Synergistic Approach Integrating Joint Capabilities for USSOCOM Contingency Contracting: Construction Management Module

By: Chris M. Hearl
   December 2010

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As a leader in front-line asymmetric threat operations, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has recently increased its presence around the world in support of military and national security objectives. Its mission demands flexibility and adaptability at the highest extent allowable under the law. Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) supporting this mission are often looked upon as logistics facilitators, business advisors, resource managers, and general tactical experts in achieving contractual requirements and arrangements supporting the USSOCOM mission. As key enablers of this mission, CCOs are often asked to fulfill construction contract requirements in austere locations with little or no training in construction terminology and concepts. This project investigates the effectiveness of CCOs in executing construction requirements within the USSOCOM area of responsibility (AOR). The study provides strategic and tactical recommendations to address identified weaknesses, such as: proper training and manning of personnel, inadequate acquisition planning and contract management processes, and a lack of integration among a splintered platform of cross-functional stakeholders. One such tactical recommendation is the development of a prototype Construction Management Module (CM²) to better manage the contingency contracting process for construction requirements. This recommendation is provided to improve specific problems realized with inadequate acquisition planning, insufficient oversight of work, and failure to include the appropriate funding considerations, clauses and evaluation factors in construction contracts.
SYNERGISTIC APPROACH INTEGRATING JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR USSOCOM CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING: CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT MODULE

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December 2010

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ABSTRACT

As a leader in front-line asymmetric threat operations, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has recently increased its presence around the world in support of military and national security objectives. Its mission demands flexibility and adaptability at the highest extent allowable under the law. Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) supporting this mission are often looked upon as logistics facilitators, business advisors, resource managers, and general tactical experts in achieving contractual requirements and arrangements supporting the USSOCOM mission. As key enablers of this mission, CCOs are often asked to fulfill construction contract requirements in austere locations with little or no training in construction terminology and concepts. This project investigates the effectiveness of CCOs in executing construction requirements within the USSOCOM area of responsibility (AOR). The study provides strategic and tactical recommendations to address identified weaknesses, such as: proper training and manning of personnel, inadequate acquisition planning and contract management processes, and a lack of integration among a splintered platform of cross-functional stakeholders. One such tactical recommendation is the development of a prototype Construction Management Module ($CM^3$) to better manage the contingency contracting process for construction requirements. This recommendation is provided to improve specific problems realized with inadequate acquisition planning, insufficient oversight of work, and failure to include the appropriate funding considerations, clauses and evaluation factors in construction contracts.
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<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After-action Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Acquisition Community Connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADDIE</td>
<td>Analyze, Design, Develop, Implement, Evaluate</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFFARS</td>
<td>Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<td>AFLMA</td>
<td>Air Force Logistics Management Agency</td>
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<td>AMC</td>
<td>Army Material Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>APDP</td>
<td>Acquisition Professional Development Program</td>
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<td>AT&amp;L</td>
<td>Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPA</td>
<td>Blanket Purchase Agreement</td>
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<td>CAG</td>
<td>Competition Advocate General</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Congressional Budget Office</td>
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<td>CCJH</td>
<td>Contingency Contracting Joint Handbook</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>[United States] Central Command</td>
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<td>CCC</td>
<td>CENTCOM Contracting Command</td>
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<td>CCO</td>
<td>Contingency Contracting Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commanders Emergency Response Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSOCC</td>
<td>Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJSOTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM²</td>
<td>Construction Management Module</td>
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<tr>
<td>COCO</td>
<td>Chief of the Contracting Office</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combtant Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>Contracting Officer’s Representative</td>
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<td>COTR</td>
<td>Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative</td>
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<td>DAWIA</td>
<td>Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCC-I/A</td>
<td>Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan</td>
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<td>JCMEB</td>
<td>Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command</td>
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<td>JFUB</td>
<td>Joint Facility Utilization Board</td>
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<td>JMD</td>
<td>Joint Manning Document</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operational Area</td>
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<td>JTSCC</td>
<td>Joint Theatre Support Contracting Command</td>
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<td>JULLS</td>
<td>Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System</td>
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<td>LD</td>
<td>Liquidated Damages</td>
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<td>LOGCAP</td>
<td>Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program</td>
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<td>LOGCAP</td>
<td>Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAWS</td>
<td>Money as a Weapon System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFP-11</td>
<td>Major Force Program-11</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILCON</td>
<td>Military Construction (funding)</td>
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<td>MIPR</td>
<td>Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request</td>
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<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multi-national Force-Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other than War</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTW</td>
<td>Major Theatre War</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-commissioned Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCMA</td>
<td>National Contract Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
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<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>Overseas Contingency Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>Outside the Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
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<td>OPS</td>
<td>Operations</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive</td>
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<td>PMR</td>
<td>Performance Management Reviews</td>
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<td>PPO</td>
<td>Project Planning Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACE</td>
<td>United States Army Corp of Engineers</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAFRICOM</td>
<td>United States African Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
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<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>United States European Command</td>
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<td>United States Northern Command</td>
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<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
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<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Southern Command</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

This chapter introduces the background, problem statement, and research elements associated with this project. As a leader in front-line asymmetric threat operations, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) recently increased its presence around the world in support of global operations against terrorist networks and other military and national security objectives. The USSOCOM mission demands flexibility and adaptability at the highest extent allowable under the law. Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) are often looked upon as logistics facilitators, business advisors, resource managers, and general tactical experts in achieving contractual requirements and arrangements supporting the USSOCOM mission. As key enablers of this mission, CCOs are often asked to fulfill construction requirements in austere locations with little or no training in construction terminology, concepts, and protocols. This lack of expertise has posed a problem for the command. This chapter presents this problem and outlines the subsequent research to illustrate the need for the creation of a tactical handbook. This handbook is identified herein as the Construction Management Module (CM2).

B. BACKGROUND

The command mission for USSOCOM is to provide fully capable Special Operations Forces (SOF) to defend the United States (U.S.) and its interests while conducting synchronized planning of global operations against terrorist networks (Cannaday, PowerPoint presentation, 2008). The USSOCOM commander uses the Center for Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics (SOAL)\(^1\) to provide rapid and focused acquisition, technology, and logistics support to the SOF warfighter. SOAL is recognized as a “key enabler” of the USSOCOM global mission. The Directorate of Procurement (DoP) within SOAL acquires SOF-peculiar weapon systems, equipment, services, and construction in direct support of SOF Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) (Cluck, 2009).
To meet this challenging mission, the Director of Procurement utilizes the most innovative, streamlined, and expedited acquisition practices available, while maintaining strict compliance with required statutes and regulations. It is important for USSOCOM contracting personnel to rapidly execute objectives in an ever-changing joint battlespace. These assets often come from contracting organizations throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) that must quickly adapt to the USSOCOM mission and policies. The increasing role of contingency contracting in austere conditions demands a more agile and skilled workforce. The current operations tempo around the globe has resulted in both a growing number of bare-base initiatives with emergency requirements and continued sustainment of the existing infrastructure for deployed forces. As a matter of prudent resource management and risk mitigation, more mature, sustainment-oriented environments in the contingency Area of Responsibility (AOR) must withstand increasing scrutiny and must meet higher expectations of statutory and regulatory compliance than that of bare-base environments in an immature AOR.

In order to meet these higher expectations, the DoP requested this study to determine how to better enable the mission effectiveness of USSOCOM CCOs while they are achieving this compliance and supporting strategic objectives. The focus of this study concerns enabling the CCOs to more effectively execute construction requirements in a contingency (expeditionary) environment through a practical, yet comprehensive, management module that facilitates the respective mission objectives.

C. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Through the NPS Acquisition Research Program, USSOCOM leadership expressed a need for a management module that would enable its CCOs to better execute expeditionary infrastructure requirements. In order to appropriately craft such a module, the existing operational environment was analyzed to determine which content and focus areas needed to be addressed. CCOs supporting USSOCOM missions are often in austere conditions, with little or no contact with the larger regional or theatre-wide contracting centers. They are also under the Operational Control (OPCON) of other agencies and commands within the AOR. This situation presents a unique dynamic in which a CCO
must use the regulations and contract authority of one specific command, while supporting the operational objectives of another particular geographical combatant commander on the ground.

A cross-functional and joint-force environment further compounds this problem because different military services and functional areas are accustomed to their own regulations, procedures, doctrines, and objectives. The interaction of these various forces can be combined to create an effect greater than the sum of their individual effects. In other words, cooperative interaction among the individual cross-functional and joint-force members can create enhanced effectiveness greater than the sum of their individual effectiveness. This phenomenon will be referred to throughout this report as synergy. A more synergistic approach to how CCOs manage requirements is needed to effectively integrate the capabilities of both the joint-force environment and cross-functional areas of the acquisition team (such as finance, engineering, legal, logistics, and the operational unit requesting contractual support). Creating this synergy is not easy; CCOs need a structured management process to bridge the gaps between their respective military services’ training doctrine and their individual skills, as well as the expectations of commanders on the ground. This report found that some of the biggest effectiveness gaps that arise when CCOs are executing construction requirements include: inadequate training of personnel; confusing contract management policies and construction management standards; non-compliant contracts (e.g., a failure to include the appropriate clauses and drawings); deficient acquisition planning and integration of contracting into operational planning; and insufficient oversight of work and poor interaction between units.

Construction requirements often are dynamic and more complex than simplified commodity purchases; they demand frequent integration and close coordination between a cross-functional acquisition team. This integration is often troubled by the unpredictability of contingency environments and the speed of war. A construction management module focused on integrating the joint-force environment will allow even a relatively inexperienced CCO to better manage his/her environment and more effectively support SOF.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The specific research questions for this study include the following:

(1) What are the gaps in the effectiveness of contingency contracting with respect to executing construction requirements?

(2) Can a comprehensive management module be developed to effectively mitigate these gaps? If so, what would it entail?

E. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This project has two primary goals:

(1) Examine the contingency contracting environment concerning expeditionary construction requirements.

(2) Provide recommendations to address problems in the field. Among these will be the development, creation, and delivery of a prototype tactical training handbook for CCOs to better manage the contingency contracting process for construction requirements, known herein as the USSOCOM Construction Management Module (CM²).

F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Practical, qualitative research was conducted using multiple methods. The foundation for planning this overall research project—determining the research questions and selecting subsequent sources—followed a mixed application of fundamental research concepts outlined by many different sources (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998; Marshall & Rossman, 1998; Creswell, 2003; Leedy & Ormond, 2005; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).

Archival data, such as governmental reports, policies, training materials, and after-action reports (AARs) from USSOCOM was analyzed. Additionally, the researcher collected data using questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with key informants. Informants were made up of USSOCOM personnel and supporting SMEs, selected from individuals with diverse backgrounds and experience. These informants were selected from current USSOCOM CCOs, staff, and customers. Questionnaires were developed
and interviews were conducted using standard operating procedures approved by the NPS Institutional Review Board for the study of human subjects. Data from the literature and informant feedback was compared and contrasted for successes and failures documented throughout contingency contracting. This data was processed predominately using the Analyze, Design, Develop, Implement, and Evaluate (ADDIE) model with a rapid, prototyping approach (Strickland, 2006). The ADDIE method was used to apply principles, processes, and designs for self-instruction (Keirns, 1999). Additionally, the ARCS motivation model (Keller, 1984) was used to build motivation in the reader of the CM². Specifically, the ARCS model provides a proven method of building the student’s attention, relevance, confidence, and satisfaction.

In an effort to clearly organize the collected data, the analysis (Chapter V) and subsequent strategic recommendations (Chapter VI) are organized into three overarching categories: people, processes, and platforms. These categories are used herein to represent strategic pillars of planning and executing joint operational contracting activities. The CM² prototype is intended for use by the tactical-level CCO during contingency operations. It was, therefore, organized in a manner to match that of typical contracting structure: pre-award, award, post-award. Chapters addressing operational framework and strategic alignment are also included in the CM² in order to address strategic implications of the CCO’s performance.

G. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

Anticipated benefits from this study include a current overview of existing problems faced by USSOCOM construction CCOs and recommendations to resolve or mitigate those problems—including a construction management module to be distributed to future CCOs. Although a broad contingency contracting handbook titled Contingency Contracting—A Joint Handbook for the 21st Century exists, it does not adequately address construction requirements with respect to the unique operating environment of the USSOCOM AOR. Up to this point, it has been unclear as to exactly what gaps in capabilities and knowledge currently exist in the field. Such gaps will be identified by
interviewing contracting officers, staff officials, end-users, and other SMEs. Once these gaps are identified, this research will provide effective ways to mitigate the gaps through recommended solutions.

H. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS

This research is focused on construction requirements in contingency contracting within USSOCOM. It reviews the overall USSOCOM mission and contingency contracting concepts, trends, challenges, and capabilities for comprehensive background and context. This research will not evaluate a statistical sample representation of the population of all CCOs or all SOF personnel. Feedback from informants is limited to USSOCOM-related contingencies and may not address current issues outside this scope.

The following assumptions/disclaimers pertain to this report:

1. Research was conducted throughout 2009. It is not intended as an exclusive solution to long-term operational needs and must be evaluated and updated accordingly over time. Future evaluation procedures and methods are addressed in the final recommendations in Chapter VI.

2. The term construction as used herein includes materials, supplies, and real property alterations associated with building or rebuilding infrastructure—including some services used in support of establishing infrastructure.

3. The models and information addressed are to be used as a theoretical foundation or guide and shall not overrule any current or future laws, regulations, or policy.

4. DoD contracting and SOF professionals of various positions with diverse backgrounds comprise the sample for questionnaires and interviews. Results of feedback may or may not reflect overall position(s) of the DoD.

5. The research assumes the reader has a fundamental understanding of DoD contracting and military command structures within the joint landscape.

I. SUMMARY

This chapter provided the background, problem statement, and research questions associated with improving USSOCOM CCO execution of construction requirements in
expeditionary environments. Chapter II will provide the specific methodologies followed in the project research and development of the CM2.

NOTE: SOAL-K is undergoing a name change in 2010 from SOAL-K to Special Operations Research, Development, & Acquisition Command (SORDAC). SOAL-K will be used herein due to its reference during data gathering efforts for this research.
II. METHODOLOGY

A. OVERVIEW

The nature of the identified problem necessitated the use of multiple research methods. Methods included the ADDIE model, an accepted training development methodology, and generally accepted qualitative research techniques. Fundamentally, the problem was to develop instructional content addressing capability gaps found in USSOCOM contingency contracting. This instructional content was addressed by developing the CM² prototype. In developing the CM², Strickland’s (2006) framework for designing self-directed instructional content was followed. This qualitative research framework is referred to as the ADDIE model—analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate—and includes a rapid prototyping approach.

Qualitative research is often used to focus on real-world complexities to examine multiple perspectives of a problem or group of problems. It helps define what needs to be studied in order for a researcher to best describe what is happening in a given environment. This type of research is also focused on interpreting problems in a given environment and then evaluating the effectiveness of solutions to those problems (Hudgens, 2009). Multiple methods of data gathering and analysis were followed in order to obtain multiple perspectives of the perceived problem(s) associated with this research.

First, archival data such as government reports, policies, training materials, and after-action reports (AARs) from USSOCOM, was collected and analyzed. Data was also collected from questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with key informants, made up of USSOCOM personnel and supporting SMEs. Questionnaires were developed (see Appendixes A–C) and interviews were conducted using procedures approved by the NPS Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the study of human subjects. The information gathered from these informants suggests positive lessons learned, as well as challenges CCOs face within the contingency contracting environment. One such challenge was the need for additional CCO training in dealing with construction requirements. According to Ausink, Baldwin, and Paul, “successful training programs tend to be multifunctional,
involving personnel with diverse backgrounds that are relevant to new practices” (2004, p. 20); as such, targeted informants included USSOCOM staff members, customers, and CCOs of various rank and service backgrounds. The resulting data was then triangulated from archival sources and informants to compare commonalities between the literature and feedback from informants. These commonalities were further utilized to develop relevant learning objectives and content best suited for the CM².

The structure of the CM² follows various self-directed learning concepts as outlined by Keirns (1999) and Keller (1984). These concepts include the principles of self-instruction, ARCS model, and Bloom’s taxonomy. These concepts will be discussed in further details in the section on self-directed learning below.

B. DATA MANAGEMENT

Data collection is a selective process to be controlled primarily by formulation of the problem (Brewer & Hunter, 1989). In this research, the problem involved determining capability gaps in USSOCOM contingency contracting and then developing instructional content to mitigate those gaps. The data selected for analysis included reports from the following: Congressional Research Service (CRS) (10), Government Accounting Office (GAO) (6), RAND (3), Office Management & Budget (OMB) (2), Inspector General (IG) (2), Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2), and AARs (12). Other literature sources included: MBA theses (14), USSOCOM performance management reviews (PMR) (2), the Gansler report (USA, 2007), various DoD instructions, regulations, and policy, along with related journal articles and training documents. This data was reviewed for evidence of lessons learned and positive or negative commonalities. The diverse selection of sources, while not covering all existing data on the problem area, allowed for reasonably certain conclusions to be drawn, based on commonalities between unbiased and unrelated sources.

In addition to reviewing these reports, fielded questionnaires and conducted semi-structured interviews were conducted with USSOCOM CCOs, staff officers, and end-users. The questionnaires and interview questions were developed based on an extensive review of various university websites and published survey design guidance (Dillman &
Salant, 1994; Spector, 1994; Couper, Traugott, & Lamias, 2001; Kenett, 2006; Fowler, 2008; Dillman, Smyth & Christian, 2008; Babbie & Cano, 2009). The questions were also developed through personal consultation with survey expert Professor Ronald Fricker of the Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School. The questions were designed to illicit open-ended and creative responses to several questions regarding contingency contracting; specifically related to training, integration, and effectiveness of contingency contracting. They were similar for all informants; however, questions were adapted for the different roles of the actual informant (CCO, staff, and customer). The target informants for these questionnaires and interviews were selected based on relevant experience and diversity of background (rank, functional area, position, etc.). A strategy for selecting a sample for field research should be based on accessibility and relevance to the research question. This approach can be used to generalize, with reasonable confidence, that the sample is a fair representation of the data (Brewer & Hunter, 1989). This particular strategy uses a constant comparative method in which the informants are provided questions to address their operational environment. The feedback was compared among informants and to related literature on the contingency contracting environment. In this research, the informants were asked to share their experience in the relevant areas and provide direct recommendations for solutions to any perceived problems. The informants were also asked direct questions regarding applicable content areas of training aides such as the CM². These results were then compared to determine what commonalities exist among the responses. These commonalities, in turn, helped to confirm the validity of the questions and outcome from the study.

Due to geographical and communication constraints, the sample of informants was limited to 20 current USSOCOM personnel. Informants included personnel with various functional backgrounds and deployment experience. Demographic information was obtained through the questionnaires and interviews. Demographic questions included military service, rank, years of service, current position, location of and number of times deployed, and contracting certification level (if applicable). In order to preserve anonymity, informants’ quotes from these questionnaires and interviews will be cited
only by position (division chief, chief of contracting, etc.) or role (CCO, staff, end-user). A support letter from the USSOCOM DoP (see Appendix IV) was presented to each informant to help remove fear of retribution, to express the intention of the research, and to show top management support for the research.

Informants completing questionnaires consisted of the following USSOCOM personnel: four CCOs, three staff members, and two senior customers. Informants participating in interviews consisted of the following USSOCOM personnel: five senior staff members and six CCOs. All CCO informants were currently deployed in support of USSOCOM during the time of the questionnaire or interview. A more rigorous research approach would have been to select a larger sample making up past and present USSOCOM personnel. In an attempt to mitigate this primary-source limitation, all sixteen USSOCOM AARs on file were analyzed. Deployments preceding these AARs were conducted within the last four years and were written by CCOs from all four military services, serving in twelve different locations, across eleven countries.

C. INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

This project began with an understanding of the perceived need by USSOCOM leadership of a management module to instruct USSOCOM CCOs on how to better execute construction requirements. Thus, the research was conducted with the intent of garnering data to assist in the design of such a module, identified herein as the CM². The field of instructional design provided the catalyst for research associated with the development of the CM².

Design is the systematic method of research, planning, developing, evaluating and managing an instructional process (Strickland, 2006). All of these individual components are incorporated into the method termed instructional design (Strickland, 2006). All models of instructional design have three common functions: (1) identifying the outcomes of the instruction, (2) developing the instruction, and (3) evaluating the effectiveness of the instruction (Strickland, 2006).

The design process must be both systematic and specific. Systematic means an orderly, logical method of identifying, developing and evaluating a set of strategies aimed
at attaining a particular instructional goal. *Specific* means each element of the plan must be applied with attention to precise details. By applying systematic procedures and being attentive to specific details, one can design effective instruction. One such systematic procedure is known as the ADDIE model (Strickland, 2006).

1. **ADDIE Model**

The ADDIE model is a generic and simplified instructional systems design (ISD) model. ADDIE is an acronym for Analyze, Design, Develop, Implement, and Evaluate (Strickland, 2006). This model follows traditional instructional systems design concepts for developing training, while allowing prototyping to rapidly field the learning tool-in this case, the CM².

   a. **Analyze**

   In the *analyze* phase, the instructional designer reviews the related literature to determine knowledge, skills, and gaps to clarify instructional problem(s), to establish basic goals and objectives, and to identify the learning environment and learner characteristics (Strickland, 2006). According to Merriam-Webster (2009), analyze means to study or determine the nature and relationship of the parts of by analysis. Analyzing suggests separating or distinguishing component parts of a substance, process or situation, so as to discover its true nature or inner relationships (“Analyze,” 2009). Thus, to truly analyze the necessary elements of this study, a literature review and analysis of key informant feedback was conducted, as documented in Chapter V.

   b. **Design**

   In the *design* phase, the instructional designer identifies the strategies for specific learning objectives, chooses the mode of delivery, and determines the conceptual method of evaluation (Strickland, 2006). The framework and learning objectives for the CM² prototype were designed during this phase. The strategy was closely coordinated with USSOCOM leadership to ensure applicability and synergy with existing policy and procedures. It was during this phase that the decision was made to include both strategic
and tactical level recommendations to the students of the CM². It was also during this phase that it became clear that the final evaluation of the prototype CM² would have to be accomplished by USSOCOM after delivery.

c. **Develop**

In the *develop* phase, materials are produced according to the decisions made during the design phase (Strickland, 2006). In this research, the specific content was developed for the CM² as part of this phase. The titling of chapters was also developed during this phase. The content and chapter development of the CM² was accomplished to provide the relevant information in a reader-friendly manner. This content addresses gaps and deficiencies identified through various data sources. Thus, the content was targeted toward closing the identified gaps in competence of CCOs.

d. **Implement**

During the *implement* phase, the researcher initiates production and tests prototypes with a targeted audience. This is the phase in which an implementation plan is typically developed. An implementation plan establishes the implementation timeline and procedures for both training the facilitators and the learner, as well as delivering the final product. The final product is developed based on needs and errors discovered while utilizing a prototype product with members of the target audience (Strickland, 2006). As partial fulfillment of this phase, the prototype CM² was delivered to USSOCOM. The USSOCOM staff was satisfied with the prototype; however, USSOCOM is responsible for creating and executing the implementation plan and the final evaluation of the plans effectiveness. Therefore, prototype testing, evaluation, and revision are beyond the scope of this research.

e. **Evaluate**

*Evaluation* is an ongoing activity conducted at each phase of the ADDIE model. Evaluation consists of two parts: formative and summative. Formative evaluation is part of each preceding phase and determines the effectiveness and quality of each stage. Summative evaluation consists of tests for criterion-related referenced items,
provides opportunity for feedback from the users, and assesses learner outcomes (Strickland, 2006). Performing due diligence, formative evaluation was conducted throughout the research process through communication with USSOCOM leadership and experienced CCOs. Internal validity was evaluated by NPS peer reviews and USSOCOM member review. Both validity measures resulted in positive feedback in terms of analysis, structure, and content. The final stages of summative evaluation will be accomplished by USSOCOM personnel after this research has concluded.

2. **Self-Directed Learning**

Another concept of instructional design utilized as part of this research is the concept of self-directed learning. The term self-directed learning may be understood in a variety of ways. As a methodology for instruction, self-directed learning refers to a learning situation in which an individual works with instructional materials without direct supervision or guidance. “In situations in which many individuals must learn the same information but are unable to meet as a group, self-instructed materials may provide a very practical answer to the need” (Keirns, 1999, p. 8). A circumstance in which learners have varied levels of entry knowledge or skill but must all attain a given competency is another illustration of where self-instructed materials are appropriate. Theoretical investigations of self-directed learning often focus on meta-cognition: the skills and abilities which individuals employ to guide their cognitive experiences in learning situations (1999). The principles discussed by Keirns in *Designs for Self Instruction, Principles, Processes, and Issues in Developing Self-Directed Learning* were instrumental in the development of the CM². Table 1 summarizes the principles of self-instruction as outlined in her book.
Table 1. Principles of Self-instruction (After Keirns, 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRINCIPLES OF SELF-INSTRUCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active responding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small steps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-pacing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testing by the learner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In developing the content and end-of-chapter questions for the CM\(^2\), care was taken to focus on motivating the reader toward the material. Keller’s (1984) ARCS model of motivational design (Table 2) was used for this function. “The ARCS Model identifies four major motivational factors (Attention, Relevance, Confidence, Satisfaction), all of which must be considered when planning an instructional event” (Lambert, Tice, and Featherstone, 1996, p. 97).

Table 2. ARCS Motivation Model (After Keirns, 1999; Keller, 1984)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARCS MOTIVATION MODEL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, a way to classify the different types of learning to be achieved in each learning objective within the CM\(^2\) was needed. This classification was accomplished by determining the domains of learning associated with each learning objective. “Most self-instruction occurs in the cognitive (knowing, thinking, acquiring, storing, and using information) domain” (Keirns, 1999, p. 12). One of the best known
models for classifying different types of learning in the cognitive domain is *Bloom’s Taxonomy of Cognitive Objectives* (Keirns, 1999, p. 12). Table 3 depicts the categories within Bloom’s Taxonomy as they relate to describing cognitive objectives.

Table 3. Bloom’s Taxonomy (Keirns, 1999, p.12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Ability to recall previously learned material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehension</td>
<td>Ability to grasp meaning, explain, restate ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application</td>
<td>Ability to use learned material in new situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>Ability to separate material into component parts and show relationship between parts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthesis</td>
<td>Ability to put together separate ideas, establish new relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Ability to judge the worth of material against stated criteria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These cognitive objectives were considered when analyzing the gaps found in the contingency contracting environment. Once the gaps were determined, the evidence and extent of those gaps were used to suggest a certain level of cognitive understanding, based on the Bloom’s categories described above. These categories were then used to develop the learning objectives within the CM². Based on the analysis of this research, the learning objectives are defined Chapter V. Learning objectives derived from the results of this research and the cognitive categories in which those learning objectives best fit are defined in Chapter V.

**D. VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY**

“Multi-method research validity is tested by triangulating multiple sets of data speaking to the same research question from different viewpoints” (Brewer & Hunter, 1989, p. 83). The researcher infers validity from the agreement between data sets. To support these inferences, the data must be collected by different means, employed independently of one another, but focused on the same research question(s) (1989). In
this research, data was collected from various literature and informants using a variety of methods, as discussed above. All of the methods used focused on answering the same fundamental questions: (1) what gaps in capability exist within USSOCOM contingency contracting? and (2) can a management module be developed to mitigate those gaps? This multi-method approach avoided reliance on any preconceived bias by the researcher and allowed for objective triangulation of the data.

The prototype CM2 was tested for internal validity and reliability through peer debriefing and member checks (Hudgens, 2009). The peer debriefing consisted of three graduate-level, experienced CCOs reviewing the module for credibility. Their review was based on their experience and training associated with construction requirements and contingency contracting. These debriefings resulted in agreement from the peer members that the content and structure of the CM2 would provide useful and effective training support for CCOs regardless of their military service, background, experience, or education. Furthermore, USSOCOM member checks were conducted by distributing a draft version of the prototype through the USSOCOM staff headquarters to CCOs currently deployed in a contingency environment under USSOCOM warrant authority and supporting construction requirements. Feedback from the members suggested the prototype provides a comprehensive and effective tool. However, further testing should be conducted to ensure validity and reliability using the aforementioned ADDIE method and to ensure that the CM2 can achieve the learning objectives. Additional information regarding recommended implementation and evaluation of the CM2 is provided in Chapter VI.

E. SUMMARY

This chapter explained how exploratory research was conducted using a variety of qualitative research methodologies. This research is focused on real-world complexities, allowing the researcher to examine multiple perspectives of a problem or group of problems with USSOCOM CCOs executing construction requirements in a contingency contracting environment. Data was collected from informants made up of USSOCOM personnel and supporting SMEs using questionnaires and semi-structured interviews.
Targeted informants included USSOCOM staff members, customers, and CCOs of various rank and military service backgrounds. Archival data such as government reports, policies, training materials, and AARs were also collected and analyzed. The information gathered from these informants and from archival records suggests positive lessons learned, as well as challenges CCOs face within the contingency contracting environment.

The investigation and analysis herein follows a multi-method approach to qualitative research. The development of the CM\(^2\) follows the Analyze, Design, Develop, Implement, and Evaluate (ADDIE) model, with a rapid prototyping approach (Strickland, 2006). The internal structure of the CM\(^2\) incorporates various learning concepts as outlined by Keirns (1999) and Keller (1984). Prior to implementation, the validity and reliability of the prototype CM\(^2\) was tested using peer debriefings and member checks. Chapter III will explain the background and current environment of contingency contracting.
III. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

A. OVERVIEW

This chapter reviews the relevant literature surrounding the contingency contracting phenomenon. To give the reader the context in which identified problems exist, this chapter will breakdown the term contingency and define the concepts of contingency contracting. Chapter IV will then discuss the framework of USSOCOM and how CCOs operate within its structure. In Chapter V, an analysis is provided of policy and guidance from the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and its supplements, USSOCOM Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Inspector General (IG) and Government Accountability Office (GAO) Reports, related Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) policy directives, and feedback from USSOCOM personnel through questionnaires and AARs to identify key concerns and possible solutions to identified problems as they concern USSOCOM.

B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In the late eighteenth century, the United States military was established via the American Revolutionary militia. The American Revolutionaries focused their organic capabilities solely on the war strategies and battles at hand. Consequently, the leaders heavily depended on external logistical support to provide basic life support to the troops, such as food, clothing, and shelter (D’Angelo, Houglan, & Ruckwardt, 2007). The U.S. government, even during its infancy, recognized the importance of outsourcing external support for the military (Luse, Madeline, Smith, & Starr, 2005).

Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance in 1781, stated, “in all countries engaged in war, experience has sooner or later pointed out that contracts with private men of substance and understanding are necessary for the subsistence, covering, clothing, and moving of an Army” (Luse et al., 2005, p. 5). The process was not formally recognized as contingency contracting at the time; however, the principles and objectives of the modern version of the process are identical to those Morris described. This direct purchase system, not unlike today’s contingency contracting, had its share of problems. George
Washington and Alexander Hamilton observed that contractors were often more concerned with increasing their profits than with providing the supplies and services the Army required (Shrader, 1990). Another significant problem during this period was contractors failing to meet delivery requirements. A notable delinquent contract was Eli Whitney’s failure to meet a delivery schedule of 4,000 muskets to the War Department; the requirement was fulfilled eleven years after the established date (Nagle, 1992). Despite recurring problems, the military has continued to use private industry to augment its logistical force (D’Angelo et al., 2007).

While the term contingency contracting was coined only a decade or two ago, the United States military has been contracting out logistical support for its military forces—in different degrees, in both domestic and overseas operations, with varying levels of success—since 1775. Early attempts at contracting logistics support for military operations sometimes brought the expedition to ruins; but since World War II, contingency contracting has generally proved an integral part of the military’s operational capabilities, although problems still exist today (Luse et al., 2005).

Reduced manpower and increased global positioning of military forces has increased demand for contractor support during contingencies. For decades, the military has been contracting for goods and services, thus becoming a less self-sufficient organization. This means contractors are more often relied upon for supplies, services, and construction in contingency environments (Hill, 2006). Metrics indicate there are more contractors on the battlefield than ever before; as of 2007, State and Defense department figures show 180,000 civilians working in Iraq under U.S. contracts (Miller, 2007, July 4). The U.S. must conduct contracting in contingency operations in order to provide essential support to time-sensitive operational objectives. Contingency contracting encompasses the procurement and acquisition of supplies and services in a contingency environment—ranging from simplified acquisition procedures to complex defense system acquisitions, interagency support, services, and military construction.
C. CONTINGENCY DEFINED

A contingency is an event that requires the deployment of military forces in response to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse of law and order, political instability, or other military operations (Yoder, PowerPoint presentation, 2007). A contingency operation may either be declared or non-declared. According to 10 United States Code (*USC*), a declared contingency in the DoD may be either:

a. Designated by the Secretary of Defense when members of the Armed Forces may become involved in military actions against an enemy of the U.S. and/or;

b. Declared by the President or Congress when members of the uniformed forces are called on active duty (a reserve component mobilization) under any provision of law during a declared war/national emergency (*USC*, 2008, 101(a) (13)).

In contrast, a non-declared contingency operation is any other DoD operation other than those described above. Barbaris and Callanan explain that “The distinction between a declared contingency and a non-declared contingency is crucial in the contracting community” (2008, p. 9). In a declared contingency, often the regulations and policies outlined within the FAR (along with those of the various military services) are relaxed to provide flexible and streamlined guidance to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of expeditionary or wartime functions. FAR Part 18, entitled “Emergency Acquisitions,” details many of the streamlined processes (GSA, 2009).

D. TYPES OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Since the inception of our nation, members of the U.S. Armed Forces have deployed throughout the globe in response to emergency situations caused by natural disasters, wars, terrorist activities, and/or political instability. They have been called upon for rescue and humanitarian relief efforts, and to protect U.S. national security interests against demonstrations of force and raids worldwide. The volatile, urgent, and uncertain nature of these efforts creates the distinct need for advanced planning, rapid response, adaptable solutions, and flexible procedures during support of a contingency
operation. The operational environment will influence the extent to which contracting forces are utilized. Contingency contracting support has evolved over time from support of military operations into more complex support of interagency needs (DPAP, 2009).

Four main types of DoD-supported contingency operations include: major theatre war, smaller-scale contingencies, military operations other than war (MOOTW), and domestic disaster/emergency relief operations (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008).

1. **Major Theatre War (MTW)**

In a MTW, hostilities are ongoing, imminent or likely, and involve a substantial commitment of U.S. military forces (DAU, 2005, pp. 2-7). These types of operations are generally conflicts that engage an entire force structure within a specific geographical area. Contracting support is provided to supplement a vigorous combat support and combat service support infrastructure. Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF) are current examples of MTWs.

2. **Small-Scale Contingencies (SSCs)**

The 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* established small-scale contingencies (SSCs) as a new mission for military operational requirements and a major consideration in deciding upon the appropriate force structure. Support provided for SSCs is similar in nature to that provided for a MTW, yet is less lengthy and can be as minor as a show of force. However, one key difference is that SSC operations are set in motion against a less compelling threat than those involved in MTW operations. They also dedicate fewer U.S. forces and have a more restricted time schedule ("Small-scale Contingency," 2009). Operations Urgent Fury (Grenada) and Just Cause (Panama)—along with the Implementation Force/Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia later associated with Operations Allied Force (Kosovo)—are all examples of SSCs.

3. **Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)**

MOOTWs refer to a wide range of activities utilized by U.S. military forces to support operations other than large-scale war. The main focus of these operations is to prevent war, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support civil authorities in response to
domestic crises. They may involve both combat and noncombat operations. MOOTW are generally conducted outside the continental United States (OCONUS); however, some types may be conducted within the continental United States (CONUS) in support of civil authorities consistent with established law. Operations Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq) and Uphold Democracy (Haiti) are two examples of MOOTWs conducted by the U.S. over the past several years (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008).

4. Domestic Disaster/Emergency Relief (DD/ER)

The spectrum of assistance provided during DD/ER operations includes CONUS natural and man-made disasters, CONUS local community disturbances, and CONUS terrorist activity. However, the main focus of this type of support is to mitigate the effects of natural or man-made disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, oil spills, riots, and air, rail, or highway accidents (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008). DoD disaster relief efforts included clean-up and humanitarian assistance efforts resulting from hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Katrina.

E. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

The Defense Acquisition University’s (DAU) Contingency Contracting course (CON234) defines Contingency Contracting as: “Direct contracting support to tactical and operational forces engaged in the full spectrum of armed conflict and MOOTW, both domestic and overseas” (Yoder, PowerPoint presentation, 2009). Basically, contingency contracting is the process by which essential supplies and services are obtained to support deployed forces. This can be during a declared war or peacetime and can take place either in the CONUS or OCONUS. The definition of contingency contracting is deliberately broad in order to include the four types of contingency operations discussed above (DAU, 2005, pp. 2-7).

Additionally, when planning for contingency operations, CCOs consider the maturity level of the environment to help determine the type and level of required contracting support. Existing resources available in a respective AOR are also considered. For example, a CCO would prepare for a contingency operation in the CONUS differently than OCONUS, and areas such as Western or Eastern Europe
differently than in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Iran. A contingency environment can be classified as either mature or immature, as described below.

A mature environment is one that can be characterized by a sophisticated infrastructure capable of supporting and sustaining operations for extensive periods of time. A mature environment can have all or a combination of the following characteristics: legal framework, host-nation agreements, financial networks to support complex transactions, vigorous transportation systems, business capacity, capability, and a willingness to interact (Yoder, PowerPoint presentation, 2007). A mature environment has the capability to quickly adapt to changing requirements and priorities. It often consists of vendors and suppliers that have prior contracting experience with the U.S. government and that can comply with FAR requirements.

In contrast, an immature contracting environment is one lacking the support infrastructure detailed above. Few, if any, vendors may be available with which to conduct business, and they likely have had no previous experience working with the U.S. government (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008).

While no two contingency contracting operations are exactly alike, they fall into one or more of the four typical phases of a contingency: Phase I - Mobilization/Initial Deployment; Phase II - Buildup; Phase III - Sustainment; and/or Phase IV - Termination/Redeployment (AFLMA, 2008, p. 126). It is important for CCOs to understand what phase of a contingency an operation falls within, as this classification can assist them in assessing their resources and preparing for the requirements needed to fulfill mission support. It is important to note that not all operations will follow the particular sequence detailed below; a location may be in a hybrid phase based on various factors—including, but not limited to—operational environment, mission adjustments and personnel surges.

1. **Phase I - Mobilization and Initial Deployment**

   The mobilization and initial deployment phase of an operation, normally the first 30–45 days, can be one of the most stressful and confusing environments a CCO will face. As initial support organizations may not be available upon arrival, a CCO may
perform different roles in rapid sequence, such as: initial requestor, approving official, certifying officer, lodging officer, logistics coordinator, transportation officer, inspector, supply/inventory manager, and property administrator, among other things. The need to award contracts quickly upon arrival is usually imperative to the mission. The number one priority for contracting professionals during this stage is to be responsive to providing basic life-support requirements, security services, and support for arrival of the initial ground troops. These items can include food, water, shelter, utilities, transportation, fuel, sanitation, interpreters and guides.

A CCO expected to deploy during this phase of a contingency can plan ahead and obtain access to sample documents that may be needed for forming and administering contract awards. These documents include statements of work, logs of available contract numbers, contract forms, and award checklists. CCOs must remain flexible, as the number of available contracting personnel during this phase of a contingency is limited. The predominant types of contract vehicles used during this phase of a contingency operation are SF44s with cash payments, government-wide commercial purchase cards, and blanket purchase agreements (BPAs). In addition, Standard Form 44s (SF 44) act as an all-in-one order: invoice and payment voucher with cash payments.

2. **Phase II - Buildup**

The buildup phase of a contingency operation, normally day 45 and forward, is generally a continuation of the initial deployment phase. The main body of troops to support the mission will arrive, along with additional contracting personnel; however, the number of new contracting personnel may not seem proportional to the number of troops needing support. Again, the main focus is basic life-support and security requirements, but a CCO must also now pay attention to construction material, heavy equipment, quality-of-life items (audio/visual items, gym equipment, etc.), and office equipment. The establishment of a contracting office with a solid and reliable vendor base is a key priority in this phase. The use of cash transactions is limited at this point, as the
contracting office is working towards establishment of BPAs with a network of ordering officers (who may have decentralized control of the ordering or may coordinate with the CCO for each order off the BPA).

3. Phase III - Sustainment

The sustainment phase of a contingency operation runs from the end of the buildup stage through the point that redeployment begins. Contracting activities will continue to focus on life-support and quality-of-life requirements; however, an increased focus will be given to providing permanent facilities and equipment, office supplies, and discretionary services. The main priority of a CCO and his or her support team will be establishing long-term, indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts and BPAs that consolidate requirements—thus benefiting from economies of scale and reducing costs. The improvement of contract files and documentation is crucial, as internal controls are established to minimize waste and abuse. The contracting team will also focus on increasing competition amongst its vendor base and on transitioning the workload for the next round of contracting personnel or termination and redeployment (Yoder, PowerPoint presentation, 2007).

4. Phase IV - Termination and Redeployment

This phase of a contingency operation will be characterized by an urgency to prepare the troops to go home or to deploy forward to other areas of an operation. The CCO will continue to focus on life-support contracts throughout the duration of the mission. New requirements may include packing and freight services, transportation of troops, and preparation of material and equipment for transfer (Yoder, PowerPoint presentation, 2007). Contracting personnel will be required to terminate and/or closeout existing contracts and orders. This includes ensuring final payment to contractors and closing any open issues associated with their contracts. If redeployment is scheduled, a CCO’s team prepares the contract files and documentation for reassignment and coordinates with the appropriate agency or office. The CCO may transfer the files to an organization such as the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), or the CCO may be responsible for storing or destroying the files themselves as appropriate.
During all of these phases, CCOs are responsible for maintaining accurate and complete contract files in a complex and high-threat environment, while constantly adapting to new procedures, new technology, and new demands. These requirements get even more complicated, and the threat environment often increases when CCOs are deployed supporting USSOCOM SOF teams on the front lines.

F. SUMMARY

Since 2001, DoD’s contingency contracting environment has changed dramatically, mainly as a result of reconstruction efforts in Iraq (and Afghanistan). Contingency contracting encompasses all contracting done in a contingency environment (declared and non-declared), including various phases of contingencies. As mentioned above, the DoD has also experienced an unprecedented reliance on contractors to support the force. Contractors are now called upon to fill a growing number of back office positions, provide front-line support in contingencies, and help with the cradle-to-grave contracting process (DPAP, 2009).

This chapter defined the terms contingency and contingency contracting as they relate to the DoD and the four main types of DoD-supported contingency operations including: major theatre wars, smaller-scale contingencies, military operations other than war, and domestic disaster/emergency relief operations. Mature versus immature contingency environments was explained, followed by the four typical phases of a contingency: mobilization/initial deployment, buildup, sustainment, and/or termination/redeployment. In Chapter IV, the USSOCOM organizational structure will be explained along with an explanation of how USSOCOM supports contingency contracting.
IV. USSOCOM

A. USSOCOM FRAMEWORK

The National Defense Authorization Act of 1986 (SOAL-KA, 2008) established the concept of USSOCOM. A year later, the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act (Hill, 2006) formally created USSOCOM and established the military service-component support roles. It also provided substantial autonomy for Special Operations Forces (SOF), to include unique budget and procurement authority for SOF units. “The broad intent of these provisions was to create a more effective special operations capability that was not beholden to parochial service attitudes or constrained by service priorities for conventional forces” (Hill, 2006, p. 3). However, since September 11, 2001, the focus of USSOCOM has shifted from that of a force provider to that of a Combatant Command. The command has a dual role as a unified combatant command, while still having unique military service-like authorities in terms of procurement and developing personnel. Key elements of these responsibilities are defined in Table 4.

Table 4. USSOCOM Dual Responsibilities (From Cannaday, PowerPoint presentation, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USSOCOM – A UNIQUE AND DYNAMIC ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>MILITARY DEPARTMENT (SERVICE-LIKE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Roles and Authorities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNIFIED COMBATANT COMMAND</strong></td>
<td><strong>ORGANIZE, TRAIN, AND EQUIP SOF</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command all U.S.-based SOF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synchronize planning for global operations against terrorist networks</td>
<td>Develop SOF strategies, doctrine, and tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deploy SOF to support Geographical Combatant Commander objectives</td>
<td>Program and budget for SOF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct operations globally</td>
<td>Procure SOF-peculiar items (Procurement Authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan pre-crisis activities</td>
<td>Monitor SOF personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execute pre-crisis activities</td>
<td>Conduct internal audits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operations conducted by SOF teams encompass the use of small units in direct and indirect military actions designed for national security interest, strategic or organizational objectives. They require units with combinations of highly trained, specialized personnel and equipment, and tactics that exceed the routine capabilities of conventional military forces. The nature of SOF operations are often extremely politically sensitive missions, in which only the best equipped and most proficient forces are deployed to avoid detection and possible mission failure that could result in damage to the United States’ prestige and interests (Cluck, 2009).

The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps commands of USSOCOM (illustrated in Figure 1 above) use authorities and budgets granted by legislation to the USSOCOM commander to organize, equip, train, and deploy their forces to support operational commanders around the globe. Olson (2009) explains, “When outside the United States, all SOF teams are under the operational control of respective Geographic Combatant Commander[s] (GCCs)” (p. 54). Administratively, the SOF forces still report to the respective theatre special operations commands depicted in Figure 2.
Over 10,000 members of SOF are under OPCON of Central Command (CENTCOM). Over 2,000 others are scattered throughout the globe, in over sixty countries—including over one hundred SOF personnel assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) structure (Olson, 2009). Figure 3 depicts the respective AORs for the U.S. Combatant Commands throughout the world.
The USSOCOM commander has unique procurement authorities and responsibilities compared to that of other Combatant Commands (COCOMs). Similar to the authorities granted to each military service, Title 10 USC, Section 167, vests in the USSOCOM commander the responsibility and authority to develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment, the authority to exercise the functions of the head of agency, and the authority to execute funds. USSOCOM uses special appropriation funding known as Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11) to support the development, acquisition, and sustainment activities for USSOCOM. This authority is delegated down to the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive (SOAE), Mr. James W. Cluck, as the Senior Procurement Executive for the command. He leads the Special Operations Acquisition and Logistics Center (SOAL) in executing USSOCOM funding authority (Cluck, 2009). Figure 4 depicts the matrix relationship of these organizations.

Figure 4. SOAL Location within the USSOCOM HQ Command Structure
(From SOAL-KA, 2008)
Although USSOCOM’s budget is historically less than 2% of the total defense budget (Olson, 2009), this procurement authority has resulted in a significant increase to expenditures within USSOCOM. During the 1990s, USSOCOM expenditures averaged under $400 million. As of the end of fiscal year 2008 (FY08), that number has grown to over $2.68 billion (Cluck, 2009). While breakdowns of historical contingency expenditures are often classified, we do know that OCOs account for roughly $200 million of the FY10 $1.6 billion budget request (McKaughan, 2009).

B. USSOCOM CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING

The contracting arm of SOAL is the Director of Procurement (also known as SOAL-K), located within the USSOCOM Headquarters, MacDill AFB, Florida. The mission statement of the SOAL-K Office depicts its goals: “contracting professionals teaming with acquisition and industry professionals to rapidly transform acquisition strategies into superior technologies, equipment and services for USSOCOM and SOF” (Cluck, 2009, p. 43). An overview of the various divisions within SOAL-K is depicted in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Operations Division and Contingency Contracting Cell within the USSOCOM Contracting Organizational Structure (From Cannaday, PowerPoint presentation, 2008)
SOAL-K places CCOs within deployed SOF teams through the Operations Division, SOAL-KA, as depicted in Figure 5. The SOAL-KA division handles the contingency contracting planning and policy. It also conducts the orientation and training for CCOs before they deploy into a specific AOR with SOF teams. As part of USSOCOM, SOAL-KA is not a force provider, nor does it have OPCON over the individual CCO assigned to support the SOF units (LTC Smallwood, SOAL-KA Division Chief, personal communication, June 17, 2009).

1. **Contracting Versus Command Authority**

The SOAL-KA division exercises the given procurement authority over the CCOs by issuing them a CCO warrant in accordance with *FAR* 2.101, which gives each CCO the signature authority to obligate USSOCOM MFP-11 funds, enter into contracts, terminate them, and make determinations and findings. A simplified depiction of where this authority begins and how it is delegated down to the CCO is provided in Figure 6.

![USSOCOM Flow of Contracting Authority](image)

**Figure 6.** Flow of Contracting Authority to a USSOCOM CCO (From Cannaday, PowerPoint presentation, 2008)
Lines of authority can be easily blurred with USSOCOM CCOs. Figure 7 depicts the typical Command Authority versus Contracting Authority in a standard Combatant Command. However, the USSOCOM authority is much more streamlined.

![Diagram of Authority Flow](image)

**Figure 7.** Flow of Contracting Authority to Conventional CCO (AFLMA, 2008, p. 37)

Unlike USSOCOM’s streamlined structure, a typical contingency contracting unit falls deep within a complex operational structure of forces. In larger or more complex contingency operations—such as Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom—there is a specific command established, conceptually known as a joint theatre support contracting command (JTSCC). This concept is defined in depth in *Contingency Contracting: A Joint Handbook for the 21st Century* (AFLMA, 2008, p. 47). The current JTSCC is better known as the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) (Recently changed to CENTCOM Contracting Command (CCC)), will be referenced herein as JCC-I/A. This structure often requires more oversight than can typically be provided through a single lead-service organizational option, in which a contracting team falls deep within a single service chain of command responsible for all operations within the AOR.
Operational conditions that may drive this option could include, but may not be limited to the following:

- Extremely complex operation that requires direct control of theatre support contracting by the JFC commander,
- Mission that is of long-term duration,
- Mission that is beyond the capability of a single military service,
- Mission that requires significant coordination of contracting and civil-military personnel on aspects of the JFC’s campaign plan, and/or
- Significant numbers of different military service forces that may be operating in the same area or joint bases that may be served by the same local vendor base.

A JTSCC, by design, is a joint command that has command-and-control authority over designated, service-component, theatre-support, contracting organizations and personnel within a designated support area. This command performs the same functions as a lead service contracting organization, but reports directly to the JFC. Since GCCs do not have their own contracting authority, the JTSCC’s HCA authority flows from one of the service components (normally the executive agency or lead service component).

There is not a formally approved set model for a JTSCC. Conceptually, the JTSCC will be initiated only for major sustained operations, as the JCC-I/A is currently. As seen in recent operations, these sustained operations may include major reconstruction and transition to civil authority mission requirements in addition to the standard joint-forces-support mission requirements. In these major long-term stability operations, JFC commanders often prefer to establish a JTSCC with separate senior contracting officials (SCOs) responsible to support the JFC, host nation forces or transition operations, and reconstruction support.

The JTSCC structure is very robust and includes multiple layers of positions for leadership and personnel matrixed into subordinate units supporting the JTSCC commander. These positions are discussed below.
2. Joint Theatre Support Contracting Command (JTSCC) Overview

a. Commander

The commander of a JTSCC is normally an O-7 or O-8 with significant contingency contracting experience. Because of the manner by which the military services develop their contingency contracting officers, this position will normally be filled by an Air Force or Army general officer. The JTSCC commander reports to the JFC commander and is responsible for ensuring the theatre support contracting mission is conducted in an effective, efficient, and well-coordinated fashion. This commander would also serve as the JFC’s principal advisor for contracting support.

b. Administrative Staff

The commander’s administrative staff support is determined by the JTSCC commander. This support requires no specific rank and no contracting-related experience.

c. Chief of Staff

Like all chiefs of staff, the JTSCC chief of staff is responsible for integrating all special and primary staff functions within the command. Normally, this position would be an O-6 with contingency contracting experience.

d. J1

The JTSCC J1 performs personnel actions, to include working personnel assignments, joint manning document (JMD)-related actions (e.g., number of personnel slots), awards, and ratings. The J1 generally would be a personnel officer with no specific rank or contracting-related experience.

e. J2/3/5

A JTSCC does not typically have or need a J2, J3 or J5 office. If required by the JTSCC commander, the J2/3/5 officer—normally an O-5 with contracting experience—is responsible to assist the commander and SCOs with synchronizing support to ongoing operations and planned future operations. The J2/3/5 focus is on
supporting the JFC commander’s intent with effective and efficient contracting actions. If needed, the J2/3/5 could also contain separate policy and contract-compliance divisions.

f. **J4**

The JTSCC J4 performs logistics actions, to include general office supply, coordinating facility support, intra-theatre travel, and other similar actions. The J4 is normally a logistics officer with no specific rank or contracting-related experience.

g. **J6**

The JTSCC J6 performs communications support-related actions, to include coordinating communications support, website management, and related functions. The J6 normally would be a communications or signal officer with no specific rank or contracting-related experience.

**h. Senior Contracting Official (SCO)**

The JTSCC generally has one to three SCOs, normally at the O-6 level, with significant contracting-related experience and certifications. The SCO’s general responsibilities include:

- Overseeing day-to-day contracting operations within his/her area of contracting responsibility
- Overseeing and assessing the effectiveness of contracting programs
- Issuing warrants and determining delegated warrant authorities
- Participating in the JARB (primarily the SCO for forces support)
- Chairing the JCSB as directed
- Managing and executing unit inspections through procurement and performance management reviews
- Developing and providing oversight and management-control programs
- Conducting special reviews as required
- Managing the contract audit follow-up program,
- Suspension and debarment
i. Senior Contracting Official Operations Staff

Each SCO will normally have an operations staff with primary duties that mirror the joint theatre support contracting command J-staff functions listed previously. These staffs can vary in size and should be made up of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) with at least some contracting and acquisition experience.

j. Senior Contracting Official for Forces Support

The SCO for forces support is responsible for planning, coordinating, and managing theatre support contracting for deployed U.S. forces and multinational forces. This support may also include support to interagency personnel and facilities, but does not normally include support to other government agency-led civil reconstruction projects. The SCO for forces support will generally have three or more RCCs. Each RCC will have with multiple Regional Contracting Offices (RCOs). Also, the SCO for forces support may have a specialty contracting division to handle common, joint operational area (JOA), or complex contracts that exceed RCC and RCO capabilities. Three contracting organizations that often report to the SCO for forces support and are established within a JTSCC include: RCCs, RCOs, and specialty contracts divisions.

k. Regional Contracting Centers (RCC)

The specific makeup of these RCCs is dependent on the specific mission support requirement; however, a typical RCC could consist of ten to twenty-five warranted contracting officers, NCOs, and DoD civilians. It is also common practice to align these RCCs to a major land force (division, corps, or Marine Expeditionary Force) headquarters or air expeditionary wing or group. The key to the proper manning of these RCCs and their subordinate RCOs is not the rank of the contracting officers on staff, but warrant and experience levels of the staff members.

l. Regional Contracting Offices (RCO)

RCOs are joint-staffed contracting organizations under the command and control of an RCC. RCOs are made up of two to eight warranted contracting officers, NCOs, and DoD civilians. The size and makeup of an RCO is based on actual mission-
support requirements. RCOs normally provide area support to specific forward operating bases (FOBs) and designated areas within the JOA.

**m. Specialty Contracts Division**

In some operations, there may be a need to develop a specialty contracts division that can contract for common, JOA-wide services or supplies. Additionally, these contracting organizations may be utilized to perform complex contracting actions that exceed the RCC and RCO capabilities. The specialty contracts division will be made up of specially selected, highly trained contracting officers, NCOs, and DoD civilians who have the requisite experience and warrants to handle large, complex contract actions.

**n. Senior Contracting Official for Host Nation (HN) Forces and Transition Support**

This SCO for HN and transition support is responsible for planning, coordinating, and managing theatre support contracting actions in support of the JFC mission to develop, organize, train, equip, and sustain HN security forces. The SCO for HN and transition support is also responsible for providing training and transition assistance to HN security forces (and other governmental agencies as directed) in order to facilitate the development and sustainment of their own contracting support capabilities.

**o. Service and Commodity Divisions**

The SCO for HN Forces and transition support would normally have some type of subordinate contracting organization (or organizations) responsible for managing HN security forces and theatre support contracting actions that cannot be readily accommodated by the existing forces.

**p. Transition Teams**

If established, the SCO for HN and transition support will normally have multiple transition teams. These transition teams are responsible for planning and executing support HN security forces and, if directed, HN governmental contracting
support organizations and capabilities. These teams will vary in size, but must be manned with military or DoD civilian personnel with the contracting experience required by their assigned mission.

q. **Senior Contracting Official for Reconstruction Support**

The SCO for reconstruction is responsible for planning, coordinating, and managing theatre support contracting actions in support of the civil reconstruction mission. Normally, the SCO for reconstruction would directly support the U.S. Chief of Mission or U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The SCO for reconstruction generally would have multiple-sector support-contracting organizations. These subordinate organizations could include, but are not limited to, the following reconstruction sector areas: water, sanitation, electricity, transportation, oil production, and other related functions. As much as resources permit, these staffs will be made up of select, highly trained contracting officers, NCOs, and DoD civilians who have the requisite experience and warrant to handle large, complex reconstruction-related contract actions (AFLMA, 2008).

Figure 8 depicts the textbook structure of a JTSCC as outlined in the most recent *Contingency Contracting: A Joint Handbook for the 21st Century* (AFLMA, 2008).
A typical USSOCOM contracting operation will be most similar to a Regional Contracting Office at best. Often, USSOCOM contracting units are made up of one to three CCOs operating in support of the theatre SOF teams in a particular AOR. They do not often fall within the robust structure outlined above; therefore, although streamlined, they do not have the vast network of personnel and resources available as a JTSCC would. As noted above, the command authority and OPCON comes from the local AOR GCC, while the procurement (contracting) authority comes direct from HQ USSOCOM. This differentiation can increase a CCO’s ability to act in a more timely fashion; however, this also causes difficulty in coordinating and integrating with other functional areas.
C. SUMMARY

This chapter explained the organizational construct of USSOCOM. It also provided the framework of USSOCOM, showing its unique procurement authority and how that authority is delegated down to the CCO through the SOAL. Information in this chapter provided a basic understanding of USSOCOM. This chapter also delineated the differences between a typical JTSCC (such as the JCC-I/A) and the construct of operations faced by USSOCOM CCOs. Chapter V identifies specific commonalities with construction requirements experienced by CCOs and their customers within USSOCOM operations.
V. ANALYSIS

Chapter V provides a review of literature and findings from governmental reports and audits, scholarly reports, after-actions reports, and the results of interviews and fielded questionnaires with USSOCOM personnel. As a way to properly categorize the vast spectrum of information obtained during the data collection, the analysis is organized into three overarching pillars: people, processes, and platforms.

A. TRAINING OF PERSONNEL (PEOPLE)

As a fundamental pillar for success, the makeup and training of personnel is crucial in virtually any environment. This section will analyze the existing makeup of the acquisition workforce and describe the future direction in which experts believe that workforce is headed. The chapter will then describe the training opportunities, requirements, and shortfalls of acquisition personnel and how varying levels of effectiveness and standards exist for USSOCOM CCOs. The chapter will also describe how contingency contracting lessons learned are documented and how contracting leadership and CCOs can use this documentation to enhance their training programs.

1. Changing Workforce

In an April 2, 2008, breakout session at the National Contract Management Association’s (NCMA) World Congress, Dr. Steven Kelman, Weatherhead Professor of Public Management, Harvard University, commented on the present state of government contracting, saying that the acquisition workforce is at risk of falling into a “death spiral” (as cited in Barbaris & Callanan, 2008, p. 17). Kelman describes this as a combination of insufficient numbers of contingency contracting professionals and increasingly complex work requirements. This type of working environment raises error rates, and as a result, increases audits and management oversight (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008).

The contingency contracting environment is plagued by many of the same problems as the conventional acquisition workforce. In 2007, the Secretary of the Army established an Independent Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management
in Expeditionary Operations. The commission was chaired by Dr. Jacques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L)), and was tasked to review the Army’s policies, procedures, and operations in contingency environments, and to recommend necessary changes to ensure that future military operations achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency (USA, 2007). This report, commonly known as the Gansler Report, is widely respected as a comprehensive assessment of expeditionary contracting activities. The findings within this report documented systemic problems with expeditionary contracting that include, but are not limited to, the USSOCOM AOR. While USSOCOM is made up of all military services, the Army is the DoD Executive Agent for all contingency contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (USA, 2007). Therefore, the Army plays a critical role in training and shaping the personnel who support the effectiveness of USSOCOM CCO operations. This background is important when analyzing the results of the Gansler Report because as the lead agent for contracting activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, the situation in the Army is directly linked to the outcomes in at least the two largest existing AORs for contingency contracting. These are two areas in which USSOCOM is significantly involved, according the SOAL-K DoP.

Currently, the Army is unable to fill the necessary contracting billets in terms of either quantity or qualifications. Although providing contracting support to the Army and Marine Corps is not part of Air Force doctrine, the Air Force provides over 67% of the contracting resources for JCC-I/A—including most of the complex actions such as reconstruction operations (USA, 2007). This percentage was estimated by the SOAL-KA division chief to be the same for USSOCOM billets throughout the world. This means that while the Army is leading the joint force in policy and procedure for contingency contracting, the Air Force is leading in manning of CCO taskings.

The USSOCM contingency contracting workforce is matrixed through the tasking of personnel across all military services under an applicable CENTCOM UMD. In other words, members of the CCO workforce do not come directly from special operations units; rather, they originate from the acquisition workforce of their respective military service. Based on relevant publications, congressional hearings and Government
Accountability Office (GAO) reports, the Army contracting community has at least four key problem areas that must be addressed, as they affect the Army’s ability to effectively and efficiently respond in contingency contracting situations. Those four areas are: the changing war environment, increased contracting workload and complexity of contract actions, increased responsibility of acquisition professionals, and a declining capability of the acquisition workforce (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008, p. 17).

The changing war environment impacts how personnel train because it involves the move from a post-Cold War era to one in which asymmetric, non-state sponsored warfare is more prominent. This type of warfare is also known as fourth generation war (Lind, 2004). The first three generations of war sought to defeat the enemy’s will with military power. However, the fourth generation of war will need to win on the moral, political, and social level rather than exclusively with military might (Lind, 2005). Army leaders indicate that the nation may continue to be engaged in an era of persistent conflict, characterized by protracted confrontation among many players. The tendency to employ violence to achieve political and ideological ends is not new, but modern networked terrorist cells pose new problems—particularly for a large, complex, and hierarchical bureaucracy (HQA, 2008). As described by former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, “the truth is, this will be a war like none other our nation has faced” (Rumsfeld, 2001, p. 1). This declaration was an early indication of the changes our armed forces would have to make in order to adapt to this new war environment. From an acquisition and contracting standpoint, there were initiatives set in place during the 1990s that should have supported this new environment; however, the training did not follow with the reform initiatives. This decade brought about a need for acquisition personnel to acquire new skill sets and adapt to increasing workload and responsibility. The largest increase to the workload was in actions over $100,000, with an increase of 28% over the decade (DoD, 2000). Despite workforce reductions of approximately 50% between 1990 and 2001, the workload for the DoD acquisition community increased by 12% (GAO, 2003). As a result, the training and credentials of federal acquisition
personnel suffered. The DoD downsized the workforce without ensuring that remaining personnel had the specific skills and competencies needed to accomplish future DoD missions (GAO, 2008).

This environment led to further problems when increased expeditionary contracting professionals (or CCOs) were needed to support two major-scale conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Gansler report found that the expeditionary environment requires more trained and experienced military officers and non-commissioned officers than they now have, and that the Army is doing more with less people with an overall workload increase of 600% (USA, 2007).

A senior NCO currently serving in a USSOCOM CCO billet stated that, “reductions in the force directly correlate to problems with managing customer education, CCO authority, acquisition planning, and oversight.” The CCO also identified his impression that the force reductions do not just affect contracting, but have changed the expected roles of personnel and overall reality of contingency operations. An example provided by this CCO was that by deploying a limited number of CCOs at each location, the standard contracting office structure is lost in a deployed environment. In his office, three CCOs, plus the chief of contracting (COCO), were supporting 58 locations with over 290 actions, and obligated just less than $10 million in 9 months. This same senior NCO noted in his questionnaire that the force reductions also drove inadequately trained engineers to write, inspect, and accept projects on behalf of the government—a disturbing trend that will be discussed throughout this report.

The Army has made advancements to addressing the recommendations laid out in the Gansler Report in terms of the acquisition workforce. The Army has plans to hire an additional 1,400 contracting personnel (GAO, 2008, p. 9). In July 2008, the Army approved a concept plan detailing a recruitment strategy that will further increase its workforce over the next few years. In an attempt to attract new talent and to be able to hire personnel in an expedited manner, the U.S. Army Material Command (AMC) has requested approval for direct-hire authority (Castelli, 2008).
A major initiative for the Army to improve its contracting workforce was the establishment of the Army Contracting Command. General Benjamin Griffin, commander of the Army Contracting Command, said the stand up of the organization was a:

…historic event, not because it was a new command but because the Army was demonstrating to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) leadership, Congress, and the American taxpayer that Army leadership was serious in taking steps to regain confidence in Army contracting and ensuring that it becomes one of the Army’s core competencies. (Leipold, 2008, p. 1)

Other improvements to contracting training from the Army include (as cited in Parsons, 2008, p. 2): Operational Contract Support (Joint Publication 4-10); Commanders Guide to Contracting Contractor Management (Field Manual 4-10); and Contract Support Brigade (Field Manual Interim 4-93.42). The Army is also reexamining training curriculum for new acquisition officers and civilians (Parsons, 2008). These initiatives will further the capabilities of Army CCOs; such an increase will, in turn, provide a larger and more qualified pool of support for USSOCOM missions.

Through interviews with USSOCOM staff, it was apparent that USSOCOM does not have OPCON over its CCO tasking slots, nor is it responsible for a CCO’s training prior to his or her deployment under a USSOCOM billet. In fact, its CCO taskings come from the joint manning document (JMD) from the respective geographical combatant command (COCOM) in theatre. The COCOM gets its CCOs out of the pool of deployable contracting professionals throughout all the military services. As of summer 2009, USSOCOM leadership noted that the Air Force is providing the majority of forces for all USSOCOM contracting deployments. The stand up of the Army Contracting Command and comments above suggest that future USSOCOM billets will be filled by more Army CCOs.

A joint initiative, brought about (at least in part) from the recommendation of the Gansler Report, has been the development, creation and publication of the Contingency Contracting: A Joint Handbook for the 21st Century, which began distribution in February 2008 throughout the DoD. The handbook is made up of a hardcopy book and supporting DVD. The intention is for the handbook to be revised each fiscal year to
accommodate changing regulations, policies, and lessons learned from the OSD. The second and latest version was published in December 2008.

The shortfall with this handbook is that there is no section devoted to unique USSOCOM policies or the complexities of construction contracting; in fact, there’s simply a page that defines the term construction (AFLMA, 2008). A current USSOCOM CCO serving as the COCO noted in a questionnaire for this research that construction is significantly different when it is conducted in a deployed area, and that the existing Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Joint Contingency Contracting course (CON 234), used as the primary contingency contracting training, does not adequately cover construction. This CCO respondent felt construction should be the focus of at least one week of the course.

2. Training

The past few decades have brought about change across the DoD in regard to specific training requirements and opportunities. From 1975 to 1990, the United States deployed its forces twenty-six times to various overseas contingencies. Post 1990, the number skyrocketed to over seventy deployments supporting contingencies. These deployments indicated a need to have trained CCOs ready to deploy on short notice (Luse et al., 2005).

a. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA)

In response to continuing concerns about the DoD’s ability to effectively manage its acquisition programs, Congress enacted the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Action (DAWIA) on November 5, 1990 (10 USC 1701), in order to make the DoD acquisition workforce more professional. The act established experience, training, education, and other qualifications for acquisition personnel (GAO, 1993, p. 1).

Each acquisition position throughout the DoD is required to have a designated certification standard. Certification is the process by which DoD agencies determine whether an individual meets all the mandatory standards as they relate to education, experience and training. There are three established career levels within each
associated career field, including contracting. The levels listed below identify the career levels as they relate to military acquisition positions (Master, PowerPoint presentation, 1995).

- **Level I (Basic Level)** - This level is for individuals typically in grades E-1 through E-5/O-1 through O-3. Basic-level training standards are designed to establish fundamental qualifications and expertise in the individual’s job series, functional area, or career field. Development at the basic level lays the foundation for career progression and is designed to prepare qualified, motivated personnel for positions of increased responsibility (Master, PowerPoint presentation, 1995).

- **Level II (Intermediate Level)** - This level is typically for individuals in grades E-6 through E-9/O-3 and O-4. At the beginning of the intermediate level, specialization is emphasized. Later, individuals broaden their background towards a more general understanding of the overall process in their career field. An individual’s experience in their primary career field should optimally be followed by a lateral movement to a related specialty ((Master, PowerPoint presentation, 1995).

- **Level III (Advanced Level)** - This level is typically for individuals in grades E-9/O-4 and above. By the time they reach Level III, these individuals should have completed all the mandatory training and education requirements up to that level. Additionally, they should have advanced through a career path that has given them an in-depth knowledge in their career field and a wide breadth of knowledge across the entire acquisition process (Master, PowerPoint presentation, 1995).

b. **Defense Acquisition University (DAU)**

The Defense Acquisition University was established on August 1, 1992. The DAWIA initiative allowed for a joint venture between existing Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marine, and DoD schools. One of their primary functions was to standardize training among the different DoD acquisition communities. Through the DAU consortium, the military service schools would remain separate and distinct institutions, but certain mandatory courses would be managed centrally through DAU. In an effort to expand the reach of many mandatory courses, DAU authorized the use of satellite facilities and internet courses. Many accredited universities and military service schools teach acquisition courses whereby students earn DAWIA certification through DAU equivalency courses (Luse et al., 2005, p. 47). According to the most recent DAU Strategic Plan (DAU, 2009, p. 5), its core competencies include the following: multi-functional, applied, subject-matter expertise, unique curriculum development and rapid response capabilities, knowledge sharing, practitioner training, performance support, applied research, and acquisition career management. However, after reading this entire document and examining all of the transformational efforts going on at DAU, three key words missing from the plan included: (1) construction, (2) contingency, and (3) contracting. This suggests that although there are highly visible transformation efforts underway at DAU, these efforts do not include a strategic focus on training the acquisition workforce in construction elements of contingency contracting (DAU, 2009).

c. Certification

According to the online DAU catalog, the contracting career field includes the positions of contract negotiator, contract specialist, contract termination specialist, contract administrator, procurement analyst, administrative contracting officer, procuring contracting officer, contract price and/or construction analyst, contracting officer, and termination contracting officer (DAU, 2008).

Certification criteria are selected from education, experience, and training categories. Both the experience and training categories are required for certification, while education requirements may be waived. Some acquisition professionals feel that DAWIA certification has failed in its intended purpose and has done more to alienate the acquisition communities. Some argue that career certification has created an unintended
result: namely, the completion of training programs and other certification requirements becoming an end in itself rather than a means to improve performance (Snider, 1996).

d. Established Courses

It is important that CCOs be provided with the training they need to excel during their assignments. CCOs need to apply sound procurement techniques, understand funding implications, and effectively administer their contracts while demonstrating exemplary integrity and ethics. CCOs help the DoD to accomplish its contingency mission and often funnel much-needed funds into regional economies (DAU, 2009, September 21).

To this end, the DAU has offered CCOs some elective training courses. According to the DAU 2010 Catalog, CON 234 (Joint Contingency Contracting) develops skills for contracting support provided to joint forces across the full spectrum of military and disaster-relief operations. Exercises focus on unique aspects of contingency, critical thinking skills, and the execution of appropriate contractual instruments. The course is offered in residence only and lasts for nine days. The Joint Contingency Contracting course is not currently a requirement for DAWIA certification and is not identified as part of the DAU transformation effort; however, it is the most utilized comprehensive resident training course offered in the field of contingency contracting. There is a follow-up online refresher course, CLC 114 (Contingency Contracting Officer Refresher), also identified in the catalog. Both classes are noted as electives for Level II DAWIA certification in contracting, although neither is required for any DAWIA certification.

According to the SOAL-KA Contingency Cell, USSOCOM’s standard operating procedure (SOP) is to only accept CCOs who have attained DAWIA Level II contracting certification. Yet, as mentioned above, according to the DAU website (DAU, 2008), neither CON 234 (Contingency Contracting) nor CON 244 (Construction Contracting) are requirements for Level II certification. However, both courses are specifically identified as being recommended “whenever practical” for those assuming duties in a related environment.
According to a senior USSOCOM policy official, USSOCOM leaders’ preference is to utilize CCOs who have completed both CON 234 and CON 244; however, this is not always possible due to the short-notice nature of taskings and varying degree of priority given to these training programs throughout the military services. Thus, there is no current written policy that CCOs must attend either of these courses in order to be placed in a position in which they may be managing complex construction requirements in a contingency environment.

e. Training Effectiveness

USSOCOM interview informants were asked to rate the effectiveness of all previous pre-deployment CCO training (including DAU courses and unit training) on a scale of one to five, with one being not effective and five being optimally effective. The average response was two, with not one member rating the effectiveness above a three. This suggests that based on the most recent feedback from both USSOCM staff and CCO experience, the pre-deployment training does not result in optimum effectiveness. Of the USSOCOM CCOs interviewed, all responded that their home station unit (all Air Force in this case) conducted contingency contracting training and addressed construction requirements. However, all respondents noted that such training was inadequate for the challenges faced on their USSOCOM deployment, and that the training did not address USSOCOM-specific procedures.

As discussed in Chapter II, the complexity of contracted goods and services has increased over time; yet, the U.S. armed forces have been engaged in construction in contingency environments since World War I. The training and credentials required by CCOs often place little to no requirement on an understanding of construction fundamentals or how to support construction requirements. According to a senior USSOCOM staff member, most CCOs have “little to no construction experience and find themselves as the lead CCO for construction projects.” With all the regulations and policies in a joint environment, CCOs also get confused as to which documents they should be following. These inadequacies in contingency and construction concepts, along with the absence of USSOCOM-specific guidance, hinder the CCO’s ability to be as
effective as they would be with clear guidance. They lose valuable execution time while researching the necessary policies and procedures that apply to their situation. The SOAL-K DoP feels that a construction-specific management module that incorporates USSOCOM contingency elements would help to mitigate these inadequacies.

\textbf{f. Standards}

Based on review of AARs and questionnaires of USSOCOM personnel, evidence suggests that CCOs are often confused as to what contract regulation and construction standard they should apply to various situations during their deployments. A senior DCMA liaison officer (LNO) for USSOCOM noted that a CCO may not know which standards apply to which situation. This is a problem with both physical construction standards and contractual regulations and policy. Confusion often exists as to whether JCC-I/A, CENTCOM, or USSOCOM policy prevails in any given contract action. CCOs often have to apply whichever standard the local commander directs, rather than relying on prescribed guidance.

Several respondents noted that physical construction standards were the most difficult to understand and apply. One senior DCMA LNO for USSOCOM noted that “electrical codes, standards of living, and commanders’ expectations” vary greatly across the AOR. Both the Army and Air Force have department-wide policies on deployed construction standards. However, these standards are often ignored or unavailable to deployed engineers. CCOs are not required to be experts in construction standards; therefore, they rely on the local subject-matter expert to determine the appropriate standard. This poses a problem when he/she develops the contract. If a contractor is not given a clear standard, it is difficult to enforce when the government goes to accept or reject the work.

The SOAL-KA Division Chief mentioned that based on his unit inspections, a CCOs’ biggest shortfalls in following contract standards involve a lack of appropriate clauses within construction contracts, inadequate training of oversight personnel, and a lack of awareness of funding restrictions and the appropriate review thresholds for construction projects. The division chief suggested that the lack of a
documented contract standard for these items was the root cause of these shortfalls. The division chief also noted that if CCOs had basic drawings and specifications for commonly contracted construction projects, such as water wells and guard towers, they could better support their customers. According to the division chief, a comprehensive management module focused on construction support would effectively mitigate these shortfalls and improve effectiveness of CCOs at all levels of experience. Other interview respondents also noted various items that would be useful in a management module such as: references to current regulations and policies, templates for construction contracts (SOW, IGCE, drawings, specifications, liquidated damages (LD), determinations and findings (D&F), etc.), checklists for construction-specific pre-award, award, and post-award contract administration concerns, construction terminology fundamentals, and how to successfully execute construction contracting with local nationals.

Contract administration is another area in which the standards vary throughout the AOR. DCMA is generally responsible for all post-award administration; however, throughout the contingency environments of today, DCMA is primarily focused on exclusively supporting the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract and is not manned to provide post-award administration on other requirements (D. Graff, Commander, DCMA International, personal communication, September 2, 2009). A recent IG report noted that the contracting organizations throughout Iraq and Afghanistan have consistently failed to adhere to FAR guidance associated with: adequately appointing and training oversight personnel, including appropriate clauses associated with construction contracting, the quality of statements of work (SOW), completing viable independent government cost estimates (IGE), and adequately justifying price reasonableness (IG D-2008-119, 2008). According to senior USSOCOM staff, the most recent PMRs further document that these issues are also trends throughout the USSOCOM AOR—including issues concerning inadequate drawings with construction projects and several incidences in which funding regulations were violated.
3. Lessons Learned

The changes in war and the joint dynamic of the deployed acquisition workforce have resulted in a vast network of CCOs with deployment experience across all military services. The lessons learned, whether positive or negative, during these deployments may often serve as a relative gold mine of information for CCOs who have limited deployment experience in a particular theatre or environment such as USSOCOM. Compiling these lessons learned is challenging, but is critical to training personnel and achieving future success.

a. The Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS)

The joint uniform lessons learned system (JULLS) was developed to facilitate the evaluation of joint exercises. It is also frequently used to collect after-action reports for actual operations and contingencies and is the most commonly used software for this purpose in the DoD. In addition to JULLS, the military services and major commands often collect and archive additional after-action information and data. For example, AFFARS Appendix CC requires all Air Force CCOs to submit AARs to their HCA and to the Air Staff subsequent to each deployment. Similarly, the Army Center for Lessons Learned systematically collects on-site information on all major exercises and operations in which the Army participates (Luse et al., 2005, p. 51).

b. Acquisition Community Connection (ACC)

DAU has now created an online acquisition community connection (ACC)—a database in which AARs from all military services are stored. This user-friendly, interactive website allows for registered users to access all submitted DoD, unclassified AARs prior to, during, or after their deployment (ACC, 2009).

c. USSOCOM Contracting Portal

USSOCOM has a similar model with its USSOCOM contracting portal. This unsecured website is maintained by the SOAL-K organization and includes USSOCOM-specific AARs, SOPs, training documents, samples, and many other items to assist registered CCOs in collaborating lessons learned from their deployments. An area
missing from each of these lessons learned databases is comprehensive contingency contracting guidance dealing specifically with construction and the necessary integration of joint forces.

B. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT POLICY (PROCESSES)

Once the workforce has been properly trained, processes must be established to provide an effective working environment. This section will describe several elements of contracting policy as it relates to establishing and maintaining appropriate processes for contract management. First, the importance of integrating contracting into the acquisition planning process will be explained. Then, the policy requirements as a result of the increased contractor support on the battlefield will be described. Finally, the problems faced with executing effective oversight policies and processes will be identified.

1. Integration of Contracting Into Planning

According to the Gansler Report, “USSOCOM has recognized the importance of expeditionary contracting to the successful completion of its mission” (USA, 2007, p. 40). The SOAL-KCC develops policies and doctrine to facilitate the success of deployed CCOs. KCC also provides review and approval of large-dollar actions to ensure compliance with statutory and regulatory guidance. The real-time involvement of this cell includes: properly collecting and reporting field contracting data, identifying lessons learned and using them to update policies, guidance, and/or developing training as appropriate. This involvement does not guarantee perfection in their processes; in fact, it has identified several gaps in the capabilities of CCOs, as discussed (in part) in the section on people earlier in this report. Requesting support from NPS for a management module is an example of the KCC conducting responsible leadership and seeking out continuous improvement. The staff conducts regular visits to units to perform informal audits and PMRs. It was as a result of these PMRs that the SOAL-KA division chief identified the need for additional integration of contracting into the acquisition planning process. Acquisition planning includes: generating a viable requirement description,
conducting market research, planning pro-actively versus re-actively, writing an adequate SOW, developing performance measurements, and adequately allocating and training qualified oversight personnel.

In addition to meeting with the deployed contracting unit, the KCC staff often maintains open communication with the SOF units that the CCOs support. This forum provides a clear opportunity for the staff to discuss shortfall issues directly with the warfighter. The Gansler Report found that “the USSOCOM KCC is a useful example of how to meld the contracting function with the warfighters to ensure the successful accomplishment of the overall mission” (USA, 2007, p. 24). Even with successful accomplishment of the overall mission, there are still areas of improvement that were identified during staff audits and PMRs regarding the integration of contracting into planning. The Gansler Report also noted an overall lack of integration of contracting into planning (USA, 2007, p. 40). One informant (with over ten years experience in contracting and five CENTCOM AOR deployments) was asked to comment on lessons learned concerning the effectiveness of acquisition planning. He stated, “Acquisition planning is minimal at best. Acquisitions are typically knee-jerk reactions to requirements and [are] pushed to contracting for immediate action.” However, the SOCENT chief of contracting was asked the same question and he stated, “[acquisition planning] is extremely effective when the CCO is included in the planning stages of [the] requirement, but it is only effective when the CCO and/or customer both possess the experience to know how to execute the requirement properly.” These responses suggest that simply integrating customers and CCOs is an important part, but that both parties must also be properly trained in their respective roles. The Gansler Report found that “translating a commander’s requirement into a SOW serves as the basis for a binding contract” and that “during expeditionary operations, the focus of the contracting process is on contract award, with […]contract] management being neglected” (USA, 2008, p. 39). This reference to contract management includes both post-award administration and requirement generation during pre-award planning. Despite the critical role that contracting plays in expeditionary operations, CCOs are not always brought into the requirement-generation process, nor are commanders trained on how to adequately define
their requirements. “The importance of the ability to translate a combatant officer’s requirement into a responsive contract SOW cannot be overstated” (USA, 2008, p. 40). An experienced CCO familiar with the requirement can often help write a basic SOW. However, the inability to generate an effective SOW is due to a lack of trained personnel who can translate their commander’s intent into a requirement that can readily be given to and adopted by the CCO. This deficiency only further underscores the importance of having a requirements-development process that brings the experts to the table during the planning and post-award periods of a contract. Stated another way, although the military services conduct operational planning, they fail to train on a key component to that planning process—contract requirements development (USA, 2007).

2. Increased Reliance on Contractor Support

This section provides details outlining the increase over time of contractor support on the battlefield. This is important to managing processes and policies because increased contractors on the battlefield often present cultural sensitivity issues and additional legal considerations for commanders. Contractors are not treated the same as military personnel, nor do commanders have the same authority over contractors as they do over military personnel.

While numbers of contractor and military personnel are ever-changing and are difficult to track exactly, legislation has spurred improved tallying and tracking of contractor personnel. For example, Sections 815 and 854 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364); section 3305 of the US Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28); and section 861 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) have each required the DoD to issue reports detailing the use of contractors operating in-theatre and the policies that govern them (as cited in DoD, 2007; 2008).

Contractors play a substantial role in supporting the U.S. in military, reconstruction, and diplomatic operations in Iraq (among other places)—accounting for a significant portion of the manpower and spending for such activities. The Congressional
Budget Office (CBO), at the request of the Senate Committee on the Budget, studied the use of contractors in theatre to support U.S. activities in Iraq (2009). Under their report, the CBO considered the following areas to be part of the Iraq theatre: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. While USSOCOM operates globally, and this report was specifically targeted at the Iraq theatre, this report suggests an overall increased reliance on contractors supporting war efforts over time and helps to quantify the level of current contractor involvement. For this reason, the findings within the CBO report were used as the primary source for analysis in this section. Unless otherwise noted, all information within this section comes from the website containing the aforementioned report (CBO, 2009).

a. Expenditures

From 2003 through 2007, U.S. agencies awarded $85 billion in contracts for work to be principally performed in the Iraq theatre, accounting for almost 20% of funding for operations in Iraq. More than 7% of those awards were for contracts performed within Iraq. The DoD-awarded contracts totaled $76 billion, while the USAID and the Department of State (DoS) obligated roughly $5 billion and $4 billion, respectively, over the same time period.

b. Scope and Magnitude

Although the use of contractors during military operations is well established, most experts agree that the scale of the deployment of contractor personnel in the Iraq theatre (relative to the number of military personnel in the country) is unprecedented in U.S. history. Historical data on numbers of contractor personnel in-theatre support that conclusion. The current ratio of contractor to military personnel in the Iraq theatre is 1 to 1—higher than it has been during any other major U.S. military operation (see Table 5). In the 1990s, U.S. operations in the Balkans illustrated the potential extent of the successful use of contractors during future conflicts. The ratio of contractor to military personnel in the Balkans was also about 1 to 1, but those operations involved no more than 20,000 U.S. military personnel at any time—about 1/10 of the total in the Iraq theatre as of December 2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONFLICT</th>
<th>CONTRACTOR</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>RATIO OF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary War</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1:6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War of 1812</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican-American</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1:6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-American</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1:24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>1:7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>1:2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1:1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Theatre: Early</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1:1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The historically high ratio of contractor personnel to military personnel in the Iraq theatre is the result of several factors. In response to reductions in the size of the post-Cold War military, the DoD augmented its force structure by relying more heavily on contractors for support functions—for example, through LOGCAP (CBO, 2005, pp. 16-21). Those contractors perform functions in-theatre that would otherwise require the deployment of additional military personnel. The extent of the DoD’s contracting is particularly evident during prolonged, large-scale operations—like those in Iraq—in which there may not be enough military personnel available to provide logistics support.

On the basis of data collected from the DoD, DoS, and USAID, the CBO estimates that at least 190,000 contractor personnel work in the Iraq theatre on contracts funded by the United States. The ratio of U.S.-funded contractor employees to members of the U.S. military in the Iraq theatre is, therefore, approximately 1 to 1, as stated above. The 190,000 estimate includes personnel who work directly for the DoD, DoS, and USAID as prime contractors, as well as subcontractor personnel for the DoD. About
20% (38,700) of all contractor personnel working in the Iraq theatre are U.S. citizens (see Table 6). Local nationals account for roughly 40% of the theatre’s contractor population (70,500 and 81,000, respectively). Table 6 illustrates these demographics.

Table 6. Number of Personnel Working in Iraq Theatre (From CBO, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S. Citizens</th>
<th>Local Nationals (a)</th>
<th>Third Country Nationals (b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DoD (c)</td>
<td>36,100</td>
<td>66,300</td>
<td>77,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other agencies (d)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>38,700</td>
<td>70,500</td>
<td>81,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:

a. Local Nationals: Citizens of the country in which they are working.
b. Third country nationals: Neither US citizens nor citizens of local nations.
c. DoD data includes prime contractors and subcontractors, including those working of the Army Corps of Engineers. The DoS, USAID, and other agencies do not track subcontractor employees and are, therefore, not included.
d. Other agencies: Includes Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Interior, Justice, Transportation, and Treasury, as well as Broadcasting Board of Governors and the General Services Administration (GSA).

c. Regulation and Policy

More generally, the U.S. government placed greater emphasis in recent decades on outsourcing activities to the private sector that are not inherently governmental. The government’s policy is to subject services identified as commercial to the forces of competition (OMB, 2003). In addition, the current ratio of contractor personnel to military personnel reflects the United States’ attempt to reconstruct infrastructure while military activities are under way, rather than delaying rebuilding until hostilities have ended.

d. Cultural Considerations

The significant number of contract workers in-theatre highlights the critical need for counting, tracking, and maintaining oversight of these workers (CBO,
It also increases the footprint of local/foreign nationals into operations, suggesting that awareness and practice of cultural sensitivity are important to maintaining support from these workers. Representatives at all levels have the responsibility to maintain cultural awareness when dealing with contractors. One informant commented that “dealing with foreign nationals is very different than dealing with stateside contractors.” A different culture is one of many differences experienced by CCOs dealing with foreign nationals. According to USSOCOM leadership, these differences should be respected and integrated into how a CCO does business while in a foreign country.

\textbf{e. Legal Considerations}

Contractors on the battlefield present challenges to military leadership in terms of authority and a clear process for managing contractor personnel (CBO, 2009). Regarding legal considerations associated with contractor personnel, the CBO found that military commanders have less direct authority over the actions of contractor personnel than over their military or civilian government subordinates. Contractors’ duties are set out in their contract, which is managed by a government contracting officer, not the military commander.

The legal status of contractor personnel is uncertain, particularly for those who are armed. Contractor personnel are potentially subject to a number of laws and jurisdictions, including the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction Act of the United States, and the U.S.A. Patriot Act, although very few cases are on record applying these laws (CBO, 2009).

Although military commanders can directly control the actions of military personnel and government civilians, their control over individual contractor personnel is indirect. Military personnel are subject to criminal punishment if they fail to obey a lawful order from their military commanders. On the other hand, government civilians may fall under the control of military commanders either permanently or temporarily during a conflict, but only under extraordinary circumstances would they be subject to administrative actions, such as suspension or termination, if they failed to obey an order.
Military commanders may change the daily tasks and duties of military and civilian DoD employees within the usual military chain of command, subject broadly to the laws and regulations of the United States. The commander can only give orders that are consistent with U.S. laws and regulations (USC, 2008). The commander and employees may also be subject to local laws, depending on the content of treaties and status-of-forces agreements. In practice, that authority enables the military commander to allocate the personnel under his or her command among any number of tasks those personnel are able and trained to do. The military commander may also request that additional personnel be reassigned from other parts of the government if necessary. By contrast, the duties of contractor personnel are set out in a fixed, written contract (DoD, 2005, section 6.1.4; Vernon, 2004, p. 369) and are not subject to military commander directives. Contracts are governed by statues, case law, the FAR and its supplements (GAO, 2008). A CCO may need to help onscene/deployed commanders bridge expectations of contractors in these circumstances, however, this was not found to be significant deficiency in this research.

3. Oversight

The CCO is the official designee of the head of the agency for binding the government of matters related to a particular contract (DoD, 2005, section 6.3.3; GSA, 2009, 48 C.F.R. 1.602). However, the CCO may not have access to the place of performance if that place is remote or dangerous or if it covers a large geographic area (GAO, 2008). Instead, he or she may rely on a technical representative, usually a military member of the unit being supported and collocated with the contractor. DFARS 201.602-2 notes that technical representative interacts frequently, sometimes daily, with the contractor and is generally responsible for oversight performance but is not an authority for adjusting the scope or size of the contract (GSA, 2009).

“The inability of the government to monitor contractor performance and enforce contracts is a critical problem in an expeditionary environment” (USA, 2007, p. 15). Overwhelming evidence found during this research suggest there is clearly a trend throughout the contingency contracting environment of problems associated with inadequate oversight of contractor performance. The majority of all literature reviewed
noted this problem—with no sources showing positive trends in this area. Every individual interviewed raised this concern, and every questionnaire fielded included multiple responses identifying oversight as being one of the most challenging problems to address in a contingency environment. In addition, every USSOCOM AAR reviewed dating back to 2001 noted this as a concern.

The documented failures ranged from a lack of adequate documentation of appointment and training of oversight personnel to the government’s inability to provide oversight personnel. These failures could potentially lead to unfulfilled responsibilities on the part of the government. If the government cannot perform the oversight function required by the contract terms and conditions, it often has a direct affect on a CCO’s ability to enforce contractor performance. Contractors in expeditionary environments often perform at levels different from those conformed to by military personnel. Without oversight and occasional guidance, contractors could make early mistakes in judgment or performance that could be easily avoidable if the government representative performed prudent due diligence. One USSOCOM CCCO, a senior NCO with five deployments to his credit, noted that construction requirements often have “minimal oversight due to continuous stress on other career fields and a lack of manning.” This CCO noted that typically the SME cannot be present; therefore, the customer sends an under-qualified person to conduct oversight. This ad-hoc oversight by the government, based on the CCO’s experience, causes unauthorized changes and/or sub-par acceptance. Oversight is conducted by a CCO through responsible contract management and by the CCO’s appointed representative through delegated authorities of on-site inspections and acceptance.

a. **Contract Management**

“Contract management is the essential post-award contracting function to ensure mission accomplishment and to ensure that the Government obtains the required work on time and at the quality level called for by the contract” (USA, 2007, p. 27). It is also an important control over fraud, waste, and abuse. A CCO is responsible for contract management. The CCO ensures that both the government and contractor fulfill
their respective roles outlined in the terms and conditions of the contract. This can involve monitoring progress schedules, documenting government acceptance of goods and services, reviewing material submittals from the contractor, approving invoice payments, etc. In addition to managing the contract, the CCO must establish and oversee the contract management processes. This process includes but is not limited to: in-scope change-order management procedures (what to do if the customers’ needs change after award), steps to ensure proper funding is available and properly certified for contract actions that will obligate money, routine (weekly, monthly, etc.) meetings between contractor personnel and government personnel to discuss schedules and other concerns with the contract, having a process in place for government personnel to approve material submittals provided by contractors, and having appropriate personnel trained and appointed for performance oversight. There are reported cases in which there were no personnel trained to monitor and ensure that the contractor was performing or providing the contracted requirement needed by the warfighter. This neglect can cause difficulties; for instance, a CCO would not know whether a contractor had actually performed the requirements established in the contract (USA, 2007).

b. Delegated Authorities

In expeditionary contracting, there are several designations for personnel other than the CCO responsible for oversight on contracts in the contingency environment. The particular term used for oversight personnel varies across the military services, with contracting officer representatives (COR) being the most common for USSOCOM operations. Other names include: contracting officers technical representative (COTR), or quality assurance personnel/evaluator (QAP/E) (used most often to refer to oversight of services contracts). A customer is responsible for nominating a subject-matter expert (SME) for the CCO to train and appoint as the COR (or other designated title) to a particular contract. This SME is then assigned to perform oversight responsibilities throughout the life of the contract. The SME is also given the authority for final acceptance of goods and services; however, this individual is not given the authority to obligate funds on behalf of the government. In special cases, there are SME personnel assigned for construction projects in which a CCO may delegate
obligation authority up to $25,000. These SMEs are known as project planning officers (PPO). A PPO can be used in environments in which SOF units are isolated from the contacting office. If the SOF unit has a qualified engineer attached to it, that engineer may be appointed as a PPO with the proper training and delegation provided by a warranted CCO.

An essential link in construction projects is the COR (also called COTR). This person is the on-site SME who should be viewing the contractor’s performance frequently enough to remedy any perceived problems with performance before they compromise the overall project. The COR should have clear and open communication with both the contractor and the CCO. The COR should also clearly understand the contract terms and conditions, including the SOW. The delegated authority to CORs allows for them to direct the contractor within those terms and conditions. The COR is a valuable asset to the acquisition team because of his/her expected knowledge of the requirement contracted for and for his/her ability to be on-site with the contractor much more frequently than a CCO could be. CCOs often have numerous projects in multiple locations and could not possibly manage or oversee the daily performance by the contractor, nor are they experts in construction. Based on regulatory guidance within DFARS 201.602-2 and DoD Directive 550.7R, a COR is intended to be a qualified individual appointed by the CCO to assist in the technical monitoring or administration of a contract. This guidance is not specific in what exact qualifications are needed. As mentioned above, the customer is responsible for nominating a qualified SME to best represent the needs of the requesting unit. When a CCO appoints the nominated COR, the CCO documents in the appointed letter that contract oversight should be a priority in the individual’s daily duty. However, this position is often assigned as an additional duty and often requires no formal experience. Those who fill it are often young service members with little to no training, simply tasked from a functional unit responsible for the requirement. The turnover is high among CORs, leaving many gaps in contract coverage (USA, 2007). Likewise, a fragmented and conflicted chain of command exists with delegated oversight personnel. According to the AARs, CORs and other oversight personnel often have higher priority mission objectives other than their COR additional
duty. Although CORs are formally appointed by the CCO, these positions do not fall under the CCO’s command. CCOs often provide documentation of appointment and training at the onset of contract award to one person, and then have to continually track that person down or adjust when the functional unit commander re-prioritizes projects and/or personnel.

The communication trail and oversight control is complex in (the deployed) theatre. Mission success or failure is often dependent on effective oversight of contracts. Construction is at the top of the list of core competencies that need to be developed in order for SMEs to be available to fill COR slots. (CDR David Graff, Commander–DCMA International, personal communication, July 29, 2009)

“If the government cannot abide by and enforce its own terms and conditions of a contract, it’s hard to legally enforce the performance terms required by the contractor” (E.C. Yoder, personnel communication, July 29, 2009).

USSOCOM staff members also noted CORs and other oversight areas as a concern throughout their AOR. One senior member stated, “PPOs and CORs from the engineer units are often put in charge of construction requirement generation and oversight with little to no training on the type of construction on contract.” The examples respondents used frequently included the use of bridge demolition experts for oversight on building living facilities and the use of paving experts on electrical and plumbing projects. When these individuals are the last link in making a determination whether a contractor has performed in accordance with the contract terms and conditions, inadequate work is often accepted. Based on feedback from USSOCOM personnel interviews and field questionnaires, this inadequate work generally causes significant re-work and frustration on the part of both the commanders and the CCOs. According to the SOAL-KCC Division Chief, a standardized document showing the roles and responsibilities of oversight personnel is needed. CCOs on the ground also expressed a need for functional units to assign personnel for contract oversight duties prior to deployment, then send them through a comprehensive training program directed by their chain of command.
C. SYNERGISTIC APPROACH (PLATFORM)

1. Cross-Service

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) brought organizational changes to the execution of contingency contracting between the military services in a truly joint environment that may potentially improve future support. One of the most intriguing observations is the integration of contingency contracting personnel between the military services at the tactical level, which is common at the strategic and operational levels, but not very common at the tactical level (Luse et al., 2005).

Today, the contracting workforce is based on the application of rules established in statutes, case law, the FAR and its supplements, when operational tempo demands that CCOs must operate within an environment filled with exceptions to the rules. These exceptions are applied differently in different environments. Not only do the military services apply the FAR differently, but these diverse organizations (such as CENTCOM service AORs, JCC-I/A, Army Corps of Engineers, and USSOCOM) often differ on how particular regulatory requirements are applied (USA, 2007). That is the challenge for CCOs who support multi-service and multi-organizations during their careers—adaptation to changing regulations across different organizations is essential to streamlining operations and maintaining compliance with legal and regulatory requirements.

The FAR system was established for codification and publication of uniform policies and procedures for federal acquisition at all executive agencies. The problem is there is not uniform application of these policies and procedures across agencies; each agency has a degree of latitude and flexibility to adapt the regulation for its respective operational needs. For example, the DoD military services have multiple levels of exceptions and restrictions for contracting outside of the CONUS. A CCO may often be trained and experienced in one agency or department, yet deploy under USSOCOM, which has its own variation of regulations within the Special Operations Command Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (SOFARS). The SOFARS provides
minimum essential implementation of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS). The SOFARS applies to all CCOs that receive contracting authority from USSOCOM.

USSOCOM has a very reliable and aggressive set of internal control procedures in accordance with DoD Instruction 5010.40. These procedures enforce basic FAR compliance” (USA, 2007, p. 7). However, there is no USSOCOM CCO policy to bring together and clarify the various layers of regulations (and exceptions to those regulations) in which USSOCOM CCOs must operate. Per USSOCOM staff officers, this leaves the CCOs to operate in an ad-hoc manner in terms of navigating through the thousands of pages of regulations. Contracting is a compliance-based process and profession (R.G. Rendon, personal communication, March 2, 2009). Contracting personnel need a clearly articulated and non-conflicting set of acquisition rules that can be immediately referenced and applied to exceptional contracting requirements and special provisions of expeditionary operations (USA, 2007).

2. Cross-Functional

When the SOAL-K DoP was interviewed for this project, he specifically noted the importance that USSOCOM CCOs interact and facilitate a synergistic relationship with other functional areas such as finance and engineering. These stakeholders each have different interests, policies and procedures through which contracting professionals must navigate in order to facilitate a successful acquisition cycle.

a. Finance

During his interview the DoP specifically identified funding as an item in which his CCOs need better cross-functional involvement and awareness, and as an area that he would like to see included in the management module. The DoP noted that this can be a very daunting area for CCOs, as there are numerous financial regulations and agency policies associated with the appropriate use of funding. The application of these may or may not be clear in a given a situation.
As mentioned in Chapter III, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1986 established the concept of USSOCOM. A year later, the 1987 Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Act formally created USSOCOM and established the military service-component support roles, while providing substantial autonomy for SOF—including unique budget and procurement authority. This authority sets USSOCOM apart from traditional COCOMs. The authority builds in speed and flexibility for CCOs, though it also poses a challenge to them as they try to ensure the proper execution of these special funds. Similar to the authorities granted to each military service, Title 10 USC, Section 167, grants the USSOCOM commander the responsibility and authority to develop and acquire SOF-peculiar equipment, the authority to exercise the functions of the head of agency, and the authority to execute funds. USSOCOM uses special appropriation funding known as major force program-11 (MFP-11). The USSOCOM CCO warrants only provide authority to spend MFP-11 funds on SOF-peculiar requirements. In his interview, the USSOCOM staff legal advocate stated that this is an area in which CCOs must be careful. Other functional areas often come to USSOCOM CCOs for contracting support, knowing that the MFP-11 funding rules are less restrictive in terms of speed, review thresholds, and approval. Based on his experience, the staff legal advocate stated that personnel in other functional areas may pressure USSOCOM CCOs to procure goods and services not actually specific to the USSOCOM mission. Spending MFP-11 funds for non-USSOCOM missions is a clear misuse of the funding authority and is prohibited by the SOFFARS. In addition, this special funding has subordinate categories of spend for specific uses and must be allocated accordingly.

“All appropriated funds are subject to three basic fiscal constraints: time, purpose, and amount. Failure to execute funding within these constraints could result in breach of the Bona-Fide Need Rule, Misappropriations Act, or the Anti-Deficiency Act respectfully (AFLMA, 2008, p. 56). On the other hand, there are several specifics within the various funding regulations that allow for exceptions to standard procedures. The most comprehensive overview of these regulations was compiled by the Comptroller for the Multi-National Command-Iraq in
2005, with his smart book briefing entitled *Money as a Weapon System* (MAAWS), to which USSOCOM staff members often refer CCOs for clarification on funding policies (Aaron, PowerPoint presentation, 2005). In this briefing, the comptroller stated that:

…effective application of all available resources is vital to the success of our mission. The concept of Money as a Weapon System (MAAWS) is simple: think about resources as a critical enabler of everything done on the battlefield, apply and employ money as a non-lethal weapon system to maximize operational effects at minimal cost. (Aaron, PowerPoint presentation, 2005)

While the primary responsibility for funding concerns falls within the finance functional area, evidence suggests that contracting and CCOs play a critical part in overseeing the application of funding on contractual obligations; therefore, CCOs need to be apprised of the regulations and policies associated with funding.

Contracts throughout Iraq and Afghanistan have been incrementally funded unnecessarily, causing increased contracting workload and inefficient operations. The Gansler Report found that people in the field identified this as a major problem hampering their efforts to support the warfighter (USA, 2007). If there were a more efficient and reliable funding stream, CCOs might be able to negotiate better deals with contractors. Even though that the over-burdening of contracting personnel is currently documented, incremental funding is occurring at monthly or, in some cases, shorter intervals. This leads to an unnecessary increase in workload for the CCOs because modifications to the contract must be processed and additional administration steps must be taken each time funding is applied to the contract. One solution recommended by the Gansler Report was to use an approach similar to what was used in the Balkans, known as the “Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund.” This essentially is a pot of money adequately resourced up-front without usage or fiscal year limitations (USA, 2007, p. 25).

(3) Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB). The first layer of defense in accurately certifying funding for appropriate use is the joint acquisition review board (JARB). This is a J4 board that validates O&M funding requirements estimated at $200,000 or more. The JARB validates requirements less than $200,000 in specific areas
including (but not limited to) engineer equipment, facilities, and LOGCAP (Aaron, PowerPoint presentation, 2005). At larger expeditionary bases, contracting personnel have a seat on this board; however, in smaller, more austere locations, a CCO may receive a requirement that was either validated through a JARB at a regional location, or simply certified by the on-scene finance representative. Per the AARs on file with USSOCOM, CCOs operating within an AOR with a functioning JARB had fewer incidents of misused funds.

b. Engineering

For construction taking place on or around DoD installations in an expeditionary environment, the Engineering Corps is critical. The engineers are the planners, designers, and overseers of construction projects and operate side by side with CCOs. Below is a summary of the key decision bodies per the MAAWS briefing (Aaron, PowerPoint presentation, 2005).

(1) Joint Facility Utilization Board (JFUB). This is a J7 board that oversees requirements for construction and base camp development, including MILCON, minor construction using OMA, real estate actions, and other engineering requirements.

(2) Facilities Engineering Team (FET). After review and validation by the JFUB, the requirement is approved by the facilities engineering team (FET) members, who determine which contracting agency is appropriate for the work: SFO CCOs, local RCC, DCMA, USACE, USAID, or another organization. (DoD, 2008, September)

(3) Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB). The JCMEB validates CERP requirements greater than $500,000. The JCMEB also recommends approval or disapproval to the appropriate approval authority for a respective AOR.

Per the USSOCOM Staff, depending on how robust the SOF presence is in the AOR, the USSOCOM CCO may or may not be required to utilize some
or all of these review channels. However, in more sustained areas—in which SOF are more integrated with large installations—the USSOCOM CCO is bound by these policies. Neither the existence of nor attendance to the above engineering activities and review boards are adequately documented in past AARs. Interviews with informants suggested that CCOs currently react to these activities in an ad-hoc manner based on the Chief of Contracting directives at each office location.

3. Agency Interoperability

In addition to cross-functional cooperation, interoperability between USSOCOM CCOs and agencies such as DCMA, JCC-I/A, and other cooperative agencies conducting contingency contracting in its AOR was noted as a top concern for the SOAL-K DoP. The director specifically expressed concern for CCOs being able to meet mission objectives in the most effective manner while exercising synergy with these other agencies.

a. Splintered Responsibility

The Gansler Report addressed the importance of synergy and documented numerous problems with splintered responsibilities in theatre between key players such as AMC, LOGCAP, Army Corps of Engineers, JCC-I/A, DCMA, CENTCOM, USAID, Department of State and many more (USA, 2007). Furthermore, the report noted that after examining the entire landscape of acquisition issues in Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the members of the commission found that the problems experienced in an expeditionary environment are not due to one particular problem, nor an individual failure to perform (USA, 2007). Rather, multiple agencies and departments having failed to fully recognize or comprehensively address the significance of the shifting challenges from the post-Cold War environment to one in which state militaries find themselves fighting non-state opponents (USA, 2007; Barbaris & Callanan, 2008).

b. Multiple Stakeholders

Contracting involves multiple stakeholders, including the warfighter, financial management, contracting, engineering, and contractor(s). Combined, these
stakeholders’ actions contribute to a successful acquisition. No single person can cover all the various contracting processes nor provide the necessary deliverables—which include a defined requirement, statement of need, funding certification, a contract, contract modifications, award management, oversight of performance, and acceptance documentation (USA, 2007). These actions take place during pre-award, award, and post-award phases of contracting. The stakeholders play an integral role due to the inability of a CCO to be an expert in every subject area needing contract support.

D. FILLING THE GAPS

This report found that some of the biggest gaps in effectiveness that arise when CCOs are executing construction requirements include: inadequate training of personnel, confusing contract management policies and construction management standards, non-compliant contracts (e.g., a failure to include the appropriate clauses and drawings), deficient acquisition planning and integration of contracting into operational planning, insufficient oversight of work, and poor interaction between units.

A construction management module focused on fulfilling these gaps while integrating the joint-force environment will allow even a relatively inexperienced CCO to better manage his/her environment and more effectively support SOF.

This project fulfilled two primary goals:

1. Examined the contingency contracting environment concerning expeditionary construction requirements.

2. Provided recommendations to address problems in the field. Among these recommendations was the development of a prototype tactical training handbook for CCOs to better manage the contingency contracting process for construction requirements. This training handbook is known as the USSOCOM Construction Management Module (CM²), discussed earlier in this report.

The existing operational environment was analyzed in order to answer the following research questions.
1. What Are the Gaps in the Effectiveness of Contingency Contracting With Respect to Executing Construction Requirements?

There are extensive capability gaps addressed within the three categories of people, processes, and platforms. These gaps were used as the catalyst for developing the learning objectives for the CM2 prototype. To best compare these gaps with the appropriate learning objectives, the researcher created a coding system. Table 7 is a coded depiction of the gaps found within each respective people, processes, and platforms category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>IDENTIFIED GAPS IN EFFECTIVENESS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ap1</td>
<td>Inadequate training of personnel associated with executing construction requirements (CCOs, CORs, SMEs, end-users, requirements-generators).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap2</td>
<td>Changes in the acquisition workforce (more work, less people).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap3</td>
<td>Manning shortages across multiple career fields.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap4</td>
<td>Lack of appropriate contracting certification prior to deployment (appropriate DAWIA levels).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap5</td>
<td>Lack of professional training in construction contracting prior to deployment (DAU courses).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap6</td>
<td>USSOCOM CCOs have little to no experience in construction contracting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap7</td>
<td>Conflicting regulations and policy for contingency contracting (FAR, DFARS, SOFARS, AFFARS, vs. COCOM).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap8</td>
<td>Conflicting and confusing construction standards for construction contracting in a contingency environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap9</td>
<td>Inadequate training of oversight personnel (CORs, COTRs,).</td>
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<tr>
<td>ap10</td>
<td>Inadequate application of existing contracting regulation and policy (lack of appropriate clauses, SOW, IGEs, review thresholds, etc.).</td>
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<tr>
<td>ap11</td>
<td>Inappropriate use of funding authorities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CODE</td>
<td>IDENTIFIED GAPS IN EFFECTIVENESS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap12</td>
<td>Lack of understanding by CCO of basic construction terminology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>bp1</td>
<td>Contracting left out of planning process (acquisition and operational).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bp2</td>
<td>CCO behaving in a re-active way rather than a pro-active way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bp3</td>
<td>Increasing expenditures, scope, and magnitude of contractors supporting the force on the battlefield.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bp5</td>
<td>Increased cultural sensitivity concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bp6</td>
<td>Increased legal ramifications for commanders’ ability to command and control personnel in their battlespace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bp7</td>
<td>Work is being performed on contract at increasing distances away from the CCOs physical duty location.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bp8</td>
<td>Increased number of oversight personnel (personnel pulled from primary mission more often).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bp9</td>
<td>Lack of adequate training of oversight personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bp10</td>
<td>Lack of documentation of appointment and training of oversight personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cp1</td>
<td>Ad-hoc development and execution of the contract-oversight process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cp2</td>
<td>Lack of coordination between cross-functional areas (finance, engineering, legal, contracting, end-user).</td>
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<tr>
<td>cp3</td>
<td>Misuse of MFP-11 funding authority by CCOs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>cp4</td>
<td>Lack of awareness of cross-functional requirement review boards.</td>
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<tr>
<td>cp5</td>
<td>Inadequate interoperability between agencies (DCMA, JCC, USAID).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

2. **Can a Comprehensive Training Module Be Developed to Effectively Mitigate These Gaps?**

This research suggests that there are extensive areas of concern with the gaps in people, processes, and platforms associated with contingency contracting construction
requirements. CCOs need a structured management process to bridge the gap between their respective military services’ training, their individual skills, and the expectations of commanders on the ground. The leadership of USSOCOM expressly articulated a need and desire for a management module mitigating these gaps. Furthermore, this research has discovered that current training opportunities (both informal and formal) do not adequately cover dynamic skill sets required for effective management of construction requirements.

A tactical construction management module (CM²) is one method of mitigating the gaps discussed. However, these gaps have strategic implications and, thus, also require strategic involvement from USSOCOM staff. Strategic recommendations addressed in Chapter VI include: adapting to the changes in the workforce, establishing mandatory training requirements, revisiting lessons learned, effectively integrating contracting into planning, developing aggressive oversight measures, capitalizing on cross-functional capabilities, and building synergy in joint operations. To adequately fulfill the gaps outlined within this report, both tactical level CCOs and strategic level staff members at USSOCOM will need to implement and, in time, evaluate the recommendations provided.

The greatest areas of concern documented in government reports and feedback associated with this research included: a lack of integration of contracting into all levels of planning (including acquisition and operational planning), inadequate requirements-generation procedures, insufficient oversight of work, and a failure to use the appropriate funding and clauses in construction contracts. The CM² entails guidance and examples to mitigate these concerns. The CM² provides this training through a breakdown of the following themes: operational framework, strategic alignment, pre-award, award, and post-award. In the module, each of these themes encompasses a chapter.

Table 8 is a breakdown of the learning objectives within each chapter of the CM² and how they relate to mitigating the listed gaps above.
Table 8. Learning Objectives of CM²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GAP CODE</th>
<th>CM² LEARNING OBJECTIVES (BY CHAPTER)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap1, ap2, ap4, bp1, bp2</td>
<td>1. Know the six fundamental responsibilities of a USSOCOM CCO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap6, ap7, ap8, ap12, bp2</td>
<td>2. Know where to find additional DoD construction-related guidance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap6, ap7, ap10, ap11, bp2, cp1, cp2, cp3</td>
<td>3. Comprehend and apply the special funding authority to USSOCOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap7, cp1, cp2, cp5</td>
<td>4. Comprehend the unique command structure and procurement authority in which USSOCOM operates around the globe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cp4, bp2</td>
<td>5. Comprehend the key joint staff functional elements within CFSOCC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap9, ap10, bp6, bp7, bp8, bp8, bp10</td>
<td>6. Know where to find and when to apply approval levels of authority for CCOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap6, ap10, bp2</td>
<td>7. Know when theatre business clearance is applicable for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap10, bp2</td>
<td>8. Know current USSOCOM policy for MILCON requirements.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap1, bp1, bp2, cp4, cp5</td>
<td>9. Know initial step in preparing a requirement and accurately certifying funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap1, bp1, bp2, cp4, cp5</td>
<td>10. Comprehend the common engineering elements with which a CCO should be concerned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap1, ap2, ap3, ap7</td>
<td>11. Synthesize why CCOs should focus on interoperability with other agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cp1, cp2, cp5</td>
<td>12. Synthesize contracting’s operational leadership’s role in strategic alignment.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PRE-award</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap1, ap4, ap5, ap6, bp6</td>
<td>13. Know key contracting considerations during acquisition planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap11, bp2, cp3, cp5</td>
<td>14. Comprehend funding concerns within contingency contracting operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap11, bp2, cp3, cp5</td>
<td>15. Comprehend CERP guidelines and limitations.</td>
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</table>
### GAP CODE CM<sup>2</sup> LEARNING OBJECTIVES (BY CHAPTER)

#### OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GAP CODE</th>
<th>CM&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; LEARNING OBJECTIVES (BY CHAPTER)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ap1, ap7, ap9, bp2, bp6, bp7, bp8, bp9, bp10</td>
<td>16. Comprehend responsibilities and limitations with authorities that a CCO may delegate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap1, ap4, ap5, ap6, bp6, bp7</td>
<td>17. Know two items a CCO should clearly understand in regard to requirement definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap1, ap5, ap8</td>
<td>18. Know the two primary clauses associated with oversight of construction contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap1, ap5, ap8</td>
<td>19. Comprehend the key construction clauses to include in solicitations and their purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap1, ap5, ap8, bp1, bp2</td>
<td>20. Comprehend recommended elements of a pre-construction conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap1, ap4, ap5, ap8, bp1, bp2, bp3</td>
<td>21. Comprehend the three main elements in establishing source selection evaluation procedures.</td>
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</table>

#### AWARD

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>GAP CODE</th>
<th>CM&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; LEARNING OBJECTIVES (BY CHAPTER)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ap4, ap7, ap10, bp2</td>
<td>22. Know where to find references for source-selection procedures and policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap1, ap4, ap6, ap7, ap10, bp2</td>
<td>23. Know what determinations and findings are required for construction contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap4, ap6, ap10, cp1, cp5</td>
<td>24. Analyze security considerations in distribution and notification elements within a contingency environment.</td>
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#### POST-AWARD

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<tr>
<th>GAP CODE</th>
<th>CM&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; LEARNING OBJECTIVES (BY CHAPTER)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ap4, ap6, ap7, ap10, bp6</td>
<td>25. Analyze and apply four main remedies for changes under construction contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap1, ap4, ap6, ap7, ap10, bp6</td>
<td>26. Know the clause for payments under a fixed-price construction contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap1, ap4, ap6, ap7, ap10, bp6</td>
<td>27. Know where to find the USSOCOM regulation and policy on terminations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ap1, ap4, ap10, bp6</td>
<td>28. Know six final actions a CCO should be concerned with during contract administration.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

#### E. SUMMARY

This chapter analyzed the three overarching pillars of joint contingency contracting operations. First, the pillar of “people” was broken down to reflect the
acquisition workforce environment and the training and certification elements of contingency contracting personnel. The changing workforce dynamic and manning shortages resulted in the number of acquisition personnel increasing and the creation of a new Army Contracting Command. These changes suggest an increase in the number of Army personnel tasked to support contingency contracting—a field in which the Army is the lead agent for the two largest active theatres of Iraq and Afghanistan. Evidence suggests that the current training of construction standards and construction terminology is inadequate for USSOCOM CCOs. Contract standards such as clauses, SOWs, IGEs, and funding restrictions have been misused by CCOs. There is currently confusion as to which agency regulation or policy a USSOCOM CCO should apply. In addition, CCOs are not currently trained in construction terminology, which makes their job more difficult in communicating and coordinating with engineers working on construction requirements.

Second, the pillar of “processes” was analyzed to determine how contract management policies were affecting USSOCOM CCOs. The failure to integrate contracting into the acquisition planning processes is a global concern that has caused fragmented, reactive behavior on the part of CCOs and their customers. Evidence suggests that CCOs and their customers can be more effective if they integrate their planning efforts early. The effect of increasing amount of contractor support on the battlefield was also analyzed. The increase in contractors has complicated both cultural and legal considerations for military commanders. These complications have affected the military commanders’ ability to create and execute processes and policies within their theatre. CCOs must be aware of these considerations and be prepared to bridge the expectations of commanders with legal and statutory contractual requirements. Most likely, a result of these manning shortages, training failures, an increase in contractors in the AOR, and oversight of contractors has suffered. CCOs have had difficulty in establishing contract management procedures that effectively monitor and enforce terms and conditions. There is evidence to suggest that SMEs nominated by the end-users as CORs are often unqualified and ill-equipped to perform adequate contract oversight.
This has presented a problem as CCOs strive to enforce delegated oversight authorities and, in turn, has increased the difficulty for a CCO to enforce the terms and conditions of the contract.

The final pillar of operations was the “platforms” in which personnel have been able to execute a synergistic approach to joint operations. This section began by breaking down the diverse cross-service regulatory environment in which a CCO operates. This environment needs established contracting standards if CCOs are to integrate the skill set and doctrine of individual military services. The cross-functional environment was then analyzed, finding that a CCO must lead the acquisition team through various boards and regulations in order to achieve success for all stakeholders. These stakeholders include personnel from various functional areas such as finance, legal, engineering, and the operational warfighter. The CCO must also navigate within an environment of splintered responsibilities between various agencies, such as the DCMA, JCC-I/A, Army Corp of Engineers, USAID, etc. These splintered responsibilities among stakeholders have resulted in inefficiencies, delays, and frustrations.

The recommendations provided in Chapter VI will attempt to mitigate these concerns and provide solutions to problems documented throughout this analysis of the data. These recommendations include training policy adjustments, structural integration considerations, and the development of a CM² for CCOs as discussed above.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. STRATEGIC-LEADERSHIP CONSIDERATIONS

In order to address the weaknesses and problems identified in the previous chapter, several actions are necessary. Next, ten actions, organized by people, processes, and platforms, are recommended and explained.

1. Training of Personnel (People)

   a. Adapt to Changes in the Workforce

      With the unique nature of the special operations mission, there are often concerns with utilizing civilians to fill necessary positions. Yet, there are opportunities supporting more sustained operations—such as those at larger bases in both Iraq and Afghanistan—at which CCOs could be augmented by a civilian workforce. Decision-makers should explore this supplementation of personnel to remove a portion of the burden from over-tasked military CCOs. Depending on the deployment arrangement of the civilian positions, this arrangement could also provide additional layers of continuity in some locations.

      This report has shown that there is currently a shortfall in both training and manning of CCOs across the military services. Currently, USSOCOM is receiving more than 2/3 of its CCOs from the Air Force, although the Army is the lead agent for the ongoing major contingency contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. USSOCOM is a joint organization, and while utilizing the best trained and equipped personnel to accomplish its mission is critical, bringing in other military services will provide the U.S. with a stronger, more effective force in the long-term. Currently, the Air Force is the best trained and equipped military service for developing effective CCOs; however, the Army has made great strides in this area with the creation of the Army Contracting Command (Parsons, 2008). In addition, both the Navy and Marine Corps are improving the training and experience of their personnel. A recommendation of this report is that USSOCOM take an aggressive approach in requesting additional personnel from the Army to fill USSOCOM taskings in Iraq and Afghanistan, since the Army is the lead agency for
contingency contracting in both Iraq and Afghanistan. This may involve tasking less experienced CCOs to more sustained locations and deploying them to locations with higher numbers of experienced CCOs to provide on-site assistance as necessary. Contingency contracting is a learning-intensive field that also demands a great deal of flexibility and adaptability from its members. This flexibility and adaptability cannot be learned in a classroom; thus, deploying CCOs into the battlefield environment is the most opportune way to build their experience.

b. Establish Mandatory Training Requirements

Current USSOCOM SOPs require CCOs to have completed both DAWIA Level II contracting certification and the DAU Construction Contracting (CON 244) course prior to filling a USSOCOM tasking. These requirements are sometimes waived due to the high operations tempo and priority of taskings. The mission of USSOCOM contracting may be better achieved by enforcing a firm policy for CCOs to be Level II contracting certified, to have completed DAU courses Contingency Contracting (CON 234) and Construction Contracting (CON 244), and to review the CM2 prior to being assigned to a USSOCOM tasking. This recommendation could hinder USSOCOM’s ability to fill taskings in the short-run. A way to mitigate shortfalls in this area, however, is to effectively communicate to the military services that in order for personnel to fill a USSOCOM tasking, they must have such training. By funding such training, decision-makers would ensure more personnel will obtain it in a timely manner. In addition, a cross-command or cross-services Memorandum of Understanding would also help ensure this new requirement is met.

Another recommendation is that USSOCOM extend the current single day pre-deployment training to at least three days, and provide it before CCOs deploy for their respective AORs. In addition, the personnel responsible for conducting the training should review the results of recent PMRs, repeating errors from the latest contract action reviews and incorporate solutions to recurring problems. A more robust in-house training would provide ample time to review USSOCOM-specific regulations and procedures and would help better prepare CCOs for the dynamic missions on which they are about to
embark. This extended time would be a great opportunity to reinforce those areas in which CCOs may be either in-experienced or not current regarding the most recent AOR issues.

c. Revisit Lessons Learned

Currently, all CCOs are required to complete and submit AARs at the end of their deployments. This is a worthy policy; however, there is no policy officially addressing what is to be done with those reports. USSOCOM should consider having newly-tasked CCOs review the AARs posted on USSOCOM contracting portal and submit a one-page summary of common trends noted in the AARs for their respective AOR. In addition, the CCOs should provide their recommended solutions to recurrent problems prior to departure from pre-deployment training. This policy will ensure that new CCOs have reviewed conditions within their respective AORs and will yield additional solution sets for USSOCOM leadership to consider.

2. Contract Management Policy (Processes)

a. Better Integration of Contracting Into Planning

Integration of contracting into planning can be completed at all levels. Contracting leadership can discuss logistical movements and operational objectives with other functional leaders. These discussions can provide the contracting leadership (COCO, CCO, or staff member) an opportunity to recommend sound business advice and an acquisition plan to support those movements and objectives. In communicating with contracting leadership, strategic-level planners can help the individual CCO to better prepare for and execute new requirements. A pro-active approach to engaging contracting has benefits at all stages of the acquisition. A process of early engagement also provides an opportunity to appoint and train qualified CORs. The appointment of a COR at the beginning of the acquisition cycle can increase his/her commitment and ensure the COR has time to become familiar with the requirement. This policy change is only effective if both contracting and the leadership of the end-user agree that only qualified CORs will be nominated by the end-user and accepted by the CCO. The strategic importance of contracting must be aggressively stressed by senior leaders to foster a pro-active
engagement of operational leaders with contracting leadership. This engagement is critical if the tactical-level CCO is to effectively enforce his/her authority. When a CCO must react to the ad-hoc behavior of customers, it presents an environment in which sound business advice and responsible contract management is more difficult to achieve. The Yoder Three Tier model (Figure 9) is recommended as a direct and comprehensive approach to achieving integration. “Several notable requests for better planning, coordination and integration of contracting operations with broader theatre-support elements […] have been postulated” (Yoder, 2004, p. 13). Prominent calls for better planning and integration include, but are not limited to: Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 entitled Managing Complex Contingency Operations; the RAND Report on Civil and Military Cooperation, and NPS publications (as cited in Yoder, 2004; Coombs, 2004; Anderson & Flaherty, 2003).

PDD 56 was issued by President Clinton in 1997. This directive determines the integration of planning and execution among Federal agencies called to support in contingencies. The problem with PDD 56 is two-fold (Yoder, 2004). First, PDD 56 is not embraced by the current administration. Second, PDD 56 does not apply to combat operations. A RAND Report (Pirnie, 1998) proposed greater integration, and identification of stakeholders in contingency operations. In addition, “The Yoder three-tier model maximizes effectiveness and efficiency of theatre contingency contracting operations, and directly links operations to COCOM broad objectives through integrative planning and execution” (Yoder, 2004, p. 14). Each tier of the model performs unique functions and requires specific education, developed skill sets, and unique personnel and manpower characteristics. The principle elements of the Yoder Three Tier model are broken down below and summarized in Figure 9.

(1) Ordering Officer Model. The most basic and simplistic level is the “ordering officer” model. This is the most rudimentary level of contracting support, which includes functions such as placing orders against existing theatre contracts. By nature, this requires little interactive engagement with experienced personnel in the environment and is best suited for warranted junior officers and junior enlisted personnel.
(2) Leveraging Contracting Officer Model. The next higher level is the “leveraging contracting officer” model. This level includes the basic ordering functions of the ordering officer model, but includes leveraging the capacities and capabilities of the local and regional economies in the contingent theatre. The practitioner in the leveraging model will be engaged in interfacing with local and regional businesses, creating business processes, and potentially coordinating with higher military, Non-governmental Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations (NGO/PVO) and political organizations. Thus, only higher-level, more qualified and capable practitioners should perform in the leverage model. A shortfall of this model is that the CCO may or may not be integrated with the broader goals of national and theatre objectives. In the worst case, some of the tactical execution may actually be counter to those higher-level goals.

(3) The Integrated Planner and Executor model. The highest level is the “Integrated Planner and Executor” (IPE) model. This model takes the leveraging contracting officer function one giant step forward. In this model, well-educated and qualified CCOs are integrated into the operational-planning phases of contingencies—often before actual troop deployment; they then make the transition to operations. The hallmark of this model is that contingency contracting operations may be planned and subsequently executed to meet National Strategic and theatre objectives. Additionally, the myriad NGOs and PVOs—which, in many cases, are essential to the overall efficiency, effectiveness, and success of operations—can be integrated into the planning and execution of contingency operations. While this integration requirement may seem obvious, the integrated planning and execution among warfighters, CCOs, and the NGOs and PVOs is not; such integration does not occur on a regular basis (Anderson & Flaherty, 2003).

Through this model, the IPE CCO can be utilized in a broader planning-and-execution role. The CCO, with higher-level certification, education and experience, should be integrated within the J-4 and J-5 logistics and planning/operations and exercise organization structure. Integration is essential to achieve desired synergies between the myriad organizations operating in contingency environments. Operational
planners can also leverage integration of all theatre players (military, NGOs/PVOs, and contractors) to achieve harmony between National Security Strategy (NSS), Combatant Commander (COCOM), and significant NGOs’ and PVOs’ objectives. This integrated planning, exercising, and execution may: help in eliminating competing (and often conflicting) demands of the participants, closely marry acquisition support with stated objectives, allow for the creation of robust contingency contract support plans, and integrate such plans into broader operational plans in support of theatre operations. The higher-order IPE calls for the most highly educated and seasoned planners and operational/theatre-level planners (Yoder, 2004).

The Yoder Three Tier Model can be implemented in a contingency theatre regardless of the military service being employed and is perfect for utilization within the USSOCOM concept of operations. The Yoder Three Tier Model will allow for better acquisition planning and coordination of tactical, operational, and theatre objective support to the warfighter. The successful utilization of this conceptual model involves several functional areas; therefore, the broadest dissemination and integration of the model is recommended. A representation of the model is found in Figure 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YODER THREE TIER MODEL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Model Tier Level &amp; Model Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ordering Officer—Tier One</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE)—Tier Three</td>
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<td>• highest level of planning and integration—joint</td>
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<td>• linked/integrated with J-4/ J-5</td>
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<tr>
<td>• creates and executes OPLAN CCO strategy</td>
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<td>• provides direction to tier two and one</td>
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<tr>
<td>• links operations strategically to theatre objectives of COCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>• education: Master’s degree or higher and, JPME Phase I and II</td>
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<tr>
<td>• DAWIA Certified CON Level III, and other DAWIA disciplines (LOG, ACQ, FIN, etc)</td>
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Figure 9. Yoder Three Tier Model (From Yoder, 2004, p. 17)

**b. Stress Ethical and Cultural Considerations**

Based on the data collected, USSOCOM is doing very well in consistently displaying ethical behavior in their contracting operations. Even with the increased number of contractors on the battlefield, USSOCOM has adapted well to cultural considerations that the increase brings with it. USSOCOM SOF teams and CCOs have capitalized on building positive relationships with contractors of all cultures while adhering to the highest ethical standards (personal communication with senior SOF end-user, June 9, 2009). This area should be noted as a best practice for USSOCOM contracting operations, and it should continue to be stressed in pre-deployment training and all leadership engagements.
c. **Develop Aggressive Oversight Measures**

Oversight of contracts is critical to the success of military operations (USA, 2007). This oversight not only involves contracting personnel, but other functional areas—most notably the end-user for the respective requirements. One recommendation to help ensure oversight is given the proper attention is for USSOCOM to develop an aggressive policy that builds commitment and accountability from both CCOs and the end-users in the field. A contract is only as good as the outcome it provides. If a CCO does everything right in developing the contract document and subsequent statement of work, yet the government provides insufficient oversight and coordination during the performance of the contract, the efforts in planning and development of the contract may be weakened. The current practice of CORs being an additional duty presents a problem. Holding a COR accountable is difficult when the COR has primary duties to perform. CCOs and their leadership must engage with operational units to stress the importance of oversight and accountability. In addition to building a robust training program for CORs, the CCOs should actively and aggressively enforce the responsibilities of the CORs (or similarly titled oversight professional, SME, COTR, etc.). If CORs do not fulfill their duties, there must be a process in place to hold them accountable or, if necessary, to replace them with another COR. This is likely to increase tension among CCOs and end-users; however, with adequate support from leadership, this practice will provide more effective oversight in time.

3. **Synergistic Approach (Platform)**

   a. **Capitalize on Cross-Functional Capabilities**

   This report outlined the various functional capabilities that make up joint support operations. There are many dynamic conditions that warrant coordination and execution across all functional areas. USSOCOM has an opportunity to capitalize on these capabilities. One recommended way to capitalize on these capabilities is for USSOCOM staff to develop a clear and agreed-upon definition for the roles and responsibilities of each of these functions. This may mean extracting definitions already
delineated in existing regulations. By including these roles in a clear policy document, contracting leadership and CCOs themselves will have a stronger position in holding CORs accountable for their responsibilities.

Another recommendation is to fund requirements in bulk, in certain AORs, rather than funding them by incremental funding or individual appropriations. Finance, engineering, and contracting personnel should be able to consolidate and leverage certain requirements that can be easily forecasted. This consolidation leads to decreased lead times of supplies and can reduce the procurement lead time needed to execute contract awards for such requirements. Bulk funding also minimizes the number of accounting line options and, in turn, minimizes errors or violations in the use of those various accounting lines.

This report detailed the number of cross-service authority and regulation concerns that a CCO must juggle in the expeditionary environment. Since changing exceptions, policies, and procedures are the norm, more streamlined policy direction may be helpful. USSOCOM has a vast array of policy letters, reach-back resources, and published self-help-type items to assist CCOs with navigating the cross-functional and cross-service world. One recommended addition to these items is a clear snapshot of the major policies and regulations that differ between military services and how those differences are enacted within USSOCOM operations. Where feasible, these items should be standardized and indoctrinated into USSOCOM published policy and training documents.

b. **Build Synergy in Joint Operations**

One recommendation to build synergy in joint operations is for USSOCOM leadership to set an operational mindset of utilizing all resources available to a CCO in his or her execution of contingency contracting requirements. Nowhere else is this synergy more important than in executing construction requirements. A basic construction requirement touches almost every functional area on an installation or within an AOR. The security forces need to be concerned with pass, identification, and security concerns of workers accessing the base. Military intelligence needs to be concerned with
problems associated with the possible access to information while on the base, as well as any intelligence information the military may be able to learn from the contracted workers. Finance leaders need to be concerned with the structure of payments for the job, be it incremental at progress points, cash pick-up, or electronic based payments. Engineering leaders need to be concerned with the layout, design, stability, and footprint of the supported infrastructure. Contracting leaders need to be concerned with the accountability and stewardship of taxpayers’ money and with the socio-economic implications of a project. The base commander needs to be concerned with command and control of personnel within his AOR, including contract workers on the base. Medical personnel need to be aware of conditions of disease or injury associated with workers on the base and their responsibilities if construction workers off base are injured while associated with supported projects in the local area. A CCO needs to communicate and coordinate between all of the above mentioned functional areas and build synergy to allow for these individual functions to work together to get funding, allow for contractor access to the installation for delivery or performance of work, document acceptance of the supply/service, and get the contractor paid for the supply/service provided. A CCO, through training and coordination, should bring everyone together and show how their actions can have secondary and tertiary effects on the contracting process. These functional areas are made up of joint service personnel with varying degrees of objectives, priorities, and command structures that have contract management concerns. By bringing the key personnel within these functional areas to the table and ensuring support to contract-related concerns, decision-makers can better prepare all personnel to not only handle unplanned events, but to provide for a more effective operation in which communication and integration of personnel is fluid. An example of this is the close coordination of finance and contracting in payment processes. Finance may have certain requirements for contractors to get paid in cash—including face-to-face secure transactions or established bank accounts in a particular region. If the CCO is aware of these requirements, he/she can communicate them to the contractor and better prepare the contractor at the time of award to ensure establishment of the necessary accounts or to help facilitate a secure location for face-to-face payments. Accomplishing the mission is
a common objective that personnel share across all of these functional areas. Each area mentioned above has a specific mission that needs to be accomplished in order for the larger, strategic missions to be accomplished. Each area has a responsibility to one another to work together and overcome challenges that will exist in a contingency environment. By building synergy in joint operations, the CCO will be able to hold the members of the team accountable regardless of functional expertise or military service. A CCO will take ownership in a requirement along with the end user and act in a program manager role to keep everyone focused on the mission objectives. By utilizing the tools described in the platform, processes, and people approach, USSOCOM and their individual CCO have the opportunity to enable the strategic mission of joint operations.

B. TACTICAL-CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT MODULE (CM²)

This report identified multiple concerns with the people, processes, and platforms of contingency contracting. A tactical recommendation to help mitigate the concerns found within these pillars is the distribution, testing and refining of the CM² prototype in accordance with the following chapter structure.

1. OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
   A. OVERVIEW
   B. CONTRACTING OFFICER RESPONSIBILITIES
   C. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
      1. USSOCOM PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY
      2. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING CELL
      3. COMMAND STRUCTURE
   D. CONTRACT REVIEW
      1. REVIEW POLICY
      2. THEATRE BUSINESS CLEARANCE
         a. POLICY
         b. CONTENTS FOR REVIEW PACKAGES
   E. FUNDING
      1. USSOCOM MILCON POLICY

2. STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT
   A. SYNERGISTIC APPROACH
      1. JOINT ACQUISITION REVIEW BOARD (JARB)
2. ENGINEERING
   a. JOINT FACILITY UTILIZATION BOARD (JFUB)
   b. FACILITIES ENGINEERING TEAM (FET)
   c. JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY ENGINEERING BOARD

B. INTRA-AGENCY COORDINATION
C. OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP

3. PRE-AWARD
   A. ACQUISITION PLANNING
   B. ESTABLISHING ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
   C. FUNDING
      1. FISCAL CONTROLS
         a. PURPOSE
         b. TIME
         c. AMOUNT
      2. FUNDING SOURCES
      3. ECONOMY ACT
         a. CONTRACT OFF-LOADING
         b. DETERMINATION AND FINDINGS
         c. CONTRACTING SUPPORT
      4. MILITARY INTERDEPARTMENTAL PR
         a. ACCEPTANCE
         b. CCO ROLE
      5. BULK FUNDING
      6. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FUNDS
         a. EMERGENCY & EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSE
         b. OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION FUNDS
         c. CINC INITIATIVE FUNDS
         d. HUMANITARIAN CIVIC ASSISTANCE
      7. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
         a. DAMAGED OR DESTROYED FACILITIES
         b. CONTINGENCY AUTHORITY
            (1) DECLARATION OF WAR
            (2) EMERGENCY CONSTRUCTION
            (3) CONTINGENCY CONSTRUCTION
      8. CERP
         a. PURPOSE
         b. USES
D. DELEGATED CONTRACTING AUTHORITY
1. CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVES (COR)
2. CONTRACTING OFFICER’S TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE
   a. RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY (COR & COTR)
   b. LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY (COR & COTR)
   c. APPOINTMENT AND TRAINING
3. FIELD ORDERING OFFICE (FOO)
   a. GOVERNING REGULATION
   b. PURPOSE
   c. POLICY
   d. GUIDELINES
   e. KEY CONCERNS
4. PROVISIONAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRT)
   a. PURPOSE
   b. POLICY
5. PROJECT PURCHASING OFFICER (PPO)
   a. PURPOSE
   b. POLICY

E. REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION
F. OVERSIGHT PROGRAM
G. SOLICITATION DOCUMENTS
H. KEY CONSTRUCTION CLAUSES
I. DRAWINGS
J. EVALUATION PROCEDURES

4. AWARD
   A. SOURCE SELECTION
      1. REFERENCES
      2. DOCUMENTATION
   B. DOCUMENTATION
      1. TECHNICAL EVALUATIONS
      2. ABSTRACT
      3. PRICE REASONABLENESS
      4. DETERMINATION AND FINDING
      5. PROFESS SCHEDULE
C. SUMMARY

This chapter outlined the recommendations as a result of this research. These ten recommendations provide strategic implications with the people, processes, and platforms of USSOCOM contracting. The specific strategic recommendations include the following: (People) adapt to the changing workforce, establish mandatory training requirements, and revisit lessons learned; (Processes) better integrate contracting into the planning process using the Yoder Three Tier model, stress ethical and cultural considerations, and develop aggressive oversight measures; and (Platforms) capitalize on cross-functional capabilities and build synergy in joint operations. By implementing these recommendations, decision-makers will provide for more effective CCO operations while supporting the objectives of commander in the field. The tactical recommendation is to implement and evaluate the CM² within the USSOCOM AOR. This recommendation will increase CCO effectiveness and provide a useful tool for CCOs
across all levels of experience. Chapter VII will draw conclusions from this research report by addressing the research questions, stating the limitations to study, and identifying areas of future research.
VII. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY

Through the NPS Acquisition Research Program, USSOCOM leadership expressed a need for a management module enabling its CCOs to better execute construction requirements in a contingency theatre of operations. In order to appropriately craft such a module, the existing operational environment was analyzed to determine the appropriate content and focus areas to include in the module. This report began by introducing the background of contingency contracting and how it relates to USSOCOM. As a leader in front-line asymmetric threat operations, USSOCOM has increased its presence around the world in support of the GWOT. Its mission demands flexibility and adaptability at the highest extent allowable under the law. CCOs supporting this mission are often looked upon as logistics facilitators, business advisors, resource managers, and general tactical experts in achieving contractual requirements and arrangements supporting the USSOCOM mission. As key enablers of this mission, CCOs are often asked to fulfill construction contract requirements in austere locations with little or no training in construction terminology and concepts. This lack of expertise poses a problem for the command. In addition, construction requirements often are dynamic and complex and demand integration between engineering, legal, finance, contracting and operations units.

CCOs supporting USSOCOM missions are often in austere conditions, with little or no contact with the larger regional or theatre-wide contracting centers. They are also under OPCON of other agencies and commands within the AOR. This situation presents a unique dynamic in which a CCO must use specific regulations and contract warrant authority of one command, while supporting the operational objectives of a particular geographical combatant commander on the ground. A cross-functional and joint-force environment further compounds this problem because different military services and functional areas are accustomed to their own regulations, procedures, doctrines, and objectives. The interaction of these various forces can be combined to create an effect greater than the sum of their individual effects. In other words, cooperative interaction
among the individual cross-functional and joint-force members can create enhanced effectiveness greater than the sum of their individual effectiveness. This process is commonly known as synergy. A more synergistic approach to how CCOs manage requirements is needed to effectively integrate the capabilities of both the joint-force environment and cross-functional areas of the acquisition team (such as finance, engineering, legal, logistics, and the operational unit requesting contractual support). Creating this synergy is not easy; CCOs need a structured management process to bridge the gaps between their respective military services’ training and doctrine and their individual skills, as well as the expectations of commanders on the ground.

1. The Gaps in “People”

This research suggests that there are systemic problems with the training received by personnel assigned to execute construction requirements. These personnel include both the acquisition workforce and operational units tasked with developing and overseeing their requirements. This research suggests that most USSOCOM CCOs have little to no construction experience and yet find themselves as the lead CCO for construction requirements. In addition, the contingency environment presents numerous conflicting regulations and policies for which a uniform standard for USSOCOM does not exist. This lack of uniformity exists in both contracting policies and construction standards.

USSOCOM staff inspections suggested that CCOs’ biggest shortfalls in following contract standards involve: lack of the appropriate clauses in construction contracts, inadequate training of oversight personnel, and a lack of awareness of funding restrictions and review thresholds for construction projects. Questionnaire respondents and interviewed informants further identified other shortfall areas, including a failure to reference current regulations, a lack of templates for assisting in the design and development of SOWs and IGEs, an absence of checklists for the different phases of construction contracting, and a lack of understanding of basic construction terminology used by end-users and contractors. Finally, contingency contracting lessons learned are compiled at various levels of command. These lessons learned often reflect recurring
problems throughout the same locations over time. This research suggests a failure to adequately integrate these lessons learned into current training programs.

2. The Gaps in “Processes”

This research suggests that the way in which contract management policy is handled throughout the contingency environment is inadequate for achieving optimum effectiveness. To begin with, contracting has been historically left out of the planning process in terms of acquisition and operational planning. This inadequacy has lead CCOs to a reactive approach to executing contract management policies and processes.

The failure to integrate contracting was magnified when the DoD increasingly relied on contractors to support battlefield objectives. Over the last ten years, this reliance has increased in expenditure, scope, and magnitude. CCOs are often not physically at the location where a contract is performed. This leads to increased numbers of CORs to oversee the work and coordinate with contractors. The failures in oversight included a lack of adequate appointment documentation, training, and the government’s inability to provide oversight personnel. This research suggests that oversight control is complex in a contingency theatre; yet, mission success or failure is often dependent on effective oversight of contracts. With conflicting guidance and policy in the area of oversight, CCOs and their delegated representatives often behave in an ad-hoc fashion in terms of how they develop and execute the contract oversight process.

3. The Gaps in “Platform”

This research suggests that the lack of a synergistic approach to joint operations has hindered CCOs’ ability to effectively perform in a contingency environment. Personnel tasked with the role of a CCO for USSOCOM come from all military services. Each military service has particular guidance and regulation concerning contingency contracting operations. This cross-service diversity can be leveraged for best practices; however, current regulations are convoluted and difficult to follow for USSOCOM CCOs. CCOs also operate in an environment that demands support, coordination, and expertise of other functions such as finance and engineering. One critical area that exhibits this division of command structure is in the funding authority afforded to
USSOCOM CCOs. USSOCOM uses a special appropriation funding known as MFP-11. This authority is given through Title 10 USC, Section 167, and is similar to the authority given to the military services. The authority is allowed only when CCOs are procuring items and services (including construction) for SOF units. Other functional units operating near the CCOs have been found trying to misuse this funding authority by trying to have the CCOs procure items and services for units other than SOF.

This research has shown that gaps exist in CCOs’ understanding of both financial and engineering elements such as funding restrictions and requirement review boards. Current contingency operations exhibit failures in interoperability between agencies (USA, 2007). These failures suggest splintered responsibilities between agencies and a lack of effective interaction between multiple stakeholders. These failures leave CCOs confused and frustrated.

B. STUDY LIMITATIONS

1. Access to Data

The biggest challenge of this research was communicating effectively with the appropriate personnel to gain the most insight and experience into current USSOCOM operations. All USSOCOM personnel were extremely accommodating. However, due to mission constraints and operations tempo, it was often hard to track down the right person for the right data. Specifically, it was difficult to track down SOF end-users and the CENTCOM theatre Chief of Contracting for interviews. However, the study was augmented by USSOCOM leadership’s aggressive support through access to personnel and documentation. Another concern of the research was avoiding classified discussion that did not relate to the objectives of the report. In order to access information relating to USSOCOM deployments, there is a certain degree of risk in discussing and disclosing classified information.

2. Limitations in Recording Interviews

The security procedures and lack of computer access in SOCOM facilities posed a minor challenge during the on-site interviews due to the policy of no removable
electronic data storage devices (flash drives), no digital records, and no e-mail access. This challenge was mitigated by written documentation of interviews and follow-up e-mail/phone communication prior to the inclusion of data within the report.

3. Qualitative Research Is Inherently Interpretive

The identified gaps in CCO effectiveness and the ensuing recommendations and training developed (CM²) were based on information obtained from a literature review, informant testimonies, and archival records. Much of this information is subjective in nature.

4. Inability to Test the Effectiveness of Recommendations and CM²

Although the ADDIE method includes an evaluation phase, a thorough evaluation of the recommendations as provided in this research was not possible given time constraints. Future research should evaluate the strategic and tactical recommendations to include the effectiveness of the CM².

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

1. Test the Effectiveness of the Recommended CM²

Time constraints did not allow the researcher to follow a USSOCOM implementation plan for the CM². Thus, this research did not adequately test the effectiveness of the fielded module. Future research could continue to execute the ADDIE model by analyzing the implementation of the module and evaluating its effectiveness once fielded to CCOs. Future researchers could also explore evaluation methods in the Four Levels of Evaluation by Donald Kirkpatrick (1994). The method referred to in this book is more of a stand-alone evaluation protocol in which the researcher would test the reaction, learning, transfer of knowledge, and results of training in terms of return on investment (time or money).
2. **Develop a DoD-wide Joint Regulation Established for Contingency Contracting**

DoD contingency contracting operations are conducted around the world. Currently, each military service has different regulations and policies. Many subordinate commands within those services have additional or adjusted regulations and policies that differ with the region, command, or assignment in which the CCO operates. There are an increasing number of joint regulations that deal with contingency operations of all forces, as well as informal guidance in the *Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook* developed by AFLMA (2008). Future research could analyze the feasibility of developing a DoD-wide joint regulation specifically for contingency contracting.

3. **Examine Possible Systemic Ethical Failures in CCO Behavior**

This research did not uncover (nor this study discuss) any cases of fraud or failure of USSOCOM CCOs to display ethical behavior in the contingency environment. In the past, there have been documented cases of such behavior, predominately among Army CCOs (USA, 2007). Future research could examine the effects of the Army’s attempts to change the culture and behavior of Army CCOs since published accounts, such as the Gansler Report, unveiled gross fraud.

4. **Explore Concept of USSOCOM Contingency Contracting Battalion**

Discussions with USSOCOM policy and staff officers suggest that there has been informal debate over whether or not a contingency contracting battalion should be established at USSOCOM to focus more attention on contingency contracting operations within its AOR. The establishment of a new contingency contracting battalion could potentially result in changes to the JMD and to the tasking of CCO deployments for USSOCOM operations. Future research could explore the feasibility and effect of establishing such a battalion.
5. **Determine If More USSOCOM Predeployment CCO Training Should Be Conducted**

This report found serious and systematic shortfalls in training through the acquisition and contracting field. USSOCOM personnel were asked during interviews and questionnaires if additional pre-deployment CCO training should be conducted at USSOCOM Headquarters. Currently, CCOs spend one day onsite with SOAL-KCC personnel reviewing the policies and background information associated with their deployment. The feedback was split on the benefit of extending this training to one week. Additional research could be conducted to determine the feasibility of such training, what exactly it should entail, and how it should be executed.

6. **Examine Current USSOCOM Procurement Authority and Its Feasibility in the Future**

The USSOCOM commander has unique procurement authorities and responsibilities over that of COCOMs. Title 10 USC, Section 167 grants the USSOCOM commander the responsibility and authority to develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment, the authority to exercise the functions of the head of agency, and the authority to execute funds. USSOCOM uses special appropriation funding known as Major Force Program-11 (MFP-11) to support the development, acquisition, and sustainment activities for USSOCOM. Since actual OPCON over CCOs is provided by the commands in which they operate, there is debate that the procurement authority should fall within the responsibility and accountability of those commands. Further research could be accomplished to evaluate options associated with maintaining CONUS acquisition procurement authority versus delegating CCO procurement authority to the theatre.
APPENDIX A. CCO QUESTIONNAIRE

PURPOSE: This questionnaire was developed for Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) who have (or are currently) deployed under a United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) billet with experience dealing with infrastructure requirements (all construction requirements and those services in direct support of infrastructure activities such as gravel deliveries/concrete batch plant operations, etc.). The purpose is to explore challenges associated with a CCO’s ability to support infrastructure requirements in expeditionary environments. This information is being gathered in conjunction with other research concerning the development of an infrastructure handbook for USSOCOM CCOs. Your input is critical to crafting an effective, viable product. All responses will remain confidential between the informant and the researcher.

INSTRUCTIONS: Please review the information below and answer each question by bolding (electronically) and/or providing feedback as appropriate. Answer questions ONLY from the perspective of your experience deployed under USSOCOM. Only UNCLASSIFIED information should be included in your responses. This questionnaire will be conducted without any form of retribution at any level of command. Please feel free to comment at the conclusion of the questionnaire on any additional related themes not covered herein. This questionnaire will include a follow-up interview/conversation (approx. 30 minutes) with the researcher to discuss evolving themes and to clarify or elaborate on ideas presented.

RETURN COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE TO CMHEARL@NPS.EDU NO LATER THAN 15 JUL 09

DEMOGRAPHICS:

GRADE/RANK: Enlisted Officer

SERVICE: USAF USA USN USMC

DAWIA CERTIFICATION LEVEL: I II III

YEARS IN CONTRACTING: 1-4 4-8 8-12 12-16 16-20 20+

CURRENTLY DEPLOYED: YES NO

THEATRE: JCC I/A CENTCOM (non-JCC I/A) AFRICOM OTHER

NUMBER OF TIMES DEPLOYED IN CONTRACTING: _________________

LOCATIONS/DURATION (months):
If location was classified, simply state “Classified” on the line.

___________________________________ __________________________________
___________________________________ __________________________________
_______________________________ __________________________________

CONTACT INFORMATION:

NAME: ______________________________
E-MAIL: ______________________________
PHONE: ______________________________
TRAINING:
1. Do/did you have at least 1 year experience in construction contracting before you were assigned to your last/current deployed CCO construction position in USSOCOM?
   YES  NO  If no, how many months experience did/do you have in construction?______________

2. Rate the effectiveness of (all combined) previous CCO training (CON 234, Unit Level, Pre-deployment, etc).
   1  2  3  4  5  [ 1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness]

3. Does your unit have recurring CCO training at your home station? If so, how often?
   YES  NO
   WEEKLY  MONTHLY  ANNUALLY  OTHER_________________

4. Did your recurring CCO training address infrastructure issues in a deployed environment (construction, services, quality assurance, oversight, joint challenges, real property/engineering topics, etc.)?
   YES  NO  N/A

5. Did you receive CCO training within 90 days prior to departure on your last deployment?
   YES  NO
   If so, was it helpful?____________ Please explain why/why not below:

6. Would you find a one-week, comprehensive CCO training with all other CCOs deploying into your theatre useful immediately prior to arrival into the AOR on your next deployment?
   YES  NO
   If so, what areas do you feel need to be addressed?

7. Would you find a training handbook useful to prepare for and/or execute future deployments?
   YES  NO

8. When supporting infrastructure requirements, what capabilities do you think CCOs need improvement on in order to better support their customers and the overall mission? In other
words, what do you think CCOs need to be able to do better? For each improvement, please explain why you think it is important.

9. Do you think a comprehensive handbook focused on infrastructure support would effectively mitigate these shortfalls in capability?

   YES   NO
   If so, what items do you feel it should entail? (Specifically)

10. What templates would be beneficial for such a training handbook? (For instance, specific SOW/SOOs, drawings, source-selection plans, termination documents, evaluation criteria framework, technical evaluation checklist, etc.)
INTEGRATION:

11. Rate the effectiveness of acquisition planning prior to your receipt of funded construction requirements from your customer. In other words, have/does your customer typically work with you to conduct adequate acquisition planning prior to the funded requirement being presented to you? Is there coordination that takes place between the engineers or applicable end-user and the CCO to facilitate an effective solicitation/award?

*Acquisition planning:* Defined as the generation of a viable requirement description, market research, pro-active vs. re-active planning, writing an adequate statement of objectives/statement of work, development of performance measurements, adequately allocated and trained quality assurance evaluators/construction inspectors, discussing the need for and development of a quality assurance plan, etc.

1 2 3 4 5  [1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness]

Please discuss or comment on any success stories/lessons learned, do not include names of those involved. However, use of positions/organizations/rank is acceptable. For each lesson learned, please identify the root cause(s).

12. Rate the level of post-award oversight of contract requirements by your customer.

Oversight = Coordination with subject-matter experts, timely inspection and acceptance of work IAW contract schedule, compliance of government (end-user) responsibilities, communication with CCO after award, pro-active monitoring of expiration dates, timely submittal of new SOW for follow-on contracts, etc.

1 2 3 4 5  [1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness]

Please discuss or comment on any success stories/lessons learned, please do not include names of those involved, use of positions/organizations/rank is acceptable. For each lesson learned, please identify the root cause(s).

Please feel free to provide any additional comments that you feel would be helpful to better position our CCO workforce to enable the warfighter through effective execution of infrastructure requirements. Continue on next page if applicable.

FOR QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS: CONTACT CHRIS M. HEARL, CAPT, USAF AT cmhearl@nps.edu

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND SUPPORT IN THIS EFFORT
APPENDIX B. STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE

PURPOSE: This questionnaire was developed for Contracting Policy and Staff Officers who have exposure to or support from Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) deployments under United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) billets with experience dealing with infrastructure acquisition requirements (all construction and those services in direct support of infrastructure activities such as gravel deliveries/concrete batch plant operations, etc.). The purpose is to explore challenges associated with a CCO’s ability to support infrastructure requirements in expeditionary environments. This information is being gathered in conjunction with other research concerning the development of an infrastructure handbook for USSOCOM CCOs. Your input is critical to crafting an effective, viable product. All responses will remain confidential between the informant and the researcher.

INSTRUCTIONS: Please review the information below and answer each question by bolding (electronically) and/or providing feedback as appropriate. Answer questions ONLY from the perspective of your experience under USSOCOM. Only UNCLASSIFIED information should be included in your responses. This questionnaire will be conducted without any form of retribution at any level of command. Please feel free to comment at the conclusion of the questionnaire on any additional related themes not covered herein. This questionnaire will include a follow-up interview/conversation (approx. 30 minutes) with the researcher to discuss evolving themes and to clarify or elaborate on ideas presented.

RETURN COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE TO CMHEARL@NPS.EDU
NO LATER THAN 15 JUL 09

DEMOGRAPHICS:

GRADE/RANK: Enlisted Officer
SERVICE: USAF USA USN USMC
DAWIA CERTIFICATION LEVEL: I II III
YEARS IN CONTRACTING: 1-4 4-8 8-12 12-16 16-20 20+
NUMBER OF TIMES DEPLOYED IN CONTRACTING: _________________
LOCATIONS/DURATION (months):
If location was classified, simply state “Classified” on the line.

____________________________________ __________________________________
____________________________________ __________________________________
____________________________________ __________________________________

CONTACT INFORMATION:
NAME: ___________________________________
E-MAIL: ___________________________________
PHONE: ___________________________________
**CAPABILITIES:**

1. What are all of the required capabilities for executing infrastructure requirements for a CCO on a USSOCOM deployment?

2. When supporting infrastructure requirements, what capabilities do you think CCOs need to improve in order to better support their customers and the overall mission? For each improvement, what evidence suggests an improvement is necessary?

3. Do you feel a comprehensive training handbook focused on infrastructure support would effectively mitigate these shortfalls in capability?

   YES  NO

   If so, what items do you feel it should entail? (Please be specific.)

4. What templates would be beneficial for such a training handbook (specific SOWs, drawings, checklists, etc.)?
TRAINING:

5. Are you aware of any infrastructure-centric training initiatives for CCOs deploying to a USSOCOM billet?

   YES  NO  If not, what initiatives do you feel would benefit CCOs dealing with infrastructure requirements?


6. How would you rate the effectiveness of (all combined) CCO training (CON 234, Unit Level, Pre-deployment, etc)?

   1  2  3  4  5  [ 1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness]


7. Do you feel CCO training within 90 days prior to departure for a deployment would benefit CCOs?

   YES  NO

   If so, what topics need to be addressed? Why do you believe such training would be helpful?


8. Do you feel a one-week, comprehensive CCO training immediately prior to departure into their respective AOR would benefit USSOCOM CCOs?

   YES  NO

   If so, what areas do you feel need to be addressed? Why do you believe such training would be helpful?
INTEGRATION:

9. Please discuss any policy/staff initiatives to integrate pre-deployment coordination between CCOs and their deployed end-users; this includes memorandums of agreement with other units/agencies, tasking coordination, cross-functional training, etc.

10. Please discuss any leadership initiatives to provide top cover, logistical support, and contracting reach-back opportunities for CCOs deploying in support of SOF objectives.

Please feel free to provide any additional comments you feel would be helpful to better position our CCO workforce to enable the warfighter through effective execution of infrastructure requirements. Continue on next page if applicable.

FOR QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS: CONTACT CHRIS M. HEARL, CAPT, USAF AT CMHEARL@NPS.EDU

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT
APPENDIX C. CUSTOMER QUESTIONNAIRE

PURPOSE: This questionnaire was developed for Customers and End-users of Contracting support from Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) deployments under United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) billets with experience dealing with infrastructure acquisition requirements (all construction and those services in direct support of infrastructure activities such as gravel deliveries/concrete batch plant operations, etc.). The purpose is to explore challenges associated with a CCO’s ability to support infrastructure requirements in expeditionary environments. This information is being gathered in conjunction with other research concerning the development of an infrastructure handbook for USSOCOM CCOs. Your input is critical to crafting an effective, viable product. All responses will remain confidential between the informant and the researcher.

INSTRUCTIONS: Please review the information below and answer each question by bolding (electronically) and/or providing feedback as appropriate. Answer questions ONLY from the perspective of your experience deployed under USSOCOM. Only UNCLASSIFIED information should be included in your responses. This questionnaire will be conducted without any form of retribution at any level of command. Please feel free to comment at the conclusion of the questionnaire on any additional related themes not covered herein. This questionnaire will include a follow-up interview/conversation (approx. 30 minutes) with the researcher to discuss evolving themes and to clarify or elaborate on ideas presented.

RETURN COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE TO CMHEARL@NPS.EDU
NO LATER THAN 15 JUL 09

DEMOGRAPHICS:

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<th>GRADE/RANK:</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Officer</th>
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<td>USA</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>POSITION:</td>
<td>________________________________</td>
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<tr>
<td>CURRENTLY DEPLOYED:</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEATRE:</td>
<td>JCC I/A</td>
<td>CENTCOM (non-JCC I/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A CONTRACTING OFFICER REPRESENTATIVE (COR) OR QUALITY ASSURANCE EVALUATOR (QAE)?</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DO YOU TYPICALLY DEAL WITH CONTRACTED REQUIREMENTS AND CONTRACTING PERSONNEL AT YOUR HOME BASE?

| YES | NO |

CONTACT INFORMATION:

| NAME: | ________________________________ |
| E-MAIL: | ________________________________ |
| PHONE: | ________________________________ |
**CAPABILITIES:**

1. Please rate the effectiveness of support you received from CCOs for your infrastructure requirements.

   1  2  3  4  5  
   [ 1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness]

2. Do you feel CCOs supporting you on your SOCOM deployment(s) were competent?

   YES  NO  
   If not, what evidence suggested the CCO was less than competent?

3. Have/do you receive sufficient timely contracting support from CCOs?

   YES  NO  
   If not, what were the circumstances surrounding this lack of support?

4. During your SOCOM deployment(s), did you get consistent support no matter which CCO you worked with, or did you detect significant differences between individual CCOs? Please explain:

   YES  NO  
   Either way, please explain:

5. Did you get the impression that CCOs were making up the rules as they went along?

   YES  NO
6. What capabilities (areas of knowledge and/or abilities to execute) do you need from a CCO in terms of infrastructure requirements?

7. In your experience, what areas have CCOs consistently done well to support your requirements?

8. Please explain how CCOs have failed to meet your needs. Vivid experiences will be very helpful.
INTEGRATION:

9. While deployed, has/does your unit leadership have frequent communication with Contracting leadership? (Includes informal coordination and formal established meetings)

   YES    NO    DON’T KNOW

   IF SO, HOW OFTEN?      WEEKLY    MONTHLY    ANNUALLY
   OTHER_________________

10. Do you feel CCOs typically understand your mission?

    YES    NO

11. Has/does your deployed unit ever coordinate with the Contracting Office to bring CCOs to the applicable training courses or otherwise integrate Contracting personnel into cross-functional teams to better integrate them into your immediate mission needs?

    YES    NO    DON’T KNOW

12. Does your home station unit ever coordinate with the local Contracting Office to bring CCOs to the applicable training courses or otherwise integrate Contracting personnel into cross-functional teams at home stations?

    YES    NO    DON’T KNOW

13. What opportunities related to the above do you see CCOs benefiting from that your office could facilitate?
14. Rate the effectiveness of acquisition planning prior to your submittal of a funded requirements to Contracting.

In other words, do you typically work with Contracting to conduct adequate acquisition planning prior to submitting the paperwork for your requirement? Is there pro-active coordination that takes place between you and the CCO to facilitate an effective solicitation/award?

*Acquisition planning: Defined as the generation of a viable requirement description, market research, pro-active vs. re-active planning, writing an adequate statement of objectives/statement of work, development of performance measurements, adequately allocated and trained quality assurance evaluators/construction inspectors, discussing the need for and development of a quality assurance plan, etc.*

1 2 3 4 5 [ 1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness]

Please discuss or comment on any success stories/lessons learned. Please do not include names of those involved, though the use of positions/organizations/rank is acceptable. For each lesson learned, please identify the root cause(s).

15. Rate the level of post-award (after contract has been signed and contractor begins work) oversight of contract requirements by you/your office.

Oversight = Coordination with subject-matter experts, timely inspection and acceptance of work IAW contract schedule, compliance of government (end-user) responsibilities, communication with CCO after award, pro-active monitoring of expiration dates, timely submittal of new SOW for follow-on contracts, etc.

1 2 3 4 5 [ 1 - no effectiveness, 5 - optimum effectiveness]

Please discuss or comment on any success stories/lessons learned. Please do not include names of those involved, though the use of positions/organizations/rank is acceptable. For each lesson learned, please identify the root cause(s).
16. Do you feel Contracting and your (deployed) organization have capitalized on opportunities to work together to better support your operational needs?

   YES  NO  Either way, please explain:

17. Do you feel Contracting and your (deployed) organization have capitalized on opportunities to work together to better put in place effective contractor support that facilitates successful performance of the requirement(s)?

   YES  NO  Either way, please explain:

Please feel free to provide any additional comments that you feel would be helpful to better position our CCO workforce to enable the warfighter through effective execution of infrastructure requirements. Continue on next page, if applicable.

________________________________________

FOR QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS: CONTACT CHRIS M. HEARL, CAPT, USAF AT CMHEARL@NPS.EDU

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND SUPPORT IN THIS EFFORT
APPENDIX D. SUPPORT LETTER FROM SOAL-K

MEMORANDUM FOR Captain Christopher M. Hearl, USAF, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

SUBJECT: Support for Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Research, Contingency Construction Operations

1. USSOCOM’s Directorate of Procurement (DoP) provides contracting and acquisition support for acquiring Special Operations Forces (SOF) peculiar weapon systems, equipment, and services in direct support of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). To meet this challenge, the DoP utilizes the most innovative, streamlined, and expedited acquisition practices available, while maintaining strict compliance with required statutes and regulations.

2. As you know, to more effectively execute this mission, the DoP requested support from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School to assist us in researching policies, procedures, and techniques concerning construction requirements in our contingency contracting operations. NPS selected you to assist us in researching construction requirements. To support your research, I request you contact applicable USSOCOM, SOCCENT, and other personnel. If you need assistance in gaining timely responses, please inform LTC Smallwood or Mr. Chris Rollins.

3. Questions or comments regarding this matter should be directed to SOAL-KA Division Chief, LTC Phil Smallwood at DSN 289-5552 or phillip.smallwood@uscom.mil.

JOHN E. CANNADAY
Colonel, U.S. Air Force
Director of Procurement
LIST OF REFERENCES


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library  
   Naval Postgraduate School  
   Monterey, California

3. Phillip Smallwood  
   USSOCOM/ SOAL-K  
   MacDill AFB, Florida

4. John Travieso  
   AFLMA  
   Gunter Annex, Alabama

5. Brigadier General Camille Nichols  
   CENTCOM CONTRACTING COMMAND-International Zone  
   Baghdad, Iraq

6. Kristin Uchimura  
   SAF/AQC  
   Washington, DC

7. David Villareal  
   SOCENT  
   MacDill AFB, Florida

8. Jeffrey Parsons  
   Army Contracting Command  
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

9. Andrew Sackett  
   HQ USAFCENT/A7K  
   Shaw AFB, South Carolina

10. Karey Shaffer  
    Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Program  
    Monterey, California

11. Acquisition Community Connection  
    Defense Acquisition University  
    Washington, DC