ASSESSING THE INFLUENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES’ NUCLEAR DETERRENT ON
THE CHINA-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

by

David L. Stanford, Jr.

December 2010

Thesis Co-Advisors: Wade L. Huntley
Robert J. Weiner

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To what extent has the United States’ guaranteed nuclear deterrent to Japan influenced the security relationship between China and Japan? The conventional wisdom holds that while the overall balance of U.S. influence has been to both ameliorate and exacerbate tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, Washington’s nuclear guarantees in particular have served to reduce tensions by helping to prevent a nuclear-armed Japan. Much scholarly work has been dedicated to analyzing the U.S. impact on the China-Japan relationship generally and the prediction of increased tensions resulting from changes to the U.S. nuclear umbrella (namely, development of ballistic missile defense). However, little attention has been paid to assessing how the magnitude and direction of U.S. influence have varied over time and whether the predictions of a worsening Sino-Japanese security dilemma have come to fruition. Conducting a historical analysis of the period 1945–present, this thesis finds that the influence of U.S. extended deterrence is more nuanced. While the strongest influence has been to ameliorate long-term hostilities, the influence most frequently felt was exacerbation of short-term tensions. This influence notwithstanding, this thesis finds that changes in the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Japan have infrequently been associated with changes in the China-Japan security relationship.
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ASSESSING THE INFLUENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES’ NUCLEAR DETERRENT ON
THE CHINA-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

To what extent has the United States’ guaranteed nuclear deterrent to Japan influenced the security relationship between China and Japan? The conventional wisdom holds that while the overall balance of U.S. influence has been to both ameliorate and exacerbate tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, Washington’s nuclear guarantees in particular have served to reduce tensions by helping to prevent a nuclear-armed Japan. Much scholarly work has been dedicated to analyzing the U.S. impact on the China-Japan relationship generally and the prediction of increased tensions resulting from changes to the U.S. nuclear umbrella (namely, development of ballistic missile defense). However, little attention has been paid to assessing how the magnitude and direction of U.S. influence have varied over time and whether the predictions of a worsening Sino-Japanese security dilemma have come to fruition. Conducting a historical analysis of the period 1945–present, this thesis finds that the influence of U.S. extended deterrence is more nuanced. While the strongest influence has been to ameliorate long-term hostilities, the influence most frequently felt was exacerbation of short-term tensions. This influence notwithstanding, this thesis finds that changes in the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Japan have infrequently been associated with changes in the China-Japan security relationship.
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<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty</td>
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<td>ASAT</td>
<td>Anti-satellite weapon</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic missile defense</td>
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<td>BMDO</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense Organization</td>
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<td>BMDR</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>CLB</td>
<td>Cabinet Legislative Bureau</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Central Military Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
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<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>DF</td>
<td>Deng Feng (“East Wind”)</td>
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<td>EASR</td>
<td>East Asia Strategy Review</td>
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<td>GPALS</td>
<td>Global Protection Against Limited Attacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate range ballistic missile</td>
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<td>JCG</td>
<td>Japan Coast Guard</td>
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<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japan Defense Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>JL</td>
<td>Julong (“Giant Wave”)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMSDF</td>
<td>Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
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<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party)</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutually-assured destruction</td>
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<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicle</td>
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<td>MST</td>
<td>Mutual Security Treaty (U.S.-Japan)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDPG</td>
<td>National Defense Program Guideline</td>
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<td>NDPO</td>
<td>National Defense Program Outline</td>
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<td>NFU</td>
<td>No First Use</td>
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<td>NMD</td>
<td>National missile defense</td>
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<td>NPR</td>
<td>Nuclear Posture Review, NPR Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance</td>
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<td>PAA</td>
<td>Phased, Adaptive Approach</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
<td>Patriot Advanced Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLAN</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army (Navy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTBT</td>
<td>Partial Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNEP</td>
<td>Robust nuclear earth penetrator</td>
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<td>RRW</td>
<td>Reliable replacement warhead</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty</td>
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<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander Allied Powers</td>
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<td>SCC</td>
<td>Security Consultative Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self-Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDIO</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIOP</td>
<td>Single Integrated Operations Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>Submarine-launched ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>Standard Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SORT</td>
<td>Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>Ballistic missile submarine</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theater missile defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNW</td>
<td>Theater or tactical nuclear weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>WESTPAC</td>
<td>Western Pacific Missile Architecture</td>
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</table>
First and foremost, I must thank God for providing me with the patience and wisdom to complete this thesis. Just as David facing Goliath, I know that I have finished this task only with His help.

I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to my advisors, Drs. Robert Weiner and Wade Huntley, for their assistance (and patience) in helping a historian navigate the world of political science. In addition, my thanks go to my other professors in the Department of National Security Affairs, especially Dr. Alice Miller, Colonel Mark Chakwin, and Mr. Robin Sakoda. Despite this tremendous collective wisdom, however, the responsibility for any fault of fact or judgment remains my own.

Additionally, I would like to thank the friends I made in Monterey who provided much-needed encouragement and diversion during the thesis process. To my friends at NPS and in the Bay Area Christian Church—especially Rich, Ricardo, and Brent—you have helped me more than you probably realize.

Finally, and most importantly, I must express my thanks and love to my family for their enduring patience and unfailing love despite many long hours and late nights. Sarah, you encouraged me even when I thought I would never finish—well, I have. I could not have done this without your love and support. To my children, Charlotte and James—you finally have your daddy back. This thesis is dedicated to you. I love you all.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis endeavors to answer the question: To what extent has the United States’ guaranteed nuclear deterrent to Japan influenced the security relationship between China and Japan? This thesis assesses whether U.S. actions have ameliorated or exacerbated the severity of the Sino-Japanese security dilemma and how that influence has varied over time.

While the China-Japan security relationship is at least the sum of Sino-Japanese interactions, there is also a qualitative nature to it which forms the context within which these interactions take place. The conventional wisdom holds that while the overall balance of U.S. influence has been to both ameliorate and exacerbate tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, Washington’s nuclear guarantees in particular have served to reduce tensions by helping to prevent a nuclear-armed Japan. Recent changes in the U.S. nuclear umbrella—in particular, ballistic missile defense (BMD)—are expected to exacerbate the security dilemma between China and Japan. By evaluating policy documents and statements by government officials, as well as analyzing quantitative and qualitative changes in military postures among all three nations, this thesis assesses whether and how the security relationship between China and Japan has been influenced by changes to U.S. nuclear posture.

B. IMPORTANCE

The China-Japan-United States triangle is one of the most important and complex regional, trilateral relationships. These nations are the three largest economies and, with Germany, four largest exporters and importers in the world.1 They carry great political weight in a region characterized by instability, with tensions ranging from nuclear proliferation to the reunification of two nations divided since the end of World War II.

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The United States has the most technologically advanced military in the world, Japan is slowly increasing the role of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in international affairs, and China is continuing to rapidly modernize what is already the world’s largest armed force, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Interstate relationships are, like interpersonal relationships, immensely complex.\(^2\) On the one hand is a (relatively) simple matter of what each party does to the other, or how one reacts to actions by the other. On the other hand is a very subjective assessment of the quality or character of the relationship. Are the two parties friends, enemies, or mutually ignorant of each other? It is in this qualitative sense that the China-Japan security relationship is especially complex. Even in the pre-1972 absence of formal diplomatic recognition, the informal ties and significant bilateral trade would indicate that neither Tokyo nor Beijing ignored the other. China and Japan could hardly be described as enemies—they have had formal diplomatic relations for forty years, carry on extensive economic trade, and cooperate on some important regional security issues, most notably the Six-Party Talks over North Korea’s nuclear program. Yet, the Sino-Japanese security relationship is not always one that could be described as amicable. China and Japan have a long-standing historical animosity, in addition to mutual suspicions about the other’s military buildup. As will be discussed in Section E of this chapter, both a long-term and short-term qualitative evaluation must be made.

The mutual suspicion and uncertainty of motives between Beijing and Tokyo means that even if both sides were to pursue purely defensive capabilities, there would nevertheless exist the potential for a Sino-Japanese arms race, or even the possibility of outright war. Such a situation could have several negative consequences, not the least of which could entail U.S. entry into the conflict through the mechanism of the long-standing U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (MST), thus pitting the United States in a war against China. To the degree that U.S. policy may have driven or prevented this conflict, it is important to understand the extent of U.S. influence in Sino-Japanese security relations.

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\(^2\) I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Professors Huntley and Weiner and their various analogies to interpersonal relationships for their assistance in helping me conceptualize this paragraph.
There is a consensus that the overall balance of the United States’ influence, through its alliance with Japan, has been to both ameliorate and exacerbate the severity of the security dilemma between China and Japan. Understanding the extent of U.S. influence—“how much” of an impact the United States has had—will help policymakers in Washington appreciate the security dynamic between Beijing and Tokyo. If U.S. actions have tended to ameliorate the security dilemma between China and Japan, policymakers could rely on similar actions as a damper on Sino-Japanese tension. If, however, the impact of U.S. actions has been to exacerbate the security dilemma, causing one or the other party to take increasingly provocative steps, policymakers could consider alternatives to such actions. A third contingency, that the United States has no appreciable influence in the China-Japan security relationship, must not be discounted.

This thesis will use the U.S. nuclear deterrent as a lens for analyzing U.S. influence on the Sino-Japanese security relationship. Nuclear deterrence is an aspect of trilateral relations of an enduring nature, spanning from the depths of the Cold War to the present day. At the same time, while long-lasting, it has not been monolithic, evolving to include not just deterrence of nuclear attack but also the possibility of defending against missiles after they have been launched.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

There are several specific aspects to consider in assessing the extent to which the United States has influenced the Sino-Japanese security relationship. The first is whether the balance of U.S. influence has done more to ameliorate or exacerbate the security dilemma between Japan and China. The second is whether that influence has remained constant or has changed over time. The influence of the United States could be broken down into two components: direction (i.e., amelioration or exacerbation) and magnitude (i.e., how much influence does the United States exert).

This thesis hypothesizes that both the direction and magnitude of U.S. influence have varied over time. Broadly speaking, the influence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella has shifted from having a general effect of amelioration during the Cold War, toward a general effect of exacerbation in the post-Cold War, and especially post-9/11, era. While
the United States applied pressure on Japan throughout the 1950s and 1960s to maintain a united front against the perceived monolithic Communist bloc of China and the Soviet Union should have exacerbated tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, the situation was ameliorated through the impact of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, obviating the need for Japan to develop an indigenous nuclear force. Beginning with Sino-American (and Sino-Japanese) rapprochement in 1972, U.S. interactions with China and Japan created conditions that allowed Tokyo and Beijing to warm up to each other and thus further ameliorate the security dilemma, despite the enduring controversies of history and territorial conflicts. With the end of the Cold War, the United States took steps to redefine and strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, encouraging Japan to assume a more prominent (military) role in international affairs generally and alliance activities specifically. The inclusion of missile defense into the broader U.S. strategic deterrence led to Japan’s joint development of missile defense programs, raising Beijing’s fear about new-found militarism in Tokyo and thus exacerbating the Sino-Japanese security dilemma.

This thesis further hypothesizes that the magnitude of U.S. influence has followed a more muddled path. Broadly speaking, Washington’s influence in Tokyo and Beijing are inversely related. During the early part of the Cold War, the United States had great influence in Japan and very little in China. Following Sino-American rapprochement and normalization, the United States gained more influence in China; the cost, however, was influence with Japan, as Tokyo and Beijing themselves grew closer. Following the end of the Cold War, trilateral relations were significantly altered. Without a mutual Soviet enemy and as a consequence of post-Tiananmen sanctions, the United States lost what little influence it had in Beijing; changes in Japanese domestic politics led to Tokyo pushing for increased foreign policy independence from Washington. By the mid-1990s, however, Japanese policymakers had a more uncertain assessment of their own national security, allowing the United States to exert more influence through the mechanism of the alliance. This influence increased greatly following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, while strained relations with Beijing meant that Washington continued to have little influence over Chinese policy.
D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The security dilemma is the mechanism by which “trying to increase one’s security can actually decrease it.”3 This is because:

[In an uncertain and anarchic international system, mistrust between two or more potential adversaries can lead each side to take precautionary and defensively motivated measures that are perceived as offensive threats. This can lead to countermeasures in kind, thus ratcheting up regional tensions, reducing security, and creating self-fulfilling prophecies about the danger of one’s security environment.]4

The potential thus exists for defensive actions by China or Japan to cause increasing tension between the two. There is a consensus in the literature that the broad pattern of Cold War-era U.S. influence in Sino-Japanese relations has been to at once ameliorate and exacerbate the security dilemma. From the Chinese perspective, while the U.S.-Japan alliance was an integral part of the American strategy to contain to Communist bloc—which included China—the alliance also served to prevent the post-World War II remilitarization of Japan.5 For Japan, concerns of attack (while primarily envisioned as from the Soviet Union) were assuaged by the large U.S. military presence in Japan; Tokyo needed neither its own military force nor nuclear weapons as its security was provided in large part by Washington.6 Thus, most analysts agree that, to the extent that

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Japan did not take steps to rearm, conventionally or with nuclear weapons, the U.S. influence during the Cold War had an ameliorative effect.

Reflecting the strategic ambiguity of the post-Cold War era, the literature divides on the state of the China-Japan security relationship and the U.S. role in the post-Cold War era. Thomas Christensen, T.J. Pempel, and others believe that, at least in the early 1990s, the situation between Japan and China changed little, with U.S. influence continuing to balance between amelioration and exacerbation. Around the middle of the decade, however, things changed. While the United States was already taking steps to strengthen its alliance with Japan (such as issuing revised cooperation guidelines which increased the missions and geographic area within which the SDF could operate in non-combat support of U.S. forces), the greatest shift came with Tokyo’s acquiescence to joint American-Japanese development of a BMD system with Washington following North Korea’s 1998 test of a Taepodong-1 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). China became more militarily assertive to dampen Taiwan’s increased leanings toward independence, and Beijing increased the pace of its ballistic missile modernization program.

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8 Nick Bisley, “Securing the ‘Anchor of Regional Stability’?: The Transformation of the US-Japan Alliance and East Asian Security,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 1 (2008), 75–6; Arase, 567–8; Samuels, 68–9, 82, 104; Christensen, “Security Dilemma in East Asia,” 59–61, 64; Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 389–90; Ross, 8–9. While the literature refers to programs such as theater missile defense (TMD, for defense of Japan) or national missile defense (NMD, defending the United States), I refer to them collectively as ballistic missile defense, or simply, missile defense programs.

The literature is virtually unanimous in identifying the year 2001 as pivotal in the U.S.-China-Japan triangle. The George W. Bush Administration came into office with clear plans to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance, and was predisposed to viewing China as a “strategic competitor.” The Bush Administration placed particular emphasis on development of land- and sea-based BMD systems both with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations in the West and Japan in the East. In the context of Japanese support for U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, most analysts argue not only that Sino-Japanese relations took a drastic turn toward tension and mutual suspicion, but that the United States was a primary driver in that change.\(^{10}\) There are a few dissenting opinions; several notable scholars claim that Bush’s second term took a more pragmatic, conciliatory approach toward China,\(^{11}\) while others point out that nationalist trends in Japanese politics have at least as much to do with worsening relations between Tokyo and Beijing.\(^{12}\) None of these authors, however, argue against the consensus that changes to Washington’s deterrent strategy, especially U.S.-Japan cooperation on BMD, have served to exacerbate tensions between China and Japan.

Much scholarly work has been dedicated to analyzing the U.S. impact on the China-Japan relationship generally and the prediction of increased tensions resulting from changes to the U.S. nuclear umbrella (namely, development of BMD). However, little attention has been paid in the literature to assessing how the magnitude and direction of U.S. influence have varied over time and whether the predictions of a worsening Sino-Japanese security dilemma have come to fruition. This thesis attempts, in small part, to fill that void.

\(^{10}\) Bisley, 79–81; Pempel, 112–3, 132; Arase, 570–2; Rosenbluth, Saito and Zinn, 587–8; Samuels, 99–103; Wu, 120–1; Berger, “Japan’s International Relations,” 156–7; Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma,” 14–5; Gaye Christoffersen, “The Role of East Asia in Sino-American Relations,” \textit{Asian Survey} 42, no. 3 (May–June, 2002), 371–2.

\(^{11}\) See, for example, Pempel, 126, 128–9; Victor D. Cha, “Winning Asia: Washington’s Untold Success Story,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 86, no. 6 (November–December, 2007), \url{http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58454/victor-d-cha/winning-asia} (accessed May 14, 2010); Rosenbluth, Saito and Zinn, 587.

\(^{12}\) This is essentially the whole of Arase’s argument in “Japan, The Active State?” See also Pempel, 121, 123–5; Samuels, esp. chapter 5.
E. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis conducts an historical analysis to assess how the magnitude and direction of U.S. influence have varied over time. The broad periods of analysis will be the early Cold War (roughly, 1945–1969), from Sino-American and Sino-Japanese rapprochement to the end of the Cold War (1969–1991), from the end of the Cold War to the September 11 attacks (1989–2001), and from September 11 to the present. Timelines are constructed comparing Japanese, Chinese, and U.S. actions, statements, and changes in military posture over time. This will assist in the analysis of how China and Japan have responded to each other, and whether U.S. actions had an influence on that response. Although the correlation (or non-correlation) of U.S. actions with changes in the China-Japan relationship will likely be easy to identify, determining whether the United States caused those changes will be more difficult to assess. To the extent possible, changes in Sino-Japanese tensions caused largely by factors other than the United States (for example, Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine) will be identified and excluded from the analysis.

There are, of course, shortcomings in the use of these historical markers. The “end of the Cold War” was not a definitive moment as much as it was a process; the events of September 11, 2001, themselves likely had little impact on trilateral strategic relations. It would be difficult, however, if not impossible to separate U.S. nuclear strategy in East Asia from either the broad historical trend of the Cold War or the context of post-9/11 U.S. security posture. The events chosen to demarcate these broad historical eras are admittedly not perfect, and are intended as a convenient tool for analysis.

A few definitions require explication for the purposes of this thesis. U.S. influence is considered to be the interaction of both direct, intentional efforts to influence an actor (such as pressure applied on Tokyo through the U.S.-Japan alliance) and more indirect (and perhaps unintended) consequences of U.S. actions.13 The following

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indicators of influence are used. Using either unilateral or (or, in the case of the U.S.-Japan alliance, bilateral) actions or governmental statements as a starting point, it will note the other party’s reaction. This reaction is expected to take one (or both) of two forms: a rebuttal statement or, more importantly, a significant change in military posture.

While the terms “nuclear umbrella” or “nuclear guarantee” typically refer to the doctrine of extended deterrence, this thesis considers four different definitions or scopes for the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The strictest definition pertains to the U.S. guarantee to use nuclear weapons in order to deter or defend against an attack on Japan only. An expanded definition encompasses such a guarantee to any nation or group of nations. An even broader definition incorporates BMD; while some may consider “defense” to be distinct from “deterrence,” the ability to defend against an incoming missile attack can itself serve to deter an adversary from initiating an attack in the first place, and thus is in keeping with U.S. promises to protect against nuclear attacks. A fourth definition is briefly considered: the actual use of nuclear weapons in constituting an existential deterrent. In measuring changes to the U.S. nuclear guarantee, indications of the strength or degree of this guarantee will include (1) the materiel required to effectively have a deterrent capability, (2) changes in the object of the deterrent, and (3) statements which go to the credibility of the deterrent. The measurement of U.S. influence is necessarily subjective, with magnitudes ranging from none, to little, to moderate and perhaps significant; direction will be measured in terms of ameliorating or exacerbating security dilemma dynamics between China and Japan.

As discussed earlier, evaluating the quality of the Sino-Japanese security relationship is complex. On the one hand is the long-term, “strategic” nature of the relationship, whether friends, enemies, or mutually ignorant (i.e., no formal

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On the other hand is the more short-term state of the relationship, which can be one of either cooperation or conflict. Thus states, as with people, can have varying degrees of relationships: long-time friends occasionally fight, just as sworn enemies might sometimes get along for a short time. As a tool of convenience, this thesis uses the classification scheme in Figure 1 for describing both the long-term and short-term nature of the China-Japan security relationship at a given point in time. Because security is more encompassing than just the military balance between two countries, the indicators of variation in the China-Japan security relationship will include (1) political interactions (for example, statements or rhetoric, visits by dignitaries, or bilateral summits); (2) economic interaction; and (3) military interaction, be it cooperation or more of an arms race dynamic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long-Term</th>
<th>Short-Term</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>Cooperation Friends</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ignorant</td>
<td>Tacit Friends</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enemies</td>
<td>Amicable Enemies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Classification of interstate relationships

The sources used for this thesis are varied. Primary sources include Chinese, Japanese, and U.S. defense posture statements, white papers, and other materials related to military postures; unilateral or bilateral statements (both formal, diplomatic documents and more informal comments by government officials); and the various iterations of U.S.-Japan joint defense guidelines. Because the author reads neither Chinese nor Japanese, significant reliance is placed on translated documents, as well as secondary sources

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15 It is acknowledged that this is not a perfect scheme, and the author makes no claim of this classification being able to completely describe the strategic relationship between states. Any such claim would quickly be refuted by a cursory study of the U.S.-USSR relationship during the Cold War: they were not enemies (as they did not engage each other directly in combat); they were not ignorant (as they maintained diplomatic relations for the entirety of the Cold War); but in no case could they be considered “friends,” at least not in the conventional sense of the term. In any event, for the relationship under examination here, this categorization of long-term trends is adequate, if imperfect.
comprised of scholarly analysis on U.S.-China-Japan relations. In addition, limited use of periodicals is made throughout the thesis, but especially in sections dealing with the post-9/11 era.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is organized into six main sections, of which this introduction is the first. The second analyzes the period of the early Cold War (roughly 1945–1969), with emphasis given to the development of China’s nuclear weapons program and the evolution of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Japan. The third section covers the period from Sino-American and Sino-Japanese rapprochement to the end of the Cold War (roughly 1969–1989). Particular attention is paid to the impact of Sino-American normalization, as well as maintenance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and assessment of any proposed Japanese involvement in the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The fourth section analyzes the period from the end of the Cold War until the September 11 terrorist attacks (1989–2001). In this section, specific attention is given to the United States’ post-Cold War nuclear posture, the status of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the beginnings of the BMD program. In the fifth section, analysis focuses on the post-9/11 era. Attention to the Bush Administration’s war on terror is limited mostly to its direct impact on U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China relations; most of this section focuses on the impacts of the accelerated BMD program and trilateral reactions to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. The last section summarizes the thesis’ findings and attempts to draw some policy implications.
II. THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1945–1969

The period from 1945 to 1969 witnessed the formulation and coalescing of the initial Cold War relationship between the United States, Japan, and China. During this time, Beijing and Tokyo went from a state of open war to a more ambiguous relationship. The United States’ nuclear deterrent also saw significant change during this period, growing from a handful of weapons perceived to be simply more effective artillery pieces, into a vast strategic deterrent against attacks not only on American soil, but on American friends and allies as well.

Tracing the evolution of the nuclear umbrella as well as the course of the China-Japan relationship, this chapter will demonstrate that the Eisenhower Administration’s threat to use nuclear weapons over Communist Chinese advances in the Taiwan Strait led to the development of a Chinese nuclear weapons program. This project, once consummated by the detonation of a nuclear device in 1964, caused increased Sino-Japanese tensions, leading Tokyo to petition Washington for explicit protection under the nuclear umbrella.

A. ENDING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

1. Hiroshima and Japan’s Surrender

On August 6, 1945, when the United States opened the nuclear age to public minds by dropping an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, the relationship between China and Japan was that of hostile enemies in the midst of their ninth year of war. On August 15, Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender, which was formalized on board USS Missouri on September 2. At this point, Japan lost its sovereignty, and its relationship with China became one of ignorant enemies—no diplomatic relations and still characterized by a state of war between them.

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16 In a technical sense, the nuclear age began with the July 17, 1945, “Trinity” test at Los Alamos, New Mexico. Because of the tremendous secrecy surrounding the Manhattan Project, however, it is unlikely that any nation would have been influenced by the U.S. nuclear program before Hiroshima.

It is frequently argued that the United States’ bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the proximate cause of Japan’s surrender, and thus one could argue that the budding U.S. nuclear capability led to the change in Sino-Japanese relations from hostile to ignorant. This is not, however, a foregone conclusion; some scholars suggest that the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific theater had at least as much influence on Japan’s surrender as did the nuclear bombings. What is more, by the summer of 1945 it was obvious that Japan was eventually going to lose the war, it was but a matter of when.\textsuperscript{18} In a sense, then, Sino-Japanese tensions were going to be ameliorated regardless of whether the United States used the atomic bomb. Would the nature of relations between China and Japan have been different if the war had ended in February 1946 instead of September 1945? In the context of this thesis the answer is, likely not; as demonstrated below, the relationship between Japan and China languished in ambiguity for decades, and so a difference of six more months of war would probably not have made much of a difference (of course, it is impossible to know what else might have occurred during that time, or whether Japan would have capitulated in the face of Soviet entry into the war). Nevertheless, if U.S. nuclear deterrence is interpreted in the broadest sense—to include actual weapons employment—then it had a significant effect of ameliorating Sino-Japanese tensions by helping to end the state of war between them.

2. Allied Occupation and the San Francisco Treaties

The Allied occupation of Japan began on September 2, 1945, with the signing of the Japanese instrument of surrender. Over the ensuing five years, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) set about the task of completely demilitarizing Japan. The staff of General Douglas MacArthur drafted a new constitution for Japan, which was formally adopted by the Diet and promulgated by the Emperor on November 3, 1946.\textsuperscript{19} It is often referred to as the “Peace Constitution” for its Article 9, the now-famous “renunciation of war” clause:

\begin{quote}
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\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{18} Pyle, 209.

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.\textsuperscript{20}

The complete demilitarization of Japan progressed apace until the outbreak of the Korean War, at which point many U.S. troops present in Japan were sent to the peninsula and American officials began rethinking the policy of a Japan with absolutely no armed forces.\textsuperscript{21} By this point, however, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru had already set Japan on a course of economic expansion at the expense of military reconstruction, a concept which endures to this day as the Yoshida Doctrine.\textsuperscript{22} Negotiations between SCAP and the Yoshida cabinet resulted in the creation of the National Police Reserve Force in July 1950 to maintain Japanese domestic security in the absence of the U.S. occupation forces; this evolved into the Self-Defense Force (SDF) in 1954.\textsuperscript{23} While this resolved the immediate issue of Japanese security, a long-term solution would be needed to the simultaneous problem of allowing American access to Japanese bases while not relying on American forces alone to defend Japan. The answer was a two-step process of restoring Japan’s sovereignty and then signing a security treaty between Washington and Tokyo. Both steps were carried out on September 8, 1951, with the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace with Japan (the Treaty of San Francisco), immediately followed by the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States (the Mutual Security Treaty, or MST).\textsuperscript{24}

As the first step in the process, the Treaty of San Francisco formally ended the state of war between Japan and forty-eight other nations, ended the Allied occupation, and restored full sovereignty to Japan. Notably absent from the peace negotiations or the

\textsuperscript{20} Constitution of Japan.
\textsuperscript{21} Pyle, 219–20; Samuels, 45–6.
\textsuperscript{22} For an excellent treatment of the Yoshida Doctrine, see Samuels, 29–59, and Pyle, 237–77.
\textsuperscript{23} Samuels, 46.
signing of the treaty was a representative from China. Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, the dormant rivalry in China between the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang, or KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) erupted into full-blown civil war. On October 1, 1949, the Communists under Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and by December the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek had taken up exile on Taiwan, with both governments claiming to be the legal government of a single Chinese state.25 Owing to this ambiguous situation, the United States and the United Kingdom could not agree on which representative to invite to the San Francisco negotiations, and as a result the state of war between China and Japan remained after September 1951.26

The second step was the signing of the MST between Washington and a newly-sovereign Tokyo. The treaty permits the United States to not only “maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan,” but also to utilize those forces “to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.”27 The language of the treaty is not as strong as that of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1947, or the successor MST concluded in 1960; although the United States is implicitly called to defend Japan, there is no explicit mechanism by which this is to take place; nuclear weapons were not mentioned implicitly or explicitly. Nevertheless, if we construct the U.S. deterrent more broadly than nuclear weapons, we can consider the origins of that deterrent to Japan as having begun on September 8, 1951.

The government in Beijing regarded the Treaty of San Francisco, the MST, and the 1952 Treaty of Taipei (ending the state of war between Japan and the government it recognized as China) as evidence of designs for an aggressive war against China and of

26 McClain, 557, 608.
resurgent Japanese militarism, and declared that the technical state of war would remain between Beijing and Tokyo.\textsuperscript{28} The Sino-Japanese relationship thus remained that of tacit enemies.

B. EVOLUTION OF U.S. DETERRENT STRATEGY

The debate over nuclear doctrine in the United States began almost as soon as the Trinity test had been concluded. Some scientists, military leaders, and political decision-makers argued that nuclear weapons were just another artillery piece, certainly more evolved but also as available for use as any other weapon might be; others argued that, by virtue of its unprecedented destructive force, nuclear devices should be seen as a weapon of last resort.\textsuperscript{29} This debate was not fully resolved by the time of the Korean War, opening the Truman Administration to significant internal debate—which sometimes leaked to the public, perhaps most famously when General MacArthur advocated the use of nuclear weapons against Chinese forces on the Korean Peninsula.\textsuperscript{30} The debate was further complicated when the Soviet Union tested an atomic weapon in August 1949, ending the United States’ “nuclear monopoly” and introducing the beginning of nuclear deterrence theory.\textsuperscript{31}

1. The “New Look” and the Birth of Extended Deterrence

Shortly after the Korean Armistice was signed in 1953, the still-new President Eisenhower directed a review of U.S. security strategy generally, and nuclear strategy in particular. The result was a classified memorandum, NSC 16/2, which laid out the administration’s basic national security policy, including a significant reliance on nuclear weapons and a concomitant reduction in the need for large numbers of conventional


\textsuperscript{30} Freedman, 71–2, 89.

\textsuperscript{31} Freedman, 56–8.
forces. This policy was announced publicly during Eisenhower’s State of the Union address in January 1954, introducing his “New Look” for defense; his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, later expounded on the concept that came to be known as “massive retaliation.” The doctrine of massive retaliation—essentially, the use of nuclear weapons in response to any aggression, even if by conventional means—was intended mostly to counter the threat in Europe, where the Soviets had overwhelming conventional superiority over America’s allies (even if one took into account the U.S. forces based in Europe). While not explicitly called “extended deterrence,” the New Look and massive retaliation were essentially the beginning of the United States providing a nuclear umbrella to its friends and allies.

Although massive retaliation and the nascent nuclear umbrella were designed with Europe in mind, it was soon exported to Asia. As early as January 1953 Eisenhower had suggested his willingness to use nuclear weapons to end the Korean War, a threat which Secretary of State Dulles attempted to communicate to the Chinese in May. In September and December 1953, and again in March 1954, Dulles intimated that Washington might use nuclear weapons in the context of the crisis in Indochina. The United States again suggested a willingness to use nuclear weapons during conflict in the midst of the Geneva conference on Indochina from April to July 1954.

The earliest explicit notion of extended deterrence in Asia came during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. The crisis began on September 3, 1954, when the PLA began shelling the KMT-controlled islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The Chinese logic behind

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33 Lewis and Xue, 17.
35 John Gittings, The World and China, 1922–1972 (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 203; Lewis and Xue, 13–4. Lewis and Xue report that Dulles communicated a threat to use nuclear weapons against China during a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Nehru. Dulles assumed that the threat would be forwarded to Mao, but Nehru “later denied that he had grasped the intent of the Dulles communication, and in any case had not transmitted any atomic threat to Beijing.”
36 Lewis and Xue, 18–9; Gittings, 203.
this action is not of consequence to this thesis; what is important is the action-reaction cycle of the United States and China. The crisis started on the eve of the Manila Conference to negotiate a Southeast Asian mutual defense treaty, which had the effect of validating the need for such an agreement amongst the potential allies.\textsuperscript{37} It also encouraged Washington to accelerate plans for a separate treaty with Taipei, which was signed on December 2, 1954.\textsuperscript{38} This was followed shortly by public statements from various administration officials, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Arthur Radford, declaring the will of the United States to use nuclear weapons in meeting its treaty obligations to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{39} The Formosa Resolution of January 29, 1955, gave President Eisenhower the legal authorization he needed to use U.S. armed forces to defend Taiwan against attack, which Dulles and Eisenhower reiterated in March included the use of nuclear weapons. Washington’s willingness to use nuclear weapons against Beijing was again emphasized by President Eisenhower in September 1958, during the second Taiwan Strait crisis.\textsuperscript{40}

We thus see that by early 1955, the United States had adopted a policy of using its nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, defend against an attack upon its allies. Although not explicitly directed to the U.S.-Japan alliance—indeed, in April 1954 the Japanese Diet unanimously passed a resolution calling for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons world-wide\textsuperscript{41}—the initial development of a nuclear umbrella is nevertheless significant for the reaction it sparked in Beijing.

2. “Flexible Response”

When the Kennedy administration entered office in 1961 it was already wary of the doctrine of massive retaliation because it provided little recourse other than a global nuclear war. These fears were underscored during the Berlin Crisis of October 1961, when it became obvious that additional steps were required on the ladder of escalation.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[37] Lewis and Xue, 24.
\item[38] Lewis and Xue, 20–1.
\item[39] Lewis and Xue, 32.
\item[40] Lewis and Xue, 37, 40; Gittings, 203.
\item[41] Kamiya, 64.
\end{footnotes}
The result was doctrine of “flexible response,” introduced by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in 1962. Reversing the trends of the Eisenhower era, flexible response called for maintaining a credible strategic nuclear capability but also increasing the United States’ (and allies’) conventional forces. The practical result of this shift was that the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which had grown to include over 1700 ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) by the mid-1960s, would remain at a constant size until the 1980s.42

Flexible response was directed mainly at Washington’s allies in Europe; in fact, it took NATO until 1967 to formally adopt the policy into alliance doctrine over fears of “decoupling” U.S. security from that of Europe.43 For Tokyo, flexible response was less significant at this juncture; not only had the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Japan not yet been explicated, but at this point the Diet was continuing to advocate the abolition of all nuclear weapons. The question of credibility that was attendant the introduction of flexible response thus had little impact on U.S.-Japan relations and, by extension, the Japan-China relationship.44

C. EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

When discussing China and nuclear weapons, the first thing which often comes to mind is Mao Zedong’s now-famous denunciation of nuclear weapons as a “paper tiger.”45 Although sometimes considered naïve, one must put his comment in the context of his experience during the Sino-Japanese war; while nuclear weapons could handily destroy China’s small industrial capacity and the millions of people living in its urban centers, they would be almost useless against the other billion or so Chinese who would retreat to the more rural provinces and wage a protracted, guerilla war (much as the Communists

42 Freedman, 228, 285–6, 297.
45 Lewis and Xue, 6; Freedman, 274.
had done in the Sino-Japanese War). Mao’s point was that nuclear weapons would be unable to compel a Chinese capitulation in the same way that it would utterly destroy the societies of Western Europe.46

This did not mean that Mao and the Chinese Politburo were immune to nuclear threats. As Washington increasingly indicated its willingness to use nuclear weapons in Asian conflicts, leadership in Beijing quickly arrived at the conclusion that the best defense against a nuclear weapon was another nuclear weapon. Mao thus declared, during an expanded meeting of the Party Secretariat on January 15, 1955, that China would “‘immediately devote major efforts to developing atomic energy research’ for military purposes.”47 By the end of 1955 the major scientific research and industrial arms required for producing nuclear weapons were in place; in early 1956 a strategic missile program was started in order to develop a delivery vehicle for its future nuclear weapons.48

In the early years of the Chinese nuclear program, significant assistance was provided by the Soviet Union. This officially started on January 17, 1955 (only two days after Mao first decided to pursue nuclear weapons) with a Soviet announcement of supporting any socialist nation’s research into “peaceful uses of atomic energy.”49 By the middle of 1956 Moscow’s assistance to Beijing had been manifested in rubles, people, and materiel, with Soviet scientists supervising Chinese scientists operating a Soviet-donated reactor, inside a Soviet-designed and constructed laboratory. The Chinese asked, and the Soviets readily supplied, for technical documents and blueprints for almost all aspects of their nuclear program—with the exception of a prototype weapon itself. Moscow had, at least in principle, agreed to provide a prototype nuclear device at some point during the development process. By early 1958, however, the Soviet Politburo began expressing reservations about Mao’s view of atomic warfare and

46 Lewis and Xue, 329; Freedman, 274–5.
47 Lewis and Xue, 38.
48 Lewis and Xue, 48–50.
49 Lewis and Xue, 40–1.
the wisdom of continuing Soviet assistance. Rather than flat-out renege on an agreement with their comrades in Beijing, Moscow instead took the slow-roll approach, first insisting on a never-ending series of security improvements to the proposed laboratory in China, then using the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) negotiations in Geneva as an excuse to delay not only the prototype, but also blueprints and other technical data. By late 1959, Soviet scientists had begun travelling home on a few weeks’ “furlough,” but never returned, and by August 1960 Moscow had recalled all of its technical experts from Beijing’s strategic nuclear program. If China wanted nuclear weapons, it would have to go it alone.

While Beijing was building its nuclear weapons program, it simultaneously maintained a steady stream of anti-nuclear weapon rhetoric. In the two days following Mao’s nuclear decision, the PRC released at least two statements decrying the United States’ “brandishing” of nuclear weapons in its Asia policy. Following the Sino-Soviet split, the USSR also became a target of Chinese anti-nuclear rhetoric, claiming Soviet use of “nuclear blackmail to intimidate the people of the socialist countries.” At the tenth World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs—held in August 1964, mere months before China’s first nuclear test—the delegation from Beijing took the opportunity to decry nuclear weapons and even the previous year’s PTBT as “favorable to nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail by nuclear powers and the U.S. imperialism.”

China’s first nuclear test took place at 3:00 pm on October 16, 1964. Within a few hours, Premier Zhou Enlai released a statement announcing the successful

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50 Lewis and Xue, 60–4.
51 Lewis and Xue, 72.
52 Lewis and Xue, 37.
53 Lewis and Xue, 194.
54 Liu Ningyi, head of the Chinese delegation, quoted in Lewis and Xue, 195.
55 Lewis and Xue, 185–7. Lewis and Xue recount a fascinating legend about a technician at Lop Nur named Wang, who awoke on October 1, 1964 from a dream involving “three fifteens” which he and his coworkers felt had something to do with the imminent nuclear test. The next day, the CCP Central Committee transmitted to Lop Nur the date and time of the test, 3:00 pm on October 16, 1964—1500 hours, fifteen days after the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the PRC.
detonation. The statement included two important emphases. First, China “solemnly declare[d] that China will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” Thus, China’s no-first-use (NFU) policy dates to the very day that it became a nuclear power. Perhaps more significant, if not for the declaration itself than for the frequency with which it is mentioned, was the claim that China’s nuclear weapons program was initiated “under compulsion” in order to respond to “ever-increasing nuclear threats from the United States” and the “U.S. imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats,” and to “[protect] the Chinese people from U.S. threats to launch a nuclear war.” Zhou’s statement thus made clear that China’s nuclear program was launched in response to the U.S. nuclear guarantees expressed over the preceding decade.

**D. JAPAN SEEKS SHELTER UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA**

The detonation of a nuclear weapon by China almost immediately raised concerns in Japan, reinforcing the “tacit enemies” character of the Sino-Japanese relationship. To the extent that Zhou Enlai’s statement could be taken at face value, Beijing’s nascent nuclear deterrent was directed against Washington, not Tokyo. But part of Japan’s obligations under the revised (and strengthened) MST of 1960 was to provide “facilities and areas” for use by American air, ground, and naval forces “[f]or the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” It took but a small logical leap to see that if China were to retaliate against the United States, it could do so at close range by targeting U.S. forces in Japan.

Although Tokyo’s initial, public reaction to Beijing’s announcement was “relatively muted,” Prime Minister Sato Eisaku wasted little time in testing the response of his American allies. In late December 1964, the U.S. ambassador in Tokyo, Edwin

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Reischauer, reported to the State Department an encounter in which Prime Minister Sato suggested that Japan might develop its own nuclear weapon program in response to China’s test; Sato reportedly made a similar intimation directly to President Johnson.\(^{59}\) During a summit meeting with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Sato again probed the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and hinting that, failing a credible reassurance from Washington, Tokyo might seek its own nuclear deterrent.\(^{60}\)

To think that Japan might “go nuclear” was not out of the question. Japan had at least ten years of experience operating civilian nuclear power plants, constituting at least a latent nuclear potential ready to be tapped on short notice.\(^{61}\) While Article 9 of the constitution restricted “war potential,” the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB) issued an interpretation in 1957 that possession of nuclear weapons would not be unconstitutional as long as the weapons were deployed in a defensive manner.\(^{62}\) In the interest of meeting its treaty obligations but, just as importantly, in support of its growing non-proliferation initiative, the Johnson Administration acceded to Sato’s request. While the public Joint Statement at the end of the summit contained a vague reference to “the United States’ determination to abide by its commitments under the treaty to defend Japan against any attack,” in private conversations McNamara gave the kind of direct assurance that Sato had sought.\(^{63}\)

A firm extension of the U.S. nuclear deterrent to cover attacks on Japan was a relief, but Sato still had to reconcile government policy with popular anti-nuclear sentiment. Japan was the only nation ever to suffer from a nuclear attack; many of its citizens still remembered first-hand the devastation that had been wrought. As a result, public opinion was (and has almost constantly been) highly negative of the possession of nuclear weapons, even if only for defensive purposes.\(^{64}\) Further, Japan’s political left

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\(^{60}\) Schoff, 26–7.

\(^{61}\) Kamiya, 64.

\(^{62}\) Green and Furukawa, 349.

\(^{63}\) Schoff, 26–7.

\(^{64}\) Green and Furukawa, 357; Kamiya, 64–6.
objected to U.S. protection because of the (common) fear that the nuclear umbrella was but a ploy to further control non-nuclear-weapon states; even more moderate politicians had reservations over the potential to become entangled in a nuclear exchange.65

Sato took bold steps to overcome these obstacles. The first came on December 11, 1967, when Sato announced the now-famous “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”—that Japan would not possess or manufacture nuclear weapons, nor would it allow their “introduction” into the country without the prior permission of Japan.66 Faced with concern that the principle of non-introduction might actually weaken the U.S. deterrent, Sato announced two months later the “Four Pillars Nuclear Policy.” Here, Japan committed itself to the non-nuclear principles, the peaceful use of nuclear power, a push for global nuclear disarmament, and an explicit reliance on the U.S. extended deterrence against a nuclear attack on Japan.67 This marked the first time that any official, in Tokyo or Washington, had publically declared that U.S. nuclear weapons would be used to deter an attack against Japan. This explicit guarantee made possible, in no small part, Tokyo’s participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Japan’s ratification of the NPT was not a quick or uncomplicated process; eighteen months of Diet debate took place before Japan signed the treaty in February 1970, and it was an additional six years before the treaty was ultimately ratified by the Diet.68

65 Schoff, 27.
66 Schoff, 27.
67 Schoff, 27.
It has been difficult to find contemporary documentation of Beijing’s response to these developments. Later statements encouraging Tokyo to maintain its non-proliferation stance suggest that Sato’s announcements would have ameliorated tensions between China and Japan by confirming that Tokyo would not seek a nuclear deterrent of its own. This is, however, but one component of the Four Pillars; what remains unclear is whether Beijing took Tokyo’s reliance on the nuclear umbrella as a positive sign, or if it was interpreted as only further evidence of hostility by the alliance toward China. We do know, however, that Beijing decried the NPT for its discriminatory stance toward non-nuclear weapons states, and for its enshrinement of superpower monopoly over nuclear technology; this is represents, in a sense, a point of unity in thinking between Beijing and Tokyo, as the Diet debate over the NPT also focused on the perception of creating a second class of states.

E. BURGEONING SINO-JAPANESE TRADE

Despite the lack of formal relations, Beijing and Tokyo nevertheless began developing significant trade relations soon after the Japanese surrender. In 1950 small-scale transactions for agricultural goods and small machinery accounted for $58 million in bilateral trade, although this trade quickly dropped off as a result of export restrictions.

69 A search of various academic journals and government databases failed to return anything from the period, at least nothing in the English language. At this time, China was in the midst of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1965–77), a time of great domestic political turmoil and international isolation. Foreign relations, in particular, suffered greatly; all but one of Beijing’s ambassadors were recalled for “political re-education.” (See, for example, Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution through Reform (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 115.) The absence of Chinese comment on the Non-Nuclear Principles may, then, be a result of ignorance about the principles, or a function of the lack of external communication during this period. It could also be a reflection of the fact that Chinese leaders, while aware of the changes in U.S. posture and the U.S.-Japan alliance during this time, were nevertheless too preoccupied with domestic events to respond to international events. Alternatively, if Beijing did respond it may simply be recorded in an obscure location. In any event, the lack of an identifiable response to this particular aspect of the nuclear umbrella is not especially threatening to the argument of this thesis. Indeed, it could actually serve as evidence that changes in the U.S. nuclear deterrent had little influence on the China-Japan relationship; making a definitive judgment in this regard, however, would require an exhaustive search of Chinese-language documents and archives which are simply inaccessible to the author.


instituted by U.S. Forces Japan in the context of prosecuting the Korean War.\textsuperscript{72} When Japan regained its sovereignty, however, trade with the PRC boomed. In June 1952, immediately after the San Francisco Treaty came into force, a group of Japanese businessmen travelled to Beijing to establish private, informal business missions.\textsuperscript{73} Trade flourished, growing from a low of $15 million in 1952 to a high of $141 million in 1957, with slightly more than half consisting of imports from China to Japan.\textsuperscript{74} From 1952 to 1958, private businessmen—with the tacit backing of their governments—concluded four trade agreements. In 1955 the PRC government itself opened a trade mission in Japan.\textsuperscript{75} The relationship between Beijing and Tokyo could thus be judged as that of tacit friends—no formal relations, but with informal approval of burgeoning trade.

This tacit friendship came to an end, however, in 1958. In May, a group of Japanese youths hauled down the PRC flag at a trade fair; this became known as the Nagasaki Flag Incident. In the aftermath, China cut back trade with Japan, severely limiting exports to Tokyo and almost completely cutting off imports.\textsuperscript{76} These restrictions lasted until 1960, when Premier Zhou Enlai permitted the resumption of trade only with companies that were willing to accept certain conditions, referred to as “friendly trade.” China again eased restrictions in 1962, permitting semi-official trade under fixed, five-year agreements. From 1962 to 1966 trade grew from $84 million to $621 million, marking a period that, except for China’s 1964 nuclear test, could be characterized as tacit friends.\textsuperscript{77}

Interestingly, tension over China’s nuclear test is not reflected in a dip in trade (in contrast to the Japanese reaction to the Tiananmen Square protests, discussed in Chapter

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{72} Rose, 44.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Iriye, 104.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Rose, 46.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Iriye, 106; Rose, 44.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Iriye, 115–6. There is a rough consensus that the Nagasaki flag incident was a symptom of broader discord between Tokyo and Beijing. Rose argues that Beijing was looking for reasons to break ties with the conservative, pro-Taiwan administration of Prime Minister Kichi Nobusuke. Gittings goes further, arguing that Kichi had reneged on a previous trade agreement, and that as a result Zhou was waiting for an excuse to cut off ties, which the Nagasaki incident provided. See Rose, 45; Gittings, 215.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Rose, 46–7.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
V). Trade did, however, fall off slightly after 1967, a reflection of both China’s increasingly isolationist foreign policy during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, as well as Japan’s increasingly pro-Taiwan, anti-PRC government under Prime Minister Sato. In April 1970, China imposed further restrictions, implementing the “Four Principles of Trade,” essentially prohibiting Japanese firms conducting business in China from also conducting activities which support U.S. anti-communist policies in the region. Despite these restrictions, bilateral trade continued to flourish, growing from $822 million in 1970 to $1,100 million in 1972.78 Thus, even within the context of bilateral trade, the relationship between Tokyo and Beijing oscillated between cooperation and conflict.

F. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

This chapter has traced the changes in the Sino-Japanese security relationship and the United States’ extended deterrent through the first decade and a half of the Cold War. At the very beginning of the nuclear era, China and Japan were in the midst of almost a decade of fighting; their relationship could only be characterized as hostile enemies. With the Japanese surrender and loss of sovereignty the relationship was altered to one of tacit enemies, lacking in formal recognition and hardly on good terms. Various events from 1945 to 1969 reinforced this status. The Treaty of San Francisco did not resolve the state of war between Japan and China, and the Treaty of Taipei was not binding on the government in Beijing. Despite growing bilateral trade, relations between Beijing and Tokyo remained unofficial; economic interaction alone might argue for a relationship of tacit friends, but events such as China’s nuclear test and Japan’s explicit coverage under the U.S. nuclear umbrella continued to promote suspicion, if not a conflictual relationship best described as tacit enemies.

During this period, U.S. nuclear doctrine evolved and deterrent strategy matured. As the Truman Administration’s reluctance to use nuclear weapons gave way to Eisenhower’s “New Look,” it became increasingly clear that the United States was willing (at least in principle) to use its nuclear arsenal to deter and defend against attacks

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78 Rose, 46–7.
on its friends and allies as well. Over time this commitment was made more explicit, culminating in the late 1960s with private and public statements that the United States would use its nuclear weapons to provide a nuclear umbrella over Japan.

The relationship between U.S. nuclear deterrence and the Sino-Japanese relationship during this period is illustrated in Figure 2. Throughout the early- to mid-1950s Washington made ever-clearer statements of its willingness to use nuclear weapons in the event of an attack on Taiwan; combined with the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO countries, this constituted the very earliest conceptions of a nuclear umbrella for U.S. allies. This umbrella was a significant, if not the primary, cause of China’s nuclear weapons program. When Beijing became a nuclear power, this caused immediate concern in Tokyo, prompting the Sato administration to seek explicit coverage under U.S. extended deterrence.

While it was the United States’ guaranteed nuclear coverage to Taiwan, not Japan, which influenced China’s decision to obtain nuclear weapons, taking a broad definition of the independent variable to include all U.S. allies shows that Washington’s guaranteed deterrent had a significant, deleterious impact on tensions in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Conversely, it could be argued that once the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Japan was made explicit it had the effect of putting a damper on any Japanese nuclear ambitions and thus ameliorating tensions by preventing a Sino-Japanese nuclear arms race. The magnitude of this positive influence, however, is moderate; the provision of the nuclear umbrella alone cannot be credited with preventing Japan from obtaining nuclear weapons. Taken on the whole, then, the influence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella was somewhat muddled from 1945–1969; while the strongest influence was the amelioration of tensions by ending the war and preventing a nuclear Japan, Washington’s policies were nevertheless largely responsible for motivating the Chinese to obtain nuclear weapons which, in turn, threatened Japan.
Figure 2. U.S. nuclear deterrence and Sino-Japanese relations, 1945–1969
III. THE LATE COLD WAR, 1969–1989

The twenty years that comprised the late Cold War witnessed what is arguably the most dynamic period in the Sino-Japanese security relationship. Beginning in a state of mutual ignorance, the relationship changed almost overnight to one of formal and friendly diplomatic relations. Advances in technology improved the qualitative and quantitative capacity of the U.S. nuclear deterrent force, with some developments potentially redefining the nature of deterrence itself.

This chapter will examine the evolution of the China-Japan relationship in the wake of Nixon’s opening and the Sino-Japanese and Sino-American normalization processes, as well as changes in the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Japan incident to the Guam Doctrine, normalization, and technological advances such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This chapter will demonstrate that, while the significant improvement in Sino-Japanese relations largely coincided with a strengthening of the United States’ nuclear deterrent, there is nevertheless little evidence to suggest a causal relationship.

A. THE GUAM DOCTRINE

When Richard Nixon became President of the United States in January 1969, he faced pressure to reduce U.S. military commitments overseas, especially in Asia where 500,000 troops were fighting in Vietnam, in addition to the thousands of troops stationed in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. At a press conference in Guam on July 25, Nixon announced a fundamental shift in the United States’ security policy. While Washington would continue to meet its treaty obligations, “as far as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons…the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.”79 This point was further clarified in early November when, addressing the nation on his program

of “Vietnamization,” Nixon emphasized that the United States would continue to provide “a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us.”

Despite the nuclear guarantee and emphasis on meeting treaty obligations, the so-called Guam Doctrine nevertheless introduced a degree of uncertainty into Asia generally, and the U.S.-Japan alliance specifically. At a previously-scheduled summit in late November, Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon exchanged views on the nature of relations between Washington and Tokyo. The resulting Joint Statement, issued on November 21, detailed several important points of concurrence. The first was that the Guam Doctrine would not undermine the United States’ commitments to Japan, extending even to troop levels. The communiqué also outlined the process for reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control by 1972, with an understanding that the reversion would respect Tokyo’s policy on nuclear weapons (i.e., the principle of non-introduction). The two leaders also declared their shared “hope that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations.” Perhaps most significant, however, was the explicit declaration that “the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also important for peace and security of Japan,” and thus of mutual interest to the allies.

As noted earlier, it has been difficult to find documents pertaining to Chinese reactions to either the Guam Doctrine or the Nixon-Sato communiqué. Intuitively, the Guam Doctrine should have elicited a positive response to the perception that America was withdrawing from its hegemonic role in Asia. The nuclear guarantee of the Guam Doctrine, however, may have perpetuated fears of superpower domination first expressed in China’s statement of October 16, 1964. At the same time, the Nixon-Sato communiqué not only revitalized the U.S.-Japan alliance, but also incorporated Taiwan as

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80 Quoted in Schoff, 29.
81 Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 148.
83 See note 69, above.
a mutual concern of the allies; this would likely have caused China to express concern about the interference of the United States and Japan in a domestic Chinese affair. This absence of evidence is, admittedly, a shortcoming in assessing the influence of U.S. nuclear deterrence on the relationship between China and Japan.

B. NIXON'S OPENING TO CHINA

Over the course of the next three years, the Sato cabinet and the Nixon administration carried on a dialog relating not just to the Okinawa reversion, but on issues related to bilateral policy toward China. Specifically, Washington wanted to coordinate with Tokyo on a plan for recognition of Beijing in the United Nations. These discussions were so “intimate and frank” that, following a meeting on June 17, 1971, to formalize the Okinawa reversion, Sato was convinced that he and Nixon were lockstep on their mutual China policy. One can imagine the prime minister’s surprise when, less than a month later, Nixon announced that his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, had just returned from a secret meeting to Beijing, and that Nixon himself would travel to China the following year. 84

Nixon’s visit to China took place from February 21–28, 1971. The resulting Joint Statement, known as the Shanghai Communiqué, dealt in large part with matters of bilateral relations. Beijing took the opportunity to express its concern about “the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism” and its support for “the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan.” For its part, the American delegation confirmed that it “place[d] the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan” and would continue to develop the existing “close bonds.” Both sides agreed

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84 Halperin, 11–2. Sato was reportedly notified by the U.S. ambassador about three minutes before Nixon made his televised announcement. It is worth noting that the visit was kept secret not just from the Japanese, but from most of Nixon’s own administration; even Vice President Spiro Agnew and Secretary of State William Rogers were kept in the dark until after Kissinger had returned from China. See Halperin, 11.
that they should deal with each other without resorting to threat or use of force, while “agreeing to disagree” on the matter of Taiwan and the “one China” policy.85

1. Japanese Reactions to Nixon’s Opening

The Guam Doctrine raised concerns among Japan’s leaders about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. While the Nixon-Sato communiqué of 1969 spoke to the enduring mutual interest in the alliance and America’s unflagging commitment to its treaty obligations, the Sato cabinet nevertheless began studying the means and costs of weaning Japan from its dependence on the U.S. armed forces for its own defense. Two studies were concluded in 1970, one convened by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) director general (and later prime minister) Nakasone Yasuhiro, the other conducted by the Cabinet Office of Research at the behest of Sato himself.86 Both panels studied the feasibility of an independent, Japanese nuclear deterrent. The two studies arrived at similar conclusions. Japan could easily overcome the technical difficulties involved in starting a nuclear weapons program; nevertheless, the consequences to Tokyo’s economic, domestic, and international standing outweighed any strategic benefit (and, indeed, could include costs to Japan’s strategic security as well). The reports recommended continued reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella as the best course of action, but nevertheless advocated maintaining the technological, scientific, and industrial capacity to quickly mount a nuclear weapons program should the strategic environment change drastically.87


86 Green and Furukawa, 350–1; Schoff, 30.

87 Green and Furukawa, 351; Schoff, 30.
C. THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS

1. Sino-Japanese Normalization

Although Japan had decided to remain under the coverage of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, this did not completely allay its suspicions about the stability of the alliance. Indeed, Nixon’s overtures to China during 1971–1972 stoked further concern that a long-held fear was coming to fruition. Dating back to Yoshida’s signing of the San Francisco and Taipei treaties, Japanese leaders had harbored concerns that they would “wake up one morning to find that the United States had changed its policy toward Peking, leaving the Japanese out on a limb.” When Japan awoke on July 15, 1971, to find that it had, in fact, been left out to dry, it spurred Tokyo to seize the momentum (or fill the vacuum) and begin charting a more independent foreign policy from Washington’s.

Although Prime Minister Sato disapproved of Nixon’s about-face on China, Tokyo soon mobilized its own program of rapprochement with Beijing. In July 1972, Sato retired and was replaced as prime minister by Tanaka Kakuei, who took a more forward-leaning approach than his predecessor. On September 29, 1972, Tanaka travelled to Beijing—the first visit of a Japanese head of government to China. The resulting Joint Statement announced that Tokyo and Beijing would establish normal diplomatic relations immediately. In the course of fourteen months, the strategic relationship between China and Japan had changed from one of mutual ignorance to that of friends.

2. Sino-American Normalization

The rapid process of establishing normal relations between Tokyo and Beijing stands in stark contrast with the drawn-out process of normalization between Beijing and Washington. For many reasons, relations between Washington and Beijing (and, for that matter, Taipei) languished in a state of ambiguity. Beijing and Taipei both maintained a

88 Halperin, 11.
89 Halperin, 11–2.
“One China” policy: Taiwan was an integral part of China, with both Beijing and Taipei claiming to be the legal government of that single Chinese state. Mao Zedong and his premier, Zhou Enlai, maintained that acknowledgement of the “One China” policy and renunciation of ties with Taipei was a condition for establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing. While Tanaka quickly conceded to this condition, Nixon was not prepared to do so on his first trip to China. He no doubt expected to normalize Sino-American relations after his reelection to a second term in November 1972. The Watergate scandal, however, set Washington into a period of turmoil, and at the same time Beijing entered a period of leadership turmoil following the deaths of Zhou and Mao. As a result, Sino-American normalization was postponed until 1978, when Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and President Jimmy Carter released the “Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations,” announcing that Beijing and Washington would formally recognized each other on January 1, 1979.

D. THE IMMEDIATE POST-NORMALIZATION ERA, 1972–1979

1. Arms Control and the Nuclear Umbrella

Although Nixon’s opening to China is often viewed in the context of a worsening relationship with the Soviet Union, Washington and Moscow nevertheless made progress on the arms limitation process begun in the 1960s. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) resulted in two agreements. The first, known also as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), was signed by President Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev in May 1972. Although it did not reduce strategic arms per se, it did place significant constraints on the construction of ballistic missile defense systems. By limiting the United States and the Soviet Union to two systems each—one to defend an ICBM site, the other to defend the national capital—the treaty in effect institutionalized the doctrine of mutually-assured destruction (MAD). The second agreement, signed by President

91 Hsü, 785.
92 Hsü, 785–6.
93 Hsü, 788–90.
Carter and Brezhnev in June 1979, imposed a limit of 2,250 strategic delivery vehicles on each side. Although the U.S. Congress never ratified the treaty (Carter having withdrawn it from consideration in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), the Americans and Soviets nevertheless abided by its requirements until President Reagan formally broke the treaty in 1986.95

While the SALT treaties restricted BMD systems and number of delivery vehicles, they failed to address (from Washington’s perspective) the strategic superiority of Soviet ICBMs, raising questions about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and therefore the nuclear umbrella provided to its allies. SALT II restricted the number of delivery vehicles, but not the number of warheads; a suitable answer to superior Soviet ICBMs would be the multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV). In 1972 the United States authorized a program to develop a MIRV’d ICBM for the Minuteman III. Additionally, research was begun on the MX missile, intended to replace the aging, liquid-fueled Titan missile—thus maintaining the number of delivery vehicles while increasing the material capability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Development progressed rapidly, with the first of these new Peacekeeper missiles being deployed in 1979.96

2. Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty and Trade

With the establishment of normal relations between China and Japan in 1972 and Tokyo’s formal break with Taiwan, policymakers soon turned to the task of resolving the technical state of war that had remained despite the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. Negotiations between Tokyo and Beijing began in 1974 but were suspended the next year due China’s insistence on an “anti-hegemony” clause which Japan felt would define the Sino-Japanese relationship as an anti-Soviet alliance. Talks were suspended in May 1975 and, owing to domestic political crises in both China and Japan, did not resume until 1977. Negotiations proceeded slowly until April 1978, when a small fleet of Chinese ships appeared in the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islands; Rose suggests that the Chinese “instigated” the incident as a “shock tactic” to bring about positive Japanese action on the

95 Baucom, 76.
96 Freedman, 345–7, 355; Wirtz, 114.
peace treaty.\textsuperscript{97} If true, it appeared to have worked; Prime Minister Fukuda soon dropped his objection to the anti-hegemony clause, and the treaty was signed in August of that year.\textsuperscript{98} The tensions of April 1978 casted a pall over the peace treaty negotiations; while the termination of the state of war was significant, it was also largely a formality. As a result, the characterization of the relationship at this point in time (admittedly, quite subjectively) is that of feuding friends.

Following the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, bilateral trade exploded. In 1972 total bilateral trade equaled $1.1 billion; the next year it had almost doubled, to $2 billion. By the end of the decade trade had tripled; Tokyo and Beijing were trading $6.6 billion, representing a six-fold increase since normalization.\textsuperscript{99} In 1975, Japan became China’s largest trading partner, and Beijing sought increased economic assistance from Tokyo following the death of Chairman Mao in 1976.\textsuperscript{100} These heady economic times were not without setbacks, however. Faced with increasing inflation in the context of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, in February 1979 China unilaterally cancelled several contracts with Japanese corporations, causing a mild rebuke from Tokyo, although trade volume was not affected.\textsuperscript{101}

3. **Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance**

In the late 1970s, Washington and Tokyo took steps to strengthen their nearly thirty year old partnership. In 1976 the Japanese Cabinet issued its first-ever National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), spelling out (rather ambiguously) the threats Japan faced and using that as justification for its force structure for FY1976 and after. In releasing the NDPO, Prime Minister Miki committed Japan to an annual defense budget not to exceed 1% of GDP. In 1978 the Cabinet released the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Guidelines, another first; while notionally explaining how U.S. and Japanese forces would interoperate, the Guidelines remained focused only on contingencies in the

\textsuperscript{97} Rose, 51.
\textsuperscript{98} Rose, 51–2.
\textsuperscript{99} Rose, 53; Iriye, 127.
\textsuperscript{100} Rose, 50.
\textsuperscript{101} Rose, 52.
defense of Japan itself. Although similar efforts in the 1950s and 1960s would have resulted in condemnation from Beijing, in the context of a Soviet build-up in the late 1970s the development of the NDPO and the Cooperation Guidelines were actually viewed favorably by the Chinese government.102

E. THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

1. Reagan’s Vision

Ronald Reagan entered office in 1981 on a platform of tough anti-Communist rhetoric. In a speech on March 23, 1983, Reagan announced SDI. Partly a response to the Soviet Union’s buildup of large numbers of ICBMs, the SDI program was intended to create a ground- and space-based capability to protect the United States from large-scale ballistic missile attacks.103 This was not America’s first attempt at a missile defense capability. Interest in defense against ballistic missiles began almost as soon as the missiles themselves were introduced, dating back to early U.S. Army research in defensive systems against the German V-2 rocket. In the mid-1950s the project was known as Nike-Zeus, intended to defend U.S. cities against a large-scale strategic attack by the Soviet Union. In the face of technological hurdles, the project was scaled down and renamed Sentinel in 1967, now oriented to defending U.S. cities from “the kind of light, unsophisticated attack” that China’s nascent strategic force was expected to be capable of by the 1970s. In 1969 the program was again renamed and scaled down, with Safeguard focusing on defending ICBM sites instead of cities. In the context of the 1972 ABM Treaty, Safeguard was again reduced in scope, with plans to defend the national command authority in Washington, DC, and one ICBM site in North Dakota. Technological and financial difficulties led to the project’s ultimate cancellation in 1976.104


104 Baucom provides an excellent treatment of the history of U.S. missile defense programs through SDI.
SDI was unique among these programs for two reasons. First was that, rather than relying on ground-based interceptors alone, SDI would also incorporate space-based systems, including lasers. This technology was unproven; indeed, a good portion of it had not even been invented yet. The costs of SDI were expected to be enormous.\textsuperscript{105} This led to the second significant difference between SDI and its predecessors—inclusion of allies. Partly to help defray costs, but also to allay fears about delinking of U.S. deterrence from alliance policies, Washington began courting its allies shortly after the President’s SDI announcement, especially the high-technology-savvy West Germany and Japan. In exchange for sharing the burden of SDI, the allies would also reap the benefits of protection from a massive nuclear attack.\textsuperscript{106}

The technical and financial challenges aside, SDI was not without controversy. Even short of actual development and deployment, the very concept SDI as something the United States might actually pursue had the potential to fundamentally alter the nature of nuclear deterrence. If the United States could defend itself against incoming missiles—not just one or two, but the large-scale attack that the Soviet Union was expected to employ in a nuclear exchange, and the kind of attack against which the Reagan administration declared SDI was designed against—it would have the practical effect of undermining the credibility of the Soviet Union’s own nuclear deterrent. Proponents claimed that this would reduce the importance of, and create conditions for a world free of, nuclear weapons. Critics, on the other hand—including leaders in many NATO capitals—foresaw a renewed arms race. The United States could launch a disarming first attack on known Soviet missile bases, confident that SDI could counter any remaining second-strike capability. As the argument went, SDI would have a deleterious effect on the relative stability between the superpowers; if Washington was going to research a strategic missile defense system, Moscow would have to respond by either developing its own missile defense system, or increasing the survivability of its nuclear arsenal by deploying more weapons at more hardened locations (or, possibly,\textsuperscript{105} Baucom, 195–6. \textsuperscript{106} Edward Reiss, \textit{The Strategic Defense Initiative} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 169–71.
both). Worse yet, the Soviet Union (or other nuclear-armed states) might resort to their own disarming first attack in the hopes of eliminating the U.S. nuclear arsenal before SDI could be deployed.\footnote{Baucom 20–4; Reiss, 34–6; Roberts, 12–3; Glaser and Garrett, “Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative,” 29, 34. Although not directly related to this thesis, it is nevertheless worth noting that Moscow did, in fact, opt for both improving survivability of its nuclear weapons \textit{and} pursuing its own missile defense system. Indeed, the extravagant costs associated both with this modernization and the SDI project are often cited as one, among several, causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union. See, for example, Baucom, 198–9.}

Throughout 1985, the United States went to great pains in recruiting its allies to the SDI cause. During a summit in January, Reagan reassured Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro that the system was “defensive in nature and [was] ultimately intended to make possible the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons.”\footnote{Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \textit{Diplomatic Bluebook 1985} (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985), \url{http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1985/1985-3-3.htm} (accessed November 2, 2010).} At the G7 summit the following May, the U.S. delegation agreed to five points submitted by NATO and Japan regarding SDI; included were statements that “SDI should form an integral part of deterrence,” that SDI was not intended to achieve superiority over the Soviet Union, and that the Initiative should only move forward after “consultations with the allies and negotiations with the Soviet Union.”\footnote{Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \textit{Diplomatic Bluebook 1985}.} The following year, the United States and Japan agreed to a technical study on a Western Pacific Missile Architecture (WESTPAC), which took place from 1989 to 1993.\footnote{C. Hughes, 29–39.}

2. \textbf{China’s Response to SDI}

The announcement of SDI roughly coincided with, and in many ways spurred, the beginning of Chinese academic interest in deterrence theory.\footnote{Glaser and Garrett, “Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative,” 31.} As a result, Beijing was somewhat slow to respond. While some academics claimed that SDI was not only an “inevitable and appropriate response” to Moscow’s superior ICBM forces, others feared the impact on the credibility of China’s own deterrent.\footnote{Roberts, 11–2.} The first official statement...
from the PRC government came on August 2, 1985, almost eighteen months after Reagan’s announcement. Deng Xiaoping, Vice Premier and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), decried SDI as a “qualitative escalation in the US-Soviet arms race.”113 Even if SDI did not upset the strategic balance between the superpowers, it would still have a significant impact on the credibility of China’s own nuclear deterrent. At this point in time, China’s ICBM force amounted to approximately 10 Deng Feng (DF)-4 and DF-5 missiles, which could easily be defeated by a U.S. or Soviet BMD system.114 Motivated by this concern over the survivability of its limited nuclear arsenal, in 1984 Beijing began round-the-clock alerts of its Strategic Missile Forces.115 In 1985, China began a tactical nuclear weapons program in the context of Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on “local, limited war.”116

The mid-1980s saw two very significant developments. The first was a rapid increase in the number of warheads in China’s stockpile. One analysis shows the gradual increase in the number of warheads from 1964 to 1980, with a rapid increase through 1985.117 The second was the beginning of China’s solid-fueled strategic weapons programs, the DF-31 (to replace the liquid-fueled DF-4 and DF-5), and a new SLBM, the Julang (JL)-2. Of course, these programs were not publicly announced at the time, and in any event were not specifically linked as a response to SDI. Glaser and Garrett note that most Chinese analysts were concerned about the threat to Beijing’s deterrent by the Soviet Union, as a result of a potential SDI arms race; additionally, Beijing’s concerns at the time expressed sympathy with Western Europe, and did not mention Japan—despite the

115 Roberts, 14.
significant role that both were to play in Reagan’s program. Nevertheless, to the extent that Japan would later feel threatened by the Chinese strategic modernization program begun in the wake of SDI, we can consider the U.S. nuclear umbrella to have exerted a significant influence of exacerbating tensions between Tokyo and Beijing.

An additional development of note in China’s nuclear program was the first successful, submerged launch of the JL-1 SLBM from the Xia in 1988. Although the deployment of a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) notionally enhances the credibility of one’s deterrent by providing a survivable, second-strike capability, the significance of this development is circumscribed by the fact that it has rarely put to sea since then; an SSBN is not survivable if it is in port. Additionally, the successful deployment of the JL-1 was likely more coincidentally timed in the context of SDI than intentionally planned; Project 09, the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) SSBN program, was first authorized in 1958, decades before the advent of SDI. As a result, the SSBN-SLBM program is best viewed as a long-term result of China’s initial nuclear program, and not a response to SDI.

F. THE SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP IN THE 1980S

On non-military fronts, the 1980s was a period of oscillation between tension and cooperation. Trade relations were especially fraught. By 1981 bilateral trade accounted for $10.4 billion, a ten-fold increase since 1971. This tapered off from 1982 to 1983, first as a result of Beijing’s suspending contracts for various construction projects funded by capital from Japanese businesses, then as China imposed restrictions on Japanese imports. After recovering from this dip, trade continued to grow from 1984 until 1989, reaching $19.6 billion—almost doubling from the beginning of the decade.

120 Saunders and Yuan, 87; Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 93, 98.
121 Xue, 168.
122 Rose, 53.
123 Iriye, 127–8; Rose, 52–3.
Diplomatic interactions alternated between a series of “firsts” and reflections on the past. In the summer of 1982 a controversy erupted over a proposed Japanese high school textbook which appeared to gloss over the atrocities of the Japanese army during the Pacific War; a similar crisis arose in 1984. August 1985 saw Prime Minister Nakasone make a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, a memorial to Japanese war dead where many Class A war criminals were enshrined in the 1970s. These low points were punctuated by highs. In 1982, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang travelled to Tokyo to celebrate the tenth anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations. In April 1984 senior PLA officials made a first-ever visit to Tokyo, followed by a reciprocal visit of SDF leaders to Beijing the following June. May 1985 saw the deputy director-general of the JDA visit China, and the chief of the Chinese general staff visited Japan the same month. Two years later, the JDA director-general made his own visit to China. When these changes in the Sino-Japanese relationship are compared against changes in the U.S. nuclear deterrent—and especially Japan’s involvement in SDI—there appears to be little correlation. For example, the 1985 decision to participate in SDI occurred in the context of both increasing trade and increasing military-to-military exchanges. As a result, the oscillation between cooperative and conflictual relations as measured by trade and diplomatic interactions cannot be attributed to changes in the nuclear umbrella.

G. THE BEGINNING OF THE END

1. The Tiananmen Square Protests

Following the death of the moderate Chinese reformer, Hu Yaobang, in April 1989, pro-democracy protests began to spread throughout Beijing. By May, students, intellectuals, and other protesters had occupied Tiananmen Square, urging the government to continue the moderate policies of Hu. Concerned for the stability of the government and the party’s hold on power, Deng Xiaoping declared martial law in Beijing and the PLA was ordered to clear the square. Shortly after midnight on June 4,

124 Rose, 18.
125 Rose, 55.
tanks and armored personnel carriers began moving into Beijing, often violently dealing with protesters along the way. By the end of the day, Tiananmen Square had been cleared, and thousands of civilians had been injured or killed.\textsuperscript{127}

The Tiananmen crackdown represented a sharp turning point in China’s foreign relations. Almost immediately every Western nation, as well as Japan, announced severe economic and political sanctions against Beijing. The United States and European Union imposed tight trade restrictions, including cutting off all sales of military technology, and curtailed military-to-military cooperation.\textsuperscript{128} Japan also terminated military exchanges, as well as suspending ¥810 billion in loans.\textsuperscript{129} For the Sino-Japanese relationship, June 4, 1989 marks a very distinct change, from cooperative friends to feuding friends.

\section*{2. Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe}

In the broader context of international events, June 1989 in many ways represented the beginning of the end Cold War. Partially a result of Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev’s \textit{glasnost} and \textit{perestroika} reforms, a wave of largely-peaceful revolutions swept through the Warsaw Pact throughout the summer and fall of 1989. Beginning in Poland, by the end of the year Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and East Germany had overthrown their Communist governments and begun the process of democratization. By November the Berlin Wall had fallen, and a joint U.S.-Soviet statement from a shipboard summit off Malta announced that the “epoch of cold war” had ended.\textsuperscript{130} The ideological conflict between East and West was over, and as a result a significant reordering of U.S. military posture was in store.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{127} Hsü, 926–41.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Hsü, 962.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Wan, 24, 35.
\end{itemize}
H. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

This chapter has traced the course of the China-Japan security relationship through a period of immense change. Beginning in 1969, Beijing and Tokyo were in the post-World War II state of formal, mutual ignorance, with increasing levels of informal interaction on trade issues being best characterized as a relationship of tacit friends. The strategic relationship changed in September 1972 when, spurred by the shock of Nixon’s opening to China, Japan switched its diplomatic recognition of “China” from Taipei to Beijing, and thus making the friendship one of cooperative friends. The relationship remained amicable throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but the PRC’s crackdown in Tiananmen Square and the resulting Japanese sanctions left the relationship in terms of feuding friends from June 1989. Although China and Japan both witnessed qualitative and quantitative improvements in their military capabilities, there is no evidence that these changes were part of a negative security spiral.

Washington’s extended deterrent saw great change throughout this period as well. Despite reassurances from the White House, the Guam Doctrine and the opening to China left many in Tokyo concerned about the credibility of the United States’ guarantees to defend Japan. The evolving arms control process suggested Washington was becoming less willing to develop new nuclear weapons to undergird its deterrent; at the same time, these agreements did not lead China to cease or slow its own nuclear program. The 1983 introduction of SDI threatened to alter the face of nuclear deterrence, although by inviting its allies to participate in the necessary research and development, Washington demonstrated its intention that SDI would be incorporated into the nuclear umbrella it provided over Europe and Japan. The 1980s also saw qualitative advances in the U.S. nuclear arsenal itself, including design of the new Peacekeeper ICBM and deployment of the Trident SLBM, both incorporating MIRV’d warheads.

These significant changes in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, however, appear largely uncorrelated to changes in the China-Japan security relationship. Although actions by Washington directly influenced the beginning of Sino-Japanese rapprochement and normalization—that is, Nixon’s opening to China in 1971–72—that influence was not a function of changes in America’s nuclear posture under any of the definitions adopted in
this thesis. When significant changes did occur in the U.S. deterrent, as with the introduction of SDI, the relationship between Beijing and Tokyo reflects little significant change at that time. It can safely be said that between 1969 and 1989 the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Japan had little, if any, immediate influence on tensions in the China-Japan security relationship, as illustrated in Figure 3. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, however, the introduction of SDI would have a negative impact on Sino-Japanese relations in the late 1990s and 2000s. This serves as a poignant reminder that the temporal periodization adopted here should not be taken for anything more than a convenient means of managing a lengthy history.

![Figure 3. U.S. nuclear deterrence and Sino-Japanese relations, 1969–1989](image-url)

The approximate decade from the end of the Cold War in December 1989 to the summer of 2001 saw a massive reordering of the global balance of power. As the threat of strategic nuclear attack subsided, the U.S. nuclear arsenal underwent significant qualitative and quantitative changes. The relationship between China and Japan continued to evolve as well, as both nations sought to establish a framework for interaction in the post-Cold War era.

In this chapter, the changes in the U.S. nuclear arsenal are traced from the immediate post-Cold War reduction in nuclear force readiness to the evolution of missile defenses in the face of threats from regional nuclear proliferators such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Analysis of the relationship between Beijing and Tokyo reveals that, while missile defense cooperation with the United States is a source of ire for Beijing, most changes in the quality of the relationship are a function of considerations outside the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

A. TRANSITION FROM THE COLD WAR AND U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

1. Collapse of the Soviet Union

The seven months from June to December 1989 witnessed the end of Communism in Eastern Europe; this precipitated a weakening of the Soviet Union. Combined with Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika of the late 1980s, the early 1990 decision to legalize political parties other than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) sparked a rapid process of opening, democratization, and ultimately declarations of independence by various Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs). The result was a rapid decentralization and further reform, culminating in the independence of all the constituent SSRs and the transfer of power from Soviet institutions to Russian ones. By December 31, 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceased to exist. The collapse of the Soviet Union marked a change in the international system whose significance is difficult
to overstate. In the course of two and a half years, the bipolar balance that had dominated international relations for almost half a century had given way to a unipolar world with the United States as the sole superpower.\textsuperscript{131}

2. Immediate Impact on U.S. Nuclear Deterrence

As a result of the rapid decline in Washington-Moscow tensions and the United States’ emergence as the world’s sole superpower, American security policies would soon come under review. During his State of the Union speech in January 1991, President George H.W. Bush announced a retooling of SDI; rather than defending against large-scale attacks from an enemy who no longer existed, the missile defense program would focus on limited, regional nuclear attacks.\textsuperscript{132} In May, the United States removed many targets in Eastern Europe from the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP). On July 31, Bush and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), committing Washington and Moscow to reduce their arsenals to 6,000 operational warheads, or approximately 40\% of 1989 deployment levels. Two months later, Bush announced several unilateral reductions in U.S. nuclear postures, including the removal of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) from Europe and from U.S. Navy warships world-wide, the end of day-alert status for the U.S. Air Force’s nuclear bomber force, the cessation of deterrent patrols by SSBNs armed with the older \textit{Poseidon} SLBM, and the cancellation of various nuclear force modernization plans.\textsuperscript{133} The United States and Russia further agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals in January 1993, with the signing of the START II agreement. This treaty provided a limit of 3,000 operational warheads by 2004, as well as for the de-MIRVing of all land-based ICBMs, which spelled the end of the \textit{Peacekeeper} ICBM.\textsuperscript{134}

\begin{footnotesize}


\textsuperscript{133} Wirtz, 115–6; Hadley, 200.

\textsuperscript{134} Wirtz, 116.
\end{footnotesize}
In 1994, the Clinton Administration carried out the United States’ first Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR determined that, in light of the changed strategic environment and the pending implementation of START II, additional reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal were in order. The NPR recommended reducing the number of SSBNs and nuclear-capable bombers, and as well as reducing the number of Minuteman III missiles that would be retained. In order to reassure allies—namely, NATO—about U.S. commitment to its nuclear guarantees, significant numbers of TNWs would remain in the European theater, although all such weapons had already been removed from forward deployment in Asia.\textsuperscript{135} Despite these reductions, however, the 1994 NPR also indicated that the United States would not seek further reductions and would maintain the ability to increase its arsenal again in order to “hedg[e] against an uncertain future.”\textsuperscript{136} Although the actual NPR remains classified, the unclassified press release is notable because it frames the entire discussion of U.S. strategic posture in terms of the former Soviet Union and the bilateral arms control treaties, START I and II. Brief mention is made to the threat of “weapons of mass destruction in a regional conflict,” but no specific mention is made of China or Japan.\textsuperscript{137} It is worth noting, however, that discussion incident to the leak of classified portions of the 2001 NPR also mentioned that nuclear war with China was a contingency considered for war planning in the 1994 review.\textsuperscript{138} Because this information was not disclosed until six years had elapsed, China did not respond at the time the 1994 NPR was released.


3. Scaling Down “Star Wars”

While the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union obviated the need for SDI as protection against a massive nuclear attack, the rise of regional nuclear proliferators highlighted the need to protect U.S. and allied forces from small-scale, theater missile attacks. This was partially underscored by the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, where a coalition led by the United States not only forced Iraq out of Kuwait, but also entered Iraq in an effort to find and dismantle Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons programs.139

As discussed earlier, President Bush announced a scaled-down SDI in 1991, focusing on regional threats as opposed to a massive Soviet nuclear attack. The concept of this limited missile defense was explicitly extended to U.S. allies and, in overtures beginning in 1992, to non-enemies such as Russia.140 The idea was to build a “global protection system from limited attacks” (GPALS) by “renegade countries;” including Russia in this program would reassure Moscow that they were no longer the target of U.S. missile defense. China, however, was not extended an invitation to participate in GPALS discussions, suggesting that the United States viewed China as a threat.141

President Clinton continued the missile defense program when he entered office in 1993. The former SDI Organization (SDIO) was renamed the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), with an explicit focus on theater missile defense (TMD), designed to defend U.S. and allied forces against a limited attack by a regional threat, such as Iraq or North Korea.142 Following North Korea’s May 1993 test of a Nodong-1 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and threat to withdraw from the NPT, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin approached JDA Director General Keisuke Nakanishi about Japanese participation in a TMD system; the result was the September 1993 establishment of a TMD working group to study a way ahead for U.S.-Japanese

139 Roberts, 19.
140 Hadley, 194.
141 Roberts, 17.
cooperation. In June 1994, four proposals were put forth, and in August the Prime Minister’s Advisory Group recommended that Japan cooperate on a TMD system to counter a “limited missile attack.” From 1995 to 1998, the Japanese defense budget included a total of ¥560 million for studies, but Tokyo “remained reticent about committing itself to actual participation in co-operative research” with the United States. Although Japanese leaders maintained that TMD cooperation was in response to the North Korean missile threat, Chinese leaders were suspicious at continued interest despite the October 1994 Agreed Framework which appeared to eliminate Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions.

B. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS TO 1996

1. Recovery from Tiananmen

Following the PLA’s crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square, China’s relations with the world entered a period of marked coolness and even isolation. Western nations suspended military-to-military contacts and trade in defense-related materials and technology; for its part, Japan suspended the third in a series of significant yen loans to Beijing out of protest for the harsh treatment of its citizens during the June 4, 1989, incident. Although Tokyo and Beijing maintained formal relations during this time, the short-term character of the relationship was that of feuding friends.

While many of the post-Tiananmen restrictions imposed by Europe and the United States continue to the present day, Japan’s ostracization of China came to a comparatively quick end. Barely six months afterward, Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu became the first post-Tiananmen visitor to Beijing, where he announced a loan to build a hospital in Shanghai. By June 1991, two years after the crackdown, Tokyo lifted its

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144 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “China’s Nuclear Tests.”
145 C. Hughes, 31.
146 C. Hughes, 32; Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” 393.
147 Rose, 25.
sanctions and resumed full trade with Beijing, including reinstatement of the ¥810 billion loan that had been suspended in the wake of the Tiananmen protests. In October 1992 Emperor Akihito travelled to Beijing, becoming the first Japanese head of state to visit the Middle Kingdom. The Sino-Japanese relationship was thus restored to cooperative friends.

This improvement was short-lived, however. In 1993, facing the beginning of what would become known as the “Lost Decade” of economic stagnation, Tokyo grew increasingly concerned about Beijing’s growing strength in the bilateral relationship. Japan redefined the rules for its Overseas Direct Assistance (ODA) funding, inserting an “insistence on restraint in military spending.” In response, China began raising the issue of Japan’s history of aggression and, to some, failure to adequately apologize; this was complicated throughout the spring and summer of 1994, as some Japanese cabinet officials inexplicably denied well-documented events such as the Nanjing massacre.

2. China’s Continuing Nuclear Tests

Tensions further deepened in 1995, as Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi (who would later become the first prime minister to officially apologize for Japanese actions during World War II) travelled to Beijing in early May 1995 for a summit with Chinese Premier Li Peng. During the visit, Murayama asked Li to self-impose a moratorium on nuclear testing. This seemed a reasonable request to Murayama, as Japan was the only nation ever to suffer a nuclear attack; Chinese leaders, on the other hand, resented being criticized by “the country that had wreaked havoc on their land and never satisfactorily apologized.” China made clear its response on May 15 by conducting its forty-second nuclear test. As a result, Tokyo immediately suspended approximately $86 million in ODA, although this was largely symbolic in the context of

148 Green, 78.
150 Rozman, 106.
151 Rozman, 107.
152 Rozman, 107.
a $1.6 billion package for FY1996. To Beijing, however, this ODA was viewed as a sort of informal war reparation, and as a result attempted to deny Japan the right to suspend the funding.

3. The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis

Matters got worse in July with the onset of the third Taiwan Strait Crisis. From July 1995 through March 1996, Beijing conducted various military exercises and missile tests in the international waters surrounding Taiwan; an additional nuclear test at Lop Nur in August. Although these actions are widely understood as intended to intimidate Taipei and its increasingly pro-democratic government, the crisis nevertheless raised concerns for Tokyo as well. First, as an island nation, Japan is heavily dependent on imports, much of which travels by sea over the shipping lanes adjacent to Taiwan; a conflict off the coast of Taiwan could jeopardize the safety of those shipping lanes. More alarming, however, was the deployment of two U.S. aircraft carriers—including the Japan-based USS Independence—to the region. The MST committed Tokyo and Washington to consult on issues of “international peace and security in the Far East,” but did not require that Japan physically aid in the enforcement or creation of such security. Nevertheless, the potential for direct United States involvement in a cross-strait crisis raised the prospect that Japan might be drawn into a war between Beijing and Taipei as a result of its alliance with Washington. Despite the tension in the alliance, and an August 1995 confrontation between Japanese and Chinese fighters over Senkaku/Diaoyu airspace, Japan’s response was muted. The government publically condemned Beijing’s threat of force to intimidate the island, but did not take any tangible action such as suspending any economic or political interactions.

153 Green, 80–1; Wan, 36.
154 Rozman, 108.
155 Green, 81; Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “China’s Nuclear Tests.”
156 Berger, “Japan’s International Relations,” 136; Green, 21.
158 Wan, 36.
C. REAFFIRMING THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

By 1995, the alliance between Washington and Tokyo was in a state that many analysts called “drift,” lacking a clear direction. Japanese inaction during the Gulf War left many in the United States wondering about the purpose of an alliance where the benefits appeared to accrue to one partner at the expense of the other.\(^{159}\) As evidence of Japanese concerns over the credibility of U.S. deterrent guarantees in the context of a shrinking nuclear arsenal and increasing reliance on missile defense, as well as growing concern over North Korea’s nuclear program, the JDA initiated a study on the “Problems of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.”\(^{160}\) Despite the somewhat misleading title, the report actually investigated the feasibility of an independent Japanese nuclear deterrent in the post-Cold War era. Like the reports of 1968–70 (another period of malaise in the U.S.-Japan alliance), the 1995 study concluded that, while technically feasible, Japan’s national interest was best served by not obtaining its own nuclear weapons, and maintaining reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.\(^{161}\)

1. The Reaffirmation Process

A series of bilateral and international events—the rape of an Okinawan girl by a U.S. Marine, the third Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the North Korean nuclear crisis—convinced alliance managers in Washington and Tokyo that a “reaffirmation” was necessary.\(^{162}\) The plan that was conceived involved four distinct steps: the U.S. East Asia Strategy Review (EASR), a revised Japanese NDPO, revised guidelines for cooperation, and a joint security declaration.

The February 1995 EASR (also known as the Nye Initiative) emphasized the U.S. commitment to an enduring presence in the Asia-Pacific, specifically concerns about


\(^{161}\) Green and Furukawa, 353.

\(^{162}\) Green, 22.
reducing conventional forces to a level which made friends and allies uneasy. In December 1995 the Cabinet unveiled the National Defense Program Outline for fiscal year 1996 and after. It emphasized Japan’s intention to closely coordinate with the United States on security matters, and to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent while making efforts toward the abolition of all nuclear weapons. The April 1996 Joint Security Declaration between President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro emphasized that the alliance “remain[ed] the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region;” it also confirmed that “U.S. deterrence…remains the guarantee for Japan’s security” and emphasized the importance of BMD cooperation.

The reaffirmation process culminated in the September 1997 release of revised Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Guidelines. The revised Guidelines significantly expanded the role of the SDF in responding to contingencies, especially those in “areas surrounding Japan.” The Guidelines also provided for greatly increased coordination between the United States and Japan in defense planning and intelligence sharing.

2. China’s Reaction to the Reaffirmation Process

China’s reaction to the alliance reaffirmation process was notably hostile. The increased role accorded to Japan in the 1997 Defense Cooperation Guidelines was perceived as a means of containing China in much the same way as the Tokyo-Washington alliance contained the USSR during the Cold War. Although the Guidelines referred only to cooperation during contingencies in the “areas surrounding Japan,” Washington and Tokyo went to great lengths to emphasize that this was a “situational” and not a geographic definition.

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167 Green, 91.
alliance was posturing for greater intervention in a future Taiwan contingency. This suspicion was fueled by Japanese missteps; for example, on August 17 the Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary stated that Taiwan was in fact included in the “areas surrounding Japan.” The next month, during a visit to Beijing, Prime Minister Hashimoto faced “strong opposition” from President Jiang Zemin over both the Guidelines and Tokyo’s increasing cooperation with the United States on TMD.

China’s hostile reaction to the alliance reaffirmation must also be viewed in the context of strictly bilateral issues; in this sense, the mid-1990s were turbulent. In July 1996—mere months after the Clinton-Hashimoto Joint Security Declaration which sparked Chinese suspicions—a group of private Japanese citizens erected a lighthouse in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which Tokyo then refused to dismantle. Later that month, Prime Minister Hashimoto made a visit to the divisive Yasukuni Shrine, sparking public protests in Beijing and other Chinese cities.

D. EXPANSION OF MISSILE DEFENSE

1. Greater Japanese Participation

The year 1998 provided the first test of the newly-reaffirmed alliance. On August 31, North Korea conducted a test of its Taepodong-1 ICBM; the path of the missile took it through Japanese air space. As a result, Secretary of Defense William Perry reoriented the BMDO toward pursuit of both TMD and a larger-scale national missile defense (NMD) program. In addition, the United States again approached Japan regarding participation in TMD development. Motivated by the increasingly-imminent threat of North Korean missiles, Tokyo acceded. In October, Japan and the United States

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168 Wan, 37.
170 Wan, 25; Rose, 18.
announced that they would jointly conduct technical research into a missile defense system, a decision which was formally approved by the Japanese National Security Council on December 25.\textsuperscript{171}

Japan’s cooperation materialized in the form of ¥978 million for research into four key components of the TMD interceptor: an infrared seeker, a heat shield for the seeker, a kinetic warhead, and the second-stage rocket motor. Of the four proposed U.S. systems (ground- and sea-based systems, each with a high- and low-end configuration), Japan’s participation was targeted at the low-end, sea-based system. This was a result of the JMSDF’s investment in the U.S. Navy’s \textit{Aegis} technology, upon which one of the options was based.\textsuperscript{172}

While the NMD and TMD research progressed apace under the Clinton Administration, the program received greater attention in early 2001 under President George W. Bush. In a speech on May 1, Bush placed BMD in the context of not only the nuclear threats posed by countries such as North Korea and Iraq, but also the need to de-emphasize nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world in an attempt to stem the trend toward proliferation. He tasked Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld with identifying options for rapid deployment of a limited missile defense, as well as continuing existing research and development on a more robust system. Further, he declared the dispatch of envoys to allies across the globe, and emphasized the “need to reach out to other interested states, including China and Russia.”\textsuperscript{173} While this statement arguably indicates that missile defense was not directed against Beijing, it did not extend the same invitation for joint development that was made to Moscow.

\section{Chinese Reactions to Missile Defense}

Beijing’s response to missile defense was consistently negative; after every major U.S. announcement, China quickly followed with a denouncement about the destabilizing effects of a potential missile defense system in the region.

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\item\textsuperscript{172} C. Hughes, 31.
\item\textsuperscript{173} George W. Bush, “Remarks at the National Defense University, May 1, 2001.”
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
effect that missile defense would have, especially on countries with small nuclear arsenals, and general threats about the necessity of either increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal or developing its own missile defense system as a means of ensuring the credibility of its deterrent.\footnote{Roberts, 20–2.}

During this time, China sent mixed signals regarding its strategic deterrent. In July 1996, shortly after the release of the Joint Security Declaration, China conducted a final nuclear test before announcing its preparedness to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) then under negotiation. Washington and Beijing both signed the CTBT on September 24, although its ratification has been stalled in both countries.\footnote{Green, 81.} In 1998, Beijing published its first-ever defense white paper, which publically reemphasized its commitment to its NFU policy.\footnote{Jia Qingguo, “China’s Nuclear Weapon Policy,” in \textit{Perspectives on Sino-American Strategic Nuclear Issues}, ed. Christopher P. Twomey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 88; People’s Republic of China State Council, \textit{China’s National Defense} (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, 1998), 521, \url{http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/index.htm} (accessed September 24, 2010).} Nevertheless, Chinese leaders continued to emphasize the importance of nuclear deterrence to Chinese strategy, and took steps to demonstrate that importance. In 1997, PRC President Jiang Zemin announced a fifty-year national defense modernization program, including significant upgrades to China’s deterrent capability. In August 1999, China conducted the first successful test of its newest ICBM, the solid-fueled DF-31, and the Central Committee of the CCP reportedly authorized a program to develop countermeasures and other means of defeating a missile defense system.\footnote{Saunders and Yuan, 86; Chu and Rong, 162; Roberts, 31.}

As U.S.-Japan cooperation on missile defense deepened following the 1998 North Korean missile test, China’s anti-missile defense rhetoric increased as well. In an April 1999 speech to U.S. and Chinese academics and policymakers, the Chinese ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament decried missile defense as inimical to U.S. interests in nuclear non-proliferation and ultimate disarmament; he also argued that U.S.-Japan cooperation on BMD would be destabilizing more broadly for the Asia-Pacific region,
and could serve as “a stepping stone for Japan's return to the track of militarism.” A joint statement between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin in July 2000 denounced the plans of a “certain country” to implement a missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region, and called on the international community to “pay serious attention” to international stability in the face of this development—although neither Putin nor Jiang called out Japan for its cooperation on missile defense. In reaction to Bush’s 2001 speech on BMD, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement warning of the destabilizing effects of the “destruction” of the ABM Treaty; again, however, Japan was not called out for its cooperation with the United States.

E. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AT THE END OF THE CENTURY

Looking more broadly than defense issues, the Sino-Japanese relationship appeared on a general downward trend from 1998 to 2001. In November 1998, the month after the U.S.-Japan announcement on joint BMD research, Chinese President Jiang Zemin travelled to Tokyo for a summit meeting. While the BMD announcement cast a small pall over the visit, the summit was truly overshadowed by a summit just prior in Korea. There, Prime Minister Obuchi issued a formal apology for Japanese actions on the Korean peninsula since 1910. When it became obvious that no such apology was forthcoming during the Jiang-Obuchi summit, the Chinese leader was incensed; he proceeded to spend the remainder of the summit angrily discussing the issue of Sino-Japanese history. Tensions subsided through 1999 and 2000 with the onset of China’s “smile diplomacy,” leading to a July 1999 summit where Prime Minister Obuchi

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181 Rozman, 111.
endorsed China’s bid for accession to the World Trade Organization.\textsuperscript{182} By early 2001, however, a new, right-wing leader had come to power in Japan. The first months of Koizumi Junichiro’s administration saw renewed protests over a proposed junior high school textbook revision, a trade dispute over agricultural imports to Japan, and Beijing’s imposition of retaliatory tariffs on automobiles and other consumer goods.\textsuperscript{183} Tensions reached a low in August when, despite pleas from both Beijing and Seoul, Koizumi followed through on a campaign promise to visit Yasukuni Shrine.\textsuperscript{184}

F. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

The period from late 1989 to mid-2001 saw significant change in the quantitative and qualitative credibility of Washington’s nuclear deterrent. As the Soviet Union collapsed and the existential threat to the United States ceased, successive presidents reduced the size of America’s nuclear arsenal and cancelled modernization programs in favor of life extension programs for existing nuclear weapons. As the threat of attack from regional proliferators increased, however, the United States saw utility in a missile defense system and enlisted the help of its allies—including Japan—in its development. This program only took on additional urgency in the wake of North Korea’s 1998 ICBM test.

On the strategic level, the China-Japan relationship remained squarely one of long-term friends, with no breaks in diplomatic relations during this time. While tensions between Tokyo and Beijing receded quickly after the repeal of Japan’s post-Tiananmen sanctions, bilateral relations nevertheless suffered as a result of Chinese actions before and during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–96, culminating in the suspension of significant Japanese aid to the Chinese economy, although this was short-lived, with aid being reinstated following China’s signing of the CTBT. Although Tokyo was the subject of some angry Chinese rhetoric over its participation in U.S. missile defense research, tensions between Beijing and Tokyo were mainly related to domestic politics

\textsuperscript{182} Wan, 26; Rozman, 113.

\textsuperscript{183} Wan, 26–7; Rozman, 120.

\textsuperscript{184} Wan, 27.
and trade issues, not Japanese participation in missile defense. The China-Japan security relationship thus oscillated back and forth from feuding friends to cooperative friends.

Short of rhetoric, however, Tokyo’s participation in TMD does not appear to have been the impetus for changes in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Trade continued to grow during this time. The Chinese observation that TMD could impair Beijing’s ability to attack targets in Japan raised some eyebrows in Tokyo—China had never (and still, technically, has not) admitted to aiming missiles at Japan, and its self-avowed NFU policy would suggest that non-nuclear-armed Japan should be exempt from nuclear threat—but did not lead to any sanctions, cancelled visits, or other clear indications of cooling relations.185 While the risk of missile defense serving as a “stepping stone” to Japanese remilitarization is an issue, China’s main point of contention over U.S. missile defense—and Japanese participation in joint development, especially the sea-based, mobile variant—appears to revolve around its implicit extension to Taiwan. Coverage of Taiwan by U.S. missile defenses would not only constitute foreign intervention in a domestic dispute (in Beijing’s mind) but would also severely undercut the deterrent (or coercive) effect of the thousands of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) pointed across the Taiwan Strait.186

To the extent that the Sino-Japanese relationship can be solely measured in terms of military hardware, China’s nuclear modernization program in the context of Japanese participation in TMD might imply a security spiral. The lead-time on such an extensive program as the DF-31 makes a causal relationship difficult to gauge; because the DF-31 program was begun in the mid-1980s it can more reasonably be judged a response to SDI, not TMD and NMD. Perhaps the program was accelerated and timed to coincide with a response to the 1998 advancement of Japanese participation in TMD. There is little evidence, however, to indicate that the pace of modernization increased during this

185 Green, 93.
period; the time from initial development to first test for the DF-31 is comparable to that for all of China’s previous DF-series missiles.\textsuperscript{187}

As illustrated in Figure 4, the linkage between changes in the U.S. nuclear umbrella and the Sino-Japanese relationship is most clearly evident in the late 1990s, first as a result of China’s response to SDI, then later as Beijing began new programs in response to more recent missile defense initiatives. Some of this is tentative; will China’s BMD countermeasures be successful? How long will that take? In any event, the influence of the U.S. nuclear guarantee is clearly toward exacerbation; the magnitude, however, is varied. To the extent that SDI motivated China’s strategic modernization, the influence would be significant; as noted in the previous chapter, Chinese analysts saw SDI as upsetting the delicate balance between Washington and Moscow. On the matter of late 1990s initiatives, the influence is best judged as weak to moderate. The lack of transparency in Beijing’s defense policy makes it difficult to determine when, exactly, its

![Diagram of U.S. nuclear deterrence and Sino-Japanese relations, 1989–2001](image_url)

Figure 4. U.S. nuclear deterrence and Sino-Japanese relations, 1989–2001

\textsuperscript{187} Saunders and Yuan, 86; Keith Crane, et al., *Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 143–4. Crane et al. explain how the time from project initiation to first successful test ranges between fifteen and twenty years for each of China’s missile programs.
BMD countermeasures and other programs were initiated, and thus complicates a
determination of whether they were simply a continuation of the reaction to SDI or
represented a new response.
V. THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ERA, 2001–PRESENT

The events of September 11, 2001, ushered in a new era in U.S. security strategy. Giving impetus to a new look at Washington’s nuclear posture, the Bush Administration set out to add new, tactical nuclear capabilities to its arsenal, as well as expansion of its nascent missile defense program. The relationship between Tokyo and Beijing also underwent significant change, often alternating between cooperative friends and feuding friends. As this chapter will demonstrate, however, those changes in the short-term relationship are largely uncorrelated with changes in the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Japan.

A. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

On the morning of September 11, 2001, a group of nineteen Al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners; two crashed into New York’s Twin Towers and one into the Pentagon, with the fourth crashing in a field in rural Pennsylvania. By the end of the day, almost 3,000 people were dead, and the United States was orienting itself toward a war on terrorism. In the words of David Lampton and Richard Ewing, the events of September 11, 2001, “brought about profound changes to the threat perceptions of Americans and, consequently, to America’s national security strategy.”188 Significantly, the war on terrorism presented an opportunity for increased cooperation between Washington and Tokyo, as well as Washington and Beijing. For Japan, U.S. operations in Afghanistan presented the opportunity to redeem its lack of support in 1991; Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro quickly pledged his government’s support, and soon Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) oilers were deployed to the Indian Ocean to refuel coalition warships operating in support of the war on terror.189 China was also quick to lend its support to the United States; in addition to pledging $150 million for the reconstruction of post-Taliban Afghanistan, Beijing also used the specter of Al-Qaeda and Islamist extremism to crack down on the Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang province.190

189 Samuels, 95–6.
190 Lampton and Ewing, ii, 11–2.
While the September 11 attacks prompted improved bilateral relations between Washington and its Asian partners, it also presented an opportunity to underscore the Bush Administration’s position on missile defense. The 9/11 attacks were planned and executed by a group based out of Afghanistan. If such a low-tech yet highly devastating operation could be orchestrated from a rogue nation with no nuclear ambitions, imagine the risk posed by such nations that were pursuing nuclear weapons. Shortly after September 11, the U.S. government indicated that there might be a relationship between Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network and Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq. Although such a relationship was ultimately disproved, the threat of nuclear terrorism sponsored by rogue nations nevertheless served to support the Bush administration’s argument in favor of a robust missile defense system.\footnote{“YEARENDER: Terror Attacks Prompt U.S. Military Strategy Adjustments,” \textit{Xinhua News Agency}, December 28, 2001, \url{http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-18437761.html} (accessed November 6, 2010).}

1. \textbf{The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review}

In January 2002 the administration released its 2001 NPR. Abandoning the “legacy” strategic triad of SSBNs, bombers, and ICBMs, the 2001 NPR established a new triad consisting of nuclear and non-nuclear strike capability, active and passive defenses, and a robust research and development capacity and industrial infrastructure to “develop, build, and maintain nuclear offensive forces and defensive systems.” The term “active defenses” was understood to refer to BMD.\footnote{Wirtz, 119.}

A key component of the 2001 NPR was the assessment that a strategic nuclear attack by Russia was unlikely (although a leaked version of the still-classified report indicates that a nuclear war with China was considered a planning priority in the context of a Taiwan crisis), and that America’s nuclear arsenal needed to be re-tooled in order to respond to smaller threats from rogue nations and non-state actors, and to execute precision strikes against hardened targets.\footnote{Bleek, “Nuclear Posture Review Leaks;” Wirtz, 119.} The September 11 attacks and resulting war in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan supported the notion that a precision, low-yield
nuclear weapon could be employed against targets where even precision conventional munitions would be unsuccessful. In this context, the administration sought funding for research and development on both a robust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP) for targeting hardened sites such as command and control or weapons research bunkers, as well as a reliable replacement warhead (RRW) that would be optimized not for the greatest yield-to-weight ratio but instead for reliability after a period of long-term storage. Both programs, however, failed to receive the approval of the U.S. Congress.\textsuperscript{194}

In the spirit of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, in 2002 President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) in Moscow. Although the Moscow Treaty imposed a lower ceiling on nuclear warheads than previous treaties—2,200 weapons by the end of 2012—the treaty lacked the kind of robust verification regime of the START series.\textsuperscript{195}

China’s reaction to these developments was mixed. While Beijing supported Washington’s efforts on arms control treaties, it reacted with “shock” to the leak of the 2001 NPR which purported to include China into the SIOP. For its part, Japan (as with other U.S. allies) had very little to say on the matter.\textsuperscript{196}

B. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE POST-9/11 ERA

Although the events of September 11 helped to emphasize President Bush’s belief in the necessity of a missile defense system, he had announced its acceleration before the attacks, on May 1, 2001, as discussed in the preceding chapter. Following the third successful test (out of five attempts) of the U.S. Air Force’s NMD system, in December 2001 Bush gave the requisite six-month notice of his intention to withdraw the United States from the ABM Treaty.\textsuperscript{197} By the middle of 2002 the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army

\textsuperscript{194} Wirtz, 120–1.

\textsuperscript{195} Wirtz, 116.

\textsuperscript{196} Bleek, “Nuclear Posture Review Leaks.”

had successfully demonstrated their components of TMD, using the Aegis Weapon System and the Standard Missile (SM-3) and the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile, respectively.\(^{198}\)

1. **Japan’s Increasing Involvement**

Throughout the early years of the twenty-first century, the United States encouraged Japan to increase its participation in missile defense from research to joint development and, ultimately, employment. While Prime Minister Koizumi was in many ways the most pro-Washington leader of the Diet in decades, joint development and deployment of missile defense was initially stymied for a variety of reasons. First, joint development came up against Japan’s tight controls on the export of military weapons and technology, first imposed under Prime Minister Sato in 1967. While Tokyo created an exception in order to allow Japanese participation in the development of SDI in the 1980s, the arms control policy nevertheless prevented third-party transfers—in other words, missile defense technology developed by Japan and shared with the United States could not then be implemented in a system shared between the Washington and its NATO allies.\(^{199}\) Second, many members of the Diet feared that the intelligence sharing necessary to joint deployment of TMD with the United States would implicitly involve Tokyo in Washington’s NMD, possibly running counter to Japan’s self-imposed prohibition on the use of collective self-defense.\(^{200}\)

Japan’s resistance to joint development and deployment soon changed. Toward the end of 2002, North Korea announced that it was reactivating the nuclear facilities that had lain dormant since the establishment of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and on January 10, 2003, Pyongyang formally announced that it was withdrawing from the

\(^{198}\) Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Missile Defense-Related Statements and Development Chronology.”

\(^{199}\) Samuels, 90, 106.

\(^{200}\) Samuels, 180; C. Hughes, 36–7. The United Nations charter of 1946 grants to all nations the rights of self-defense and collective self-defense, that is, using one’s armed forces to repel an attack against an ally. The Japanese Constitution neither accepts nor rejects the principle of collective self-defense; a 1954 interpretation by the Cabinet Legislative Bureau determined that while Japan technically has the right to collective self-defense under international law, it is nevertheless unconstitutional under Article 9. See Samuels, 48.
NPT. On December 17, 2002, the United States announced it was going ahead with development and deployment of a missile defense system centered on ground- and sea-based interceptors for defense against SRBM attacks, as well as ground-based interceptors for use against ICBM attacks. Throughout 2003, Washington and Tokyo engaged in discussions over missile defense; by the end of the year, the Koizumi government determined that Japan could not afford to either forgo a missile defense system or pursue a system of its own; greater cooperation—even joint development and deployment—was necessary. On December 19, Tokyo agreed to joint development of a missile defense system with the United States, and that the components of missile defense would be exempt from the Sato-era arms control policy, including the prohibition on third-party transfers.

2. Alliance “Transformation and Realignment”

In the mid-2000s Japanese defense policy and the Washington-Tokyo alliance both began a period of reorientation. In December 2004, the Japanese Cabinet introduced a revised National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) for FY2005. The new NDPG was, to a certain extent, a reiteration of past practice and commitments, explaining in multiple places Japan’s continued reliance on U.S. extended deterrence and joint development of a BMD system. In its discussion on the “security environment surrounding Japan,” however, the FY2005 NDPG did make two declarations that represented a significant break from previous iterations. First, it expressed concern at the

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201 Lampton and Ewing, 44–5.
203 Samuels, 106; C. Hughes, 4.
“uncertain” situation across the Taiwan Strait. Second, in addition to North Korea’s many threats, the modernization of China’s strategic and naval forces were identified as trends to which Tokyo must “remain attentive.”

The implication of a “China threat” was reiterated in February 2005, this time through the forum of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC). In the joint statement released on February 19, the allied ministers of defense and foreign affairs explicated the allies’ common strategic objectives. Enumerated in this list encouraging China to “play a responsible and constructive role” in the international community, “improv[ing] the transparency of its military affairs,” and the “peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait.” At the SCC meeting in October 2005, the process of strengthening the alliance was given a formal title: “transformation and realignment.” The subject of the meeting was to develop means, not justifications, for increased cooperation between the United States and Japan. As a result, while neither China nor Taiwan are mentioned as concerns, the joint statement does reiterate the continuing provision of the nuclear umbrella and the future of cooperation on missile defense.

If the allies needed additional justification to continue the transformation and realignment process, it came in summer and fall of 2006. On July 4, North Korea conducted its first test of an ICBM since 1998, launching a series of Taepodong-1 and other, shorter-range missiles. Three months later, on October 9, Pyongyang announced that it had successfully tested a nuclear weapon. In response, President Bush reiterated that same day Washington’s commitment to its nuclear guarantee; a week later, Secretary

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204 National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005–, Reference 9 in Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2009, 403–4, 406. The NDPG is the successor to the two previous National Defense Program Outlines (NDPO) of FY1976 and FY1996. While the English rendering was changed in 2004 from “outline” to “guideline,” the Japanese term remained the same; it is not believed that this change in rendering has any significance.


of State Condoleezza Rice emphasized that “[t]he United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range, and I underscore the full range, of its deterrence and security commitment to Japan.” At the next meeting of the SCC, in May 2007, the allies again “reaffirmed that the full range of U.S. military capabilities—both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities—form the core of extended deterrence and support U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan.” Although North Korea’s tests did not involve an explicit acceleration of U.S.-Japan BMD development, the aftermath of the crisis did witness the first deployment of PAC-3 batteries in Japan, as well as the first joint test of the Aegis sea-based TMD system.

3. China’s Muted Response

In contrast to its vocal protests throughout the late 1990s, China’s response to developments in America’s missile defense program in the twenty-first century was more muted. Following the formal withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty, the only official statement noted that Beijing was “regretful” over the decision and its hope that Washington would act “prudently.” Brad Roberts attributes this “quiet acquiescence” to a variety of factors: China’s belief that its “worst fears seemed to be coming true” about a pro-Taiwan administration in Washington; an attempt to reset Sino-American relations in the wake of President Bush’s post-September 11 “with us or against us” view of international relations; and recognition that if Sino-Russian protests had thus far failed to stall U.S. missile defense efforts, they were unlikely to succeed.

Despite this muted diplomatic response, China has nevertheless made efforts toward both overcoming missile defense and developing a system of its own. Beijing has executed an ambitious strategic force modernization program: the solid-fueled DF-31 was

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207 Green and Furukawa, 368, note 8.
211 Roberts, 32.
successful tested in 1999, the longer-range DF-31A is under development, and the JL-2 SLBM is expected to enter service soon. In 2006, China was reported to be pursuing various BMD countermeasures, including improved missile accuracy, “cold-launch” techniques to delay boost-phase detection of a launch, flattening the trajectory of the DF-31 to frustrate mid-course intercept, and “infrared stealth” technology. In addition, there is evidence that Beijing has been pursuing its own missile defense system. On January 11, 2007, the PLA successfully tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon system, shooting down a defunct weather satellite at an altitude of over 500 nautical miles. In its 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (BMDR), the U.S. Department of Defense reported that China had successfully tested a ground-based intercept—the initial step in developing a missile defense system—on January 11, 2010. Keeping in mind the previously-cited fifteen to twenty year interval between project initiation and first successful test, these programs may have been started in response to the late 1990s increase in U.S. missile defense programs, with seemingly coincidental timing. The lack of transparency in China’s weapons programs, however, makes this difficult to judge.

China has also responded to the alliance “transformation and realignment” process. In response to Tokyo’s FY2005 NDPG, naming China as a specific concern, Beijing issued a statement protesting the negative characterization of China in the NDPG.


213 Chu and Rong, 173.

214 United States Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments, 36. The U.S. Navy’s Aegis BMD performed a similar demonstration with the destruction of a defunct National Reconnaissance Office satellite in February 2008. However, the Navy and contractor Lockheed Martin emphasized the ASAT is beyond the regular capabilities of Aegis BMD; in order to shoot the satellite, both the Aegis computer and the SM-3 missile required special, one-time hardware and software modifications. See United States Department of Defense, “DoD Succeeds in Intercepting Non-Functioning Satellite,” February 20, 2008, http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11704 (accessed November 6, 2010).

Following the February 2005 SCC statement, which incorporated the Taiwan Strait as an alliance interest, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing specifically warned Japan against “challenging China’s core national interest in Taiwan.” As a result of Beijing’s protests, we can consider these points to represent periods of feuding friendship between China and Japan.

Despite the military advances China has made, there is little evidence that a negative security spiral is currently underway. In 2008 the RAND Corporation undertook a study on the reactions of U.S. allies in the Pacific to the rise of China. The project concluded that, while the growth of China’s military power (including nuclear forces) is undeniable, there has been little appreciable change in behavior—in terms of economic interaction, military expenditures—to suggest that U.S. allies in the region feel immediately threatened by China. One could thus conclude that, to the extent that the China-Japan security relationship can be measured in terms of military expenditures, the U.S. nuclear umbrella (including missile defense) has not exacerbated tensions between Beijing and Tokyo.

C. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS SINCE 2001

In addition to discord between Beijing and Tokyo over the U.S.-Japan alliance and BMD, the first part of the decade got off to a rough start. In April 2001, shortly after he took office, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro followed through on his campaign promise to visit Yasukuni Shrine. This took place despite repeated, public protests from Beijing and Seoul both before and after the visit; as a result, China suspended military-to-military interactions for a year. This did not stop Koizumi from making further visits; in April 2002, January 2003, January 2004, and October 2005 he again visited Yasukuni, again suffering the consequence of diplomatic rebuke from Beijing. Bilateral tensions also suffered in May 2002 in a dispute over the forcible entrance of Chinese police into the Japanese consulate in Shenyang. In November 2004 a Chinese submarine illegally

216 Wan, 42–3.
218 Wan, 27–8.
entered Japanese territorial waters, sparking a minor diplomatic exchange.\textsuperscript{219} In April 2005 a new junior high school textbook was released which, to many, appeared to gloss over many of Japan’s atrocities from 1931 to 1945; the result was a wave of popular protests in China, including the largest gathering of protestors in Tiananmen Square since the June 1989 crackdown.\textsuperscript{220}

After Koizumi, more moderate politicians ascended to the prime minister’s office, leading to a significant number of positive interactions going forward. In March 2006 Beijing suggested to Tokyo a joint exploration program for the Senkaku islands; the plan was ultimately agreed to in June 2008. In November 2007, a PLAN warship made the first-ever visit of a Chinese warship to Japan; this was reciprocated in June 2008, when a JMSDF vessel visited a Chinese port for the first time.\textsuperscript{221} Bilateral defense exchanges increased toward the end of the decade, with major summits between China and Japan’s respective defense ministers held in May 2007 and March 2009.\textsuperscript{222}

The trend in the China-Japan security relationship thus reflects the personalities and politics of the individuals involved. While Koizumi presided over Japan’s diplomacy, the relationship between Beijing and Tokyo was almost always that of feuding friends. On the other hand, the premierships of Abe Shinzo, Fukuda Yasuo, Aso Taro, Hatoyama Yukio, and now Kan Naoto have seen a relationship that has been largely that of cooperative friends, despite Japan’s increasing involvement and joint deployment of BMD with the United States.

D. “A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS”?

1. The Prague Initiative

Speaking to an audience in Prague on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama declared “America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” Admitting that such a goal might not be met soon or even in his

\textsuperscript{220} Wan, 30.
lifetime, Obama nevertheless committed to making visible progress on meeting Washington’s Article VI obligations under the NPT to disarm itself.\footnote{White House, “Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered,” \url{http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-in-Prague-As-Delivered} (accessed August 13, 2010).}

A year later, the United States appeared ready to make progress on that commitment. In its 2010 NPR, Washington announced that, in view of the radically changed strategic environment since the end of the Cold War—namely, the end of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry and greatly improved conventional weapons—it was “now prepared to strengthen its long-standing ‘negative security assurance’ by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”\footnote{United States Department of Defense, \textit{Nuclear Posture Review Report} (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010), 15, \url{http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf} (accessed May 3, 2010).} While this would seem to mark a radical change from typical U.S. ambiguity regarding its nuclear deterrent policy, the 2010 NPR describes several caveats. First, this does not constitute an NFU policy; there is still a “narrow range of contingencies” in which Washington’s nuclear arsenal would be used to deter a conventional, chemical, or biological attack by states not covered by the negative security assurance (that is, states possessing nuclear weapons or not in compliance with their NPT obligations). Second, the NPR does not express Washington’s intentional to unilaterally disarm: “[t]he fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.” Third, “the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted” by the emergence of new chemical or biological threats.\footnote{United States Department of Defense, \textit{Nuclear Posture Review Report}, 15–6.} Finally, the document underscores that the United States would continue its provision of extended deterrence to its “allies and partners.”\footnote{United States Department of Defense, \textit{Nuclear Posture Review Report}, 31.} On the whole, then, the
NPR does not represent a radical change from previous U.S. deterrence policy, but nevertheless represents a step toward reducing the importance of nuclear weapons in security strategy.\(^\text{227}\)

In February 2010, a few months before the NPR and concurrent with its *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (QDR), the administration released its first-ever BMDR. The report goes to great lengths to explain that missile defense is oriented against the regional threats posed by North Korea, Iran, and Syria, and specifically *not* against Russia and China, going so far as to suggest that Russia could itself be included in missile defense “if political circumstances make that possible.”\(^\text{228}\) While the report may have soothed Moscow’s fears, it made little attempt to quell Beijing’s concerns. First, China was not invited to participate in missile defense in the same way Russia was, although the report does state that “[m]aintaining strategic stability in the U.S.-China relationship as important to the Administration as maintaining strategic stability with other major powers.”\(^\text{229}\) Nevertheless, aside from the regional threats that BMD is notionally targeted against, only China is singled out for its “particularly concern[ing]” strategic modernization program and the “growing imbalance of power across the Taiwan Strait;” the report expressing concern that “Chinese missiles will be capable of reaching not just important Taiwan military and civilian facilities but also U.S. and allied military installations in the region.”\(^\text{230}\) This fuels further fears in Beijing about the implicit extension of BMD protection to Taiwan.

### 2. Hedges on the Prague Initiative

While the United States has declared its official vision of a world without nuclear weapons, it has both maintained a significant hedge against future threats and made some effort to reassure allies that the promise of extended deterrence and missile defense will

\(^{227}\) An additional change of note in the 2010 NPR is its reference to the “strategic triad” as consisting of ICBMs, SSBNs, and nuclear bombers (p. 21–2). This appears to be a retraction of the 2001 NPR’s “new triad,” although it is not explicitly stated as such.


continue as long as there remain any nuclear weapons in the world. For its part, Japan has welcomed both. As a long-time supporter of non-proliferation and disarmament, Tokyo publically praised the Prague Initiative as a step toward the global nuclear disarmament that Japan has pushed for since 1954. At the same time, Japan has always been quick to publically affirm its reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Following ceremonies observing the sixty-fifth anniversary of Hiroshima nuclear bombing on August 6, 2010—the first time an official U.S. representative was in attendance—Japanese Prime Minister Kan Naoto was pressed to abandon the nuclear umbrella; in response, Kan actually reiterated Japan’s reliance on American nuclear weapons, stating that nuclear deterrence is essential to Japan’s security as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world.²³¹

For its part, Beijing had a mixed response to the Prague Initiative. The concept of global nuclear disarmament is in keeping with Chinese declarations dating to Zhou Enlai’s announcement of the first nuclear test in 1964. Yet, the official newspaper of the CCP expressed doubt about the credibility of Obama’s commitment on two counts. First, Washington’s continued pursuit of ballistic missile defense is seen as running counter to the “spirit of nuclear disarmament,” owing to Russia’s withdrawal from START II after the United States abrogated the ABM Treaty. Second, the article notes that the U.S. budget for 2010 contained $7 billion for nuclear “projects,” an increase from the previous year. Although the article explains that the budget includes funding for civil nuclear research and security of the warhead stockpile in addition to a new, more secure warhead, it is clear that Beijing remains skeptical about the U.S. nuclear deterrent.²³²

3. Phased, Adaptive Approach and North Korea’s Nuclear Test

The day that President Obama announced his Prague Initiative, North Korea attempted to launch a satellite into space atop a Taepodong-1 ICBM; the launch was a


failure, but the missile nevertheless passed through Japanese airspace. On May 24, Pyongyang conducted its second nuclear detonation, followed in July by a series of Taepodong-1 tests.\textsuperscript{233} It was in this context that Obama announced the “phased, adaptive approach” (PAA), a drastic reduction of the scope of BMD in Europe. Rather than fielding yet-to-be-proven ground-based sensors and interceptors in Poland and Czechoslovakia (which Russia vehemently opposed), the United States would instead focus on rapidly deploying a more limited system based on the successful, sea-based Aegis BMD project, with options for expansion as the ground-based program is perfected.\textsuperscript{234} The lack of a response by Japan or China to the PAA is, to a certain extent, surprising. Of course, the 2010 BMDR recognized that PAA was intended only for Europe, at least for the time being, and there has been no indication of a pending extension of the reduced missile defense shield to Asia.\textsuperscript{235}

E. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

In the period since September 11, 2001, the China-Japan security relationship has seen significant oscillation. Although Beijing and Tokyo have remained long-term friends, short-term relations have been characterized by alternating bouts of feud and cooperation. Many significant summits and military-to-military exchanges took place, fostering improved relations; at the same time, provocative statements and actions by Japanese leaders, especially visits to Yasukuni shrine, led to angry rhetoric from Beijing. Despite these frosty relations, however, bilateral trade has continued to grow, with most of Japan’s trade now conducted with China.

The United States’ nuclear umbrella has seen a significant shift. The decreased importance of nuclear weapons accorded by the 2001 and 2010 NPRs raised some questions about the long-term credibility of America’s deterrent; the lack of any modernization program whatsoever further reinforces those concerns. Nevertheless, the

\textsuperscript{233} Wade L. Huntley, “Bucks for the Bang: North Korea’s Nuclear Program and Northeast Asian Military Spending,” \textit{Asian Perspective} 33, no. 4 (December, 2009), 152.


ongoing development of ballistic missile defense systems suggests that Washington will continue to provide protection against nuclear attacks on its allies, whether in the form of deterrence or defense.

This focus on missile defense is often credited with motivating China to modernize its strategic nuclear force. While U.S. missile defense may be a partial justification for Beijing’s modernization, this program—which has been underway for over two decades—does not appear to have been appreciably accelerated in the face of Washington’s progress on BMD. At the same time, while China’s modernization might be threatening to Japan, Tokyo’s major decisions on participation in Washington’s BMD program appear key to events on the Korean Peninsula, and the major exchanges of negative diplomatic rhetoric between Beijing and Tokyo have not been over missile defense. Defining U.S. nuclear deterrence broadly to include missile defense, it has had a weak effect of exacerbation on the China-Japan relationship. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 5.

China’s missile defense program is almost certainly a response to U.S. missile defense initiatives—Beijing has not demonstrated a propensity to exceed the technological capabilities of the superpowers, only to maintain the balance of its “minimum deterrence” against the changing strategic capabilities of the United States and Russia, and the United States is the only nation currently spearheading a missile defense program.236 The relationship of BMD to China’s strategic modernization, however, is less clear; as discussed in the previous chapter, the DF-31 and JL-2 programs were begun in mid-1980s in anticipation of changes in the strategic balance which would attend the implementation of SDI; Beijing’s ASAT and its own BMD program may be extensions of this response, a reaction to the late-1990s increase in U.S. and Japanese interest in TMD, or even a brand new response to the post-9/11 emphasis on BMD.

236 Chu and Rong, 169.
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<td>JP deploys PAC-3: 3-5/08</td>
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Figure 5. U.S. nuclear deterrence and Sino-Japanese relations, 2001–present
VI. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the historical development of the U.S. guaranteed nuclear deterrent as well as the evolution of the China-Japan security relationship, this chapter will summarize those findings and draw out the long-term trends in the interaction of these two variables. Specifically, it will analyze whether the U.S. nuclear umbrella has exerted influence on relations between Beijing and Tokyo, and what the nature of that influence was. This chapter will examine the conditions under which Washington’s guaranteed deterrent had stronger (or weaker) influence, and will identify some policy recommendations.

A. OVERARCHING TRENDS IN THE CHINA-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

At the strategic level, the China-Japan security relationship is clearly characterized by the gradual improvement in relations. In August 1945 China and Japan were in the midst of almost a decade of war. This clearly hostile relationship gave way to one of mutual ignorance, first when Japan lost its sovereignty at the end of the war in September 1945, but reinforced in 1951 at San Francisco and again in 1952, when Tokyo failed to resolve its relationship with Beijing and instead signed a peace treaty with the Nationalists in Taipei. This state of ignorance persisted for twenty years, until Prime Minister Tanaka’s landmark visit to Beijing in September 1972, formally establishing diplomatic relations between China and Japan for the first time since 1937. This state of long-term friendship—that is, mutual recognition—continues to the present.

While the long-term relationship between Beijing and Tokyo shows a consistent progression toward improved relations, the short-term relationship is characterized by frequent oscillation between cooperation and conflict. In the period of strategic mutual ignorance (from 1945 to 1972), events such as China’s first nuclear test were punctuated with developments such as increasing bilateral trade, moving back and forth from being tacit enemies to tacit friends. This pattern has not changed in the era of strategic friendship. While Beijing and Tokyo were cooperative friends upon establishing normal
diplomatic relations in 1971, by 1989 they were feuding friends in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown. This pattern repeated in the early 1990s, with Tokyo quickly repealing its sanctions only to reimpose them in the context of China’s continued nuclear testing and the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis. Vacillation between feuding friends and cooperative friends also characterizes the early twenty-first century; while relations under Prime Minister Koizumi’s caused increasing tensions (such as antagonistic visits to Yasukuni Shrine), Tokyo and Beijing have nevertheless been able to achieve several significant “firsts,” including unprecedented military-to-military exchanges and an agreement on joint mineral exploration in the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Most recently (as of this writing), the relationship between China and Japan has again taken a turn toward feuding friends: following the collision of a Chinese fishing vessel with a Japan Coast Guard (JCG) cutter in the Senkaku/Diaoyu, Japan arrested the fishing vessel’s master, and Beijing has threatened to cut off exports of rare earth materials to Tokyo.237

Out of this trend analysis come a few significant observations with respect to the interstate relationship classification scheme introduced in Figure 1. First, improvement in the strategic relationship from ignorant to friends did not occur until the short-term relationship had become more cooperative, i.e., tacit friends. This suggests, not surprisingly, that an improved short-term relationship can open the door to better a long-term relationship as well. What remains unclear, at least empirically, is whether the long-term relationship can improve at a time of short-term conflict, i.e., a transition from tacit enemies to feuding friends. Second, the progression in the long-term relationship was always in a positive direction, first from enemies to ignorant, and then from ignorant to friends. The obvious caveat, however, is that just because the China-Japan security relationship improved at the strategic level does not mean that this course is irreversible. One can easily think of examples where states broke off diplomatic relations after many

years of burgeoning economic and political interaction (one need only look at Europe in the first half of the twentieth century for a handful of such instances). In the end, aside from serving as a useful tool for labeling, further research is necessary beyond the very narrow scope of this thesis in order to support or refute any weightier importance for the classification scheme.\footnote{Such a research project, if undertaken, should account for instances where states have normal diplomatic relations but are nevertheless not on any terms approaching that of “friend,” as was the case between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. See note 15, above.}

\section*{B. EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES’ NUCLEAR UMBRELLA}

The United States’ nuclear deterrent has undergone significant change in the last 65 years. Beginning with a handful of weapons in the late 1940s, by the mid-1950s Washington had thousands of weapons and was in the midst of an arms race with the Soviet Union. The quantitative and qualitative improvements in the U.S. nuclear arsenal continued throughout the 1980s, growing to encompass a “strategic triad” of delivery vehicles as well as technological improvements such as MIRVs. Despite this ever-stronger materiel capability, the advent of arms control negotiations in the 1970s led to Washington’s allies questioning the credibility of its nuclear guarantee. In the waning years of the Cold War and the immediate post-Soviet era, these arms control treaties took a significant turn, with the limits imposed by the START agreements, leading to the first quantitative reductions in the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. At the same time it was reducing the importance of nuclear weapons, Washington became increasingly interested in missile defense systems to provide protection against regional threats without the risk of sparking a nuclear war. The most recent round of arms control negotiations—resulting in the New START—was accompanied by the 2010 NPR, which stated America’s intention to pursue a world with no nuclear weapons at all.

The nuclear guarantee that Washington provides to Tokyo has similarly evolved. Its origins are found in the vaguely-worded commitments of the 1951 MST and the subtle threats and intimations about the use of nuclear weapons against China in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. By 1968 extended deterrence was an explicit component of the U.S.-Japan
alliance; even at times when the United States appears to be withdrawing from a large role in regional affairs (as with the Guam Doctrine), Washington and Tokyo have been quick to reiterate the centrality of the nuclear umbrella to the alliance relationship. As the U.S. conception of deterrence has grown to encompass missile defenses, the burden of holding up the nuclear umbrella is now shared, in small part, by the nation reaping its benefits. In the context of President Obama’s Prague Initiative, both the United States and Japan have reiterated the desirability of a nuclear-weapons-free world but also the necessity of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent as long as there remain nuclear weapons in the world. For its part, Japan has maintained a hedge against future changes in U.S. extended deterrence, maintaining a latent capability to militarize its civilian nuclear industry.

How have these changes in the U.S. guaranteed nuclear deterrent influenced the China-Japan security relationship? In Figure 6, the major changes in Sino-Japanese relations are compared side-by-side with key changes in Washington’s extended deterrent. Constructed very narrowly, the U.S. guarantee to use nuclear weapons to deter or defend an attack on Japan has had precious little influence on the relationship between Tokyo and Beijing. In this strict construct, the most significant impact of Washington’s nuclear deterrent has been Japan’s failure to obtain nuclear weapons. The provision of a nuclear umbrella obviated the need for Japan to obtain its own strategic deterrent, and thus removed the potential for a Sino-Japanese nuclear arms race like that between Washington and Moscow. This influence should not be seen as decisive, however; not only was the U.S. nuclear guarantee given grudgingly (and only after repeated inquiries by Tokyo), but it also was one of many influences at work. The absence of a Japanese nuclear weapons program may also be due to the “nuclear allergy” of public opinion, the constraints on military spending under the Yoshida Doctrine, and of course the negative international reactions of obtaining nuclear weapons. And while Tokyo has determined time and again that it is not in Japan’s national interest to obtain nuclear weapons, Japan’s leaders have also emphasized the need to maintain the scientific and industrial capacity to become a nuclear power on short notice should the strategic situation change. While the direction of influence in this instance would be to ameliorate tensions between
Beijing and Tokyo and the magnitude could be judged as moderate, one must nevertheless keep in mind that Japan retains, in theory, the option to go nuclear.

By constructing the independent variable somewhat more broadly, to include nuclear guarantees from Washington to any ally, we include in our field of view the “nuclear blackmail” of the 1950s. Here is the most acute example of the U.S. nuclear deterrent exerting influence on the China-Japan security relationship. We know that Eisenhower was intentionally issuing threats of nuclear force in the context of the Korean War, the Indochina conflict, and a showdown over Taiwan. We also know that these threats prompted China to pursue its nuclear weapons program, and we know that the advent of a nuclear Beijing caused unease in Tokyo. In this case, the direction of influence was clearly to exacerbate the already-hostile relationship between Tokyo and Beijing; one could argue (with some stretching) that as a result, any tensions over China’s nuclear program is due to the fact that it has a nuclear program at all, which can be traced back to the impact of Washington’s nuclear blackmail. The magnitude of this influence could rightly be called significant or even great; it drove another state to devote its limited financial, scientific, and industrial resources to a nuclear weapons program. This magnitude is tempered, however, by the recognition (at least implicit) of the fact that a Chinese nuclear program was likely an unintended consequence of Washington’s nuclear threats.

Expanding our definition of nuclear deterrent again to include missile defense systems introduces the changes that characterized the post-Cold War era. The progressive decrease in the qualitative and quantitative capabilities of the U.S. nuclear arsenal correlates with a general period of cooperation between Tokyo and Beijing. This correlation, however, may have as much to do with the radically altered strategic environment after the Cold War; the decrease in the nuclear arsenal and the improvement in Sino-Japanese relations may both be indicators of some larger influence at work in the international system. Similarly, the relative worsening in tensions between Japan and China coincides with an increasing interest by the United States on missile defense in the late 1990s and 2000s. Beijing certainly issued some negative rhetoric on the matter, and there is limited evidence that China has increased the pace of its strategic modernization.
program; but the most important and highly-funded projects—the DF-31 and the JL-2—have been underway since the mid-1980s. Indeed, it appears that, while Chinese sources do not explicitly say as much, Beijing’s strategic modernization was a response to the Reagan-era interest in SDI. In this sense, to the extent that Japan would later feel threatened by China’s strategic modernization throughout the post-Cold War era, we can consider the U.S. nuclear umbrella to have exacerbated tensions between Tokyo and Beijing. The magnitude of this influence, however, is considered moderate; China’s modernization was begun in the context of general strategic instability, not a perceived threat from the United States; Japanese policymakers and public opinion polls indicate that North Korea, and not China, is still the main object of BMD. In addition, many changes in the relationship can be more clearly drawn back to bilateral issues, from Yasukuni and the history textbook controversies, to the conflict and cooperation over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

By including in our view of U.S. nuclear deterrence the actual use of nuclear weapons, we thus introduce the events of August and September 1945 into our analysis. This yields an additional ameliorative influence of significant magnitude, as the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a leading (though by no means the only) cause of the surrender of Japan and the end of the war between Tokyo and her neighbors. This definition of nuclear deterrence is not only the broadest but also, in a sense, the polar opposite of a nuclear guarantee to protect Japan—in this case, Japan was the objective against which nuclear weapons were used, not the subject of a guarantee of protection or defense.

Outside of these instances of evident influence, the other major changes in the China-Japan security relationship appear unrelated to changes in the U.S. nuclear umbrella; at the same time, significant changes in Washington’s nuclear deterrent are not always followed by changes in the relationship between Tokyo and Beijing. The causal mechanism for these changes seems creditable to either U.S. diplomacy more broadly or events of a bilateral, and sometimes domestic, nature. Sino-Japanese normalization was a result not of U.S. nuclear guarantees, but of President Nixon’s opening to China, and of a more general fragmentation in the Communist bloc. The major break in relations
between Tokyo and Beijing in 1989 stemmed not from Japan’s involvement in SDI or the relative decline of the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, but rather from the crackdown at Tiananmen and a wave of global sanctions against China. Even when the U.S.-Japan alliance has expanded the nuclear umbrella in ways that are antagonistic to China—namely, cooperation on BMD—the major changes in Tokyo’s participation were precipitated by the actions of North Korea; only recently has Beijing’s modernization entered into Tokyo’s strategic calculus (at least, to the extent of public documents such as the NDPG).

Nevertheless, from the foregoing analysis, a few trends can be observed. Under what conditions does the U.S. nuclear guarantee influence the China-Japan security relationships? First, the magnitude of influence between the variables is strongest when China and Japan are already on poor terms, either long-term ignorant or outright enemies. This was demonstrated in the 1945 use of nuclear weapons to force Japan’s surrender, as well as the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–55 and 1958. In both cases the U.S. nuclear umbrella (or, in the former, use of nuclear weapons) caused a significant change in behavior in one of the other states. Second, while the strongest instance of influence (the lack of an independent Japanese nuclear weapons program) has been to ameliorate tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, the influence most often exerted has been to exacerbate, even if that influence was weaker than that of amelioration. Under the narrowest definition, the United States’ nuclear deterrent has ameliorated Sino-Japanese tensions once, but in a significant way—preventing, to a large extent, the Japanese government from pursuing its own strategic deterrent. However, when constructed more broadly, the United States’ nuclear umbrella has served to exacerbate tensions at least four times, namely China’s nuclear weapons program, the advent of SDI in 1983, the increase in Japanese involvement in 1998, and joint U.S.-Japanese development and deployment of a BMD system since 2006. Looking at the broadest definition possible for U.S. nuclear deterrence, the atomic bombings of August 1945 served to ameliorate Sino-Japanese hostilities in the most significant way possible, by ending the war between them.
Figure 6. U.S. nuclear deterrence and Sino-Japanese relations, 1945–present (continues)
The finally tally of U.S. influence on the China-Japan security relationship is thus two instances of significant amelioration and four instances of moderate or weak exacerbation. How do these influences balance against each other? Of the examples of amelioration, only the use of nuclear weapons caused a change in the strategic relationship between China and Japan, shifting from a state of hostile enemies to one of tacit relations. The second instance of amelioration—preventing a Japan armed with nuclear weapons—did not itself lead to a change in the relationship; although it is a counterfactual, one can easily imagine the negative impact on Sino-Japanese relations in the event of a Japanese nuclear test. The four cases of exacerbation, however, resulted in changes only in the short-term relationship between Beijing and Tokyo, and then only served to exacerbate tensions.

While the trends observed appear at first to confirm the conventional wisdom demonstrated in Chapter I—that is, the nuclear umbrella both ameliorates and exacerbates the Sino-Japanese security dilemma—the findings in fact demonstrate some significant qualifications to this conventional wisdom. No change in U.S. posture has, by itself, served to both ameliorate and exacerbate; individual changes have influence only in one or the other direction. Further, the fact that instances of exacerbation have occurred more frequently than those of amelioration might suggest that it is thus easier for the nuclear umbrella to exacerbate rather than ameliorate, contrary to the general assumption that nuclear weapons bring stability. This suggests that policymakers should avoid using extended deterrence as a tool to shape this relationship, which is discussed in greater detail below.

C. CHALLENGES TO THE ASSESSMENT

In the course of this thesis, several limits to the assessment were discovered. First, the lack of transparency—on both sides—makes it hard to know what the other side is doing at a given point in time. Second, there significant time-lag between when influence is exerted and when a resulting change is manifested, making it more difficult to gauge whether and how much of an influence is had. A perfect example is the U.S. “nuclear blackmail” of the 1950s. Washington’s threats of nuclear force in 1954–55 and 1958
directed contributed to Beijing’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. While the decision to obtain weapons was made in 1955, the result—a nuclear detonation—was not seen until 1964, almost ten years after Washington’s influence was exerted! In a certain sense, we can judge the U.S. nuclear guarantee (to Taiwan) as the cause of China’s nuclear program only because Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai told us so. At the same time, China’s strategic modernization today might simply be continuation of programs started decades ago, either in response to SDI or just in the pursuit of the nuclear deterrent that rightfully belongs to a great power. Intelligence in this regard is indispensable; although China did not publically announce its nuclear program in 1955, by 1960 the U.S. intelligence community was well aware of China’s ongoing nuclear research and testing projects. Similarly, although programs such as the Xia SSBN or the DF-31 ICBM have come online recently, intelligence analysis informs us that these programs were begun at least two decades before the fruits (rotten though they may be) were borne.

The bottom line here is that hindsight is 20/20. Because of the long lead time in developing new weapons programs, it may not be possible to see correlation (much less causation) for several decades after the influence has been exerted or a change has taken place. As additional documents related to Chinese and U.S. nuclear programs in the 1980s and 1990s are declassified, it may be worthwhile to revisit the question of influence in the China-Japan security relationship.

D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the analytic conclusions presented above, a few policy recommendations can be made:

1. **Do Not Take the Nuclear Umbrella as a Microcosm of U.S. Influence**

   The first recommendation is that policymakers should not take the nuclear umbrella as a microcosm of U.S. influence; that is, the way in which the U.S. nuclear umbrella exerts influence may not be the same as the other tools of influence available to Washington. The United States has the full range of national power—diplomatic, economic, etc.—at its disposal in attempting to drive the international outcomes it desires. These tools may be both more effective and more efficient than the nuclear
umbrella because they are more easily targeted specifically at the China-Japan security relationship. Diplomatic efforts or trade barriers, for example, can easily be deployed against Beijing (or Tokyo) alone. The U.S. nuclear deterrent, on the other hand, is more of a blunt instrument; indeed, the changes in Washington’s nuclear posture since at least the 1960s have impacted Europe as well as Asia. While this thesis has investigated the influence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella on the China-Japan security relationship, additional avenues for research could include particular economic tools, or perhaps the use of diplomatic rhetoric alone.

2. **But Do Not Underestimate the Influence of the Nuclear Umbrella, Either**

   This is not to say that nuclear deterrent policy is unimportant or inconsequential. A corollary to the first recommendation is that policymakers must not underestimate the influence of the nuclear umbrella; indeed, this thesis has found that in a few, limited instances extended deterrence has, at least in part, generated a change in the Sino-Japanese relationship. The strongest influence was to ameliorate tensions, as with the end of the Pacific War and the absence of Japanese strategic deterrent. The influence most frequently felt, however, was exacerbation, although this influence was only felt on the short-term nature of the relationship. This is significantly more nuanced than the conventional wisdom that the nuclear umbrella both ameliorates and exacerbates. At the same time, we cannot rule out the fact that as the nuclear balance shifts—with Washington possessing ever fewer warheads and Beijing ever more—this pattern of influence may shift as well. For example, while missile defense has so far not exacerbated tensions to the point of changing the long-term relationship, it is far from certain that this will always be the case. Indeed, one can easily conceive of a situation in which missile defense pushes the relationship to the brink—Japanese intelligence used by a U.S. missile defense system to defend against a missile attack on Taiwan, for example.

3. **Do Not Expect Results That are Simple, Expected, or Immediate**

   A partial result of the nuanced influence the U.S. nuclear guarantee exerts on the China-Japan security relationship is that, when influence is applied—whether
intentionally or not—the results are often complex, unanticipated, and take a long time to be realized. This is demonstrated in at least two instances. The first is Eisenhower’s nuclear blackmail; while the intended result was that China would not attack Taiwan, the actual result was more wide-ranging. Mao decided to pursue a nuclear weapons program; nine years later China detonated its first nuclear device, prompting Japan to seek out nuclear assurances from the United States—which further exacerbated tensions between Tokyo and Beijing. The second example is Reagan’s SDI, a change in the nuclear umbrella which was not even directed at China. Yet the threat of strategic instability caused Beijing to begin a robust modernization program aimed at enhancing the credibility and survivability of its deterrent against a Soviet missile defense system. Nevertheless, two decades later, the fruits of modernization were born in the form of the DF-31 and JL-2 missiles, prompting Japan to view China more warily and (to a limited degree) increase its cooperation on BMD with the United States. Because it takes so long for influence to be felt, the strategic situation may have changed drastically, thus producing results which were unanticipated.

4. Be as Transparent as Possible

To the extent that Washington does not desire spiraling tensions between Beijing and Tokyo,\textsuperscript{239} and despite the conclusion that the nuclear umbrella has relatively circumscribed influence in that relationship, there is nevertheless one way in which the United States can make changes to its extended nuclear deterrent and mitigate the potential for exacerbating tensions in the China-Japan security relationship. By being as transparent as possible in altering its deterrent—transparency both of material capability as well as the object of the deterrent—Washington may be able to allay Beijing’s fears of being the target of a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance and U.S. nuclear deterrence. Both in terms of its nuclear arsenal as well as missile defense, Washington could take steps to reassure both Beijing and Tokyo: Beijing that missile defense is not intended to undermine its limited deterrent, and Tokyo that it will continue to fall under U.S.

\textsuperscript{239} This assumes, of course, that Washington desires a good Sino-Japanese relationship. It is not impossible, however, to imagine a situation where increased tensions between Tokyo and Beijing may well be to Washington’s \textit{advantage}; trade or foreign investments are but a few examples.
protection until the last nuclear weapon is disabled. This is no easy task; indeed, transparency could well undermine the credibility of the deterrent itself. By revealing the exact composition of one’s strategic forces, an arms race may be sparked in the name of achieving nuclear parity; publically acknowledging the limitations of a BMD system might invite exploitation of those weaknesses.

E. CONCLUSION

To what extent has the United States’ guaranteed nuclear deterrent to Japan influenced the security relationship between China and Japan? In the years since 1945 this influence has varied in magnitude and direction. In the endgame of World War II and in the formative years of the Cold War, the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by the United States had a significant influence on the relationship between Japan and China, first ameliorating tensions by bringing the Pacific War to an end, later exacerbating tensions by driving Beijing to obtain its own nuclear weapons. This influence of exacerbation was felt again, albeit in a more limited sense, with the advent of the Strategic Defense Initiative and its successor theater and national missile defense systems.

The relationship between China and Japan, however, has undergone many more shifts, both in the long-term nature of being friends or enemies as well as the short-term condition of cooperation or conflict. Most of these shifts, however, are unrelated to the U.S. nuclear umbrella or Japan’s participation in missile defense research and deployment. As a result, the influence of Washington’s nuclear guarantee to Tokyo is best described as limited; in a few pointed instances it had some impact, but the greatest impact was felt when China and Japan were already on poor terms.

This is not to say that the provision of extended deterrence by the United States is unimportant. Indeed, the nuclear umbrella has been a small but important reason for Japan not obtaining its own strategic deterrent; a nuclear Japan would almost certainly lead to a nuclear arms race between Tokyo and Beijing akin to the Cold War competition between Washington and Moscow. While the U.S. nuclear guarantee cannot by itself influence the Sino-Japanese security relationship, it should not be considered
inconsequential. To paraphrase President Obama, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, the United States must continue to deter nuclear attack on itself or its allies.
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