Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations: Insights From Seven Case Studies

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Summary

The CNA project on the Marine Corps and Humanitarian Assistance Operations, sponsored by the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (CG MCCDC), is examining Marine requirements to conduct humanitarian assistance/peace operations (HA/POs). To help identify these requirements, this research memorandum examines seven HA/POs that involved U.S. Marine Corps forces.

Requirements for USMC forces to conduct HA/POs

A number of common requirements cross the examined cases. Some of these call on traditional Marine capabilities, whereas others seem unique to the HA/PO environment. In terms of the traditional capabilities, HA/POs seem to rely most extensively on three areas:

- Command and control
- Transportation
- Combat service support.

If we look at transportation, for example, in the seven operations Marines

1. *Self-deployed* (via fixed- and rotary-wing assets, and on the ground)
2. *Moved people* (evacuees, aid workers, VIPs)

Unlike transportation, some other requirements are not as easily sourced within the Marine Corps or within the entire U.S. military. These other requirements range from medical supplies for infants to mobile phone systems for operating in an urban environment. Because Marine Corps units are unlikely to meet every potential
requirement with on-hand capabilities, key is the ability to source these needs (whether from elsewhere in the U.S. military, the U.S. Government, coalition partners, or from outside contracting).

Other issues of interest

Other issues emerge when examining these operations. Perhaps the most prominent issue is the fact that Marines repeatedly received or assumed additional taskings beyond initial taskings because of the inherent capabilities of a Marine-Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). In five of the seven operations, USMC forces assumed responsibilities for taskings that went far beyond those initially assigned Marine forces. Thus, any discussion of shortfalls should begin with a realization that Marine forces generally acquire additional taskings as operations continue. The following issues deserve further examination:

- **Missions and tasks shift.** HA/POs are prone to shifts in objectives and therefore in the tasks assigned to the forces involved in the operation. Forces involved in an HA/PO need the flexibility to respond to such changing environments. The current discussions over *mission creep* capture part of this problem.

- **Inter-organizational relations.** During HA/POs, the U.S. military (and the USMC as a part of it) must interact with organizations that do not typically play a role in a battlefield environment. HA/POs thus require liaison and cooperation with a wide range of organizations, ranging from other U.S. Government agencies to local relief societies. Lack of familiarity with these organizations (their objectives and operating procedures) can hamper mission success.

- **Civilian needs.** Civilian populations have different requirements from the typical military unit. For example, military units do not require baby food or diapers as do most distressed civilian populaces.

- **Management intensiveness.** For many reasons, the military manages force activities more intensely in HA/POs than in combat operations. The causes range from the legal complexities (especially for domestic operations) to the fact that HA/POs
often require military personnel to operate outside established doctrine.

- **Breadth of command responsibilities.** Commanders often must assume a wide range of “non-traditional” responsibilities in HA/POs, as they must deal with disrupted civilian populations. The commander may have to act as mayor, judge, or educator, as well as commander of the military force.

- **Impartiality.** HA/POs often require the military force to maintain impartiality. This can range from the almost impossible situation of operating as a neutral party amid a civil war to dealing with complaints about the distribution schedule of relief supplies after a natural disaster. The implications and complications of operating “impartially” are serious and inadequately understood.

Although the Marine Corps has been involved in some form of HA/POs for almost as long as it has existed, HA/POs have only recently risen to prominence for planning considerations. Thus, as the few examples cited above indicate, many issues that arise in these operations could benefit from further examination. This research memorandum highlights some of these issues through the examination of requirements in seven HA/POs involving USMC forces.

The case studies do not present traditional histories or lessons-learned analysis. Instead, after a brief description of the operation, each case study identifies the tasks (whether explicit or implicit) assigned to Marine forces, the requirements to execute these tasks, and shortfalls encountered in meeting these taskings. The opening sections of the memorandum discuss insights on requirements from the seven operations and other reoccurring themes that emerge from the examination of them.
Introduction

Background

As part of the CNA project on the Marine Corps and Humanitarian Assistance Operations, sponsored by the Marine Corps Combat Development Center (MCCDC), this research memorandum examines USMC involvement in seven humanitarian assistance/peace operations (HA/POs).¹ (Table 1 lists the operations and their key features.) This project seeks to help MCCDC identify requirements (whether in doctrine, organization, training, or equipment) to improve the Marine Corps' ability to effectively perform HA/PO tasks. The project team is identifying the range of HA/PO requirements through a variety of methods, including seminar gaming, evaluation of existing doctrine and policies, and evaluation of the historical record.

Objectives

This research seeks to help illuminate the potential requirements in future HA/POs by examining what Marine forces actually did during past operations. The requirements highlighted through the case studies will feed into the broader study.

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¹ CNA Information Memorandum (CIM) 334, A Chronology of USMC Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations, by Adam B. Siegel, Sept 1994, discusses the definition of these terms. This umbrella definition captures domestic operations, more appropriately referred to as “Military Support to Civil Authorities.” In brief, the project uses an expansive definition to include use of USMC forces to limit the damage from natural or man-made disasters (HAOs) and use of Marines to restore or maintain order (POs). CIM 334 documents 154 USMC HA/POs from 1811 through 1993.
Table 1. Key features of the seven USMC HA/POs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>U.S. force size</th>
<th>Approx. no. of Marines</th>
<th>Other services</th>
<th>CJTF service</th>
<th>Coalition?</th>
<th>Security situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Exit</td>
<td>Provide Comfort</td>
<td>Sea Angel</td>
<td>Fiery Vigil</td>
<td>GTMO</td>
<td>LA Riots</td>
<td>Hurricane Andrew</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start date</td>
<td>01/02/91</td>
<td>04/07/91</td>
<td>05/11/91</td>
<td>06/08/91</td>
<td>11/25/91</td>
<td>05/01/92</td>
<td>08/26/92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End date</td>
<td>01/11/91</td>
<td>continuing</td>
<td>06/06/91</td>
<td>06/30/91</td>
<td>06/30/93</td>
<td>05/13/92</td>
<td>10/17/92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of operation</td>
<td>Evacuation</td>
<td>Refugee assistance</td>
<td>Disaster relief</td>
<td>Evacuation/Disaster relief</td>
<td>Refugee assistance</td>
<td>Domestic security</td>
<td>Disaster Relief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Turkey/Iraq</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Guantanamo Bay, Cuba</td>
<td>Los Angeles, CA</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. force size</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. no. of Marines</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>USN, USAF</td>
<td>USA, USAF, USN</td>
<td>USA, USAF, USN</td>
<td>USA, USAF, USN, USAF</td>
<td>USA, USAF, USN, USC</td>
<td>USA, USAF</td>
<td>USA, USAF, USN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF service</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security situation</td>
<td>Semi-permissive</td>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td>Semi-permissive</td>
<td>Semi-permissive</td>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td>Semi-permissive</td>
<td>Permissive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scope/Limitation

This research memorandum looks at only 7 of the more than 150 HA/POs that have involved USMC forces since 1811. Even for the period covered by the case studies, 1991–1992, Marine forces conducted or played a part in other HA/POs, from assistance to the Italian government in halting a lava flow threatening a village, to drought relief operations in Micronesia, to airlift operations from Kenya into Somalia, and to support of the airlift of relief supplies into Bosnia.

In addition, this document discusses only a limited part of Marine Corps experience. It does not examine in detail the experience and activities of other services, other elements of the U.S. Government, other countries, or various relief organizations (both official and non-governmental). (Other portions of the study are examining many of these other organizations.)
Method

This research memorandum rests on the concept that the historical record can help us understand the present and may even illuminate the future. And, in this regard, although perhaps little recognized, the Marine Corps has a long and diverse history in HA/POs. From this rich history, the study team had to decide which operations to study and how to examine each of them.

Case Selection

Three factors drove the selection of cases to examine. Briefly, the operation had to:

- Have significant Marine Corps participation, in terms of the number and role of Marines
- Have sufficient documentation available to support research
- Help represent the spectrum of HA/PO missions that Marines have conducted in the past.

In terms of this third point, these operations appear to represent a cross section (though not a representative sample in a statistical sense) of the type of HA/POs that have involved USMC forces. Although HA/POs could be categorized a number of ways, the following four-way division provides a logical basis for examining these operations:

- Humanitarian intervention and military peacemaking/enforcement/keeping (Provide Comfort)
- Movements of people (Eastern Exit, Fiery Vigil, GTMO)
- Natural disaster relief (Sea Angel, Hurricane Andrew)
- Other activities, such as police support, search and rescue, environmental clean-up. (Los Angeles riots).²

2. Clearly, these categories are not exclusive—for example, most natural-disaster-relief operations involve movements of people and/or search-and-rescue operations and some type of policing activity (whether guarding against looters or directing traffic).
The seven case studies span this four-part spectrum of operations. In addition, the seven cases involve both overseas operations (five) and domestic operations (two). The breadth of cases should help us to understand the range of requirements for USMC forces to conduct humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and military support to civilian authorities missions.

This memorandum does not examine Operation Restore Hope (operations in Somalia, December 1992 to May 1993) because CNA has already extensively examined this operation and two of the study team members spent time on the JTF headquarters staff. The experiences of and lessons from Restore Hope are included in the study team’s work.

## Analysis format

For each case study, the discussion follows the same pattern (see appendix A which describes the case-study format). Each case study provides a brief background on the HA/PO and outlines the mission, the tasks for USMC forces as part of this mission, the requirements that derive from these tasks, and any identifiable shortfalls in meeting these tasks. Thus, the examinations assume the following for each operation:

- National authorities give the military a mission.
- Based on this mission, the military commander (CINC or CJTF) gives the USMC one or more tasks to accomplish.
- The USMC has requirements to accomplish each task.
- The operation may reveal shortfalls in meeting some of these requirements which may have implications for Marine Corps doctrine, organization, training, or equipment.

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In general, the discussion will follow a logic chain from mission to task to requirement to the shortfalls in meeting that requirement. This is not always true; sometimes following this chain would result in a statement of the obvious or a long laundry list of all the requirements needed to conduct operations from personnel management to training Marines how to load and fire their weapons. For example, every operation requires communication support. Sometimes shortfalls in communications are briefly discussed without having highlighted “communications” as a specific requirement for that operation.

The discussions also highlight issues that seem relevant but may not specifically relate to a requirements issue. As in any lessons-learned or similar document, identifying shortfalls does not imply in any way that the USMC (or the military) performed missions poorly or was at fault for failing to foresee all possible contingencies. Instead, highlighting shortfalls will help in making decisions about possible changes in doctrine, organization, training, or equipment.

This document relies on a variety of source materials, such as interviews with participants and the message traffic from the operations. Some of this material explicitly discusses requirements and shortfalls (such as many entries in the computerized lessons-learned systems). Other material does not directly deal with what the Marine Corps might have required to fulfill assigned tasks in the operation. This analysis relies on a synthesis of these sources for a deeper understanding of the events and issues of each operation.

The key element of each case study is a list of requirements for Marine Corps forces to conduct the tasks within the mission. Comparing the requirements and shortfalls of each of the different operations, however, led to some conceptualizing of requirements and issues that span the operations.

4. The research cut-off date for this effort was May 1994. Source materials from and operations conducted after this date were not considered. See the appendix A (case-study format) for a brief discussion of sources, and see each case study for additional sources.
The next section discusses requirements that seem (based on these seven operations) endemic to HA/POs, rather than specific to one operation. Following this, the section on recurring themes explores some issues of broader HA/PO policy. Eight appendices follow. Appendix A discusses the formats for the case studies. The remaining seven appendices discuss the following operations:

- Appendix B: Operation Eastern Exit, Mogadishu, Somalia, January 1991
- Appendix C: Operation Provide Comfort: Eastern Turkey and Northern Iraq, April–June 1991
- Appendix D: JTF Sea Angel: Bangladesh, May–June 1991
- Appendix E: Operation Fiery Vigil: Philippines, June 1991
- Appendix G: JTF-LA: Los Angeles, California, May 1992
Insights on requirements

In the past, the military services have generally approached HA/POs in a way similar to low-intensity conflict—if the force is prepared for the big war, it can handle the small one as a lesser included contingency (the other definition of LIC). Humanitarian assistance activities have received little attention until recently; the conception was that such activities were not the purpose of military forces and that they simply required the application of traditional military capabilities to a somewhat unusual situation. To a large extent, this does seem true: many of the requirements placed on USMC (and other military) forces during HA/POs do rely on traditional capabilities. Unlike much of society, military forces are designed to maintain their organization and operate amidst disaster—specifically, the man-made disaster of war. Thus, the military maintains its capabilities to operate in the face of a natural (or other) disaster. And this is why the national leadership directs the military to respond to such situations.

Within these traditional capabilities, however, the demands of HA/POs (as compared to combat operations) often change the relative emphasis between components—placing greater demands on combat service support elements than on the ground combat forces (acting in their traditional roles). For example, Marine involvement in an HA/PO may center on constructing a tent city and caring for the civilian populace it shelters. The only “combat” function may be providing perimeter security or an on-call security force. In general, the requirements for military forces to conduct HA/POs fall within three groups:

- First are those requirements that draw on traditional military capabilities and training. These “traditional requirements” can include, for example, transportation (of people or things) or communications support.

- A second category consists of those requirements that may draw on capabilities inherent in the military (Marine Corps), but
demand that these capabilities be used differently from the ways they would be used in combat operations. For example, military medicine focuses on a healthy, primarily male, population that is 18 to 50 years old which undergoes severe trauma (i.e., a combat wound). In contrast, in HA/POs, in addition to caring for the military personnel, in HA/POs medical assistance may focus on the indigenous population, which includes weak, “at-risk” populations (infants and the elderly), or may focus on preventing the outbreak of infectious diseases. To provide another example, reconnaissance assets, critical for combat operations, are also critical for HA/POs. Evaluating surveillance photos of a disaster zone, however, differs from analyzing images of an enemy’s trench system.

- The third group consists of requirements that fall outside military equipment inventories or traditional military capabilities. For example, in almost every recent disaster-relief operation, the U.S. military’s standard communications equipment could not connect appropriately with all the involved organizations. Thus, procuring (even if simply borrowing) such communications equipment has often been an early priority. As another example, few military units have structural engineers or disaster-management specialists who can play crucial roles in disaster relief.

Each of the examined cases placed demands on the involved forces in these three broad categories of requirements. Although these groupings might help conceptualize requirements, each type of requirement does not necessarily fit within any one of the three categories. Communications is an example of a general requirement that crosses all three. During Eastern Exit, for instance, military forces needed to communicate with each other (traditional capabilities used in traditional ways), to provide communications support for both U.S. and foreign diplomats (traditional capabilities in non-traditional ways), and to communicate with civilians on the ground in Mogadishu (outside military inventories, because it required radios the Marines did not have; the American Embassy staff gave the Marines hand-held radios).
Four categories seem to capture the requirements for the Marine Corps to meet taskings in these seven operations: command and control; communications/information (including information warfare); logistics and administration; and operations (principally combat). Table 2 provides a partial listing of the requirements the Marine Corps faced in conducting these seven operations. Although each type of requirement does not necessarily fall solely within one category, these do provide a means for considering the requirements for the seven operations.

Table 2. Requirements for conducting seven USMC HA/POs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command and control</th>
<th>Communications/information</th>
<th>Logistics and administration</th>
<th>Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Equipment/software</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Maneuver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td>Finance/contracting</td>
<td>Patrols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal</td>
<td>Information acquisition/sharing</td>
<td>Base support</td>
<td>Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules of engagement</td>
<td>Dissemination</td>
<td>Camp construction; maintenance; administration</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>Public affairs</td>
<td>Evacuee/refugee processing</td>
<td>CSAR/SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSYOPs</td>
<td>Utilities and utility repair</td>
<td>Minesweeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cargo handling</td>
<td>Close air support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Forward airfield/landing zone establishment/maintenance</td>
<td>ANGLICO/forward air control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Customs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Every operation places its own unique demands on the forces involved, has its own unique successes and failures, and leads to its own unique set of lessons to ponder. Still, some issues transcend an individual circumstance and might hold insight for the future. With this in mind, a number of general requirements seem to cut across

5. These categories rely on an expansive definition of the category titles as can be seen in table 2.
the examined cases. The discussion of these requirements are organized into the categories outlined in table 2 even though, as noted above, specific requirements do not necessarily cleanly fit within any one specific category.

The discussions below simply scratch the surface in terms of the requirements that USMC forces have faced in past HA/POs, even just the seven examined in this research memorandum. They highlight some of the more important areas of requirements and provides some indication of how these differ from requirements in "traditional missions." The appendices provide more detailed information on requirements in each of the specific operations.

Command and control

Like all military operations, humanitarian assistance and peace operations require some form of command and control structure. The very existence and survivability of the military's command and control structure makes the military a preferred organization for responding in disaster situations. There are a number of ways, however, in which HA/POs can stress military (USMC) command and control differently than traditional operations. The following are some of the requirements in the command and control arena derived from the seven examined operations.

Command responsibility

In HA/POs, a commander may have to wear many more hats than he would in a "more typical" combat operation. In combat, a commander essentially must worry about commanding his unit and coordinating with other units—i.e., the commander must wear the traditional military hat (or helmet or cover). In an HA/PO, however, a commander may have to act as local mayor (resolving disputes in a relief camp or in a town without a functioning civilian political structure); educator (helping establish school systems); police chief (running the local police or using military forces to maintain public order); diplomat (dealing with VIPs, both U.S. and foreign), city planner (deciding what infrastructure the city needs to keep running); relief administrator (deciding on where to provide relief assistance); or even talk-show personality (to communicate the inten-
tions and methods of the military force). Commanders may face the challenge of wearing all of these (and even more) hats during the same operation, with a constant shifting in perspective from one responsibility to another.

**Liaison and coordination requirements**

Ensuring adequate liaison is critical in essentially all military operations, but it is particularly important in HA/POs for various reasons. This liaison must occur not only with other military organizations (whether U.S. or coalition partners) but also with governmental and non-governmental organizations. Sometimes these liaisons will function in rather traditional roles. During Provide Comfort, Air-Naval-Ground Liaison Company (ANGLICO) Marines deployed into the theater to serve with coalition forces in northern Iraq. The ANGLICO teams provided liaison between the coalition partners and U.S. forces, and acted as the forward air controllers (FACs) for the U.S. aircraft that provided close air support.

The military mission in HA/POs is often secondary to the overall objective. Especially in relief operations, the military is there to facilitate others' activities. In Provide Comfort, the coalition sought to turn over responsibility for aiding the Kurds as quickly as possible to the United Nations and non-governmental relief organizations. This required aggressive coordination with these organizations through, for example, formation of a civil-military operations center (CMOC) to coordinate military activities with non-governmental organization (NGO)/private voluntary organization (PVO) requirements.

Liaison and coordination often play critical political roles as well. Operation Sea Angel forces were in Bangladesh to assist a fledgling democratic state. The U.S. ambassador stated that it was important for the U.S. military to avoid any indication of infringement on Bengali sovereignty. Thus, the JTF commander worked closely with Bengali authorities and accepted direction in relief activities from a coordination committee run by the Bengalis.

Liaison is important for many other reasons. For example, in many HA/POs, military forces are operating in areas outside traditional military training or expertise. Thus, liaison with organizations that
may be expert in the situation (such as with UN High Commissioner for Refugees personnel who have extensive experience with refugee camps) will play an important role in the military's activities in an HA/PO.

Domestic operations, both HAOs and POs, also demand extensive liaison activity. Liaison requirements following Hurricane Andrew included the need to coordinate and conduct liaison with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); Florida state authorities; local politicians; police agencies; housing authorities; utility companies; the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and other private relief and volunteer groups; the Florida National Guard; and other units.

Legal demands

HA/POs can place great demands on JAG officers. Many of the requirements are similar to those encountered in other operations, such as assisting the commanders establish rules of engagement (ROEs) and handling infractions by military personnel. Others are not necessarily so clear cut. For example, running civilian societies (essentially, such as Operation GTMO) can present many challenges to the JAG in helping to determine appropriate policies for camp structure and organizations. (This heavily involves Civil Affairs expertise.) In many disaster-relief situations, for another example, the donations that will flood the affected region will create a different set of legal challenges. Following Hurricane Andrew, for example, someone donated the use of commercial laundry equipment for camps housing hurricane victims. Since this equipment was a “loan,” an agreement was needed delineating who was responsible for maintaining the equipment and how the equipment would be returned to the donor. The heavy demands of contracting in HA/POs clearly create requirements for more legal assistance.

Rules of engagement

During HA/POs, the U.S. military often operates with modified peacetime rules of engagement (ROEs). Determining and communicating the appropriate modifications is an early challenge during all operations, but can pose special challenges during HA/POs. These actions are critical for a variety of reasons, including, for exam-
pie, determining which weapons are appropriate for the deploying forces to bring in. Following Andrew and the LA Riots, questions arose as to the appropriate equipment and weapons readiness for military forces. Before deploying into LA, for example, Marines drew machine guns, only to return them to the armory an hour later. During Eastern Exit, differences existed between the military and the ambassador on the ROEs. The military units adopted a modified version of the ambassador's instructions—without informing the ambassador of a remaining discrepancy.\(^7\) During Sea Angel, the security (absence of a threat) and political situation led to an order that the U.S. military forces (with very limited exceptions) could not bring any weapons ashore.

**Overseas versus domestic operations**

Although many of the tasks and operational requirements might be the same, HA/POs on U.S. territory are far different legally, organizationally, administratively, fiscally, and mentally from actions abroad. The vast differences in operating environments require, for example, a clear understanding of the legal limitations the *Posse Comitatus Act* places on the police actions by federal (federalized) forces on U.S. soil. Even seemingly innocent activities can raise serious constitutional issues, such as the question of church-state separation and the role of military chaplains in a domestic disaster (such issues were raised during and following the Hurricane Andrew disaster-relief operation). Like communication of ROEs in all operations, explaining these restrictions to all involved forces is critical to operations inside the United States and its territories.


7. The ambassador stated that he did not want the Marines and SEALs to start shooting unless someone was “coming over the wall.” The military modified this to firing on direct threats in accordance with the peacetime ROEs. Thus, a Somali aiming a .50-caliber machine gun from outside the Embassy compound at either the evacuation force personnel or evacuees would draw fire, whereas a Somali climbing over the wall with only a knife in hand would not.
Joint Task Force requirements

In some ways an HA/PO is simply another military operation. Many of the requirements and challenges an HA/PO presents for a military force are encountered in many other types of operations. Just as with most other major U.S. military operations short of outright war, large HA/POs will likely occur under the command of a Joint Task Force (JTF) formed for the operation. Joint Task Forces commanded six of the seven examined operations. In two of the six, Marines commanded the JTF and provided most of the staff. JTF commands place additional requirements on USMC forces for supplying personnel (whether the core of the staff or liaison officers and a few augmentees to the staff) and other support (such as transportation) to the JTF headquarters. The creation of such ad hoc commands often highlights other requirements and issues. For example, 2d Force Service Support Group (FSSG) supplied the commander and core of the JTF for Operation GTMO. On arrival in Guantanamo, the 2d FSSG Marines established a local area network (LAN) within the JTF HQ. Augmenting Army and Air Force members of the JTF HQ staff discovered that their equipment was not compatible with the USMC LAN. Such problems compound when a combined (multinational) force rather than a joint task force is used.

Planning/transition

Planning is a central component of command. HA/POs provide a number of unusual challenges for planners, from dealing with the wide variety of organizations which a military force may need to coordinate with, to determining the operational requirements for the particular disaster, and establishing (and maintaining) a realistic endstate for the operation. The latter involves, for example, developing sensible measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to help the commander make informed decisions. As part of the endstate,

determining how to transition from U.S. military operations (and to whom) is a critical element. As with many other types of military operations, initiating an HA/PO might be easier than getting out. In terms of transitioning U.S. military forces out of an operation, the partners may not fully cooperate because they may not want to see the U.S. military forces leave. Thus, the U.S. military may have to "push" to get this transition underway. Following Hurricane Andrew and President Bush’s decision for the federal government to pay 100 percent of disaster-relief costs, many local officials resisted taking over responsibilities (such as running camps for disaster victims) from the military. Such reluctance stemmed, in large part, from the shortfalls these local governments faced in coping with the disaster-recovery requirements. It also resulted from a belief that military assistance was "free" (which it was—from the perspective of the local budget).

Communications and information

Just as appropriate communications, information acquisition (intelligence), and information dissemination are key elements of success for virtually all military operations, they are important in HA/POs. The environment of many HA/POs, however, creates a set of requirements somewhat different than that seen in more traditional missions. For example, in terms of information control, the concern in many HA/POs is to ensure the appropriate (and broad) dissemination of information on the activities of U.S. military forces rather than the drive for secrecy during combat operations. The following are some of the requirements in communications and information derived from the seven case studies.

Communications

Each of the seven HA/POs examined in this research memorandum stressed USMC (and U.S. military) communications capabilities in some way. Some stresses came from shortfalls in capabilities, such as the poor capabilities of Marine radios in an urban environment (during the LA Riots) and the shortfalls in or problems with satellite communications equipment (Eastern Exit and Provide Comfort). Other "shortfalls" simply resulted from the fact that not every organization in the world uses the same communications equipment. Marines had to acquire additional equipment to communicate with other groups.
In these seven operations this ranged from police scanners, cellular phones, and fax machines in LA to hand-held Motorola radios borrowed from the U.S. Embassy during Eastern Exit for communications with the Embassy security personnel. Despite such shortfalls, military communications capabilities often are critical in HA/POs (such as major natural disasters) in which the civilian communications system has been damaged or destroyed. Although the growth of private satellite communications capabilities, portable phones, and hand-held radios might be changing this, military communications historically have provided a critical basic capability while the civilian system was repaired.

Intelligence and information

HA/POs can place great demands on the military’s intelligence systems. Typically, little of the information required for an HAO is a priority in U.S. intelligence collection (or, perhaps, dissemination). In none of these seven operations did the command feel that it had adequate information on hand as it committed the first Marine forces. (This may be true of all military operations, however.) Some of these problems derived from failures in long-established information collection and dissemination methods. (Such as the failure to provide accurate maps to the forces in Operation Eastern Exit. They did not receive, for example, a basic map of the Embassy Compound until ten minutes after the first helicopters landed there.) In other situations, the inadequacies in information flow seem to derive from inadequate understanding of who may have information on the disaster’s circumstances. For example, no information from on-scene relief organizations made it to Sea Angel planners, even though the JTF did not form until ten days after the cyclone had hit. Also, for the two domestic operations (Andrew and Garden Plot in LA), the legal limitations on domestic intelligence activities limited the options available to monitor and report on gang activity.

Disseminating information in HA/POs

Many HA/POs will occur in the presence of or as part of coalition effort. Especially in humanitarian assistance element, a wide range of international organizations may be involved. In this type of environment, U.S. forces must be able to disseminate information with rela-
tive freedom to foster a two-way exchange of information. During Provide Comfort, a "combined task force" composed of a dozen countries' forces, much of the information supplied to the command carried the restriction "NOFORN." Information/intelligence-sharing requirements are not limited to coalition partners or host-nation governments. Often, private voluntary relief organizations will have unique perspectives or information sources in an HA/PO. The willingness to share this information with U.S. forces might depend on an eventual two-way flow of information.

Identifying others' capabilities

A key requirement in HA/POs is identifying and understanding other organizations' abilities to respond to the situation at hand and how these capabilities will interact with USMC capabilities. USMC forces, in most circumstances, cannot meet all requirements of the operation (or, perhaps, cannot do so as successfully as it could with the cooperation of other organizations). Such complementary capabilities can come from other U.S. services; for instance, Army special forces provided disaster assessment during Operation Sea Angel and Army civil affairs units essentially ran the migrant camps during Operation GTMO. In the current environment of increasing emphasis on "jointness," we can expect most HA/POs to rely on such interservice complementary capabilities.

Such complementary capabilities also come from outside the military. For example, the Red Cross handled much of the daily administration of the tent cities following Hurricane Andrew, and CARE provided the medical supplies for USN and USMC medical personnel to treat Bengalis during Operation Sea Angel. Liaisons are a key means of identifying such complementary capabilities.

Civil Affairs/PSYOPs

HA/POs, by their very nature, involve military forces with large civilian populations. In general, the military's expertise in dealing with civilians (other than, perhaps, the media and politicians) lies with civil affairs (CA) units. The U.S. Marine Corps' CA assets are in the Reserve; unless they are active for other reasons, they have to volunteer for activation if the Marine forces require CA expertise during
the operation (or the Marine forces would have to rely on Army CA expertise, which is principally in the Reserve as well). Requirements for CA in HA/POs can range from providing liaison with civil authorities (such as following Hurricane Andrew), to assisting in the restoration of civil authority (for example, during Provide Comfort), to essentially creating and running a civil society (GTMO). Psychological operations (PSYOPs) capabilities also have an important role in providing the military with a means to communicate with the affected communities about the mission, objectives, and means of the military operation. Although the term psychological operations has, in the past, made many groups (such as relief organizations) uneasy, the basic purpose of assisting the operation through information dissemination is an important corollary to other military activities. In the seven operations, such information dissemination ranged from dropping pamphlets to explain to civilians how to avoid getting hurt when a helicopter lands (Provide Comfort and Sea Angel) to using Voice of America broadcasts for informing the local populace about American military activity (Eastern Exit and Provide Comfort).

Public affairs

HA/POs can draw a horde of reporters and, especially where bullets are not flying, every military action might occur under the watchful eye of a live television feed. (During Hurricane Andrew, Marines constructing the first tent cities worked under the watchful eyes of CNN and other news teams). Reporters will often seek military assistance (such as transportation) in the austere environment likely in many HA/POs. Also, HA/POs differ from combat operations in the requirements to protect information. In general, especially in HAOs, military forces can operate more openly in HA/POs than in traditional combat operations.

Logistics and administration

Just as the military’s command and control capabilities can make it a preferred instrument for disaster relief, the military (USMC) logistics and administrative capabilities are of great value during HA/POs. The following are some of the requirements in logistics and administration derived from the seven case studies.
Transportation

Each of these operations placed heavy demands on Marine transportation assets. In every one of these cases, at least a portion of Marine forces self-deployed or deployed via Marine assets to the area of operations. The following are some examples of USMC self-deployment in these operations:

- Marine convoys from Camp Pendleton to Los Angeles for Garden Plot operations
- Fixed-wing transport of the JTF staff to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in Operation GTMO
- CH-53E insertion of Marines and SEALs from 466 nautical miles away into the American Embassy, Mogadishu, Somalia, during Operation Eastern Exit
- OV-10 self-deployment flights from Okinawa to the Philippines following Mount Pinatubo's eruption in Operation Fiery Vigil.

In addition to moving Marines and Marine equipment, Marine transportation assets moved people and goods in support of the HA/PO operations. Examples of this type of transportation support in these operations include:

- Moving evacuees from shore-to-ship during Eastern Exit
- Using USMC trucks and LVSs to help the Army move a "Mormon volunteer contingent" in Florida following Hurricane Andrew
- Helicopter lifts of food and medical supplies during Provide Comfort and Sea Angel
- Carrying VIP visitors such as the Vice President's wife, Marilyn Quayle, on her visit to Bangladesh during Sea Angel.

Engineering

Especially when conducted in austere conditions, HA/POs can place great demands on engineering assets. Only two of these operations (Eastern Exit and LA Riots) did not require some level of engineering support. USMC engineering assets were critical to restoring basic ser-
vices at Subic Bay Naval Base following Mount Pinatubo's eruption (Fiery Vigil) and provided much-needed assistance in restoring services following Hurricane Andrew (by, for example, helping put up poles for electric networks and in helping remove debris). During Provide Comfort, USMC engineers, in addition to supporting U.S. and coalition forces, helped establish expeditionary fields for helicopter and fixed-wing operations, construct camps for Kurdish refugees, and restore utility services in some Iraqi towns.

**Personnel**

Because HA/POs often require specialists not resident in most USMC units, they can place great demands on the personnel system. Through the seven cases, the Marine Corps was forced to source numerous specific personnel requirements, ranging from JTF staff augmentation with specific skills (such as logistics planners for GTMO) to linguists, to activating Civil Affairs reservists. Sometimes the requirements are met within on-scene units—such as the presence with the afloat units conducting Eastern Exit of a Marine familiar with Mogadishu and numerous multilingual Marines to help communicate with evacuees from 30 nations.

**Language/linguist requirements**

Along with liaison, many HA/POs will have many requirements for linguists. This can range from interrogators (such as those needed for Operation GTMO) to linguists capable of communicating with the people the military is assisting (such as the Spanish-speaking teams who went to local communities following Hurricane Andrew). Clearly, some of the HA/POs of recent years (GTMO and Provide Comfort, for example) have occurred in areas where the USMC has few or any specialists in the local languages. (Operation GTMO's requirement for Haitian Creole interrogators/linguists exceeded the number of Haitian/Creole interrogators/linguists then identified in the entire U.S. military.)

**Financing and contracting**

Both financing and contracting are major issues in most HA/POs. In terms of financing, across the seven operations, Marine forces saw little reimbursement of the costs of the operation, even though in
some cases they paid great attention to this issue from the initiation of the effort. To avoid paying for an HA/PO totally from O&M, Marine units have to pay close attention to the regulations on funding authorities, essentially as soon as the warning order is given (if not even earlier). Reimbursement can occur—just not rapidly, easily, or, generally, in totality.

HA/POs can lead to added expenditures in many ways, one of which is the need to contract for services the military can’t provide. Some of this is rather traditional in orientation, such as the need during Provide Comfort for host-nation trucking support to deploy the Marine forces from the port of Iskendrum to the area of operations, 450 miles inland. Other contracting requirements are not necessarily so typical, such as the need for large numbers of portable toilets following Hurricane Andrew or the requirement for baby supplies (diapers, disposable baby bottles, food) during Operation GTMO and in the tent cities in Florida following Hurricane Andrew. Although many would argue that the military does not or should not be involved in purchasing goods to support a civilian population, the record of these seven operations shows that military forces often have no choice but to do so.

**Unique logistical requirements**

Many humanitarian assistance operations require far different supplies and logistical support than what the military requires for a typical operation (if there is such a thing). For instance, civilian groups are not restricted to people 18 to 50 years old (as is the military for the most part). Thus, if required to provide for a civilian population for an extended period, a military force will require, for example, supplies of baby formula and diapers. (Operations Eastern Exit, Fiery Vigil, and GTMO all had some form of shortage of such supplies.) Such requirements have included containers for holding personal pets during an evacuation (Fiery Vigil), and particular types of food to meet religious restrictions (such as not serving pork to Muslims, Eastern Exit) or to help a civilian group celebrate traditional holidays (pumpkins for Haitians to make pumpkin soup for the national holiday during Operation GTMO).
To meet these and other unusual requirements—and to facilitate turnover of operations to other organizations—military forces in HA operations often need the ability to issue contracts for outside support. Operation Provide Comfort relied on civilian Turkish transportation for movement of forces and relief supplies. The existence of this contracted civilian support made it easier to turn over relief activities to UN agencies.

Care of civilians

The objective of many HA/POs is to assist distressed civilian populations. Marine forces in HA/POs may have to provide care for these civilians. This can range from establishing essentially cities for housing civilians (tent cities in Provide Comfort, GTMO, Andrew) to providing medical care and any number of other services. Many of the things required to support a civilian population differ from those needed by the military's mainly 18-to-50-year-old healthy population. Thus, whether the need is for diapers and formula for babies or wheelchair accessible tent facilities (such as the need to build handicap-accessible toilet facilities that were built in the Homestead tent city), this population will require many things a military unit does not have and does not require for its own activities. In addition, the military might have to provide a governing structure (as in GTMO) or assistance to civilian authorities (as in Andrew) within “tent cities.”

Operations

One nature of HA/POs, especially those conducted in a permissive environment such as the Sea Angel and Hurricane Andrew disaster relief operations, is that they change the relative prominence of various parts of the military. If, in ground combat, the tank, rifleman, and attack helicopter are at the leading edge of the campaign, mobile hospitals, five-ton trucks, and water purification units might be the tip of the spear in a disaster relief operation. Even though the relative importance of combat capabilities might change from a traditional, combat mission to a HA/PO, this does not mean that these capabilities do not have a role to play. In addition, there are some ways that HA/POs call on operational capabilities in different ways than traditional missions. The following are some of the requirements for oper-
ational capabilities as drawn from the USMC experience in the seven examined HA/POs.

**Combat capabilities**

In general war, combat forces are the tip of the military spear. In many HA/POs, combat forces are an enabling force—guaranteeing the ability of other parts of the military and other organizations to conduct relief operations. For example, the presence of coalition ground forces forced back the Iraqi military and created the conditions for Kurds to return to their homes in Provide Comfort. Some HA/POs, especially peace operations, focus on combat capabilities ranging from sniper teams and observers for urban warfare situations (LA) to large units ready for full-scale combat (Provide Comfort, again). Obviously, the more benign the environment, the smaller the requirement for traditional combat capabilities in an operation.

**Close air support**

In HA/POs in a semi- or non-permissive environment, forces on the ground might rapidly need CAS to respond to a rapidly changing environment. Both Eastern Exit and Provide Comfort required on-call CAS support to USMC ground elements. During Provide Comfort, air cover provided by the Air Force and Navy intimidated Iraqi forces and, with the recent Desert Storm experience clearly in mind, helped deter the Iraqis from more directly confronting coalition forces as they moved the Kurds back into Iraq.

**Reconnaissance**

Each HA/PO will place different demands on reconnaissance and surveillance assets. These demands range from surveys of the effects of a natural disaster (whether conducted by national assets, Marine assets (such as remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), or other military assets))) to support to forces operating on the ground. Whether mainly monitoring the activities of a refugee camp (GTMO), monitoring and assessing a natural disaster (Sea Angel, Fiery Vigil, Andrew), or conducting surveillance of enemy (potential enemy) forces (Provide Comfort), HA/POs will require some form of reconnaissance support.
Military police

Military police, both USA and USMC, have played a prominent role in most HA/POs. Requirements for MPs can range from traffic and crowd control (Fiery Vigil, Andrew, LA Riots) to providing security to camps housing refugees (GTMO) or disaster victims (Andrew). Some HA/POs might require criminal investigators (when, for example, the military has responsibility for running a civilian community that might have civilian crimes, such as occurred during Operation GTMO). MPs might also, for example, provide escorts for the many VIPs that show up during HA/POs.

Expeditionary airfield operations

Whether projecting forces into a disaster situation or into a post-conflict operation, Marine forces often have to conduct air operations in an, at-best, austere environment. Marine forces had to establish, for example, air operations capabilities in Northern Iraq during Provide Comfort (in conjunction with USAF assets) and reestablish flight operations capability at Cubi Point during Fiery Vigil (in conjunction with Seabees).

Requirements in their context

Essentially none of the requirements above stands in isolation. For example, the washing machines “donated” in Hurricane Andrew derived from a requirement to clean victims’ clothing and bedding in the tent cities. With this donation came requirements for legal (drafting an agreement on the conditions of the “loan”), contracting (finding supplies and a company to maintain the equipment), transportation (moving the equipment), engineering/sanitation (constructing facilities to house the machines, and providing electrical and water services), personnel (providing Marines to run the machines), and security (guarding the machines). Although not every requirement crosses this many boundaries, some have even more extensive ramifications. In short, this section simply highlighted some of the important requirements placed on military forces conducting humanitarian assistance and peace operations.
Other reoccurring themes

Not all issues arising from the USMC experience in HA/POs are easily placed in the context of “requirements.” The following are a number of issues or issue areas which arise from the examination of the seven HA/POs. Each of these issues has some form of implication for USMC requirements but these implications are not necessarily clear. Several of these address broader HA/PO policy issues. For example, impartiality has implications from the White House down to the individual Marine. In addition to these implications, however, it seems that the very issue of whether the United States should even attempt to be impartial in many HA/POs—at least those conducted outside the arena of traditional UN peacekeeping—deserves careful consideration. The discussions below provide a perspective rather than, necessarily, answers on these important issues.

Mission creep, mission shift, mission transition, mission leap?

HA/POs have developed a reputation for being more prone to unclear initial taskings or changing taskings than other operations. Examining these seven cases of USMC involvement in humanitarian assistance seems to bear out the contention that forces involved in humanitarian assistance/disaster-relief operations can expect a fluid set of taskings because the changing situation on the ground often causes the mission’s focus to change. Many in the defense community are criticizing the problem of “mission creep,” and are seeking to avoid it in future operations. This criticism seems, however, to group together at least four different types of mission change, each with its own form of rationale and potential problems.

- Mission creep is the gradual accretion of additional tasks viewed as necessary to achieve the mission’s initial objective. For example, Marines (and other military forces) reestablished basic utility services in northern Iraq to encourage Kurdish refugees to
return to the cities. Such actions were not included in the initial tasking nor envisioned during the planning for the movement into northern Iraq, but seemed necessary for achieving the mission's objectives. Such changes to the mission's tasks seem to occur generally "on the ground," as the "man on the spot" believes necessary. Thus, mission creep occurs on the ground due not to changes in the desired outcome but due to changing perceptions of what is required to achieve the mission's objective.

- **Mission shift** occurs when forces adopt tasks not included in the initial mission which expand the mission. Key in this is the disconnect between the on-scene decision to involve the force in additional tasks and political decision-making about the mission's objectives.

- **Mission transition** results from a changing perception as to the objectives of an operation. In reevaluating an operation's mission, this occurs in higher headquarters and political arenas. Mission transition occurs in an environment of gradual and, perhaps, unclear, unrecognized, or confused modification of objectives and tasks. These changes, therefore, may not get stated explicitly nor lead to a reevaluation of the forces involved and the tasks assigned these forces. Although the seven case studies do not provide a clear instance of mission transition, U.S. support to UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) in the

9. This type of situation occurs in many other HA/POs. For example, during Operation Restore Hope, the U.S. military helped retrain and reequip Somali police as a means to aid operational security (through, for example, Somali police directing traffic in Mogadishu).

10. Mission creep might also include instances of "leaning forward"; when a military unit conducts additional tasks not explicitly stated in the mission which do not hinder the achievement of the mission's central taskings. This would include, for example, helping families clear their yards of garbage in south Florida following Hurricane Andrew when the mission called for clearing debris from roadways, not private residences. Reservist collection and delivery of relief supplies following Hurricane Andrew, and the rescue assistance in Lebanon's severe 1982-83 winter might also fall into this category.
summer and fall of 1993 might be in this category. It seems that the Clinton administration was moving toward a new policy in Somalia while the military forces continued operations in pursuit of the objective that was laid down following Somali attacks on UN (and U.S.) forces. If the political leaders had made the transition to a new policy and had changed (or, more accurately, believed they had changed or were changing) the mission’s objectives, which seems quite possible based on the available record for September and October 1993, they did not clearly communicate this shift in orders to the military.

- Mission leap results from a decision, whether for political reasons or because of the situation on the ground, to radically change the mission and, therefore, the military’s tasks. An important point is that this represents an explicit choice, whether or not the political or military leadership recognizes the full implications of this decision. For example, Operation Provide Comfort began as a ten-day operation to provide emergency supplies (principally food and water) to Kurds who had fled Iraqi forces. Within weeks, the mission changed to providing not only relief assistance but also transportation and security for returning the Kurdish refugees to their homes. President Bush decided to change the mission and changed the forces assigned to reflect the requirements of this changed mission.

It seems clear that mission creep, mission shift, mission transition, and mission leap are part of the conduct of HA/POs. With the possible exception of Eastern Exit (the evacuation of the American Embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991), each of the operations this memorandum examines had a potential or an actual mission change (in one or more of the categories above) during the operation. Rather than simply decrying the problem, this four-way conception may allow us to focus on the real problems generally lumped together in the phrase “mission creep.” As conceived here, mission creep and leap are inevitable elements of operations, representing conscious decisions either on the scene or at higher headquarters to modify or drastically change the mission’s parameters. The serious problems exist with mission shift and transition. In both,
disconnects between policy and military operations can lead to disaster. Clear statements of policy guidance and constant interaction between the engaged force and higher headquarters might provide the only means to avoid mission shift and transition in HA/POs.

To aid understanding of this four-part distinction, figures 1 through 4 present a graphic display of the concepts of mission creep, mission shift, mission transition and mission leap.

Figure 1. Mission creep

![Mission creep diagram](image1)

a. Mission creep is the situation where additional tasks are identified as required to achieve the desired objective. In this graphic, “x”s represent originally identified tasks under the assigned mission while “y”s indicate additional tasks assumed en route the desired objective.

Figure 2. Mission shift

![Mission shift diagram](image2)

a. Mission shift is the situation where the activities on the ground begin to move away from tasks necessary to reach the identified objective. In mission shift, a possibility exists for a disconnect between policy and the activities on the ground. In this graphic, “x”s represent originally identified tasks under the assigned mission, “y”s indicate additional tasks assumed en route the desired objective, and “z”s represented tasks or activities conducted on the ground that lead the operation away (consciously or unconsciously) from the assigned mission objective.
Mission transition is the situation where policy changes are occurring which imply or require a change in objective but where this transition to a new policy is not clearly communicated to the forces on the ground. In this situation, there is a potential for a disconnect between policy and the operational activities. In this graphic, "x"s represent originally identified tasks under the assigned mission and "y"s indicate additional tasks that may or may not be contributing to the transition to a new objective.

Mission leap is the situation where an explicit choice is made to change policy and the activities on the ground to reflect a new objective. With communication of an explicit change in policy and orders, there is less chance for a disconnect between policy and operations. In this graphic, "x"s represent originally identified tasks under the assigned mission, "y"s indicate additional tasks assumed en route the desired objective, and "q"s represent additional tasks required for the new objective.
Task expansion

Just as the mission itself might change, the initial Marine Corps’ tasks might not represent the full range of eventual USMC tasks. This process of task expansion occurs when a force, whether by order or from initiative, adopts a greater share of the operational burden. Task expansion can occur whether the mission changes in some form (see discussion above about mission creep, shift, transition, and leap) or if the overall mission remains the same. Figure 5 provides a graphic representation of the concept of task expansion.

Figure 5. Task expansion

(tasks originally assigned USMC forces)

Additional USMC tasks

activities on the ground

Policy

objective

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>tasks originally assigned USMC forces</th>
<th>Additional USMC tasks</th>
<th>activities on the ground</th>
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USMC forces are, it seems, prone to task expansion as an operation goes on as is evidenced in the seven examined operations. In several cases examined, messages such as the commander’s intent, and warning or execution orders explicitly laid out tasks. In other cases, MARFOR tasks were neither cleanly nor explicitly laid out and seem to have evolved from USMC capabilities to respond to differing areas of the crisis. In some cases (such as during Fiery Vigil), we see a mixture of this. In Fiery Vigil, the CJTF explicitly laid out a limited set of USMC taskings—essentially focused on security and transportation (helicopter and ground) support. On top of these explicit taskings, USMC capabilities, such as the capability to help restore the utilities...
in Subic Bay, led to a far greater role for USMC forces in the disaster-relief aspects of the operation. The original mission included maintaining and restoring services at Subic Bay but the Marine Corps share of these initial tasks expanded due to the MAGTF's ability to shoulder an additional share of the burden amidst the disaster situation.

Provide Comfort provides numerous examples of task expansion. For example, the 24th MEU provided much of the initial staffing for JTF-B until U.S. Army, Europe, personnel arrived to assume the duties. Clearly, a JTF commander requires a staff but this was not part of the tasking to the involved Marine forces. That the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) provided augmentation to the JTF staff represents a task expansion for the Marines even though it does not mean that the overall mission changed in any manner.

The expansion of taskings beyond explicit and initial USMC taskings does not necessarily mean that the mission itself changes. Instead it seems to reflect the Marine Corps' ability (or propensity) to shoulder an additional share of the burden. Adoption of additional tasks seems to occur due to the inherent and robust capabilities of Marine Corps units which allow Marine forces to take on more taskings that are required to achieve mission success.

Management intensiveness

In a number of ways, the military has to manage force activities more intensely in an HA/PO than in a combat operation. This results from a range of causes. For example, domestic and foreign operations have different legal requirements (such as the restrictions on U.S. military forces acting as a police force on U.S. soil). These differing legal and administrative environments mean that the same basic mission would likely require more intensive management if it took place in the United States than if it took place overseas. For example, during the deployment in Los Angeles, the JTF staff was aware of the positioning of squad-sized units in outposts. This level of detail would not necessarily occur in a 12,000-man PO overseas.
Management intensiveness might also result from the fact that in HA/Ps military personnel often operate outside established doctrine and thus commanders might be less certain that the entire chain of command has the same understanding of particular taskings. During Eastern Exit, the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and Commander, Landing Force (CLF), decided to send three O-5s (with eight other officers), with just 60 personnel total, into the American Embassy compound so that they (CATF and CLF) could feel confident about the actions the inserted force might take in the event that communications broke down between the ATF and the American Embassy compound.

Size of operation could be a key factor—a massive disaster-relief operation (such as Hurricane Andrew and Fiery Vigil) would not allow the command chain to manage as intensively as they might in smaller disaster-relief efforts. In any event, it seems that the military chain of command manages disaster-relief and other HA/P operations more intensively than combat operations.

### Achieving impartiality

The traditional notion of peacekeeping emphasizes that maintaining neutrality is a prerequisite for mission success. Because concepts from peacekeeping are major inputs to conceptualizing the “new” uses of military force, impartiality has become one touchstone for consideration in any deployment. For some HA/Ps, such as disaster relief in a peaceful area (Sea Angel, Hurricane Andrew, Fiery Vigil), the issue of impartiality is not of such importance.

Impartiality becomes a more serious issue in circumstances that involve the use (or potential use) of armed force. As a military force attempts to operate in a “complex humanitarian emergency” or a peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation, the issue of whether a deployed force must be impartial and, if so, how to maintain that

11. The order to a battalion commander, for instance, to “seize that hill” will have more common understanding among Marine Corps officers than an order to “help relief organizations.” Established training and doctrine gives clarity to the first, but not, for good reason, to the second.
impartiality can complicate the operation. Currently, when examining the potential for military involvement in complex humanitarian emergencies, operating impartially is emphasized. Neutrality might not always be the most appropriate approach (such as in a peace-enforcement operation). Striving for impartiality might unduly complicate a mission, and achieving or maintaining such impartiality might be impossible.

Of the seven operations considered here, two seem relevant for this debate: Eastern Exit and Provide Comfort. In Eastern Exit, the U.S. forces sought impartiality to avoid attacks on the American Embassy and the forces evacuating it. This seems to have been achieved, perhaps because of the limited (17-hour) duration of the U.S. military presence on the ground. In Provide Comfort, on the other hand, there was no attempt at impartiality—the villain was clear to all concerned: the Iraqi military acting under Sadam Hussein’s orders. This agreement on a common villain and threat united the coalition and simplified the operation. The coalition forces had to be concerned with impartiality with the various Kurdish factions, but this was not the core issue in the operation.

Such issues are typically less important in permissive operations where the permissiveness does not rely on a threatened use of force (as in some peacekeeping situations). Still, impartiality issues can arise in permissive environments. For example, while conducting disaster-relief operations, U.S. military forces might have to be aware of the distribution of relief supplies and thus (especially in domestic operations) avoid criticism for undue favoritism of one community or group over others in the relief aid. During Sea Angel, for example, some aid groups complained that they were not receiving their “fair

12. Although no definition has been established, a complex humanitarian emergency essentially is a situation where conflict either aggravates some type of disaster (such as conflicts in the Horn of Africa aggravating drought conditions there) or complicates humanitarian relief efforts (such as the presence of Iraqi forces and Kurdish activities against Turkey, which complicated caring for the Kurdish refugees).
share” of support from U.S. assets and that the relief distribution was not appropriately spread among affected communities.

Impartiality can also mean political impartiality, as when the Sea Angel operation was clearly placed under Bengali control to buttress the fledgling democratic government there (to bolster the democratic government rather than any particular party).

Maintaining impartiality can complicate mission requirements. It might require modifying activities, extensively negotiating and conducting liaison with all potentially involved parties, and being acutely aware of all actions that might threaten impartiality.13

It might be appropriate to question the necessity of maintaining impartiality in any complex humanitarian emergency to which U.S. forces must respond. In many (perhaps even most) HA/POs, the political objectives may require impartiality, but in some cases the complications and difficulties of achieving and maintaining impartiality might make the mission impossible to achieve. Thus, rather than applying peacekeeping principles where they might not be appropriate, policy-makers and military planners should examine the necessity for impartiality before committing forces in any operation.

**Inter-agency and inter-organizational relations**

Not surprisingly, each of these operations had some type of problem with inter-organizational relationships. This happens in virtually every military operation, but in HA/POs the military is forced to deal with organizations that do not typically appear on the battlefield. Problems emerged not only among the different U.S. services, but also between the U.S. military and other U.S. Government organizations, other nations’ military forces, UN organizations, non-govern-

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13. A little-known example of this problem comes from the 1982-1984 Marine presence in Lebanon. In the summer of 1983, a large number of Marines went to a Phalangist celebration (which was reported in the local press) and then some Marines wore the Phalangist T-shirts (given to them as gifts) during the daily physical training. This came just before the escalation of Muslim attacks on U.S. positions.
mental organizations, and the host nation. For the most part, these problems did not greatly affect actual operations, and none were "show stoppers." On the other hand, such problems made it more difficult for the U.S. military to achieve assigned objectives.

In every one of the examined operations, organizations had some form of coordination problem that had potentially serious implications. These ranged from Turkish customs officials delaying the movement of follow-on forces to Operation Provide Comfort by as much as eight days to the lack of compatibility between military and police communications equipment following the Los Angeles riots. Many of these issues did not necessarily have critical consequences, but they did make the military's tasks more difficult.

Many of the problems resulted from lack of familiarity between organizations, such as the differing terminology and conceptions between U.S. military forces and local police organizations. During the deployment to Los Angeles, many military units questioned the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD's) division of the city into police districts, questioning why wasn't it more "rational" and follow highway lines. This form of complaint seems to indicate a failure to recognize the imperatives of organizing police and fire districts, which are based on response times and population totals (not to mention such "illogical" issues as tradition and the difficulty of reorganizing police departments with each new highway construction effort).

Although problems are inevitable in inter-organizational activities, especially those conducted under the stress of a disaster situation, some of these problems (especially problems resulting from lack of familiarity) seem ripe for solution. Efforts for education and exchange during training and contingency planning will reduce problems in actual operations. In domestic operations, especially, the military force commander is not necessarily in control of the entire (or even most) of the activity. Realizing this and acting accordingly will improve relations with other involved agencies and organizations. In all operations, use of liaison officers as a means for explaining the capabilities, limitations, requirements, and operating procedures of various organizations will limit problems caused by lack of familiarity or understanding. The burden, however, is not solely on the military.
 Hopefully, the on-going efforts by the U.S. military to reach out to relief and other non-traditional partners will be matched by a desire for education and cooperation by the other organizations and agencies potentially involved in HA/POs, whether domestic or foreign. Improving the synergy between all of these groups will lead to more efficient and effective activities during actual operations.

Political restrictions

Just like every form of military activity, the use of the military for humanitarian or peace operations cannot be divorced from policy and politics. As can happen in other military operations, political restrictions or imperatives can lead to criteria other than efficiency (for example) for planning and execution of military activities in HA/POs. These imperatives or restrictions can determine what, where, and how aid is offered. For example, in Bangladesh during Operation Sea Angel, essentially all 5th MEB Marines returned to the amphibious shipping overnight due to political imperatives even though it may have been more effective—in terms of delivering relief—to have some number of Marines remaining ashore. These obstacles and political implications often intrude at unexpected times and in unexpected ways. Organizations, including military forces, cannot simply expect that involvement in a “good deed”—such as disaster relief—operation will mean that all involved parties will throw their political interests (whether domestic or international) aside to help achieve a common good. Humanitarian assistance operations require the same attention to political detail that occurs in other activities involving the armed forces.
Appendix A: Case study format

The following sections present short write-ups of each of the seven operations reviewed for Marine Corps requirements. Each write-up follows a standard format and includes the following subsections:

- **Overview**: A short description of the operation, including information on the events leading to the operation and the general events of the operation. This subsection also briefly discusses, as appropriate, the activities of other services, coalition members, U.S. Government agencies, and other civilian organizations.

- **Mission**: A short statement of the military force's mission in the operation. Changes in mission are identified.

- **Concept of operations**: A discussion of the initial concept for the conduct of operations. As appropriate, this section also highlights shifts in the concept of operations.

- **USMC tasks**: Based on the mission and concept of operation, a breakdown of the USMC mission into discrete tasks. This subsection discusses how taskings shifted during the operation.

- **Requirements for USMC tasks (and forces available)**: Based on these tasks, we can identify specific requirements for USMC forces. This subsection identifies these requirements and tells how the USMC met these requirements. As appropriate (and as source material allows), this section also highlights what other USMC forces might have been available to meet these requirements.

- **Shortfalls in meeting USMC requirements**: Identifies shortfalls in meeting the requirements for USMC taskings.

- **Other issues**: This subsection discusses issues that are relevant to this study but did not fall into any of the categories above.
Sources: This subsection provides a list of sources available to examine the operations. These lists are intended to provide a means for further examination and are thus not comprehensive. For example, they do not include interviews (conducted for most cases); USMC command chronologies or equivalent other service material; Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS) or Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) entries; or message traffic.¹

These write-ups focus explicitly on USMC operations:

- The tasks given to Marine forces
- The requirements caused by these taskings
- How USMC forces met these taskings
- Any shortfalls in USMC capabilities identifiable in the operation.

With this focus, this research memorandum makes no pretense of attempting to comprehensively document each operation. The write-ups do not necessarily document the activities of other services or agencies appropriately. Nor, other than for the question of capabilities and shortfalls, does this document present lessons-learned material.

¹ CNA has extensive message traffic holdings for Operations Eastern Exit, Sea Angel, and Fiery Vigil. The Naval Operational Archives has a ten-box collection of message traffic and other material from Operation GTMO. The Army Operations Center and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers historical office have extensive files on Hurricane Andrew. The Marine Corps lessons-learned teams gathered material on Operation GTMO, Hurricane Andrew, and Provide Comfort. This material is available at the Marine Corps University’s research center in Quantico, VA. The HQ USMC Operations Center has extensive folders on SPMAGTF LA and SPMAGTF Dade County (Hurricane Andrew).
Appendix B: Operation Eastern Exit: Mogadishu, Somalia, January 1991

Overview

On 2 January 1991, the U.S. ambassador in Mogadishu, Somalia, James K. Bishop, called for military assistance to evacuate the American Embassy amidst the chaos surrounding the fall of the Siad Barré regime. The Secretary of State supported the request and the White House quickly acceded to it. The Secretary of Defense ordered Central Command to undertake the mission. CENTCOM examined four options for evacuation:

1. Use of U.S. Air Force transportation aircraft to carry people out via the airport. Three SOCCENT C-130s and one AC-130, with two platoons of U.S. Army military police, flew to Nairobi, Kenya, for this course of action.

2. Evacuation via SOCCENT MH-53E helicopters at long-range (1,500 miles). This option did not move beyond warning orders.

3. Long-range airborne insertion of security forces. At least two options were considered: a paradrop of several Ranger platoons and an airlift of a Marine company into Mogadishu. Again, this option did not go beyond contingency planning.

4. Use of amphibious forces to evacuate from the sea. CINCCENT ordered two ships (LPH-9 Guam and LPD-14 Trenton) from off the coast of Oman to steam south toward Mogadishu.

Because of fighting in the airport area and a rapid deterioration in the situation in Mogadishu, a long-range insertion of Marines via CH-53Es became the only viable option. Early on the morning of 5 January, two CH-53Es launched from Guam with a security force of 60
Marines and SEALs. The flight of 466 n.mi. involved two aerial refuelings from USMC KC-130s. After inserting the security force, the two Super Stallions remained on the ground for an hour with a USAF AC-130 providing overhead coverage. The two CH-53Es returned to Guam with 61 evacuees in a 350-mile flight; they refueled once.

The security force remained on the ground for 17 hours and, although intermittently threatened by ongoing fighting in the city, did not have to return fire. The final evacuation occurred in black-out conditions, with ten CH-46s (five from each of the two squadrons aboard Guam) ferrying the remaining 220 evacuees and 60-man security force out to the waiting ship. Operation Eastern Exit concluded on 11 January 1991, when Guam and Trenton offloaded 282 evacuees (one of whom had been born aboard ship) in Muscat, Oman.

Mission

The mission was a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) from the American Embassy (AMEMB), Mogadishu, Somalia.

Concept of operations

USNAVCENT conducted the NEO using embarked USMC aviation and ground assets. CH-53Es launched from amphibious ships with security forces at long range and with refueling support from USMC KC-130s. Inserted security forces protected the Embassy compound until the USN ships moved closer to complete the evacuation using embarked CH-46s. USAF AC-130s provided gunfire and surveillance support.

USMC tasks

The evacuation operation from Mogadishu can be broken down into three distinct periods, each with its own specific requirements for execution. The three basic tasks for USMC forces in Eastern Exit were as follows:

1. Long-range insertion of a USMC/USN security force into the AMEMB Mogadishu compound.
2. Secure Embassy perimeter during transit of USN ships to position off Mogadishu.

3. Conduct final evacuation of AMEMB compound using short-range helicopter assets.

Requirements for USMC tasks (and forces available)

We can break each of these three tasks into a series of discrete requirements. The paragraphs below give some idea of the USMC forces available for executing each task and which USMC unit contributed forces.

1. The first task, a long-range insertion of security forces, created two fundamental requirements: a long-range insertion asset had to be available and combat forces had to be available for insertion into the Embassy compound.

   a. Long-range ship-borne lift assets (two CH-53Es from a HMH-463 detachment (det) on Trenton).

   b. Ship-borne lift assets with >500-mile radius of action unfueled or with a refueling capability (CH-53Es supported by refueling by KC-130s from VMGRs 252 and 352, based in Bahrain for Operation Desert Shield).

   c. Available ground forces to provide a security force (a rifle company and other elements of Battalion 1/2 aboard Guam with additional forces (Recon and SEALs) aboard Trenton).

2. The second task required the protection of the Embassy compound for a 17-hour period while the amphibious ships steamed closer to complete the evacuation using CH-46s.


   b. Long-range communications capability for connectivity with the amphibious task force (ATF).

   c. Liaison capability with State Department personnel.
d. An evacuation control center (ECC) team for processing evacuees and preparing them for withdrawal.

e. Reserve/support forces available to reinforce the Embassy compound.

3. The third tasking required an ability to conduct a large-scale movement of people via helicopter over a short range at night. With 24 CH-46s available, with crews accustomed to night-vision goggle (NVG) operations, and a highly trained deck crew on Guam, the force was well situated for the last phase.

   a. Short-range helicopter assets capable of moving 200-plus people from the AMEMB to ships off shore in a short period of time (two CH-46 squadrons (HMM-263 and HMM-365) aboard Guam).

   b. Reserve/support forces available, including combat search and rescue (CSAR) for downed helicopter(s) (two UH-1s aboard Trenton, reserve CH-46s for SAR, and USAF AC-130 for gunfire support).

   c. Capability to conduct night-time helicopter operations.

**Shortfalls in meeting USMC requirements**

This section briefly discusses identifiable shortfalls in meeting the requirements for USMC taskings. In some cases, these comments simply highlight limitations central to the planning of Operation Eastern Exit (such as having only two CH-53Es aboard Trenton).

1. The chief limitation was the limited available long-range helicopter assets (only two CH-53Es). This limitation drove many of the other limiting factors in meeting taskings during Eastern Exit.

   a. Only two CH-53Es were available. The CH-53Es could only carry only a limited force (60 maximum authorized by Commanding General, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (CG 4th MEB)), less than what the commander, landing force (CLF), considered necessary for the reported security situation in the Embassy compound. Because of the range of the
flight and availability of only two CH-53Es, the CLF could not use CH-53Es to carry HMMWVs into the Embassy compound to support the operation.

b. Range limitations of CH-53Es led to a maximum of 500-n.mi. launch into compound (by aviation planners’ preference).

c. Only six pilots were available for CH-53Es, limiting capability for multiple long-range flights to support the evacuation operation (i.e., difficult to reinforce, if necessary, because of time, helicopter lift, and crew-fatigue considerations).

2. The limited long-range insertion capability, which drove the decision to insert only a 60-man security force, led to the force’s chief limitation during the second phase (task)—a limited capacity to confront a large determined assault on the Embassy compound. Planners considered this an unlikely scenario (and one that did not occur). The small ECC presence (and reliance on State Department personnel for ECC functions) also resulted from the limited numbers of personnel the two CH-53Es could carry.

a. USMC long-range communications support was inconsistent because of equipment problems and limited power charge. (The Marines in the inserted security force brought only one USMC portable satellite-communications system. It had a bad coupling, which limited connectivity, and the batteries ran out by early afternoon.)

b. The limit on inserted personnel meant that the Marine component of the security force (47 Marines) could guard about half the Embassy’s perimeter. (USN SEAL snipers covered the remainder of the perimeter.)

c. The limit on inserted personnel led to an ECC of just two Marines. Marines neither searched nor processed any of the evacuees before evacuating them to Guam. (U.S. State Department personnel handled administrative processing in the embassy compound.)

d. Concerns over pilot rest and potential for problems limited willingness to conduct a second insertion flight with
reinforcements for the forces in the compound, even though the on-scene commander requested them.

e. Support from an overhead AC-130 was not always available. The inserted force had no capacity to respond to indirect fire threats against the compound when an AC-130 was not overhead.

3. Few USMC shortfalls are identifiable in the third phase of Eastern Exit. Any shortfalls or other limitations fell mainly outside the USMC tasking.

a. Integral USMC gunfire-support assets were limited (two UH-1s, which did not fly during the evacuation). Reliance on USAF AC-130s for gunfire support meant that the initial CH-46 flight went without air support.

b. The withdrawal from the landing zone was not well coordinated. The failure to identify a clear withdrawal signal made accountability difficult during the final wave and nearly left two Marines in the landing zone (they had not realized that the last helicopters were about to take off).

Sources

1. USCINCCENT/\CCJ3/\ 022320Z JAN 91, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) (U) [Warning Order], Secret

2. USCINCCENT/\CCJ3/\ 030910Z JAN 91, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) (U) [Execute Order], Secret

3. USCINCCENT/\CCJ3/\ 040430Z JAN 91, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) (U) [Planning Order], Secret

4. USCINCCENT/\CCJ3/\ 042230Z JAN 91, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) (U) [Execute Order], Secret

Appendix C: Operation Provide Comfort: Eastern Turkey and Northern Iraq, April–June 1991

Overview

During the war against Iraq, President Bush encouraged Iraqis to oust Saddam Hussein from power. In March 1991, following Desert Storm, the Kurdish minority in Northern Iraq started rising against the Iraqi government. On 22 March, Iraqi forces began a counteroffensive, which led to millions of Kurds fleeing their homes toward Turkey and Iran. Having fled their homes, often with little preparation, into harsh terrain, the Kurds soon faced massive nutritional and health problems. In part due to media accounts of their suffering, on 5 April the UN voted in resolution 688 to authorize the use of force, if necessary, to protect relief efforts for the Kurdish refugees.

U.S. relief efforts began with airdrops of relief supplies the following day. The initial concept focused on the use of air assets (air drops) in a ten-day operation of emergency aid to relieve the immediate suffering in the mountains. Thus, the initially committed U.S. forces came mainly from the U.S. Air Force and Army. The Joint Staff tasked the Marine Corps to provide parachute riggers to support the air drop operations. USMC parachute riggers from the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) in California and III MEF in Okinawa were the first Marine Corps units to deploy in support of Provide Comfort.

With Secretary of State Baker’s urging, the relief effort soon expanded to a 30-day mission of sustainment operations, which would include direct ground support of the Kurds in the mountains. Within days, this expanded to a “no less than” 90-day commitment to support moving the Kurds back into Iraq. On 10 April, the day after Secretary Baker’s visit to Kurdish refugee sites, Mediterranean Amphibious
Ready Group (MARG) 1-91/24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) set sail for the eastern Mediterranean. On 13 April, the MARG/MEU(SOC) arrived in Iskenderum, Turkey, and HMM-264's three CH-53Es conducted relief flights in eastern Turkey that same day. The remainder of the MEU followed the CH-53Es into eastern Turkey, some 450 miles inland, over the coming days.

With a growing U.S. and multinational commitment, on 16 April 1991, the Joint Task Force became a Combined Task Force (CTF) under the command of LTGEN Shalikashveli, USA. Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) involved extensive USA (6,119 personnel), USAF (3,588), and USN forces (700 ashore and many more afloat, including the three MARG ships and two aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs)). In addition to the 24th MEU(SOC) and the I MEF and III MEF parachute riggers, USMC forces (1,875 Marines) committed to OPC included a remotely piloted vehicle detachment from II MEF (North Carolina) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC, in Virginia); an Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) brigade platoon from II MEF (North Carolina); a special purpose MAGTF (CMAGTF 1-91) from Landing Support Battalion assets of III MEF; a detachment from the 4th Civil Affairs Group (a Reserve command); and 17 Marines from Europe and the Continental United States (CONUS) for positions in the JTF/CTF headquarters. The United States provided half the forces and 11 other countries contributed about 11,000 personnel.

CTF-Provide Comfort had three objectives (which were also the phases for the operation):

- Stop the dying and suffering. Stabilize the population.
- Resettle the population at temporary sites. Establish a sustainable, secure environment.
- Return the refugee population to their homes.

Phase one focused on the Kurdish refugees in the mountains. Task Force Alpha, composed mainly of U.S. Army special operations forces, controlled the relief aid at the mountain sites. Phase two required that coalition forces create a secure environment (free from
Iraqi interference and harassment) in northern Iraq with the construction of temporary camps to follow. OPC aimed to move Kurds as quickly as possible from the temporary camps (phase two) to their homes (phase three).

CTF-PC established forward ground bases in Turkey and northern Iraq to expedite the distribution of supplies and provide medical assistance. The MEU forces played a central role in the move into northern Iraq. They provided, at first, the only ground forces and much of the command element for MGEN Garner’s, USAJTF-Bravo, which had responsibility for operations inside Iraq. With USA special forces relieving the immediate suffering in the mountains, JTF-Bravo and engineering forces constructed temporary communities to house the displaced civilian population inside northern Iraq; the first was near Zakhu. By mid-May, coalition forces began phase three, to assist the Kurds to return to their homes. This assistance included providing food, medical care, and transportation to the Kurds. In all, the coalition forces delivered 27,000 tons of relief supplies to about 850,000 Kurdish civilians. At the same time, the coalition forces provided security throughout the area and protecting the convoys carrying Kurdish refugees from the mountains to the tent cities in northern Iraq.

The second and third phases, especially, involved a security as well as a humanitarian mission. Through demarches and shows of force, coalition forces managed to avoid any direct combat confrontation with Iraqi forces.

OPC began on 6 April 1991 with air drops of relief supplies. On 13 April, with the MEUs entry into the operation, the first major USMC involvement began. On 20 April, the 24th MEU(SOC) spearheaded the coalition move into northern Iraq. In early May, TF Alpha (which grew out of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)) began moving refugees from the mountains to the temporary camps in the northern Iraq security zone. On 13 May, the United Nations “officially” relieved the military forces in northern Iraq. USMC elements remained in northern Iraq through the end of OPC 1 on 15 July 1991, when the last 24th MEU(SOC) elements departed.
Mission

Operation Provide Comfort’s initial mission was to provide aid to reduce the suffering of Kurdish refugees. The mission then expanded to include creating the conditions for and aiding the reestablishment of the Kurds in the northern Iraqi towns from which they had fled.

Concept of operations

As noted above, Provide Comfort began as an air-drop operation to provide immediate assistance to the Kurds who had fled into the mountains of northern Iraq and eastern Turkey. This relied principally on fixed-wing assets (both to drop relief supplies and to provide air cover in the event of an Iraqi attempt to interfere with the operation) and some special forces (for search and rescue, and to provide limited assistance directly to the Kurds).

This mission quickly expanded beyond immediate life-saving relief to an aim of returning Kurds to their homes. This required the creation of a safe security environment in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. Thus, coalition forces had to deploy into northern Iraq to confront (and force the withdrawal of) Iraqi military and special police forces. As a way station to the Kurds’ homes, the forces in northern Iraq were to construct camps to house Kurds coming down from the mountains.

USMC tasks

Just as the overall mission shifted, so did the requirements placed on the Marine Corps and USMC forces. The initial operational concept relied on USAF and USA forces, with Marines providing limited support through deployment of parachute riggers. Within days, the operation changed enormously—to describe this, perhaps we should call it mission leap rather than mission creep—and so did the taskings for Marine Corps forces. Marines then received taskings to provide helicopter lift of relief supplies and other support to these relief efforts (such as Marine Service Support Group (MSSG) assets to help load relief supplies). With the changing mission, Marine tasks expanded to include establishing secure zones for refugees in
northern Iraq and helping construct resettlement camps while providing direct relief assistance in northern Iraq.

Marine forces involved included the 24th MEU(SOC) (from aboard the MARG); parachute riggers from III MEF (Okinawa) and I MEF (California); a remotely piloted vehicle detachment from II MEF (North Carolina) and MCCDC (Virginia); an ANGLICO brigade platoon from II MEF; a special purpose MAGTF (CMAGTF 1-91) from III MEF Landing Support Battalion assets (Okinawa); and 17 Marines from Europe and CONUS for positions in the JTF/CTF headquarters. The explicit and implicit taskings consisted of the following:

1. Support USAF air drops of relief supplies.
2. Establish a forward support base at Silopi, Turkey, from which to support relief efforts for Kurds in the mountains. Create a supply line from the port of Iskendrum to operating bases in eastern Turkey.
3. Deploy MEU forces into eastern Turkey in preparation for operations in northern Iraq. MEU command element to take command of other forces as assigned.
4. Conduct security and relief operations in northern Iraq.

Requirements for USMC tasks (and forces available)

Operation Provide Comfort’s tasking for Marine forces expanded just as the missions expanded. Although the afloat forces in the Mediterranean (24th MEU(SOC)) provided the major USMC element of OPC, the Marine Corps drew on forces from around the world to meet tasking requirements.

1. The first tasking had USMC forces supporting a principally USAF operation. USMC parachute riggers deployed to aid this operation, with the I MEF Marines departing Norton Air Base for Incirlik on 8 April. (The parachute riggers supported USAF air-drop operations. Deployed units were the Air Delivery Platoon, 1st Landing Support Battalion, 1st Service Support Group, Camp Pendleton, CA, and a similar element from 3rd Service Support Group in Okinawa.)
2. USMC support for relief efforts in the mountains hinged principally on USMC helicopter assets, which, along with some USN CH-53Es from HC-4 in Egypt, provided the earliest significant helicopter support to OPC. This support came from the HMM-264 helicopters off the MARG. This support also required establishment of refueling and other helicopter support at several locations in eastern Turkey.

   a. *Transport helicopters* for delivery of relief supplies. (HMM-264 helicopters from MARG. The three CH-53Es from the squadron were the first MEU assets involved in actual relief operations.)

   b. *Aerial refueling* (for initial deployment of CH-53Es to Silopi). (USAF special operations aircraft provided the refueling support.)

   c. *Cargo-handling* personnel and equipment (from MSSG assets in MEU).

   d. *Forward maintenance/refueling support* for helicopters (MWSS-272 deployed an eight-man detachment to provide a forward air refueling point (FARP) at Silopi using the Helicopter Expeditionary Refueling System (HERS)).

   e. *Loading and other ground support* for helicopters (squadron assets).

   f. *Security for forward deployed helicopters.* (One platoon heli-lifted into the forward operating base. The remainder of the company followed in Turkish civilian buses. This movement took 36 hours to close at the base.)

3. The movement of the 24th MEU(SOC) inland required long-haul assets to move the forces and then to maintain the supply lines.

   a. *Long-haul assets* were required to move MEU inland. The MSSG had ten 5-ton trucks on the MARG shipping. In addition to integral assets, this movement relied on civilian busses and trucks.
b. *Customs.* All USMC assets, including 24th MEU (SOC), had to clear Turkish customs for entry.

4. The deployment into northern Iraq, with the real possibility of confrontations with Iraqi forces, placed additional requirements on USMC forces. In some cases this entailed the deployment of additional forces from out-of-theater.

a. *Command and control (C2)* capabilities were needed for a brigade-sized force (24th MEU (SOC) had two other battalions assigned to it during operations in northern Iraq).

b. *Helicopter support* for Task Force Bravo initially came from HMM-264 helicopters, which were pulled from supporting Task Force Alpha to support the 24th MEU's push into northern Iraq.

c. *Aerial reconnaissance* assets were required to support ground forces. This requirement was fulfilled by USN F-14s mounting TARPS operating from the aircraft carriers. A remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) detachment later deployed to support operations in northern Iraq.

d. *Additional forward helicopter and airfield support* was provided by MWSS-274. Other Marines assisted in the creation of helicopter landing zones and in clearing a runway in northern Iraq.

e. *Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison* was provided by ANGLICO units, both between U.S. and other military forces and as the forward air controllers in case U.S. Air Force or Navy aircraft had to provide close air support to the forces in northern Iraq. (Only the United States deployed fixed-wing fighter and strike aircraft during Provide Comfort.)

f. *Civil affairs* support from the USMC consisted of ten Marines of the 4th Civil Affairs Group (4th CAG) deployed from Cherry Point to OPC. The 4th CAG officers worked under the Civil Affairs Task Force, established as a separate organization during Provide Comfort.
g. *Mine clearance* became a priority. To ensure safe movement along the roads in northern Iraq, minesweeping and clearance were required because Iraqi forces had laid large numbers of mines before the war and during the operations against the Kurds.

h. *Communications* support was critical. Extensive operations in northern Iraq dispersed the Marine forces and required the ability to communicate over long ranges in often difficult (mountainous) terrain.

**Shortfalls in meeting USMC requirements**

By many accounts, OPC was a difficult operation in which many areas of the mission strained the available forces. Most of the shortfalls were not USMC specific, in fact USMC forces were often stretched to help other forces meet their shortfalls. For example, 24th MEU (SOC) provided staff support to MGEN Garner’s JTF-Bravo, as he had deployed with only four officers. (Over the weeks of the operation, USA officers joined the staff, which allowed the MEU staff to focus on USMC operations once again.) As well, HMM-264 helicopters provided much of the helicopter support for operations inside northern Iraq. Some of OPC's requirements, however, seem to have stretched USMC resources, whether of on-scene forces or even of the Marine Corps as a whole. The following are some of these perceived shortfalls.

1. The first tasking required the USMC to deploy parachute riggers to support USAF air drops of relief supplies. To supply the tasked riggers required, according to one description, "stripping the Marine Corps." The I MEF Marines, for example, had returned to Pendleton from eight months in Saudi Arabia less than two days before they received notice to deploy to Turkey. In terms of the overall operation, almost all accounts describe a shortfall in cargo-handling capacity, with the additional problem of having to support multiple airframes from different countries (each airframe required a different load-out).

2. Rapid support of relief efforts required the commitment of most of HMM-264's assets. The three CH-53Es flew off the amphibious ships for Silopi, Turkey, on 13 April, carrying
maintenance crews and equipment, and began relief flights that same day.

a. With no USMC KC-130s in theater, the initial flight of CH-53Es received refueling support from USAF assets. (This does not necessarily represent any form of shortfall. I do not know whether these USAF assets might have had other missions that did not get executed due to USMC requirements.)

b. The MWSS-272 HERS proved itself capable of supporting USMC helicopters; on the first day of operations, 16 April, the FARP conducted 319 helicopter refuelings. For three weeks, MWSS-272 provided the only bulk fuel system for helicopter operations from Silopi and then in northern Iraq. Growing helicopter refueling requirements, especially with the move into northern Iraq, stretched the USMC system to the limits, and other systems needed to be brought into theater to support the growing operations.

3. To move the MEU elements into eastern Turkey required a 400-mile move inland from the port of Iskendrum, Turkey. Because relief efforts so desperately required helicopter assets, HMM-264 assets were minimally available to support the MEU’s movement inland. Amphibious shipping restrictions due to Operations Desert Shield/Storm led to a reduced MARG. Thus, 24th MEU(SOC) had a smaller combat service support element (CSSE, which was MSSG-24 for the 24th MEU(SOC)) than it might have had otherwise. The principal obstacle, therefore, for the MEUs movement was the shortage of long-haul assets to move the force inland. (On the other hand, the reduced CSSE simply exacerbated the problems any MEU might have had trying to deploy hundreds of miles inland.)

a. *Long-haul assets.* The 24th MEU(SOC) had just ten trucks (rather than the 20 typically in a MSSG) available to support the movement inland. Host Nation Support (HNS) helped fill the gap, with buses moving Marines and contracted truckers providing line-haul support.

b. *Material-handling equipment (MHE).* In addition to line-haul assets, MSSG-24 also deployed with reduced MHE (forklifts)
and engineering assets. Through the end of April, forklifts from the landing-support platoon provided the only heavy MHE for operations at Silopi. Throughout the operation, especially at the airfields, the combined forces reported shortages of cargo-handling equipment (a shortfall frequently filled through brute manpower).

c. **Customs.** Even though the Turkish government expedited procedures initially, clearing customs created a hurdle for USMC operations. This became a more serious obstacle as the operation progressed because the Turks followed expedited customs procedures only for the initial part of OPC. For example, the CMAGTF’s gear from Okinawa was impounded for five days (from 9 to 14 May 1991) by Turkish customs, and the RPV detachment’s gear from Camp Lejeune arrived in Turkey on 7 May and took eight days to clear customs.

4. With the deployment into northern Iraq, 24th MEU(SOC) forces entered into a potential combat situation. Thus, in addition to providing a range of relief aid and coordination, the forces had to conduct security operations. During operations in northern Iraq, the coalition forces frequently confronted Iraqi forces and Kurdish irregulars.

a. **Compound security.** Terrorist (or terrorist-like) actions represented a serious threat in Iraq. The CTF-PC staff feared an incident like the attack against the USMC barracks in Lebanon.

b. **Aerial reconnaissance (manned).** With no USMC manned recon assets, the USMC forces relied on CVBG assets (F-14s flying TARPS missions) for tactical recon.

c. **Aerial reconnaissance (unmanned).** RPV assets deployed from CONUS to support OPC. This deployment led to a real-world test of equipment—the exdrone—undergoing operational tests and evaluation. Turkish customs delayed the RPV’s arrival at the force’s location for over a week.
Communications. 24th MEU(SOC) had only four satellite radios. Because the 24th MEU(SOC) operations extended across much of Turkey and Iraq, these proved insufficient to support operations. The communications section “appropriated” four more sets to support operations. In addition, the communications section relied on USN equipment and personnel to maintain a communications center afloat.

Sources

8. COL Donald G. Goff, USA, *Building Coalitions for Humanitarian Operations: Operation Provide Comfort*, USA War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 15 April 1992


Appendix D: JTF Sea Angel: Bangladesh, May–June 1991

Overview

On April 29–30 1991, Cyclone Marian devastated the southeastern coastal areas of Bangladesh. Marian killed about 140,000 people and left perhaps 2.7 million homeless and in need of all basic necessities. The storm also devastated the infrastructure of the area. It destroyed many transportation assets and essentially wiped out the area’s water supply. In addition to the actual cyclone and the immediate damage it caused, the weather remained poor and coastal areas remained flooded well into May. Chittagong harbor, the main seaport, was not only flooded, but also filled with wrecks of boats and ships destroyed by the cyclone. The widespread damage handicapped relief efforts by the Bangladesh government and non-governmental relief organizations.

The U.S. ambassador authorized immediate disaster assistance, and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) followed up with aid grants. As the scope of the disaster became apparent, the U.S. military began planning for a possible relief operation, and the Bengali government requested further outside assistance. On 11 May, the President directed the U.S. military to provide disaster assistance and USCINCPAC designated CG III MEF, Maj.Gen. H.C. Stackpole, as CJTF-Productive Effort (JTF-PE). (Based on news reporting of Bengalis calling U.S. sailors and Marines “angels from the sea,” CJCS later changed the operation’s name to Sea Angel or JTF-SA.) Forces committed to JTF-PE included a command element from III MEF (to be augmented by the PACOM deployable joint task force augmentation cell or DJTFAC), USA and USAF special forces (including two HC-130s), and the Amphibious Group (PHIBGRU) THREE/FIFTH MEB amphibious task force (with 28 helicopters), then en
route to CONUS following Operation Desert Storm. As of 18 May, the
JTF included more than 7,000 U.S. military personnel: 179 in the JTF
HQ (83 of these USMC), 3,000 in the Navy Force (PHIBGRU
THREE); 4,000 in Marine Force (FIFTH MEB); 54 Air Force (374th
Tactical Air Wing with four C-130s); 89 in Army Force (a five-helico-
pter detachment from the 25th ID); and 78 in the JSOTF).

The government and relief organizations had essentially enough sup-
plies on hand, but did not have the transportation assets to move
them. Thus, the JTF’s main task was to fill this gap. The lead elements
of the JTF arrived on 12 May and operations began the next day
(mainly the special forces beginning surveys). The JTF began airlift of
supplies from Dhaka to Chittagong on 15 May, with USA Blackhawk
helicopters providing further distribution. That day, the ATF arrived
on scene. It began relief operations via landing craft and the FIFTH
MEB helicopters on 16 May. Through two weeks of operations, the
U.S. forces delivered 2,430 tons of relief supplies.¹ JTF assets moved
not only relief supplies, but also Bengali government and other relief
personnel, media representatives, and VIPs (including Marilyn
Quayle).

Following assessment of requirements, Maj.Gen. Stackpole requested
the deployment of reverse osmosis water purification units (ROW-
PUs). On 19 May, USS St. Louis sailed from Okinawa with Contin-
gency MAGTF 2-91 and 36 ROWPUs aboard. The ATF departed on
29 May, but CMAGTF 2-91 continued Sea Angel operations through
6 June.

In addition to operating with Bengali forces, the Japanese (two heli-
copters and a 50-person relief team) and British (Royal Fleet Auxil-
iary Fort Grange with two helicopters) essentially acted under U.S.

¹ JTF-SA provided an important augmentation of transportation assets,
but did not provide the only transportation capabilities, as might be
assumed based on some accounts. The largest NGO, CARE, moved
58,000 tons of goods from 5 through 30 May by the following means:
CARE trucks, 21,500 tons (37 percent); CARE trawlers, 13,203 tons (23
percent); and JTF-SA assets, 23,553 tons (40 percent). The critical JTF-
SA augmentation was with assets (such as helicopters and landing craft),
that could move goods to remote and isolated areas of the disaster zone.
tactical control. Also present in Bangladesh were military units from Pakistan, India, Italy, and China, with numerous non-governmental organizations active as well.

Mission

CINCPAC formed JTF Sea Angel to assist the government of Bangladesh carry out relief operations after Cyclone Marian.

Concept of operations

CJTF developed a three-phase concept for the relief operation.

- Humanitarian relief operations to reduce mortality and stabilize the situation, with a focus on the distribution of immediate needs (such as food and medical supplies). CJTF estimated this phase would last 14 days. (Actual: 27–29 May.)

- Humanitarian relief operations focused on the delivery of supplies and equipment to allow self-help recovery projects to begin. Phase to last ten days. (Actual: 29 May–7 June.)

- Conversion to long-term support and reconstruction operations. U.S. military to provide some technical support but most U.S. forces to phase out of relief operations. Phase to last five days. (Actual: 7–13 June 1991.)

USMC tasks

For Operation Productive Effort/Sea Angel, Marine forces had three major tasks:

1. Provide commander and nucleus of JTF for command of the operation.

2. Help transportation of relief supplies.

3. Provide other humanitarian assistance as tasked/required.

In retrospect, the CJTF after-action report listed four tasks performed by MARFOR JTF-SA:
Appendix D

- Conducted helicopter support missions for disaster-relief operations
- Provided working parties at Chittagong Airport and Cox’s Bazar to assist in loading/unloading aircraft
- Provided communications support to augment assessment teams and non-governmental organizations
- Established sites to provide potable water.

Requirements for USMC tasks (and forces available)

The general requirements for the operation can be divided into three categories: command, control, and coordination requirements; transportation (the key support provided by the JTF); and direct humanitarian assistance. Several requirements are common to all three categories: for example, the need for liaison personnel to coordinate activities mainly with Bengali authorities, but also with other nations’ forces and with non-governmental relief organizations. Similarly, JTF-SA had to provide its own communications capabilities because the cyclone had essentially knocked out the country’s communications network and JTF-SA forces had to be self-sustaining so as not to place additional burdens on the stressed Bengali infrastructure. The following are some of the specific requirements in each of the three groupings of USMC activities.

1. Provide command, control, and coordination. III MEF command elements, augmented with the CINCPAC DJTFAC, developed the initial concept for the operation and deployed to command the operation.
   a. Develop initial plans and concepts for relief operation.
   b. Provide core of JTF staff and equipment. (III MEF provided the majority of the JTF staff.2)

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2. On 27 May, the JTF HQ had a total of 215 personnel: 89 USMC; 36 USN; 80 USAF; 8 USA; and 2 civilians. The USAF contingent included a communications unit.
c. **Coordinate operations** with Bengali government, relief organizations, and other nations' forces deployed to Bangladesh. This required both liaison officers and liaison cells, including one chaired by a Bengali general, which oversaw the entire operation. As a corollary, due to distrust between the government of Bangladesh and some relief agencies, the JTF had to act as a coordinator and mediator between the government and the NGOs as well as coordinate U.S. military with other organizations' activities.

d. **Provide communication capabilities.** Because the cyclone had knocked out essentially the entire communications network, the JTF HQ had to deploy with its own communications capability. USAF elements deployed to augment the JTFs communications capabilities.

2. **Provide transportation:** The helicopters of FIFTH MEB, combined with the landing craft of PHIBGRU THREE, provided the chief transportation assets supporting relief operations.

   a. **Provide helicopter transportation** support for relief supplies and personnel, media, and VIPs. (MAG 50 helicopters aboard PHIBGRU THREE shipping. FIFTH MEB's 28 helicopters (CH-53Ds, CH-46s, and UH-1s) flew a total of 969 flights in support of Sea Angel, carrying 698 tons of relief supplies.3)

   b. **Conduct reconnaissance** for helicopter and landing-craft landing zones. (Conducted by USMC recon and USN SEAL teams from ATF. This included at least 72 movements by USMC rigid raider craft (RRC). Helicopters also conducted reconnaissance missions. The AH-1W Cobras of HMLA-169, which otherwise had few other potential missions in a disaster-relief operation, proved useful in this role.)

3. The Army UH-60s flew 805 missions carrying 886 tons; Royal Navy SH-3s flew 251 missions with 245 tons; and the two Japanese Dauphin helicopters flew 21 missions carrying 21 tons of supplies. All of the helicopters also moved personnel. USAF C-130s and MC-130s helped move supplies within Bangladesh. PHIBGRU THREE landing craft (both air-cushion and conventional landing craft) moved relief supplies and personnel.
c. Control landing zones. FIFTH MEB air-control teams assisted Bengali air controllers in handling the increased air flow into Cox Bazar runway, for example. Marines, SEALs, and U.S. Army special forces personnel provided terminal guidance for helicopters coming into landing zones (and often conducted surveys of these landing zones before use—especially with CH-53Es, for which the landing zones had to be cleared of all Bengalis before a helicopter could land).

d. Load/unload supplies. Marines from FIFTH MEB provided the bulk of the personnel for working parties to unload the supplies being moved by FIFTH MEB and PHIBGRU THREE assets. Marines handled the load-master responsibilities for moving cargo from planes to helicopters at Cox Bazaar, which was a principal point for moving goods from C-130s to helicopters for delivery to remote sites.

3. Provide humanitarian assistance. During Sea Angel, the U.S. military did not principally “provide humanitarian assistance,” but made it possible for others to do so—for instance, through transportation of relief supplies and personnel (both from the Bengali government and from outside relief organizations). Though the primary role was that of a facilitator, the U.S. military did provide direct humanitarian assistance in a number of ways.

   a. Medical support: The principal external medical support came from NGOs and, in terms of the U.S. military, from non-USMC assets. (These included, however, Navy medical personnel assigned to and Marine corpsmen from the FIFTH MEB. This MEDCAP program treated some 1,800 Bengalis over a five-day period.)

   b. Augment water supply: The cyclone had essentially wiped out the area’s normal water supply. A total of 40 USMC ROWPUs helped fill this gap until the government could restore local storage systems. (CMAGTF 2-91, mainly from the 3rd FSSG, deployed on USS St. Louis with 36 ROWPUs. FIFTH MEB had four ROWPUs.)
c. Provide communications. In addition to the transportation network, the cyclone had devastated the Bengali communications network. Thus, the JTF provided communications support to the government and relief organizations. (For example, RLT-5 provided communications support to CARE beginning on 19 May.)

Shortfalls in meeting USMC requirements

Marine and other U.S. military elements faced a number of challenges during Operation Sea Angel. The following are some of the shortfalls experienced during the operation.

1. Disaster relief doctrine. The lack of USMC disaster relief doctrine (or other guidance) forced the involved units to develop responses to the situation virtually from scratch. For example, the III MEF staff used files on Operation Provide Comfort, the ongoing relief operation in Northern Iraq, as a key source of insight on humanitarian relief operations. Although Provide Comfort’s circumstances and requirements were far different, the staff did not know of anything better to work with. Similarly, the FIFTH MEB command staff had to hold a brainstorming session to develop an essential elements of information (EEI) list for the advance team in the few hours before its departure for Bangladesh. (Other U.S. units, such as the U.S. Army special forces who formed the disaster assessment response teams (DARTs), have better-developed concepts of disaster-relief operations.)

2. Information and intelligence. Before arriving in Bangladesh, the JTF (from the CJTF down to the units) had almost no information on the situation there following the cyclone, even though the operation commenced more than ten days following the cyclone’s landfall. For example, no information was available on the Bengali disaster-response organization and its responses to date to the disaster; or on the NGOs present in Bangladesh, their charters and capabilities, their requirements for assistance from U.S. forces, and their abilities to help U.S. forces.
3. **Medical supplies.** As in almost every HAO, the medical supplies aboard ship were of limited use in aiding Bengalis in the post-disaster situation. Thus, the MEDCAP program conducted by the FIFTH MEB surgeon relied on supplies provided by the government of Bangladesh and NGOs. (Units specifically deployed for the disaster, such as the Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit No. 6, brought supplies more appropriate to the needs of civilians.)

4. **Public affairs:** JTF-SA had a number of public affairs challenges, from not having a public affairs officer (PAO) on the advance team to inaccessibility of combat camera products. There was a lot of press interest in the situation (press coverage probably influenced President Bush’s decision to order a military relief operation), and many media representatives sought support from JTF forces. Limited numbers of PAOs, restrictions on access, and the inability to use combat camera film (which was sent to CINCPAC PSYOPs, but not given to the CJTF) all limited the coverage of the U.S. military’s actions during Sea Angel.

**Other issues**

**Host nation and regional sensitivities**

For a variety of reasons, the U.S. military’s activities were particularly sensitive for a relief operation. Bangladesh had just made the transition to civilian rule the month before the cyclone, and the cyclone’s damage seemed to threaten the government’s stability. Thus, all involved U.S. officials believed it vital for the U.S. military to demonstrate military subordination to civilian authorities in its activities and to fully coordinate all activities with the host government.

In addition, surrounding countries closely watched the U.S. military’s activities and there was some rhetoric that the U.S. planned to set up permanent facilities in Bangladesh. (The military dictatorship in Burma especially criticized the U.S. presence in Bangladesh.) For this reason, plus the desire not to add burdens to the stressed Bengali infrastructure, Maj.Gen. Stackpole determined that no more than 500 U.S. personnel would remain in Bangladesh overnight. With a
JTF staff of about 250 and several hundred USA and USAF personnel, this meant that essentially all personnel from the ATF had to return to the ships at the end of each day’s operations.

In addition to personnel restrictions, this sensitivity, along with the absence of any identifiable threat (other than natural) to U.S. forces (i.e., a permissive environment), led to a strict ROE injunction against carrying weapons while ashore.

**FIFTH MEB AFOE**

Two commercial ships, SS *Flickertail State* and SS *Cape Girardeau* had become auxiliaries to the PHIBGRU THREE/FIFTH MEB ATF during Operation Desert Storm. These two ships carried much of the FIFTH MEB’s assault follow-on echelon (AFOE), including many transportation assets and much of the MEB’s heavy engineering equipment. These ships and the equipment on board were available, if necessary, for support of Operation Sea Angel. CJTF-SA had to make a quick decision as to whether the operation required this equipment as TRANSCOM pressured for a minimal diversion because of the expense of delaying the release of these chartered vessels.

**VIPs and relief operations**

As with many other types of military activity, VIPs will quite likely be involved in the operation. This involvement can range from little more than sightseeing and publicity-seeking visits to on-hand evaluation and decision-making by senior officials. Whatever the motive, these visits can have a direct impact on the military capability to conduct the primary mission. During Sea Angel, for example, a VIP flight preempted the scheduled transportation for a medical team, which lost about 36 hours of planned relief assistance, and delayed resupply at one relief location.

**Sources**


Appendix E: Operation Fiery Vigil: Philippines, June 1991

Overview

Volcano warnings for Mt. Pinatubo began as early as 22 May 1991 and became more serious on 4 June with the start of major seismic activity. Based on warnings from U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) volcanologists of a likely eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, the Air Force began the procedures for an evacuation of Clark Air Force Base on 8 June 1991. CINCPAC stood up JTF Fiery Vigil (JTF-FV) under CG 13th Air Force at Clark to command the evacuation operation. By 10 June, more than 13,000 personnel (and about 1,500 pets) had arrived at the USN base at Subic Bay. On 12 June, the first major eruption occurred. With the eruption, 29 fixed-wing aircraft departed Naval Air Station (NAS) Cubi Point; of the remaining 66 aircraft (mainly helicopters), only nine were not in hangars.

On 13 June, ash buildup forced the closure of NAS Cubi Point and Manila International Airport (which did not return to full operational capacity until after the completion of Fiery Vigil). To compound the problems, Tropical Storm Yunya headed toward the Philippines, and the rainfall turned the fallen ash into the consistency of wet concrete. The volcanic activity brought with it earthquakes, which, for example, led to a requirement for sandbag supports to temporary lights at NAS Cubi Point so that they wouldn’t collapse into the bay. Those involved called 15 June “Black Saturday,” as the combination of major ash fall, storm conditions with heavy rain, and earthquake tremors created an almost apocalyptic environment.

The combination of falling ash and rainfall led to the collapse of 50 buildings in Subic Bay Naval Base alone. Driving conditions from 12 to 16 June left only High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) and some four-wheel-drive vehicles as options for
ground mobility. (The large pumice stones shot out by the volcano placed at risk anyone not in a hardened vehicle.) In general, helicopter operations also ceased for this period. Limited helicopter capacity was restored as early as 16 June, but flights did not restart in earnest until the 18th.

On 16 June, U.S. Navy ships began moving non-essential personnel and dependents from Subic Bay to Cebu Island. From Mactan airfield on Cebu, the evacuees flew to Guam and then (most) to CONUS. Over about two weeks, Joint Task Force Fiery Vigil (JTF-FV) evacuated some 21,000 Americans from the areas endangered by Mount Pinatubo’s eruption. Over 17,000 of these evacuees went by sea in U.S. Navy ships to Cebu Island to marry up with Air Mobility Command (AMC) aircraft. During this time, U.S. forces restored many of the operational functions at Subic Bay, including flight services at Cubi Point Naval Air Station, and evacuated sensitive equipment and materials from Clark Air Force Base.

With the volcano’s eruption, the on-scene USMC force provided a somewhat unusually well equipped force for assisting in disaster relief and other activities. The USMC force in the Philippines (then MAGTF 4-90 under Col. Darling) had three principal missions before the volcano’s eruption: contingency support; security support for the Subic Bay facilities; and training. Because of this training mission and the extensive training facilities in the Subic Bay area, MAGTF 4-90 had many capabilities suitable for disaster assistance, such as pontoon equipment for engineering training.

When augmented by elements of 15th MEU (off-loaded in part to provide space on amphibious shipping to move evacuees from Subic to Cebu Island), MAGTF 4-90 consisted of about 3,000 Marines. Because of Operation Desert Storm, most in-place Marine assets came from the Reserve forces who had taken the place of regular Marines deployed to Saudi Arabia. Thus, when the volcano struck, as phrased by the CO of MAGTF 4-90 (who was MARFOR, JTF-FV), “I had Marines who did these things in real life, such as structural engineers and emergency medical technicians. If I’d had the usual battalion and usual squadron, we would have had a bunch of 18 year-olds with-
out all these skills that we required.” Thus, the presence of reservists gave MARFOR greater flexibility in responding to taskings.

The disaster associated with Fiery Vigil challenged the military in many ways. Prepared for responding to typhoons rather than massive ash fall and flow, disaster preparations at Subic did not fully match requirements. For example, the Navy Base and Marines had to fashion makeshift shovels so that Marines could dig out critical areas on the base and protect buildings by moving the heavy ash from roofs. As another example, containers for carrying pets became a priority in the airlift to minimize problems in evacuating the numerous pets American dependents brought.

Fiery Vigil involved forces from all four services. MAGTF 4-90, as of the volcano’s eruption, consisted mainly of USMCR units (BLT 1/24 and HMLA-76). Augmenting Marine forces included elements of the 15th MEU; Contingency MAGTF 2-91 (which completed operations in Bangladesh in Operation Sea Angel and then steamed to the Philippines with 32 ROWPUs and engineering equipment aboard USS St. Louis); a survey-liaison reconnaissance party (SLRP), offload preparation party (OPP), and six CH-53Ds, which deployed from Okinawa to the Philippines aboard USS Midway; and two OV-10Ds which deployed from Okinawa. In terms of other services, 28 U.S. Navy ships directly supported the evacuation and Seabees (including additional Seabees deployed from Okinawa) did engineering work. USAF aircraft provided airlift for the 20,000-plus evacuees.

Mission

The basic mission of Operation Fiery Vigil was to evacuate U.S. personnel and dependents endangered by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Besides removing people, evacuation also meant removing sensitive equipment and material from Clark AFB. Because of the amount of damage, this initial mission was extended to evacuating dependents from Subic Bay naval base. As a corollary, U.S. forces had to restore services and operational capacity at Subic Bay naval station.
Appendix E

Concept of operations

The concept of operations called for a three-step process for the evacuation from Clark AFB.

- Movement of non-essential personnel and dependents from Clark AFB to Subic Bay (mainly completed before Mt. Pinatubo’s eruption)
- Movement of evacuees from Subic to Cebu Island via U.S. Navy ships
- Evacuation from Cebu to CONUS (or other appropriate sites) via AMC aircraft and civilian charters.

For securing Clark AFB, the USAF maintained a security force (reduced in size following the volcanic eruption) at Clark. Following the eruption (and the decision to close down the base’s operation), the JTF evacuated sensitive equipment by helicopter and other material by land to Subic.

USMC tasks

Before the volcanic eruption, the Marine forces in the Philippines had three basic standing and contingency tasks:

- Support of military-dependent and civilian evacuation
- Disaster relief
- Security of U.S. military facilities.

Operation Fiery Vigil would involve all three of these MAGTF 4-90 pre-disaster tasks. In terms of operation-specific tasks, CJTF Fiery Vigil assigned MARFOR with three tasks in his commander’s estimate of 13 June:

- Ground security
- Helicopter and surface support
- Contingency reaction force.
In reality, Marine Corps forces had a much broader range of tasks (both explicit and implied) during Operation Fiery Vigil, and many of the tasks continued into the clean-up operations that did not end with the evacuation's completion. Specific tasks ranged from providing reconnaissance support to the USGS to assisting evacuees awaiting air transport out of the Philippines from Mactan airfield. The operations involved at least six Marine Corps tasks:

1. Support Subic Bay base security as required (i.e., take over full responsibility if security situation requires it).
2. Assist CJTF Fiery Vigil (CG 13th AF) and Clark AFB as directed.
3. Assist in efforts to minimize damage and to restore services at Subic Bay.
4. Assist in evacuation operation.
6. Provide humanitarian assistance to Philippine nationals as appropriate.

MAGTF 4-90, with augmentation from other USMC units (mainly III MEF in Okinawa), handled five of these tasks. The USMC involvement in the sixth task, assistance to the evacuation operation came at Cebu Island and not the Subic Bay area. The Marine forces there did not fall under the CO MAGTF 4-90. Elements of 15th MEU provided this support (mostly helicopters) at Cebu Island. (Other elements of 15th MEU offloaded in Subic and chopped to MAGTF 4-90.)

**Requirements for USMC tasks (and forces available):**

Marine Corps forces provided several key areas of support during Fiery Vigil. A number of capability requirements crossed all taskings, such as the need to maintain communications capability under extreme conditions (the volcano knocked out the phone switching systems at Clark and Subic).

1. **Support Subic Bay base security.** As one of CMAGTF 4-90's basic tasks, MARFOR theoretically had several thousand Marines to use for this mission. In fact, base security required far fewer
than that. For the first several days after Mt. Pinatubo's eruption, essentially no violations of the perimeter occurred. ("No patrol reported any footprints in the grey-to-black virgin snow that covered the ground.") The greatest threat was economic, because Filipinos tried to enter base areas to steal (or, in these conditions, perhaps "loot"). Security became a more demanding task as the evacuation progressed and many areas of the base became depopulated.

a. *Augment Subic Bay barracks* with about 50 Marines to aid in traffic control and other on-base security support.

b. *Guard buildings* (such as those whose alarm systems were knocked out by the power outages).

c. *Patrol base* perimeter and housing areas. This requirement developed as evacuation proceeded and many areas of the base became deserted.

d. *Maintain intelligence* on potential threats to base security.

2. Assist CGTF Fiery Vigil (CG 13th AF) and Clark AFB.

a. *Assign a liaison team to JTF-FV.* The commanding officer of MAGTF 4-90 sent a three-officer team, only one of whom remained with the JTF HQ.

b. *Maintain communications with JTF* (and other commands). Damage from the volcano knocked out many communications systems (leaving Clark and Subic without operating switchboards). The MAGTF 4-90 staff used various devices to maintain phone links, and maintained a satellite hook-up to the JTF HQ that was limited only by the limited communications window for that system. For several days, the USMC liaison officer’s radio provided the only JTF HQ SATCOMM capability.

c. *Provide helicopter transport* of JTF personnel between Clark and Subic, and between Subic and Manila (starting 16 June).

d. *Assist in evacuation* of sensitive equipment and material from Clark to Subic, mainly via USMC CH-53D/Es.
3. Help minimize damage and restore services at Subic Bay. Marine personnel played several critical roles in reducing the naval base's damage. Marine working parties using fabricated shovels played a critical role in the early removal of ash from rooftops, which probably saved many buildings from collapse. Marine generators provided the first power supply to the base following the end of the ash fall, and ROWPUs provided water to the base and evacuee populations. The following are the major requirements of this task:

- **Provide working parties** to clear ash from hangars (to protect USMC and other assets), threatened buildings, and USN ships undergoing maintenance (and thus unable to head out to sea to avoid damage).

- **Restore flight services.** MAGTF 4-90 had cleared helicopter ramps at the Naval Air Station by 14 June. Flight operations by USMC helicopters resumed two days later.

- **Provide emergency utility services.** At the end of “Black Saturday,” MAGTF 4-90 had the vast majority of still working generating capacity left on the naval base. (CO MAGTF 4-90 ordered all USMC generators shut down during the ash fall to prevent damage to the systems. The base electrical supply suffered damage and the USMC systems survived intact.) USMC generators thus provided emergency power while repair crews worked on the base's electrical system. The volcano also knocked out the base's water supply because it filled the water ponds with ash. USMC ROWPUs provided potable water for the large base population (swelled by the evacuees from Clark) while USMC/USN personnel restored the water supply.

- **Restore utility services.** MAGTF 4-90 Marines assisted the restoration of utility services in a variety of means. For example, Marines cleared the ash from the water system's settling ponds.

- **Aid in damage evaluation/prevention.** Two of the Reservists serving with MAGTF 4-90 were structural engineers. These
engineers led teams to determine the safety of base structures and the steps needed to make buildings safe.

4. Support of evacuation operations. In general, USN and USAF forces handled most of the evacuation requirements (essentially the requirement to transfer thousands of people from Subic to Cebu and from Cebu to CONUS). USMC forces played important roles, especially in supporting the ship-to-shore movement and processing evacuees at Cebu.

a. Providing recon support and overhead coverage for convoys from Clark to Subic. Helicopters from HMLA(R)-76 of MAGTF 4-90 provided air coverage for land convoys 9 to 11 June 1991.

b. Providing ship-to-shore support at Cebu. Four CH-46s and four CH-53Es from HMM-163 (part of 15th MEU) off Peleliu (these helicopters operated from a forward base ashore) provided a shuttle service from Navy ships to Mactan International Airport on Cebu Island. In addition, 3 CH-53Ds operated off Midway and two from Abraham Lincoln to move evacuees from ship to shore. As of the night of 19–20 June, nighttime helicopter operations were approved to expedite evacuation activities, and the 18-person CH-53 passenger restriction was raised to 30.

c. Giving security and processing support to Air Mobility Command operations from Mactan airfield, Cebu Island. Delta Company from BLT 1/9 provided evacuation coordination center (ECC) services at Cebu. The ECC operated off USS Bristol County, which anchored off Cebu to act as a command-and-control platform for this part of the evacuation operation.

d. Assisting evacuees. USS Bristol County Marines provided shelter and rest accommodations, and distributed water and food for evacuees awaiting flights at Mactan.

e. Providing sustenance. Due to loss of power (leading to loss of refrigerated stores) and large numbers of evacuees, shortages of water and food supplies quickly plagued Subic. USMC ROWPUs provided a water distillation capacity and
water buffalos distributed the water. USMC MREs, from *Lummus* and from III MEF stocks in Okinawa, augmented other food sources to provide for the 20,000 evacuees until they were evacuated from the Philippines.

5. **Giving support to USGS.** In general, USMC support to the USGS consisted of USMC recon efforts and transportation of USGS parties (also for reconnaissance).

   a. *Providing infrared monitoring of volcano.* USGS requested infrared surveillance to aid prediction of ash flows. III MEF deployed a two-plane det of OV-10Ds with forward-looking infrared radars (FLIRs) and tape machines to support these systems. Although the FLIR devices fulfilled the USGS request, the USGS personnel determined that such films could not provide the information required to predict lava flows. This determination obviated any requirement for follow-on recon assets (RPVs had been requested).

   b. *Transporting USGS teams.* CH-53Es provided the USGS a preferred means for conducting airborne surveillance of the affected areas because the helicopters could embark a large USGS team with associated equipment (such as video cameras) for extended flights.

6. **Providing humanitarian assistance to Philippine nationals.** Following Mt. Pinatubo’s eruption, Marines provided a variety of humanitarian assistance to affected Filipinos. In general, the Philippine government handled such areas as road clearance. Filipino power sources seem to have suffered less than those on U.S. bases. (Many generators were turned off until cleared of ash flow; thus, for example, within 48 hours “cold beers were available in Olongapo again.”) Local hospitals remained open throughout the disaster. But civilian areas suffered from many of the same problems that plagued the base, and USMC forces provided limited assistance to Filipinos.

   a. *Water services.* MAGTF 4-90 used water buffalos to supply water to several local sites (such as the Olongapo hospital) and set up several ROWPUs off base (such as in Subic City) until local sources were available again.
b. *Emergency rescue.* Marine units with medical personnel attached provided an emergency rescue service using armored HMMWVs through the ash fall and until roads were cleared several days later.

c. *Food distribution.* Marine units collected food that would have otherwise spoiled because of power outages on the U.S. bases and distributed it to Filipinos.

**Shortfalls in meeting USMC requirements**

In general, USMC forces seem to have provided support far beyond initial taskings, especially in helping to restore basic services at Subic Bay. In trying to identify shortfalls, perhaps the most easily identifiable was the difficulty created by the severe conditions of operating in the aftermath of a volcano’s eruption. The dangers caused by the volcanic ash threatened helicopter operations. Ingested ash would have melted and solidified in engines, essentially destroying any such affected helicopter. Without the significant rainfall that followed shortly after the ash fall, the dangers from ash in the air might have greatly restricted helicopter operations for an extended period. In part because of USMC self-imposed restrictions, but also because of differing helicopter capabilities, other service helicopters supported some of the USGS missions that required operations in the vicinity of Mt. Pinatubo.

The initial USMC liaison team proved inappropriate for the actual situation during Fiery Vigil. The liaison team was based on JTF planning for combat operations; thus, the aviation liaison consisted of fixed-wing aviators when, during the actual operations, rotary-wing personnel would have been more appropriate.

The presence of so many Reserve forces limited MAGTF 4-90 as well as helped it (for this operation). For example, Battalion 1/24 had to leave Subic before the end of June to allow time for processing back into the Reserve. III MEF deployed an engineering unit, which married up with equipment off MV *Lummus* to replace 1/24’s capabilities.

Despite the extensive engineering and other equipment available to CMAGTF 4-90, shortfalls existed. Shovels provide the most promi-
nenent example of such a shortfall. The base had few shovels on hand other than gardening tools and the Marines' entrenching tools. With the ash flow and the need to rapidly clear rooftops, snow shovels were more practical. Thus, base personnel (and Marines) quickly began fabricating 'ash shovels' for ash clearance.

Other issues

Assumption of additional tasks

CJTF initially assigned USMC forces very limited tasks. But because of MAGTF 4-90's inherent capabilities, some of which resulted from its unusual composition (principally reserve units), and the realities of a disaster situation, the Marines tackled far more taskings than those originally assigned. In part this results from the nature of a disaster situation and a "can-do" attitude; if able, Marine forces will tackle whatever problems they believe they can help solve. Thus, for example, Marine engineering capabilities (both technical and physical) proved vital to the restoration of utility services at Subic Bay Naval Base.

Coordination with local officials

Mayor Gordon, Olongapo, requested permission from the Commander, U.S. Navy, Philippines (COMUSNAVPHIL), for Filipinos to be able to move freely through Subic Base for refuge from the volcano. R.Adm. Mercer refused this request; his refusal led to tension between Gordon and U.S. officials. (There was a long history of such tension between Gordon and base commanders.) Thus, Gordon became more likely to react to any real or perceived slight by U.S. military units. For example, many Marines got involved in directing traffic on base but some did this off base as well. Gordon complained vociferously that "armed U.S. personnel were directing traffic" when four U.S. Marines directed traffic at Rizal Circle in Olongapo. These Marines were soon recalled.

Gordon's pique at Mercer caused other problems for Marine forces. Gordon, for example, refused to cooperate with USMC efforts to distribute food from U.S. refrigerated storage that had lost power. Thus,
after initial unapproved distribution in Olongapo, later distribution had to be done further from Subic Bay in other Filipino towns (whose mayors were asking for such assistance).

Sources

1. Anne M. Bazzell, *Joint Task Force Fiery Vigil*, 834th Airlift Division history, April, 1992


Overview

Following several tense years that led to democratic elections, on February 7, 1991, Jean-Bertrand Aristide became the first democratically elected president of Haiti. The Haitian military overthrew Aristide seven months later, on September 29th. On the 30th, planning began for a potential non-combatant evacuation operation of U.S. citizens from Haiti. That same day, USCINCLANT ordered II MEF to form JTF 129 and deploy it to Guantanamo Bay in support of the NEO contingency. JTF 129 included 300 Marines with other forces (including the Air Contingency Force—ACF) on alert to support a NEO. Beginning on 23 October, JTF-129 redeployed back to CONUS (the last units returned to their home bases on 21 November).

As the NEO contingency became less prominent, another type of operation forced itself on the United States. In the decade since the Mariel boatlift, LANTCOM and FORCECOM had done a variety of planning and other preparations for dealing with large numbers of migrants. With the coup in Haiti, contingency planning began for an outflow of Haitians. This included a final planning conference and site survey on 8–9 October in Guantanamo Bay for a 5,000-person facility. Events soon caught up with these preparations.

On 29 October 1991, alien migrant interception operations (AMIO) of Haitians began with 19 picked up by a USCG cutter. On 9 November, USS Pharris picked up 17 Haitians and USCG cutters picked up 483 more over the next two days. The Coast Guard cutters had nowhere to take the Haitians and were keeping them on deck at anchor in Guantanamo Bay. On 13 November, USCINCLANT authorized the offload of 483 Haitians at the naval base. Naval-base personnel, including Marines, had prepared a camp to house the Haitians.
Although the Bush administration desired to directly repatriate Haitians, on November 19 a federal judge issued a temporary injunction against such action. On 20 November, the total reached 2,817 Haitians on USCG cutters and LSD-46 Tortuga in Guantanamo Bay harbor in addition to the 500 ashore. That day the Joint Staff issued the planning order for Operation Safe Harbor, the interdiction and support of Haitians. On 25 November, President Bush ordered the establishment of a refugee camp at Guantanamo Bay. The next day, USCINCLANT established JTF-GTMO under Brig.Gen. George Walls, then commanding general of 2d FSSG in Camp Lejeune. That evening (26 November), a 240-Marine contingent left Cherry Point for Haiti.

Initial planning envisioned holding Haitians for just a short processing period (ten days) and then either repatriating them to Haiti or allowing them to move into the United States. With this conception, two 2,500-man tent cities would provide more than adequate shelter for the Haitians. The tents did not remain “only a temporary stop-gap measure” since the number of refugees aboard USCG and USN ships on 24 November 1991 exceeded the then-planned tent cities and the interception of Haitians continued at a high level for months. Also, processing did not go as rapidly as anticipated and, after processing, a number of legal restraints (how to handle HIV-positive Haitians and legal challenges to repatriation) added to the duration of the operation.

Although the Marines were first on scene, they did not provide the bulk of the JTF force. With the exception of brief periods, the augmenting Marine force remained at about 300 in addition to about 300 Marines assigned to Marine Barracks, Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. The U.S. Army contingent (mostly civil affairs and military police) consisted of 1,000 to 1,200 soldiers from December into June 1992. The Navy and Air Force contingents ranged from 150 to 300 each into July 1992. In peak periods, the JTF consisted of about 2,000 personnel. (This does not include the 1,200 sailors and Marines assigned to Guantanamo Bay.) In addition to forces assigned to the JTF, Navy ships and Air Force and Marine Corps aircraft transported the JTF’s supplies and personnel to Cuba. Events rapidly changed these figures. On 16 December 1991, 380 Marines from the II MEF air
contingency force (ACF) deployed to support JTF-GTMO humanitarian assistance and security operations following a 15 December riot by the Haitians in the camps. This force returned to CONUS on 23 December.

The number of Haitians also fluctuated, rising to 11,000 in January 1992, falling to 2,000 in April, and rising again to 15,000. By July, only 300 Haitians remained in one tent camp. These people, who either were HIV-positive or were remaining with family members who were HIV-positive, kept Operation GTMO going through June 1993.

Mission

USMC forces faced two distinct major tasks following the military overthrow of Aristide.

- From late September into early November, the USMC prepared for a potential NEO from Haití.
- From November 1991 through June 1993, USMC forces participated in (with a Marine often commanding) a JTF to take care of Haitians at the Guantanamo Naval Base. The formal tasking was fourfold:
  - Offer emergency humanitarian assistance to Haitian migrants interned at NAVBASE Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.
  - Assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service in screening and moving eligible Haitians to asylum in the United States.
  - Coordinate with the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) and the Coast Guard for voluntary repatriation of Haitians or their follow-on migration to third countries.
  - Prepare to conduct involuntary repatriation of Haitian migrants when ordered.

A key implicit part of the tasking was for the Joint Task force to coordinate Operation GTMO with Operation Able Manner (USCG interdiction operations of Haitian migrants) and to support Able Manner as necessary.
Concept of operations

Operation GTMO's concept of operations revolved around two separate missions: providing for the basic needs of Haitian refugees, and processing the Haitians either for immigration into the United States or for return to Haiti. The first, care giving, was a military responsibility and the second, evaluation, a shared responsibility of a number of civilian agencies.

USMC tasks

Marine units had a variety of tasks during Operation GTMO. These ranged from initial efforts to construct the camps for the Haitian refugees to commanding the operation and maintaining security forces for augmenting Operation GTMO, as necessary. Thus, USMC responsibilities in GTMO seem threefold.

1. Commanding Operation GTMO
2. Helping to build and run migrant camps for housing Haitian emigres
3. Assisting security and maintaining a quick-reaction security force to augment Operation GTMO forces.

Requirements for USMC tasks (and forces available)

1. Command JTF: The tasking to CG, 2d FSSG, to command JTF GTMO, meant that 2d FSSG, with augmentation from other II MEF units, would provide the core of the JTF staff\(^1\) and the equipment and personnel to run a JTF.

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1. As of 12 January 1992, the 358 members of the JTF staff came from all four services: 298 USMC, 27 USN, 23 USA, 8 USAF, and two civilians. At this time, the JTF totaled 1,638 personnel (301 USMC, 167 USN, 1,032 USA, 195 USAF, and two civilians). This does not include personnel (including the Marines assigned to the Marine Barracks) assigned to NAVBASE Guantanamo Bay who supported the operation. (As of 6 December 1991, the last day the JTF sitrep included NAVBASE personnel, NAVBASE personnel numbered 1,035 USN and 478 USMC.)
a. **Provide core of JTF staff.** Including support personnel, this included almost 300 Marines, mostly from the 2d FSSG.

b. **Self-deploy.** Portions of the JTF staff deployed from Cherry Point via USMCC C-130s.

c. **Be self-sustaining.** Orders called for the force to deploy "self-sufficient, without significant support from Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay." Thus, the orders envisioned an expeditionary deployment, where the JTF would bring with it everything it required. (NS GTMO supported the operation in a wide variety of ways, such as the transportation and vehicle maintenance provided by the Marine Barracks.)

d. **Provide communications and computing equipment.** The 2d FSSG provided the bulk of the initial computer and communications equipment for the JTF. The Marines deployed as part of the JTF staff established a local area network (LAN) at NS GTMO for running JTF operations.

2. **Construction and maintenance of camps.** Marine forces were assigned to provide the materials for and construct "McCalla I," the first of six 2,500-person camps for holding the Haitian refugees (and completed constructing the camp on 29 November). Hotel Battery, 3/10, helped construct three of the six camps before its return to the United States in mid-December.

a. **Housing.** Needed were adequate tents (157) and bedding for a 2,500-person refugee camp. As the operation became likely, 2d FSSG staged the material for the tent city at MCAS Cherry Point.

b. **Administration.** Assisting the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) monitor the flow of migrants and keeping track of the migrants within the camps. This included a requirement to deal with both individual Haitians and leaders within the camps.

c. **Other services.** Marine personnel assisted in other tasks necessary for constructing and running the camps. For example, Marine mobile kitchen trailers (MKTs) provided one of the
early augmentations of base facilities for feeding the migrants.

3. **Provide security.** One of the main tasks for Marine forces was to provide security. This can be separated into three distinct tasks: guarding the actual camps; aiding USCG personnel in controlling migrants aboard ship; and providing an on-call security augmentation force.

   a. **Guard perimeters, augment GTMO forces.** Marines assigned to the Guantanamo Naval Base provided an immediate augmentation force in case of disturbances, and helped USA MPs in guarding the perimeters of the refugee camps.

   b. **Augment USCG security.** This involved two different requirements. The first was to provide security on the piers when USCG cutters brought Haitians into Guantanamo. The rifle company assigned to the Marine Barracks had primary responsibility for this task. The second was to provide security on cutters conducting AMIO operations. This augmentation to USCG cutters was intermittently a USMC task. A Fleet Anti-terrorist Security Team (FAST) platoon deployed to Guantanamo Bay in February 1992, and for six months Marines sailed with the AMIO cutters.

   c. **Maintain an on-call security augmentation force in CONUS.** Provided by II MEF ACF. On 16 December 1991, 309 Marines from the ACF (then the 2d Bn, 8th Marines) deployed to augment camp security following a riot on 15 December.

**Shortfalls in meeting USMC requirements**

Several groups of problems and shortfalls occurred in Operation GTMO.

**Shortage of linguists**

The ability to deal directly with the Haitians was a critical requirement. First of all, French-Creole speakers were needed. The number of French-Creole linguists requested by the JTF (one request for 52,
another request for 32) exceeded the number available throughout the U.S. military (a total of 7 trained Haitian Creole linguists).

**Staff limitations**

The JTF deployed with an initial tasking for a short operation that would provide housing for Haitians for a limited (ten-day) processing period. The mission evolved into longer processing periods and long-term care for a segment of the migrant population. In addition, orders called for a minimal footprint for the additional forces deploying into Guantanamo Bay. Thus, for example, the J-4 had only a very limited staff early in the operation; its limitations complicated tracking the operation's logistic support.

**Other personnel shortfalls**

In addition to shortfalls in linguists and the JTF staff (early in the operation), JTF-GTMO experienced a number of problems in other personnel areas. For example, MARFOR reported a shortfall in personnel trained in the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)—only three were available, only one of these had extensive experience with WWMCCs and he did not have much experience in embarkation. Also, the expertise for dealing with a large civilian population resides mainly with civil affairs units, which are either mainly (USA) or totally (USMC) in the reserves. An extended operation, such as Operation GTMO, strains the ability to maintain sufficient numbers of civil affairs personnel committed to the JTF.

**Minimal footprint**

The early deployment occurred under a restriction to minimize the size of the deployment while remaining self-sufficient. In addition to discovering that minimizing the staff deployment left the CJTF short of needed expertise, the JTF also had to rely heavily on the Naval Base for support. For example, both the Marine Barracks and the base Public Works Department (PWD) lent equipment (such as vehicles) to the JTF and repaired its equipment. Although this might work with few problems for a short-term deployment, the PWD found that it had difficulty meeting its base responsibilities after about six weeks because of the JTF's demands on PWD equipment and personnel.
Interoperability

A number of interoperability shortfalls emerged during the operation. Some of these were hardware problems. For example, only USMC systems could hook into the LAN established by the 2d FSSG core of the JTF staff. Other issues were procedural. For example, the differing specialization coding between services made it difficult for the JTF to rotate JTF staff members with other service replacements.

Care and feeding

Although taking care of the large numbers of Haitian migrants who passed through the camps was not primarily a USMC tasking, the JTF forces, in general, discovered a variety of shortfalls in that area. For example, the U.S. military does not have mobile kitchens appropriate for cooking for large numbers of civilians.

Other issues

Supplies for civilian population

Operation GTMO forces provided for more than 10,000 Haitian refugees for a long time. The Haitians required a variety of types of support different from what typically enters the military logistics change. Baby diapers provide a typical example. Even in terms of food, MREs and other military foods do not conform well with the normal Haitian diet. When the situation moved beyond emergency support to a longer-term operation, JTF-GTMO moved to bring the food supply into closer conformity with the Haitians' needs and desires. In medical services, the AMAL block provided the medical personnel with surgical supplies for a combat environment, but little in the way of appropriate supplies for a civilian population. The medical personnel "scrounged" appropriate supplies from other military medical facilities.

Running a civilian society

As the operation shifted from short-term to long-term residence, a civil society grew within the camps. This development was fostered and controlled by the JTF forces, as the presence of Haitian leaders
made running the camps easier. When a civil society develops under military control, however, new requirements can emerge. Thus, for example, policies and procedures for handling civilian-versus-civilian conflict (such as crime) are needed in this situation. The JTF had many military police, but none from the criminal investigations division (CID), who would normally investigate criminal activity. The J-2 staff handled many of these investigative functions.

**Sensitivity to civilian population**

Civilians placed in military camps, such as the Haitian migrants housed at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, are not necessarily familiar with military operations; therefore, normal base activities can create problems. During Operation GTMO, the JTF soon realized that rifle and other gunnery range activity greatly disturbed the Haitians when it surprised them. Thus, the JTF had interpreters warn the Haitians before such gunnery range activity.

**Relations with international relief organizations**

Along with U.S. Government agencies and private donations, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) aided the Haitian refugees. Because of their status as refugees (i.e., people who have fled across international borders), the UNHCR had certain oversight responsibilities and powers during Operation GTMO. Some of the UNHCR regulations led to demands on the JTF forces. For example, the UNHCR required that the Haitians receive clean eating utensils daily. This led JTF-GTMO to procure disposable plasticware for use at all meals (since the logistics of providing and washing silverware were beyond the capabilities of the forces in the operation). In addition, many Americans donated goods and clothing for the Haitians. The UNHCR inspected all of these materials before the Haitians could receive them.

**Command interoperability**

Operation GTMO highlighted the problems that proliferating computer types and programs can cause for military command and control. The 2d FSSG Marines of the JTF HQ deployed with USMC local area network (LAN) equipment and quickly established a LAN for
the HQ. JTF augmentees from other services found that their computers could not link into this LAN; thus, its value as a command network was limited. Similarly, the JTF HQ had to develop a program to monitor Haitian refugees that would work with the 12 different programs on refugees and immigration that various U.S. Government and UN agencies used. A similar issue arose with many portable radios acquired for the operation. Not all the radios could communicate with each other, and the Naval Base could repair only one type of radio (which accounted for about 80 percent). The lack of standard off-the-shelf purchasing hampered the JTF's operations.

Endstate

Operation GTMO, which had begun as a 30-day operation to temporarily care for Haitian migrants, was extended for more than 19 months. Even after the migrant crisis subsided by early 1992, the military involvement in running migrant camps continued for another year because of legal limitations on the repatriation of Haitians and disagreements over the appropriate handling of migrants who tested HIV-positive. This extended prolongation of the military mission highlights how the military often has little or no control over decisions on ending missions.

Sources


2. Files on Operation GTMO at the Naval Operational Archives, Washington Navy Yard (collected by Capt. McClintock and Capt. Monroe)
Appendix G: JTF-LA: Los Angeles, California, May 1992

Overview

On 29 April 1992, following the acquittal of four Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers in the Rodney King beating case, rioting broke out in Los Angeles. The extent of the rioting overwhelmed the LAPD, and the governor of California ordered state police and 2,000 National Guard troops to Los Angeles. As these headed toward Los Angeles, California requested federal assistance on 30 April. The next morning, USMC and Army units received GARDEN PLOT orders to assist in restoring order in south-central Los Angeles. President Bush also announced his intention to federalize the California Army National Guard (CAARNG) units in Los Angeles. Federalizing the CAARNG had two major consequences: first, as desired, it made it easier to coordinate CAARNG operations with those of incoming USA and USMC units (since CJTF-LA commanded all of these units); secondly, the posse comitatus act now applied to the CAARNG, limiting the CAARNG soldiers' ability to act in support of police operations. (For example, through federalization the CAARNG lost the ability to assume police powers and to arrest and detain suspects independent of a police presence.)

These forces began various civil-disturbance operations in Los Angeles on 2 May. They operated under a Joint Task Force commanded by MGEN Couvault, the CG of the U.S. Army’s 7th Infantry Division

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1. DOD directive 3025.12, GARDEN PLOT, is the basic DOD civil disturbance plan, which provides guidance for military forces directed to conduct domestic civil disturbance operations. For a brief discussion, see FM 100-19/FMFM 7-10, Domestic Support Operations, HQ, Department of the Army, U.S. Marine Corps, July 1993, pp. 7-11 to 7-14.
Forces under the JTF totaled about 13,450 (68 in the JTF HQ; 11,800 in ARFOR (including the CAARNG and 2,600 USA soldiers from the 7th Infantry Division); and 1,580 in MARFOR).\(^2\) Brig.Gen. M.T. Hopgood, USMC, CG 1st FSSG, was the MARFOR commander. SPMAGTF LA included elements from the 1st Marines; 3d Battalion, 1st Marines; 1st LAI Battalion (-); MAG-39 (two UH-1Ns and 2 CH-46s); a military police company; and a truck detachment from the 11th Marines. Besides the Marines deployed to MCAS Tustin or into Los Angeles, I MEF forces alerted for possible deployment included 2/9 (on one-hour alert for 2 and 3 May), and 3/7, 3/5 and the 11th Marines on six-hour alert.

In general, the situation in Los Angeles was calmer by the time federal forces arrived on scene. The units provided augmentation to LAPD patrols, mounted visible sentries in threatened areas (such as shopping malls), escorted firefighters, and provided logistical support to local police operations. Marine forces deployed in the Compton and Carson City police districts. SPMAGTF-LA's missions included providing security at various sites already secured by the police (such as at shopping centers, several schools, and a fuel farm) and establishing outposts along several streets.

Within several days, the military forces began to reduce the visibility of their presence (emphasizing night patrols, for example). Operations in Los Angeles essentially ended on 8 May with all forces back at bases by 12 May. Some military units remained on notice as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for several more days.

**Mission**

The military's mission was to assist local authorities restore order by providing a visible armed presence in areas threatened by further civil disturbance.

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2. As of 6 May, the following law enforcement and military personnel were involved in operations in Los Angeles (numbers in parentheses are approximate numbers deployed on the street): LAPD, 5,000 (1,700–2,100); California Highway Patrol, 500 (200–250); Sheriff's department, 850; National Guard, 9,844 (2,600); federal troops, 3,313: U.S. Army, 1,769 (678); USMC, 1,544 (436). *Los Angeles Times*, 7 May 1992, p. A6.
unrest and to conduct civil disturbance operations to help local authorities restore and preserve law and order in the Los Angeles area. The direct mission statement to the Marines was to provide “reinforcing and presence” in the Los Angeles area.

Concept of operations

U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps were to deploy forces into Los Angeles, and coordinate with local law enforcement agencies to restore law and order in the Los Angeles communities that were experiencing unrest. The USA and USMC forces were to provide presence in areas secured by law-enforcement agencies.

USMC tasks

USMC forces joined U.S. Army soldiers in helping California state and Los Angeles authorities restore order in Los Angeles following the outbreak of riots. Marine tasking focused on assistance in the Compton area, with some operations in other towns. Because the riots had essentially ended by the time the Marines arrived in Los Angeles, the following were SPMAGTF-LA’s basic tasks:

- Provide site security for areas cleared by police.
- Provide assistance to police forces and escort firefighters.
- Maintain a company-sized quick response force in case of another breakout of riots.

In addition to units committed to SPMAGTF-LA, I MEF had to maintain additional forces on alert to reinforce the operation. (The Director of Military Support (DOMS) began relaxing this alert structure

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3. The Secretary of the Army is the designated agent for controlling domestic military operations (generally military support to civilian authorities). DOMS is a general officer appointed by the Secretary of the Army to act as the primary contact for all federal departments and agencies. On behalf of the DOD, the DOMS staff (with augmentees from the other services) serves as a joint staff to ensure the planning, coordination, and execution of domestic operations.
on 3 May.) An additional USMC task was to provide support for other federal (military and civilian) forces deploying into Los Angeles. In addition to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Tustin acting as a staging area for SPMAGTF-LA, 350 Federal Marshals used the Marine Corps Reserve (MCR) Training Center, Pico Rivera, CA, as a staging area and MCAS El Toro provided beddown and support to four helicopters and 400 personnel from the Border Patrol. I MEF provided some transportation, food, and other logistical support to deploying 7th ID forces.

Requirements for USMC tasks (and forces available)

The Marine Corps received tasking to deploy, essentially, a reinforced battalion to join Army and National Guard forces in Los Angeles\(^4\) and to maintain additional forces on alert to reinforce the operation. Key requirements for conducting the civil disturbance mission in Los Angeles included the following:

1. **Quickly deployable forces:** The civil disturbance mission requires a rapid response to help quell disturbances and limit the damage (human or otherwise) that they might cause. The large Marine establishment in the southern California area provided a large reserve of forces for deployment into Los Angeles. Although SPMAGTF-LA consisted of only a reinforced battalion, additional regimental-sized forces stood on alert to rapidly reinforce the units deployed to MCAS Tustin and Los Angeles. Aside from police escort on the highways, Marines provided their own transport to Los Angeles and within the area of operations.\(^5\)

2. **Riot control equipment and training.** On 2 May, while awaiting orders to move into Los Angeles, USMC forces staged at MCAS

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4. SPMAGTF LA included Battalion 3/1, an engineer platoon from the 7th Engineer Battalion; a platoon from the MP company; and a detachment of trucks. Other elements involved included a command element from the 1st MARDIV, 1st Light Armored Infantry (LAI) Battalion, and Combat Service Support Detachment 11 (CSSD-11). A second battalion was on alert to deploy to Los Angeles.
Tustin conducted refresher training in riot control and domestic military operations. This included review of the arming orders and rules of engagement. Equipment provided to the SPMAGTF included 1,500 face shields, 1,500 batons, and 1,350 body shields. The Marine forces deployed with a wide range of munitions, including more than 1,700 rounds of CS, C-4 satchels, 40-mm ammunition, and more than 200,000 5.56 rounds.

3. **Liaison officers**: Domestic operations require liaison with a broad range of organizations. Liaison with law enforcement agencies is critical in a civil disturbance operation. Not only will the police be a crucial source of information (the primary intelligence source), but the military forces are supporting the law enforcement agencies and must understand the situation as perceived by these agencies. The liaison officers also must communicate the capabilities and limitations of their forces (including the legal restraints on police activities by federal forces) to civilian agencies. Liaison is one of the earliest requirements in many operations. For example, the first four Marines deployed to Los Angeles were I MEF intelligence personnel sent to provide liaison with the LAPD emergency operations center (EOC).

4. **Communications**: The operations in Los Angeles required a wide range of communications support. This included the ability to maintain communications between deployed forces and I MEF (SATCOMM and phone), between Marines and civilians (phone lines, commercial radios, fax machines), and between Marine units (Marine radios, commercial hand-held radios, cellular telephones, pay telephones). Many of these were acquired as the operation went on.

5. **Information**: To support the operation, Marine forces required a variety of information ranging from intelligence on the gang presence and some concept of how the gangs might try to act.

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5. As of the evening of 1 May, the SPMAGTF’s transportation assets included four helicopters; 54 5-ton trucks; 12 M151 jeeps, 66 HMMWVs, 12 ambulances, 2 CUCVs, 2 dump M-51s, 1 wrecker, 42 LAVs, and 4 motorcycles.
against military forces in Los Angeles to detailed maps of the assigned Marine sector and details on the other organizations involved in the operation. Many of these needs could not be met within the military.

6. **Base Support Installations (BSI).** In addition to supporting USMC forces, two USMC bases provided support to Department of Justice personnel and equipment that were helping restore order after the riots. According to the Federal Response Plan, BSI can provide a wide range of support from personnel to logistics. The support provided during this operation was logistical, such as providing meals and appropriate space in buildings.

**Shortfalls in meeting USMC requirements**

SPMAGTF-LA units faced a number of shortfalls in conducting operations in the Los Angeles area. Some of these result from the limitations inherent in any domestic U.S. military operation (see the discussion under “other issues” below). Such legal limitations do not, however, explain all the issues faced during the Los Angeles GARDEN PLOT operations. For example, as discussed below, the Los Angeles operations highlighted shortfalls in USMC communications equipment for military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), whether for wartime missions or for a domestic police-support operation. The following are some of the shortfalls in the Los Angeles operations:

1. **Communications.** Operations in Los Angeles highlighted inadequacies in communications capabilities for MOUT. The operations also required substantial interactions with other organizations with which the Marine units did not have interoperable equipment.

   a. **MOUT capabilities.** Despite the “antenna hills” established on rooftops, VHF communications were not reliable because of the built-up area of the operation. Units sometimes relied on pay telephones and, when acquired, cellular phones for communications with headquarters. The Marines also acquired commercial handheld radios, which proved more capable than the Marine AN/PRC-68 squad radio. Use of these commercial systems raises issues of security and cost (a
consideration with cellular phones). (The 1st Marine command element, at least, did not deploy to the Compton, CA, Ramada with STU-IIIs. Thus, they were unable to make secure phone calls or send classified documents via fax machine.) In many foreseeable domestic operations (such as those following a major natural disaster), commercial augmentations might not be available.

b. Liaison communications. Along with liaison officers, operating with civilian agencies required means of communication. The Compton police, for example, provided the Marines with several police scanners so that the Marines could monitor police and fire activity. The headquarters element relied on a fax machine for transmission of documents. This proved crucial for communicating with civilian agencies.

2. Maps. The domestic United States is generally not covered by military maps. For operations in Los Angeles, therefore, military units had to use commercial and USGS maps.

3. Intelligence. U.S. military forces are restricted by law in the collection of intelligence inside the United States. This limitation, along with an inadequate understanding of the limitation's parameters, hampered the operations in Los Angeles (see discussion below under “other issues”).

4. Familiarity with civilian agencies. Despite quarterly training with local law enforcement agencies, Marines (and other military forces) had little familiarity with police procedures (or the police with military procedures). For example, the initially established JTF-LA boundary zones used highways as dividers; thus, the military zones did not align with police jurisdictions.

5. Rules of Engagement (ROEs)/Arming Orders (AOs). Some confusion existed in the operations in Los Angeles in regard to the ROEs/AOs. For example, 3/1 initially drew machine guns and ammunition from the magazines and then, an hour later, returned the weapons to the magazine before deployment. In another incident, Marines expended 53 rounds of ammunition after a police officer was wounded. Some questions arose as to the appropriateness of (1) the Marines’ presence in a "ride-
along” with police, and (2) whether the suspect continued to pose a threat while fleeing. (Police officers apprehended him unharmed.) AO policy did not remain static through the operation. Initially, the CJTF authorized units to upgrade the arming status based on on-scene evaluations. The CJTF later rescinded this, reserving the authority for AO changes to the JTF headquarters.

**Other issues**

**Domestic operations**

Domestic operations—whether focusing on domestic unrest or responding to a natural disaster—place a range of legal challenges and restrictions on U.S. military forces. The following are some of the more significant issues faced during the operation in Los Angeles.

**Intelligence collection**

Executive Order 12333 (intelligence oversight) explicitly forbids the maintenance of domestic intelligence files and the conduct of domestic intelligence collection by U.S. military units. Although some of these restrictions are lifted when the national command authorities issue GARDEN PLOT orders, the Marine forces will enter into an operation with little information on “threats.” This lack of prior information and the restrictions on intelligence gathering mean that Marine units will have to rely heavily on law enforcement (and other civilian) agencies for intelligence support. As an operation continues, military assets can play a more substantial role. During the Los Angeles riots, for example, Marines deployed on the streets provided information for evaluation by the SPMAGTF’s S-2. Other military reconnaissance assets might support domestic operations.

As a corollary, because U.S. military forces do not (generally) focus on operations in the United States outside training areas, most situations will occur outside the typical map inventories. During the riots, Marine forces relied on USGS and commercial street maps.
Posse Comitatus

Federal forces, under the Posse Comitatus Act, do not have police authorities on U.S. soil. As such, military forces may not, for example, conduct surveillance or pursuit, arrest or search, or act as investigators in civilian law-enforcement activities. Two constitutional exceptions exist: when such actions are necessary to protect civilian property and functions, and when they are necessary to protect Federal property and functions.

MOUT versus riot control

Under GARDEN PLOT contingency planning, military forces prepare for civil disturbance missions that are, in essence, mass riot and crowd control. Many of those involved in the operation believed that the situation in Los Angeles more appropriately approximated MOUT than riot control. Thus, much of the additional training and the riot control equipment Marines received before deployment to the streets of Los Angeles might have been inappropriate for the actual situation military forces faced in the operation. (Or might have been inappropriate if the riots had not already mostly calmed down before the forces arrived on scene.)

Uncertain mission statement

Marine forces received initial orders to provide a “presence and reinforcing capability to local authorities.” This mission statement created some confusion as the operation developed, with disagreements and changing interpretations of the meaning of “presence.”

Sources


2. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALLS), Operations Other than War, Volume III: Civil Disturbance, CALL Newsletter No. 93-7, U.S. Army Combined Arms Command (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, KS, November 1993


Appendix H: Hurricane Andrew Disaster Relief: Florida, August–October 1992

Overview

With the approach of Hurricane Andrew, Florida Governor Lawton Chiles declared a state of emergency in south Florida on 23 August 1992. Florida state officials ordered the evacuation of over a million residents in three counties in the largest evacuation in U.S. history. Gov. Chiles ordered three National Guard battalions into south Florida, and 1,500 Florida National Guard soldiers assembled in Miami. On 24 August 1992, at 0400, Hurricane Andrew struck Florida about 25 miles south of Miami. A category IV storm, Andrew had sustained winds of 140 m.p.h. with gusts over 170 m.p.h. Andrew left a broad swath of damage, destroying 80,000 homes, leaving 250,000 people homeless, and cutting the power supply to 1.4 million Floridians. By 0700, well before the full extent of the damage became known, Gov. Chiles had requested a disaster declaration from President Bush under the Stafford Act. President Bush’s declaration thus authorized financial and other civilian federal assistance to the disaster relief situation. That day, FORSCOM issued the first deployment orders for federal forces to head to Florida even though Gov. Chiles would not make a direct request for military assistance until 27 August. On that day, President Bush ordered further federal forces to aid Florida in recovering from the storm’s devastation.¹

In line with the extent of damage, the relief operation quickly expanded to a major military operation that eventually involved more than 24,000 U.S. and Canadian military forces.² CG Second U.S.

¹ Federal forces also aided damage relief efforts in Louisiana, but their role was less significant than in Florida and these efforts did not significantly involve USMC forces.

² CG Second U.S.
Army, LTGEN Samuel Ebbesen, USA, commanded the Joint Task Force, and the Second Army provided most of the JTF staff. The SPMAGTF forces came from II MEF and initially operated as a MARFOR. Several days into the operation, the SPMAGTF was assigned to ARFOR (first reporting to XVIIIth Airborne Corps (ABC)) and then to the 10th Mountain Division).

II MEF received initial warning orders of a potential deployment on 25 August and initial planning called for a deployment of 1,500 to 2,000 Marines to Florida. The actual deployment order on 28 August changed the earlier tasking and gave the USMC units the task to construct and support two tent cities (including a 20-bed medical facility). From 28 through 30 August, 32 flights by KC-130s and C-9s from the 2d MAW airlifted elements of the Special MAGTF into Homestead Air Force Base until TRANSCOM airlift became available for moving the remainder of SPMAGTF-Dade County and its equipment from MCAS Cherry Point to Florida. The number of Marines to deploy to Florida shifted during the last days of August. As of early 29 August, II MEF was to deploy 1,700 Marines. As of the next morning, DOMS planned for 1,373 Marines to deploy while the TPFDD for that day scheduled 838 Marines. The MARFOR (including some Navy personnel assigned to the SPMAGTF) reached a total of 911. By 3 September, the SPMAGTF had closed the area of operations (AOR), and the CJTF gave the ARFOR operational control (opcon) over the SPMAGTF on 5 September. On 6 September, the SPMAGTF had its major taskings fully operational (two life support centers (LSCs—tent

2. Peak forces levels were as follows: USA, 17,102; USN, 4,134; USAF, 1,398; USMC, 920 (including assigned USN personnel); Canadian, 398; Florida National Guard, 5,991; USA Reserve, 794; and DOD civilians, 944 (principally USA Corps of Engineers).

3. On 11 September, the composition of the JTF was as follows: USA, 513; USN, 36; USAF, 19; USMC, 10; civilian, 14; total, 592. Despite the presence of Canadian forces, this did not become a Combined Task Force.

4. The principal elements of the SPMAGTF came from the eight organic battalions of the 2d FSSG, with augmentees from 3/10 and the 4th Civil Affairs Group (CAG). The command element of the SPMAGTF came from II MEF and its components (2d MARDIV, 2d MAW, and 2d FSSG) and deployed to Florida on 28 August via USMC C-9s.
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cities) and 20-bed medical clinic). These LSCs eventually housed slightly more than 2,000 people at a time. (As of 20 September, 1,290 people were at Harris Field and 799 were at the Florida City camp.)

The 2d FSSG provided the principal Marine forces involved in the Hurricane Andrew disaster-relief operation. The Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) was the largest element, with the 8th Engineer Support Battalion, 2d FSSG, the principal unit. Other II MEF forces involved included the 3/10(-), which provided the ground combat element (GCE). The SPMAGTF did not include an air combat element (ACE), although USMC aircraft (mainly from 2d MAW) supported the operation. Augmenting forces included reservists from the 4th Civil Affairs Group (CAG), 4th MARDIV.

Military relief efforts following Hurricane Andrew were wide ranging and included:

- Building and running four “life-support centers” for temporary housing and care of displaced residents
- Generating emergency power
- Serving almost 1 million meals (both meals ready to eat (MREs) and from field kitchens)
- Assisting in debris removal and restoration of power service.

By October, the emergency phase of the operations was ending. The military force’s involvement in Andrew disaster relief formally ended on 15 October 1992.

Mission

To conduct relief operations and assist civilian authorities in the restoration of services following the devastation left by Hurricane Andrew.

Concept of operations

The general concept of operations called for U.S. military forces to provide humanitarian support by establishing field feeding sites,
temporary housing, storage/distribution warehouses, cargo-transfer operations, local/line haul transportation operations, and other logistical support. CINCFOR identified four objectives for the operation:

- Provide immediate life support: food, potable water, shelter, medical services and supplies, sanitation, security, and transportation.
- Clear debris to open major road arteries and remove debris threatening public safety.
- Assess needs for relief.
- Provide help to other Federal agencies, State and local governments, and other organizations in the receipt, storage, and distribution of humanitarian supplies and equipment.

Going in, the operation had three basic phases:

- Relief: provide immediate life-support systems.
- Recovery: ensure sustainment of immediate life services and assist restoration of public services.
- Reconstitution: reestablish public services under non-DOD federal, state, and local organizations. Redeploy military forces.

The first two phases occurred essentially simultaneously: the military forces began to help restore utility services at the same time that the first tent cities were being constructed (with a gradual move from one phase to the next). By the end of September, the issue was clearly one of reconstitution and the military began redeployment.

**USMC tasks**

Early-on tasking stated the “general missions” of JTF-Andrew components as follows:

- Army: debris removal
- Marines: tent cities
- Navy: debris removal, infrastructure, buildings.
In fact, this tasking indicated a clear division of responsibilities that does not seem to have survived contact with the enemy. DOMS tasked the Marine Corps to deploy a Special MAGTF as part of the disaster-relief operations following Hurricane Andrew. This SPMAGTF had two major tasks:

1. To construct and run several tent cities to provide temporary shelter for those displaced by the hurricane
2. To provide an engineering force to support basic recovery of services in the affected areas of south Florida.

In addition to these two major taskings, USMC forces provided transportation support for personnel (such as of volunteers in the south Florida area) and relief goods.

Requirements for USMC tasks (and forces available)

The requirements for the tasks basically fall into three broad areas: constructing and running tent cities for the displaced Floridians (including the establishment of a small medical facility); engineering support (for cleaning debris and restoring utilities); and, transportation (both for self-deployment and for relief activities).

1. Constructing/running tent cities. The primary SPMAGTF task was to construct and run tent cities to house disaster victims. The final tasking required the Marines to construct two 1,500-person tent cities (or “life-support centers” (LSCs)): one at Florida City (LSC Krome) and the other in Homestead (LSC Harris). The CSSD built LSC Harris, while the GCE (3/10(-))

5. As stated by CJTF-Andrew in his concept of operations the “enemy forces” were “Hurricane Andrew—forces of nature.”

6. The deployment order (28 August) tasked the SPMAGTF with the construction of two 2,500-man tent cities; to provide a 20-bed medical clinic; and to protect government property.

CJTF-Andrew assigned the SPMAGTF three missions on its arrival in Florida: (1) Build two 1,500-person tent camps; (2) Be prepared to build one additional 1,500-person tent camp; and (3) On order, provide general support to the overall recovery effort.
Marines provided numerous services at the LSCs, including shelter, cots, showers, laundry, generators, sanitation, trash removal, messing, and some medical care.

a. **Concept for constructing tent city for civilians.** A critical first step is a concept for constructing a tent city for housing civilians. With recent experience in Operation GTMO, the involved Marines ended up providing “consulting” services for the Army units responsible for constructing the other two LSCs.

b. **Tents and other equipment for constructing a camp.** Building a tent city requires a wide range of equipment from tents to mobile kitchens. For example, the two LSCs required a total of 202 GP tents (which gave a combined total occupancy capacity of 2,800 people).

c. **Construction and material-handling equipment.** The 8th Engineering Support Battalion deployed a variety of equipment (including forklifts and a grader), which were useful in constructing the LSCs.

d. **Electrical generation.** The SPMAGTF deployed with more than 40 generators, which, with the excess ROWPU generators noted below, provided excess capacity over the needs of the LSCs. (Thus, USMC generators provided power to other organizations, such as a Metro Dade Community College adult education trailer at LSC Harris, and power to a sewage lift station at an apartment complex.)

e. **Water generation.** The SPMAGTF deployed with 16 ROWPUs. Because the SPMAGTF received no water production orders, these were hooked to shower and laundry units to recycle water. Unused ROWPU generators gave the SPMAGTF excess generator capacity.

f. **Medical services.** The SPMAGTF's medical personnel treated a total of 1,864 civilians and some military personnel, and

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7. The 3/10 maintained responsibility for LSC Krome until 26 September, when it redeployed back to Camp Lejeune along with many other Marines from the SPMAGTF.
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. provided support to local governments (immunizing more than 400 Homestead city workers with tentanus toxoid).

g. Food supplies and kitchen facilities. The SPMAGTF served almost 140,000 meals to displaced civilians during the relief operation.

h. Security: Marines provided limited security inside the camps. (Federal law limits the extent of policing activity by federal military forces.)

i. Liaison with local officials and relief groups. Marines were assigned only a portion of the tasks necessary for running the LSCs. Successfully running the camp meant coordination with numerous other agencies and organizations, including the Red Cross (responsible in the Federal Response Plan for housing victims) and local police (who were responsible for policing the populations in the LSCs).

j. Linguists. Spanish-speaking Marines went out into the community to communicate with non-English-speaking disaster victims. These teams provided support to civilian agencies that were short of linguists.

k. Contracting: A number of the services essential for running the camp, including sanitation and bulk trash removal, were provided through contracting for private services.

2. Engineering support. SPMAGTF Marines participated in a range of engineering support activities in the Andrew disaster-relief operation. In addition to construction activity related to the LSCs, Marine engineers removed debris and installed power poles for local utilities to help restore the power grid.

a. Cleaning debris. The principal Marine contributions were labor and transportation to remove debris (over 200 truckloads). This included small teams that helped homeowners clear debris and do emergency repairs of storm damage.
b. Restoring utility services. USMC engineers helped place poles for electric power lines (transporting and installing more than 520 utility poles).

c. Doing miscellaneous construction: Throughout the operation, Marines did a variety of construction tasks, both within the LSCs and elsewhere in the disaster area. For example, Marines constructed tables for the Homestead housing authority, built a sound wall for a daycare facility, and fabricated a means for handicap access to portable toilets in the LSCs.

3. Transportation. For the relief operations, USMC forces had to provide transportation for four different purposes: self-deployment of USMC assets until TRANSCOM assets became available for moving USMC forces; carrying relief supplies; moving relief personnel; and carrying debris to disposal sites. The first primarily involved KC-130s; the second both KC-130s (for carrying in donations from outside the affected areas) and line lift (for bringing supplies for reconstruction efforts). The third and fourth required ground-transportation assets.

a. Self-deployment. The initial Marine deployments (28-29 August 1992) to south Florida were via USMC KC-130s and C-9s because USAF airlift assets were not available. TRANSCOM (Air Mobility Command) airlift assets began airlifting USMC forces on 30 August. The airlift was completed by midnight, 1 September. (VMGR-252 and VMGR-253 aircraft flew 27 sorties (a total of 171 hours in surge operations) 28-31 August.)

b. Airlift of relief supplies: Through September, USMC aircraft airlifted in supplies for the SPMAGTF as well as relief supplies. These donations came from a variety of locations.

c. Transportation of relief workers. As part of the relief effort, SPMAGTF assets helped moved various relief workers in the devastated area. For example, on 7 September the SPMAGTF provided nine LVS combos and two 5-ton trucks to the 10th Mountain Division to help move Mormon volunteers and 53 tons of building materials.
d. **Transportation of relief supplies.** The SPMAGTF supported numerous organizations by transporting and handling relief supplies. For example, the SPMAGTF's motor transport delivered 92 tons of disaster supplies for the Jaycees to distribution centers.

Not all of the SPMAGTF's activities fall neatly into the three groupings above. Additional requirements, based on the actual activities of the SPMAGTF Dade County, included:

4. **Helicopter support.** Marines helped establish landing zones for helicopters and supported helicopter operations.

5. **Military police.** USMC military police provided traffic control (to further military purposes) and security (for military equipment and supplies, force protection, and VIPs).

6. **Fuel support.** The SPMAGTF provided a variety of units with bulk fuel support (both diesel and MOGAS).

7. **Technical support.** SPMAGTF Dade Country Marines provided a range of technical-support services. These ranged from providing other services with concepts of how to construct a tent city for a civilian population to repairing equipment for civilian agencies. Marines, for example, repaired chainsaws for the Homestead public works department to use in clearing debris and repaired Salvation Army air conditioners. Marines also helped rewire some schools.

**Shortfalls in meeting USMC requirements**

The following are some of the identifiable shortfalls in meeting USMC taskings in the relief operation.

- **Interoperability with non-military organizations.** The Marine forces (along with essentially the rest of the JTF) encountered problems in dealing with the variety of federal, state, and private voluntary organizations involved in the relief operation. Some of these problems emerged because of a lack of familiarity with these organizations and their roles and responsibilities in a disaster-relief situation.
• Compatibility of generators and civilian devices. The civilians housed in the LSCs brought with them many typical household electrical appliances (such as hairdryers). Other civilian devices needing electrical support included a sterilizer for baby bottles. The current provided by the portable generators did not comport with the civilian standard.

• Compatibility of communications equipment. Many of the involved organizations used non-standard and/or incompatible radios. The military police units, for example, did not have radios compatible with the local police agencies.

• Environmental concerns: Restrictions on waste outflow, for example, limited Marine operations. The wastewater from the mobile kitchens could not be discharged into the sewer system due to the grease content.

• Medical supplies and capabilities. The deployed force’s medical capabilities did not match the needs of a disaster relief situation. Shortfalls, or areas in which there were problems, included vector control, civilian immunizations, handicapped services, elderly care, and pediatric services.

Some of the shortfalls concerned coordination with other organizations responsible for specific tasks:

• The Public Health Service was responsible for environmental health specialists (EHS), who are necessary for establishing and maintaining sanitary standards in disaster-relief camps. The first EHS did not arrive at the LSC until 11 days after the operation began.

• The CSSD received orders to rely on the U.S. Army’s Corps Support Command for all supplies (except unique USMC items). The SPMAGTF was operating in Florida before the USA supply system was established; therefore, the SPMAGTF had only a limited ability to repair equipment during the early days of the relief operation.

• Red Cross and local officials did not always undertake their full responsibilities for running the LSCs. Both the Homestead and Florida City officials, for example, resisted assuming control of
the LSCs after the Marines established them. Some Red Cross staff resisted identifying “trouble-makers” to the police, thus hindering attempts to maintain order within the LSCs. Other coordination problems hampered SPMAGTF Dade County operations; for example, official Red Cross personnel arrived several days into the operation and modified the procedure for registering LSC residents. This modification made it more difficult to provide accountability of the LSC residents.

Other issues

Defining and measuring endstates

Determining when and how to end military involvement proved a major problem for the military following Hurricane Andrew. The lack of clearly defined endstates complicated planning and execution in the first weeks of the relief operation and created difficulties in withdrawing forces as the relief and recovery phases ended and the operation moved into reconstruction. (The fact that these phases progressed differently in both geographic and functional areas further complicated the situation.) As one after-action report noted, “The absence of endstates established by higher headquarters makes the trip along the humanitarian-assistance road vague and full of changes of direction.” Although a definition of the endstate may change (because of changes forced by circumstances on the ground or political imperatives), the failure to define such an endstate complicates planning and operations.

Can you treat people too well?

Were disaster victims treated too well? Perhaps that’s an odd question to ask, but many involved in Hurricane Andrew relief efforts feared that perhaps the military relief effort had treated at least some people too well. The classic example of this was the migration of homeless people from other states to the disaster area to live in the tent cities (which had such amenities as tents with televisions and VCRs, and visiting entertainment including bands and USO shows). Although the local authorities were responsible for screening people entering camps and for evicting either dangerous or ineligible residents, many
local authorities were unwilling to aggressively control the camp populations (perhaps in fear of the public-relations problems police have when they “throw people out on the street”).

**Civilian versus military standards**

When operating with large numbers of civilians, a military force encounters situations that demonstrate the different standards and requirements of the military as opposed to a civilian community. As an example, the portable generators that provided power to the LSCs were not compatible with household appliances and some other civilian devices. Because of these differences, the SPMAGTF procured disposable baby bottles and nipples as the available sterilization equipment did not work with the portable generators. As another example, the metal stakes used for tent construction were a potential safety problem in a civilian tent city (where many children were present). Such problems will probably emerge in all disaster-relief operations and require ad hoc solutions. With the tent stakes, for example, the SPMAGTF used sections of garden hose and water bottles to cover exposed metal stakes and rebar.

**Control of donated goods**

During the relief operation, tractor-trailer loads of supplies—from plywood to dog food—arrived at the CSSD base camp on an almost non-stop basis—whether the supplies had been requested or not, and whether they were needed or not. Some supplies (not due to CSSD actions) ended up dumped on the side of the road because the contributions could not be absorbed. In many disaster-relief situations, organizations will try to push in relief supplies. Sometimes these efforts are undertaken with little regard to the situation on the ground in terms of what is needed or the capacity to absorb such supplies. To the extent that this involves the military, coordination of the flow of supplies (especially during transition from relief to the recovery and reconstitution phases) is critical.

**Evolving missions**

In the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, the military mission, and thus the tasks for individual units, changed a number of times. It began as
a rather small involvement, but political imperatives made it the largest domestic disaster-relief operation in U.S. history. The Marine forces, like other involved units, felt the effects of these changes. For example, the CSSD prepared for an anticipated mission from 25 to 28 August and then received a modified mission that forced a reworking for all the mobile loads built over those four days. Due in part to this shift, the 8th Engineer Support Battalion (ESB) had to rebuild over 35 C-141 loads in a 24-hour period. The changes in the tables of organization and equipment (T/O, T/E) led to an estimated six-to-ten-hour delay in the 8th ESB deployment on 29 August. Also, the SPMAGTF's assigned mission changed a number of times. For example, the number and size of tent cities were changed by higher headquarters.

**MARRESFOR and domestic operations**

Marine Reserve Forces (MARRESFOR) will provide the only Marine forces in many disaster-relief operations. Frequently, higher headquarters might know little about the MARRESFOR activity. Some of this activity falls under the rubric of immediate assistance to save lives or prevent major property damage. In any event, Marine reserve forces will play a role often independent of other Marine activity in domestic operations. For example, during Hurricane Andrew, reservists from the headquarters and support (H&S) Company, 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion (AAB) and Marine Corps League members collected relief supplies in the Tampa area. Six Instructor and Inspector (I&I) Marines assigned to the 4th AAB drove a convoy of three 5-ton trucks and two trailers from Tampa to the Miami area. These Marines were not part of SPMAGTF Dade County.  

8. Not only MARRESFOR activity can go unrecorded. The official after-action report on relief operations in Louisiana did not report any Marine involvement, although MAG-41, with support from the 14th Marines (reserve) and VMGR 234 (NAS Glenview), coordinated and executed the airlift of more than 70 tons of "critically needed cargo" from Dallas to Louisiana on 2–3 September 1992.
Sources


4. Archival files on Hurricane Andrew at the Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (records gathered by Janet McDonnell)

5. Archival files on Hurricane Andrew at the Army Operations Center (DAMO-OPS)
Related CNA studies

The following Center for Naval Analyses studies might also be of interest:


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