absence of current doctrine, the Defence Act 1962, force standing orders, unit orders, and force policies will provide sufficient guidance. Most of the documents required will be available online via the organizations website/ internet site: www.jdf.mil.org. Thirdly, the views of senior staff officers and line commanders though desirable will not detract from the final product of presenting a landscape of considerations at the strategic level. Interim authority for the topic has already been discussed at the headquarters level. It is also desirable to consult with the
doctrinal tenets of other countries. The U.S. doctrine is available as well as that of the U.K. military online. The author’s recent exposure to the Chinese senior command college has also contributed to a broader view in their military thinking and as such this provides useful insights. It is a blend of the best principles rigorously measured against the local environment and culture of the organization that will be included in the final document.

**Delimitations**

The doctrine reviewed is limited to the U.S., U.K. and Chinese armed forces. The limitation is based on the following reasons:

1. Jamaica is a former colony of the British crown and the JDF is the military element that derived from this relationship. There is therefore commonality of military ethos between the JDF and the British armed forces. The culture, training and procedures are sufficiently similar and may serve to enable a smooth transition and implementation.

2. The JDF leadership at all levels is exposed to the doctrine of the U.S., U.K. and China.

3. The writer has received substantial training in the three countries and hence is sufficiently exposed to the doctrine to analyze the strengths and weaknesses. The relevance and principles which can be adapted to the local environment can also be extracted seamlessly.

4. The JDF has deployed previously under the umbrella of the U.N., working primarily with the U.S. and U.K. This relationship recognizes the relevance of considering the tenets of the doctrine of each of the countries.
The delimitation is relevant and also meets the resource constraints available for the completion of this document. The second major issue concerns the fact that the level of the doctrinal hierarchy being focused on is at the strategic level. Doctrine at the strategic level focuses on the command and control (C2) structure, the internal relationships and external relationships with other stakeholders.

Significance of the Study

The JDF is an institution and functions as an integral stabilizing force in the fabric of the Jamaican society. The evolution and relevance of the force has been debated for many years since independence. The SDR has provided a basis by which the future of the organization can be shaped. The development of doctrine is critical in further stabilizing the modus operandi of the entity. Strategic level doctrine defines command relationships, guidance for organizing deployments, command and control, and principles pertaining to the concentration of military and external resources. This is the purpose of this document and it will trigger the debate to promulgate the strategic level doctrine of the JDF. Doctrine represents that base of reference in the sphere of operational command and the mechanism to institutionalize this guidance at all levels is critical in moving forward.
CHAPTER 2
DEFINING DOCTRINE AND THE JDF CURRENT STATE

Introduction

Sound doctrine gave the Americans a significant advantage. Because the army did not have to devise and learn a whole new approach to battle, it was able to expend time and resources fixing internal shortcomings and problems. Combat formations concentrated on improving their battlefield performance rather than significantly revising their broad approach to operations.

—Turek

The JDF is the main actor to be assessed in this problem as we seek to sift through the doctrinal guidance existing in other countries. We must clearly establish the position of the JDF with respect to its roles, command relationships, core values, education and training. The raw unwritten doctrinal elements must be sought and formatted to represent its current doctrine. Establishing where we are will be an enabler in identifying where we want to go doctrinally. The doctrine of other countries will provoke thought, explore new ideas and expose gaps to be filled in a recommended doctrine. The risk to be accepted in this approach pertains to the notion that doctrine from a totally different environment will be relevant and workable in the Jamaican environment. This risk can only be mitigated by recognizing the potential biases involved in the selection of doctrinal elements for transplanting and adapting to the Jamaican environment.

We will examine the development of doctrine, and elements of doctrine. The SDR for the JDF will also be reviewed as a major source document acknowledged by the political and military leadership. The document builds on the findings and mandates of the NSS in order to identify the capability gaps of the organization. These gaps will be critical in the formulation of doctrine for the JDF since the reality is that you must fight
with what you have. The doctrine must, however, seek to optimize the use of current resources and craft the capacity to innovate and adapt. We must identify core values, education, and training guidance which will challenge the leadership at all levels to establish the relationships necessary to maximize national power.

Many nations have gone the route of developing the doctrine for their respective military organizations. This doctrine may be unwritten and steeped in tradition and not necessarily captured in a standard format. This doctrine may or may not be institutionalized and hence its relevance is questionable. The study of history has played a great role in the development of doctrine as nations seek to avoid the mistakes of the past by analyzing historic conflicts that shaped the rules of the fight for the armed forces. It is logical to deduce that the learning curve can be shortened by going directly to the doctrine of other military forces. This based on the premise that they would have gone through this process and done it with greater resources over a considerable period of time. There are undoubtedly universal aspects of warfare and military doctrine that must be considered as foundation tenets. The principles of war for example are captured by the British to include maintenance of the aim, momentum, offensive action, flexibility, fire and maneuver, administration, concentration of force, concealment, economy of effort, security, and surprise (Ministry of Defence 2001). The U.S. Army has named its principles of war to include objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 2007, I-3). The JDF principles of war will not be greatly different and will be largely influenced by internally focused activities working with law enforcement agencies. The principles will also be greatly influenced by a coalition heavy focus for external
deployments. This is a reality given the great scarcity of logistics and combat service support resources. The point being made is that within the profession of arms there will be some universally accepted paths to victory and so the research is not aimed at trying to create a new paradigm. The reading of the literature available is aimed at getting the context and the environment pertinent to Jamaica to fit with the tried and tested methodologies which already exist. The research is aimed at being able to deduce a myriad of permutations of principles and structures to shape the right configuration for the JDF. Doctrine is about capturing the theme, posture and key elements of the fight.

The most critical discussion to be had is that pertaining to the conceptual framework of doctrine. It is only after this discussion that the relevance of the topic and its contribution to the military professional and in particular the Jamaican context can be truly appreciated. The military profession is practiced around the art and science of warfare. Warfare is indeed an art with scientific elements relating to the employment of equipment. Doctrine serves to be an authoritative guide to the practitioners in the establishment of a framework and working the component parts of that framework. The importance of commander initiative, though recognized, must be guided. It is debatable as to what extent one should be held accountable for not applying the tenets of the established doctrine. The question of centralized planning and decentralized execution is a paramount virtue of military command. One could argue and formulate an entire new research on the extent to which doctrinal pursuits limit the achievement of this command paradigm. This paper does not serve to enter into this discussion but seeks to take full advantage of the positives associated with the establishment and application of doctrine.
The constitution of a country establishes its goals in protecting the interests of a nation and its citizens. It is a broad framework with many moving parts. It is a reference point for all other laws, procedures and practice. It is stable in nature and its character changes when the environment points to significant change. Doctrine can be viewed accordingly as the military constitution. The framework is broad, and it only changes when there is significant environmental change. A military entity which exists without doctrine is akin to a boat without a compass.

The lessons learned from two world wars, countless other conflicts across a myriad of terrain types and operational environments served to develop the tenets of the military profession in the U.S. and other states. One of those tenets includes the formulation of doctrine and this has been ingrained in all aspects of military life and protecting the national interests of states across the world.

It is possible for doctrine to exist in substance and practice but not necessarily written in a document. The elements might exist as islands of information or scattered throughout the various, laws, rules and regulations of the entity. The utility of the written word is just as significant as the utility of the actions and organizational culture that defines doctrine. The Jamaican problem set is reflective of the latter instance of its doctrinal state.

Doctrine is recognizable as a term unique to the military profession. The conceptual framework and literature is therefore limited. The nature of doctrine speaks to national security issues of countries and this leads to a process/product which is specific to countries. These are fundamental considerations as we go forward with this discussion about doctrine and the first stop is at the definition.
Secondary Questions

The following secondary questions are aimed at exploring the theory of doctrine in order to guide a similar path for the development of JDF doctrine.

1. What is doctrine and its purpose?
2. What are the pertinent characteristics that give the concept relevance, durability and adaptability to varying environments?
3. What is the hierarchy of doctrine as it affects its fit to the strategic, operational and tactical levels?
4. What are the elements that contribute to the war-fighting functions?
5. What are the inputs, processes and outputs of doctrinal development?
6. How will doctrine serve to contribute to the solution of the problem set?
7. What are the environmental factors which necessitate change?
8. What are the organizational mechanisms which safeguards the relevance and legitimacy?

The primary source for the answers to these questions was sought from the Combined Arms Doctrine Development Directorate (CADD), located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This is in respect to the framework for the formulation of doctrine in the U.S. military. The doctrine of the U.S. Armed Forces was viewed as a living representation of the output of the process. These documents will ultimately contribute to the acknowledgement of the required resources/inputs, the consultative capacity and the scope of the outputs particularly as it relates to the research process. The discussion will therefore be undertaken under the headings; Definition, Functions of doctrine, Inputs, Environmental implications, Hierarchy of doctrine development, Generic process to
facilitate its development, Institutionalization (Organizational mechanism) of the process, and Relevance.

Definition

Doctrine is defined as fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application (Turek 2010). General George W Casey’s Jr. (Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army) view on doctrine is listed as follows: “We must emphasize doctrine as the driver for change. You can’t cement change in the organization until you adapt the institutions. That change begins with doctrine” (Turek 2010).

“Doctrine describes the way forces are intended to work in pursuit of a larger idea. Doctrine influences a force’s organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities. An image of conflict is implicit in a military’s doctrine. If we get that image wrong, the result can be disastrous” (Turek 2010). Authoritative guidance is the term which best defines doctrine. The generic end state of doctrine is to achieve unity and concentration of effort and unity and concentration of force.

Functions of Doctrine

The examination of the functions of doctrine answers the most critical question in this thesis. This question deals with the utility of doctrinal development to the JDF. Doctrine allows the organization to learn from the experience of others. It facilitates the rapid dissemination of clearly understood orders and clear communication with minimum ambiguity. Doctrine facilitates the collaborative synchronization by subordinates operating off a clearly stated commanders’ intent. This achieves a unity of effort via
institutionalized methods of communication. It promotes and facilitates behavior consistent with national culture, values, nature of warfare, capabilities and limitation of human nature. The coming together of members of the population from different backgrounds is enabled by common guidelines at the strategic, operational and tactical level. This ultimately achieves rapid teaming of the human resource. These enabling functionalities of doctrine are formulated and undertaken by the CADD (Turek 2010).

These are functionalities clearly desirable for the JDF. The organization is poised at this stage of its development and desires to promulgate common guidelines to achieve optimal effectiveness at all levels. These benefits must be communicated to the leadership at all levels and stakeholders which impact on its operational endeavors.

**Inputs**

The inputs to the process of doctrine development for the U.S. take into account all the unique factors that affect the armed forces and the population as a whole. The national considerations are represented by the strategic objectives contained in the NSS, NDS, and NMS. The culture and value system of the country and military organization drives the formulation of the ethos and fighting spirit. The experiences in conflicts provided the learning experiences that contributed to changes in organization structure and strategic thinking. The legal framework of the country and in particular the Constitution forms the fundamental basis of the development of the armed forces and its values. History, political science and sociology combine to define the people and the affinity to the great freedoms promised by the American dream. Military theory has contributed greatly to the formation of doctrine in the U.S. and other armed forces. It can be argued that the U.S. developed its methodology for warfare from the lessons learned in
various campaigns across the world. The great military thinkers such as Carl von Clausewitz (Prussian military thinker), Sun Tzu (Chinese strategist), Antoine Henri Jomini (French strategist), British military historian Major General John Frederick Charles Fuller and many others have contributed to the principles of war, innovation, combined arms theory and the general development of the profession of arms. The past and current Army, joint and multinational doctrine also impacts as a starting point for the needs analysis requirement for doctrinal development. These inputs are being treated as generic notwithstanding that the elements are defined by the U.S. Armed Forces.

The JDF is currently guided by the Jamaican NSS and NSP. There is an absence of an NMS. The objective of the SDR is an adequate substitute for a NMS. The history, culture and value system heavily influenced by the British is based on the former colonial status. There is no formally established body of military thought which belongs to the JDF. The operational issues are often dominated by administrative and resource fights. The absence of a framework or institutionalization of doctrine is the basis of this thesis. The laws worthy of consideration include the Defence Act and laws relating to the declaration of a state of emergency. The lack of these inputs will require that a body of assumptions be derived. Specified and implied objectives will also be important to formulate JDF doctrine.

Environmental Implications

The dynamic nature of doctrine is demonstrated by the institutionalized response to changes of elements of the environment. Warfare combines human resources with equipment technology to defeat identified adversaries in a defined battle space. Technology is one element of the environment that changes rapidly over time. This
element often determines the art of the possible. The ultimate aim of closing with and destroying the enemy can be achieved by a myriad of weapons technologies. Lessons learned from current operations have proven to be vital in the review of doctrine. Agile thinking adversaries with a fractious command structure and fighting with irregular methods have evoked new thinking in the U.S. and British armed forces.

Organizational design changes have also dictated different doctrinal approaches. The irregular fight has forced the U.S. to push down the fight to command units at the brigade level. The division level fight is questionable as a winning option in the fight against global terrorism. Army joint and multinational doctrinal changes have also become more relevant given the fight for legitimacy through the establishment of coalition forces.

The U.S. NSS recognizes the fact that the U.S. cannot seek to fight alone but must embrace the participation of military talent from its allies. The evolving international environment is characterized by the globalized sharing of technologies which are available to potential adversaries. This has impacted the balance of power somewhat and ultimately doctrinal development. Validated and approved concepts serve to shorten the learning curve of developing a way of war. Funding serves the role of controlling the scope of development. It dictates size, mix, types and the amount of equipment available to the armed forces (Turek 2010).

The SDR explored the environmental factors pertinent to the Jamaican environment. It is within the scope of this paper that these factors will be analyzed for its doctrinal implications. The cross border activities of terrorist organizations influenced the formulation of a new role for the JDF in the anti-terrorist fight. The tourist industry is
critical for the economic survivability of the island since it is a leading foreign exchange
earner. The threat of a single IED could have a devastating impact. This environment
therefore impacts the range of operations. The JDF is integrally involved in the fight
against the drug/gun trade and organized violence. Civil disobedience, crowd control and
a criminal database owned by the intelligence unit are aspects of the environment that
will influence doctrinal considerations and application.

Hierarchy of Doctrine Development

Doctrine exists at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Strategic level
d Doctrine defines the relationship of the military unit (land, sea, undersea, air, information)
to the government and all other entities/stakeholders pertinent to the safeguarding of the
security interests of the state.

This can be categorized as the military unit’s modus and relationship internally,
and externally and globally. This can be represented as a nested structure as follows:

1. Government (NSS, NDS, MNS)
   a. Armed Forces (strategic level)
      (1) Internally (operational level, joint doctrine)
         (a) Land/Army (combined and joint)
         (b) Sea, undersea (combined and joint)
         (c) Air (combined and joint)
      (2) Externally (operational level)
         (a) Agencies within the Defence Department
         (b) Other agencies within the wider government (GA’s)
(c) Other agencies outside of the government but within sovereign space of the state (NGO’s)

(3) Globally (operational level)

(a) Military units of other states (multinational sphere)

(b) International agencies (IA’s)

Strategic level doctrine names the entities, responsibilities, job descriptions and modus of the respective bodies. There are fundamental internal and external relationships that must be formally forged and or defined within the operational scope of the armed forces. Internal relationships are required between the armed forces and the Commander in Chief (C2 structure), also within its own groupings and across the boundaries of the different arms (Army, Air, Navy). External relationships are required between the armed forces and other agencies of the state, multinational forces and international bodies such as the UN or NATO. Joint Publication, JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, for example, represents the output of strategic level doctrine for the United States.

Operational level doctrine is confined to the guidance pertaining to the fight of the internal elements. This provides guidance within the realm of ends, ways and means construct. At this level the environment is narrowed to the application within the context of the spectrum of conflict and full spectrum operations. The spectrum of conflict ranges from stable peace, unstable peace, insurgency and general war.

The JDF spectrum of conflict though not envisioning an insurgency or general war must be careful in avoiding any restriction that impinges on the reason for being of a an armed force. This is akin to the current debate that suggests a reduction of investment in conventional methods. Soldiers are to be prepared to close with and destroy the enemy.
and as such the JDF spectrum of conflict should be no different. The Jamaican environment is not suited for the declaration of a spectrum of conflict. More utility will be served by defining the range of operations. This will give more focus to the ethos and principles that will set up the organization for success. Operational level doctrine guides the fight within each of the spheres of conflict. It also guides the fight within the many permutations of offensive, defensive, stability and civil support. Each of these environments and operational characteristics is treated as being unique. Doctrine at this level comprises of many branches and increases the depth of doctrinal thinking. The ultimate aim of doctrine in this regard again is to achieve the optimal and synchronized employment of all pertinent resources within the specified environment to achieve unity of command and unity of effort. Joint Publications 3-0, *Joint Operations*; JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, Non Governmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I*; JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*; JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*; and JP 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning* represent outputs for operational level doctrine.

Tactical level doctrine guides the, ends, ways and means of the fight within the immediate battle space. This requires specific service related guidance and defined within Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps doctrine. This will not be applicable in this thesis but will certainly take on some attention in the future.

The scope of doctrine is very comprehensive and involves tremendous study and consultation. This research will focus on the strategic level of doctrine. The scoping at this level is conducive to the resources available to make the application to the Jamaican context, its history and operational environment.
Generic Process to Facilitate the Development of Doctrine

The purpose of analyzing the process of doctrine development is to twofold. First, it will provide a guide for the analysis of the doctrine of the named countries. Second, it will serve to identify the elements of this process, as the JDF will need to consider these elements in the ultimate aim of institutionalizing the process of doctrine development. The development process is by nature consultative, time consuming, and robust. The U.S. Army utilizes a needs-based approach in the writing and updating of doctrine. The process commences by the identification of a need for doctrinal development or change. Initial research is conducted to understand the environmental elements. This is followed by a program directive which essentially provides guidance to the pursuit of the research. Research and writing follow a common methodology of reviewing pertinent literature and developing criteria for the doctrinal end state. The research facilitates an author’s draft to be put forward for a wide review by the stakeholders. This internal review enables the formulation of an initial draft and an Army wide review by selected agencies. The results of the review are captured in a final draft that is also reviewed and approved by a designated group. This intense process produces the new doctrine to fill the doctrinal gap exposed in the needs analysis. These steps are captured in a proven process established by CADD (Turek 2010).

There are essentially three concepts and associated procedures employed by CADD that will inform this thesis. The first concept is that of identifying the need for doctrinal intervention. The second concept is that of wide engagement of the armed forces and other designated professionals to solicit feedback. The third concept is that maintaining a forum for exchange and feedback throughout the process to arrive at the
output. This is the approach that will greatly influence the development of strategic level doctrine for the JDF.

Organizational Mechanism to Facilitate the Life of the Process

Doctrine likened to the Constitution is best utilized as a living document. This speaks to a need to constantly review and maintain the relevance of doctrine to the fundamental elements of the environment. The strategic environment can be described using the DIME construct. The acronym speaks to the diplomatic/political, informational, military and economic factors. Some argue that other considerations within the scope of political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure are factors to be reviewed interchangeably in the strategic context. The fact is that the exercise is not finite and so as conflicts are fought, and as technologies change and environment changes take place, there needs to be a permanent structure in place to make the system robust and perpetual in nature. As a consequence of this consideration the research will lead to recommendations to develop this mechanism.

Relevance

The historical context can be captured by reviewing the history of JDF and the West India Regiment. The history of Jamaica is critical to inform us of the cultural underpinnings of the country and the JDF. The JDF has seen the transition from a colonized institution to today’s configuration. There is no doubt that there is learning to be had from this period and there are several former members of the organization that are able to relive the journey in the context of our end state. The CGSC recommended texts, “The Dynamics of Military Revolution, Makers of Modern Strategy and Cambridge
Illustrated History, Warfare,” does provide a solid and well-analyzed historical context of War. This is not a finite list since there is endless literature available which studied conflicts throughout history and tracked the significant developments which shaped the power of the military arm of government.

There are no doubt several other sources of history available that studied and tracked wars and military development. Critical to reviewing the historical data is to find the winning formula of small armies in the instances where they were able to defeat larger, better equipped militaries. Also to be taken into account is the historical context of alliances and how these organizations were able to defeat very strong adversaries. The Chinese revolutionary war is one such example whereby the smaller forces of the Communist Party (CPLA) were able to win the hearts and minds of the people and mass at critical points over time to defeat their adversary and declare victory. Strong leadership and strict discipline and command and control are very important elements of the Chinese Revolutionary War. The role of guerrilla warfare, its tenets and methodologies will be important for review since the JDF is a small organization with very limited resources. The role of alliances, characteristics of agility and the power of the people will provide interesting insights into the topic. Historical figures such as, Prussian military thinker, Carl von Clausewitz; British inter-war theorist and historian Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart; French strategist, Antoine Henri Jomini; Emperor of the French, Napoleon Bonaparte; Chinese political theorists and communist leaders, Mao Tse-tung and Deng Xiaoping and Military strategist, Sun Tzu collectively provided writings that formed the universal basis of military strategic thought. The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2006, of the JDF attempts to shape the pillars of the organization and must be taken into account in these
discussions. The Defence Act of Jamaica 1962, the Force Standing Orders (FSO), unit orders, provide local guidance pertinent to the subject.

Jargon and symbols are important aspects of doctrine and this research since when applied to the historic and local situation of the JDF will require a reconciliatory approach. The JDF receives strategic level training from several countries including U.S., U.K., Canada, India, and China. This means that the jargon and concepts are best reconciled through surveys and questionnaires in order to win the support of the current JDF leadership. It will therefore be necessary to review the jargon and symbols of the listed countries and ultimately to recommend and select the glossary of terms and concepts that will be used.

The doctrines of other military organizations will definitely provide significance guidance for the research. This will help to shape and direct the look and feel of the final product. The U.S. practices an expeditionary modus operandi which is steeped on the provision of great financial resources. This modus operandi is scarcely affordable by most militaries and this can be argued as the competitive advantage that supports its super power status. The British military has historically relied on strong alliances to also shape a somewhat expeditionary modus operandi. There is investment in modern technology but the smaller numbers and historical colonial posture result in a quasi offensive/defensive posture recognizing the significance of economy of effort. The Chinese touts a defensive attitude, using the power of the people and its large land mass to defeat any invading adversaries. The JDF has essentially adopted an offensive posture locally and relied on coalition arrangements to function effectively in the regional environment. Legislative action has also influenced adjustments in posture to accommodate restraint,
law and economy of force. The doctrines of the U.S., U.K., and China will be reviewed since these countries largely provide the strategic level training for the JDF and therefore the glossary of terms derived will be familiar to the officer corps. The common denominator between the countries is based on the success of the respective armed forces over time. Each country developed its doctrine over many years and it is this institutionalized system that will best serve the JDF objectives. These are some aspects of the doctrine of other states that are pertinent for consideration.

Jamaica Defence Force Strategic Defence Review: Where Are We Now?

Following the formulation of the Jamaican NSS in 2006, the JDF initiated and completed a Strategic Defence Review (Jamaica Defence Force 2006). The objective of the review was to extract from the NSS with a view to formulating the capabilities required to meet the security mandates of the government. The SDR outlines where we are and where we want to go with respect to capabilities to fit the mission. The leadership of the organization sought to establish the current capabilities, the desired capabilities and develop a plan to meet the capability gap identified. The literary review of this document is aimed at extracting the doctrinal elements therein. This is a follow on from the principle that the capstone planning documents of the U.S. NSS, NDS, and NMS and how it informs doctrine. The components of the SDR are assumed to be a sufficient match to the elements of the U.S. NMS in its generic form. This thesis relies heavily on the findings of the SDR since it represents a statement from the highest levels as to how they view the organization, its deficiencies and the configuration necessary to fit the future fight.
Purpose

The SDR first establishes its reason for being as a function of the mandates stipulated in the NSS (Jamaica Defence Force 2006). It is perceived that the JDF will be deployed in non-traditional operations such as internal security, disaster relief, nation building and international peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The traditional defense mission is also indicated as a safeguard towards sovereignty. The small size and resource challenges of the JDF will by necessity drive a heavy dependence on coalition efforts with our allies. The implication for doctrine is akin to the British doctrine’s description of fighting power and its utility.

Strategic Context

The international, regional and local environments are examined to conclude at the following JDF responsibilities extracted from the strategic goals of the U.S. NSS (Jamaica Defence Force 2006):

1. Defend Jamaica against military or paramilitary threats.

2. Military aid to the civil authorities (this may be for emergencies or standing commitment). Specific detailed support tasks include, but are not restricted to:
   a. Restoration/maintenance of law and order
   b. Counter-narcotics
   c. Search and rescue (SAR)
   d. Casualty evacuation
   e. Humanitarian and disaster relief
   f. Defence diplomacy
   g. Nation building projects
h. Contingency planning

i. State ceremonial duties.

3. Monitoring the integrity of Jamaica’s waters and airspace by demonstrating sovereignty over the territorial space and protecting the rights and interests in the maritime and aeronautical areas of jurisdiction (including marine environmental and fisheries protection).

4. Counter terrorism operations by monitoring and analyzing potential terrorist activities, and preventing or responding to terrorist incidents, including Nuclear Biological Chemical Detection (NBCD) and explosive ordnance disposal/improvised explosive device disposal.

The doctrinal implications of these goals build on the issue of the utility of fighting power. Safeguarding territorial integrity speaks to maneuver, contingency planning and joint/combined service approach. Fighting terrorism implies interagency and intra-agency command structures and relationships. Regional and international security denotes multinational, interagency and intra-agency guidance. Response to disasters speaks to contingencies, crisis management and military assistance to civil authorities. Violent crime and organized criminal networks primarily associated with the drug and guns trade is of great importance to the government and the population. The utility of the JDF in this endeavor speaks more to the dynamics of the local situation and resource constraints than to the traditional employment of military forces to deal with local criminality. In ideal circumstances the police force is responsible for such matters and the military reserved to deal with state and non-state actors threatening political and
territorial independence. This nonetheless will imply legal and interagency command relationships to enable the effective cooperation between the JDF and JCF.

The SDR’s treatment of command and control is limited to the structural, job descriptive and changes to the nomenclature of the staff positions. The document does not adequately speak to the C2 framework at the strategic level. There is no mention of a contingency planning mechanism and core leadership values have not been articulated. The SDR articulates the need to establish MOUs with the JCF and other government, non-government and international organizations. This implies the formulation of a C2 structure to accommodate the principles of unity command and unity of effort. Training and education are identified as force priorities to enable the desire to maintain a small highly skilled and professional defense force.

Transformational objectives project an increase in the numbers of the JDF Coast Guard and Air Wing. This stems largely from a historical perspective whereby both arms are deemed insufficiently manned mainly in relation to the growing tasks in the fight against illegal drugs. The debatable issue is to what extent this indicates the quantum shift necessary to meet the organizations’ defense objectives or strategy. In an island nation it is arguable that the Coast Guard with its own air assets should be the senior service and comprise a significant investment in resources and capabilities. The doctrinal value is the expression of the importance of adaptability and agility to the threats in the operational environment.

Another explicit role which is currently met by an implicit structure is that of nation building. This role of nation building is expressed in the SDR to meet the peculiar reality of the island state of a large youth population which are not products or
beneficiaries of an ideal stable home environment. The lack of parental guidance and available opportunities are deemed to be motivators for vulnerable youths becoming involved in organized gang/criminal activity. This role will evoke debate from this activity being a departure from our core responsibilities to those who view the organization as best poised to undertake this necessary role. This is however an expressed objective by the political directorate and greater strategic guidance will be needed to inform the actions to execute this task. High unemployment and primarily single-parent households help to create the potential/climate for social disorder and criminality. The positive reputation of the JDF facilitates public expectations that the force adopts mentoring and training for this group at risk. The lack of a force structure and budget to execute this task does beg for strategic consideration to plug in to associated government agencies.

Core Values

The core values of the JDF are the guiding principles that influence organizational culture and climate. They are the all encompassing guidelines which apply to every aspect of our military duties. These are listed as: discipline, integrity, honor, commitment, courage, and loyalty. Core values form an integral part of doctrine as it shapes the values, attitudes and ethical guidelines expected at all levels.

Conclusion

The Jamaican NSS and SDR are key planning documents to aid in the formulation of JDF strategic level doctrine. The takeaway elements to apply to the doctrinal development of the JDF include: (1) the national planning documents (NSS, SDR),
effectively defines the range of operations that the JDF must be capable of executing. The 
current NSS and SDR does not adequately address the C2 structure or issues of coverage;
(2) the JDF will be required to participate in wider a range of operations. This will 
require a broader utility of the capabilities. Joint, combined, interagency and 
multinational cooperation will be fundamental to fit the spectrum of stakeholders 
internally, regionally and globally. The counterterrorism role implies security agreements 
and cooperation mechanisms at all the strategic and operational levels. The core values 
and added principles of education and training will be necessary to institutionalize the 
capacity to innovate and adapt. The capacity to accelerate change will be important in an 
environment of scarce resources. These are local building blocks to be taken into account 
as we go forward.

Doctrinal development is a process that is dynamic in nature. There are several 
elements that influence the growth of doctrinal thought. The process of change is 
consultative and involves the detailed examination of all the factors involved. Military 
history has provided us with a blueprint for strategic, operational and tactical 
considerations of warfare. There are universally accepted principles of warfare and 
organizational structure that will inevitably be strongly considered for inclusion. The 
local history, laws, resources, and recently promulgated strategic review will provide the 
basis for the application of global military methodology to the local situation. It is this 
part of the research (application) that requires the most thought. It is acknowledged also 
that there are many aspects of doctrine, from the hierarchical to guidance that is specific 
to arms (land, air, sea). The hierarchy of doctrinal guidance includes many nested types
of operations, administration and training. This research aims at an end state of providing basic operational guidance pertinent to the achievement of the JDF mission.
CHAPTER 3
DOCTRINE FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

Introduction
The first issue to be dealt with in this analysis of the U.S. doctrine and security infrastructure is to answer the question of relevance. The U.S. and Jamaica are worlds apart with respect to economy, history, culture and interests. This no doubt raises the question as to what is the relevance of studying U.S. doctrine as a methodology to formulating the basis of the JDF strategic level doctrine. The simple answer to this question is that each state has an underlying interest to survive in this global space. Each state will therefore utilize the system of government that pertains to analyzing the environment in which it exists and one could argue that the U.S. is good at this. Heads of state are obliged to shape relationships with the internal and external actors in order to define a competitive advantage for the country. The populations within states are increasingly making demands on their respective governments to provide the means and the environment for a better life. States therefore are increasingly under pressure to provide infrastructure and to facilitate growth in order to meet these expectations. This issue makes an even greater demand for resources and the balancing of such resources.

The factors of globalization, technology and information play the role of increasing capacity but at the same time reducing the competitive threshold. The geographical mass and population size are not the true determinants of economic and diplomatic power against transnational enemies. The military still remains a force and a factor that determines a state’s place in the world. Alliances also form a critical factor in the determination of national power against transnational enemies. The global
environment dictates the importance of forging partnerships economically, politically and militarily. It is in this context that there is justification to analyze the U.S. security infrastructure in order to determine the characteristics that can be applied effectively in the Jamaican context. The transplanting of doctrine from one country to the next is not the objective. The objective is to analyze doctrine with a view to adapting the winning options to the local environment of the JDF.

The U.S. military is reputed to be one of the best military organizations in the world today. The organization structure comprises a well developed and resourced department and infrastructure to manage the task of doctrine development. The U.S. Armed Forces have also participated in both world wars and numerous conflicts all over the world. The doctrine of the organization has therefore stood the test of time and represents a compilation of numerous lessons learned in armed conflict. This validates the relevance and assurance that the principles contained in the doctrine are militarily sound. The structures and systems; namely the Combined Arms Doctrine Development Office coordinates the wide consultation and updating of U.S. Armed Forces doctrine. This speaks to the relevance of the document in the conduct of military operations in varying environments along the spectrum of conflict. This will ultimately help to “cut the learning curve” and benefit from the corporate knowledge of historical lessons learned in warfare.

The security infrastructure of the U.S. has developed from a local Revolutionary struggle against England to contemporary deployments worldwide. If there is such a phenomena titled, “the U.S. way of war,” then this can be described as characterized by a superior cognitive fighting ethos and culture, high technology, innovation, overwhelming
firepower, concentration of force, preemption and protracted political engagement. The current fight against global terrorism is characterized by a fractious, ideological adversary utilizing modern technology to wage an irregular warfare. This protracted fight has evoked recent debates as to the extent to which investments are made in conventional versus counterinsurgency orientations. These issues are to be taken into account as we proceed into our examination of U.S. doctrine.

The U.S. strategic level joint doctrine is contained within Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. This account aims to deal with the framework of the defense efforts rather than to deal with any evolutionary factors. The hierarchy for the defense system is founded on the guidance contained in the U.S. NSS, NDS, and NMS. The agencies and officers responsible for the planning and execution include the National Security Council (NSC), Department of Defense (DoD), “Secretary of Defense, “Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff “(CJCS), Joint Staff, Geographic Combatant Commands, Service Component Commands, and Joint Task Forces.

Federal legislation has played a significant role in the defense system and this is incorporated into the strategic level doctrine. The Goldwater-Nichols’s Act sought to force joint functionalities amongst the autonomous services of the U.S. armed forces. Each of the separate U.S. services has its own war mandate.

The U.S. Army’s mission is, “to fight and win our nation’s wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in support of combatant commanders.” The mission of the United States Air Force is, “to deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America and its global interests--to fly and fight in Air, Space, and Cyberspace” (U.S.
Air Force n.d.). The mission of the Navy is, “to maintain, train and equip combat-ready naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas” (U.S. Navy n.d.). The US Marines provide an amphibious capability spanning all spheres of the contemporary battle space.

The lessons coming out of the world wars and other conflicts recognized the importance of instituting forcing mechanisms by legislation to see to the joint function of the armed forces and civilian control of the armed forces. The legislation aimed at removing redundancies to create greater efficiencies in administration and operations. There were defined relationships for the functionaries that achieved the goal of unity of command and sought to remove cultural and other barriers to the winning of the nations’ wars. Other legislative action includes, Title 10 of the United States Code (U.S. Congress 2010). This outlines the roles and overall mission of each service.

The foundation principles which guide this doctrine are unity of effort and unity of command which translates to a unified action mechanism. The doctrine at this level defines the tenets emanating from the guidance contained at each level. The National Security Council (NSC) is the principal agency that guides and formulates the security policy for the United States. The purpose for looking in some detail at the composition and roles of the U.S. NSC is to shape the consideration for the Jamaican context. The Jamaican NSS has identified the formulation of an NSC as one of its special initiatives or objectives. This endeavor has not been sufficiently developed and as such we intend to take note of the U.S.’s organization and implementation of this entity. The United States National Security Council is headed by the President who is the Commander in Chief of
the U.S. armed forces. The regular attendees (statutory and non statutory) of the Council are composed as follows (U.S. Congress 2010):

1. the President (Chairman)
2. the Vice President
3. the Secretary of State
4. the Secretary of the Treasury
5. the Secretary of Defense
6. the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
7. the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (statutory military advisor to the Council)
8. the Director of National Intelligence (the intelligence advisor to the Council)
9. the Chief of Staff to the President (invited)
10. the Counsel to the President (invited)
11. the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (invited)
12. the Attorney General
13. the Secretary of Homeland Security

The President, in synchronization with the NSC, formulates the National Security Strategy. This is the foundation from which the other national planning documents of the NDS and NMS are derived. The U.S. NSS is founded on an analysis of the strategic environment and outlines the national interests and vulnerabilities. The Department of Defense (DOD) is the primary agency responsible for executing the defense function. This body extracts its mandate from the NSS. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) is the principal officer that heads the DOD. The SecDef is comprised of a military team that
provides advice for the formulation of the NDS. The NDS (DOD) deals primarily with the nested relationships amongst guidance and agencies and are represented in figure 1.

Figure 1. Security Framework

Source: Created by author.

The attributes from the stated structure is the framework, legislative and institutional guidance that informs the formulation of doctrinal considerations. Key to this is the achievement of the overarching principles of unity of effort and unity of command. A proposed NSC composition to fit the Jamaican government structure would resemble the following:

1. Prime Minister: This is aligned to the responsibilities of MOD.
2. Deputy PM: This pertains to the natural role of successor to the MOD.
3. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: This pertains to the diplomatic objectives.

4. Minister of National Security: This allows representation of the other security agencies of the JCF, and Immigration.

5. Minister of Justice: To advise on the legal implications of security options.

6. Minister of Industry, Investment and Commerce: This is ensure that the security implications on business interests are properly represented (Government of Jamaica 2006, 32).

Foundations

Joint doctrine of the U.S. is based on 12 broad principles for fundamental principles of war for conducting joint operations (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 2007, I-1). These principles are based on the traditional principles of war and other principles learned from various operations. These principles include: “objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity. Other principles include: “restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.” Values of joint operations are listed as: “integrity, competence, physical courage, moral courage, teamwork, trust and confidence and delegation of authority, and cooperation” (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 2007, I-1)

The JDF’s mandate is steeped in nonconventional internal security type deployments in support of the JCF and other agencies. In view of this reality it is recommended that the JDF embrace the following principles of war: unity of command, unity of effort, objective, economy of force, security, offensive spirit, surprise, and
flexibility. This effectively captures conventional principles and the more precise cooperative character in pursuit of internal security objectives.

The Strategic Environment

Definitions of war and irregular warfare are discussed using the writings of historical military thinkers such as Carl Von Clausewitz. The tenets of national power are identified using the factors diplomacy, information, military and economy (Wade n.d., 1-4). These factors constitute the strategic approach to securing the national interest.

The JDF strategic reality is one which demands a highly effective global, regional and internal cooperation. The doctrine must lead to an agile and flexible force which is capable of mobilizing and synchronizing resources to meet the desired end state. Partnerships, contingency planning, and coordination mechanisms must form the character of JDF strategic level doctrine.

Unified Command Plan and Unified Action

Unified command expresses the principles of the joint force structure and sees to the consolidation of state power. The unified command plan establishes contingent geographic areas of operations. This facilitates planning and ultimately is symptomatic of a preemptive modus operandi. This framework compliments the desired capacity to influence and build security relationships worldwide. The framework is not repeated by other armed forces since it is simply unaffordable to other economies.

This principle is nevertheless a significant planning concept for JDF doctrine. It is feasible to consider the establishment of permanent commands within defined geographic and territorial space of Jamaica. This will build in forward planning and preemption
based on an internal security perspective to JDF doctrine. The principle of the contingent geographic commands translates to coverage, reaction capability and a disposition that will serve to give the JDF great capacity. This capacity is primarily based on the ability to influence the security agenda within the country. JDF strategic doctrine would be served positively if the national geographic space were divided and assigned a geographic commander. This has the distinct advantage of facilitating contingency planning throughout the country.

**Strategic Guidance and Responsibilities**

National planning documents for the U.S. include: NSS, NDS, NMS, National Response Plan (NRP), and Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). The CPG represents guidance from the SecDef to the CJCS for the preparation and review of contingency operations. The roles of the senior officers in critical areas of the organization structure and of the Geographic and Combatant Commanders (GCC) are also highlighted. The expeditionary modus operandi of the U.S. Armed Forces is founded in the strategy of defending US interests outside of its’ territorial boundaries. It is therefore in this context that the globe is divided into strategic regions. This is with a view to facilitate liaison activities and towards the development of contingencies and relations with other states. This is a preemptive strategy that fits with an expeditionary endeavor. Functional combatant commanders’ (FCC) roles are outlined as a mechanism to support globally all the geographic commands. The roles of the functional commands cut across all services and geographic command space. This enables the organization to concentrate its resources towards optimizing the use of resources.
The JDF has no capacity to consider this type of strategic posture on a global scale. The posture does however find some relevance if focused internally. Breaking up the territorial space into defined commands is not a strange concept since the Jamaica constabulary force area and divisional boundaries achieves this type of land management. The centralization of strategic resources is another feature that can only benefit the JDF economic situation. The special forces grouping and the management of transportation resources are functions that would easily cut across the command boundaries. Preemption as a principle is about anticipation, and describes an offensive posture. This can also be considered in the fight against organized criminal activity, drug trafficking and the global fight against terrorism. This will lead the U.S. to examine the range of operations.

**Range of Military Operations**

The range of military operations is provided as a means of describing the varying types of employment of the U.S. Armed Forces. These include: military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, crisis response, limited contingency, major operations and campaigns (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 2007, I-15). The range of operations, in doctrine at this level, represents a kind of job description for the organization. This ultimately begins the discussion of capabilities needed in order to effectively execute these operations. The range of military operations will be common amongst most armed forces but there will be some aspects which are more relevant to the particular environment. The Jamaican NSS and JDF SDR define the range of operations which is expected of the JDF. The analysis will therefore draw on the tenets of full spectrum operations and the emphasis on the agility of the force to regulate the degrees of
application. The JDF must be versatile and have sufficient mobility to enable shift in force to meet the imminent threats in the environment.

**Joint Operation Planning**

Joint operation planning is fueled by a careful analysis of the operational environment, followed by operational design and synchronized actions. The autonomy and unique capabilities of each service is able achieve mass and concentration of force at the strategic level of planning. Joint operations connote the capacity of the services to bring unified force to an identified area of operations. This is a desired principle notwithstanding but consequent on the scarcity of resources in the JDF. This intent must be sufficiently recognized by JDF doctrine. Unit commanders must be conditioned by the principles of joint doctrine to consider the total battle space. They must also recognize the necessity to shift the main effort among the different arms to achieve the aim. The notion that the other arm’s purpose in the fight is to support the infantry exists in the JDF and this can be dispelled by the principles of joint command.

**Termination Approaches**

This guidance aims at broad measures within which national strategic objectives can be met by using military force. These include imposed settlement, negotiated settlement and taking an indirect approach. Each measure describes different levels of force. The diplomatic, informational, military and economic factors vary in its application to solve disputes. Military commands must therefore recognize the reality of the political implications and timetable. This again reinforces the synergistic requirements of the security framework. Government, nongovernment, international organizations and
multinational forces must complement each other towards the achievement of the end state.

**Legal Considerations**

This component of doctrine recognizes the legislative work that must be considered in the execution of military force. International laws and conventions, standing Rules of Engagement (ROE), standing Rules for the Use of Force (RUF), local jurisdiction, and national policy are factors that impact on doctrine at the strategic level. Titles 10 and 32 of the United States Code deal with issues of organizing, equipping, and training of U.S. forces. This protection by law is captured in the doctrinal layout.

The laws which are pertinent to the doctrinal considerations of the JDF include: constitution, defense act, the state of emergency legislations, chief of staff’s orders for opening fire, common law and criminal law. There are also issues of international laws and treaties if operating under the United Nations or in coalition environments. The interrelationship with the police implies the need for a principle of law to be recognized in doctrine. Other principles of economy of force, and restraint are relevant for consideration. Other international laws and conventions do apply in the wider regional and global environment.

**Doctrine Governing Unified Direction of Armed Forces**

The following elements of the U.S. Armed Forces doctrine achieves a coordinated and synchronized effort: national strategic direction, unified action, roles and functions, chain of command, combatant commands, military departments, services, forces, and combat support agencies (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 2007, II-1 to II-7). The
constitution is the foundation that defines the relationship amongst citizens and organs of government to achieve its interests. The President and Commander in Chief is responsible for national strategic direction.

Jamaica does not have a ministry of defense. The PM is minister of defense and as such retains executive control over the JDF. The JDF therefore belongs to the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) for executive decisions. The JDF falls under the MNS for administrative support. It is therefore from the PM that national strategic direction is functioned. This is in the form of the NSS from which the COS must extract the NMS of the JDF. The absence of a NMS means that assumptions are desirable to fill the gap. The goals and capability gaps as defined by the SDR adequately provides the assumptions necessary.

The elements, composition and roles of the NSC are critical as a coordinating body for the execution of security objectives. The SecDef is responsible for the management of the armed forces. This management obligation includes all matters relating to the capability building of the services to meet the objectives set by the President via the NSC. The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President, NSC and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). The CJCS ultimately oversees the actions of the combatant commanders and serves as conduit for the communications between the President/SecDef and the combatant commanders (CCDR). The U.S. ambassador does not command elements under the CCDRs. This achieves unity of command and the potential for coordination at a high level. The relationship between combatant commanders, joint task force commanders, military secretaries, service chiefs and forces are critical for unified action. The chain of command extends from the President through
the SecDef and to either the CCDRS for operations and to the secretaries of the military departments for matters other than operations. The distinction in the chain of command is worthy of note. This serves an advantage of creating the conditions for the speedy transmission of policies.

JDF strategic level doctrine must state the roles and functions of officers and agencies throughout the chain of command. The role of the COS is to be expanded but abstracted to a role of security advisor to the PM and NSC. Consideration is to be given for the desk of the COS to reside in the OPM. The DCDS would then be responsible for the routine operations of the force. The principle of combatant commands can be applied internally and by so doing extend the depth of the chain of command. The Jamaican SDR combined administrative and operational objectives in a way that can be described as imprecise. This separation of operations from administration must be institutionalized to facilitate their unique consideration. Following an examination of the actors U.S. doctrine then focuses on the primary agency charged with the managing the security objectives.

**Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components**

The DOD is the organ of government that manages the armed forces. The doctrine lists, organizations in the DOD, functions of the DOD, functions of the departments within the DOD (United States Department of Defense 2010). The offices of SecDef, CJCS, the joint staff and combatant commanders coordinate to carry out the set mandates of the NSS. The doctrine lists the following with respect to the office of the CJCS: composition and functions, Chairman of the JCS, Vice Chairman of the JCS, and the Joint Staff. The tenets of the Goldwater Nichols Act are contained in this doctrinal guidance. This act served to consolidate the administrative functions of the respective
services, define command relationships to see the concentration of force, reinforce
civilian control over the military and improving budgetary management and
prioritization. The SecDef communicates its guidance to the agencies of the DOD in the
NDS. The CJCS extracts from the NDS to produce the NMS. This aspect of U.S. doctrine
is unique to the mandates and resources of the U.S. strategic and operational
environments. The combatant command guidance is articulated under the following
headings: “responsibilities, assigned responsibilities, additional authority and authority
over subordinates” (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 2007, III-12-15). This is important to
streamline the entities working seamlessly together.

The take away from this examination rests with the framework and the planning
guidance that they provide. The examination of the U.S. DOD functions raises two issues
when applied to the Jamaican environment. The first pertains to the capacity and or
wisdom of lobbying government to establish a separate ministry of defense. The second
issue concerns the effectiveness of the current system as we analyze weaknesses and
proposals to fix them without changing the status quo. The latter option is entirely
workable providing there is synergy between the PM and MNS. In the U.S. system of
government there is separation between the CIC and SecDef (DOD). “Under the
President, who is also Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary of Defense exercises authority,
direction, and control over the Department which includes the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, three Military Departments, nine
Unified Combatant Commands, the DOD Inspector General, fifteen Defense Agencies,
and seven DOD Field Activities” (Department of Defense n.d.). In the Jamaican system
the PM and Minister of Defence is the same person. The MNS does not exercise the level
of focus enabled structurally by the U.S. system. The Defense Board and NSC can fill this gap and would be greatly supported by a CDS who functions in the OPM. These adjustments can strengthen the command and strategic guidance of the JDF and by extension JDF doctrine.

**Doctrine For Joint Command and Control and Joint Commands**

The command authority and relationships are critical elements in U.S. Armed Forces doctrine. The secretaries of the military departments are largely responsible for carrying out the training mandates and producing ready troops for deployment. Their organization structure will be composed of both assigned and non assigned troops. The U.S. combatant commanders and functional commands essentially do not own troops but largely comprise planning units and are capable of switching to an operational mode and receive assigned troops from the military departments. The heightened deployments worldwide do however result in the geographic and combatant commands being perpetually in possession of assigned troops. Subordinate unified commands and joint task force command options are available to the CIC. Putting all this together is the CJCS who directs the command structure and brings to life the recommendations of the combatant commands. This account has attempted to simplify intricate and involved machinery.

The modularity concept is founded on the formulation of functional units. Functional units are defined by virtue of established War Fighting Functions (WFF). The war fighting functions include: maneuver, protection, intelligence, fires, sustainment and command and control (Wade n.d., 49-53). Command decisions have been pushed down to fighting units at the brigade level. This is in keeping with the principle of centralized
planning and decentralized execution. The concept of modularity affords the capacity of assembling sub units with the capabilities of each of the WFF and form a single unit with a single aim. Each service is largely equipped with elements of the WFF. The ability to augment forces from each service in response to the operational environment renders the U.S. Armed Forces one of the most adaptive in the world. Discipline and personnel administration also form part of doctrine at this level. The establishment of planning guidance to see to the administration justice, morale and welfare is important in the marriage of personnel, equipment and security mandates.

Modularity affords the benefits of composing forces to meet the threat, to better manage the readiness of troops. This is by separating the trainers and administrators from the underpinnings of operational environment. This coupled with the war fighting functions are elements of doctrine that are relevant to the Jamaican environment. The War Fighting Functions (WFF) are foundation elements which can be attributed in part to the writings of Sun Tzu and will be discussed separately in chapter 4. The fires function is one component of the WFF which will need to be modified in keeping with fact that the JDF forces will be more focused on internal security deployments. The considerations of lethal and nonlethal actions take on greater meaning as the force is required to ensure that planning takes the legal rights of citizens into account. It is proposed that these foundation functions be mirrored to apply to JDF doctrine.

**Multinational Operations**

Multinational forces are, historically, critical to any victory in military undertakings. The NSS of the U.S. clearly articulates that,” the U.S. cannot win any battle alone” (The White House 2010, 11). No nation has the resources and capacity to win
wars independently. This aspect of doctrine outlines the possible arrangements of an alliance, and a coalition. Key factors for working with non-U.S. nationalities include cultural, religious, and other social factors. The doctrine speaks to unity of effort and defines possible command options which would seek to synchronize the actions of a multinational force. NATO and U.N. deployments are practical manifestations of a need to have unity of purpose and direction.

The JDF has undertaken roles as part of the U.N. in its recent past. This includes Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada from 1983 to 1985; Operation Carib in Trinidad in 1990; and the most recent deployment, Operation Anvil in Haiti from 1994 to 1996 (Jamaica Defence Force 2009). There are also security agreements like the Ship Rider which enabled security cooperation and missions between the U.S. and Jamaica in Jamaica’s territorial space (Government of Jamaica and Government of United States 1997). There are also training exercises with the British, U.S. and regional partners which makes multinational operations a major component for doctrinal consideration. Issues of caveats and working in lead nation arrangements will provide guidance to commanders at all levels. This outward focus can then be extended to an inward look at the agencies and stakeholders that can serve to amplify the actions of the JDF.

Interagency, Intergovernmental Organizational Organization Coordination

The relationship between the armed forces and civilian entities also is aimed at unity of effort. The overall principle of national power guides the planning process and leadership at all levels. The system of government, national interests, social factors and resources drives the exact fit to realize a common goal.
The point to be extracted is that these organizations must be identified and engaged at all stages of conflict in order to achieve a multiplier effect. Engaging these entities also serves to focus operational efforts and stretch organic resources. The national agencies have grown in a culture and environment where the JDF takes charge in local and regional crisis situations. The command and control mechanisms and contingency planning will make important doctrinal inclusion.

Conclusion

The U.S. Armed Forces doctrine is formulated to meet U.S. national interests and is based on all the unique elements about the nation. There are however key elements that can be captured and tailored to meet the Jamaican environment. These include:

1. Defense agencies
   a. National Security Council (NSC) is to be established. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) is recommended to occupy offices at the OPM. The CDS will be the military advisor to the PM and shape the formulation of the NMS.
   b. Proposals are to be made to government to establish a separate MOD to preside over the JDF. This will function similarly to the U.S. DoD in setting the NDS for the JDF. In the absence of the resources to establish a separate ministry then there are to be pertinent laws established to define the relationship between the JDF and the MNS.
   c. The CDS operating in the OPM will be better able to advise and shape the development of the JDF similar to the work currently exercised by the CJCS. The current disposition in headquarters causes much time to
be consumed in the day-to-day affairs and less time in planning and shaping the long-term future of the entity.

d. It is recommended that regional commands are established internally consistent with the U.S. establishment of GCC. This can be based on current county boundaries: Cornwall, Middlesex, and Surrey; or based on the area commands of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). This is aimed at enabling contingency planning and the reaction capability of the force. The commands are essentially planning cells and would have more impact on the expansion of the officer corps. The strength of a contingency planning framework would however serve to greatly enhance the overall effectiveness of the JDF.

e. Despite the small organization there is utility to be gained in formalizing a system to embrace the principles of the JFC.

2. Permanent areas of operations (geographic commands)

3. National planning documents (NSS, NDS, NMS) are to be updated and institutionalized to retain relevance and form a roadmap of development.

4. Contingency planning framework (JOPES, JOPP) can be enabled by the establishment of GCCs. This will institutionalize an innovative and preemptive operational climate.

5. Joint command structure

6. Modularity has some advantages but this will require a revolutionary shift in the planning mechanisms, training and education.

7. Legislative support/action (Goldwater Nichols Act and U.S. Title 10 Code)
8. Incorporating the principles of war will formally recognize the principles which govern our operations. This is critical given the internal focus of the JDF.

9. Defining war both in its traditional context and also uniquely to Jamaica.

10. Defining the range of military operations

11. Defining relationships
   a. Multinational forces
   b. Interagency, intergovernmental organizational organization coordination
   c. International organizations (U.N., NATO)

12. Unified action and unified direction of armed forces

13. The concept of termination of operations.

14. Discipline and code of conduct

These are the elements of U.S. Armed Forces joint doctrine that summarizes key strengths to be noted. These elements are relevant to the Jamaican environment and are therefore recommended for doctrinal consideration. This list is to be viewed as a shell for the development of JDF doctrine. This is with an assumption that U.S. doctrine will be a significant influence for doctrinal development.
CHAPTER 4
CHINESE DOCTRINE

China has become an important member of the international system, and the future and destiny of China have become increasingly closely connected with the international community. China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China.

World peace and development are faced with multiple difficulties and challenges. Struggles for strategic resources, strategic locations and strategic dominance have intensified.

— China’s National Defense in 2008

Introduction

The history of China dates back some 3,300 years (Chaos.umd.ed. n.d). The contribution to military literature has been well documented and includes writings of, ancient Chinese military strategist and philosopher, Sun Tzu,; Mao Zedong (translated Mao Tse-tung), political theorist and leader of Chinese Revolutionary campaigns; and former Chinese Communist party leaders, Jiang Zemin, and Deng Xiaoping. The Chinese military doctrine is derived from a compilation or building up of the principles and writings of these Chinese leaders. The society today is essentially a dictatorship based on Marxist Leninist principles (Congressional-Executive Commission on China 2006).

China possesses the largest armed force of over 3 million regular troops (GlobalFirepower.com 2009). China is reputed to have one of the fastest growing economies and is a world power worthy of analysis.

Chinese doctrine does not emanate from a book labeled Chinese doctrine but can be captured via a range of publications and policies. The direction of the armed force is largely attributed to the direction of the sitting president like many other states. The Chinese nonetheless pay strict attention to the teachings of previous leaders. Such
persons include: Sun Tzu, Confucius, First Emperor Qin, Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. The foundation principles of Marxism are revered and built upon by the respective military leaders. The basic layout of the security structure will be described and this will be followed by an analysis of the writings of the Chinese leaders and strategist mentioned above.

The National People’s Congress (NPC) is the highest organ of government in China. The NPC elects the President, Vice President and Chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC). The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is under the command of the state CMC (ChineseBusiness World.com 2009). The Chairman of the CMC is the commander in chief of the armed forces. The four general departments of the CMC are:

1. Headquarters of the General Staff
2. General Logistics Department
3. General Political Department
4. General Armament Department

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) retains control of the armed forces via the CMC. There are seven military regions established under the General Staff Headquarters. These include: Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Chengdu (ChinaDefense.com n.d.).

The description of the layout is important since there are some parallels with the U.S. system as well as indicating some relevance to the Jamaican situation. The CMC is the body that shapes the strategic framework of the armed forces. Notwithstanding the differences in the details and the politics, the role of the CMC can be likened to the role
of the NSC. The doctrinal relevance for Jamaica pertains to the urgency of establishing a NSC to take on the role of setting the agenda for the development of the JDF.

The second take away pertains to the division of military regions of command. This structure is conducive to the development of contingency plans. Contingency plans provides, depth and capacity for the armed forces. The internal focus of this regionalization is based on the strategic doctrine of the Chinese armed forces. This is built on “a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery against high-tech adversaries--an approach that China refers to as preparing for “local wars under conditions of information” (Council on Foreign Relations 2009). The JDF doctrine would benefit from a system of dividing the island into regional commands. This is to benefit from the advantage of establishing a contingency planning framework to meet the security objectives. The JCF area and divisional commands utilizes this concept to enhance its command and control. This issue will be further examined in subsequent chapters. We will now explore the writings of respective Chinese military writers with a view to extracting other principles pertinent to the development of JDF strategic level doctrine. We begin our analysis with the writings of Sun Tzu.

**Sun Tzu: The Art of War**

These writings were done in the context of the Chinese society from the 6th Century B.C. The ensuing principles described by Sun Tzu deals primarily with operational guidelines. We will examine the principles nonetheless as they will provide doctrinal guidance for areas where there is overlap between strategic and operational
considerations. Sun Tzu views war as a matter of life and death for a state (Sun Tzu 1999, 1).

**Laying Plans (Strategic Planning)**

Sun Tzu identifies five constant factors as being critical for the outcome of war. These include: moral influence (loyalty to sovereign, legitimacy, will to fight), weather, terrain (domination of battle space), commander (leadership, strategic planning) and doctrine (methodology, procedures, ends, ways, means).

Sun Tzu believes that the all warfare is based on deception. He says “when able to attack, we must pretend to be unable, when deploying our forces, we must seem inactive, when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away, when we are far, we must make him believe we are near. He speaks to the importance of maintaining the initiative, security and concealment (Sun Tzu 1999, 1).

This principle begs a comparison at this juncture with U.S. doctrine. The U.S. strategic doctrine is clearly superior in laying out a complete mechanism for contingency planning and establishing security cooperation and assistance programs to shape future operations. This has application for inclusion in the principles of war to be established in JDF doctrine. The principles of deception, surprise, security, legitimacy, concealment and seizing and maintenance of initiative are to be extracted from the Chinese doctrine and are recommended for inclusion in Jamaican doctrine.

**Waging War**

Sun Tzu spoke about the great importance of sustainment and advised against the long war. He says “An army of one hundred thousand men can be raised only when
money is in hand.” and “In directing such an enormous army, a speedy victory is the main object.” Sun Tzu continues by saying “If the army engages in protracted campaigns, the resources of the state will not suffice.” and “When a country is impoverished by military operations, it is because an army far from its homeland needs a distant transportation” (Sun Tzu 1999, 3).

The issue of defense and economy is a central theme in most countries of the world today. Scarcity of resources, depleting budgets and increasing debt fuels the importance of balancing the cost of defense against other government obligations. Sun Tzu speaks to the necessity of creating incentives and rewards for troops. He recommends the humane treatment of prisoners of war and the critical role of strategic level military leadership. This is a critical component of strategic planning and is deserving of recognition in doctrine. Doctrinal implication finds application in the establishment of the principles of war. The principles of economy of force, law, restraint, and strategic leadership are recommended for consideration.

**Attack by Stratagem**

Sun Tzu defines strategic warfare by stating: “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence,” and ”The best policy in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.” He adds that: “The next best method is to attack his army in the field” and “The worst policy is to attack walled cities” (Sun Tzu 1999, 5). These quotes emphasizes the in depth analysis of the adversaries center of gravity, critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities. Sun Tzu speaks to the role of the commander in chief referred to as the sovereign in the outcome of war. “There are three ways in which a sovereign can bring misfortune upon his army: by ordering an advance while ignorant of
the fact that the army cannot go forward, by interfering with the army’s administration without knowledge of the internal affairs, by interfering with the direction of fighting” (Sun Tzu 1999, 5).

This emphasizes the utility of doctrine to serve all stakeholders. The stakeholders include the political directorate, military commanders at all levels, government and non-government agencies internal and external. There must be a clear distinction between the army’s obligation to meet national policy and non-interference in tactical decisions. It is the responsibility of military commanders to make tactical decisions and not the political directorate. This invokes the principles of war considerations of restraint, and economy of effort. Defining the job description of the actors involved will also be critical to achieve the principle of avoiding political interference in tactical decision making. This will be aided by the role(s) of national planning documents (NSS, SDR).

Disposition of Military Strength

Sun Tzu stated that, “Invincibility lies in the Defense, the possibility of victory lies in the attack.” He also advocated principles of attack and defense by saying “Defend yourself when the enemy’s strength is abundant and attack the enemy when it is inadequate” (Sun Tzu 1999, 8). This addresses current teachings of full spectrum operations. It is applying varying degrees of defense and offense along the spectrum of conflict. The range of operations of JDF doctrine must recognize the tenets of full spectrum operations but be reconfigured to embrace the internal security focus of the JDF. The doctrine must however acknowledge that notwithstanding the value of defensive action it is offensive action that will acquire victory.
Use of Energy

Sun Tzu addresses the need of battle rhythm and appreciates the art of strategic planning. He states that “Management of a large force is the same in principle as the management of a few men.” It is a matter of organization, command and communication that determines the optimal use of forces. “He who takes advantage of the situation uses his men in fighting as rolling logs or rocks. It is the nature of logs and rocks to stay stationary on the flat ground, and to roll forward on a slope. If four cornered they stop, if round shaped they roll. The energy of troops skillfully commanded is just like the momentum of round rocks quickly tumbling down from a mountain thousands of feet high” (Sun Tzu 1999, 9).

This depicts themes of strategic planning, initiative, maintenance of the momentum, timing and precision. The concept implies the significance of a contingency planning framework which will launch troops in action with minimum complication and maximum preparation. It is these take away principles that demonstrate relevance and will impact JDF doctrine.

Weaknesses and Strengths

Sun Tzu addresses the issue of initiative and intelligence. He states that “one skilled in war brings the enemy to the field of battle and is not brought there by him.” “We can form a single united body at one place, while the enemy must scatter his forces at ten places.” “The law of successful operation, is to avoid the enemy’s strength, and strike his weakness” (Sun Tzu 1999, 11). These tenets refer to attributes of ceasing the initiative, concentration of force, intelligence and strategic and tactical planning.
Maneuvering

Maneuvering is named as a war fighting function in U.S. doctrine. Sun Tzu states that “Both advantage and danger is inherent in maneuvering for an advantageous position.” He advocated the use of local intelligence by saying that “Those who do not use local guides are unable to obtain the advantages of the ground.” Deception was a key tenet of his considerations since he also stated that “He who knows the artifice of deception will be victorious.” Sun Tzu emphasized the importance of communication during battle as he comments that, “As the voice cannot be heard in battle, gongs and drums are used.” He was not an advocate of annihilation and spoke about economy of force in achieving the aim. He said that “When you surround an army, leave an outlet free (Sun Tzu 1999, 14). These attributes of disposition, speed, communication and information operations are deemed to be critical. The war fighting function of maneuver also presents as a principle relevant to the Jamaican environment.

Discipline and Leadership

Sun Tzu advocates good leadership as a precursor to good discipline. “If troops are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will be disobedient. If not obedient, it is difficult to employ them. If troops have become attached to you, but disciplined not enforced, you cannot employ them either. Soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity but kept under control by iron discipline” (Sun Tzu 1999, 22). Core values are to be articulated in doctrine guiding the most senior and junior ranks. The current JDF core values address this consideration.
Command and Intelligence Gathering

Intelligence gathering has always featured as a critical ingredient in military operations and this is so recognized by Sun Tzu. He states that “Of all those in the army close to the commander, none is more intimate than the spies. Of all rewards, none more liberal than those given to spies, of all matters, none is more confidential than those relating to spying operations.” The critical value of intelligence remains relevant today. The leadership skills necessary for the use of ground, dealing with attrition, and attacking by fire are amongst other principles noted by Sun Tzu in his writings.

Sun Tzu was no doubt a monumental figure in formulating the art of war and principles of war. The context of his existence obtained in an environment where modern technology as we know it did not exist. The use of chariots, bows, arrows and shields does not preclude the relevance of the principles relating to the art of war. The following is a summary of terms to be noted as we go forward to review other building blocks of the doctrine of the Chinese armed forces:

1. Strategic planning (contingency planning framework and prepositioning of resources, local, regional and international agreements)
2. Roles of the sovereign and roles of senior level military commanders
3. Legitimacy, moral, welfare and administration (moral influence)
4. Economy of effort, diplomacy, and deterrence (winning without fighting)
5. Defense and economy (sustainment and resource constraints)
6. Deception, surprise, concealment
7. Communication
8. Variation and maneuver
9. Concentration of force

10. Synchronization and attrition

11. Intelligence (use of spies, centre of gravity, critical requirements and vulnerabilities)

12. Discipline (system of rewards and punishment)

13. Leadership (sovereign/commander in chief and military commanders at a high level)

14. Functional components (war fighting functions) of maneuver, command and control, fires, protection, intelligence and sustainment

We next transition into another era of Chinese development as we explore the writings of Mao Tse-tung.

Mao Tse-Tung of the Peoples Republic of China
(Chairman 1949-1976)

Mao Tse-tung is revered by the Chinese people as the savior of the nation and was one of the great leaders in Chinese military and political strategy. His main contribution to Chinese doctrine and strategy surrounded his advocacy for:

- the strategic thinking of people’s war,
- the strategic thinking of active defense,
- the strategic thinking of base area,
- the strategic thinking of guerrilla warfare,
- the strategic thinking of defeating the enemy in protracted war,
- and the strategic thinking of preventing a war.

Out of which, the strategic thinking of people’s war, the strategic thinking of active defense, the strategic thinking of preventing a war, the protracted war, guerrilla warfare, the peoples war, information warfare and flexibility in tactics. (Tse-tung 2005)

The theory of active defense was formally articulated in 1956. Mao spoke strongly against preemption and such a strategy as threatening security both internally, regionally and globally. Active defense is essentially a strong defensive posture with an
underlying intent to launch offensively. The following list of quotes was selected as they serve to inform this paper as to his doctrinal thinking.

1. “Communism is the most complete, progressive, revolutionary and rational system in human history” (Tse-Tung 1966, 23).

2. “War is the continuation of politics.” “Since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character” (Tse-Tung 1966, 58).

3. “Revolutionary war is the war of the masses, it can be waged only by mobilizing the masses.” “The army must become one with the people” (Tse-Tung 1966, 88).

4. “Victory or defeat in war is determined mainly by the military, political, economic and natural conditions on both sides” (Tse-Tung 1966, 91).

5. “Attack dispersed isolated enemy forces first” (Tse-Tung 1966, 95).

Mao Tse-tung doctrine can be summarized as the people’s war, unity of effort, active defense, legitimacy, flexibility, loyalty, education and training. Like China, JDF doctrine needs to recognize the political environment and make it a factor in its decision making. Officers must be trained to be aware of the political end state. Current western doctrine in internal security operations can be considered flawed in its failure to manage the expectations of the people. Chinese philosophy recognizes that the psychological and ideological fight is just as significant as the physical fight. There must be recognition, thinking and communication to the effect that military intervention is limited to creating the conditions for a political fix. Commanders must manage the expectations of all and make it clear in doctrine that the end state is based on political resolve. It is the time table
between military intervention and that political resolve and action that will need to be managed militarily.

The second doctrinal implication is based on the focus of the people. The theory surrounding the analysis of the center of gravity (COG) of enemy/adversarial elements can essentially form a template to embrace the power of the people. This is especially the case in U.S. counter insurgency (COIN) teachings. Winning hearts and minds and information operations are evidence of the great importance of the people. Be it in a democratic or communist environment the people remain the most powerful determinant of the resolution of all conflicts. JDF doctrine must place the people at the forefront of its activities. This must not be a focus at the point of operational deployment but must be constant and sustained indefinitely. Information operation campaigns must be ongoing and considered by commanders at all levels at all stages of planning. These are great inputs and we will next review the contribution of another Chinese giant, Deng Xiaoping.

Deng Xiaoping (Paramount Leader 1978-1989)

Deng Xiaoping served as leader of China over the period 1978 to 1989. His writings built on other’s ideas to determine the transformation of the Chinese armed forces to meet current day realities. He believed in building on Marxist theory. The foundation of the people’s war continued to be priority. He advocated the importance of army building in the new age. He recognized the need for the armed forces to continue to review it and to change to remain relevant. Deng believed that the interest of the army is subordinated to the overall interest of national development. The issue of national defense and economy was critical in reconciling the priorities of expenditure. He believed that the role of the military was based on defending state sovereignty.
Changes in the environment were categorized into the international environment, internal situations, and within the army building itself. Active defense was described and based on the following principles: full preparation for potential war, strike only after the enemy has struck, attack for better defense, and be equally good at offense and defense, launch a protracted war on powerful opponents and the use of military forces and tactics flexibly. He was an advocate of training and cultural awareness coining the term “troops with Chinese characteristics” (Debin 2005). He outlined priorities of building elite troops, advanced weapons, combined forces, and high efficiency and strengthening the army by science and technology.

Deng believed in strategic transformation, standardization and modernization, education and training, elite troops and the Party and the people. His political belief was that the bipolar world should be converted to a multi polar world (Debin 2005). Deng Xioping’s contribution was timely and his advocacy was on the institutionalization of change. This is important consideration in the JDF since our doctrine must embrace and institutionalize an advocacy for change. Self introspection must be a feature that is encouraged structurally and seen as a means to growth.

These are principles which are as relevant today as they were in the context of the time of its advocacy. The western world though using different terminology does identify equally with these tenets. The role of the armed forces in defending sovereignty, science and technology, education and training, the capacity to transform, analyzing the strategic and operational environments, legitimacy and national power (the people’s war) are certainly tenets worth considering regardless of the scale and context of military organizations. JDF doctrine must have components that advocate training and education
geared towards initiating and managing change. Self introspection must be welcomed and facilitated at all levels. The JDF culture must change to embrace the views of all ranks and this must be stated in its doctrine. This takes the discussion to review the writings of Jiang Zemin.

Jiang Zemin (President 1993-2003)

Jiang Zemin was an advocate for information warfare. He recognized the tremendous impact of technology and information on the structure, strategy and operations of the armed forces. He embraced the distinct role of science and technology in the development of armaments and the shaping of strategy. He spoke of the need to combine the human factor and modern weaponry in order to claim victory. Military transformation was a phenomenon completely on the agenda and this was seen as critical to the development of the armed forces. This was effectively a build on the advocacy of Deng Xiaoping. Military transformation was seen as a means to an end and he invested in recruiting high quality military talents. Jiang Zemin recognized the potential to be engaged in a limited high technology war. The political situation with Taiwan was the contributing factor to this belief. He spoke about innovation but categorized this into theoretical innovation, which was deemed a pre-requisite and organizational innovation as guaranteeing the framework required to move the agenda. The third category of innovation was science and technological innovation. This was defined to be the ultimate push of the Chinese administration (Xin 2005).
Conclusion

There are huge lessons to be learned from the history of China and its doctrinal thinking both at the strategic and operational levels. Chinese doctrinal development is based on the peoples war, active defense, information warfare, political training and direction, education and training, technological and theoretical transformation, strategic planning, intelligence, and defense and economy. JDF doctrine must embrace each of these principles in its principles of war, war fighting functions and core values. This is in no specific order. The U.S. and Chinese doctrines emanate from different perspectives both politically and strategically. There are however, more similarities than differences in the U.S. and Chinese principles of war, core values and future orientation. This takes us into the review of U.K. doctrine.
CHAPTER 5

UNITED KINGDOM DOCTRINE

Introduction

The Prime Minister is to establish a National Security Council (NSC), which will oversee all aspects of Britain’s security. The Prime Minister has appointed Sir Peter Ricketts (Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) as his National Security Adviser, a new role based in the Cabinet Office. Sir Peter will establish the new National Security Council structures, and coordinate and deliver the Government’s international security agenda.

The Council will coordinate responses to the dangers we face, integrating at the highest level the work of the foreign, defence, home, energy and international development departments, and all other arms of government contributing to national security.

The Council will be chaired by the Prime Minister. Permanent members will be the Deputy Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for International Development and the Security Minister.

— Prime Minister’s Office

This chapter aims to analyze U.K. doctrine; first at the strategic level of command and structure, and then the doctrine itself. The U.K.’s great history of a military power requires no introduction since the country once held one of the largest empires in modern history. There are numerous major conflicts of both a conventional and non-conventional nature from which are valuable lessons pertinent to this thesis.

The British Army is headed by the Chief of the General Staff. His office and staff are based in the MOD in London (British Army). British NSS states that its strategy deals with, “transnational crime, pandemics and flooding –not part of the traditional idea of national security, but clearly challenges that can affect large numbers of U.K. citizens, and which demand some of the same responses as more traditional security threats,
including terrorism. The broad scope of this strategy also reflects our commitment to focus on the underlying drivers of security and insecurity” (Prime Minister 2008).

There are some parallels worth noting from the above facts. The NSS of the U.K. is the foundation document that lays out the security mandates and threats. This is the basis for defining the capabilities required to meet the spectrum of missions. The British, like the U.S., accommodates the army chief in the MOD/DOD. The portfolio of defense is managed by a separate department, DOD/MOD. The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, takes charge of the CMC which does not fall under the Security Ministry. These parallels are instructive and reinforce the basic elements that will become a part and describe the C2 framework of JDF doctrine. The analysis of U.K. doctrine will be done under the headings: Purpose of doctrine, Levels of war, Military strategy and the relationship between policy and doctrine, The dimensions of the strategic environment, national interest, Instruments of grand strategy, British approach to military operations, Fighting power, Warfare and the utility of fighting power, Constraints on the use of military power, and The philosophy of command. We commence by exploring the purpose of doctrine.

**Purpose of Doctrine**

The British armed forces views and defines doctrine as a guide for the conduct of military operations. Special mention is made of the target audience which is listed as: the British Armed Forces (BAF), British Parliamentarians, academics, industrialists, journalists, members of the public, adversaries and other stakeholders (Ministry of Defence 2001, 1-1). There is clear recognition that the nature of warfare will present a
fluid environment and thinking agile adversaries demand those commanders at all levels be provided with the intellectual space to make decisions at the lower level.

JDF doctrine must also take this approach of speaking to a defined target audience. The audience recommended includes: The Jamaican public, parliamentarians, military leadership, media, the business community, public at large, and regional and global interests. The language and structure of the document must therefore be easily read and understood. The perspective of respective agencies can best be understood if warfare is viewed from the view of the fighting units. The fighting units are diplomatic and militarily based as this cohesion is a prerequisite to victory.

Levels of War

The British Defence Doctrine (BDD) lists the hierarchy as follows: Grand Strategic Level (GSL), Military Strategic Level (MSL), the Operational Level (OL) and Tactical Levels (TL) (Ministry of Defence 2001, 1-2). GSL speaks to the wider environment and translates to the U.S. doctrine at the national strategic level. This considers the factors diplomatic, military and economic. The Prime Minister and the cabinet are responsible for the formulation of GSL war. This is similar to the President and NSC formulating the NSS for the U.S. The familiar term, instruments of national power is used to describe this level. The MSL is defined as the military component of the GSL. This is synonymous to the NDS of the U.S. Armed Forces. The British Secretary of State for Defence defines the objectives of the MSL much like the SecDef formulating the NDS. The OL of strategy is defined to address the level at which campaigns are planned. This is synonymous to the NMS of the U.S. Armed Forces. The OL is formulated by the joint commander much the same way as the CJCS in the U.S. Armed
Forces This is defined as “the art of disposing maritime, land, air and special forces supported by logistics. The levels of war as defined speak to the security framework of the U.K.

The hierarchy extends from the CIC, to the minister responsible for defense to the highest military command. This relationship is important since it outlines the C2 framework within which the, ends, ways and means are defined. The BDD goes on to discuss the interrelationship amongst the three levels of war. Each level has an overlapping relationship and ultimately complements the command concept of mission command. Mission command, unity of command, unity of effort and planning documents are themes which replete the doctrinal framework of the BAF.

Military Strategy and the Relationship between Policy and Doctrine

The BDD establishes a relationship between doctrines as being nested to the achievement of national policy. “The hierarchy of military doctrine produced in the U.K. is a guide to military commanders on the conduct of campaigns and operations and the tactical employment of armed forces in support of the national policy” (Ministry of Defence 2001, 1-5). This is clearly a feature of doctrine that is to be incorporated in the JDF doctrine. This link between doctrine and policy must be clearly articulated and understood by all stakeholders.

The Dimensions of the Strategic Environment

The BDD describes the strategic environment into dimensions of political, economic, military, physical, scientific and technical, social and cultural and legal, ethical and moral (Ministry of Defence 2001, 2-1).
This then provides a context within which the U.K. fits its policies. There may be advantages to be had in this categorization since it then measures the items of policy to be pursued in order to facilitate the survivability of the state in a competitive environment. The advantage of this approach is that it recognizes the historical significance of the country’s positioning and interests in the world community. Jamaica is placed to be a significant player in the Caribbean region and as such its leadership must be guided to view the environmental factors in its decision making.

National Interest

The BDD describes national interest as the almost static objectives of territorial and political independence. Vital and marginal interests extend the scope of existence that may result in implications for the armed forces (Ministry of Defence 2001, 2-3). There is great substance in this view since the overall role of armed forces globally results in the defense of territorial integrity and enforcing the political will. This also fits the Clausewitzian view that war is extreme diplomacy or diplomacy by other means. National interest is absolutely defined by the political directorate and as such this translates to the national policy level.

The Instruments of Grand Strategy

The instruments of grand strategy are defined as diplomatic, economic, and military combined with a cross government informational campaign (Ministry of Defence 2001, 2-4). This is analogous to the DIME construct that is used by the U.S. Armed Forces. It is the mix of each of the elements of diplomatic, economic and military to meet the environmental factors that translates to the effectiveness of a national policy.
The essential elements of British doctrine are listed as: “principles of war, the war-fighting ethos, the maneuvers’ approach, mission command, Joint Integrated and Multinational Nature of Operations (JIMNO), and flexibility and pragmatism” (Ministry of Defence 2001, 3-1-9). The principles of war are dogmatic in nature as guiding principles for waging war. They are listed as: “selection and maintenance of the aim, maintenance or morale, offensive action, security, surprise, concentration of force, economy of effort, flexibility, cooperation and sustainability” (Ministry of Defence 2001, 3-1). These are criteria to be used as a litmus test in the analysis and guide to operational design. The war-fighting ethos focuses on the physical and mental conditioning that is necessary to prevail in the extreme bloodletting and human suffering that obtains in war.

There is acknowledgement that this is checked in peace keeping operations which require more precision and restraint. The maneuvers’ approach includes the application of concepts of surprise, tempo, shock, momentum and initiative. It is the rapid and measured deployment of military force aim at disrupting the decision cycle of the enemy/adversary. The concepts of centre of gravity, critical requirements, and vulnerabilities are tools used to measure the point of attack. Mission command is a desire to decentralize command in battle. This approach is deemed superior to a centralized command structure since it attempts to free initiative, speed up action, and enable flexibility. The strategic environment is characterized by an agile thinking adversarial modus and this is best fought by allowing commanders at all levels the capacity to plan within the overall intent of the higher command. The characteristic of the adversaries described is similar to the profile of drug dealers, organized crime, and the considerations for the global war on
terrorism. The JIMNO speaks to the combined and joint integration of resources. The knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of units employed in the fight are taken into account during planning. The inevitability of multinational operations requires armed forces to plan for this certain eventuality (Ministry of Defence 2001, 3-7). The doctrines, culture, C2 structure and other social and cultural elements serve to guide the maximization of effort. Flexibility and pragmatism facilitates a divergence in thought in planning and execution.

Whereas JDF doctrine must embrace the principles of war, there should be equally an emphasis on law, intelligence, restraint, cooperation and a joint approach. Internal security operations are undertaken in support of the JCF which represents the legitimacy of the deployment. Troops must therefore be legally aware and exercise restraint when operating among the public. The joint approach will aim at synchronizing the actions within to maximize the scarce resources. The JDF must define its overall approach to operations as a guide to the leadership at all levels.

**Fighting Power**

Fighting power defines the elements of military capabilities. It comprises the components of conceptual, moral and physical. The conceptual model describes seven fundamental defense capabilities. The conceptual component speaks to the cognitive aspect of the fight. It involves command, information management, and preparation for short, medium and long term. The moral speaks to the will to fight. This includes the soft elements of motivation, management, and leadership. The physical component addresses the “hardware” matters of equipment, sustainment, human resource, and the systems enabling the maintenance of performance standards (Ministry of Defence 2001, 4-1). The
concept of fighting power is synonymous to the U.S. view of the war fighting functions. It is the mixing and matching of differing degrees of the soft and hard components that increases the resolve for victory.

**Warfare and the Utility of Fighting Power**

The utilization of fighting power is ultimately towards achieving the aims of territorial and political independence. The response will be contained within the broad strategic actions of deterrence and coercion. This aspect of British doctrine can be seen as pre-positioning themes within which forces are utilized. Deterrence speaks to avoid adversaries from taking a course of action, and coercion speaks to forcing adversaries to meet the political will. The interrelationship of these themes can create a continuum of actions. The themes of deterrence and coercion can be further broken down to have utility as follows: management of the spectrum of tension, preventing conflict, enforcing order, managing confrontation, humanitarian aid, crisis management and military assistance to civil authorities within the U.K. (Ministry of Defence 2001, 5-1). These translate to roles of the armed forces within the continuum of operations but short of general war. This defined utility is applicable to the Jamaican context since it formally addresses and informs all stakeholders as to the utility of the JDF. This is important in a political environment which routinely questions investments in military hardware.

**Constraints on the Use of Military Power**

The BAF doctrinal view of limitations are described under the headings political, legal, ROEs, physical, military. This is a template approach to guide commanders thinking. The doctrinal implication is a perceived check on the level of force along the
continuum of operations. The issue of the use of force and ROEs are critical areas to be address doctrinally and materially. Whereas constraint is necessary, it must also follow that non lethal means are made available as part of the capability of the force. Constraints are relevant to JDF doctrine since the military must be viewed as a facilitator for the people and not the punitive arm of government. The political culture in Jamaica becomes a factor especially in the context of military force being directed within against criminality. It is integral that commanders are able to think of the political and social implications when planning operations. This leads to considerations of the philosophy of command.

The Philosophy of Command

British doctrine speaks to command guidance. This is an essential component of doctrine since it speaks to a general attitude that is desirable in formulating, communicating, and executing missions. Effective and efficient communication mechanisms and doctrine are deemed as prerequisites for command at all levels. The attributes of command are listed as:

1. A refusal to be dominated by circumstances.
2. Commanders must remain calm in crisis with the mental courage to withstand stress and strain.
3. Commanders require an open mind receptive to all possibilities.
4. Commanders must know how hard to drive their force.
5. Commanders need to explain clearly what they want to achieve and why so they can be supported by peers and subordinates (Ministry of Defence 2001, 7-1).
These attributes are important ingredients of doctrine and can serve to inform administrative functions of recruiting, training, evaluations, and disciplinary procedures.

Command and leadership are as much a significant part of doctrine as the structure and policy guidelines. The JDF philosophy of command must be developed and included as part of its doctrine.

Conclusion

The strength of the British Defence Doctrine (BDD) is deemed to have its basis on several elements. Defining the target audience to include key stakeholders is key for communicating guidance. Making a distinction of the levels of war will add perspective to each agency/unit involved in the fight. Connecting policy to doctrine attracts commitment at the political level. The national interest defined as a static, territorial, and political independence allows stakeholders a common understanding. The essence and instruments of national power at the strategic level guide commanders’ overview of the environmental actors. The principles of war guide the planning of operations. The war fighting ethos guides the characteristics and qualities of combatants at all levels. Mission command facilitates initiative at the lower levels. This is especially critical in the Jamaican environment where the success of operations is determined by initiative. The joint integrated and multinational nature of operations encourages synchronization of operations. The utility and broader utility of fighting power explains the value of the military capability in dealing with threats other than a conventional enemy. Finally the philosophy of command outlines the qualities mandated for commanders at all levels. These elements are strengths of British doctrine which are noted for future consideration and application.

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CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH DESIGN

Methodology

This thesis aims to extract the pertinent considerations from the existing doctrine of the U.S., U.K., and China to inform the formulation of strategic level doctrine for the JDF. There are three major considerations that will influence the research design that will see us achieving the aim of this research.

The first major consideration is the generic research methodology options which include; original surveys and questionnaires, existing surveys, interviews and operations research/systems analysis.

The second major consideration will be to examine the generic factors that influence the development of strategic level doctrine in the first instance. These factors include: national planning documents (NSS, NDS, and NMS), culture, values, combat experiences, laws, history, political science and sociology, military theory and past and current army, joint and multinational doctrine. These are factors that influenced the development of strategic level doctrine for the U.S., U.K., and China. The research design must seek to understand how these factors impacted these countries and then apply the same analysis to the JDF and Jamaica.

The third major consideration is based on the doctrinal development process as a whole. The concept of the process starts at the identification of gap between the doctrine and end state desired. The factors are considered and there is widespread consultation of stakeholders. The consultation process drives the writing of a draft. The draft is reviewed and this ultimately leads to the final product. The research design will seek to capture this
process of identifying the need then conducting the research and conduct limited consultation to produce a draft. These are the three considerations that will be pursued in more detail in an effort to optimize the research design.

Generic Research Methodology Options

This research design will largely be dependent on the detailed independent analysis of the strategic level doctrine of the U.S., U.K., and China. The resources and time available will not allow for the utilization of questionnaires and interviews of politicians or high ranking officers of the JDF. Another issue to note is that the analysis of the doctrinal guidance from the named countries will be based on exactly what is written in the respective documents. It is acknowledged that there are real or perceived weaknesses in the strategic level doctrine in these countries. This analysis will instead focus on the underlying intent of the structure and concepts rather than how well the intent is executed or how achievable it is in those environments. Whereas this may be considered a systemic weakness it is supported sufficiently by the extent of contact time the writer has spent in the military training institutions of each country. There is a wealth of information deriving from academic discussions with the officers and soldiers who actively make the transition from doctrine to operations undertaken by the armed forces of the respective countries. The research design in this instance will rely on the reading and analysis of doctrine and related environmental factors.

Factors that Influence the Development of Strategic Level Doctrine

There are two underlying facts that form the core principles of this research. The first fact is that the doctrines of the respective countries were developed to serve the
context of that country. It affects the environmental considerations and interests that are unique and peculiar to that country. This fact causes the research to examine the environmental facts of each country in order to appreciate the context under which the doctrinal guidelines were formed.

The second core principle is the simple recognition that the doctrine of one country can never be transplanted to another. The research analysis and design will therefore focus on capturing the essence of the doctrinal elements. This will also drive an in depth analysis of the Jamaican environment and status so that the uniqueness of the context is sufficiently considered. In keeping with the examination of the factors, the research design will commence with the NSS, NDS, and NMS of the, U.S and the strategic and operational national planning documents of the U.K., China, and Jamaica. These documents constitute a formal statement on the current status of the security environment and the capabilities which are desirable by the armed forces to achieve their objectives.

The next step will be to examine the established organizational structure and stated values. These details will normally be specified or implied from other data. The structure and value system are significant factors that demonstrates the uniqueness of the process. The military experiences of the respective countries are implicitly stated in their doctrine. The Jamaican SDR will play a great role in shaping the way forward. It is a document sanctioned at the highest level and must be considered as the base document. The SDR contains essential information that would have otherwise been obtained from a U.S. NDS and NMS. This is being done in the absence of these planning documents from
the Jamaican situation. A complete review and analysis will be done to identify gaps and key considerations in the formulation of doctrine.

There is a peculiarity with the Chinese in terms of not having a published doctrine. The Chinese base their strategic doctrinal guidance from the successive leadership of the country over the many years. The experience and value system of the Chinese is therefore captured by the consideration of the tenets touted by the successive leaders of the military establishment. The Chinese national defense strategy publications are also used a credible source from which doctrinal guidance can be deduced. The legal systems are very different amongst the countries being examined. The U.S. is a Federal Republic with a president. The U.K. is a parliamentary system and has a monarch which plays a role in its politics though the country is administered by the prime minister. The Chinese is largely governed by a dictatorship that is reinforced by a powerful military infrastructure. Jamaica is a former colony of the British that shares the same head of state (though ceremonial) and practices a parliamentary democracy. The constitutional underpinnings and legal system plays a varying role in the development of doctrinal guidance. The research is largely structured to extract the legal considerations from the doctrine itself or as is the case of the U.S. Goldwater Nichols’s Act, recognize instances where there might be a need for further legislative work.

History, political science and sociology are factors that are briefly explored. There is infinite value in briefly exploring the history and politics of each country. The deductions to be drawn from this analysis will be critical in sorting out the take away points. It is this factor that will form two wider approaches. The first is to derive strategic doctrine solely on the basis of what exists and secondly to derive doctrinal guidance from
material modifications to the current system and structures. The Jamaican environment is viewed in this context. It is a state that has pieces and parts which evolved over time. The considerations presented in this research aims to enable a leap on the learning curve.

Development is a process that can be managed by forcing a change at the right time. This is the context within which the recommendations are extracted from the analysis of the countries.

Military theory is a key component of doctrine. Carl von Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini, Mao Tse-Tung and Sun Tzu are among some of the military writers that have impacted the development of strategic military doctrine as examined in this thesis. The application of their teachings to doctrine is to be extracted implicitly in some cases and directly in others. The principles of war are a direct manifestation of the teachings of these military writers. It is for us to be able to assess the current environment and modify the principles to meet the current threat. Past and current joint and multinational doctrine will be a major source of the research. The structure and contents of strategic level doctrine will be of distinct importance to inform a Jamaican context. This based on the fact that there is no institutional framework for the formulation of doctrine.

There are implied criteria that will be derived based on the examination of the environment and other factors. It is criteria and principles such as national power, joint doctrine, unity of command, command expertise and training, staff and line responsibilities, the peoples war, full spectrum operations, defined capabilities, disposition, and multinational integration that will form a basis for consideration. These are some of the elements to be taken away from the examination of the factors. There are certain universal elements that all nations will need to embrace in their military doctrine.
or face defeat and failure. It is these fundamentals that we must extract and ensure that they guide the formulation of doctrinal guidance for the JDF.

The Process

The process of doctrinal development first requires the development of a need. This need is often represented by the NMS or lessons learned from current conflicts. This requirement influences the research design to explore that critical gap that the respective countries sought to close in the development of their doctrine. The same consideration affects the approach to identify the needs of the JDF. Strategic level doctrine seeks to achieve the fundamental principles of unity of effort and unity of command. The take away from seeking to achieve this endeavor is to explore the components of the armed forces and its associated agencies to see how each country is able to drive a cohesive relationship. It is this relationship that the JDF will be interested toward compiling the development of strategic level doctrine. The broad steps to be adopted will firstly be a description of the main elements of strengths identified within the doctrine. The second step will be to reconcile those strengths with the Jamaican environment. The third step is to extract the main elements considered to be relevant, desirable and meeting the requirement of the JDF.

Summary

It is having gone through the process of unearthing the fundamental principles contained in other doctrine that a set of recommendations will ensue. The strategic level doctrine of the JDF will be shaped by the guidance of the best minds and militaries of the world. The information will be evaluated totally on the basis of local, regional and global
environmental conditions. The shape and structure has to conform to the local culture and resource constraints.
CHAPTER 7

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Strategic level doctrine aims to achieve unity of command and unity of effort. This chapter aims to bring together the considerations for the outline of strategic level doctrine for the JDF. The discourse has, up to now, analyzed the theoretical aspects of doctrine, the strategic doctrine of the U.S., China, and the U.K., and the relevance to the Jamaican environment. The aim at this point is to combine the individual considerations to formulate a complete package of considerations for the JDF.

The structure for this chapter will firstly entail a summary of the generic considerations for strategic level doctrine. The components or agencies involved will then be named and analyzed in detail by way of extracting the relevant aspects from the U.S., U.K. and China. Having considered the components we will then examine the establishment of military regions. This will deal with the territorial management and coverage as a means to optimize the reaction capability of the force.

The principle of joint doctrine will be discussed in terms of its practical application for the JDF. The discussion will culminate by looking at some non tangible elements of values, psychology, and ethos being recommended for synchronizing the roles of each of the agencies or stakeholder entities. The non tangibles can be considered to be a melting pot of principles drawn from the doctrine of the countries studied. This is aimed at giving the leadership a myriad of considerations to assist them in formulating courses of action at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This will lead the
discussion to the desired end state, which are recommendations for a strategic level doctrinal package for the JDF.

Strategic level doctrine first identifies the different components and agencies of the defense infrastructure. The roles and command structure of each service (army, air component, sea component) of the armed forces must then be defined. The roles and command structure of the armed forces must be subsequently defined in the context of working with government, non-government and international agencies in the pursuit of the defense objectives. The stakeholder cadre of the political directorate, armed forces senior and junior leadership, the leadership of government and non-government institutions, the media, civil populous and allied states must be sent a clear message as to the ethos of the organization. The doctrine must then embrace and endorse those principles of war that the leadership must embrace in the planning and execution of its actions. The doctrine must articulate a core value system that deals with the nature that guides conduct, and discipline. These are the tenets/criteria of doctrine that is to be shaped for the JDF.

The Jamaican agencies/entities involved locally include, the population, Ministry of National Security (MNS), Defence Board, National Security Council (NSC), Headquarters Jamaica Defence Force (HQ JDF), Joint Operations Command (JOC), Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management ODPEM), Department of Correctional Services (DCS), and the media. The agencies involved regionally and internationally include; regional armed forces, Defence attaches (U.S./SOUTHCOM, U.K., Canada, and China) and the U.N. It is these agencies
internally and externally that must be coordinated with the JDF to achieve the mandates of the NSS.

The Jamaica Defence Force’s Doctrinal Message to Its Stakeholders

The aim of doctrine and message to the agencies outlined will be the first focus for consideration. This principle of implanting a message to each agency is extracted from British doctrine. The overall message to all involved is that we must achieve unity of effort and unity of command. The JDF needs the support of all stakeholders in order to achieve its mission. The JDF will need the support of its allies for direct developmental and logistical military support. The JDF will need the support of population which is the centre of gravity of our struggle. The JDF will need every government agency to enable it to optimize the reach of its resources. The nature of the environment and resource constraints has literally forced the necessity to synchronize and so benefit from the competitive advantages held by the respective agencies involved. More specifically the message to the political directorate must be aimed at obtaining clear guidance and non interference with operational considerations. The political culture of Jamaica is suspicious of government’s interference. Unclear strategic guidance has been found to be culpable for the failure of military action in many theatres in the past. The JDF must be a beacon of justice for all as the organization shapes its relationships to allow commanders clarity of thought in formulating the mission. The political directorate is expected to provide clear guidance and allow the corporate space for the mission to be executed using purely military principles and techniques. This principle is extracted from the writings of Sun Tzu and continues to plague military operations in many places of the world.
The JDF like many other armed forces constitute one of the instruments of public policy. Public policy is ultimately determined by the people. The population is comprised of several different groupings lobbying the government for their own interests. It is the selection, and prioritization of the accumulated interests that determine public policy. The JDF must track all aspects of public policy in order to inform the understanding necessary for battle command. Influence must be brought on the minister of defense to help to shape the public policy on defense matters. The JDF must be given clear political guidance. The political polarization of the country does however add a dynamic to the consideration. It is a perception by members of the public that the ruling political party has manipulated the operational decision making to meet the interests of the party in power. This perception should not be ignored but should be factored in considerations when public defense policy is being derived. This will be a key role of the CDS in setting the conditions when the public policy is being formulated. The minister of defense having decided on public policy must then not interfere with operational considerations. Military practitioners must be held accountable for the execution of operations to meet the end state set by public policy.

Applying “The Peoples’ War” Concept to the Jamaican Context

The message to the population must also be perpetually communicated to the different interest groups. The principles of this message must be guided by the concepts of the people’s war as extracted from the analysis of the Chinese doctrine. The population is the centre of gravity for defense and all other matters of public policy. The engagement of the people must be institutionalized and form a basis for all strategic, operation and
tactical considerations. It is especially critical for the investments in the sustained engagement of the population. This is a psychological approach that will serve to make the JDF a significant part of the lives of the people. The JDF must not be perceived to be the oppressors of the people especially since the operations are largely internal and concentrated in the poverty stricken urban centers. The legitimacy of the JDF roles must be articulated in order to calm debates about defense and the economy.

The message to the people must be that the JDF is a facilitator for the security and well being of their families. We must craft a perpetual message that the JDF is for the people and their mobilization will be necessary to affect the defense objectives. The Chinese, despite its cultural differences, are masters at engaging the population with the armed forces. The effort must not be a short or medium term engagement but a lifetime. The other target audiences must be warned to expect a warrior ethos guided by discipline, professionalism, agility and flexibility. This address to the target audience will serve to shape the expectations of all the parties involved.

Defense Agencies

The next step will be for us to deal with the issues affecting the individual agencies. The establishment of a separate MOD will be a consideration that derived from the presence of a dedicated defense ministry in the countries studied. The JDF would therefore fall under the MOD and the MNS would deal with the other eight departments and agencies: JCF, Passport Citizenship and Immigration Agency (PCIA), Private Security Registration Authority (PSRA), Firearm Licensing Authority of Jamaica (FLA), Department of Correctional Services (DCS), Police Civilian Oversight Authority (PCOA), and Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Centre. A separate
The defense ministry has the advantage of creating focused and uninterrupted attention to defense matters. It is acknowledged that this consideration may not find political favor given the cost of establishing a new ministry and the prevailing economic considerations. It is on this basis that legislative action is desirable in the interim to reinforce the executive separation of the JDF from the MNS.

The next defense entity for consideration is the NSC. The NSC is a critical component of the defense mechanism. The Jamaican government has already committed to the establishment of a NSC in its NSS. This entity has served the U.S. in defining its defense priorities. The U.K. government has also recently found wisdom in the establishment of a NSC. The Chinese CMC performs a similar function in assessing the environment and defining the objectives and capabilities required for the fight. Jamaica stands to benefit from the establishment of the NSC. This fact has already been accepted and the decisions pertaining to its composition must now be fuelled by the criteria of relevance to the task. The analysis leads to recommended composition of the prime minister, deputy prime minister, minister of foreign affairs and foreign trade, minister of national security, minister of justice and the minister of industry investment and commerce. The members of the NSC must be chosen based on government appointments. This is a political decision but will have doctrinal implications because it sets up the command structure. This part of the command structure is made complete by the role of the CDS as chief advisor to the NSC on defense matters.

The NSC will play the critical role of refining the NSS. The MOD will then extract its defense mandate and formulate a NDS. The CDS will then have a responsibility to formulate the NMS. These are important steps that will set up the lines
of communication and direction for the JDF. This line of communication is necessary to shape the capabilities and doctrine of the JDF. The coordination mechanism enshrined in law will provide the unity of command, unity of effort and enhance the reaction capability of the force. This aspect of strategic doctrine will serve to establish the public policy interests and threat assessment. The issues of harnessing national power by inter and intra agency relationships are also captured in the NSS. The NDS outlines the capability requirements joint approach in harnessing the capacities of the armed forces. The NMS deals with the capabilities issue at the operational level.

Military Regions

The next critical consideration is that the establishment of land based military regions or strategic commands to cover the territorial space. The JDF must consider the delineation of an internal geographic commands or military regions as cited in the Chinese security structure. This component of the analysis and recommendations also has to do with an efficient mechanism to enable contingency planning. County commands (Cornwall, Middlesex and Surrey) may be established and lieutenant colonels be appointed to run those commands. The commands will comprise a planning cell with or without operational troops assigned. The location of the planning cells can be sited within the counties using already established military bases or existing government owned structures within these areas. The main function of the command is to develop contingency plans for the area and to shape the relationships with the local population, government and non government institutions. The faults of the current disposition are sufficiently exposed when the force deploys island wide for example during national elections. Kingston and St Catherine comprise the areas where there is a persistent
military presence throughout the year and as such shaping operations and relationships are well established. Other areas of the island, conversely are not sufficiently covered.

**Redefining the Joint Operational Command**

The JCF will be a key entity in the relationship building in the respective commands. This relationship will bring into focus yet another command entity to be developed. This entity is the Joint Operational Command (JOC). This is to be expanded from the concept of coordinating JCF/JDF operations, but can embrace the coordination with other agencies; namely the correctional services and ODPEM. This planning and command cell is yet another staff element that will deal with all the considerations to enable the synchronized activities between the JDF and other agencies, be it government or non government. Figure 2 attempts to capture the relationship proposed for the respective agencies and departments. The relationship is aimed at benefitting from the planning framework that is inherent in the structure.

**Modularity and the Jamaica Defence Force**

The principle of modularity currently being practiced by the U.S. Armed Forces is based on an objective of composing troops to fit the task. It is a “plug and play” concept that treats with operational requirements in terms of defined functionalities. These functionalities tie in to the concept of established WFF as discussed earlier. The task may favor different degrees each of the WFF as considerations of offensive, defensive and security assistance and cooperation take place. The task is managed by a task force commander who is appointed for a specific period. This command structure has been practiced by the JDF in part during a protracted period of engagement to assist the
correctional services. This is therefore a consideration worth exploring by the JDF since it supports the coordinating function of the JOC and territorial command structure.

Figure 2. Proposed Strategic Organization of the JDF

Source: Created by author.
Joint Command and the Jamaica Defence Force

The concept of joint command takes on unique considerations when viewed in the Jamaican context. This discussion is taking place at this time since each of the countries studied recognizes the significance of the employment of joint warfare. As a consequence this is chosen as the opportune time to discuss how the JDF can benefit from the concept of joint and combined warfare. We will first deal with the issue of definitions for joint warfare and combined warfare. This will set up the understanding of the variance between the generic definition and the Jamaican context. Joint warfare is based on the integration of the different service branches into a unified command. On the other hand this quote is captured from a document dealing with the matter of combined arms which states:

For centuries, the world has witnessed the development and use of increasingly complex and powerful military systems and technologies. In the process, the "art of war" has truly become the art of combined arms warfare, in which infantry, artillery, air support, intelligence, and other key elements are all coordinated for maximum effect. (House n.d.)

The foundation of integration is common, whereas the distinction is in terms of scales. Joint warfare depicts a greater scale of integration of the service branches than combined arms warfare.

The joint command concept is aimed at achieving unity of effort and unity of command. Joint operations are aimed at concentrating and synchronizing firepower and other resources to defeat an enemy. There are three critical factors that impact joint operations and joint command in the JDF context. The factors include; the headquarters level that the fight takes place, the resources available and the peculiarities of internal
security operations. Each of these factors will be explored in an attempt to capture the unique considerations with respect to doctrinal guidance at the strategic level.

The JDF is a brigade group organization and as such the CDS and HQ JDF has command of the infantry, air wing, coast guard and support units. HQ JDF staff scarcely commands operations unless the entire force is deployed. This usually takes place during general/national elections or in the event of a natural disaster. Routine operations are pushed down to the battalion and company levels of the infantry and other units. The infantry battalions provide the main effort for internal security operations. Other units are essentially supporting elements despite the fact that they will have unit specific missions and tasks. The infantry battalion headquarters therefore makes the assessment and requests of HQ JDF the support of the other services. These internal security type operations, in assistance to the JCF, imply a defined command relationship with that entity. The critical issue of joint command is that a joint force commander takes charge of a staff that coordinates the integration of the resources allocated by two or more of the service branches for an indefinite period. The U.S. Army invested in the concept of combat teams as a means to provide functionally self sufficient units to the fight. Rightly tailored for county commands, this reduces the extent of coordination between traditional infantry, mechanized, armor and support elements. The fact that the fight is at the company level draws the consideration of establishing combat teams at the company level. The second element is the reinforcement of the broadening of the roles of the JOC.

The issue of resources is also a key consideration for the application of the concept of joint command in the JDF context. The JDF has light infantry units with grave problems with armored personnel carriers. This has dire effects on the mobility
capabilities of the units. The air capability obtains within the air wing. This unit provides light observation and troop transport capabilities. The coast guard maintains routine patrols of the territorial waters but has no truly marine/amphibious capability. The resource issue highlights the heavy reliance on coordination amongst units to achieve effectiveness.

The recommendation from this discourse is that the JDF moves to institutionalize company combat teams (CCT) which are coordinated by the JOC. CCTs will constitute a fighting unit that can be modularized to meet the threat. The JOC role must be expanded and staffed to be able to plan and coordinate the activities of the combat teams. This strategic model has been executed by the JDF on a limited and informal basis in the past. This was to deal with isolated incidents of violence in specific parts of the island. This is the reason why the recommendation states the need to institutionalize the arrangement as part of its strategic level doctrine. The respective units will assign forces as directed by the JOC to form a task force for an indefinite period. This is a middle ground option that best represents an incremental change to the way the JDF will fight internal security threats. The battalions will then be primarily responsible for the training and provision of troops that will be assigned to joint force commanders. The recommendation is aimed at benefitting from the lessons of modularity in the U.S. and joint force commands utilized by all the countries examined.

**Binding Non Tangible Principles and Troop Ethos**

At this juncture we will recommend principles which will guide the leadership at the operational level. This ultimately results in us crossing the divide between operational and strategic level doctrine. This technique of providing operational guidance within the
realms of strategic level doctrine is extracted primarily from the British and Chinese. This analysis will constitute a compilation of very broad considerations that commanders can use to shape their thinking at the operational and tactical level. These principles are sufficiently important that operational doctrine has been written to guide commanders in these areas. For example, internal security doctrine which espouses principles of intelligence, limited force, rules of engagement and non lethal targeting, gets into far greater detail and meaning. Operational and tactical doctrine is not the aim of this paper but the fact is mentioned to better shape the intent of including these considerations in our discussion of JDF strategic level doctrine.

The JDF’s approach to military operations is to be guided by an overall strategy. The strategic, operational and tactical centers of gravity will form the basis of our actions. Critical requirements and vulnerabilities must shape the development of decisive, shaping and sustaining efforts. Battle rhythm and design must shape the synchronization of resources in the domination of the battle space and defeat of adversaries. The JDF is a facilitator for the economic and political independence and freedom of the Jamaican population. The people of Jamaica will be the center of our decisions as we seek to protect their aspirations.

The philosophy of command must be consistent with enabling initiative, pragmatic action and flexibility of thought. We must centralize our planning but decentralize its execution. Operations must be based on offensive action and preemption in an effort to arrive at a decisive outcome. Defensive action can never achieve a decisive result. We must embrace a warrior ethos, that is robust and determine to achieve victory even in a protracted fight. We must out maneuver and out think agile adversaries with
fractious commands as is characteristic of global terrorism and organized criminal activity. Offensive action must be balanced by a genuine approach to achieve a decisive outcome without firing a shot. This will embrace the principles of deterrence, non lethal targeting and diplomatic action as internal security considerations. Commanders at the senior level must be mindful of managing the expectations at all levels. The JDF recognizes the need to achieve public policy by political action. The JDF will set the conditions and provide a secure environment which will facilitate the pursuit of a political solution. Knowledge of the political objectives and considerations will inform the overall fabric of operations.

The JDF development and leadership must strive to embrace self introspection, innovation, training, science, technology and education. The capacity of all must be engaged to achieve concentration of force, integration and synchronization of all entities involved in the fight. Information, intelligence, deception and multinational cooperation will guide our approach to defeat adversaries internally, regionally or globally. The JDF core values of discipline, integrity, knowledge, commitment, courage and loyalty will guide the leadership at all levels.

The JDF will find an experienced partner in the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate based at the United States Combined Arms Centre based at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The entity is staffed by a cadre of professionals in the development of doctrine in the U.S. and many other armed forces which are U.S. allies. The details of the entity may be sourced at website address:

Concluding Remarks

The road to the establishment of a doctrinal agenda is long and hard. The resources required to sustain an institution of doctrinal leadership is equally great. The value to be achieved by establishing doctrine remains the most important guide to our thinking on the management of military force. The JDF is involved in several “fights” (for resources) that must be resolved at the strategic, and operational levels. It is the view of the author that the establishment of strategic level doctrine for the JDF is at this point in time one of its’ most significant endeavors on its agenda. Strategic deficiencies and scarcely corrected at the operational and tactical levels and hence the importance of getting this aspect of our planning right. This doctrine embraces the role and responsibility of the political directorate. The political directorates are our bosses and we must shape the relationship and the communication elements to facilitate the achievement of the aim. The JDF has a responsibility to understand the political agenda and our role in it. The most significant message in doctrine is the need to depend on others. There is need to coordinate, and synchronize resources, and there is a need to understand the perspective of all the stakeholders, as we venture to do our part. These are the considerations for the establishment of strategic level doctrine for the Jamaica Defence Force.
REFERENCE LIST


Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2007. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


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Mr. Kenneth C. Ferris
Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Dr. Richard S. Faulkner
Department of Military History
USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. Bernard F. Harris, Jr.
Command and General Staff School
USACGSC
100 Stimson Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Brigadier Antony Anderson
Chief of Defence Staff
Headquarters Jamaica Defence Force
Up Park Camp
Kingston 5
Jamaica

Colonel Rocky Meade
Headquarters Jamaica Defence Force
Up Park Camp
Kingston 5
Jamaica