Emerging Patterns of American Civil-Military Relations in Sub-Saharan Africa

A Monograph
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Abstract

EMERGING PATTERNS OF AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, by Bob Leavitt, 42 pages.

The role of the Department of Defense in sub-Saharan Africa has increased significantly since 2001 as evidenced by its increased presence, personnel, and programming. Overall, this increasing role takes place in relatively close proximity to other, ongoing civilian efforts. Given this increasing role, a qualitative review of the emerging patterns of American civil-military relations and how they affect planning and execution in sub-Saharan Africa is useful and timely. The methodology relies on the application of selected elements of civil-military theory to the theater strategic, operational and tactical levels. Such elements include issues of control, monitoring, information-sharing, civilian and military preferences, and strategic assessment. Recent applications of institutional theory to civil-military relations, particularly Peter Feaver’s agency theory, which derives from the principal-agent theoretical framework, and Risa Brooks’ recent work on the interface between strategic assessment and civil-military relations both provide relevant elements of civil-military relations for this purpose. Building on these efforts to bridge the gaps between theory and practice in American civil-military relations could enhance the discourse associated with civil-military issues, identify key issues, and formulate recommendations for improving operational planning and execution.

Much of civil-military theory focuses on issues of civilian control at the highest level of decision-making (i.e., the principals) and often takes place in the context of planning for or executing military operations. However, the Department of Defense increasingly plays an important though decentralized role at the regional level through geographic combatant commands and emphasizes the importance of full-spectrum operations, including non-kinetic options. As a result, it is important to consider the often unexplored area of American civil-military relations as they play out on a day-to-day basis at levels well below the principals and in areas not dominated by military operations. Given the increasing role of the Department of Defense in sub-Saharan Africa, which is primarily a permissive operating environment, sub-Saharan Africa is an important and timely geographic focus.

In conclusion, the key elements of civil-military theory are applicable to situations other than military operations, such as civil-military operations in permissive environments. Though the match between current theory to civil-military operations in permissive environments is not perfect, many of the key elements of current theory could provide a framework for identifying and discussing civil-military issues as they play out on a day-to-day basis. In addition, the increasing role of the Department of Defense in non-military operations warrants further attention to the implications for civil-military theory and practice. Further elaboration of such an analytical framework could help identify and address uniquely American civil-military issues. Without such a framework, analysis of civil-military issues at the field level run the risk of being excessively simplified and ad hoc in nature. Such a framework could also be useful for optimizing civil-military outcomes at the field level.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1
Overview ............................................................................................................... 1
Types of civil-military relations ................................................................. 6
Patterns of civil-military relations ............................................................ 10
Civil-military theory ..................................................................................... 12
African Civil-Military Relations and State Fragility .............................. 16
Emerging Patterns: Presence, Programming and Proximity .................. 22
  Expanding presence ................................................................................. 23
  Militarizing Foreign Aid? ................................................................. 26
Emerging Doctrine, Strategy and Plans, and Expertise ....................... 33
  Strategy and Planning .......................................................................... 34
  Doctrine: Potentially unifying, potentially confusing ....................... 35
  Military Expertise and Changing Asymmetries .................................. 38
Recommendations and Conclusion ......................................................... 40
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................... 43
Introduction

Overview

The administrations of President Barack Obama and his predecessor, President George W. Bush, both addressed the combined importance of defense, diplomacy and development in foreign policy. The 2006 National Security Strategy highlighted the importance of development in foreign policy, recognizing that "Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies."1 U.S. Africa Command’s 2009 Posture Statement stated that “Development, diplomacy, and defense programs are integrally linked, and U.S. Africa Command is implementing the National Defense Strategy’s vision of a new jointness.”2 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reiterated that the Obama administration views “defense, diplomacy, and development as the three pillars of American foreign policy,” adding that “that’s not rhetoric. That is our commitment.”3

The U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy (July 2008), which provides the foundation for USAID cooperation and coordination with the Department of Defense, defined a “Three-D” approach as “a policy that recognizes the importance of Defense, Diplomacy, and Development as partners in the conduct of foreign operations, particularly in the developing world.”4 In practice, interagency coordination remains a challenge in executing foreign policy and operations; consistent approaches to defense, diplomacy, and development as the three pillars of American foreign policy,” adding that “that’s not rhetoric. That is our commitment.”

diplomacy and development is a function of a strong National Security Council, effective interagency processes, and supportive legislative actions. American civil-military relations are at the nexus of the three pillars of American foreign policy and operations and similar discussions regarding the importance of whole of government efforts. Much of the research related to American civil-military relations addresses issues associated with civilian control and prioritizes the strategic and operational levels related to military operations. However, the increasing role of the Department of Defense in areas other than major military operations warrants consideration of American civil-military relations as they play out day-to-day in areas not dominated by military operations. The geographic focus is sub-Saharan Africa, which is primarily a permissive operating environment.\(^5\)

The role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in sub-Saharan Africa has increased significantly since 2001 and is characterized by increased presence, personnel, programming and proximity.\(^6\) The most significant efforts on the continent consist of the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), and the Africa Partnership Station in the Gulf of Guinea. Overall, DOD is positioning itself for persistent presence rather than episodic engagement. This evolving role in sub-Saharan Africa provides opportunities and challenges. Development and security are inextricably linked, as

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\(^5\) U.S. Department of Defense document Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (Version 1.0. September 11, 2007, B-3) defines operational environment as “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander.” A permissive operational environment is one in which the “host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.” An uncertain operational environment is one in which the “host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area.” These definitions are consistent with U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms April 12, 2001 (as amended through October 17, 2008), 416. For the purposes of this monograph, which emphasizes foreign assistance operations, including civil-military military operations, a permissive operating environment refers to an environment in which the host country government has sufficient control and intent to assist foreign assistance operations.

\(^6\) The Department of Defense, Department of State, and USAID organize themselves differently in Africa. The Bureau for Africa in USAID, for example, is responsible for all of sub-Saharan Africa but not north Africa.
described in the *National Security Strategy 2006*, and require coordinated and complementary approaches. However, the increasing proximity of DOD efforts with those of civilian efforts in what is primarily a permissive operating environment raises questions about the nature of appropriate civilian and military roles and responsibilities. Although such issues pre-date the planning for U.S. Africa Command, it was the establishment of U.S. Africa Command that sparked much dialogue and provided an opportunity for much needed discourse. Such discourse is an important step in developing a shared understanding of civilian and military roles, responsibilities, and capabilities, and improving planning and execution at the operational and tactical level.

This qualitative review of civil-military relations, primarily at the operational level, addresses the overarching question of how current patterns of American civil-military relations affect planning and execution at the operational and tactical level in sub-Saharan Africa. The hypothesis is that current patterns of American civil-military relations as they play out on a “day-to-day” basis complicate optimal planning and execution of U.S. National Security Strategy at the operational and tactical level in sub-Saharan Africa. There is sufficient evidence to describe American civil-military friction as it plays out in sub-Saharan Africa as well as its implications for planning and execution.

Although the U.S. government has significant civil-military reach in countries at times other than during military operations, there appears to be little consideration of how the patterns of civil-military relations play out in these contexts. Civil-military theory provides the appropriate context in which to frame the overarching question and, more importantly, recommendations for improved civil-military planning and programming. Peter D. Feaver’s *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (2003) and Risa Brooks’ *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment* (2008) have both contributed to the understanding of civil-military relations. Although Feaver’s “agency theory”
of civil-military relations focused at the strategic and principals level, there are aspects of the theory that are applicable to American civil-military relations as they play out on a day-to-day basis in sub-Saharan Africa. Expanding upon Feaver’s work is an important step because his agency theory, as well as the foundational work provided by Samuel P. Huntington in *Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1957), often focus on an aggregated institutional level (i.e. the principals) and how that plays out in Washington or during military operations in hot spots. However, as the U.S. military is increasingly engaged in areas other than major or limited military operations, such as theater security cooperation and civil-military operations, it is increasingly important to consider how civil-military theory can address these new realities. Similarly, Risa Brooks advanced a theoretical framework to assess how the state of civil-military relations in a country can affect that country’s ability to conduct strategic assessment. Similar to Feaver, Brooks also focuses on the strategic level and on issues associated with military operations. Nevertheless, both theoretical frameworks as well as other selected works provide useful perspectives and attributes of civil-military relations that can be applied at the operational level. Considering the applicability of these works to U.S. principals at the sub-Saharan regional and country level, including actors such as the Geographic Combatant Commander, U.S. Ambassador, and their respective staffs, could possibly further bridge the gap between theory and practice as well as enhance the discourse associated with civil-military issues. In addition, an important part of the analysis will be the extent to which civil-military relations are balanced in terms, particularly as it relates to decision-making and funding.

The introduction provides an overview of the types of civil-military relations, key aspects of civil-military theory, and considers the applicability of current theory. Although the focus is on American civil-military relations as they play out in sub-Saharan Africa, the first section provides the essential context and challenge of understanding the African context, including consideration of current patterns of African civil-military relations. The second section provides
an overview of the evolving role of the Department of Defense in Africa, emerging American civil-military relations, and highlights some of the civil-military friction that results. These include the evolving role of DOD in Africa in the context of U.S. foreign policy and foreign assistance, particularly as it relates to emerging patterns and issues associated with American civil-military relations at the operational and tactical level in permissive environments. The third section addresses specific challenges at the operational and tactical level planning and execution, including in how the operating environment is understood. In addition, this section addresses how conventional notions of military "expertise" may be changing.

The last section summarizes the key opportunities and challenges for American civil-military relations in sub-Saharan Africa and provides recommendations to address them. Overall, although there are relevant attributes of recent work in American civil-military theory applicable to the theater strategic, operational and tactical levels in sub-Saharan Africa, it is worth developing, refining and testing an analytical framework that could best identify civil-military relations at such levels. This is particularly important as the role of the U.S. military extends well beyond traditional military operations. An initial such framework suggests that there is justification to provide greater clarity on lines of responsibility and chain of command in permissive operating environments where the work of a U.S. country team, geographic combatant command, and task force may intersect. Though such clarity is warranted and important, it is equally important for relevant civilian departments to constructively exert greater leadership at the country team and interagency levels. One such indicator of whether or not such leadership may be forthcoming would be whether the Department of State, USAID and the National Security Council could work in concert with one another to draft a strategic framework for foreign assistance in Africa.

The initial framework considered here also highlights the need for greater transparency in budget data for all key actors, civilian and military, in sub-Saharan Africa. In the case of the
Department of Defense the issue of transparency may not be an intentional lack of transparency as compared to the difficulty in capturing budget data for a broad array of Department of Defense-related entities in sub-Saharan Africa. This is a challenge and opportunity for the newly established U.S. Africa Command to rectify. One way to assist in better capturing budget and funding data would be to align the Department of Defense budget data for all accounts associated with theater security cooperation and qualified as official overseas development assistance. Doing so would also better align the Department of Defense budget data with the reforms of U.S. foreign assistance and official overseas development assistance, which falls under the purview of the Development Principals Coordinating Committee (PCC), under the National Security Council. The Development PCC could also be a venue for developing a comprehensive framework for foreign assistance and development and security strategy.

**Types of civil-military relations**

Civil-military relations describe a broad and often ill-defined range of relationships between civilians and the military. Civil-military theory often refers to the civilian and military leaders at the principal level (i.e., Secretary of Defense, President, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs). However, suggested “guidelines” for civil-military relations and ad hoc commentary on such relations often extend to the tactical level in situations where, for example, a civil affairs team operates in conjunction with or in close proximity to non-governmental organizations. Unlike a traditional geographic command, U.S. Africa Command at its inception included two deputy positions, including “Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities” and “Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations.” The Department of Defense filled the position as Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities with a senior U.S. Foreign Service Officer with

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extensive experience as a U.S. Ambassador. The position title suggests a broad range of civil-military responsibilities within the command including those related to coordination with other civilian interagency elements, international organizations, host country officials, and host country civilian populations, among other relationships. Given the possible breadth of civil-military relations, it is important to establish a typology to recognize the specific intricacies of various relationships and to assess in what cases civil-military theory is applicable or not. Recognizing the actual type of civil-military relationships is important because different types of relationships often play out differently at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels.

In 1961 William T. R. Fox, a professor of political science and international relations, distinguished between four “types of civil-military relations” as those between “uniformed subordinates and their civilian superiors within the Department of Defense,” “officials of the Department of Defense and those of non-military departments”, “the Department of Defense and the White House”, and the Department of Defense and Congress. These four types of types of civil-military relations captures the most important characteristic of American civil-military relations, civilian control as mutually exercised by the executive and legislative branches of government. In the executive branch, the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and bears the responsibility for nominating “civilian superiors within the Department of Defense.” It is the legislative branch that confirms executive branch nominations as well as exercises powers of the purse and U.S. Code (i.e., authorities guiding the department of defense).

These four types of types of civil-military relations also describes the Department of Defense’s place in the U.S. government, including its interagency relationships with non-military departments, Congressional and Executive oversight, and the military’s advisory role in decision-making.

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making at the political and strategic levels. Civil-military theory predominantly revolves around these four types of civil-military relations and focuses on the traditional consideration of civilian control over the military. This is particularly applicable to what Fox referred to as the interface between civilians and their uniformed subordinates in the Department of Defense and the interface between the Department of Defense and the White House. Although civil-military theory has not necessarily excluded the role of Congress in terms of civilian control, the role of Congress as a major actor in civil-military relations has often received limited attention. Recent work has explicitly expanded to include the role of civilian oversight and control exercised by Congress\textsuperscript{11}. In terms of theory, there has been little attention to relations between the Department of Defense and non-military Departments. Although other Departments, such as the Department of State, may feature in civil-military case studies, the role of the Department of State does not feature as prominently from the perspective of its role in terms of control (i.e., in the form of Chief of Mission authority). In addition, much of the literature focuses on cases associated with the use of military force, which is a matter specifically tied to military expertise and professionalism.

An understanding of American civil-military relations, however, would be incomplete without recognition of American civil-military relations as they play out in foreign regions and countries at the theater strategic, operational and tactical levels. Since 1961, which was also the year of the Foreign Assistance Act and the establishment of USAID, the relationships between the Department of Defense and non-military departments have become increasingly complex, in both Washington and at the country level. With the establishment of Geographic Combatant

\textsuperscript{11}Charles A. Stevenson in \textit{Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-military Relations Under Stress} provides a broader analysis of civil-military relations that appropriately highlights the role of the military's dual civilian masters (in the executive branch and the legislative branch). The distinction is important given the potential for the military to seek redress in Congress for what it could not achieve from the executive branch. Charles A. Stevenson, \textit{Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-military Relations Under Stress} (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2006), 1-11.
Commands as part of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the relationship between the Department of Defense and those of non-military departments often plays out between the Geographic Combatant Command and the U.S. Country Team. At the center of this relationship is the Chief of Mission (U.S. Ambassador) and the Commander of the Geographic Combatant Command (or commanders of any active joint task forces). As the President’s representative at the country level, the Chief of Mission provides an additional level of control over most U.S. activities in-country; the relationships between the Department of Defense and non-military departments also play out within the country team between civilian officials and the country team’s Military Group. Although these relationships are captured by the major types described by Fox in 1961, particularly in what he referred to as the relations between the Department of Defense and non-military departments, the extent of U.S. presence overseas and the likelihood that civil-military relations play out differently at theater strategic, operational and tactical levels warrants greater attention to the nuances of American civil-military relations at this level. The relations between the Department of Defense and the Chief of Mission, including his or her country team, represent an important type of American civil-military relations.

In addition, civil-military relations describe relations between the Department of Defense and actors outside of the U.S. government, including international governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and host country officials, and civil society. Such actors are described in the doctrinal definition of Civil-Military Operations, which refers to establishing relations with “nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace.

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in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area." Civilian organizations could include international organizations operating in a particular country or region or an indigenous host country organization. This type of civil-military relations – which could be considered the nexus between patterns of American civil-military relations and patterns of host country civil-military relations – also receives little to no attention in terms of civil-military theory but is often the focus of ad hoc analysis. Whereas civil-military theory often focuses on the level of the principals, analysis of civil-military relations at other levels are often based on ad hoc analysis. Recognizing the different types of civil-military relations in the context of American civilian control over the military is important because what could be considered an issue of military overstepping could also be considered the result of a civilian-based decision.

**Patterns of civil-military relations**

Eliot Cohen observed that the U.S. military has a "persistent preference for excessively neat patterns of civilian-military relations. Reality seldom obliges. The tendency is to blame personality, to castigate the inability or unwillingness of civilian officials to fully grasp the needs and appropriate uses of the military... In reality, the basic structure of American civil-military relations is imbued with unsolvable problems, perplexing dilemmas, and deliberate inefficiencies, all reflecting the deeper intricacies of the American political system." The potential for friction within American civil-military relations can play out differently in the different types of civil-military relations described above. Such complexity is one of the hallmarks of American civil-

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14 It is interesting to note that the doctrinal definition Civil-Military Operations broadly refers to other U.S. departments and agencies operating in the area of operations in the same vein as non-governmental organizations.
military relations; given the size and reach of the U.S. presence abroad such friction can play out at the field level and can take place in the context of host country civil-military relations.

As Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz wrote while at the Strategic Studies Institute in 1995, the first principle of American civil-military relations is civilian control and that “all other facets of the relationship reflect this or are designed to assure it.”\textsuperscript{16} Such facets extend to the role of Congressional oversight, and Chief of Mission Authority. The concept of civilian control suggests a non-existent clarity when in reality, as Eliot Cohen suggested, patterns of civil-military relations are often messy in practice.

Similarly, civilian and military preferences are also quite unclear. In the context of the four original types of relations at the political and strategic levels, William T. R. Fox concluded that the professional military may not find “necessarily identical sets of civilian considerations standing between him and the making of Presidential decisions in the politico-military field.”\textsuperscript{17} This conclusion could be extended to the field level as well where the professional military may not find “necessarily identical sets of civilian considerations standing between him” and the Chief of Mission. The military professional may often find conflicting civilian issues in each type of civil-military relations and at the political, strategic, operational or tactical levels. The corollary also holds true that civilian actors may not often find identical military considerations involved in military planning and coordination.

In addition to how civilian and military considerations and preferences may differ, decision-making at multiple levels and planning could also be impacted by the relative balance between civilians and the military. One of the necessary attributes associated with control and preferences is balance. Johnson and Metz noted that “the framers of the Constitution crafted a compromise between military effectiveness and political control. They trusted balance, the

\textsuperscript{16} Johnson and Metz, \textit{American Civil-Military Relations}, 2.
\textsuperscript{17} Fox, “Representativeness and Efficiency Dual Problem of Civil-Military Relations,” 363.
diffusion of power, and shared responsibility—all basic elements of the new political system—to control the military.\(^{18}\) Any such reliance on "balance, diffusion of responsibility and shared responsibility" run the risk of imbalance, particularly during times of significant change or crisis. There is nothing new about the suggestions of militarism or militarization to characterize a situation where any perceived or actual imbalance favors the military's preferences or role. President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously warned "against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or un- sought."\(^{19}\) Others warned of an "over-militarized" foreign policy during the Vietnam War.\(^{20}\) Morris Janowitz, a major contributor to civil-military relations theory and author of one of the foundational works in the field, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, recognized that "any imbalance" in civilian-military affairs domestically or internationally is "often the result of default by civilian political leadership."\(^{21}\) When considering emerging American civil-military patterns, it is critical to highlight such issues of balance. Issues associated with balance could be reflected in the ever changing patterns of civil-military relations in both functional and relational terms. Functionally, civil-military patterns reflect technical skills, expertise, and roles and responsibilities (such as whether the technical skills are distinct or not and whether roles and responsibilities are clear or not). Relationally, civil-military patterns describe the relationship of the military to civilians in terms of lines of control (such as whether such lines of control are clear or not).

**Civil-military theory**

Whereas much of civil-military theory addresses issues of control and the extent to which the military professional engages in national security decision-making, the increasing engagement

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\(^{19}\) As quoted in Fox, "Representativeness and Efficiency Dual Problem of Civil-Military Relations," 254.


of the U.S. military in broader foreign operations and assistance makes it appropriate for civil-
military theory to catch up with such developments. Adapting civil-military theory to these new developments would provide an analytical framework for identifying issues associated with the appropriate role of the military in foreign assistance. For example, such a framework could perhaps explore whether there are specific civil-military issues in addition to the institutional and interdepartmental issues that would be expected of any large bureaucracy at the operational and tactical level. Applying civil-military theory, which as of late reflects broader institutional theory relevant to large bureaucracies, is one way to assess whether the types of civil-military issues that may exist and distinguish them from broader institutional issues. Such a distinction is also useful since it helps to clarify that some issues raised in some areas may not really be a "military" issue but may actually be a "civilian issue" at heart.

Aspects of the Peter Feaver’s agency theory, which derives from broader institutional theory relevant to large bureaucracies, is one way to assess whether the types of civil-military issues at the theater strategic, operational and tactical levels that may exist and distinguish them from broader institutional issues. Feaver focuses on the extent to which the military works with or does not work with (or “shirks”) civilian leadership. The extent to which the military works with or shirks is a function of the extent to which the civilian leadership monitors or does not monitor intrusively. Although the clarity of Feaver’s analysis is most pronounced with a clear principal-agent relationship, such a relationship becomes increasingly complex at the operational and tactical levels where lines of control may become blurred; in other words, there may be in practice multiple principles.

Risa Brooks provides a recent and broad framework for gauging the effectiveness of civil-military relations and its subsequent impact on strategic assessment. Whereas Feaver

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23 Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 120.
emphasizes issues of control—particularly hierarchical civilian control over the military—Brooks explores how the dynamics of civil-military relations (American or not) impact the quality of strategic assessment. In particular, Brooks considers what happens when civilian and military preferences converge or diverge in the differing contexts of when there is political dominance, military dominance, or a shared power. Brooks considers these dynamics for the four processes associated with strategic assessment, information sharing, structural competence, strategic coordination, and the authorization process.24

Although there are several recent efforts to apply institutional theory to the civil-military realm, Feaver's work is one of the most recently referenced ones but does not necessarily reflect an accepted standard. Although there have been several critiques of Feaver's Principal-Agent Theory, it provides an effective tool for considering civil-military issues even though it was not specifically designed with the operational and tactical level in mind.25 The application of key attributes of this theoretical framework in conjunction with others such as Brooks and Stevenson proves useful in highlighting several areas in which civil-military relations may not be optimal, such as the primacy of clearly designated roles and responsibilities and the fractured nature of civilian and military control and leadership in the African context (and by extension, the centrality of modeling civilian control over the military in the African context). Since Feaver's theory and aspects of others referenced herein were not originally designed for such an application it is fair to conclude that the fit is not perfect. As such, these attributes are useful in explain current issues but may have limited predictive utility.

25 For example, Charles A. Stevenson concludes that "principal-agent theory, as elaborated by Feave, [Deborah] Avant, and [Amy] Zegart, tries to explain how institutions like the armed forces are established and managed over time... but it tends to presume a single principal acting with only one or very few goals in a linear action-reaction way. When there are multiple principals and numerous goals and a complex matrix of interactions, this approach is far less helpful." Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians, 205-207.
As with most civil-military theory, Feaver's relies on the central issue of control, civilian control of the military. However, unlike much of the theory, he is more interested in the subtleties of control and how they play out on a day-to-day basis. Feaver addresses what happens when civilian and military "ideas diverge."\textsuperscript{26} Similar to Feaver, Risa Brooks addresses the convergence and divergence of such ideas though referring to them as civilian and military preferences.\textsuperscript{27} Drawing on a limited pool of recent, public analysis at the operational and tactical levels in sub-Saharan Africa, it is possible issues that may suggest the convergence or divergence of civilian and military preferences. Such preferences could be exhibited during strategy formulation and planning but they could also be exhibited in doctrine.

Beyond issues of control are issues associated with the balance in civil-military relations. The onus for any perceived militarization or imbalance often falls on the military when there are a range of factors contributing to it. In The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (1960), one of the fundamental works in civil-military relations, the author Morris Janowitz observed during the height of the Cold War that any imbalance in civil-military relations characterized by an expansion of the military's role is not necessarily by military design. Janowitz wrote that "the greater economic and human resources of the military establishment and its increased responsibility result in greater... involvement" and that "it cannot be assumed that such an expansion represents 'designed militarism.'" The key question he asks is "to what extent does this expansion represent a response to a vacuum created by the ineffectiveness of civilian institutions and leaders?" He answers the question by stating that "unanticipated militarism' develops from lack of effective traditions for controlling the military establishment, as well as from a failure of civilian leaders to act relevantly and consistently."\textsuperscript{28} His conclusion is just as relevant today as it was in 1960: "civilian control of military affairs remains intact and

\textsuperscript{26} Feaver, Armed Servants, 224.
\textsuperscript{27} Brooks, Shaping Strategy, 23.
\textsuperscript{28} Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 14.
fundamentally acceptable to the military; any imbalance in military contributions to politico-military affairs—domestic or international—is therefore often the result of default by civilian political leadership.”

African Civil-Military Relations and State Fragility

One of the unique features of American civil-military relations is that it often takes place and plays out at the operational and tactical level overseas in a variety of contexts. In the case of regions or countries where U.S. military operations are not predominant, the extent to which American civil-military relations yields successful outcomes may be in part a function of a consistent and coherent understanding of the operating environment, including an understanding of civil-military relations in the host country. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, American civil-military relations often play out in the context of state fragility. This monograph does not seek to examine the extent to which the role of the U.S. military in Africa and American civil-military relations writ large provide an appropriate or perhaps not-so appropriate model for African civil-military relations. However, this section will highlight some of the intricacies of African civil-military relations in order to highlight potential challenges associated formulating appropriate programs in such a context and the potential for civilian and military convergence or divergence of preferences.

A USAID report on Civil-Military Relations: USAID’S Role (1998) concluded the following about sub-Saharan Africa:

the most important issues of civil-military relations in sub-Saharan Africa continue to include the extensive politicization of most officer corps, the narrow base of popular support for many ‘democratic’ governments (entailing reliance on coercion rather than legitimacy), serious economic conditions resulting in declining standards of living for many (but rarely for the politically privileged), endemic corruption undercutting the professionalism and effectiveness of police and other internal security forces, and in

29 Janowitz, Professional Soldier, viii.
some instances the failure of states and the collapse of militaries. These combine to make the reestablishment of security the overriding immediate need.30

While this assessment dates to the late 1990s, there has been significant progress in several countries, most notably South Africa and Ghana. However, the assessment retains resonance for counties considered to be weak or fragile states. The “second independence” and the massive political changes in South Africa have not altered the major elements of the civil-military relations equation in most sub-Saharan states.

Based on the 2008 Index of State Weakness in the Developing World, which ranks 141 developing countries, “Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the world’s highest concentration of weak and failed states.” The top 10 poor performers worldwide included Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Sudan, Central African Republic, Zimbabwe, Liberia, and Cote D’Ivoire. While some countries in sub-Saharan Africa performed relatively well (i.e., Botswana, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and South Africa), overall the report concluded that “23 of the 28 critically weak states are in sub-Saharan African.” “The Index shows that state weakness is pervasive in sub-Saharan Africa: more than three-quarters of the failed and critically weak states and more than half the world’s weak states are African.”31 Similarly, the University of Maryland’s “Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger” for 2008 concluded that “of the 25 countries with the highest risks for political instability and internal war... 19 are in Africa.” In addition, “of the 51 African states in the analysis, 28 are in the high risk category. Many others qualify for

moderate risk, leaving just seven states on the entire continent qualifying at the lowest level of risk.\textsuperscript{32}

One of the prevailing patterns of sub-Saharan civil-military relations is the engagement of the military in politics, most poignantly through coup d’
état. Although the epidemic of coups is not as extensive as it used to be, the threat of a coup remains a possibility for weak states as well as those with a veneer of stability. Whether a military resorts to a coup or not, the military at the individual and institutional levels may have economic or security interests which it may seek to protect or expand. In addition, George Klay Kieh and Pita Ogaba Agbese, political scientists specializing in the role of African militaries in politics, observed that “the military in several African states has become a factionalized, ethnicized and partisan force beholden to myriad particularistic interests, to the body detriment politic.”\textsuperscript{33}

In Africa one of the most common forms of military intervention within the military’s own state has been through the physical grabbing of power through a coup. Such coups were often justified on the grounds that the military had to replace an incompetent and corrupt civil administration and that the military was best placed to provide the necessary competence and order. Kieh and Agbese further observed that the Africa “coup epidemic” was such that “by the early 1990s, more than two-thirds of Africa countries were governed by military regimes.”\textsuperscript{34} One of the interesting features of such coups in Africa has been of the coups from below, coups planned and executed by junior-level officers.\textsuperscript{35} Although coups are not as prominent or widespread as they once were, coups still play a recurring role in Africa politics. Two successive

\begin{enumerate}
\item Kieh and Agbese, \textit{Military and Politics in Africa}, 7.
\end{enumerate}
coup between 1999 and 2000 in Cote d’Ivoire demonstrated that a seemingly stable state and economic hub could fall prey to coup; the case of Cote d’Ivoire also makes it clear that a coup can quickly unveil the extent of state weakness hiding behind a thin veneer of stability.

The December 2008 military coup in Guinea was a reminder that coups still can come from below, a group of officers led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara seized power in the wake of the long-awaited death of President Lansana Conte. Although the military had played an important role behind the scenes in President Conte’s long rule, the BBC reported that “with many Guineans—disgruntled by almost a quarter of a century of misrule—appearing to back the army’s move, most former ministers soon pledged loyalty to Captain Camara.”36 As typical in most coups taking place since the “third wave of democratization” in Africa, the coup leaders quickly announced that they would counter corruption, promote living standards, and handover power during future elections. George Klay Kieh and Pita Ogaba Agbese, however, observed that “in terms of performance, there is a general consensus that military regimes in Africa have not done any better than their civilian counterparts.”37 As a result of the military coup, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union decided “to suspend the participation of Guinea in the activities of the AU until the return to constitutional order in that country.”38

Once the number of coups in Africa peaked in the 1990s when approximately a third of all countries were led by military regimes, there have been greater efforts to curtail such interventions in state affairs. As the number of democratically-elected governments increased, there were increased efforts at the state and regional levels to better control the military. South

37 Kieh and Agbese, Military and Politics in Africa, 7
Africa and Ghana were two of the strongest cases where countries sought constitutional frameworks for controlling the military by placing it firmly under civilian control. In the case of South Africa, control is exercised by a clear chain of command and parliamentary oversight. At the regional level, the Organization of African Unity and its successor organization, the African Union, sought to design and execute collective measures to decrease any perceived incentives for undertaking a coup by state level by threatening the suspension of the state’s membership. However, in 1999 the ‘anti-coup regime’ failed its very first test the same year it was passed when General Robert Guie took power in Cote d’Voire through a coup. The African Union has had a better track record. The Africa Union suspended both Mauritania (2008) and Guinea (2008). The African Union’s Peace and Security Council condemned the coup in Guinea referring to it as “a flagrant violation of the Constitution of Guinea and of the relevant AU instruments” and decided “to suspend the participation of Guinea in the activities of the AU until the return to constitutional order.” The African Union’s Peace and Security Council similarly condemned the coup in Mauritania and suspended its membership.

Unlike in the United States and other advanced and stable countries, in sub-Saharan Africa the control of the military remains a key facet of civil-military relations. The application of Feaver’s principle agent theory in such countries could lead to confusion of who is the principal and who is the agent. The case of Mauritania suggests that its current leader, who came to power through a coup, was the principal behind the scenes (or waiting behind the scene). He had been instrumental in the countries previous coup in 2005 and acted again in 2008 when he had a falling out with the democratically-elected president. The August 2008 military coup in Mauritania, a country that has experienced approximately ten coups since its independence in 1960, General Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz declared himself president after ousting democratically

39 Kieh and Agbese, Military and Politics in Africa, 10
elected President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi.\textsuperscript{41} This coup has significant implications for U.S. efforts in the trans-Sahel region as legislative restrictions prohibit military assistance to countries impacted by a coup.

This is often characterized by interventions ranging from a coup to political manipulation behind the scenes. Whereas several countries have had effective controls and practices in place, like South Africa and Ghana among others, in weak and fragile states at the other end of the continuum such control often comes in the form of international intervention in the form of sanctions (such as by the African Union) or peacekeeping. Whether through bilateral or regional efforts to control the “traditional” or “non-traditional” military establishment, Kieh and Agbese conclude that “central to the democratic control of the military project is the legitimacy of civilian regimes in Africa. These civilian regimes can gain and maintain legitimacy by, among other things, providing accountable and transparent leadership and creating the conditions through progressive public policies for meeting the basic human needs” (Kieh and Agbese, 2004, p.15)

Lauren Ploch, an Analyst in African Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, has noted that “Among several African governments and militaries, on the other hand, AFRICOM has been received with cautious optimism... potentially bringing increased resources, training, and assistance. U.S. foreign military assistance has increased in recent years, and military training programs in Africa have steadily been on the rise.”\textsuperscript{42} However, the concern has been how to manage the potential for competing US military and civilian preferences in engaging an African military. One such case of potential preference divergence was cited at length in a 2006

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staff report to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign” (December 15, 2006).

One Central African country in particular illustrates the need for State Department perspective and guidance to temper Defense Department enthusiasm. The country is unstable, desperately poor, and run by a repressive government that is being challenged by a persistent armed resistance. Desperate for a military strong enough to protect it from the rebels, the government has signed an Article 98 agreement, exempting U.S. military personnel from International Criminal Court procedures and thus enabling it to receive military assistance. It has also signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States. With extensive “undergoverned spaces” as potential terrorist havens and bordering countries with equally uncertain futures, the country was termed “a model country for security assistance” by the regional combatant command. Civilian embassy officials, however, are demonstrably less keen. They question the rate at which military programs are rapidly escalating and the sizable and still growing presence of U.S. military personnel in-country. A U.S.-labeled backpack, observed on a government soldier undergoing U.S. training, underscored for SFRC staff the potential complications of a too-close association with the country’s military. It would be a major setback if the United States were to be implicated in support of operations shoring up the repressive regime, regardless of the stated intent of such training.43

It is such examples where preferences may vary that there may be competing demands on civilian and military actors at the operational and country team level.

**Emerging Patterns: Presence, Programming and Proximity**

This section identifies the increasing presence of the U.S. military in Africa, as characterized by the increasing numbers of personnel, amount of programming and subsequent proximity to other U.S. government civilian efforts. The American civil-military patterns have changed in Africa from being relatively episodic and situational to persistent. Various stakeholders have expressed concern about the increasing role of the US military in sub-Saharan Africa—concerns that range from a “militarizing foreign aid” to an unhealthy balance in the elements of national power. In the context of the key features of American civil-military theory,

one of the most important questions to consider upon identifying and assessing emerging patterns of American civil-military relations is whether such patterns results in the US military having excessive influence. Such excessive influence over US policy, strategy, planning, and decision-making in sub-Saharan Africa—primarily though not exclusively at the theater strategic, operational and tactical level—could be warranted or unwarranted.\textsuperscript{44} Such influence could also be a function of limited civilian control, whether resulting from a fraying of traditional control mechanisms, absent civilian leadership, or disregard for civilian guidance.

**Expanding presence**

American civil-military relations in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s were often characterized by episodic engagement on the part of the U.S. military, including Noncombatant Evacuation Operations and a reluctant humanitarian intervention in Somalia. These patterns reflected the immediate post Cold War period. These patterns changed most visibly with the Global War on Terrorism and the subsequent increased presence of the military in non-combat countries.

The role of the Department of Defense in Africa has increased significantly since 2001 and is characterized by increased presence, programming and personnel. The most obvious efforts on the continent are represented by the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), and the Global Fleet Station in the Gulf of Guinea. The Department of Defense established CJTF-HOA in October 2002 and since May 2003 it has been based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. With a staff of approximately 2,000, which includes U.S. Armed Forces, civilian employees, and partners, the CJTF-HOA stated mission “employs an ‘indirect approach’ to counter violent extremism” and

\textsuperscript{44} As quoted previously, President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously warned “against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or un-sought.” Although he was speaking mostly of the “military-industrial complex” the phrase has been borrowed given its possible applicability to the situation described herein. As quoted in Fox, “Representativeness and Efficiency Dual Problem of Civil-Military Relations,”, 354.
conducts “operations to strengthen partner nation and regional security capacity to enable long-
term regional stability, prevent conflict and protect U.S. and Coalition interests.” The Combined
Joint Operating Area includes Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Seychelles.
In addition, CJTF HOA operates in Uganda, Tanzania, Mauritius, and Comoros.45

OEF-TS is the Department of Defense’s portion of the broader U.S. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The U.S. Government established the TSCTP in fiscal year 2005 in order “to eliminate terrorist safe havens in northwest Africa by strengthening
countries’ counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology.”46 US
Africa Command states that OEF-TS portion “is designed to assist participating African nations
as they improve control of their territories and thus deny safe havens to terrorist groups”47
However, OEF-TS “focuses on overall security and cooperation rather than solely on Counter
Terrorism” in eleven countries, including Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal.48

Operation Objective Voice, previously known as Operation Assured Voice-Africa, OAV-
A, is an effort to partner with African governments “to broadcast messages to counter extremist
propaganda.” In coordination with the Department of State public diplomacy efforts, Military
Information Support Teams have worked in countries such as Nigeria, Mali, and Kenya.49

The two most visible of these efforts are CJTF-HOA and OEF-TS. In addition to these
two operations, another highly visible effort is the Africa Partnership Station. The Africa

HOA.asp (accessed April 9, 2009).
46 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance
Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. GAO-08-860, Report to the Ranking
Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Partnership Station, which is the Africa portion of the U.S. Navy's Global Fleet Station, focuses on enhancing "regional and maritime safety and security in West and Central Africa." The first official mission of the Africa Partnership Station deployed in 2007 and lasted for six months. Similar to Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans Sahara, the Africa Partnership Station maintains a regional presence but with a minimal footprint ashore. Similar to the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa, the Africa Partnership Station maintains a relatively high profile.

Overall, DOD is positioning itself for persistent presence rather than episodic engagement. The US Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement highlights the following named operations in Africa, all of which pre-date the establishment of the command in 2008. Although not located in Africa, the establishment of US Africa Command in 2008 has increased the number of U.S. Government staff focused on Africa. The headquarters staff, which is currently located in Stuttgart, Germany, is expected to total 1,300. In addition, the most prominent entity associated with US Africa Command, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, has approximately 2,000 staff based in and out of Djibouti. U.S. Africa Command also consists of four component commands each with its own (albeit smaller) headquarters staff; these include U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF), U.S. Air Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA), and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF). U.S. Africa Command is also responsible for one sub-unified command, U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA), which executes Operation Enduring Freedom. The Army and Navy components will be located in separate locations in Italy while the Air Force and Marine components will be based in Germany.

There does not yet appear to be publicly available data yet regarding staffing levels for the various components.

The sheer number of Department of Defense personnel and operating units focused on Africa as of 2008 could create a new coordination and communication challenge for lesser staffed US Government departments and agencies also working on Africa. Although the full staffing levels for U.S. Africa Command’s components remain to be determined, U.S. Africa Command and CJTF-HOA alone include approximately 3,300 staff as of 2008. In the case of USAID, staffing levels for the past several years have been relatively constant; those focused on sub-Saharan Africa in 2008 included approximately 2,200 staff, with over 90 percent of them serving in Africa. This figure includes approximately 1,750 Foreign Service Nationals, which is the agency’s backbone. Staff based in the field work primarily in the 23 bilateral and three regional missions. 54

Militarizing Foreign Aid?

Although the expanding role of the Department of Defense in sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by the recent establishment of US Africa Command, many developments pre-date the decision to establish the command. As discussed above, the highly visible presence in the Horn of Africa, Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans Sahara, the Africa Partnership Station, and the associated increase in funding levels pre-date planning for the new command. However, it was the highly visible announcement to establish the command that either sparked or coincided with expressions of concern about the possible militarization of foreign policy and assistance. In its February 2009 report, the US General Accounting Office concluded that the Department of Defense “encountered some concerns from civilian agencies, African partners, and

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nongovernmental organizations over the command’s mission.” These concerns included “persistent stakeholder concerns, such as fears of AFRICOM militarizing foreign aid.” These concerns were reflected on Capitol Hill on several occasions, including when the House Foreign Affairs-Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health held a hearing called "Africa Command: Opportunity for Enhance Engagement or the Militarization of U.S Africa Relations." Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates weighed in on the topic when he recognized the “concern among many organizations... about what’s seen as a creeping ‘militarization’ of some aspects of America’s foreign policy” and concluded that “this is not an entirely unreasonable sentiment” because the US “military has become more involved in a range of activities that in the past were perceived to be the exclusive province of civilian agencies and organizations.”

Concerns about the increased US militarization or militarism may be relatively new to the African context but are not new to other regions; such concerns have been raised at various times as US policies over time and civil-military patterns oscillate. The central question is whether any such imbalance in civil-military relations that leads to concerns about militarization or militarism reflects any fundamental weakening of civilian control. Although there does not appear to be such a weakening of civilian control at the highest levels of decision-making within the US government, or at the theater strategic, operational and tactical levels, there are imbalances and nuances associated with civilian control that result in occasional frictions in civil-military relations.


In a widely read “peer review” of US foreign assistance, based on US government data, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) observed that the USAID share of official development assistance reduced from 50.2 percent (of $14,839 billion of total gross ODA) in 2002 to 38.8 percent (of $27,682 of total gross ODA) while the Department of Defense share increased from 5.6 percent in 2002 to 21.7 percent in 2005.\(^{58}\) Although the peer review placed such a shift in the proper global context of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which skewed significantly funding streams, this analysis has often been taken out of context to suggest that such a shift has taken place in many areas. However, an analysis of sub-Saharan-specific data suggests that the funding shifts were not so dramatic in the case of sub-Saharan Africa.

Department of Defense funding in sub-Saharan Africa has increased, which perhaps has led to some of the concern about its role in Africa, but it has increased from a small amount and remains a small fraction of overall US government assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. For 2007, table 1 highlights some of the major US funding accounts in sub-Saharan Africa and reflects the relatively small portion of Department of Defense funding in sub-Saharan Africa.\(^{59}\) If one were to assume that increased funding by the Department of Defense in sub-Saharan Africa might reflect a militarization of foreign aid, perhaps a more appropriate conclusion would be that the

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\(^{58}\) Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee, *The United States: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review* (Paris, France: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2006), 12, 73, and 97. The U.S. Government and OECD define “official development assistance” as “grants or loans to countries and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) and multilateral agencies active in development that are: undertaken by the official sector; with the promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 25%).”

Global HIV/AIDS Initiative and the Millennium Challenge reflect the most significant changes in official development assistance in the case of sub-Saharan Africa.  

Figure 1: FY2007: Selected Accounts for Sub-Saharan Africa (in millions, historical dollars)

Within sub-Saharan Africa a further analysis of foreign assistance provides appropriate perspective on the role of the US military in Africa. In FY 2006, the estimated costs for CJTF-HOA totaled $109.1 million for Operations and Support, which included the CJTF-HOA budget of $32.5 million and the pro-rated CJTF-HOA camp costs of $76.6 million). The CJTF-HOA budget of $32.5 million in the Horn of Africa included $11.3 million spent on "humanitarian aid

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60 PEPFAR refers to the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative account that funds PEPFAR began in 2004. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) began in 2005 in order to provide direct budget support to developing countries demonstrating effective governance across a broad range of indicators.
and civil affairs efforts." By comparison, in the same year, 2006, the USAID budget for Sudan alone totaled approximately $615 million in emergency assistance, $50.7 million in development assistance, and $19.08 million in Child Survival and Health. Considering that the CJTF-HOA Joint Operating Area includes Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Seychelles and that CJTF-HOA operates in Uganda, Tanzania, Mauritius, and Comoros, these same countries in FY 2006 received a total of $150.2 million in the Development Assistance Account and $110.6 million for the Child Survival and Health Account.

The point is that concerns about militarization of foreign aid must be kept in context. An important part of that context is not simply an increase in Department of Defense funding in Africa but the overall increase in foreign assistance during the same period (over 300 percent increase between 2001 and 2007 for all economic [non-military] assistance. In addition, an important part of that context is that US foreign assistance to sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly fragmented between an increasing number of US departments and agencies. Such fragmentation complicates the task of coordinating foreign assistance. Lastly, although civilian foreign aid is vastly larger than that managed by the US military and that civilian foreign aid is managed by fewer staff, it is also difficult to draw parallels between varying staffing patterns and implementation modalities. USAID primarily implements through implementing partners, such as US, international, national and local non-governmental organizations, which number in the hundreds in sub-Saharan Africa.

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Nevertheless, though still a small portion of overall foreign assistance, the reach of the US military and number of personnel remains significant. Although there have been concerns of militarization, the appropriate question is to what extent is there or could there be an emerging civil-military pattern characterized by an imbalance? Also, if there is an imbalance, what causes the imbalance? Does it adversely impact civil-military relations and subsequent theater assessment, strategy, operations and tactics?

Similarly, current concerns of imbalance reflect a number of factors, many of which fall outside of the military responsibility. The increased level of Department of Defense personnel focused on Africa compared to the number of USAID staff provides a case in point. Just as the staffing levels related of Department of Defense personnel focused on sub-Saharan Africa increased since 2001, USAID staffing took a sharp drop in the 1990s as the executive and legislative branched considered changes to the US government’s posture overseas in the wake of the Cold War. In this case, Congress and the Department of State played a critical role in the reduction of USAID staffing levels in the 1990s as well as the reduction of USAID missions. Many of these changes reflected the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993. The Accompanying Report of the National Performance Review: Agency for International Development (1993) summarized the potential changes facing USAID, “in 1992, a presidential commission recommended that the agency be merged into the State Department; a recent congressional task force and others have called for the agency to be abolished and to be replaced by other public or quasi-public entities.”64 In particular, the Accompanying Report of the National Performance Review (1993) recommended that USAID “should regionalize missions and staff services overseas and close nonessential missions”; “should concentrate field presence

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substantially by fiscal year 1996”; and “establish ‘graduation’ criteria for countries receiving U.S. assistance.”

In 1993 USAID was present in 35 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which included three regional and bilateral missions. Between 1994 and 1999 USAID closed 13 bilateral missions and one regional office. USAID closed missions in Cote d'Ivoire and Togo in 1994; Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad and Lesotho in 1995; Capre Verde, Gambia and Swaziland in 1996; Burundi and the regional West Africa office in Abidjan in 1997; and Guinea Bissau and Niger in 1998. By 1999, USAID maintained a presence in 22 countries. As noted in USAID’s Congressional Budget Justification for Fiscal Year 2001, by 2001 USAID staffing levels fell “to approximately 207 U.S. direct hire in Africa and 90 U.S. direct hire in Washington as USAID is challenged to increase aid effectiveness and to take up new efforts” for a requested budget of $1,096 million. By the end of 2008 the figures included 23 bilateral and three regional missions with 279 U.S. direct hire staff and 2,144 non-direct hire staff in sub-Saharan Africa and 89 positions in the Bureau for Africa, in Washington, DC, for a budget of approximately $5.5 billion administered by USAID.

Civil-military relations are often impacted by many external and endogenous variables. USAID staffing levels are far lower than they were in the 1980s. However, when considering the challenges associated with the staffing disconnect between the Department of Defense and

67 U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Africa, USAID in Africa February 2007, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDAC1914.pdf (accessed April 9, 2009). In 2005, worldwide, USAID staff worked in the following technical areas: Democracy and Governance (411), General Development (309); Health (263); Environment (116); Private Enterprise (115); Disaster Response (114); Education (107); Agriculture and Rural Development (104); Economist (80); Food Aid (74); Legal (70); and Engineering (58). U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID Primer: What We Do and How We Do It (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, March 2005): 29.
USAID it is also important to recognize that demands on USAID staff are coming from multiple angles simultaneously. USAID has not only increased its staffing commitments to coordination with Defense but has also dedicated significant more staff time to other major commitments, such as working with PEPFAR, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the private sector through the Global Development Alliance, other donor partners through OECD/DAC and consistent with Paris Declaration requirements. In other words, the broader role of development assistance has changed significantly, not just the expectation to further increase coordination with Defense. Therefore, the requirements and available staff for enhanced coordination with the Department of Defense are also required to increase coordination with other partners as well.

**Emerging Doctrine, Strategy and Plans, and Expertise**

Although USAID resources far outweigh those of the Department of Defense in Africa, it is essential for USAID and the Department of Defense to effectively and efficiently coordinate. The effectiveness and efficiency of such coordination is particularly critical given the staffing differentials and perceptions of imbalance discussed earlier. Emerging military doctrine, on one hand, could provide a basis for improved understanding and coordination. On the other hand, doctrine could possibly contribute to misunderstanding if it results in differing pictures of the operating environment. Similarly, coordination in developing strategies and plans could facilitate improved coordination just as a shared understanding of the mutual expertise in relevant areas.

In Feaver’s attention to civilian control of the military, he suggests a possible proxy mechanism for civilian control at operational and tactical levels comes in terms of doctrine and budget.⁶⁸ Although Feaver refers to the “principal” civilian, such as the Secretary of Defense or other political, civilian participation in the formation of doctrine could facilitate civil-military in

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⁶⁸ Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 75.
terms of civilians in other government departments and agencies and those of the Department of Defense, particularly at the theater strategic and operational levels. At this level, the issue of control becomes less paramount because the concept of control becomes more diffuse. For example, the number of "principles" increases at the country team level where actors must consider the Chief of Mission authority inherent in the Ambassador’s position combined with the potential for competing demands by a geographic combatant commander. As a representative of the President, the Chief of Mission, in general, trumps others at the country level in most noncombat countries and under most circumstances. In such a context with multiple actors, control often becomes a function of access to information, including a role (perhaps through subordinates) in shaping budgets and or being knowledgeable of them; clarity in roles and responsibilities; and monitoring.

**Strategy and Planning**

In terms of strategy and plans, USAID has been increasingly engaged in reviewing and making contributions to strategic guidance for the theater strategic and operational levels as well as operational level planning. While a fair amount of this participation has been informal in the past, it is increasingly becoming formalized through a variety of efforts. For example, through a joint Department of Defense and USAID initiative, USAID provided input into the last round of the Department of Defense’s Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), which provides the parameters for security cooperation planning at the geographic combatant commands. As recently reported on January 29, 2009 in News Stand (produced by Inside Defense.com), USAID “can now formally contribute to the next version of the Pentagon’s Guidance for the Employment of the Force." According to the Director of the USAID Office of Military Affairs, just as the Department of Defense will seek feedback from the Geographic Combatant Commands, USAID

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will now request similar input from its own regional and country specialists. As the Director stated, the GEF and theater campaign plans, when appropriate or necessary, “should be consistent with our regional strategies from a development perspective.” 70

Although still at the early stages of working with the Department of Defense at the Geographic Combatant Command level, USAID has already worked closely with US Africa Command, CJTF-HOA and OEF-TS in terms of contributing to the their strategy and plans. Although USAID participated in such process for several years now, USAID is now able to participate at the earliest stages of the process so as to better inform the process and product rather than being brought in at the end. A 2008 GAO Report focusing on OEF-TS suggested that such efforts are being made but that in the case of OEF-TS the result remains a basic level of coordination. From a whole of government perspective, the report concluded that OEF-TS “lacked a comprehensive, integrated strategy” and that “State, USAID, and DOD developed separate plans focused on their respective program activities. Although these plans reflected some collaboration, such as in assessing a country’s development needs, they did not constitute an integrated approach and may have hampered the ability of key agencies to collaboratively implement their activities.” 71 However, this initial level of coordination and shared planning is an advance on some of the earlier planning efforts.

Doctrine: Potentially unifying, potentially confusing

U.S. Joint and Army Doctrine have been trying to keep pace with recent changes in the operating environment. Some changes facilitate an improved understanding of roles and responsibilities and some do not. Several recent publications have further clarified roles and responsibilities of the U.S. military vis-à-vis other federal agencies. For example, U.S. Joint

Forces Command *Joint Publication 3-29: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, which is a revision of *Joint Publication 3-07.6: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign*, the first and most prominent change stated in the revised doctrine "identifies the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as the principal agency for US bilateral development and humanitarian assistance." However, whereas some aspects of revised doctrine could clarify roles and responsibilities, other aspects could further confuse perspectives at the operational and tactical level if not addressed appropriately.

The recent Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 on Irregular Warfare and any subsequent effects on doctrine could be one such example. In December 2008, the Department of Defense released directive 3000.07 on Irregular Warfare that stated that it is DOD policy to recognize that Irregular Warfare "is as strategically important as traditional warfare." Irregular Warfare can take place under the umbrella of traditional warfare or could take place independently. The directive elaborated that Irregular Warfare "can include a variety of steady-state and surge DoD activities and operations: counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; and stability operations that, in the context of IW, involve establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state." Secretary of Defense Robert Gates introduced the importance of Irregular Warfare in the FY 2010 Defense Budget and broke down the implications as follows: "let me put this very crudely -- if you broke this budget out, it would

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72 U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). *Joint Publication 3-29: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* (Norfolk, VA: USJFCOM, March 17, 2009), iii-iv. Joint Publication 3-29 also "Establishes the use of and reference to the terms and definitions of developmental assistance and security assistance... Provides figures/tables depicting the interagency coordination flow for FHA operations... Establishes entirely new/revised sections on strategic communications and civil affairs... Provides figures/tables depicting the overarching relief process. Provides figures/tables depicting the three FHA operational environments of: permissive, uncertain, and hostile.... Provides a significant revision to the USAID information."
probably be about 10 percent for irregular warfare, about 50 percent for traditional, strategic and conventional conflict, and about 40 percent dual-purpose capabilities.\textsuperscript{73}

USJFCOM leads the Department of Defense’s effort “to deploy joint forces that are as effective in conducting irregular warfare as they are conventional warfare.” USJFCOM will be responsible for identifying and filling the gaps in joint doctrine, education and training in order to create a greater balance between irregular warfare and conventional warfare.\textsuperscript{74} The command’s Irregular Warfare Vision include the following activities and categories that should be considered as part of an approach to irregular warfare: providing essential services, governance, and economic development.\textsuperscript{75} In the context of the possible permissive environments in which irregular warfare could take place, it is interesting to note that at the same time that there is increasing discussion and recognition of the lack of balance between civilian capabilities and military capabilities, the recent directive on Irregular Warfare could possibly lead to furthering the imbalance (i.e., further emphasizing the development of military capabilities that in some cases are also practiced by civilians). The observation is not a critique but merely an observation that achieving balance in civilian and military capabilities (or “putting a civilian face on it”) will likely remain challenging, particularly in permissive environments. As the military develops such capabilities for operations other than strictly military operations associated with conventional warfare makes it clear that traditional civil-military theory based on the concept of a uniquely military expertise in matters of military operations (and what Huntington referred to as


\textsuperscript{75} The list also included information and the battle space of competing narratives; training and equipping (or developing) local forces; and combat operations. U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), “Memorandum for U.S. Joint Forces Command: Irregular Warfare Vision,” 2.
"autonomous military expertise) army be eroding. The lines between inherently civilian expertise and military expertise could be blurring as result.

Military Expertise and Changing Asymmetries

Much of civil-military theory focuses on military operations. Given the increasing prominence of full-scale operations, including that of civil-military operations, and the large role of the Department of Defense in areas in addition to military operations, such as theater security cooperation, theory will have to catch up with these changes. Samuel Huntington recognized the importance of limiting civilian intrusion in military affairs since objective control is premised on the prominence of military expertise and professionalism, which he referred to as he called "autonomous military professionalism" in military affairs.\textsuperscript{76} Such traditional civil-military theory emphasizes military operations and is not as applicable to civil-military operations at the theater strategic, operational and tactical levels. In cases of civil-military operations in primarily permissive environments, there may likely be additional expertise associated with the country team. Changes in doctrine and practice increasingly place emphasis on such skill sets in which the military may develop necessary skills but does not necessarily have any particular autonomous functional expertise. As much of what takes place is "amongst the people", military and civilian expertise in permissive environments create a gray zone that challenges the best of coordination mechanisms.

Feaver refers to "information asymmetry" as challenge for civilian principal, particularly in areas of specific military expertise.\textsuperscript{77} However, whereas Feaver often focuses specific military expertise regarding military operations, the asymmetries differ in civil-military operations. As DOD becomes increasingly engaged in civil-military operations with humanitarian or


\textsuperscript{77} Feaver, \textit{Armed Servants}, 70.
development outcomes, the asymmetry of expertise may decrease. Current doctrine requires broader skill sets and in some cases reduced uniqueness or perspective, which is also apparent in DODD 3000.05. Asymmetries or minimization of them could both cause friction. At what point could theater security cooperation activities, such as those broadly addressing humanitarian conditions, look like a regular government program similar to that of State or USAID? Just as patterns of civil-military relations at the country level become complicated by expanding roles, an application of principal agent theory and broader civil-military theory could become complicated (thus requiring a new formulation). Given the importance of full spectrum operations, the distinction between military expertise and civilian expertise could merge in several sectors; roles and responsibilities could become blurred.

Unlike issues associated with the use of force considered by Feaver, the complicating factor in applying agent theory to non-kinetic operations and activities, particularly civil-military operations, is that the U.S. military may not have a monopoly on the technical issues at play. For example, country team civilian staff may actually have greater technical experience in technical sector-specific issues. Such a fact and acting on such a fact by engaging such civilian expertise, however, must recognize any possible distinctions between the technical outcome (such as a community borehole) and the military objective associated with it. Such questions would always clarify whether civil-military operations primarily have a humanitarian outcome or a military one (such as access and influence). The fact that the Department of Defense has been diligent in reaching out to USAID also recognizes the fact that USAID has a role to play in providing such situational and technical expertise. The interesting point is that USAID staff is sometimes called upon to support a global combatant command or component thereof in order for that command or component to better support USAID objectives. Whereas traditional views and theories of civil-military revelations emphasize an objective need to provide parameters and guidelines but not to engage in the operational or tactical details, this is not as applicable in situations other than the
use of force. Although such perspectives had been more an ideal than a reality in practice, the key point is that efforts to engage areas in order to “prevent conflict” and to undertake efforts amongst the people make it clear that a new theoretical framework is required.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Representative Nita Lowey, Chairwoman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs, recently concluded that the fragmentation of U.S. foreign operations has “been a management nightmare for our ambassadors from the field,” particularly the “congressional lack of oversight, accountability, coordination and coherence of assistance programs.” Representative Lowey’s analysis applies to the civilian-military interface and the implications of imbalance at the field level. Just as her conclusion highlights operational and tactical implications (in this case for the ability of the Ambassador to manage foreign operations), recommendations for addressing such issues must also focus at the national level (including the responsibility of Congress) and not just the operational and tactical levels. Similarly, the following recommendations highlight the importance of effecting changes at the national level in order to mitigate some of the challenges of imbalance at the operational and tactical levels.

Feaver’s agency theory is based on the centrality of civilian control over the military and the role of effective monitoring in order to help achieve this. Although Feaver’s analysis often relies on a principal-agent relationship where one principal is assumed, agency theory highlights the difficulties that may arise when there may be one or more principals. At the operational and tactical levels where various civilian and military efforts may be planned and executed, lines of control and coordination may often become blurred, particularly in the context of a void in

leadership. In this context, agency theory provides an important argument for clarifying lines of control and over all roles and responsibilities at the operational and tactical levels in permissive operating environments where the work of a U.S. country team, geographic combatant command, and task force may intersect. Though such clarity is warranted and important, it is equally important for relevant civilian departments to constructively exert greater leadership at the country team and interagency levels. This recommendation applies to the country team as well as the interagency levels. One such indicator of whether or not such leadership may be forthcoming would be whether the Department of State, USAID and the National Security Council could work in concert with one another to draft a strategic framework for foreign assistance in Africa.

At the interagency level, the Principals Coordinating Committee provides a framework for enhancing coordination in areas of strategy, mechanisms for coordination, and coordinated funding accounts. A Civil-Military sub-committee of the Development Principals Coordinating Committee (PCC), under the National Security Council could be assigned responsibility for ultimately devising a civil-military framework and budget framework. As recognized in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, “long experience shows that operators, regardless of parent agency, collaborate closely when faced with common challenges in the field: they often resolve interagency concerns quickly and seamlessly to achieve team objectives.” Such efforts are taking place out of necessity at the field level with mixed results, as the varying cases of OEF-TS and CJTF-HOA demonstrate. The PCC and sub-PCC level could learn from the field level in order to streamline lessons learned and mitigate unnecessary ad hocery.

In addition, the US government—through USAID and the Development PCC—could develop a comprehensive framework for foreign assistance and development and security strategy for sub-Saharan Africa. As illustrated in the case of the central African country cited above, development and security objectives often conflict with one another. Security and development

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are intricately linked, but that does not mean that separate efforts in security and development would not undermine one another.

It also is important to align Department of Defense budget data for all accounts associated with theater security cooperation, particularly all accounts qualified as official overseas development assistance. Such information is a critical component of effective and efficient civil-military relations. At present, foreign assistance is characterized by the fragmentation in terms of the numbers of US government departments and agencies involved in its execution. While recent efforts to reform foreign assistance have been helpful in consolidating Department of State and USAID data, it still remains difficult to gather such information for other departments, especially those that do not fall under the authority of the Department of State or USAID. Ready access to such data is important to meet government-wide reporting requirements and commitments as well as facilitate the monitoring and de-conflicting civil-military issues as appropriate.

It remains important to develop, refine and test an analytical framework that could best capture issues associated with civil-military relations at the theater strategic, operational and tactical level. As discussed above, current civil-military theory primarily focuses on issues of control and on decision-making at the “principals” level in the context of military operations. A corresponding framework for civil-military operations (the day-to-day relations as they often play out in primarily noncombat countries) could facilitate further understanding of emerging patterns in American civil-military relations at that level, particular in terms of convergent or divergent preferences. Such a framework is important and timely given the increased extent of programming and proximity of Department of Defense efforts with those of civilian agencies; the implications of US military personnel becoming increasingly involved in full-spectrum capabilities that at times mirrors civilian capabilities; and since the lack of a current framework complicates discourse.


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