CORDON AND SEARCH
Purpose: ALSA Center publishes the ALSB three times a year. ALSA is a multi-service DOD field agency sponsored by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), and the Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education (LeMay Center). This periodical is governed by Army Regulation 25-30, Chapter 10. The ALSB is a vehicle to "spread the word" on recent developments in warfighting concepts, issues, and Service interoperability. The intent is to provide a cross-service flow of information among readers around the globe. 

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Submissions: We solicit articles and reader's comments. Contributions of 1,500 words or less are ideal. Submit contributions, double-spaced in MS Word. Include name, title, complete unit address, telephone numbers, and e-mail address. Graphics can appear in an article, but you must also provide a separate computer file for each graphic and photograph (photos must be 300 dpi). Send e-mail submissions to alsadirector@langley.af.mil. ALSA Center reserves the right to edit content to meet space limitations and conform to the ALSB style and format.

Next issue: January 2011. Submission DEADLINE: COB 1 November 2010. Theme of this issue is "humanitarian assistance."

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Cover photo – US Soldiers from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, thoroughly search houses during a cordon and knock with Iraqi Army soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 4th Brigade, 9th Iraqi Army Division, at Taji Market, near Camp Taji, Iraq, August 2009. (Photo by SPC David M. Sharp, USA)
For 35 years, the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center has proudly bridged the gap of Service interoperability. We recently celebrated this milestone with our 35th Anniversary Dining Out. We were honored to have Maj Gen (S) James J. Jones, Deputy Director of Operations for US Central Command, a former ALSA action officer, give the keynote address and COL (R) Gordon P. Lynch, the first ALSA Director, speak of ALSA’s early days. Additionally, I want to personally thank all of the former ALSA Directors, action officers and staff for attending and enlightening us with their stories of ALSA’s lineage.

As ALSA closes out this milestone year, I want to reaffirm our commitment to addressing multi-Service interoperability issues with multi-Service solutions. Meeting the immediate needs of the warfighters remains our number one priority. We recently published *Conventional Forces and Special Forces Integration and Interoperability (CFSOF)*, and revised *Brevity, Military Diving Operations (MDO), Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)*, and *Dynamic Targeting* are in the final stages and will be available soon. The theme of our January 2011 ALSB is Humanitarian Operations. We want to capture the recent experience from natural disasters and humanitarian assistance operations. Articles are due by 1 November 2010.

For this ALSB, we focus on cordon and search (C/S) operations. C/S operations are a staple tactic in counterinsurgencies and are common practice in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Four years ago we published FM 3-06.20, MCRP 3-31.4B, NTTP 3-05.8, and AFTTP (I) 3-2.62, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations. For this ALSB we wanted to reach out to warfighters to solicit information about the current C/S fight to gain insight on new TTP for the revision of the MTTP publication.

Therefore, we lead off with an article written by John Sutherland, Rick Baillergeon, and Tim McKane, originally published in *Armchair General Magazine* that lays the doctrinal ground work of C/S operations by detailing C/S task organization, phases of operation, and keys to success. The second article is written by CPT Jess Greaves, an observer/controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). CPT Greaves asserts that isolation of the target by the inner cordon is key to conducting a successful operation. Our third article gives a firsthand account of a joint C/S operation with a US Armor Company/Team and an Iraqi Police unit from the commander, CPT Damasio Davila. Our fourth article, by Capt James Holler, illustrates proper implementation and benefits of using Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) to support C/S operations, bringing attention to a capability that is often underutilized by ground commanders. Next, we present the serious issue of civilian casualties (CIVCAS) as a result of miscommunication in positive identification (PID) of targets. In their article, Capt Preston Rhymer and Capt Eric Danielsen discuss the implications of CIVCAS and give recommendations on how to mitigate this issue in future operations. Finally, Capt Phil George outlines the potential issues and recommendations in an article about using close air support (CAS) for special operations forces C/S missions.

We have had many additions to the staff here at ALSA over the last few months. I want to give a hearty welcome to COL Bruce Sones, US Army, as our new Deputy Director. Bruce joins us from the Iraqi Theater where he served as an advisor to the Iraqi National Police. I want to also welcome Lt Col Drew “Stitch” Frasch and Maj William “Braveheart” Wallis from the Air Force, LTC Reg Armstrong, and MAJ(P) Steve Parker from the Army, and our new Illustrator Ms. Laura Caswell to ALSA. Lastly, I want to say farewell to Lt Col Robert “Slab” Bradeen, Lt Col Brent “Raygun” Brockinton, and MAJ Joe Leach. These officers have been an essential part of ALSA and will be missed as they move on to other endeavors. Hopefully, this edition of the ALSB will provide insights and views that will be helpful to you. As always, we value your feedback on the ALSB and all of ALSA’s MTTP publications, so do not hesitate to let us know how we are doing. Better yet, send the editor an article on a joint warfighting topic for publication in the bulletin!

*David B. Hume, Colonel, USAF Director*
CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS—
“A Deadly Game of Hide and Seek”

By
John Sutherland, Rick Baillergeon,
and Tim McKane

This article was originally published in Armchair General Magazine, 23 April 2008 issue.

Whether you grew up in a city or suburbia, the game of hide and seek is a common experience that most of us can relate to. Today, a variant of hide and seek, called cordon and search, is played daily throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. However, there are two clear differences in this variant. First, it is obviously not a game. Second, the ramifications for winning and losing have much more serious consequences.

Perhaps the most famous cordon and search operation conducted to date in Iraq was the ultimate capture of Saddam Hussein. Working on intelligence received 24 hours earlier, Soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division with special forces operators conducted Operation RED DAWN on 14 December 2003. About 60 Soldiers cordoned off an area of roughly 2 square miles to enable the preponderance of forces to search for Hussein. After initially coming up empty handed, forces researched the farm. Finally, Hussein was discovered hiding in an 8-foot-deep, camouflaged, spider hole. Operation RED DAWN was a success!
INTRODUCTION
Cordon and search operations have become one of the most frequent operations in the Global War on Terror. This type of combat operation involves isolating the target area and searching suspected buildings to capture or destroy possible insurgents and/or contraband. A cordon and search may also be thought of as a movement to contact, a raid, a deliberate attack, or as area reconnaissance, based on the accuracy of intelligence.

PURPOSE
Why is the cordon and search used so frequently in Iraq and Afghanistan? The key reason is that in this complex environment it has proven to be an effective means to seize key materials that an enemy may utilize or to seize personnel. Materials could include weapons caches, explosives, contraband, evidence, or intelligence. Personnel normally fall into the categories of insurgents, sympathizers, or criminals. Cordon and search may also be conducted for other reasons, perhaps as a show of force or to demonstrate to the local populace that the government and not the insurgents have control of the area.

ORGANIZATION
Whether you consider yourself a neophyte or a master tactician, executing a cordon and search is a thinking man’s game. The challenges of a complex urban environment can make your brain hurt just a bit. The skilled tactician will disregard this pain and begin planning for success. One of the first things to plan is your task organization, so let’s begin by understanding the task organization of battalion or company cordon and search operations. There are many variations on task organizing; we will portray one version below. (Fig. 1)

![Figure 1. Task Organization](image)

The typical organization for a cordon and search operation consists of a Command Element, Security Element, Search/Assault Element, plus a Support/Reserve Element to deal with the unexpected.

**Command Element**
Effective command and control is tantamount for all military operations and no less important during a cordon and search. The Command Element is the headquarters of the organization executing the operation. Careful consideration should be given to the size and composition of this element. The Command Element should be large enough to effectively coordinate and synchronize the security and search operations but must be small enough to not create an overwhelming footprint and become a burden on overall security. The execution of a cordon and search is no place for a commander to carry a big entourage with him!

The position of the Command Element in relation to the search operation is another important factor. Since the focus of the operation is the actual search, the Command Element usually positions itself where it will be close enough to the search to carry out its duties but without getting in the way. Normally, the Command Element will include host-nation representation in the form of a police or government official, adding legitimacy to the overall operation.
Security Element
The Security Element consists of two primary components: the outer and inner cordon. Cordon is a tactical task given to a unit to prevent the enemy’s withdrawal from or reinforcement of a position. A cordon is a type of isolation. It implies seizing or controlling key terrain and/or mounted and dismounted avenues of approach along the search area. Let’s discuss each one of the components separately and then we will tie them together.

Outer Cordon
The objectives of the outer cordon are to prevent anyone/anything from moving into the designated objective area (search area). (Fig. 2) This could include enemy reinforcements or even civilians who could disrupt the operation. This element may utilize any of a number of tactical tasks to accomplish their purpose, including isolate, block, contain, deny, secure, etc. To achieve these tasks, an element may set up traffic control points or blocking positions, emplace snipers, utilize observation posts, and conduct patrols. The commander will determine the various methods to use based on his analysis.

Inner Cordon
The main objectives of the inner cordon are to protect the main effort of the operation (the Search/Assault Element) from the enemy and ensure the enemy cannot enter or leave the search area. (Fig. 3) The tactical tasks that may be utilized include those mentioned above in outer cordon and suppress, cover, and guard. The element executing the inner cordon may utilize (among several methods): overwatch positions, support-by-fire positions, and emplacing snipers. One of the major differences in the outer and inner cordon is the amount of terrain involved. Whereas, the outer cordon may require setting up forces along many blocks (or kilometers if in an open environment), the inner cordon may only require a block, a single building, or even a portion of a building.

Establishing Cordons in an Urban Environment
Obviously the type of terrain and nature of the threat will dictate the inner and outer cordon location and method. Planners must also consider the type of construction searchers will encounter among dwellings when conducting cordons in built-up areas. What’s important to remember is to establish positive direct-fire control measures between forces of the inner and outer cordon.

Sequencing the Timing of the Cordons
Tacticians must carefully consider the sequence of establishing the outer and inner cordons. Like most combat operations there really is not a cookie-cutter solution. Planners must consider all METT-TC [mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations] factors in deciding the timing of events. If the outer cordon is in place too early it could...
alert the search area and compromise the mission. The same is true with establishing the inner cordon first. If the operation is in a hostile area with the inner cordon established first, the threat could react and cut off the inner cordon before the rest of the friendly force is in place. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan contend with this dilemma in almost every circumstance. Near-simultaneous establishment of the inner and outer cordons seems to be the trend but is extremely difficult to pull off. Imagination is the only limit when it comes to cordons. Given the right terrain and threat situation, aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been effective in augmenting cordons. Although these force multipliers are incapable of “holding” terrain they can provide early warning and bolster the security forces in achieving an effective cordon.

**Search Element**

Now let’s look at the decisive operation. The main purpose of a cordon and search operation is to find selected personnel or material. It is the Search Element’s job to do just that. The Search Element contains an assault team, search team, security team, and a support team. The assault team seizes the objective to allow the search team to conduct the search. The security team provides on-location security of the immediate objective area and holds any detainees. The support team provides overwatch in the search area and is prepared to assist the other teams as required. In addition, the Search Element may use many unique special teams depending on mission requirements. Some of the more common types of special teams include:

- Detainee Team
- Vehicle Search Team
- Demolition Team
- Documentation Team
- Military Working Dogs
- Tunnel Recon Team
- Interrogation Team
- Mine Detection Team
- Combat Camera
- Civil Affairs Team
- Psychological Operations Team
- Human Intelligence Team
- Field Interview Team
- Sensitive Site Team
- Escort Team
- Female Personnel Search Team
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team
- Possibly the Media
- And as many interpreters and linguists as you can get!

Again, imagination and careful planning drives the special team configurations that the Search Element requires. The search may be in the form of a forced entry where shock and speed is used to rapidly gain control of the search area or a more benign approach can be used. Cordon and search operations normally fall into the categories of “Cordon and Kick” or “Cordon and Knock or Ask.” Units use the same organization of forces as a regular cordon and search with similar security procedures, but instead of breaking in the door the Search Element knocks on the door and informs the occupants that a search is to be conducted. This may seem odd given that this is still considered a combat operation, but in the battle for the population’s hearts and minds, politeness counts. Planners choose the hard or soft approach based on the level of intelligence of the objective and the estimate of the threat involved. Female Soldiers are another important consideration to include within the search team. Units must respect cultural taboos in searching and handling of female noncombatants and children. Let’s briefly discuss Cordon and Kick and Cordon and Knock or Ask.

**Cordon and Kick**

When speed and surprise are necessary, then this method will likely be executed. As the name
suggests, a cordon is quickly emplaced and then the assault and search teams quickly breach any entrances (barriers, doors, etc.) and begin the search for the targeted person or material. The objective in this method is obviously the target.

**Cordon and Knock or Ask**

When a kinder, gentler approach is required, then this is the preferred method. Here, speed and surprise are not paramount, while establishing rapport and building relationships are. Certainly, speed and surprise are still important, but they are sacrificed a bit to ensure the legitimacy of the operation is understood by the populace. The difference between Knock and Ask is:

- In Knock, you are *telling* the occupants of the location you are conducting a search.
- In Ask, you are *asking* the occupants of the location for permission to conduct a search.
- By the way, in Kick you are simply conducting the search —no discussion required!

Once the search area is secured, the search team usually conducts the search using one of the following methods:

- Central Assembly
- Restriction to Homes
- Control the Heads of Households

The central assembly method assembles inhabitants in a central location. This method provides the most control, simplifies a thorough search, denies the personnel an opportunity to conceal evidence, and allows for detailed interrogation. It has the disadvantage of taking inhabitants away from their dwellings which can provoke hostility.

Another effective way is to restrict inhabitants to their homes. This prohibits movement of civilians and allows them to stay in their dwellings. The disadvantages of this method are that it makes control and interrogation difficult and gives inhabitants time to conceal evidence.

One of the most effective methods is to control the heads of the households. The head of each household is told to remain in front of the house while everyone else in the house is brought to a central location. During the search, the head of the household accompanies the search team through the house. Disruption to the property is reduced and the head of the household sees that the search team is not stealing or damaging his property. This is the best method for controlling the populace during a search. Whichever method is used the search team should be courteous and disrupt as little as possible when conducting the actual search. In spite of the intrusive act of searching homes, creating more hostility within the population must be avoided.

**Support/Reserve Element**

The last element to discuss is the Support or Reserve Element. Since cordon and search operations involve finding hostile forces hiding in the open within the population anything is likely to happen. It is the Support/Reserve Element that provides the commander flexibility to deal with the unknown. The exact composition of this element is directly related to its anticipated tasks. Possible missions may include dealing with an angry crowd that threatens the outer cordon or reinforcing the Search Element in handling detainees. As a consequence, the Support Element must be prepared for just about anything. Every member of the Support/Reserve Element must be familiar with the other elements’ roles and functions during a cordon and search. Proper rehearsals are the key to ensure mission readiness.

One the most important aspects to conducting a cordon and search is to have a contingency plan if contact is made during the operation. All cordon and search operations should be prepared to transition to hasty
attack. Again, careful considerations as to direct-fire plans among the elements are imperative to avoid friendly fire. The use of indirect fires and/or close air support needs careful planning and consideration as well. Planners need to cautiously consider their approach into the search area as well as the withdraw routes.

**PHASES OF A CORDON AND SEARCH**

If it's a military operation there are likely to be phases: cordon and search is no different! Below you will find the typical phases of a cordon and search operation, some of which may be conducted in conjunction with one another.

**Phase 1: Planning**—It all starts with a plan! Planning for a cordon and search is no different than in any other operation. A commander and his staff will conduct a thorough mission analysis. The objective is to achieve a complete understanding of your force, the enemy, and the terrain and weather. With this understanding, a commander can develop feasible courses of action and then select one to execute. What is extremely critical during planning is to explore "what if" and discuss contingencies. Another factor to consider is that your planning timeline can also be very short: Remember you are receiving time-sensitive intelligence, so you may have to execute the mission pretty quickly.

**Phase 2: Recon**—As in any operation, prior recon is good! However, you must weigh this with the potential for giving away your intent to your enemy. For example, it is probably not sound for you to recon an area you have not been seen in before. This is a red flag to the enemy that something may be happening here in the near future.

**Phase 3: Maneuver to Objective**—Just as in every operation, you must get to the objective in good shape mentally and physically to execute the decisive operation (the search). Timing is paramount in this phase. A commander must ensure the maneuver between the security element and the search/assault teams is synchronized. Certainly, you do not want your search/assault teams getting to the objective before the security element sets up the cordons. Conversely, if the security element begins setting up the cordons too far ahead of the maneuver of the search/assault, you may very well lose surprise and even compromise the operation.

**Phase 4: Cordon (Isolate) the Objective**—We cannot stress enough the importance of isolation in any urban operation. As discussed earlier, isolation within the context of a cordon and search operation is achieved when an outer and inner cordon of the search area is established. A commander may elect to establish the cordons simultaneously or one after the other. In either case, the commander must ensure he utilizes a sufficient number of Soldiers to make the cordons effective. The commander who assigns all his Soldiers to the search/assault team will fail. Establishing the cordons is critical and it requires Soldiers.

**Phase 5: Conduct Search**—Obviously, the decisive phase of the operation is the execution of the search. The search element must clear the area, search for the targets (personnel or material), and then conduct consolidation and reorganization. As stated before, an element will likely find itself augmented by various "specialists" to conduct the search. These professionals bring valuable expertise to the operation; however, in many cases they may have limited experience working with the element they are attached to. This can be a test for any commander.

**Phase 6: Withdraw from Objective**—You maneuvered to the search area, conducted the search and now it is time to leave the area of...
operations (AO). As in most operations, this is usually the most challenging phase of the mission. The principles for withdrawing from the search area are similar to a withdrawal in any environment. Key in the withdrawal phase is proper determination of withdrawal routes. If at all possible never use the same routes leaving as you did coming in. The chances are they will be far more dangerous this time around.

**Phase 7: Conduct After-Action Review**—Although somewhat overlooked, this is one of the most important phases of the operation. After the mission is complete, you must conduct a thorough analysis. What went right? What did not go so well? What are the lessons learned we can carry over to the next operation? These are all vital questions that must be answered.

**KEYS TO SUCCESS**

Every mission has certain elements that will assist in mission accomplishment. Let’s briefly address those for cordon and search.

**Surprise**—Obviously, you do not want to tip your hand about your operation. Surprise ensures your enemy cannot react prematurely. This reaction could mean some type of spoiling attack or hiding the material or person you are looking for.

**Speed**—Once the operation begins, speed is critical. Of course, it must be controlled speed.

**Isolate**—As in all urban operations, isolation is vital. You must isolate the target area. That is the cordon of cordon and search. You must ensure the target cannot escape or receive assistance from outside sources.

**Positive Target ID**—There is much activity going on in an urban environment and in all likelihood your target area is filled with civilians. This makes finding your target difficult even with the best intelligence. Make a mistake in target identification, and you could initiate a public relations nightmare.

**We Are in This Together**—In many situations (such as today), you could be conducting operations in support of a host-nation government; thus, your operations must reflect this. If they do not, the country is likely to spin into more chaos than it is currently in.

**Damage Control**—When conducting a cordon and search operation you must keep collateral damage at a minimum. There is no better way to turn a populace against you than to destroy their homes and businesses. It is also a good way to dry up potential or current intelligence sources.

**Act on Actionable Intelligence**—In most cases, you have a limited time to conduct an operation; reliable intelligence ages quickly. If you let the window close, you may not see it again. Of course, do not act on highly questionable reports from questionable sources; this could put Soldiers’ lives on the line for no good reason.

Commanding a unit conducting a cordon and search is a supreme challenge. As a commander you have elements maneuvering in a relatively small area. These elements are often intermixed with civilians and enemy acting as civilians. A commander must know where his Soldiers are. He must also provide an environment where initiative is encouraged. The micro-manager will not succeed in this operation.

**SUMMARY**

The cordon and search is one of the most universal types of tactical operations conducted in the war on terror. By understanding how the forces are organized for this unique but common operation, you can appreciate the challenges. Whether at the company or battalion level, cordon and search operations require detailed planning and creative thinking. It’s truly a thinking man’s game!
INNER CORDON AS THE DECISIVE EFFORT

By

CPT Jess Greaves, USA

The cordon and search operation is an increasingly common tactic used by company and battalion level commanders to further their counter-insurgency campaign plan. The purpose of this article is to make the argument that the inner cordon, rather than the search element, should be regarded as the decisive operation when conducting company level cordon and search operations.

FM 3-06.20/ MCRP 3-31.4B/ NTTP 3-05.8/ AFTTP (I) 3-2.62, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations*, identifies the task organization of a typical company level cordon and search operation as having a command element, a search/assault element, a security element, and a support element.

The command element maintains command and control throughout the operation ensuring synchronization, as well as timely and thorough execution of subordinate tasks and purposes.

The security element is responsible for isolating the objective and specific target areas within the objective. To accomplish this, it is divided into two separate groups: the outer cordon and the inner cordon. The task for the outer cordon is generally to block or screen with either an enemy oriented purpose such as preventing the enemy from focusing effective fires on the decisive operation or a friendly oriented...
purpose such as allowing the decision operation to exploit the objective. The inner cordon generally receives the task to isolate a specific area in which the target is located preventing the enemy from escaping from the objective area.

The search or assault element’s task and purpose is enemy-centric such as clear, destroy, or neutralize. As the search element is generally regarded as the main effort, its purpose can be independent of the other elements such as capturing a high value target (HVT), exploiting a cache, or recovering captured coalition personnel or equipment.

Finally, the support element acts similar to a reserve and is a force multiplier during a cordon and search operation. This element should be positioned where they can best accomplish their assigned planning priorities and be-prepared-to tasks.

One generally accepted deviation from doctrinal task organization has been to organize the company into three elements: outer cordon, inner cordon, and search elements. In this task organization, the forces that would have been designated as a reserve are committed during the planning phase to the search element. This non-employment of a reserve is often necessary due to ancillary combat power depletions such as combat injuries, mid-tour leave, and force protection responsibilities which challenge the company’s ability to maintain a credible self-sustaining reserve. Incorporating the reserve with the search element gives the search element the extra combat power required to accomplish the unique and often unexpected control measures that may be required on the objective such as sensitive site exploitation, detainee handling, street level engagements, and population control.

Rather than assigning the inner and outer cordon to one security element, these two tasks can be split between the two remaining maneuver elements. This is often necessary as, with the reserve committed elsewhere, one maneuver element generally struggles to conduct both the inner and outer cordons.

Finally, by collocating the command and control element with either the inner or outer cordon, the commander can place himself where he can best synchronize the emplacement of the cordons as well as to allow the search element to pass through the cordons and access the objective. Further, if the commander travels between his three maneuver elements, using them as his security force, he will not have to deplete them to maintain an independent security force.

The doctrinally accepted task organization generally associates decisiveness with the search/assault element. When using the popular task organization which deviates from doctrine, decisiveness is generally associated with the search element as well. However, in either of these task organizations, the element conducting the inner cordon is a better choice for the decisive effort.

The foundation for this argument is the commander’s intent to neutralize and prevent him from registering any credible effect on the operational environment (OE). The enemy’s ability to register credible effects on the OE is effectively terminated once he is isolated on the objective. Of the three available courses of action (retreating and blending into the populace, surrendering, or fighting), the enemy’s preferred tactic of blending is eliminated by the inner cordon. Even if the search element never arrives to clear the enemy off the objective, as long as the inner cordon remains intact to prevent the enemy from escaping, the commander has accomplished his intent.

In order to isolate the enemy, the company must constantly strive to reduce the time between burning the target (the point at which friendly actions inevitably convey commander’s intent to the enemy) and isolating the objective to achieve a
tactical situation in which the enemy cannot escape. The time between these two actions is significant as this is the window that the enemy has to escape off the objective and blend into the local population.

Minimizing burn to isolation time is essential. Company commanders accept tactical risk each time they put troops outside the wire to conduct operations. The commander must balance two conflicting moral responsibilities, that to accomplish his mission and that to safeguard the lives of his Soldiers. By decisively establishing the inner cordon, the commander reduces burn to isolation time, greatly increasing his odds of isolating the objective while the HVT is still there. This ensures the greatest chance that the cordon will isolate and the search element will capture the HVT. This dramatically increases the worthiness of the tactical risk that the company commander has assumed by conducting the mission to begin with.

To further decrease the burn to isolation time, the company commander should consider establishing the inner cordon prior to or simultaneously to the outer cordon. While there is an increased immediate tactical risk associated with establishing the inner cordon without an already established outer cordon, it is outweighed by the long term tactical risk of repeated missions to capture an HVT who escapes due to lack of isolation or retaliatory actions by an escaped cell leader.

There are two arguments against assigning the decisive effort to the inner cordon and establishing it independently of the outer cordon. The first is that the inner cordon cannot be the decisive effort as it does not actually capture the enemy; it merely holds the enemy in place allowing the decisive operation to kill or capture him. However, on closer examination the time sensitive operation which neutralizes the enemy is the inner cordon. Once the enemy is isolated in a structure, a terrain feature, or even a neighborhood, the commander has achieved the desired effect of eliminating any credible effect the enemy can have on the OE.

The second argument is that the inner cordon should not be established without the outer cordon to protect it. However, this is not necessarily accurate. While the inner cordon will eventually require the protection of the outer cordon in order to focus its efforts on preventing the enemy from escaping the objective, the commander is only accepting additional tactical risk during the period between burning the objective and establishing the outer cordon. Also, during this period the inner cordon should be able to protect itself. The inner cordon is comprised of a rifle platoon with the same, or similar, armament to the outer cordon. If in contact with the enemy, the inner cordon should be able to close with and destroy them rather than relying on the outer cordon to provide this protection. This additional tactical risk can be further offset by increasing the inner cordon’s combat power by task organizing a portion of the reserve to the inner cordon and allowing this element to then pass to the search element after the outer cordon has been established. An optimal time for this reallocation of combat power occurs when the search element passes through the inner cordon in order to access the objective.

Successful cordon and search operations have become one of the pillars of US efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Company commanders of maneuver elements will most likely face this tactic during a 12-month rotation to either arena. Company commanders must identify their intent, properly designate their decisive operation, and allocate task organized combat power in a manner that best supports their determined intent. In so doing, they greatly increase the likelihood of accomplishing their mission and safeguarding the lives of their Soldiers.
US Soldiers from 2nd Battalion - 162nd Infantry out of Patrol Base Volunteer set up perimeter security with M2A3 BFVs during a Quick Response Force mission in Sadr City, Iraq, in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. (Photo by SSgt Ashley Brokop, USAF)

By
CPT Damasio Davila, USA

Based on the terrain and mission focus, the Company-Team was task organized and attached enablers that allowed the mission to be easily executed.

Since the beginning of the Iraq War there have been countless cordon and search operations. Numerous tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) are used when conducting a cordon and search. This article focuses on how Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment (D/1-12 CAV), a Company-Team, conducted a joint cordon and search operation with the local Iraqi Police (IP) during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) 06-07. By gathering intelligence from the local population and including the local security forces, a cordon and search of Al-Karam was conducted to confirm or deny insurgent activity. Based on the terrain and mission focus, the Company-Team was task organized and attached enablers that allowed the mission to be easily executed.

BACKGROUND
During OIF 06-07, D/1-12 CAV operated throughout Iraq but concluded its tour in the Buhritz sub-district of southern Baqubah. The company operated out of a combat outpost that was the former Buhritz Iraqi Police Station (BIPS). The BIPS was located on the western part of town, along the Diyala River. The company was task organized into a headquarters platoon, two tank platoons, and one mechanized infantry platoon.
Due to offensive operations over the past year and the creation of a Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) program, there was a decline in insurgent activity which allowed the people to re-build their homes and live in relative peace. The CLCs augmented the local Iraqi Police (IP), and together, they were able to retain areas by establishing checkpoints and defensive positions. D/1-12 CAV helped to increase the role of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) by conducting joint cordon and search operations.

The Buhritz area was composed of several neighborhoods or hayys. Most hayys were Sunni, with a small outcropping of Shia that lived east of Buhritz in hayy Al-Tamimi. During the height of insurgent activity, the Shia had been displaced but later returned at the invitation of the local government. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) had been placed along Route Yankees on the east side of Buhritz leading to Al Tamimi. While most were discovered, some detonated on the local population. One detonation injured the brother of Abu Ali, the sheik or leader of Al-Tamimi. During a meeting with Abu Ali, we learned that his brother’s leg had been amputated in the mangled remains of a pick-up truck. Abu Ali also presented us with a 155mm artillery shell, proclaiming that he had found and disarmed this IED along the road. Based on what we learned at this meeting, we requested an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team.

While CLC strong-points overwatched the Al-Tamimi/Buhritz road, they were incapable of deterring insurgent activity during hours of darkness. To mitigate the lack of night vision devices at CLC strong-points, D/1-12 CAV incorporated a section of M1A2 and M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) into the CLC area of defense. The night vision devices and thermal sites on the vehicles allowed us to identify potential insurgent activity.

Abu Ali claimed that hayy Al-Karam, a neighborhood south of hayy Al-Tamimi was an insurgent staging and bed-down point. He stated that the local CLC had seen men in Al-Karam who later that evening fired at the local CLC strong-point. He additionally stated that livestock had been killed or maimed in explosions in the field between Al-Tamimi and Al-Karam, suggesting that IEDs had been the cause. Upon reviewing this information with COL Yaheea, the local IP Chief, he confirmed that hayy Al-Karam had in fact been abandoned for some time. Manning issues did not afford COL Yaheea the ability to patrol this peripheral and vacant town effectively. He stated that any family moving into the area had to inform the local IP of their move and since this had not occurred, he concluded that these men were insurgents. He suggested that together we conduct a mission to clear the area. Then he could convince the CLC to establish a strong-point to retain the area. I spoke with MAJ Mohammed, the local Iraqi Army commander for the Buhritz area. MAJ Mohammed agreed with COL Yaheea and was willing to task several soldiers and a vehicle in support of a mission to clear hayy Al-Karam. Faced with the reports of possible insurgents in hayy Al-Karam and backed by the Iraqi Security Forces, I planned an operation to search hayy Al-Karam.

**PLANNING THE OPERATION**

With input from the battalion commander and operations officer, I began conducting troop leading procedures and drafted an operations order. Terrain analysis of hayy Al-Karam indicated that the area consisted of approximately 17 distinct compounds with numerous structures along a hard-packed road known as Route Dodgers. Weaving out to the east, Route Dodgers intersected with Route Detroit, a two-lane paved highway. A palm grove was located on the western
edge of the neighborhood while fields to the north and south of the area provided clear observation and ample stand-off. The enemy was templated as having placed defensive IEDs along Route Dodgers to the west of Al-Karam. The IEDs would serve as early warning and allow enemy forces to leave the area. The operation determined that any force entering hayy Al-Karam would have to be dismounted in order to conduct a thorough search of the dense structures. However, a dismounted force would be vulnerable to IEDs and small arms fire. To mitigate this, the bulk of the search force would arrive in armored vehicles and the dismounted approach into Al-Karam would begin after Route Dodgers was cleared and the outer cordon was established. The dismounted avenue of approach would lead in from the west where they could take advantage of the cover and concealment offered by the palm grove. The threat of IEDs in the fields determined that an outer cordon would best be achieved by tracked vehicles. The M2A3 and M1A2 BFVs could better sustain IED blasts and utilize fire control systems to identify and neutralize potential threats. Although Route Detroit was far enough away from the objective area not to be a direct factor, it allowed us access to a high-speed avenue of approach. To protect this key terrain, a blocking position was established south of the intersection of Route Dodgers and Route Detroit.

During this time, Delta Company was comprised of one headquarters platoon of about 15 soldiers, two armor platoons, Diablo Red and Diablo White, and one infantry platoon, Bone White. The armor platoons were assigned 16 Soldiers each while the infantry platoon was composed of approximately 50 Soldiers. Since Bone White comprised the bulk of the company’s dismounted force and could simultaneously operate its vehicles, it was tasked as the main effort for the cordon and search of Al-Karam along with the attached ISF. Their M2A3 BFVs would establish the northern part of the outer cordon while two of Diablo White’s tanks and a headquarters tank were tasked to serve as the southern part of the outer cordon. The headquarters platoon, along with the IP, was tasked with establishing a blocking position to the east of Al-Karam along Route Detroit to prevent movement from the west into the objective area. Diablo Red was tasked with securing the BIPS and providing a section of tanks as an armored reserve or quick reaction force (QRF). Enabler support was received after requests were made through battalion. The battalion attached an EOD team and sniper team, while the brigade attached a Combat Camera crew and two AH-64 helicopters. The EOD team was tasked with reducing IEDs and other unexploded ordnance (UXO). The Combat Camera crew was tasked with recording the operation while the sniper section identified and reported potential threats. The AH-64s were tasked with maintaining a screen line to the southeast of Al-Karam. A route clearance team was requested to clear Route Dodgers but was unable to support the operation because of priority taskings.

**SCHEME OF MANEUVER**

At 1006 30 Nov 07, Bone White conducted a combat patrol to Al-Tamimi where they inserted the sniper team. The sniper team was tasked with identifying and reporting activity within Al-Karam the night prior to the operation. The sniper team established a hide within Al-Tamimi and reported their location and status over the radio every 30 minutes. Bone White was on-call to pick-up the snipers in the event they became compromised. At 1105 30 Nov 07 Diablo White and the headquarters platoon began movement from the BIPS to the blocking position along Route Detroit. The
sniper section reported that there had been no movement within Al-Karam that evening. From their position, they continued to overwatch Al-Karam throughout the operation. At 1106 30 Nov 07, Bone White with attached ISF, EOD team, and Combat Camera crew began movement towards Al-Karam. Once Bone White reached Route Dodgers, an infantry squad dismounted and began to clear the sides of the road leading into Al-Karam. An M2A3 BFV served as the center of a “V” formation while the infantry radiated out at 45 degree angles on either side of the M2A3. This technique had been used in the past and was successful at identifying command-wired IEDs. Once Bone White had cleared the road, the remainder of the platoon dismounted on the western edge of the palm grove and set in a hasty assault position. By this time, headquarters platoon with the IP had established a blocking position along Route Detroit. The Bone White M2A3 BFVs and the Diablo White tanks simultaneously established the outer cordon. Once the outer cordon was established, Bone White began their movement through the palm grove and into Al-Karam.

To maintain situation awareness of friendly locations, all vehicle commanders, squad leaders, snipers, and helicopter pilots were provided with common operating graphics that identified each compound by number. As a squad approached a compound, they would relay the compound number over the company radio. This enabled the company to quickly identify the location of friendly forces. Additionally, it allowed the company to relay the locations of unknown forces within Al-Karam. When in dense areas, the Bone White squads utilized smoke and bounding techniques to relay their position and secure their...
movement. During the course of their search, the squads located a tripod. It was believed that this tripod served as the base for some sort of indirect or surveying sighting device. The squads continued their search into the northern field and identified an IED. The IED consisted of three explosive fuses bound together at the base and wired together with a detonation cord. The IED was secured and disposed of by the EOD team.

During this operation, the AH-64s were assigned to the company and controlled by the headquarters platoon. They were given two grids that delineated the ends of an imaginary line on the ground. This line became the screen line and the aircraft would fly back and forth on this line. They were occasionally ordered to fly over Al-Karam to observe compounds and the surrounding fields. While flying the screen line, the pilots identified an exodus of vehicles and men in a town south of Al-Karam. They reported the event over the company net and the information was relayed to the IP. The IP at the blocking position stopped several of the cars that had moved north on Route Detroit. The men that left on foot were coerced to return to the town after the helicopters dropped flares in front of their path. COL Yaheea had one of the drivers arrested when he could not provide identification. The driver led the IP to the southern town where they were able to arrest several other men who had fled.

As the operation in Al-Karam concluded, a group of CLCs established a strong-point in one of the buildings. Once the strong-point was established, the Bone White infantry squads moved back to the palm grove for pick-up. The sniper section left their hiding position after the infantry squads had cleared Al-Karam and left in the M2A3 BFVs. The BFVs then moved back to Route Dodgers to pick up the rest of their platoon. Diablo White displaced from the southern portion of the cordon and moved towards Route Detroit. Once on Route Detroit, the headquarters blocking position was removed and the platoon proceeded to move back to the BIPS. After ensuring the IP had left the southern town, the tanks proceeded north on Route Detroit and back to the BIPS.

LESSONS LEARNED

The inclusion of the ISF in this operation allowed them to learn that intelligence was actionable and would yield results. Once Al-Karam was cleared, the CLCs retained control of the area by placing a strong-point in the hayy. Conducting this operation empowered the ISF and led them to conduct their own operation where several men were arrested and another area cleared. Though the results of this operation yielded very little in terms of tangible evidence, it did serve as an exercise that united the Company-Team and ISF with the local population.

Good relationships with the local population and ISF are necessary. In this operation, you can see that the relationships with Abu Ali, COL Yaheea, and MAJ Mohammed resulted in actionable intelligence and better security for the area. As a result of including the ISF commanders, they were empowered and encouraged to conduct future joint operations. A weekly visit with the local leaders and security force commanders to discuss the area facilitated two-way conversation. These conversations provided leaders the ability to express their concerns and painted a better picture of what each group was doing.

Request enabler support! The worst that can happen is someone says no...and then ask again. For this operation, I was provided with a number of enablers that contributed to mission success and greater situational awareness. I was not excited about being tasked a Combat Camera crew for this operation, I thought that they would get in the
way but as it turned out, the Combat Camera crew documented the entire mission on over 100 photographs. Through these photographs, we conducted an after action review, talked about lessons learned, and created story boards. Additionally, we framed pictures of the ISF personnel and presented them to COL Yaheea and MAJ Mohammed. When dealing with enablers, directly assign them to the lowest unit that they are supporting. Make contingencies in the event that enabler support is not available; for example, we modified our movement into Al-Karam by dismounting forces to clear the route when route clearance was not available.

Utilize the snipers to answer questions or commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) you have about the objective. Snipers are highly trained Soldiers that can be used to gather intelligence about an area or observe indirect fires. Prior to the operation, I should have used sniper teams to record patterns of life in the area. Having the intelligence about the area could have prepared me to plan for a clearance of the southern town. The snipers observed the objective 24 hours prior to the operation; but because Al-Karam was abandoned, they could only report what they observed, which was nothing. The snipers should have been tasked with establishing a position within or closer to Al-Karam prior to, during, and after the operation. This would have provided better situational awareness of the objective, focused the efforts on the objective, and made the snipers directly available to the Bone White infantry squads. The snipers were underutilized for this operation because of a lack of planning and guidance.

Number structures and use marking systems to clearly illustrate where Soldiers are and what rooms/buildings have been searched. During this operation, the Bone White squads spray painted an orange “X” on the outside wall next to the door of the room or building that had been searched. They also identified suspicious characteristics of a structure with orange arrows. This technique ensured that the squads had searched all structures and identified potential hazards to the rest of the platoon and attachments. This technique is controversial as it appears disrespectful to the local population. With prior planning, paint or cleaning supplies can be distributed once the operation has concluded to re-paint or remove the marking systems.

Retain what is cleared. This operation would have been futile without an ability to retain what had been searched and cleared. By placing a CLC strong-point in Al-Karam and conducting presence patrols, we ensured that this area could not be used by insurgents again. Additionally, the snipers could have repositioned to Al-Karam after the operation to assist the CLC strong-point in the event of an evening attack. They could have also been used to observe illumination rounds and provide the CLCs greater visibility.

There was a dependence on direct fires in the form of a 25mm chain gun and 120mm cannon, and as a result, there was no indirect fires plan for this operation. Indirect fires are force multipliers and add to operational security. Preplotted targets on possible enemy locations within and in vicinity of Al-Karam would have maximized lethal effects and limited friendly exposure. Smoke could have screened Bone White’s movement when clearing Route Dodgers and moving through the palm grove. Additionally, use indirect fire assets to protect sniper positions. In this case, indirect fires would have responded quicker than any QRF.

Indirect fires are force multipliers and add to operational security.
Proper Implementation of E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) for Cordon & Search Operations

The weapons section of the E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft voices targeted information to the fighter and bomber aircraft during their exercises in the Korean Peninsula area. (Photo by TSgt Rey Ramon, USAF)

By Capt James “Screamin” Holler, USAF

The JSTARS radar, the AN/APY7, recently received the IR 5.3 radar upgrade to enhance its ability to accurately track dismounted moving target indications (DMTIs) with low radar cross-sections (LRCS.) This improved DMTI can support multiple mission sets. One such mission is support to cordon search operations. The key considerations are the cordon area itself, the JSTARS user interface, and the interoperability of JSTARS with other platforms.

There are a few key points to consider in using JSTARS in any operation. The first is that JSTARS doesn’t have an on-board capability to identify a target, it only detects movement. The air battle managers (ABM) and airborne intelligence officers/technicians (AIO/T) rely on cross-cueing the radar data with off-board assets. MC-12s, P-3s, attack helicopters, remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), and joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC) operating in the area provide the “eyeball” to allow proper identification of a track of interest (TOI).

The next consideration is location. Is the operation within a large urban area or a rural village? Is the region mountainous or heavily forested? Urban areas are of particular concern because even though the radar can track in these areas, roads that run parallel to the JSTARS’s orbit will be screened due to buildings. Mountainous or heavily forested areas also result in screening. To negate the effects of terrain, JSTARS
must shift its orbit to look up the valleys instead of across them. To reduce the impact of foliage the E-8 must be perpendicular to the roads, which is difficult to do if they aren’t straight. Therefore, the ideal search zones are suburban and outlying rural township areas. The limited terrain and foliage maximize JSTARS ability to track low radar cross-section (LRCS) targets that are fleeing the cordoned zone.

The operator interface onboard JSTARS provides many options to enhance the situational awareness (SA) of crews both on-board and on the ground. The crew can overlay moving target indicator (MTI) data on current satellite imagery of the cordoned area. This allows the ABM or AIO to add accurate fill-ins, such as specific buildings or terrain features while talking assets onto a TOI. To pass the information off-board, JSTARS utilizes a robust communications suite. It’s equipped with internet relay chat (IRC), Force Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), JVoice [software-based voice over Internet Protocol], surveillance coordination data link (SCDL), Personal Computer Improved Data Modem (PCIDM™), and satellite communication (SATCOM) to compliment its 12 UHF, 4 VHF, and HF radios. Also, the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) will be added soon.

So, what will JSTARS support look like for a cordon and search operation? The following scenario is based on a cordon and search in the vicinity of a rural village commonly found in the current operational theatre and has four phases (phase 0 through phase 3).

Phase 0 is the planning phase, followed by marshalling, ingress, and finally extraction. The players for this scenario include the task force on the ground, 2 x OH-58 attack helos, 1 x RC-12, RPAs, and an E-8.

JSTARS integration in the planning phase is essential. Aspects such as timing, choke points, blind spots, objective buildings, and ingress/egress routes must be covered to maximize sensor coverage. Also, the E-8’s command and control (C2) capabilities must be addressed and utilized. This includes packaging the air assets and assigning the E-8 investigate authority of TOI. How will the E-8 crew communicate to the other players? Will it be via radio, IRC or messages in improved data modem (IDM) to the OH-58s? How will the E-8 reference the ground track? “Bullseye” is the quickest means of cueing assets to a target, but lacks the accuracy of universal transverse Mercator (UTM) or geographic reference (GEOREF). Another option is referencing link tracks over IDM.

During Phase I, the ground forces take position along the perimeter of the village as planned. Their locations, and the search patterns of the RPAs and other air assets, will be transmitted to JSTARS via FBCB2 and JTIDS respectively. This provides JSTARS the big-picture of the operation, enabling the crew to provide information to the correct entities. This picture allows E-8 operators to focus their tracking efforts on any gaps in coverage that may exist, and either inform the task force about the gaps, or assume responsibility for reporting movement in those areas.

Phase II is the initial push into the zone and is typically the most hectic time. The enemy will attempt to either blend-in, escape, or resist. JSTARS, with its DMTI capability, focuses on two things: escape attempts or signs of “milling”. If individuals try to flee the area, the E–8 operator will see a stream of radar “dots” heading away from the area, and this is considered “coherent movement.” Milling is nonspecific localized movement and can indicate a mortar team setting up or a group of individuals about to strike the search team. Once movement is detected, the E-8 crew
analyzes the MTI data to confirm it didn’t originate from the cordon and search team. Next, the ABM passes that information to the cross-cue asset, the asset validates the TOI, and the information is passed to the task force commander. Below is a communications example to an OH-58 using an IDM track to cue it to the location.

E-8: “Kiowa 11, Strikestar with tasking”
OH-58: “Strikestar, Kiowa, go with tasking”
E-8: “One-one, capture track 345, call ready details”
OH-58: “Track 345 captured, ready details”
E-8: “Possible personnel on foot, originating in field 75 meters NE of bldg 6 track N.”
OH-58: “One-one copies all, overhead now. Visual, 4 armed personnel fleeing N.”

At that point the decision of how to prosecute the track falls under the appropriate rules of engagement (ROE) for the situation. Once the immediate scene has stabilized and the search commences, the E-8 assists by providing a wide swath of coverage to compliment the sensors on the RPAs and OH-58s. Additionally, signals intelligence (SIGINT) hits from other platforms can provide ellipses for JSTARS to search within for suspect movement in the vicinity.

After the search is complete, Phase III begins and the E-8 provides over-watch of the egress. It provides updates to the convoy commander and airborne support assets of any movement that could intercept the convoy, as well as individuals attempting to plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This provides the convoy commander with advance notice and time to adjust their response posture accordingly to ensure safe passage back to the staging area.

The E-8 can be a force multiplier for cordon and search operations and is most effective when integrated early in the planning process. JSTARS specializes in using its sensor to compliment its system, and others, by pulling information from multiple sources to develop an accurate “big-picture” of the ground war. This provides the field commanders with enhanced SA of the tactical situation.

An E-8C JSTARS aircraft takes off for an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission. (US Air Force file photo.)
CIVILIAN CASUALTY (CIVCAS)—
“Communication Breakdown”

By
Capt Preston “Broose” Rhymer, USAF
Capt Eric “Julio” Danielsen, USAF

In counterinsurgency (COIN), we—Airmen and the terminal attack control (TAC)—have a very difficult task. Until we identify, geolocate, and action the insurgent, he holds the initiative. If we do our job well, we can make tactical and operational gains. If we do our job poorly, we can have a negative strategic impact.

BACKGROUND
In the early morning hours of 21 February 2010, two OH-58Ds decisively struck a 3-vehicle group in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, killing up to 23 civilian men and injuring 13 men, women, and children. The subsequent investigations revealed that several compounding mistakes, made by various operators from various branches of the military at various locations, culminated in an incorrect positive identification (PID) declaration.

PROBLEM
Differentiating between combatants and noncombatants can be very difficult. If one lacks standardized terminology to characterize the people they observe and the confidence of their characterizations, one can miscommunicate and thereby mistake noncombatants as combatants. Furthermore, if one lacks simple tools to keep track of the multisource data which they must weigh to achieve and maintain PID, one may overlook missing data, fail to recognize critical assumptions, and induce undue subjectivity.

SOLUTION
Operational lessons learned have revealed an unacceptable level of risk within which coalition forces have operated by not standardizing and simplifying the terminology and processes involved in differentiating between combatants from noncombatants for determining PID. The authors advocate specific terminology and process solutions be added to relevant ALSA MTTP publications such as JFIRE and BREVITY.

Terminology

Human Categories—We spend a lot of time watching the world through full motion video (FMV) and describing what we see, but without standard terminology, we describe things differently. Operators are routinely tasked to count the number of people in an area of interest and determine their sex and ages. Some report military-aged males (MAM), teenagers, and adolescents. Some of these terms have commonly understood definitions, but many of them are dangerously ambiguous. In the 21 February CIVCAS incident, some people were assessed to be children. That assessment was then re-characterized as adolescents after follow-on video review. That was, in turn, translated into teenagers. The teenagers were then assumed to be MAMs. At the end of the day, they were all resolved to be targeted non-combatants. In order to prevent this cycle of subjective interpretation and terminology drift, the authors recommend standardizing definitions of observed humans into the following three categories: Adult/s, Child/ren, and Unknown. (See table 1.) The Adult/s category can then be further divided by sex—Male, Female, and Unknown.

There are no tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that can guarantee an operator’s flawless categorization of observed people into the above categories. However, by standardizing the categories of observed people, one...
can mitigate the use of ambiguous terminology and subsequent terminologal drift.

### Table 1. Human Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult/s</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Relative size, shape, activity, and clothing denote adult male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>Relative size, shape, activity, and clothing denote adult female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td>Relative size, shape, activity, and clothing denote adult, but not sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child/ren</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Relative size, shape, activity, and clothing denote a child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Relative size, shape, activity, and clothing are not assessable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Slant**—It is often tactically relevant to determine the number and categories of people in an area of interest. For example, these numbers can be used to determine collateral damage estimations (CDEs). The authors propose adopting a commonly used term, such as *slant*, in this simple categorization example:

```
Slant: Adult Men/Adult Women/Adult Unknown/Children/Unknown
```

As such, an example *slant* would be presented as:

```
“Slant: 5/0/3/2/2”
```

Meaning—“There are five adult males, zero adult females, three adult unknowns, two children, and two people of unknown age.”

If passed via voice communications, operators may need to include the actual field category for the sake of clarity:

```
“Slant: five adult males, zero adult females, three adult unknowns, two children, and two unknowns”
```

**Confidence Levels**—On 21 February, many people were very sure of themselves. Some trusted their own intuition to the extent that they are unable to critically evaluate their own perceptions and those of others. Some failed to incorporate new input that conflicted with their conclusions. Some failed to question others’ unsubstantiated claims and highly dangerous conclusions. They were caught in a self-reassuring loop indicative of Groupthink. For personnel involved in targeting and applying firepower, this is a dangerous state to be in. With no gauge of confidence, all information, no matter how irrational, was treated equally.

Because intelligence assessments are rarely 100% certain, they are accompanied by confidence levels to give decision makers the ability to accurately weigh several sources of data and come to reasonable conclusions. However, two significant problems exist with this process. First, while many intelligence personnel understand their respective confidence levels, many Airmen, tactical commanders, and operational commanders do not. Second, different intelligence disciplines have different terms and definitions to quantify their confidence levels. Amid this potential confusion, an operational commander may fail to PID a valid target or incorrectly PID an invalid target.

To establish a universal vocabulary which conveys an assessment’s confidence level, the authors recommend the following terms be used (1) across all intelligence disciplines which disseminate information to an operational commander and (2) by operators who provide...
data to decision makers for the purpose of targeting.

Some argue that there should be only two levels—a firm confident or not confident. There are three significant problems with that argument. First, it would result in inaccurate assessments because collected data is rarely so clear and decisive to lend itself to such binary confidence levels. Second, by forcing assessments that are “all or nothing,” one runs the risk of creating an environment where crews are too reserved to label their assessments with the higher confidence level for fear of the loss of credibility and punitive consequences should their assessments prove wrong. Third, the operational commander is responsible for making difficult decisions such as PID of a target based on multiple sources of information. By forcing what may be interpreted to be “shoot” or “no shoot” confidence levels upon others, that operational commander is unintentionally shifting his/her responsibility to someone who may not have the training or authority to make targeting decisions.

The current lexicon for geospatial intelligence is Possible, Probable, and Confirmed. The authors recommend replacing Probable with Likely to reduce the risk of confusing Possible with Probable when transmitted via voice communications. (See table 2.) The 2007 Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence, offers five similar levels of confidence, which is unnecessarily numerous, uses unwise vocabulary, and is not employed operationally.

### Table 2. Confidence Levels

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>&lt;50% confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>&gt;50% confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed</td>
<td>≥95% confidence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Target Identification (ID) Tracker**

On 21 February, no friendly parties immediately involved in the CIVCAS incident demonstrated any functional understanding of PID, its definition, its minimum criteria, or standards for establishing and maintaining it. While United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) PID policy is very simple and rational to a reasonable person who takes the time to read it carefully, it does have intricacies which may be difficult to keep track of while under stress and trying to coordinate multiple assets, while receiving multiple sources of data, each unique with varying levels of confidence.

As such, the authors recommend adoption of the Target ID Tracker shown in table 3 into JFIRE to (1) ensure clarity and accuracy on the part of the PID authority, (2) provide operators with a simple reference that ensures consideration of the constituent elements of PID, and (3) instill confidence in the PID declaration. Ultimately, this tracker would help PID authorities keep track of the required elements establishing and maintaining PID and keeping the PID determination within the bounds of “reasonable.” Ideally, the ultimate PID authority in a given tactical situation would maintain this tracker. All others may use a copy to track their own and/or others’ inputs as needed, but the PID authority’s version would serve as primary.

Note: The italicized text in table 3 constitutes an example of what one may write in the tracker; it is not based on any actual event or system capability.

It may not always be practical to fill out an actual Target ID Tracker. However, if concerned parties study the critical elements of the tracker—Time, Source, Assessment, Geospatial resolution, Confidence level—they will ask the right questions to achieve reasonable determinations.

**CONCLUSION**

Experience has demonstrated the challenges of differentiating between combatants and noncombatants in a COIN environment.
combatants and noncombatants in a COIN environment. The authors believe that the recommended terminology and PID processes may improve the communication between the ground force commander and close air support (CAS) players, providing an enduring methodology that mitigates the potential for CIVCAS.

Table 3. Target Identification Tracker

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PID Type</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Geospatial Resolution</th>
<th>Confidence Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PID Establishment¹</td>
<td>0030z</td>
<td>JTAC eyes on</td>
<td>2 x adult male shooting at FF</td>
<td>41S PS 54045 46353, TLE CAT IV, plot on map</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTAC69</td>
<td>0045z</td>
<td>SIGINT system</td>
<td>Insurgent coordinating multi-person attack on FF</td>
<td>41S PS 53997 16415, 99 x 42m, 132°</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0055z</td>
<td>MG-9</td>
<td>2 x adult unknown sex with weapons</td>
<td>41S PS 54098 16365, TLE CAT IV, targeting pod</td>
<td>Likely</td>
</tr>
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<td>PID Maintenance</td>
<td>0110z</td>
<td>MG-9</td>
<td>2 x adult unknown sex with weapons</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Notes:
1. Include grids, target location error (TLE) category (CAT), source.
   Example 12X XX 12345 67890
2. Include centerpoint grids, semi-major x semi-minor axes, orientation off north.
   Example: 12X XX 12345 67890, 500x200m, 45°
3. Possible: <50% confidence / Likely: >50% confidence / Confirmed: ≥95% confidence
4. Users may write in the space directly below who is responsible for establishing and maintaining PID.

Table Columns:
- **PID Type**: This column serves primarily to make clear the distinction between PID establishment and maintenance and, if necessary, gives space to annotate which party is currently responsible for each.
- **Time**: Correlating assessments from separate sources requires consideration of time. For example, vehicles and dismounts move at different rates and keeping track of report times helps correlate or avoid correlating associations over time.
- **Source**: Noting an assessment’s source allows the user to better judge its reliability and geospatial resolution capabilities [e.g., coordinates vs. ellipse]. Also, different sources may require different confidence levels in accordance with [IAW] combatant command [command authority] (COCOM) PID policies.
- **Assessment**: User must know exactly what each source assesses to correlate data for a reasonable conclusion.
- **Geospatial Resolution**: Correlating two sources requires that their reported data is geospatially resolved within reason. Also, COCOM PID policies may specify maximum degrees of geospatial error.
- **Confidence Level**: Considering a source’s confidence level helps the PID authority keep his/her PID determination within reason. Also, COCOM PID policies may require minimum confidence levels for specific data types.
An F-15E Strike Eagle deploys flares over Afghanistan during a close air support mission in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. (Photo by SSgt Aaron Allmon, USAF)

By Capt Phil George, USAF

In the current counterinsurgency fight, cordon and search is a commonly used tactic. Special operations forces (SOF) set up a cordon around an identified target area (or individual) in order to prevent anyone from entering or leaving. The security element will maintain these positions while the assault force searches the target area for any evidence to use against the target individual in the host country’s court of law. Due to information operations (IO) implications, finding evidence is as important as finding the targeted individual; without it, the assault force may not be able to prove the accused individual’s association with known terrorist groups.

SOF ground commanders go through a decision process on whether to conduct a kinetic or nonkinetic strike to reduce collateral damage and prevent disruption of the population. Generally, the only time a ground commander approves a kinetic strike is when there is risk to the force that requires close air support (CAS). When a commander decides to pursue a kinetic strike, the assault force’s first course of action will be to use their organic weapons to suppress or eliminate the threat.

As many aircrews know, collateral damage estimates (CDE) have become a major senior leader concern. While it is not the aircrew’s responsibility to determine CDE,
they still need to know weapons effects. The biggest lesson emphasized to today’s SOF operators is that you can kill the target, but if the kinetic strike impacts the local populace, it is going to have negative strategic implications. With rising CDE concerns, a pilot will usually only get one opportunity for weapons employment. It is also important to know that it is in these situations the ground commander does indeed own the bomb and it is his authority to grant weapons release, as opposed to having to ask the joint operations center (JOC) for approval.

Most CAS engagements in support of (ISO) SOF units are circumstances where the assault force is not in a position to engage the target, usually around exfiltration or infiltration. These are the situations where pilots need to know the rules of engagement (ROE), special instructions (SPINS), and tactical directives. Aside from knowing the ROE, SPINS, and tactical directives, CAS pilots also need to understand the capabilities of the other assets that support special operations assault forces. This knowledge allows CAS pilots to understand how the assault forces find, fix, and target our enemies.

IMPROVING THE SITUATION

The current special operations fight requires that CAS pilots be proficient on CAS tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and asset capabilities. When opportunities arise to employ weapons, pilots need to be on target, on time, and be able to get weapons away on the first pass. Recent experiences in Afghanistan highlighted instances of pilots slowing down the kill chain because they did not understand the ground commander’s intent, the ROE, or desired weapons effects. CAS pilots need to understand the fleeting nature of SOF targets and that a missed opportunity may not present itself again. This can mean days or even weeks worth of work being lost in a few minutes and reemphasizes the need for combat air forces (CAF) squadrons to take advantage of every opportunity available to train with special operation units before deploying.

It is every pilot’s dream to WINCHESTER his or her jet in combat. Unfortunately, those opportunities are rare. With limited opportunities to employ, the best way to help the assault force may be providing good sensor coverage to help build situational awareness. A sensor contract should be one of the first things a CAS pilot asks for if it is not passed by the joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) in the area of operations (AO) update. Maintaining disciplined sensor coverage is as important to the fight as employing weapons. It is imperative that CAS pilots know proper terminology and what the JTAC wants them to point the sensor at. A CAS pilot will build situational awareness by knowing their own responsibilities and sensor responsibilities for other assets in the aircraft stack, preventing duplication of effort. This management plan will prevent personnel fleeing the target (squirters) unseen, which could lead to mission failure and/or unnecessary risk to the assault force.

Providing good sensor coverage takes coordination. This is easily accomplished when the aircrew receives the mission products before they step to the aircraft. When the aircrew takes off without products or are retasked to a mission they did not plan on supporting, it is highly recommended that they contact the JOC fires support officer (FSO) as soon as possible. The FSO can provide an up-to-date status of the assault force to include current position of friendly forces, enemy situation template, and pertinent contact information. In most cases,
the FSO can provide all of the information provided in the products minus the ground reference guides (GRGs). This knowledge should be gained through the squadron’s liaison officer (LNO) at the JOC and disseminated to the rest of the squadron. Information can also be learned and reinforced through training exercises that are readily available to CAS squadrons before deploying.

CONCLUSION

United States special operations units execute many important missions in today’s fight. With this in mind, flying squadrons should seek out integrated training opportunities in order to prepare for combat downrange. Given the multiple assets that support SOF missions, aircrews should not think that they can show up and be an expert. It takes training and relationship building to remain on top and that starts with predeployment training. Unfortunately, it seems that too many flying squadrons are tasked to support exercises that prepare them for the next fight, which causes them to miss opportunities that will prepare them for the current fight. Flying squadrons should seek ways to overcome the challenges posed by maintenance, manning, and scheduling conflicts to capitalize on the training opportunities that are readily available to them.

1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment and special operation force Soldiers search for enemy fighters after Air Force munitions strike a target in Sangin District, April 2010. Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan Soldiers have been conducting operations in Sangin to eliminate insurgents and promote peace and stability in the area. (Photo by SPC Daniel Love, USA)
## CURRENT ALSA MTTP PUBLICATIONS

**AIR BRANCH – POC alsaa@langley.af.mil**

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<th>TITLE</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AOMSW</strong>&lt;br&gt; Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare&lt;br&gt; Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>17 NOV 08</td>
<td>NTPP 3-20.8&lt;br&gt;AFTTP 3-2.74</td>
<td>Description: This publication consolidates Service doctrine, TTP, and lessons-learned from current operations and exercises to maximize the effectiveness of &quot;air attacks on enemy surface vessels&quot;. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONS</strong>&lt;br&gt; Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations&lt;br&gt; Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>9 JUL 05</td>
<td>FM 3-06.1&lt;br&gt;MCRP 3-35.3A&lt;br&gt;NTPP 3-01.04&lt;br&gt;AFTTP 3-2.29</td>
<td>Description: Provides MTTP for tactical-level planning and execution of fixed- and rotary-wing aviation urban operations. Status: Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IADS</strong>&lt;br&gt; Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System&lt;br&gt; Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>1 MAY 09</td>
<td>FM 3-01.15&lt;br&gt;MCRP 3-25E&lt;br&gt;NTPP 3-01.8&lt;br&gt;AFTTP 3-2.31</td>
<td>Description: Provides joint planners with a consolidated reference on Service air defense systems, processes, and structures to include integration procedures. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JFIRE</strong>&lt;br&gt; Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower&lt;br&gt; Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>20 DEC 07</td>
<td>FM 3-09.32&lt;br&gt;MCRP 3-16.6A&lt;br&gt;NTPP 3-09.2&lt;br&gt;AFTTP 3-2.6</td>
<td>Description: Pocket size guide of procedures for calls for fire, CAS, and naval gunfire. Provides tactics for joint operations between attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft performing integrated battlefield operations. Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JSEAD / ARM-J</strong>&lt;br&gt; Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses in a Joint Environment&lt;br&gt; Classified SECRET</td>
<td>28 MAY 04</td>
<td>FM 3-01.4&lt;br&gt;MCRP 3-22.2A&lt;br&gt;NTPP 3-01.42&lt;br&gt;AFTTP 3-2.28</td>
<td>Description: Contributes to Service interoperability by providing the JTF and subordinate commanders, their staffs, and SEAD operators a single, consolidated reference. Status: Current</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>JSTARS</strong>&lt;br&gt; Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System&lt;br&gt; Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>16 NOV 06</td>
<td>FM 3-55.6&lt;br&gt;MCRP 2-24A&lt;br&gt;NTPP 3-55.13&lt;br&gt;AFTTP 3-2.2</td>
<td>Description: Provides procedures for the employment of JSTARS in dedicated support to the JFC. Describes multi-Service TTP for consideration and use during planning and employment of JSTARS. Status: Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KILL BOX</strong>&lt;br&gt; Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box Employment&lt;br&gt; Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>4 AUG 09</td>
<td>FM 3-09.34&lt;br&gt;MCRP 3-25H&lt;br&gt;NTPP 3-09.2.1&lt;br&gt;AFTTP 3-2.59</td>
<td>Description: Assists the Services and JFCs in developing, establishing, and executing Kill Box procedures to allow rapid target engagement. Describes timely, effective multi-Service solutions to FSCMs, ACMs, and maneuver control measures with respect to Kill Box operations. Status: Current</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SCAR</strong>&lt;br&gt; Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance&lt;br&gt; Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>26 NOV 08</td>
<td>FM 3-60.2&lt;br&gt;MCRP 3-23C&lt;br&gt;NTPP 3-03.4.3&lt;br&gt;AFTTP 3-2.72</td>
<td>Description: This publication provides strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR) MTTP to the military Services for the conduct of air interdiction against targets of opportunity. Status: Current</td>
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<td><strong>SURVIVAL, EVASION, AND RECOVERY</strong>&lt;br&gt; Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery&lt;br&gt; Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>20 MAR 07</td>
<td>FM 3-50.3&lt;br&gt;NTPP 3-50.3&lt;br&gt;AFTTP 3-2.26</td>
<td>Description: Provides a weather-proof, pocket-sized, quick reference guide of basic survival information to assist Service members in a survival situation regardless of geographic location. Status: Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TAGS</strong>&lt;br&gt; Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System&lt;br&gt; Distribution Restricted/ REL ABCA</td>
<td>10 APR 07</td>
<td>FM 3-52.2&lt;br&gt;NTPP 3-56.2&lt;br&gt;AFTTP 3-2.17</td>
<td>Description: Promotes Service awareness regarding the role of airpower in support of the JFC’s campaign plan, increases understanding of the air-ground system, and provides planning considerations for the conduct of air-ground ops. Status: Current</td>
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<td><strong>TST (DYNAMIC TARGETING)</strong>&lt;br&gt; Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets&lt;br&gt; Distribution Restricted</td>
<td>20 APR 04</td>
<td>FM 3-60.1&lt;br&gt;MCRP 3-16D&lt;br&gt;NTPP 3-60.1&lt;br&gt;AFTTP 3-2.3</td>
<td>Description: Provides the JFC, the operational staff, and components MTTP to coordinate, de-conflict, synchronize, and prosecute TSTs within any AOR. Includes lessons learned, multinational and other government agency considerations. Status: Revision</td>
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<td>UAS</td>
<td>3 AUG 06</td>
<td>FM 3-04.15, NTTP 3-55.14, AFTTP 3-2.64</td>
<td>Establishes MTTP for UAS addressing tactical and operational considerations, system capabilities, payloads, mission planning, logistics, and most importantly, multi-Service execution. Status: Revision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordon and Search</td>
<td>25 APR 06</td>
<td>FM 3-06.20, MCRP 3-31.4B, NTTP 3-05.8, AFTTP 3-2.62</td>
<td>Consolidates the Services’ best TTP used in cordon and search operations at the tactical level of war. Status: Assessment</td>
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<td>MILITARY DECEPTION</td>
<td>12 APR 07</td>
<td>MCRP 3-40.4A, NTTP 3-58.1, AFTTP 3-2.66</td>
<td>Facilitate the integration, synchronization, planning, and execution of MILDEC operations. Service as a “one stop” reference for service MILDEC planners to plan and execute multi-service MILDEC operations. Status: Revision</td>
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<td>NLW</td>
<td>24 OCT 07</td>
<td>FM 3-22.40, MCRP 3-15.8, NTTP 3-07.3.2, AFTTP 3-2.45</td>
<td>Provides a single-source, consolidated reference on the tactical employment of NLWs and offers commanders and their staff guidance for NLW employment and planning. Commanders and staffs can use this publication to aid in the tactical employment of NLW during exercises and contingencies. Status: Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEACE OPS</td>
<td>20 OCT 03</td>
<td>Change 1 incorporated 14 APR 09</td>
<td>Provides tactical-level guidance to the warfighter for conducting peace operations. Status: Current with Change 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACTICAL CONVOY OPERATIONS</td>
<td>13 JAN 09</td>
<td>FM 4-01.45, MCRP 4-11.3H, NTTP 4-01.3, AFTTP 3-2.58</td>
<td>Consolidates the Services’ best TTP used in convoy operations into a single multi-Service TTP. Provides a quick reference guide for convoy commanders and subordinates on how to plan, train, and conduct tactical convoy operations in the contemporary operating environment. Status: Current</td>
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<tr>
<td>TECHINT</td>
<td>9 JUN 06</td>
<td>FM 2-22.401, NTTP 2-01.4, AFTTP 3-2.63</td>
<td>Provides a common set of MTTP for technical intelligence operations. Serves as a reference for Service technical intelligence planners and operators. Status: Current</td>
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<td>UXO <strong>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Unexploded Explosive Ordnance Operations</strong></td>
<td>16 AUG 05</td>
<td>FM 3-100.38, MCRP 3-17.2B, NTTP 3-02.4.1, AFTTP 3-2.12</td>
<td>Distribution Restricted</td>
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<td><strong>BREVITY</strong> <strong>Multi-Service Brevity Codes</strong></td>
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<td>FM 1-02.1, MCRP 3-25B, NTTP 6-02.1, AFTTP 3.2-5</td>
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<td><strong>Civil Support</strong> <strong>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Civil Support Operations</strong></td>
<td>3 DEC 07</td>
<td>FM 3-28.1, NTTP 3-57.2, AFTTP 3-2.67</td>
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<td><strong>JATC</strong> <strong>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control</strong></td>
<td>23 JUL 09</td>
<td>FM 3-52.3, MCRP 3-25A, NTTP 3-56.3, AFTTP 3-2.23</td>
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<td><strong>JTF IM</strong> <strong>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force Information Management</strong></td>
<td>10 SEP 03</td>
<td>FM 6-02.85, MCRP 3-40.2A, NTTP 3-13.1.16, AFTTP 3-2.22</td>
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<td><strong>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Reprogramming of Electronic Warfare and Target Sensing Systems</strong></td>
<td>22 JAN 07</td>
<td>FM 3-13.10, MCRP 3-51.1, NTTP 3-51.2, AFTTP 3-2.7</td>
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<td><strong>TACTICAL CHAT</strong> <strong>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Internet Tactical Chat in Support of Operations</strong></td>
<td>7 JUL 09</td>
<td>FM 6-02.73, MCRP 3-40.2B, NTTP 6-02.8, AFTTP 3-2.77</td>
<td>Distribution Restricted</td>
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**LAND AND SEA BRANCH – POC alsab@langley.af.mil**

**COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) BRANCH - POC: alsac2@langley.af.mil**

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<td><strong>AIRSPACE CONTROL</strong> <strong>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control</strong></td>
<td>22 MAY 09</td>
<td>FM 3-52.1, AFTTP 3-2.78</td>
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<td><strong>BREVITY</strong> <strong>Multi-Service Brevity Codes</strong></td>
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<td><strong>CIVIL SUPPORT</strong> <strong>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Civil Support Operations</strong></td>
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<td><strong>COMCAM</strong> <strong>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations</strong></td>
<td>24 MAY 07</td>
<td>FM 3-55.12, MCRP 3-33.7A, NTTP 3-13.12, AFTTP 3-2.41</td>
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<td><strong>HAVE QUICK</strong> <strong>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for HAVE QUICK Radios</strong></td>
<td>7 MAY 04</td>
<td>FM 6-02.77, MCRP 3-40.3F, NTTP 6-02.7, AFTTP 3-2.49</td>
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<td><strong>HF-ALE</strong> <strong>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the High Frequency-Automatic Link Establishment (HF-ALE) Radios</strong></td>
<td>20 NOV 07</td>
<td>FM 6-02.74, MCRP 3-40.3E, NTTP 6-02.6, AFTTP 3-2.48</td>
<td>Distribution Restricted</td>
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<td><strong>JATC</strong> <strong>Multi-Service Procedures for Joint Air Traffic Control</strong></td>
<td>23 JUL 09</td>
<td>FM 3-52.3, MCRP 3-25A, NTTP 3-56.3, AFTTP 3-2.23</td>
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<td>FM 6-02.73, MCRP 3-40.2B, NTTP 6-02.8, AFTTP 3-2.77</td>
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NEW PROJECTS

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<td>Military Diving Operations (MDO)</td>
<td>ATTP 3-34.84, MCRP 3-35.9A, NTTP 3-07.7, AFTTP 3-2.80, CG COMDTINST 3-07.7</td>
<td>Description: This MTTP publication describes US Military dive mission areas (DMA) as well as the force structure, equipment, and primary missions that each Service could provide to a JTF Commander. Status: Signature Draft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multi-Service Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military Diving Operations</td>
<td>Approve for Public Release</td>
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<td>UHF TACSAT/DAMA</td>
<td>FM 6-02.90, MCRP 3-40.3G, NTTP 6-02.9, AFTTP 3-2.53</td>
<td>Description: Documents TTP that will improve efficiency at the planner and user levels. (Recent operations at JTF level have demonstrated difficulties in managing limited number of UHF TACSAT frequencies.) Status: Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Package for Ultra High Frequency Tactical Satellite and Demand Assigned Multiple Access Operations</td>
<td>Approved for Public Release</td>
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ALSA 35th Anniversary

ALSA recently celebrated its 35th anniversary by holding a dining-out at the Langley Air Force Base Officers Club. Pictured from left to right are former ALSA Directors: COL (R) Lynch, COL (R) Manganaro, Col (R) Bristow, COL (R) Kucera, Col Garland, and the current Director, Col Hume.
ALSA’s mission is to rapidly and responsively develop multi-Service tactics, techniques and procedures (MTTP), studies, and other like solutions across the entire military spectrum to meet the immediate needs of the warfighter.

ALSA is a joint organization chartered by a memorandum of agreement under the authority of the Commanders, Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), USMC Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), and Headquarters, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education. ALSA is governed by a Joint Actions Steering Committee (JASC) consisting of four voting and three nonvoting members.

### Voting JASC Members

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<th>Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command</th>
<th>Commander, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education</th>
<th>Deputy to the Commanding General US Army Combined Arms Center</th>
<th>Director, Capabilities Development Directorate, Marine Corps Combat Development Command</th>
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<td>RADM Wendi B. Carpenter</td>
<td>Maj Gen David S. Fadok</td>
<td>Mr. Dale A. Ormond</td>
<td>BGen Daniel J. O’Donohue</td>
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### SUBJEC&T MATTER EXPERTS NEEDED!

**UPCOMING JOINT WORKING GROUPS:**

- **Cordon and Search** – Nov 2010  
  POC: LTC Reginald Armstrong  
  reginald.armstrong@langley.af.mil

- **Survival** – Nov 2010  
  POC: MAJ Brian Bolio  
  brian.bolio@langley.af.mil

- **JSTARS** – Dec 2010  
  POC: Maj Ray “Ponch” Zuniga  
  ray.zuniga@langley.af.mil

### CALLING ALL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE EXPERTS!

If you participated in recent assistance efforts (Haiti, Chile, Samoa, Gulf Oil spill, flood recovery, etc.), we want to share your observations, insights, and lessons learned! Write an account of your experience, enhance your professional development, and get published. We’re always looking for current pictures as well!

Submissions due by **1 Nov 2010** for publication in our January 2011 issue.

Send articles (in MS Word document format) and pictures (in high resolution JPG format) to:  
CDR (S) Cynthia Dieterly, USN  
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