A Joint Theater Sustainment Command Responsible for the Retrograde, Redeployment and Reinforcement of Forces

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Challenges faced by Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) and Joint Force Commanders (JFC) regarding theater logistics require more centralization when conducting redeployment, retrograde and deployment occurring simultaneously. This paper explores the factors affecting theater distribution and joint theater logistics command and control and their effects on unity of command and unity of effort at the operational level. The paper reviews the current problem areas crossing strategic and operational boundaries of logistical support within the CENTCOM AOR. The failure to establish a single, integrated joint logistics command and control organization to manage and coordinate theater level logistics has abated current doctrine, resulting in the “good enough” solution to a very ill-structured problem. The recommendations contained within this paper offer solutions to achieve a more synchronized joint logistics command and control while maintaining unity of command and unity of effort.
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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

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## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Logistics Structure and Responsibilities</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

Challenges faced by Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) and Joint Force Commanders (JFC) regarding theater logistics require more centralization when conducting redeployment, retrograde and deployment occurring simultaneously. This paper explores the factors affecting theater distribution and joint theater logistics command and control and their effects on unity of command and unity of effort at the operational level. The paper reviews the current problem areas crossing strategic and operational boundaries of logistical support within the CENTCOM AOR. The failure to establish a single, integrated joint logistics command and control organization to manage and coordinate theater level logistics has abated current doctrine, resulting in the “good enough” solution to a very ill-structured problem. The recommendations contained within this paper offer solutions to achieve a more synchronized joint logistics command and control while maintaining unity of command and unity of effort.
INTRODUCTION

“The line between disorder and order lies in logistics…”

...Sun Tzu

The Responsible, Retrograde, Redeployment (R3)\(^1\) of U.S. Forces from Iraq, coupled with simultaneously building a larger force structure in Afghanistan, without a centralized command and control authority for all logistical forces is a “ill-structured problem.”\(^2\) In 2009 the United States Government Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a report detailing of Department of Defense (DOD) planning efforts for the drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq and discovered “logistical organizations have not enforced or lack the authority to enforce compliance with orders to implement improvements to the retrograde process.”\(^3\) It goes on to state “while efforts have been made to synchronize planning for reposturing, DOD has not yet clearly established all the roles and responsibilities for managing and executing the retrograde of equipment and materiel from Iraq.”\(^4\) The report also identifies several other issues, which are symptoms of other problems that add to the insufficient command and control structure.

A single joint logistical commander responsible for synchronization among all theater-wide logistical units with the ability to manage strategic level agencies concurrently would create unity of command and unity of effort. Command and Control (C2), along with the authority over all logistical related responsibilities to coordinate, integrate and synchronize theater logistics functions in a Geographic Combatant Commander’s (GCC)

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\(^1\) Author’s use of terms to describe the multiple missions that are integrated with the drawdown of Iraq.
\(^4\) Ibid, 17.
Area of Responsibility (AOR) should be given to the commander of the Theater Sustainment Command (TSC). Furthermore, this would decrease the redundancy of ad hoc organizations, handshake agreements among echelons of commands, and confusion as to which commander’s intent should be followed.

The biggest issue facing R3 of Iraq and the sustainment build-up for Afghanistan is the lack of an adequate C2 structure within the logistical footprint of the AOR. This footprint is often focused on past command relationships within a legacy type logistical unit or as a result of the quick solution to fix the problem or as described in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 an “Ill-Structured Problem.” In addition, there are several non-tangible complex problems that include personal relationships of senior commanders, service cultures, interagency communication, and an ever-changing security environment, making them difficult to solve. Furthermore, the complexity of transporting equipment into Afghanistan is an ill-structured problem in itself. This problem, like the C2 of the logistic structure creates a complex, non-linear and chaotic situation for planners and executors. The majority of this paper focuses on the logistical C2 aspect of the C2 at the operational level in United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) AOR and provides recommendations to improve logistical C2.

There is no definitive formulation on how to solve this problem, as ill-structured problems do not include a large inventory of conceivable solutions. Planners at all levels have determined that there are not “black or white” answers to this, only “good or bad”

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solutions leading to a “better or worse” or “satisfying or good enough” solution. The current R3 in regards to the logistical C2 and unity of effort leans toward the “good enough” solution.

Within this paper the term “retrograde” will be interchangeable with “reposture planning” as defined by United States Forces – Iraq (USF-I) and will refer to the movement of equipment and supplies from within Iraq. The term “redeployment” throughout this paper will refer to the movement of Soldiers and their units. The term responsible, redeployment and retrograde, or (R3) refers to the “responsible drawdown,” a term used by 3rd ARMY and DOD, to identify this process in its entirety and is not a doctrinal term. The terms “retrograde movement,” “retrograde operation” and “retrograde personnel” are doctrinal terms defined in JP 1-02 of which often reflect a “withdrawal from the enemy” and is not how the R3 is to be perceived. This is consistent within the GAO reports, “for this reason according to DOD Officials, U.S. forces in Iraq will not be “drawn down” but rather “repostured” and will be used as such throughout this paper.”

BACKGROUND

In remarks delivered at Camp Lejeune on February 2009, President Obama stated his strategy for ending the war in Iraq and announced that all United States’ combat operations will conclude by the end of August 2010. This is in accordance with the Status of the Forces Agreement signed by Iraq and the United States in November 2008 and results in all U.S.

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troops having to leave Iraq by the end of December 2011.\textsuperscript{8} Later in the year, President Obama declared he would begin a “troop surge” in Afghanistan with an additional 30,000 troops starting spring 2010, with hopes to begin withdrawal of all U.S. Forces from Afghanistan in July 2011.\textsuperscript{9}

Directly addressing these issues were a series of Government Accountability Reports (GAO) published between 2008-2010, identifying that the command and control for the R3 of Iraq’s planning efforts lacked unity of command and synchronization among agencies.\textsuperscript{10} This is in direct contradiction with Joint Publication 3-35, which states, “Unity of command must be maintained through an unambiguous chain of command, well-defined command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities.”\textsuperscript{11}

Properly supporting both missions simultaneously requires unity of command, along with significant amounts of planning, preparation, and the right leadership with commensurate authority at all levels. Unfortunately, planning by different agencies occurred at the same time and the necessary C2 relationships were not changed. Moreover, the proper synchronization at the strategic, operational and tactical levels was not completed across all lines of communication. Instead, a series of plans and ad hoc C2 structures and organizations led to a “good enough solution” of an organizational C2 that is constantly being patched, fixed and sometimes recreated on the go to facilitate unity of effort.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{8} Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq, Section III, November 17, 2008.
\textsuperscript{11} Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, IV-19 (May 14, 2007)
\textsuperscript{12} Unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Mar. 20, 2009)
As of April 2010 the R3 of equipment and supplies from Iraq are ahead of schedule and are exceeding the original numbers expected.\textsuperscript{13} As an example, the April 2010 GAO report stated, “according to USF-I, as of February 8, 2010, there were just over 98,100 service members in Iraq, approximately 3,200 fewer than had been projected.…..as of January 2010, DOD retrograded 2,610 more pieces of rolling stock than projected and, as of December 2009, 5,195 more containers of equipment than projected.”\textsuperscript{14}

Afghanistan is reporting similar successes, however, the current flow of equipment inbound is close to exceeding the maximum throughput capacity for most airfields. The alternative to movement by air is a risky route stretching several hundred miles. The “Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a commercially-based logistical corridor connecting Baltic and Black Sea ports with Afghanistan via Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia”\textsuperscript{15} was established to transport equipment into Afghanistan and is stretching the logistical lines of communication. More supplies are needed than it can provide, creating a vulnerability to the overall flow of sustainment.

It could be argued the current C2 of logistical units is working and should be left as is. CENTCOM is doing an unprecedented job of executing R3 by maintaining or at some levels exceeding set goals, despite such complex problems. Part of the success is due to the creation of \textit{ad hoc} organizations to fill the void of not following doctrinal relationships for C2, specifically among the TSC and Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) (ESC). For example, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ARMY created the United States Army Central Command (ARCENT) Support

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Element – Iraq to increase synchronization between units within USF-I and the 1st TSC. There is certainly room to improve efficiency on an already stressed C2 logistic footprint, but creating organizations where current commands already exist is confusing. Furthermore, there are Institutional barriers to break as there is a “legacy attitude” and comfort level for what logistical C2 “used to be like” compared to the existing doctrine.

**Current Logistics Structure and Responsibilities**

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have primarily been an Army-centric fight when it comes to sustainment and logistics. The combatant commander established ARCENT, as the overall responsible agent for the drawdown. This right is given to the GCC by United States Code (USC). USC Title 10, Chapter 6, Section 164, states the combatant commander, “given authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.” As a result, he has overall responsibility for logistics. USC further states, “organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.” This is essential to do and is supported when ARCENT was given the responsibility to conduct retrograde and redeployment operations.

Since much of the logistical footprint in Iraq belongs to the Army, the majority of the units, materiel, and equipment the Army uses are coordinated through the logistical C2 of the Army service component. Other services have logistical staffs and perform different functions for their own service but are expected to provide direct coordination among each other and to ARCENT. However, this does not always occur. Within the AOR, the Army’s

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16 United States Code 10, Section 164, Subsection (2) (A).
17 Ibid.
logistical staff, mainly the TSC, reports directly to ARCENT and is geographically located in Kuwait with ARCENT. The Marine Corps utilizes Army logistics for deployment and redeployment. As a result, they have established a forward Marine Coordination Element (MCE) to be collocated with ARCENT in Kuwait. However, they also have a logistical staff located within their service component for CENTCOM called (MARCENT) which is collocated with the Navy’s component for CENTCOM in Bahrain. The Air Force logistical component is located in Qatar. Because each service is not collocated with ARCENT, this creates difficulties with synchronization and establishing unity of effort. Primarily the logistic structure is Army centric as it’s the Army’s logisticians who are in the process of redeploying units and equipment from Iraq. For this reason, the CENTCOM commander directed ARCENT as the responsible agent for the R3 of Iraq and to continue sustainment for the theater of operations. This helps when conducting Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI), as it is necessary to have unity of command, synchronization, and balance while planning and executing the R3 from Iraq while supporting Afghanistan simultaneously.

United States Army Central Command (USARCENT) 3\textsuperscript{rd} ARMY has a triple role. First, ARCENT 3\textsuperscript{rd} Army serves as the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC). Second, it is the responsible agent for theater-level logistic activities. Finally, it has been specifically designated by the GCC as the lead or executive agent for the R3 of Iraq.

To accomplish this daunting final task, ARCENT is inherently built to provide theater support through its subordinate logistical command, the TSC which today is the 1\textsuperscript{st} TSC. 1\textsuperscript{st} TSC is assigned to ARCENT and was the first TSC to be established in 2006 from the 1\textsuperscript{st} Corps Support Command or 1\textsuperscript{st} COSCOM. The mission of the TSC is tailored specifically
for a GCC to command and control Army operational-level support of a joint or multinational force providing centralized command and control (C2) and decentralized operations throughout the theater.\textsuperscript{18} Although the responsibility has been assigned to ARCENT, and delegated to the TSC, to provide theater wide logistical support, the command authority over all logistical commands in theater has not been given to ARCENT or the TSC. Within both USF-I and USF-A, each commander retained Operational Command and Control (OPCON) of their logistical commands, mainly the Expeditionary Sustainment Commands (ESC) verses having the C2 under the TSC commander.

According to Army Field Manual 4.94, the ESC is a subordinate command under the TSC. The ESC “provides operational reach and a span of control for sustainment, distribution, theater opening, and reception, staging, and onward movement for Army forces within the spectrum of conflict.”\textsuperscript{19} The purpose of the ESC is to provide almost the same support staff the TSC does but lacks the scale and scope in planning and full scale management capabilities making the command and control relationship with the TSC all that more important and valuable.\textsuperscript{20} Again, this does not occur in Iraq or Afghanistan, creating a system of hand-shakes, promises and ad hoc agreements to ensure the lines of communication remains open.

The 1\textsuperscript{st} TSC, the 311\textsuperscript{th} Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) Kuwait, the 13\textsuperscript{th} Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) Iraq, USF-I, CENTCOM Director of Logistics, TRANSCOM, DLA, Army Materiel Command (AMC) and many more agencies all play a significant part to the overall redeployment and retrograde of Soldiers, equipment, and

\textsuperscript{18} U.S. Army, \textit{Theater Sustainment Command}, Field Manual (FM) 4-94 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 12 February 2010), 2.1


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
supplies from Iraq. Each agency has its unique chain of command and area of responsibility of which depend upon an interagency coordination built around necessity and unity of command.

As the lead agent for redeployment, ARCENT has difficulty establishing unity of command and unity of effort because they do not have direct authority over some units conducting redeployment operations. According to Joint Publication 4-0, “the joint logistician will rarely have unity of joint logistics command, and subsequently control of joint logistics is more challenging.” Despite CENTCOM’s order assigning ARCENT as the executive agent in order to establish a single point for unity of effort for the synchronization of retrograde and redeployment operations, unity of command is almost impossible to create within Iraq and Kuwait. Each command structure within Iraq and Kuwait has command and control over the specific logistical units and assigns responsibilities and duties requiring support to its own operational needs.

In Iraq, the current ESC is the 13th ESC and is under the command and control of USF-I instead of the 1st TSC. In Afghanistan, the 135th ESC is under the command and control of USF-A. In Kuwait, the 311th ESC is under the direct control of the 1st TSC and has established unity of command and unity of effort. The command relationship could easily be changed and should be in order to create a seamless flow of logistics compared to the patch and go relationships that are holding the system together today.

To further complicate the logistical C2 within the AOR, several ad hoc organizations have been created to bridge the gaps described above. For example, 3rd Army created an “ARCENT Support Element-Iraq,” which is a “team of specialists that accomplishes the task of responsibly drawing down forces and equipment from Iraq while concurrently building
force structure in Afghanistan and throughout the CENTCOM area of operations.”

The ARCENT Support Element-Iraq’s main purpose was to provide coordination between another ad hoc organization created by USF-I called the Drawdown Fusion Center. The Drawdown Fusion Center was “created to provide a strategic picture of drawdown operations, identify potential obstacles, address strategic issues, and assist in the development of policy and guidance related to several aspects of the drawdown.” However, this mission is exactly the same as the ESC, which is already under the C2 of the TSC. Because the TSC lacks OPCON over all logistical units, ad hoc organizations such as the Support Element-Iraq and the Drawdown Fusion Center are created, which adds confusion, redundancy, and stops any efforts in establishing unity of command.

A better solution would be to utilize the organizational model outlined in doctrine, the Joint Distribution Deployment Operations Center (JDDOC) from United States Transportation Command USTRANSCOM, but under the C2 of the TSC Commander. The JDDOC is a functional combatant commander’s attempt to link strategic logistics to operational logistics. The JDDOC is “designed to synchronize and optimize national and theater multi-modal resources for deployment, distribution, and sustainment.”

The GCC logistics directorate (J4) is responsible for developing logistics plans, formulating policies to ensure effective logistics support for all forces in the command ensuring the commander’s guidance takes place. To assist the J4 and the GCC in bridging the gap between the strategic level and the operational level is the JDDOC, or CDDOC. This

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is a unique organization well sourced from TRANSCOM, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), all Services, and national partners. It is intended to optimize the use of available resources to achieve efficiency and effectiveness and is typically collocated with the J4. The Distribution and Deployment Operations Center (DDOC) collocated at USTRANSCOM’s HQ’s synchronizes all DOD deployment and distribution functions based upon information gathered from the JDDOC. The overall goal for JDDOC is to provide the GCC with assistance in providing end-to-end distribution, door-to-door (D2D) unit movements, and an increased ability to identify, monitor, and manage shipments within the global distribution system. Currently the GCC, through the advice of the J4, has placed the JDDOC at the TSC in an effort to better synchronize theater-wide logistics. It has been argued that this creates dual responsibility and redundancy of efforts as the TSC is more than capable of completing all JDDOC’s functions but lacks the command authority to do so. The JDDOC collocated with the TSC does provide unity of effort and easier communication and coordination. However much of the JDDOC today is reactionary and is simply a dual effort collecting information from the TSC and passing it directly to the DDOC. A part of the JDDOC should be pushed forward as a cell working directly for the TSC through the ESC. This would eliminate ad hoc organizations like the ARCENT Support Element-Iraq and the Drawdown Fusion Center.

The lack of C2 in the logistics system is evident when looking at theater property and retrograde support teams. Their mission is to facilitate the overall redeployment and retrograde process. AMC thru its subordinate command Army Sustainment Command (ASC) has responsibility for retrograde and theater provided equipment (TPE) to forces

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within Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan. They have teams called Redistribution Property Assistance Team (RPAT), responsible for accountability, turn-in, and retrograde of theater provided equipment. They also assist units with documentation and provide disposition instructions for their excess. However, the C2 relationship between the RPATs, and ARCENT is difficult. ARCENT has direct tactical C2 over two teams. Of the remaining eight teams, each report to a different chain of command: Two teams report to AMC/ASC, two report to USF-I, one to TRANSCOM, one to Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), one to DLA and one to the Marine Corps Logistics Command. The lack of C2 over these teams makes their use unclear and confusing when trying to track materiel, equipment and identify necessary assets to move the excess equipment for redeployment.

Another example of a complex C2 problem is the Joint Redeployment Support Team, (JRST) which reports directly to TRANSCOM as a strategic asset providing tactical support skipping the ESC and TSC operational level. The JRST, provides supporting units with customs, disposition, hazardous material and transportation expertise, in addition it provides in-transit visibility from the units’ forward operating base to its home station. Information generated by the JRST is needed by the TSC in order to plan the necessary lift requirements which generate multiple requests for support. Without forecasting this need, TSC planners may not have the necessary truck assets, airlift, or sealift contracted to meet the needs of the unit. Eventually, the JRST passes its information directly to the DDOC, then down to the JDDOC and finally to the TSC.

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27 Ibid, 17.
28 Ibid, 18.
Several organizations have published orders detailing a phased drawdown from Iraq, creating confusion and conflicting priorities for valuable resources. The command doctrinally designed to pull this together is the TSC. Recently in Kuwait, the 1st TSC commander co-hosted a “rehearsal of concept or ROC drill” with 3rd ARMY for the next phase of the responsible drawdown. This process included briefings, discussion on the withdrawal timeline for units, what to do with specific equipment, and who is responsible for each action. However, while it identified who was responsible for each piece, it did not and could not enforce the plan because it was a planning/synchronization meeting and not a tasking meeting.

In summary, CENTCOM lacks unity of command in operational logistics. This is a direct result of not having a single commander in charge of operational logistics. If the C2 of all operational logistics responsibility was given to the TSC commander, unity of command could be achieved. Instead, this responsibility is shared between ARCENT, USF-I and USF-A. Commanders who are left with the responsibility to sort out problems that arise from a lack of operational logistics synchronization and are held responsible. As a result, they are “good enough” or “need it now” type solutions instead of investing in a doctrine solution.29

RECOMMENDATION

The GCC should exercise his authority under USC Title 10, Chapter 6, Section 164, which gives him authority for: “organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.” In doing so, he should give command and control of all logistical units and responsibility to the commander of the 1st TSC in order to establish unity of command and unity of effort for the redeployment, retrograde and sustainment of all forces within the AOR. Having a single commander for logistics will bridge the gap of strategic level agencies supporting the operational and tactical commander while maintaining concurrent operations. This would also eliminate ad hoc organizations such as the ARCENT Support Element-Iraq and USF-I’s Drawdown Fusion Center.

The GCC has the authority to assign the TSC Commander the task of setting up and executing joint logistics for the theater. However, in order to establish a solid working relationship between the logistics command and the USF-I and USF-A commanders, the TSC Commander should be a 3-star in a unified joint command. This would provide synchronization between the strategic, operational, and tactical level along with and the C2 necessary to bring the strategic assets into a manageable resource. This would decrease the duplicate demands on critical resources, reduce duplicate efforts and staffs, and reduce additional manning requirements. While recent newspaper articles from Iraq and Afghanistan point to signs of success, the underlying web of handshakes and “good enough” solutions, coupled with the lack of senior officers to embrace the “expeditionary” in the

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30 United States Code 10, section 164 section (2)(C)
Army and in the joint community, will only create further problems in the coming redeployment, retrograde of Afghanistan.

ESC’s supporting Iraq and Afghanistan should be under operational control (OPCON) of the TSC acting as a forward C2 presence to provide responsive support to multiple forces. Furthermore, the JDDOC should be under the Tactical Control (TACON) to the TSC forming a “strategic cell” in a supporting role. In addition, each ESC should receive a JDDOC cell specifically designed to be that strategic link between DOD strategic agencies working at the tactical level.

The importance of a JDDOC cell pushed forward to the ESC would bridge the gap between the strategic agencies on the battle field to the operational level at the ESC in order to achieve unity of effort where it’s needed most. In Joint Publication 4-0, the Joint Logistics Environment (JLE) exists throughout the operational, strategic, and tactical levels. JLE is most important at the operational level as logisticians have the most difficulty in coordinating and integrating capabilities from many providers to sustain forces for a Joint Force Commander (JFC). This process needs refining, as the example of the ten theater property and retrograde support teams clearly shows.

CONCLUSION

The logistics of the R3 of Iraq and the sustainment of Afghanistan is a difficult problem to solve. Current doctrine shows how a GCC has the flexibility to adjust command relationships as needed to meet such difficult problems. The current snapshot of the logistical achievement in Iraq and Afghanistan point to success. However, the success stems from a unity of effort achieved through cooperation and not through unity of command. Rather, the success comes with a level of “good enough” solutions comprised of ad hoc

32 Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics, V-2 (July 18, 2008), I-4.
organizations because the command and control structure is not following doctrine. In order to sustain and enhance upon this level of success it will require a revision of the logistical command and control to the TSC.

Establishing the TSC as a Joint Command with the authority to command and control all logistical units from the strategic to operational level within a GCC AOR would create unity of command throughout the theater. This would provide true centralized direction for logistics. As stated by Dr. Milan Vego, “Centralized direction is the key prerequisite for ensuring unity of command.” This is most effective way to achieve unity of effort.

With unity of effort and unity of command for logistics, an ill-structured problem will become much simpler to manage and result in the successful R3 and troop surge for Afghanistan. The future redeployment and retrograde of Afghanistan and its success will depend upon the logistical C2.

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