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14. ABSTRACT The U.S. Department of Defense has recently responded to a large number of humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations. By the nature of these events, response agencies have an extremely limited amount of time to crisis action plan for HA/DR events. As such, a difficult balancing act emerges for the commander supporting the operation: ensuring the response, to include the use of limited transportation assets and force capabilities, is not only expeditious but, just as important, is efficient and effective. The current methods of deploying DOD forces are the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) method and the Request for Forces (RFF) method. An objective analysis of current planning documents supporting HA/DR operations, as well as lessons learned from recent HA/DR operations (Operation Unified Assistance to tsunami victims in 2005 and the DOD response to Hurricanes Rita and Katrina) illustrates that neither the TPFDD method nor the RFF method are the single perfect solution to deployment planning for HA/DR operations. This paper outlines a smarter way of planning for the deployment of forces in HA/DR operations: the development and leveraging of an initial deployment framework. This framework would allow operational commanders to use the flexibility of the RFF method as well as the robustness, in-transit visibility, and structure of the TPFDD method to greatly reduce the time necessary to execute deployment of DOD forces in support of HA/DR operations. In these crisis events, any increase in the effectiveness of the response by DOD forces ultimately saves innocent lives.					
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A Smarter Way to Plan for the Deployment of Forces in Humanitarian Operations

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

A Smarter Way to Plan for the Deployment of Forces in Humanitarian Operations

The U.S. Department of Defense has recently responded to a large number of humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations. By the nature of these events, response agencies have an extremely limited amount of time to crisis action plan for HA/DR events. As such, a difficult balancing act emerges for the commander supporting the operation: ensuring the response, to include the use of limited transportation assets and force capabilities, is not only expeditious but, just as important, is efficient and effective. The current methods of deploying DOD forces are the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) method and the Request for Forces (RFF) method. An objective analysis of current planning documents supporting HA/DR operations, as well as lessons learned from recent HA/DR operations (Operation Unified Assistance to tsunami victims in 2005 and the DOD response to Hurricanes Rita and Katrina) illustrates that neither the TPFDD method nor the RFF method are the single perfect solution to deployment planning for HA/DR operations. This paper outlines a smarter way of planning for the deployment of forces in HA/DR operations: the development and leveraging of an initial deployment framework. This framework would allow operational commanders to use the flexibility of the RFF method as well as the robustness, in-transit visibility, and structure of the TPFDD method to greatly reduce the time necessary to execute deployment of DOD forces in support of HA/DR operations. In these crisis events, any increase in the effectiveness of the response by DOD forces ultimately saves innocent lives.

INTRODUCTION

The United States has found itself involved with an increasing number of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HA/DR) operations around the world since 2000. Some of these have resulted in Department of Defense (DOD) deployments and subsequent operations on U.S. soil such as responses to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Others have been far outside U.S. borders such as Operation Unified Assistance, providing aid to the tsunami victims of 2005. Still other HA/DR operations fall in the middle ground, distinctly outside U.S. soil but geographically close, such as Operation Unified Response in early 2010 following the earthquake in Haiti. Despite the widely disparate nature of HA/DR operations when considering the type of disaster and its location, one thing is consistent in all these operations: they are crisis events with little or no warning. As such, they must be planned for and executed without significant foresight as to their locations or scope of operations. Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) already perform intricate balancing acts when planning and executing operations, weighing the operational factors of time, space, and force to execute a successful operation; the inherent additional uncertainty of these factors in a HA/DR event only increases the complexity.

Milan Vego, U.S. Naval War College professor, comments that “deployment is the single most important major phase in the employment of combat forces.”¹ There are few instances where timely deployment of forces is more important than a significant HA/DR operation in which the objective is the alleviation of human suffering and the stabilization of a traumatized nation. The CCDR is responsible for the proper movement and sequencing of assets into his/her theater for a particular operation. Use of the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) is the primary method of ensuring that the sequencing is correct

and achievable while supporting the operational objectives.² The other method DOD leadership can implement for initial and follow-on deployments is the Request for Forces (RFF) process.³ Both of these processes have been utilized for major combat operations. The TPFDD was first used notably during Operation Desert Storm while the RFF method was used for Operation Iraqi Freedom.⁴ Both methods have also been used in HA/DR operations with different levels of success. In the wake of a HA/DR event, the key for the CCDR is to make the best use of his/her forces while overcoming the extremely limited time his/her staff has available to plan.

Given the lessons garnered from previous HA/DR operations and the inherently limited time available to plan and execute these operations, all supporting HA/DR plans should include an initial deployment framework in order to expedite the complex processes of correctly and efficiently sourcing and deploying DOD forces.

BACKGROUND

The TPFDD is the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) database portion of a plan used to manage the movement of forces from their point of origin to their final destination. It is how a CCDR can visualize his/her deployment plan, sequencing of capabilities, and flow of forces into a theater of operations.⁵ Based on the critical factor of available strategic lift assets, a TPFDD is also used to conduct a transportation feasibility study to determine if the deployment plan is achievable.⁶

Using RFFs is a significantly different process from the TPFDD. Using RFFs, the Geographic CCDR initiates a formal request directly to the U.S. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) for specific capabilities. If the SECDEF approves the request, it is sent to U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to source the actual forces, which are then notified via a

Deployment Order (DEPORD).⁷ There is no single document or database that lists all the forces for deployment in support of a specific operation; instead, multiple RFFs may be submitted simultaneously to SECDEF for approval. Then DEPORDs can be issued as RFFs are approved instead of waiting for all the required forces to be identified.

DISCUSSION

In any operation, the operational commander (e.g. a Joint Task Force, Joint Force, or Geographic Combatant Commander) must arrange forces in time and space to achieve his/her operational objectives. Factor time is the most critical because, once it is expended, he/she can never get more.⁸ Factor space refers to physical elements of a deployment such as the geographic attributes of the battlespace and, most importantly for this analysis, the distances involved with deploying forces to support the operation.⁹ Factor force refers to the actual military forces (along with their characteristics and capabilities) that must be present to accomplish an objective.¹⁰ Balancing these three factors is extremely challenging in a HA/DR operation because the CCDR has limited time to begin operations (usually within 72 hrs), there is often a large physical distance from where forces currently are located to the actual Joint Operational Area (JOA), and each HA/DR will have unique force capability requirements. HA/DR operations cannot be as thoroughly planned in advance as some combat operations because there is no known “enemy,” no known JOA, no known capabilities in the JOA, and no predetermined objective. Therefore, a HA/DR effort is significantly different from most combat operations, which are planned in advance against a known enemy with known capabilities toward a known objective.

Combat operations are typically based on complete Operation Plans (OPLANs) which are extremely detailed and are required to include a TPFDD as part of the completed plan¹¹.

As a result of the unpredictable nature of HA/DR operations, planners cannot create OPLANs for them and, instead, are driven to either developing Concept Plans (CONPLANs) or Functional Plans (FUNCPLANs). These plans are not as thoroughly vetted as OPLANS and do not require the inclusion of a TPFDD.¹² CONPLANs are “operation plans in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN” while FUNCPLANs are “extremely broad plans that are primarily for operations in peacetime or non-hostile environments and have no requirement to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.”¹³ While CONPLANs and FUNCPLANs can outline, in very broad senses, what may happen during a HA/DR scenario, they leave a significant amount of planning still to be done once the time, location, and overall objective of the HA/DR operation is determined.

Regardless of which type plan is used by the Geographic CCDR, none of them associated with HA/DR operations can include a fully developed TPFDD; the information required (including Points of Debarkation (PODs), specific unit capabilities and requirements) is simply not available without knowledge of where the operation will take place or the situation in the JOA. As a result of this uncertainty, none of the HA/DR plans from the five Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) have an associated TPFDD.¹⁴

The lack of a fully developed TPFDD outlining force deployment coupled with the extremely limited amount of time that an operational commander has when responding to a HA/DR situation results in an extremely dangerous situation for the operational commander. A TPFDD-like product early in the operation is crucial for balancing time, space, and forces to achieve the operational objective on short notice and yet there is no such product available.

There have been several HA/DR operations in the recent past that have resulted in significant U.S. DOD force deployments without any TPFDD-like products available prior to the operation. Some of the largest were Operation Unified Assistance (OUA, otherwise known as Tsunami Relief) in response to the tsunami in Southeast Asia in 2004, Operations Katrina and Rita in response to the hurricanes that made landfall on the U.S. Gulf Coast in 2005. In OUA, a “push” method similar to the RFF method was employed before a TPFDD was formed, approximately two weeks after the beginning of the operations.¹⁵ In Katrina and Rita, forces deployed using only the RFF process.¹⁶

The executing command for OUA, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and the operational Combined Support Force (CSF)-536 had a CONPLAN that did not include a TPFDD or any deployment framework.¹⁷ As a result, there was a significant amount of planning required just to determine what forces would be needed to support the operation. The end result was a TPFDD built from the ground up by the USMC and USAF components of CSF-536. It was an uphill battle; there were not even any TPFDD Letters of Instruction (LOIs) (items which give CCDRs and their planning staffs movement guidelines) for the operation until two weeks after the operation commenced.¹⁸ Absent movement guidelines coupled with limited information from the operational area meant operational planners did not know which items should have priority in the TPFDD, forcing them to arrange the TPFDD based only on their best guesses. This lack of a standing TPFDD or LOIs resulted in the generation of Operational Orders (OPORDS) for “likely needed” forces on an *ad hoc* basis. While in the end OUA was successful in delivering over 24 million pounds of relief supplies to victims of the tsunami and was deemed an “outstanding operational success” by the operational commander, there was clearly room for improvement to include correcting

the sequencing of forces and the accountability of personnel during deployment of forces per after action reports.¹⁹

With their landfall on the U.S. Gulf Coast only a few months after OUA, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita offered the DOD another crisis to plan and execute a HA/DR mission against. Operations in response to these hurricanes were based on FUNCPLAN 2501 which did not include any TPFDD.²⁰ Instead of a TPFDD, the RFF process was utilized for the presentation and deployment of forces to U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in support of Katrina and Rita.²¹ While the exact timing and landfall location of the hurricanes were not known in advance, they could be predicted with some accuracy. In fact, the military was tracking Hurricane Katrina when it was an unnamed tropical depression; by the time it made landfall, the DOD had already issued warning orders to units that might be deployed in support of resulting HA/DR operations.²² While ultimately DOD responses to Katrina and Rita were also deemed a success, the DOD found it significantly difficult to properly leverage and manage resources, resulting in the duplication of some capabilities and the lack or latency of others.²³

ANALYSIS

Current Plan Requirements

While the JSCP does require Geographic CCDRs to have plans for HA/DR operations, it does not dictate the corresponding deployment method.²⁴ Of the five GCCs, four require the use of TPFDDs in their respective HA/DR plans. This is significant in that PACOM utilized a TPFDD for OUA in 2005 and a TPFDD is required per PACOM CONPLAN 5070-02.²⁵ The PACOM lessons learned from the tsunami relief efforts showed that, while there were issues with the TPFDD in OUA, it was then and still is the preferred

method for deploying forces in the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR).²⁶ Additionally, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) now requires a TPFDD in support of NORTHCOM FUNCPLAN 3501 despite the use of RFFs in Katrina and Rita.²⁷ This may indicate that NORTHCOM was not satisfied with the results of the deployment of forces in Katrina and Rita utilizing the RFF method, and has since opted to use the TPFDD method for deployment of forces in a CONUS-based HA/DR operations. Additionally, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) requires the use of a TPFDD in SOUTHCOM FUNCPLAN 6150-06 for HA/DR operations.²⁸ In fact, SOUTHCOM command utilized a TPFDD for Operation Unified Relief in support of the Haitian earthquake in early 2010.²⁹ Finally, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) also requires the use of a TPFDD in support of HA/DR operations in FUNCPLAN 4269-98.³⁰

CENTCOM is the only geographic command that currently outlines the use of the RFF method to deploy forces in support of a HA/DR operation in CONPLAN 1211-07.³¹ Possible reasoning for this is that the RFF method was utilized for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and CENTCOM has become adept at using the RFF method to source forces. Additionally, unlike PACOM and EUCOM CENTCOM does not “own” any forces, and hence must source those forces through JFCOM before deploying them to the theater.

Use of TPFDDs in recent HA/DR operations

The TPFDD is the more robust, typically utilized method for implementing deployments in support of traditional operations.³² It was utilized with success in OUA, although it also had some significant room for improvement. In OUA, there was no TPFDD in-place in advance of operations, but instead one had to be built while the operation was underway. As a result, OUA highlighted some problems with utilizing the TPFDD method

for an HA/DR. For example, at times the TPFDD does not provide enough flexibility in the rapid deployment process associated with HA/DR operations since at some point a TPFDD is “locked,” meaning that changes cannot be made to it without approval from the Geographic CCDR or deputy (usually a general or flag officer). In OUA, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) did not accept USAF inputs to the TPFDD after it was locked, resulting in delays of moving Tactical Airlift Control Element (TALCE), Airfield Assessment teams, Mission Support Elements (MSEs) and Mission Support Teams (MSTs). This delay resulted in the command staffs, aircraft, and associated support arriving at forward operating locations in the JOA prior to the TALCE, MSEs and MSTs.³³ This flow greatly limited the operational effectiveness of the aircraft at those FOLs due to the lack of airfield control and handling equipment to download cargo. Not only was there no effective C2 in place without the TALCEs, but the suitability of the airfields was questionable until the Airfield Assessment teams arrived to make their site surveys. Had the airfields been unsuitable for operations, the initial arriving aircrew would have learned “the hard way,” resulting in a potentially negative impact on the operations from those forward bases and overall relief operations.

Additionally, TPFDDs take time to develop from scratch. In OUA, it took almost two weeks for planners to build and implement a TPFDD to deploy forces and provide visibility to deploying assets.³⁴ In a HA/DR scenario, time is of the essence and operational commanders do not typically have two weeks to begin deploying forces. To consider a catastrophic scenario, imagine a Weapon of Mass Destruction detonating in a major U.S. city. Millions of people would require assistance immediately. DOD forces would need to be deployed immediately following such an event or risk the potential loss of thousands more lives. In this case, waiting for a TPFDD to be developed would be unacceptable.

After two weeks of a “push” system, OUA utilized a TPFDD for the deployment of forces to the region in support of the tsunami relief efforts. Upon implementing a TPFDD to deploy forces the operational commander of CSF-536 had much greater visibility of which forces were deploying to the JOA, in what order, and at what time.³⁵ This reduced duplicate capabilities while still providing necessary capabilities, thus reducing the burden on an already highly taxed airlift system.³⁶ Additionally, forces could be sequenced more effectively; capability deficiencies, such as airlift command and control (C2) shortfalls, could be identified and the required means provided to CSF-536.

Use of the RFF Method in recent HA/DR operations

The RFF method is, by its very nature, a flexible option for deploying forces in support of an operation. It aids the balance of time-space-force by minimizing the time to execute the deployment of actual forces. However, it is not always as efficient or as effective as it may seem. The main advantage of the RFF process is its flexibility, not being set on a rigid deployment schedule. This strength, however, is also the great weakness of the RFF process: by not having a rigid schedule or list of units, the wrong units may be deployed at the wrong time as described earlier or Ports of Debarkation (PODs) may get backed-up due to an inadequate assessment of their throughput capacity.

During the initial phases of OUA (prior to a TPFDD being utilized), the accountability of personnel deployed in support of the operation was problematic. The operational commander had no visibility of many of the individuals flowing into the theater as there was no single document that tracked them from the approval of the RFF through their arrival in theater. Once in theater there was no way to account for these individuals because the personnel accountability teams (teams who had the responsibility of accounting

for deployed military forces) had to reach the theater via commercial airlift and did so later in the process. The result of this improper sequencing and lack of visibility resulted in the operational commander's lack of knowledge of the capabilities he had ready to employ and, hence, the delayed establishment of key functions within the JOA.³⁷

For Katrina, there was no TPFDD prior to Hurricane Katrina making landfall. There was only a FUNCPLAN plan loosely detailing the support the DOD might provide in the case of a disaster in CONUS.³⁸ Utilizing the RFF method, the DOD deployed some 20,000 active-duty personnel, although initially these were only aviation, medical, and engineering forces. Eventually NORTHCOM provided more RFFs detailing the deployment of ground forces to augment the National Guard. However, at no time were DOD intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets provided to NORTHCOM via RFF.³⁹ This could be directly attributable to the RFF method and lack of any single planning document that lists all capabilities required and requested for an operation. If at any time there was a single document detailing what was needed for a HA/DR operation, then these critical capabilities would likely not have been left out of the deployed military forces. This oversight, according to the Government Accountability Office, resulted in the deployment of military forces without full understanding of the extent of the damage or the required assistance; those forces were deployed to certain areas with sub-optimal capabilities.⁴⁰

Ultimately, the RFF method used in Katrina proved to be under-utilized and insufficient. In the haste to provide military support at the onset of the operation there were numerous units deployed to the JOA that were ill-suited to the task at hand. Task-appropriate units that could have better accomplished those initial search and rescue and medical missions were delayed, although they were eventually deployed.⁴¹ The first 72 hours

following any catastrophic disaster are the most critical for saving lives.⁴² By not sourcing and deploying the most capable units up-front, precious time was lost in the initial response to the disaster. If the most capable units are not deployed early then a significant portion of that opportunity is lost along with lives that could have been saved. Additionally, deploying the incorrect forces at the outset of an operation requires follow-on deployments of the correct forces, taxing the already strained logistics infrastructure and taking up valuable strategic lift that could be otherwise utilized for relief supplies.

Counter-argument:

Due to the unpredictable nature of HA/DR situations, there is no way to plan for the forces that might be needed in response to a HA/DR situation. The list of unknowns is exceptionally lengthy: location of the event, damage to infrastructure, civilian casualties, nature of the disaster, other nations and organizations that will be involved, political relationship with the affected country, and, most importantly, when the actual event will occur. As a result, while DOD forces must be sourced, deployed, and employed as soon as information is known about the nature of the HA/DR operation, those specific forces cannot be identified as per an OPLAN or other established plan. Even the Joint Publication for Humanitarian Operations points out that “crisis action planning will likely be emphasized during humanitarian operations.”⁴³

Once a HA/DR operation begins, the RFF method is the single best sourcing and deployment method to utilize. Former SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld pointed out during Operation Iraqi Freedom that the RFF process was much more flexible and responsive than the TPFDD process, and hence, was one of his major reasons for using the RFF process to support that conflict.⁴⁴ This support from SECDEF illustrates that, when a HA/DR operation

begins, it must use the RFF method to support the flexibility required. This flexibility is likely the very reason that CENTCOM utilizes the RFF method in its supporting plan for HA/DR operations and a reason that other GCCs should consider following suit.⁴⁵

Counter to the Counter-argument:

HA/DR operations are crisis events, with little or no notice. However, just because something is unknown does not mean a GCC cannot prepare for it. In fact, those situations where there will be limited time to react are the most important situations to plan out to the greatest extent possible. Joint guidance already requires that GCCs have a plan in place for humanitarian assistance.⁴⁶ While HA/DR plans cannot go into the level of detail associated with OPLANs there is still significant benefit gained by going into some greater detail than a basic CONPLAN or FUNCPLAN.

JP 3-29, *Foreign HA/DR Operations*, points out that “in as little as a few days, the supported GCC and the JFCs and their staffs must develop and approve a feasible course of action (COA), publish the plan or order, prepare forces, ensure sufficient support, and arrange sustainment for the employment of US military forces.”⁴⁷ This is an exceptionally difficult task given the short time span, but can be made more efficient and effective by utilizing the lessons learned from previous HA/DR operations, building options to execute immediately instead of waiting for those options to be developed. Milan Vego points out that “learning proper lessons is one of the key prerequisites for any military organization to avoid repeating errors and mistakes.”⁴⁸ By implementing deployment lessons learned into existing plans, it becomes much quicker to execute deployments in support of HA/DR operations.

Finally, even if deviated from, it is usually better to have some planning in place for deployment as opposed to none. The Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics states that

while “CONPLANS and other off-the-shelf documents are critical to the success of operations, a more robust capability would improve the overall effectiveness of a response to a [HA/DR] event”.⁴⁹ Given that the goal of any operational commander planning and executing a HA/DR operation is to achieve his objectives while balancing factors time, space and force, the more effective and efficient a response can be, the better. Therefore, even if some planning is not utilized, it is far better to have a robust plan for deployment to deviate from than no plan at all.

CONCLUSION

While the RFF method is useful for rapidly deploying forces without a lot of “red tape,” it is not a substitute for a TPFDD as operations become more complex and progress from immediate crisis response to longer-term support of HA/DR operations. The TPFDD, while much more robust for sourcing and sequencing military capabilities for a HA/DR operation, does not allow for immediate response to a HA/DR situation. Therefore while neither the TPFDD nor the RFF are a single good solution to the problem of planning for deployment of forces in an HA/DR situation, an initial deployment framework would permit the strengths of both methods to be utilized to enable the operational commander to balance factors time, space and force.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The most effective means of deploying forces rapidly and with appropriate sequencing and in-transit visibility is a combination of the two methods: the RFF method to provide immediate response by DOD forces to a HA/DR JOA followed by the rapid development of a TPFDD to ensure that forces are properly sequenced and capabilities are provided as required by the operational commander. To manage this deployment process

effectively and efficiently with little to no warning requires some prior planning focused on which capabilities will most likely be required, together with the priority and sequencing. This prior planning should take the form of a draft TPFDD and be an initial deployment framework.

This initial deployment framework for the deployment of forces would be extremely advantageous to any operational commander and staff for planning HA/DR operations. On this point, the after action report from Katrina and Rita agrees with JP 3-29: a product which outlines the basic capabilities to be deployed at the onset of a HA/DR operation can be used to facilitate rapid Course of Action development.⁵⁰ Such a product would provide force capabilities required, potential in-theater forces which could be utilized, and where appropriate specific Unit Type Codes (UTCs) outlining actual forces from the different services. With this type of product available to operational planners, the time gap between the initial rapid “push” RFF method and more orchestrated use of a TPFDD could be short enough to make the best use of both methods to accomplish operational commander objectives and ultimately save lives.

As outlined above, having no plan prior to the outset of a HA/DR operation for deploying selected forces is extremely detrimental to achieving the objective. None of the FUNCPLANs or CONPLANs for HA/DR operations from the five GCCs has a TPFDD or any list of potential required force capabilities attached to it. Any RFFs or TPFDD would have to be built from the ground up and hence run the risk of not providing the correct forces in a timely manner. The planning staffs of the GCCs should develop an initial deployment framework of required capabilities and UTCs to go along with these plans. While not a TPFDD, such an initial deployment framework would list the capabilities, in order of

deployment, that would likely be needed in a HA/DR. The importance and order of capabilities may shift slightly based on the specifics of a situation. If correctly packaged together, this initial deployment framework would provide a “menu” for planners to start issuing RFFs from and eventually facilitate the development of a TPFDD while limiting the chances of forgetting some critical unit, capability, or of incorrectly sequencing required forces. This initial deployment framework idea is supported by the observation of the 1st Air Expeditionary Task Force commander during Katrina and Rita that “NORTHCOM should develop standing EXORDs identifying forces required for potential HA/DR operations within CONUS”.⁵¹ This would clearly provide that “menu” of force capabilities in a logical order that could be quickly used to build a TPFDD for operations within or outside CONUS.

JP 3-29 also provides doctrine to indicate what some assets on a HA/DR TPFDD might be. They include forward-deployed command and control (C2) elements, airlift, engineering support, security, medical, and civil affairs.⁵² If the HA/DR occurs in a littoral environment, then sealift is likely to be a requisite capability. Alternatively, if the HA/DR occurs in a landlocked area, then airlift and ground transportation capabilities are more likely to be required than sealift. Each GCC has specific areas with associated challenges and advantages, such as transportation distances or pre-positioned forces or equipment, which may make one type of disaster relief and subsequent response more likely. All of these theater-specific situations and considerations should drive a tailored initial deployment framework for each HA/DR plan, further reducing the guesswork in the initial RFFs to deploy forces and speeding the development of a full TPFDD for follow-on forces.

All of this planning could be easily captured by GCC staffs in an initial deployment framework that would outline required capabilities, UTCs, and notional commander required

dates (CRDs) for the forces. This simple outline would ensure that when a HA/DR operation is initiated, the RFFs can be sourced in the correct order, providing needed forces “right now,” and a robust TPFDD can be quickly built to provide for greater visibility and sequencing of deploying assets. An example of such an initial deployment framework is shown below in table 1. This framework outlines notional capabilities, potential service components, their specific Unit Identification Codes (UIC), UTCs, and the Commander’s Required Date (CRD) for when each capability would be required to be in-place.

Table 1: Initial Deployment Framework Example

Capability	Service	UIC	UTC	CRD (in hrs)
Forward-deployed JTF C2 element	US Army	HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT, BRIGADE		C+12
Airfield Assessment Teams	USAF	GLOBAL LAYDOWN ASSESS TEAM		C+24
Medical Response Team	USAF	MEDICAL PRIMARY CARE TEAM		C+24
Theater Airlift Control Element	USAF	MOB C2 TALCE MOG 12 OR LESS		C+24
Land-based Tactical Airlift	USAF	TAS 12 C-130H		C+36
Land-based Rotary Wing Airlift	US Army	THEATER AVIATION BATTALION		C+36
Civil Affairs Liaison Team	USAF	PAO PA SPECIALISTS		C+48
Ground Transportation	US Army	INFANTRY BATTALION, MOTORIZED		C+72
Civil Engineering Team	USAF	INITIAL RED HORSE CE TEAM		C+120

If this initial deployment framework can be produced using prior HA/DR operations lessons learned and JP 3-29 as guides for required forces, then the operational commander and his/her planning staffs will be able to more aptly arrange forces in time and space to accomplish the mission. These commanders will be able to reduce the time to deploy forces

in a HA/DR operation, ensuring the correct forces are rapidly deployed in the shortest time possible across whatever vast distances may be required. Using an initial deployment framework attached to planning documents will lead to smoother and more successful DOD force deployment and participation in HA/DR operations in the future.

NOTES

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