THE EFFICACY OF SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS IN FAILED AND POTENTIALLY FAILING STATES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military Strategy

by

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# The Efficacy of Security Force Assistance in Countering Violent Extremist Organizations in Failed and Potentially Failing States

The 2008 National Defense Strategy identifies promoting security as one of the nation's strategic objectives, using Security Force Assistance (SFA) as a method to build partner capacity. The primary threat addressed is violent extremist organizations operating in failed and potentially failing states and ungoverned areas. Current doctrine with respect to Security Force Assistance is inconsistent in its explanation of various critical principles as well as ambiguous in addressing the “whole of government” approach that is vital to conducting these types of operations. Additionally, definitions of violent extremist organizations and failed and potentially failing states and ungoverned areas vary both domestically across the interagency as well as internationally, creating confusion at the strategic level that translates to the operational and tactical levels. Presented first in this thesis are analyses of Security Force Assistance doctrine in its current state and of the definitions of violent extremist organizations and failed and potentially failing states and ungoverned areas. Presented next are two historical case studies of Security Force Assistance operations: Somalia and Colombia. These case studies examine Security Force Assistance operations of varying intensity in failed and potentially failing states that contain violent extremist organizations. This thesis identifies anomalies in doctrine, particularly with respect to incorporation of the interagency and the integration of the elements of national power outside of the military. This thesis by identifying Security Force Assistance doctrinal gaps that are critical to the efficacy of the concept in failed states and ungoverned areas.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE EFFICACY OF SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS IN FAILED AND POTENTIALLY FAILING STATES, by Major Jeffery T. Burroughs, 99 pages.

The 2008 National Defense Strategy identifies promoting security as one of the nation's strategic objectives, using Security Force Assistance (SFA) as a method to build partner capacity. The primary threat addressed is violent extremist organizations operating in failed and potentially failing states and ungoverned areas. Current doctrine with respect to Security Force Assistance is inconsistent in its explanation of various critical principles as well as ambiguous in addressing the “whole of government” approach that is vital to conducting these types of operations. Additionally, definitions of violent extremist organizations and failed and potentially failing states and ungoverned areas vary both domestically across the interagency as well as internationally, creating confusion at the strategic level that translates to the operational and tactical levels. Presented first in this thesis are analyses of Security Force Assistance doctrine in its current state and of the definitions of violent extremist organizations and failed and potentially failing states and ungoverned areas. Presented next are two historical case studies of Security Force Assistance operations: Somalia and Colombia. These case studies examine Security Force Assistance operations of varying intensity in failed and potentially failing states that contain violent extremist organizations. This thesis identifies anomalies in doctrine, particularly with respect to incorporation of the interagency and the integration of the elements of national power outside of the military. This thesis by identifying Security Force Assistance doctrinal gaps that are critical to the efficacy of the concept in failed states and ungoverned areas.
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<td>ACOTA</td>
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<td>AFRICOM</td>
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<td>CERP</td>
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<td>CJTF-HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Civil Response Corps</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Direct Action</td>
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<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
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<td>EACTI</td>
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<td>EIPC</td>
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<td>ELN</td>
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<td>JIIM</td>
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SA  Security Assistance
SC  Security Cooperation
SF  Special Forces
SFA  Security Force Assistance
SOF  Special Operations Forces
SSR  Security Sector Reform
TFG  Somali Transitional Federal Government
UN  United Nations
U.S.  United States
VEO  Violent Extremist Organization
VTC  Video Teleconference
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Working with and through local actors whenever possible to confront common security challenges is the best and most sustainable approach to combat violent extremism.

— Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2008 National Defense Strategy

The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identifies promoting security as one of the nation's strategic objectives. One of the primary methods the United States (U.S.) chooses to promote security globally is through building the capacity of international partners. Security Force Assistance (SFA) is one of the mechanisms used to build capacity. Numerous governmental policy statements denote this function as critical to achieving our national objectives. The NDS specifically denotes “building the capacity of a broad spectrum of partners” as critical to achieving long-term global security. Building capacity internationally is critical primarily due to the threat of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) in the contemporary operating environment (COE).

Background

SFA as a function is not a new concept. In fact, SFA has been utilized throughout history as a method of increasing security and bringing stability to fledgling and struggling governments. From an American historical perspective, the concept of SFA was critical to the success of the Continental Army and the subsequent maturation of the U.S. Army. Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, General George Washington’s Inspector General of the Army, established discipline and professionalism in the fledgling Continental Army, an army that lacked formal training. He developed and published the
Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States in 1779 that was adapted from the Prussian Army. This first doctrinal manual, a result of operations akin to SFA, serves as a predecessor to the current Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*.³

The U.S. has practiced different levels of SFA subsequent to the American Revolution. Specifically, the U.S. has conducted SFA in areas ranging from military advisors in Vietnam as early as the 1950s to advisors in El Salvador beginning in 1981. The outcome of SFA in these, and other, cases varies almost as widely as the locales in which they were conducted. In the case of El Salvador, SFA is generally viewed as being successful in increasing the effectiveness of the El Salvadoran Army along with improving its human rights record. In the case of Vietnam, SFA is routinely viewed as having been an unsuccessful venture that was punctuated by the fall of Saigon in 1975.⁴

In both El Salvador and Vietnam, the communist ideology was the primary opponent. Communist guerillas in El Salvador were the primary threat to the establishment of a stable government and, as such, was the primary focus of the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign there in the 1980s. In Vietnam, a COIN element was also prevalent, but was reinforced by the communist North Vietnamese. The COE, however, has added a new dimension to conflict. In contrast to the central focus against the spread of communism that existed in the post-World War II era, current conflict is characterized by numerous dynamics that are as unpredictable as they are varied. The contemporary threat is defined by the emergence of rogue states, non-state actors, tribalism, religious-based, ethnic, and cultural conflicts and a long list of failed or failing states.⁵ In the past decade, the U.S. military has dealt with each of these different factions
in one manner or another. The most significant and dangerous threat, however, can arguably be identified as existing in the form of VEOs.

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 illustrate the destruction that VEOs can cause when allowed to operate in a relatively unconstrained environment. The VEOs responsible for these attacks organized, planned and trained in the relative obscurity of Afghanistan, a failed state whose warring factions and ineffective government allowed VEO proliferation in the post-Soviet era. This tendency of VEOs to prey on failed and potentially failing states has perpetuated itself during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in other states in Southeast Asia and Africa, such as Indonesia and Somalia.

As Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate, a foreign force experiences great difficulty in finding, fixing, and finishing an asymmetric force indigenous to a country. Many reasons exist, but some of the primary causes are differences in cultural and religious beliefs as well as a thorough understanding of the language and the area. These limitations significantly inhibit foreign force identification with the populace they intend to support. Additionally, citizens of a country are much more likely to cooperate with domestic security forces than they are with security forces that they perceive as occupying or imperialist forces. These problems define the criticality of SFA as a strategy for increasing security on a global scale.

**Statement of the Problem/Purpose of Study**

Two primary objectives in our NDS are winning the long war against violent extremism and promoting global security. Achieving these strategic goals requires the application of all of the elements of national power--Diplomatic, Informational, Military,
and Economic (DIME). Central to obtaining these specific objectives, however, is building the capacity of a broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long-term security. This theory is predicated on the assumption that SFA, in the form of generating, employing, and sustaining security forces, will counter the rise of VEOs. Particularly relevant to the SFA concept is the proliferation of VEOs in failed and potentially failing states and ungoverned areas, where they have the most influence, the greatest freedom of movement, and the highest probability of flourishing. The impact of SFA on VEOs in failed and potentially failing states and ungoverned areas is critical to the formulation of our national military strategy (NMS) as we complete the drawdown from Operation Iraqi Freedom and transition to successive areas of operation.

**Research Question**

Is SFA in its current state efficacious in countering VEOs in failed and potentially failing states? Secondary questions that will support the answer to the primary question are:

1. What is SFA in its current state?
2. What are failed and potentially failing states?
3. What are VEOs?
4. Where has the U.S. conducted SFA operations in a failed or potentially failing state against VEOs?
5. What was the impact of SFA Operations on host nation security forces and on VEOs in these areas?
Definitions of Terms

Listed below is a glossary of key terms that are particularly relevant to this study. In cases where the joint, interagency, or service-specific definition is vague regarding a term, a brief discussion will follow that further explains and clarifies the term based on general operational usage. Knowledge of these terms will aid the reader, regardless of background, in understanding the concepts and analysis presented in this research study.

Contemporary Operating Environment. An era of persistent conflict, a period of protracted confrontation among state, non-state and individual actors who increasingly use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. It is defined by a global struggle against a violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state system. Beyond this transnational struggle, we face other threats, including a variety of irregular challenges, the quest by rogue states for nuclear weapons, and the rising military power of other states. The COE is characterized by an asymmetric threat operating across nation-state boundaries for a variety of purposes. The complexity of the COE cannot be underestimated, as it encompasses the full spectrum of threats, from homemade explosive devices to weapons of mass destruction, by actors ranging from violent extremist groups to nation-states.

Foreign Internal Defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID.

Foreign Military Sales. That portion of U.S. security assistance (SA) authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of
1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred.\textsuperscript{11}

**Foreign Security Forces.** Forces, including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel, that provide security for a host nation (HN) and its relevant population or support a regional security organization’s mission.\textsuperscript{12} This term and Host Nation Security Forces are used interchangeably throughout this study.

**Host Nation.** A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.\textsuperscript{13} The HN is normally the nation receiving aid or the supported nation.

**Internal Defense and Development.** The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society.\textsuperscript{14} Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) is a program undertaken by a HN to promote its own growth in the area of its own security.

**Limitations of Scope**

This research study will be limited to defining SFA, failed and potentially failing states and VEOs for the purpose of evaluating the impact of SFA on VEOs through a case study analysis of separate countries or regions. Research for this study will be limited to
open-source information available in the public domain. Testimony or addresses pertinent to this research will also be limited to that available via open-source.

**Delimitations**

Several topics of interest pertinent to the subject of SFA fall just outside the scope of this study. Specific methods of SFA along with analysis of their effectiveness will not be addressed in a comparative manner in this research study. Additionally, in-depth analyses of specific failed and potentially failing states with recommendations and prioritization for future SFA efforts falls outside the scope of this study and will not be addressed. A comparative analysis and current disposition, composition and capabilities of various VEOs with respect to their position in the COE are outside the purview of this study and, as such, will not be addressed. Finally, a comprehensive analysis of all elements of national power—DIME—and their applicability to countering VEOs and/or providing stability to failed and potentially failing states and ungoverned areas falls outside the scope of this study and will not be addressed.

**Assumptions**

The relevance of this thesis is predicated on the validity of several assumptions. First, maintenance of building capacity through SFA as a primary national method of achieving the national objectives of global security and winning the long war defines the criticality of the importance of this research. The second critical assumption is the existence of a COE defined by persistent conflict with asymmetric threats and transnational, non-state actors on a nonlinear battlefield and the involvement of the U.S. in that environment. The third critical assumption is the continuation of the U.S. as a
global power with the self-proclaimed responsibility to be a leader on the international stage.

**Significance of Thesis**

The significance of SFA to the National Security Strategy of the U.S. is apparent from the attention paid to it by the current and previous administrations. President Obama has referred repeatedly in his addresses and policy statements to the importance of increasing the will and capacity of our international partners to counter terrorism.\(^{15}\) The 2008 NDS has identified SFA as a national way to achieve several national objectives.\(^{16}\) The U.S. Army, as an institution, has taken steps to institutionalize SFA in its 2008 Army Strategy by officially placing responsibility for SFA on the conventional army, instead of its historical residence with Special Forces (SF).\(^{17}\)

Using SFA in its current state as the cornerstone of a strategy for countering violent extremism on a global scale is predicated on the assumption that SFA does indeed counter the proliferation of violent extremism. This assumption is the crux of the argument for SFA and, therefore, the study of the efficacy of SFA is relevant and critical to the validation of policy and strategy at the national level. Validation of the SFA concept in principle will contribute to the proof that the current U.S. method of SFA either is or is not appropriate for achieving the national objectives of promoting security and winning the long war.

A great deal of literature on the subject of SFA is available in the public domain. Primary topics include national strategic documents, doctrinal manuals, interagency and service produced papers and research, independent research organizations, and books and historical documents. Chapter 2 discusses the significance of this literature by type and
provides a summary of the various themes addressed in the literature. This review reveals the basis for defining SFA, VEOs, and provides the basis for further comparative analysis of SFA within the COE.


2While Baron Friedrick Wilhelm von Steuben’s actions with the Continental Army were not sponsored by the Prussian government and therefore are not explicitly classified as SFA, the concept of training a foreign security force, in this case the Continental Army, is consistent with the conceptual foundation of SFA and supports it as a legitimate means of building foreign security force capacity.


11Ibid.

12Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.1, Glossary-2.

13Ibid.

14Ibid., GL-8.


17 Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

A significant amount of literature exists that reinforces the criticality of SFA as a key method to attainment of U.S. National Objectives. This literature exists in five primary categories that support research related to SFA. The first category consists of national strategic documents such as presidential speeches, the NDS, and the Army Strategy that identify the importance of SFA to achieving the nation’s strategic objectives. Second, joint and Army doctrine, including joint publications and Army FMs, define SFA in great detail and with respect to organization, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and operational objectives. Third, service school publications, military research studies, and professional journals contain an inordinate amount of information related to the conduct of SFA, with specific emphasis placed on its application during the War on Terror. The fourth is research organizations such as the Congressional Research Service, Strategic Studies Institute, and the RAND Corporation that identify issues and trends related to SFA, regional analyses of VEOs, and description and categorization of failed and potentially failing states and ungoverned areas. Finally, this study incorporates books, articles, and historical documents related to SFA operations, the characterization and proliferation of VEOs, and the designation of failed and potentially failing states. Following a brief summary of these five categories, this chapter identifies information gaps and trends in the literature. The chapter will then discuss the significance of this study to the existing literature.
National Strategic Documents

Under National Strategic Documents, there is one collection and three other noteworthy documents that identify SFA as a primary method of achieving the nation’s strategic objectives. The first is a compilation of sources that, in the absence of a published National Security Strategy, serve to define the nation’s objectives and methods for attainment of these objectives. President Obama’s positions on the Issues of Defense and Homeland Security, accessed from The White House website on 14 October 2009, specify building partner capacity as critical to defeating violent extremism. This position is further reinforced by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s “Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations” on 15 July 2009 and the President’s own remarks at the National Counterterrorism Center on 6 October 2009.

The 2008 NDS, while written before the election of President Obama, maintains relevance in its portrayal of strategic defense policy due to the maintenance of Secretary Robert Gates as the Secretary of Defense for the Obama Administration. It is a critical document to this study as it overtly identifies violent extremism as a threat to national security as well as establishes a baseline for the characterization of VEOs. It further reinforces the national objectives as set forth in President Obama’s position statements and states the programmed methodology for attainment of these objectives, specifically denoting partner capacity building as critical to long-term security.

The 2008 Army Strategy also discusses the importance of SFA to the attainment of the nation’s strategic objectives. The document also discusses the importance of SFA through its institutionalization in the Army. The discussion centers on the augmentation
of SF to fulfill mission requirements or extending the mission to conventional forces in the form of the augmented Brigade Combat Team (BCT).

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report supports the information contained in the 2008 NDS and is the most current relevant document in the specification of national strategy. It emphasizes the impact of terrorist networks outside of the established battlegrounds of Iraq and Afghanistan, also assisting with establishment of a baseline for categorization of VEOs, describing the COE as a Complex Environment. It defines building partner capacity as a key mission area and addresses examples of historical and ongoing international assistance efforts. It further addresses the capabilities of the nation’s forces with specific respect to the military’s ability to conduct SFA. It does so by directing that general purpose forces assume SFA as a core competency.

Interagency, Joint, and Army Doctrine

Under interagency publications, there is one document that applies to SFA. The Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, published in 2009, addresses the necessity of integration of interagency actors in stabilization and reconstruction. This document emphasizes and explains the whole of government approach to stabilization and reconstruction and serves as a foundational document for interagency integration. It specifically addresses SFA in its discussion on Security Sector Reform (SSR) and how interagency integration facilitates and supports SSR.

Joint Doctrine

There are two noteworthy documents under joint publications that apply to SFA. The first is the Commander’s Handbook for Security Force Assistance, dated 14 July
2008. This document is a compilation of the lessons learned and best practices from SFA in Iraq and Afghanistan. It addresses SFA with respect to defining its purpose, its definition, and its broad-based application at the BCT level. It further addresses concepts necessary for the effective planning and organization of military elements to conduct SFA.

The second joint publication is JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)* dated 30 April 2004. While this publication does not address SFA holistically, it does address the joint nature of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), the military instrument of which SFA supports. It addresses the full spectrum of FID, from organization and responsibilities, through planning and training, to execution. Given the primary goal of FID as to promoting the HN’s program of IDAD, a thorough understanding of FID is critical to understanding the framework and mechanics of SFA. Understanding FID from a joint perspective will facilitate a better understanding of SFA from a joint perspective.

Army Doctrine

There are two U.S. Army Field Manuals (FMs) that are essential to understanding and defining SFA. The first is FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* dated October 2008, which is the keystone doctrinal publication for stability operations. This FM is critical to the study of SFA because it defines the strategic context within which the Army conducts stability operations. It introduces SFA as a HN capacity building function within Army doctrine, defines SFA as organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising host-nation security forces, and provides the linkage between SFA and stability operations.
This document is critical from the strategic to the tactical level in identifying SFA as an Army method for achieving strategic goals.

The second key doctrinal publication is FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* dated May 2009. This publication is the keynote publication for the conduct of SFA in the Army. This FM primarily provides guidance and direction for conducting SFA at the BCT level. It is critical to defining the methods for SFA within the Army and how operations at the tactical level, across the full spectrum of conflict, affect operational and strategic objectives. This FM describes the conduct of SFA from the individual advisor through Echelons above Brigade, emphasizing recommended practices for conventional Army forces in full-spectrum operations based on historical operations. It is the primary publication that defines contemporary SFA operations in support of national strategic objectives.

Service School Publications, Military Research Studies, and Professional Journals

The era of persistent conflict and subsequent importance of building partner capacity as the cornerstone of the nation’s strategy for defeating violent extremism and achieving international stability has raised awareness and research of SFA. As a result, many service school publications, military research studies, and professional journals have been published addressing SFA. For the purpose of this study, these publications have been divided into two primary areas: historical critique and analysis of military assistance operations and analysis of SFA and military aid in concept.

The first publication that analyzes military aid historically is “Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions,” a Strategic Studies Institute
report dated April 2006. This thesis provides historical context for military aid through an analysis of the aid provided in Africa. Particularly noteworthy in this thesis is its discussion of the impact of counterterrorism and SA operations in Somalia in the contemporary environment.

Similar in importance and impact is a Robert A. Hartung’s “A Critique of Plan Colombia,” dated 17 May 2005. This Naval War College (NWC) paper analyzes the U.S.’ military assistance to Plan Colombia in its battle with numerous VEOs. This paper contains a good discussion on actions that should have been implemented, from a military assistance viewpoint, to further enhance the positive impact of Plan Colombia as well as examining the overall impact of Plan Colombia. Additionally, this paper compares military assistance operations in Colombia with those in El Salvador.

In the area of SFA analysis, the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) monograph “Developing Security Force Assistance: Lessons from Foreign Internal Defense” provides invaluable information. This publication addresses SFA from a developmental perspective, drawing upon the experience of the special operations forces (SOF) community and its extensive involvement in FID. This publication is focused primarily on the integration of conventional forces into SFA and maximizing the use of both conventional forces and SOF. In addition to the discussion of techniques and concepts, this paper also addresses the SOF experience in Colombia through an historical analysis of operations in that country.

**Research Organizations**

Numerous publications exist from external research organizations related to SFA and other topics related to SFA, particularly violent extremism and failed and potentially
failing states. The first of consequence is a RAND Project Air Force study entitled *Ungoverned Territories* published in 2007. This study examines in detail the factors that give rise to ungoverned territories and thus their classification as such. The study further examines the characteristics of these areas that make them conducive to the proliferation of violent extremism. The study concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of ungoverned territories and their integration into the security cooperation (SC) efforts of the Department of Defense (DOD). This study is particularly relevant due to the relationship between ungoverned territories and failed and failing states with respect to the proliferation of violent extremism.

A second external publication that addresses SFA is *A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts* published by the Strategic Studies Institute in September 2009. This study addresses the national requirement for SFA and then outlines perceived shortcomings of the current method for executing SFA operations. This document is critical to this study because it not only supports the national strategic requirement for SFA, but also assists in the establishment of a framework from which to assess SFA from an historical context.

Similarly, the publication *Withdrawal from Iraq: Assessing the Readiness of Iraqi Security Forces* published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in August 2009, further contributes to the establishment of an assessment framework. This publication presents the “whole of government” implications of SFA. Specifically, it examines the efficacy of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from the local to the national level by defining the security problems and then assessing the effectiveness of the ISF in dealing with these problems from a holistic perspective. The situations and assessment
criteria described in this publication can be extrapolated to SFA operations in other failed and failing states to help, in conjunction with other points of view, establish a baseline for evaluation and comparison.

A fourth noteworthy publication is the Congressional Research Service’s *Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy* dated 28 August 2008. This publication provides an in-depth analysis of failed and potentially failing states from an interagency perspective. It standardizes the various interagency definitions of failed and potentially failing states, to include the various descriptions of potentially failing states, to standardize the language for the nation’s policy makers. It includes a threat analysis of failed and potentially failing states and the linkage between these types of states and the identified strategic national security threats. It further contains a list of states identified as “at risk” based on the criteria established.

The fifth external publication of value to this study is *Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm* published by the Strategic Studies Institute in February 2009. This publication truly addresses the “whole of government” approach to SFA through an analysis of emerging initiatives in the DOS, primarily through examination of the Civil Response Corps (CRC) and its integration into SFA with DOD. Like other documents in this section, it also examines SFA from a national strategic perspective including the security imperative for SFA. Unlike other publications, it addresses the historical precedent the U.S. set for exercising SFA, even before the term was officially established.
Books, Articles, and Historical Documents

An overview of the battle against violent extremism was found in *State of the Struggle: Report on the Battle Against Global Terrorism*. While the analysis of the nation’s success against violent extremism was not relevant to the analysis of SFA due to date of publication, several items of background information contained in the book were extremely relevant. First, the book addressed the state of the environment regarding violent extremists and their operational patterns with respect to failed and potentially failing states and ungoverned areas. The second item addressed was the formation of Al-Qaeda (AQ) and its subsequent actions and operations in Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s to include its relationship with the Taliban. It further confirmed capacity building of international partners and contained numerous discussions of the applicability of SFA and the status of SFA as of 2006, which lends historical context to the thesis.

A second resource is *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State*. This book examines the evolution of Afghanistan from its civil war in 1978, to its demise into a failed state, to the ascension of the Taliban. This book provides historical documentation of the criticality of failed and potentially failing states to the rise of violent extremism. It also examines the risk of failure of external attempts to build capacity through examination of the military assistance provided by the U.S. and other nations during the Afghan civil war.

Analysis of Literature

A common theme throughout the national strategy documents is the emphasis on building partner capacity as a method of achieving security and winning the long war against violent extremism. These sources reinforce the relevance of the research question
by illustrating the assumption that a negative correlation exists between SFA and the proliferation of VEOs. Current doctrine, however, contains numerous contradictions with respect to the taxonomy of SFA within the greater framework of SA and SC programs. Some of this confusion stems from the relative infancy of SFA as a formal doctrinal framework as well as the numerous agencies involved in its implementation. Similarly, inconsistency and ambiguity abound in the definitions of VEOs and failed and potentially states in the various publications.

**Gaps in the Record**

There are doctrinal, historical, and conceptual gaps within SFA literature. Doctrine is very ambiguous with respect to the interoperability of the interagency with the armed forces; each entity is addressed independently in separate publications with only ambiguous references to collaboration and coordination made to the other. Additionally, doctrine fails to address the absence of HN governments despite a contemporary environment where the proliferation of VEOs in failed states is a primary threat.

There are gaps in the historical record, as well. Most literature written about building capacity in Africa omits reference to SA efforts in Somalia. Most literature is focused on Eastern Africa as a region with Somalia identified as a failed state within that region. While much more literature is available related to SA efforts in Colombia, most literature is written from a strategic and high operational perspective. The history generally omits lower operational and tactical assessments of SFA efforts in support of Plan Colombia.
Conceptually, the record generally omits the concept of unity of command between the interagency and the military. Numerous research reports and historical analyses identify insufficient interagency coordination as a limiting factor in SA operations but the concept is never addressed in doctrine. Unity of effort without unity of command is the accepted structure in joint and interagency doctrine with no other comparisons to validate or invalidate this assumption.

**Trends**

The principal trend in building capacity is advising and assisting foreign security forces (FSF) to maintain security within a HN. Many documents and publications focus on this without addressing capacity building through the other elements of national power. Another trend is the ad hoc and unstructured nature of interagency-military coordination causing insufficient coordination between the military and interagency. Contradictory taxonomy of SA and SC programs is the last enduring trend in the literature.

**Significance of Thesis in Relation to Existing Literature**

While the historical gaps in the record exceed the scope of this research, it does address both the doctrinal and conceptual gaps. In comparison to the current literature, this study approaches the analysis of SFA from a different perspective. By first analyzing the doctrine of SFA within joint and interagency doctrine, defining the terms used to identify the environment and the threat, and then analyzing historical case studies, this thesis recommends needed changes to the doctrine to achieve a whole of government approach to capacity building that will make SFA effective in failed states. As the
proponents of joint and interagency doctrine continue to refine SFA, this research may provide a different perspective to adjust doctrine to meet the challenges of the COE.

As seen in this review, the five types of literature provide comprehensive view of the national strategy objective of promoting security and the method of achieving that objective through capacity building, specifically through the use of SFA. National strategy documents define the nation’s ends, ways, and means. Doctrine defines the framework within which SFA is currently conducted. Service school publications, papers, and journals provide professional analysis of SFA within historical and contemporary contexts. Research organization reports provide information on external supporting concepts and themes, identify historical and contemporary problems, and propose solutions. Finally, books, articles, and historical documents complete the picture by providing historical and contemporary analysis that aid in understanding the outcomes of the application of doctrine in the COE. This review has also identified contradictions in current doctrine, gaps in the record, and trends in existing literature.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Documentation identifying SFA as a method of achieving the national objectives of winning the long war and promoting security is readily available, as is documentation describing the organization, techniques, and procedures for conducting SFA. However, the current record does not clearly validate the critical assumption that a negative correlation exists between SFA as defined by current doctrine and VEO activities. To answer the research questions posed in chapter 1, this research study will initially define specific terms and locations and then conduct a case study analysis of historical SFA operations and the impact of these operations on VEO activities in that particular location.

This chapter will first define the methods used to collect information relevant to this study. This will be followed by a discussion of the research criteria, to include the selection of relevant case studies and the credibility of source material. A description of the research methodology will comprise the majority of the chapter followed by a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the defined methodology.

Methods of Information Collection

This study will be limited to available unclassified, open-source information. Extensive use will be made of Joint, Interagency, and Army electronic publication sites to garner information originating in doctrinal, regulatory, and policy-producing publications. Additional web-based research included the Congressional Research Service, the RAND Corporation, the Strategic Studies Institute, and online resources of
the Combined Arms Research Library in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Research librarians in the Combined Arms Research Library were enabled access to a wide range of service-school papers, operational and strategic policy papers, and other types of relevant literature.

Research Criteria

SFA operations are extremely complex and variable across the spectrum of operations. While SFA as a term is relatively new, SFA as a concept has been practiced on numerous occasions in numerous forms throughout history. As identified in the literature review, significant documentation exists on SFA as a concept and SFA as a current U.S. method to achieve the national objectives of promoting security and winning the long war. Literature also exists describing various SFA operations and the outcomes of these operations or current status of the locations involved, which makes case study analysis of SFA operations feasible.

Research will be conducted to identify the locations where SFA Operations, failed and potentially failing states, and VEOs coexist. The possibility exists that these locations encompass transnational ungoverned areas. In these cases, the transnational areas will be treated similarly to failed and potentially failing states. From this research, locations will be selected for further analysis to determine the impact of SFA on the VEOs.

Research Methodology

The initial section of this research paper will define specific terms and locations. The taxonomy of SFA will be examined in detail through the examination of national strategic documents, joint and interagency publications, and developed and developing
doctrine. An analysis will then be conducted of the definitions of failed and failing states, to include ungoverned areas, in order to arrive at a definition applicable across a broad range of policy documents and acceptable for further location analysis. Similarly, an analysis of VEOs will be conducted to determine a definition that is applicable for interpretation and analysis of policy and situations across a broad range of sources.

Post definition, two locations will be defined that are failed or failing states that contain VEOs in accordance with the definitions presented in the previous sections. These locations will then be analyzed using a case study method to determine the efficacy of SFA in these areas during the time period presented. The case studies will be qualitatively assessed using the available data from numerous sources as well as research that may be available on the current status of the location and the VEOs operating in that location. Qualitative analysis of quantitative data will be one component utilized to determine SFA efficacy. Examples of quantitative data for possible inclusion in the study may consist of but not be limited to reports of violent crimes, reports of terrorist training camps, reports of terrorist activities, statistics for drug production and narco-trafficking, statistics for piracy, and statistics for kidnapping. General trend analysis will be conducted on these data types to determine activity levels of VEOs over the time. Additionally, qualitative research related to SFA and the instruments of national power will be analyzed to develop conclusions about the suitability of SFA to the current situation. The locations will then be compared holistically to derive a conclusion on the efficacy of SFA in each situation.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Methodology

The strength of this research lies in the analysis of current SFA doctrine across both the joint and interagency spectra and the compilation and analysis of historical case studies relevant to SFA. By comparing historical situations and outcomes of operational areas with similar VEO influences to the COE, a relevant assessment of the efficacy of SFA in the COE can be determined. This assessment can then be used as a tool to either support or adjust the national strategy or to reevaluate the doctrine associated with SFA.

There are also weaknesses to this methodology. First, this thesis will be limited to two case studies for analysis. It is not possible to capture the complexity of the COE with complete accuracy from only two historical case studies. This limit is self-imposed, however, due to the required length of the study and the use of only open-source information. Second, the analysis of the case studies will present a conclusion that is qualitative in nature, leaving it subject to researcher interpretation. The utilization of quantitative variables to support the conclusion will serve to add some validity to the conclusion, but will not be holistic in their support. The nature of the research question lends itself to some qualitative analysis and therefore leaves room for variance based on point of view and perception.

The research methodology for this thesis consists of four parts. First is the definition of SFA, failed and potentially failing states, and VEOs. These definitions will facilitate the classification and analysis of two locations where the three defined aspects concurrently existed. Through the historical review of the two cases, analysis will yield a conclusion as to the efficacy of SFA on VEOs in failed and failing states. The next chapter answers the secondary research questions identified in chapter 1. The conclusions
derived from these secondary research questions will answer the primary research question defined in chapter 1.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

Security Force Assistance and National Strategy

As the U.S. continues to be a leader on the international stage and a world power, the question of how to advance global security as a mechanism for the country’s own protection and that of its interest’s abroad remains. The DOD describes the COE as complex and uncertain where the distribution of global political, economic, and military power is becoming more diffuse.¹ In the 2010 PO Report, the DOD explicitly identifies building the capacity of partner states as a key mission area, stating that the “ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq make clear, these dimensions of U.S. defense strategy have never been more important.”² To this end, DOD has programmed significant enhancements to the operating force in this area. Among these enhancements is the strengthening and institutionalization of general purpose force capabilities for SFA, in effect identifying SFA as a core competency of the operating force.³ This significant strategic change in mission and doctrine is predicated on the assumption that SFA is efficacious in countering VEOs in failed and potentially failing states.

Current Doctrine for Security Force Assistance

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates defines SFA in general terms in the 2010 PO Report as “‘hands on’ efforts, conducted primarily in host countries, to train, equip, advise, and assist those countries’ forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories.”⁴ He further identifies the sustainment of advances as critical to the success of SFA. He incorporates
the “whole of government” approach into SFA by including the enhancement of institutions into the definition included in the 2010 QDR. The 2010 QDR specifically addresses defense ministries as an example that through context seems to represent a broader whole.\textsuperscript{5} The 2010 QDR references security forces, which is consistent with joint doctrine as including all forces, not just military, and also upholding the rule of law as critical to controlling and defending territories. The “whole of government” approach is further represented by the numerous references to the integration and coordination of other U.S. Government agencies, emphasizing the importance of the interagency approach to SFA.\textsuperscript{6}

The use of the “whole of government” approach and the integration of the interagency population and funding into SFA run the risk of expanding the scope of SFA to achieve the connotation of both SC and SA. Realistically, SFA, SC, and SA are conducted simultaneously with SFA being a primary component of both SC and SA. These three elements, along with the element of FID, are quite often used interchangeably, albeit incorrectly, as each of these elements have certain distinctions.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commanding General Martin E. Dempsey further reinforced the challenge of accurately defining SFA during an address at the Command and General Staff College on 17 March 2010. He stated that when discussing SFA and capacity building programs, it is imperative to mind taxonomy. He further went on to define SFA as tactical level programs aimed at training and advising units on the ground in the daily fight. He also identified this as a core competency of the nation’s military forces, reinforcing the position held in the 2010 QDR. General Dempsey then delineated SFA from building partner capacity by defining
the latter as the formation of institutions or architectures responsible for force generation, sustainment, and budgeting, assigning this responsibility to TRADOC, Army Materiel Command (AMC), and other higher-level military commands. Finally, General Dempsey stated that the building of ministries falls under the realm of SSR (SSR), which is the responsibility of the Office of Security Cooperation, a DOS function manned in the various embassies throughout the world.7

General Dempsey’s comments are in line with other DA positions and doctrine, specifically with respect to governance issues, which he assigned to DOS. This coincides with the stated position that DA and DOD address security, but not governance or economic issues. His position on SFA in particular, however, is somewhat contradictory of what is written in doctrine. His position that SFA is strictly a tactical issue despite doctrinal evidence to the contrary highlights the complexity of defining the relationship of SFA with SC, SA, and FID as well as the definition of SFA itself.

SC involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a HN.8 SA is a group of programs “authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the U.S. provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.”9 The relationship between SC and SA is that SA is a subset of SC.
FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. FID involves all of the instruments of national power, Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic in support of a country’s IDAD. Both SC and SA are integral to FID programs as they relate to IDAD, although both SC and SA are much broader than FID alone.

SFA is a composite of all three of the previously mentioned, and somewhat more commonly known, methods of building partner capacity. SFA supports, and is sometimes supported by, SC. The same is true for the SFA relationship with SA. In both cases, SFA can have a supported or supporting relationship but in neither case is SFA wholly inclusive. SFA has a similar relationship with FID, supporting the military instrument of FID (see figure 1.).

Several key points are necessary to develop an understanding of SFA. First is that SFA extends to all security forces: military, police, and border forces, and other paramilitary organizations. The second point is that SFA may occur in three general situations: an internally focused bilateral relationship, an externally focused bilateral relationship, and a multilateral relationship. The underlying meaning is that SFA supports the partner’s strategy for security, whether that is externally focused SSR or internally focused IDAD. Third, SFA is limited to a HN or organization’s security forces and those institutions that sustain those security forces, exercising the military instrument of national power. The definition of SFA and its purpose seem to become divergent in both the first and third of these components.
Figure 1. Relationship of security force assistance with security cooperation, security assistance, and foreign internal defense

FM 3-07.1 defines SFA as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.” In this context, security forces are collectively referred to as FSF. FSF are defined as “including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel--that provide security for a HN and its relevant population or support a regional security organization’s mission.”

This definition seems to be contradicted in fact by the Army’s position in a 12 January 2010 video teleconference (VTC) where it non-concurred with the DOD
definition of SFA, “activities that directly support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their sustaining institutions.” The Army recommended the deletion of the word “directly” because it “precludes compliance with DOD policy to strengthen non-military security forces and institutions.”¹⁶ The implication is that while SFA may include security forces other than military forces, the Army does not have the capability to influence directly the capacity of these forces, only influencing them in an indirect manner. This position was reinforced in a brief presented by LTC Dave Keefe during the same teleconference. The brief was used during the formulation of the 2010 QDR and not only identified the Army, but also DOD, as providing key capabilities to other federal agencies charged with lead agent responsibilities for capacity building of Ministry of Interior/Intelligence Services and Local Security or Police Forces, as opposed to conducting these activities as the lead agent themselves (see figure 2).¹⁷
This position that neither DA nor DOD functions as lead agent with respect to building the capacity of forces other than military, only providing key capabilities, seems to contradict the doctrinal definition of SFA with respect to FSF. Reinforcing this contradiction is the assertion by DA that it can only indirectly support other than military forces. This position significantly limits the capability of DA or DOD to build capacity in any forum other than that of the military, effectively canalizing the security of the HN to that which can be handled militarily.

The second contradiction in the doctrinal definition of SFA and its execution in practice exist in the realm of institutional sustainment. FM 3-07.1 explicitly states that SFA addresses security issues, but not economic or governance issues. The latest DOD
definition that defines SFA seems to contradict this doctrinal statement, where it defines SFA as, “activities that directly support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their sustaining institutions.” Further, FM 3.07-1 contains a section that addresses building HN sustainment capacity. This section specifically identifies having a “holistic perspective” as one of the SFA logistics planning considerations. It further defines this concept by stating that “SFA forces determine the foreign security force’s logistic and reconstruction requirements. . . . Rebuilding the HN’s infrastructure and industrial capacity not only provides long-term job opportunities, but also builds trust and legitimacy in FSF, the host-nation government, and partner organizations.”

The holistic approach to building sustainment clearly indicates the inclusion of both governance and economic issues into the concept of SFA. This position is further reinforced by the subsequent discussion in FM 3.07-1 of asset management. The FM describes asset management as a “tool at the disposal of the commander and planners during an evaluation of foreign infrastructure and industrial capacity.” Evaluation of these items is immense in scope, and to be thorough, would necessitate a simultaneous evaluation of the ministry, or other governmental institution, providing oversight to not only the military component of the FSF, but all other components as well. This clearly exceeds the scope of SFA as defined doctrinally. The criticality of institutional sustainment, however, is clearly communicated outside of the established doctrinal framework. FM 3.07-1 states, “Without an improvement in sustainment capacity, FSF cannot significantly improve regardless of how much effort is devoted to advising and training.”
In an effort to bridge the gap between doctrine and reality, emphasis has been placed on the conduct of SFA in a collaborative environment. FM 3.07-1 states that SFA is not just an Army function, but requires the coordination of military and civilian joint and multinational forces in a collaborative effort. This framework is dependent upon the HN being the key actor within the comprehensive approach to capacity building. While conceptually this seems plausible, it is dependent upon the coordination and collaboration of numerous separate organizations with different organizational cultures and objectives.

The two primary organizations involved, DOD and DOS, have made progress in recent years toward this end. Understanding that DOS did not have the budget to undertake such projects unilaterally, Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163) was amended to authorize the DOD to transfer to the State Department up to $100 million per fiscal year in defense articles, services, training or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries. This seems like a good first step to integrating the interagency into SFA activities, especially given that it was originally conceptualized by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to provide authorization and funding for projects that would involve interagency coordination.

The reality is that the problem of managing this coordination exists at levels higher than those of the Secretaries. The original wording of the law required “notification” of intent to exercise this provision to Congress from the Secretary of Defense, and this notification must have been prepared collaboratively with the Secretary of State. This would seem to be a forcing function to facilitate interagency coordination, at least between DOD and DOS. In 2009, however, Congress raised concerns over
Section 1207 and its use. The major point of contention was DOD influence over the allocation of the funds, despite the funding being an allocation from DOD to DOS. DOD’s initial position was that the authority was to bring civilian expertise to operate alongside or in place of the armed forces. This position was subsequently modified in 2009, primarily to retain the authority after the Senate Armed Services Committee raised concerns, with DOD verbalizing the additional purpose of providing early civilian resources to avert crises that could require U.S. military forces to intervene.25

Congressional concerns were not mollified, however, as they continued forward with the intent to appropriate the funding directly to DOS, stating “The DOD could still participate in deciding on project proposals, but the money would be guaranteed and could be made available more quickly. This would require coordinating the efforts of various congressional committees, but it would restore the traditional role of the DOS [Department of State] in funding U.S. foreign assistance.”

This contention over funding exemplifies the barriers that must be overcome to achieve true concert in the interagency community. SFA doctrine is predicated, as previously discussed, on the collaboration of various agencies, to include the government and ministries of the HN. Lack of unity of effort in the joint, interagency, inter-governmental, and multinational (JIIM) community is a significant detractor and one that, to this point, has not been resolved. While doctrinally a collaborative, “whole of government” approach is recommended, in reality it is mandated. The lack of unity of command is a hindrance to unity of effort, and has consistently caused conflict in SFA efforts, particularly in recent operations. Both the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) and Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC-I) addressed the issue in the preface to their 2009
Unified Common Plan stating, “Capacity building efforts in Iraq to date have not had the
degree of coordination and synchronization necessary to maximize success. In some
cases, individual units/agencies have performed these actions independently with limited
awareness of the other interagency efforts within the same geographical area resulting in
counterproductive or duplicate efforts.” Recognizing the issue, the organizations
collectively developed the Unified Common Plan to fill the existing gap in interagency
architecture, specifically to provide unity of effort in the absence of unity of command.

Another issue in the conduct of SFA exists in the integration of the HN, which is
specified doctrinally as the “key actor” in SFA operations. Understanding that national
sovereignty will normally preclude unity of command, it does not alleviate the
requirement for unity of effort. The partnership between the HN and the SFA force is
critical, particularly with respect to national goals and force sustainment. The HN’s goals
with respect to its desired security posture and security forces are critical, as these goals
should form the foundation for the endstate of SFA efforts in that country. The lack of
unity of command adds significant complexity, requiring an almost purely collaborative
effort in an environment that is inherently political. This further necessitates a
coordinated, interagency approach from the SFA forces.

The second conundrum posed by HN collaboration is that of FSF sustainment. To
achieve the stated SFA goal of building the security institutions that will support gains
made in the earlier stages of SFA, it is necessary to involve the applicable HN ministries.
As previously mentioned, this includes both governance and economic issues, both
requiring the collaboration of the interagency in dealing with the HN. Adding to the
complexity of this issue are the objectives of the HN. Resolution of this issue is
dependent on the objectives of the HN, primarily with respect to economic capacity and
budgeting. Once again, unity of effort in the absence of unity of command becomes
critical, as movement toward a common objective will facilitate the type of coordinated
effort necessary to achieve success.

For the purposes of this research, several sources will inform what is meant by the
term SFA. The definition from FM 3-07 will form the foundation, defining SFA as the
“unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security
forces in support of a legitimate authority” where the applicable security forces are
defined as “including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence
forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and
correctional personnel--that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population
or support a regional security organization’s mission.” However, in accordance with
stated Department of the Army and DOD policy, capacity building will be of a direct
nature for military forces and an indirect nature for non-military security forces based on
Army and DOD definitions of core competencies. Direct support for non-military force
capacity building will be relegated to the interagency, with coordination facilitating unity
of effort. The C2 architecture for SFA operations will reflect the existing relationship
between military forces and the interagency, with unity of effort accomplished through
coordination instead of formally promulgated through unity of command. The legitimate
authority referred to is the host nation or another recognized, legitimate regional security
body. This legitimate authority will function as the key actor, with SFA operations
supporting existing SSR and IDAD. Finally, in accordance with established doctrine,
SFA operations will pertain to only the military instrument of national power, and will
not delve into the realm of governance or economics issues. Coordination with the interagency for support external to the SFA effort will be the standard for implementation of activities that involve the other instruments of national power.

Failed and Failing States and Ungoverned Areas

Stability operations since the end of the cold war have uncovered a distinctive trend in the international community. This trend defines the COE in terms of the collapse of established governments, the rise of international criminal and terrorist networks, a seemingly endless array of humanitarian crises, and grinding poverty.\textsuperscript{31} This position is reinforced in the latest QDR, where changes in the international environment are purported to “put pressure on the modern state system, likely increasing the frequency and severity of the challenges associated with chronically fragile states.” The 2010 QDR further identifies these “chronically fragile,” or failed and potentially failing, states as catalysts for the growth of radicalism and extremism and at least as likely as support conflict over the next several decades as established, strong states.\textsuperscript{32} The National Strategy Information Center identifies the problem of failed and failing states as being more widespread and complex than that alluded to in the 2010 \textit{QDR}. They state that as of 2010, half of the nearly 200 countries in the world are weak, failing, or failed states, which constitutes over half of the world’s population.\textsuperscript{33} This position is reinforced by the 2009 Failed States Index from Foreign Policy Online, which classified 131 out of the 177 rated nations as potentially failing or worse.\textsuperscript{34}

The definition of weak, failing, and failed states varies with the source of the definition, and in some cases, the terms are only vaguely or not at all defined. U.S. governmental organizations clearly demonstrate this issue when discussing failed and
failing states, from variations in taxonomy to ambiguity in definition. The National Security Council (NSC) uses the term “weak states” and defines them as lacking the “capacity to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities” and lacking “law enforcement, intelligence, or military capabilities to assert effective control over their entire territory” in the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT). The National Intelligence Council (NIC) uses the term “failed or failing states” and defines them as having “expanses of territory and populations devoid of effective government control” and are caused by internal conflicts. Further, the NIC considers the terms “post-conflict” and “failed state” to be synonymous.\(^{35}\) It is clear that precision in taxonomy and definition is currently not present in strategic literature and must be further refined.

The National Strategy Information Center considers potentially failing and failed states as those that are unable to control all their territory, maintain a monopoly over the instruments of force, or perform core functions beginning with providing security for significant sections of their populations.\(^{36}\) Foreign Policy Online characterizes state failure similarly, but with certain additional criteria: the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; an inability to provide reasonable public services; the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.\(^{37}\)

Various U.S. government and government-affiliated efforts take yet another position that is based on four major elements of state function: peace and stability, effective governance, territorial control and porous borders, and economic sustainability. First, failed and failing states are often in conflict, at risk of conflict and instability, or newly emerging from conflict. Second, failed and failing states routinely have poor
governance, corruption, and inadequate provisions of fundamental public services to its citizens. Whether this is caused by lack of physical security compromising state functions or lack of political will is inconsequential, as either condition presents a destabilizing influence. Third, failed and failing states may lack effective control of their territory, military, or law enforcement, creating a security void for nefarious elements. Finally, failed and failing states often lack economic viability. Many are among the poorest countries in the world without the conditions to achieve economic development.38

Analysis of these criteria, emphasizing the overlapping criteria from each, provides a classification architecture that effectively describes failed and failing states. The first criterion consistent to all three methodologies is that failed and failing states lack effective control of its own territory. This can be due to several considerations, but most often internal or external conflict. The second criterion, which is related to the first and is also present in all three methodologies, is failure to maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Many factors can influence this, including but not limited to de facto military or law enforcement power, the lack thereof, weak or fractured governance, and corrupt security institutions. The third criterion, also consistent with each of the three presented methodologies, is governance incapable of providing core services to the populace, regardless of reason. Core services, for purposes of clarification, are defined as those that meet the physiological and security needs in accordance with Maslow’s Hierarchy. The fourth and final criterion, present directly in only one of the methodologies but indirectly represented in all three, is the erosion of the legitimate authority to make collective decisions. This criterion is manifested in lack of economic
control leading to an informal economic system, inability to effectively interact with the international community, and lack of efficacy domestically, among others.

One of the most poignant, and as yet undiscussed, points is that of ungoverned areas. The Congressional Research Service Report on Weak and Failing States briefly mentions ungoverned areas during its discussion of territorial control and porous borders, simplistically identifying these areas as those devoid of military or law enforcement control. The RAND Corporation, in a study for Project Air Force entitled Ungoverned Territories, identified four primary indicators of ungovernability: the level of state penetration of society; the extent to which the state has a monopoly on the use of force; the extent to which the state can control its borders; and whether the state is subject to external intervention by other states. In comparison to the previously identified variables used for failed and failing states, monopoly on the use of force is the only direct match. Monopoly on the use of force, unlike with failed and failing states, is not viewed holistically, but can refer to only portions of the state that may have the presence of organized armed groups outside of the state’s control or criminal networks linked to terrorist or insurgent groups as well as populations with relatively free access to weapons. Of the remaining variables, all three are components of, or include, the previously discussed variables in some way, shape, or form, but with emphasis on applicability to ungoverned areas, as opposed to failed or failing states.

The first variable, level of state penetration of society, is actually a composite of the third and fourth criteria of the failed and failing state methodology. Among the criteria defined, numerous measures exist to reflect the level of state penetration: the existence of state institutions such as law enforcement; compliance with existing laws;
and the legitimacy of the state governance when compared to other forms (tribes, clans, and others). Three additional criteria exist within the state penetration framework that are useful in analysis. The first is the lack of physical infrastructure, as one of the defining characteristics of ungoverned areas is tied to inaccessibility. The second criterion is the existence of corruption and the prevalence of the informal economy. With respect to corruption, the problem is systemic corruption rather than individual, as widespread corruption severely delegitimizes the state. The informal economy refers to the extent to which it overshadows the formal economy, detracting from state viability by siphoning off potential tax revenues that would be garnered through governmental oversight of the formal economy. The third analytic is social and cultural resistance to state institutions, defined by popular dispute over the legitimacy of the state government in favor of alternative governmental forms, primarily ethnic groups, tribes, clans, and others.

While the criteria for failed and failing states specifically addresses lack of territorial control, the variable for ungoverned areas more specifically addresses lack of control over borders. The border areas are critical to the analysis of ungoverned areas because they are the locations where states are least likely to exercise a monopoly on the use of force. They mark the interface between nation-states and they serve as functional barriers where states control the transnational movement of people and goods. They are also important because they are gateways through which insurgent and terrorist groups trade resources and receive critical inputs. Their regulation is particular problematic when both sides share tribal, clan, or family ties. The criticality is that ungoverned territories are generally found in border areas, remote from the capitals, where neither regime can successfully exert control and where the exact location of the border is not obvious.
There is a second set of considerations that are necessary when dealing with ungoverned areas. This set of variables is commonly referred to as dimensions of conduciveness and relates to the environmental factors that allow terrorist and insurgent groups to flourish in particular places. There are four key variables that seem to influence the extent to which territories are conducive to the presence of terrorist and insurgent groups: adequacy of infrastructure and operational access; availability of sources of income; favorable demographic and social characteristics; and invisibility.45

The first of these variables, adequacy of infrastructure and operational access, refers to the existence of an infrastructure that allows terrorist groups to perform basic functions. Related to this is the idea of “operational access,” which is reasonably easy access to desired attack venues.46 Availability of sources of income refers to, as the nomenclature suggests, the ability to generate revenue from local sources to finance activities. This variable may be discounted if the terrorist or insurgent organization has the capability to obtain external funding.47

The third variable for analysis is favorable demographic and social characteristics. This is important because the societies of ungoverned territories are complex, some of which are conducive to terrorist penetration and some that are not. These societies must have a base of support that is willing to support or able to be coerced into supporting the terrorists’ cause. Additionally, the social norms of the area must be close enough to support or able to be manipulated by the terrorist organization. Areas of conflict are particularly attractive to terrorist organizations due to the existing grievances or fissures that can be exploited. The existence of criminal organizations also lends itself to terrorism, as the terrorists or insurgents can leverage these criminal elements in
operational and strategic alliances as well as for procuring manpower to conduct their activities.\textsuperscript{48}

The fourth, and perhaps the most important variable in the world of terrorism and insurgency, is invisibility. Ungoverned areas must be able to provide the terrorists with the environment to operate in relative to total obscurity from local and international officials and organizations. This can be achieved two ways: through homogeneity, where the terrorists or insurgents blend into the population; or through heterogeneity, where diversity in appearance, language, and behavior is the norm and the terrorists or insurgents do not stand out any more than the average person.\textsuperscript{49}

Ungoverned areas do exist and are described by a set of dimensions that measure ungovernability. The critical distinction is whether or not an ungoverned area is conducive to supporting terrorism, insurgency, or radical extremism. While dimensions of conduciveness exist that assist in classification, the problem is more complex. While based on these variables, certain ungoverned areas may not be conducive to holistic terrorism or insurgency, they may be suitable for specific activities that enable organizations in other areas. For example, ungoverned areas may serve well for training camps, but not for financing or recruiting activities. To that end, analysis of ungoverned areas must be comprehensive and ongoing to determine not only that they are indeed ungoverned, but that they are also conducive to terrorism, insurgency, or extremism and for what types of activities.

**Violent Extremist Organizations**

For the foreseeable future, this environment will be defined by a global struggle against a violent extremist ideology that seeks to overturn the international state system. . . . Violent extremist movements such as al-Qaeda and
its associates comprise a complex and urgent challenge . . . today’s violent extremist ideology rejects the rules and structures of the international system. . . . Armed sub-national groups, including but not limited to those inspired by violent extremism, threaten the stability and legitimacy of key states.50

This excerpt from the 2008 NDS illustrates the importance of the term “violent extremism” as the keystone concept in the nation’s description of the strategic environment. Subsequent to the NDS, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once again defined the threat in the same terms when he stated, “What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign--a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation.”51 Violent extremism, along with similarly ill-defined terms like radicalism, irregular, hybrid, and asymmetric, is used consistently throughout strategic, operational, and tactical literature and discussion to describe the current enemy. Much like the terms failed and failing when referring to the status of states, the definition of VEOs is subject to the interpretation of the user.

U.S. strategic documents are filled with references to not only extremism, but also terrorism, insurgency, organized crime, and the ambiguously all-encompassing “other illicit groups.”52 They are also unclear as to the meaning of the word extremist or extremism. They generally address threats related to failed and failing states as falling into four categories, two that are enemy focused (terrorism and international crime), one that is a weapon or capability (nuclear proliferation), and one that is a condition (regional instability).53 These classifications do not particularly help refine the meaning of the term violent extremism or classify actors or actions as such.

The term “extremist” is an all-encompassing term that includes many ideologies, most notably radical Islam. The first problem with the identification of extremist groups is whether or not they pose a threat.54 There are extremist groups that are not actively
engaged in anti-Western efforts or in subversive or nefarious activities at all. Additionally, the baseline for extremism is subjective, based on the point of view of the classifying individual. What is extreme in one culture may be the norm in another. Generally, however, the extremist group populations that draw interest are unable to compete in a direct confrontation and revert to using asymmetric tactics such as terrorism to engage their enemies and further their ideologies.\textsuperscript{55} It is for these reasons that the identifier “violent” was added to extremist, in hopes of identifying those individuals and organizations that promote through the use of terrorism, or other tactics counter to good order and discipline, to advance their ideologies.

The second problem present in the term extremist is aggregation of groups under a single title. Combining all extremist groups together conceals the variety of goals that exist by group and the considerations specific to each group individually. Conversely, limiting the classification to only radical Islamic groups excludes any secular or nationalistic groups that may be more threatening.\textsuperscript{56} The 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks and subsequent actions directed against AQ have turned a great majority of literature to define the threat in terms of radical Islamism. The reality of the situation is that, while radical Islamism does constitute a majority of the contemporary threat, other ideologies are equally as likely and opportunistic and should not be excluded from the problem. This is evidenced by the recent violence in the Indian state of Chhattisgarh, where Maoist insurgents killed 76 Indian soldiers on 6 April 2010. This attack followed a 24 February 2010 attack in the state of West Bengal that killed 24 police officers and illustrates the danger of violent non-Islamic groups as well.\textsuperscript{57}
This is not a new problem and one that has previously been discussed and studied. The RAND Corporation argues that ambiguous definitions are unacceptable because they do not define the threat with “sufficient clarity for use in understanding the implications for U.S. forces.”58 A complete discussion of the threat from an individual element perspective exceeds the scope of this research. Additionally, while this level of understanding may be necessary to inform the tactical, and possibly operational, perspective, the strategic imperative for defining VEOs is somewhat different. Strategically, their composition is important to the extent that it facilitates the identification of these groups’ existence and an understanding of where these groups choose to operate.

The Nature of the Long War Seminar provided a more precise definition that, while somewhat narrow and constraining, is a baseline for an appropriate definition for VEO: “A transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals--and their state and non-state sponsors--which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends.”59 The critical point of contention with this definition lies primarily in its ascription of violent extremism to Islam. While radical Islamists may constitute the bulk of the current threat, particularly with respect to AQ. This definition unduly restricts the classification of violent extremists to those founded upon Islam. It is commonly believed that ideology is a key component of why groups undertake violent action and can be a motivating factor to increase the capabilities of VEOs.60

A secondary point of contention with the aforementioned definition is the identification of violence strictly in terms of terrorism. This could be viewed as a constraint based on the applied definition of terrorism. There is, however, no generally
agreed upon definition of terrorism in the international community.\textsuperscript{61} This problem was addressed, without resolution at the United Nations’ (UN) 2005 Summit, during discussion related to a comprehensive convention on combating terrorism to be developed during the next session. The initial draft of the declaration from this summit proposed a definition:

\begin{quote}
We (the world leaders) affirm that the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and non-combatants cannot be justified or legitimised by any cause or grievance, and we declare that any action intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organisation to carry out or to abstain from any act, cannot be justified on any grounds, and constitutes an act of terrorism.\textsuperscript{62}
\end{quote}

The official release, however, did not include this definition due to resistance during the negotiations, thereby setting the stage for next session of the UN General Assembly and their work on the terrorism strategy:

\begin{quote}
The stumbling block for such a treaty . . . is a lack of agreement over what constitutes and characterizes terrorism; in other words, a definition. . . . Because of the resistance negotiators met, however, the document that leaders adopted at the summit reverted to a simple blanket condemnation of terrorism. The issue of a definition still must be resolved in order to reach agreement on a comprehensive convention.\textsuperscript{63}
\end{quote}

The Sixtieth Session of the UN General Assembly did adopt UN Resolution 60/288, The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, subsequently reaffirming its support for the strategy two sessions later in UN Resolution 62/272 dated September 2008. Both resolutions, however, failed to include a definition for terrorism.

For purposes of this research, the draft UN definition is limits violence to that directed deliberately against civilians. This would seem to exclude violence directed at FSF in support of the same purpose. The joint definition is a little more ambiguous with respect to the target of the violence, only classifying the violence itself as unlawful. “The
calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”⁶⁴ This interpretation seems to include FSF as targets while simultaneously excluding the actions of states while acting in accordance with recognized resolutions or international law governing warfare. It also, in accordance with the aforementioned discussion of the importance of ideology to VEOs, includes ideology in the definition. As such, this definition seems to rectify the point of contention with respect to the use of the word terrorism as a component of the definition of VEOs.

**Contemporary Security Force Assistance**

The U.S. has conducted SFA Operations throughout its history. The turn of the twentieth century saw the U.S. engaged in a COIN fight in the Philippines, a component of which was training the Philippine Scouts to combat the insurgency. World War II found U.S. advisors retraining French troops for combat as well as advising the Nationalist Chinese. This trend continued after World War II, with advising efforts in Greece, Turkey, Korea, and Vietnam.⁶⁵

Contemporary SFA operations have taken many forms, all with the underlying theme of building partner capacity. These operations have been conducted using both SOF, most often SF, as well as conventional forces under the new doctrine set forth in the 2010 *QDR*.⁶⁶ The critical requirement necessary for this research is identifying where SFA operations have been conducted in failed states and ungoverned areas with VEOs. The War on Terror has presented multiple SFA operations, from the obvious choices of Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Horn of Africa, and into South America.
In Africa, Somalia ranks near the top of most lists of failed states, including a number one ranking in the 2009 Failed States Index from Foreign Policy Online.\textsuperscript{67} Somalia has been a home for many different VEOs since the early 1990s. These VEOs include Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyyaa (AIAI), AQ itself, and a recently emerged, extremely violent jihadist cell led by Aden Hashi ‘Ayro. AIAI seems to have acted as a terrorist hub for other groups active in Ethiopia. The Jihadist group led by Aden Hashi ‘Ayro is an example of an evolved terrorist node that operates primarily against westerners in Somalia. AQ has suspected links to AIAI and ‘Ayro, and appears to have developed Somalia as a key hub for attacks throughout East Africa.\textsuperscript{68} Another group that must be classified as a VEO is the pirates that operate off of the coast of Somalia, basing out of Somalia itself. The pirates are not as easily identifiable by group as some other VEOs, and therefore could be overlooked as simply a criminal element out for themselves, which is the prevailing notion by some.\textsuperscript{69} Others, however, view the piracy in terms of various numbers of loosely affiliated groups. The bottom line is that the piracy is centrally located in Somalia and has a significant impact both regionally and internationally.

South America also contains ungoverned areas and failed or potentially failing states. Colombia is one such example. Not only is Colombia a potentially failing state, ranking forty-first out of the one hundred seventy-seven states included in the rankings in Foreign Policy’s Failed State Index\textsuperscript{70}, but the border it shares with Venezuela is also an ungoverned territory. This area suffers from extreme poverty and an armed conflict involving Marxist insurgents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the smaller National Liberation Army (ELN), and the groups constituting the United Self
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). These organizations vie for control of the drug trade in the region and use the porous border to support their illicit transactions, to obtain arms, and to provide safe haven from Colombian forces. Once again, these groups support the concept of heterogeneity with respect to VEOs as they are not Islamic radicals yet still resort to violence to support their ideologies. As with piracy in Somalia, the argument could be made that they are drug-dealing criminals. Similarly, they have also formed distinct groups that represent certain ideologies and represent not only country internal, but also regional threats and therefore should be classified as VEOs and treated as such.

Security Force Assistance in Somalia

Prior to the 9/11 bombings of the World Trade Center, direct military action targeting identified terrorist cells was the predominant U.S. approach to combating terrorism, and by extension VEOs. Direct action (DA) in Somalia clearly demonstrated the difficulty of these operations in addressing VEOs in failed states. The shining example of the failure of DA in Somalia was the operation to neutralize Mohammed Farah Aideed and his subordinate leaders in 1993. The major challenges that confronted U.S. forces during this DA in Somalia were endemic violence, lack of infrastructure, and the complete absence of state security or criminal justice systems.

The road to conducting SFA in Africa was been long and circuitous. After the 1993 conflict in Mogadishu, Somalia, the U.S. withdrew troops from the area and became somewhat isolationist until 1996, when the scale of the Rwandan tragedy became evident and further conflict developed in Burundi. U.S. intervention at this time marked the beginning of initial pseudo-SFA efforts with Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s proposal to create an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), an indigenous African
military force, trained and equipped with the help of the U.S. military, available for deployment to trouble spots on the continent. The ACRF proposal demonstrated the criticality of buy-in from the HN, or in this case multiple nations, not only to the success of SFA programs, but also to their initial implementation.

African criticism to the ACRF initiative was widespread, ranging from accusations of neo-imperial patrimonialism to resentments about the failure to adequately inform or consult with African leaders. As a result, the U.S. shifted its strategy from creating a force to establishing a capacity-building initiative aimed at enhancing existing capabilities of African states to contribute to peacekeeping operations (PKO) in accordance with sovereign decisions of their governments. The resulting program was entitled the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), an SFA-like operation conducted by the U.S. Army 3rd SF Group, which had actually been conducting some limited FID by training African armies since July 1990. The ACRI consisted of a 70-day training cycle with a 6-month follow-up including Field Training Exercises (FTX) and computer-based simulations. During the training, various national battalion-level units received non-lethal peacekeeping training with an emphasis on the development of basic military skills, protection of refugees, operating effectively with humanitarian organizations and the observance of human rights.

The ACRI was accompanied by three other limited scope SFA operations in order to counter the escalation of conflicts occurring throughout Africa in the 1990s. The first, the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program, was created in 1996 to help increase the pool of armed forces capable of participating in multinational peace support operations. The second was the Africa Regional Peacekeeping Program
(ARP), which was created in order to equip, train and support troops from selected
African countries that were involved in PKO. The third was the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program, which offered military education and training
activities to African military officials at facilities in the U.S.

A 2001 interagency review brought about the realization, however, that the
violent nature of African conflicts constituted a growing need to enhance the ability of
African troops to operate in hostile environments and conduct peace enforcement
operations in accordance with chapter 7, in addition to the capacity to conduct nonlethal
PKO in accordance with chapter 6 of the UN Charter. This resulted in the transformation
of ACRI into a new program called the African Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance (ACOTA). ACOTA trained military trainers and equipped African national
militaries to conduct peace support operations and humanitarian relief. One difference
between ACRI and ACOTA is that under ACOTA, African troops were also provided
with lethal military weaponry, including rifles, machine guns and mortars. Another
critical difference between ACRI and ACOTA is that ACOTA is run by the State
Department, which in turn employs contractors to conduct the actual training. U.S.
Military participation is in a supportive, rather than central role in ACOTA programs, a
critical diversion that placed a core competency of DOD under the auspices of DOS.

Post 9/11 saw a greater emphasis being placed on building capacity to combat
VEOs as a primary method of achieving security in failed and potentially failing states
and ungoverned areas. As a result, SFA in Africa underwent further revision in 2004
when ACOTA and EIPC were incorporated into the Global Peace Operations Initiative
(GPOI). The GPOI was a larger program aimed at training and equipping 75,000 military
troops, a majority of them African, for PKO. Correspondingly, U.S. funding to support the GPOI also increased from previous levels. The U.S. spent a total of $154 million on the previous programs ($121 million for ACRI/ACOTA from FY1997-FY2005 and $33 million for EIPC from FY1998-FY2005). It has, however, committed over $660 million to GPOI from FY2005 through FY2009 in addition to continuing with the IMET and ARP programs.79

Building capacity for peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the primary objectives of the previously mentioned programs in Africa, contribute to the fight against VEOs by minimizing ungoverned spaces and diminishing support for VEOs in those spaces. The particular attributes addressed by these programs are primarily environmental in nature, and according to several sources do not build capacity for specifically targeting the VEOs. There are two programs in East Africa, however, that sources classify as counterterrorism and, as such, do support direct targeting of VEOs in and around Somalia, although they also combine SFA with humanitarian programs that “reduce the conditions that lead to terrorism and win hearts and minds in support of the War on Terror,” the same environmental attributes identified in the GPOI, IMET, and ARP.80

The two SFA programs that focus on Somalia and surrounding areas are the East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) and the Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). The EACTI and CJTF-HOA provide the base for U.S. counterterrorism programs. The key goals of U.S. counterterrorism policy in East Africa are containment in Somalia, counterterrorism and the promotion of peace and stability in Sudan, and security partnerships with Kenya and Ethiopia.81 The EACTI is a program of the Department of State (DOS) and established in June 2003 and seeks to bolster the
security of the east African region by channeling funds into several key areas: (1) military training for border and coastal surveillance; (2) programs designed to strengthen the control of the movement of people and goods; (3) aviation security capacity-building; (4) assistance for regional efforts to counter terrorism financing; and (5) police training. Each of these initiatives falls directly under the auspices of increasing the capacity of FSF according to current SFA doctrine. This initiative specifically focuses on containment of the VEO threat, particularly with respect to international terrorism in Somalia and Sudan.

The CJTF-HOA was created post 9/11 to break up terrorism in the Horn of Africa and is the primary DOD effort in the region, falling first under the purview of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and more recently under the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). CJTF-HOA conducts a combination of COIN operations, SFA, and DA missions in its attempts to accomplish its mission. These take the form of short-term operations that are designed facilitate information operations, increase border security, provide counterterrorism training, increase coastal security, and foster intelligence sharing as well as engaging in civil-military operations and civil-affairs operations to support the primary activities. The current problem with CJTF-HOA is that it has focused most of its efforts on training the armies of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. Like the other initiatives in the area, the CJTF-HOA seems to be furthering a containment policy with Somalia and attempting to influence the failed state by strengthening the region instead of targeting either institutions or the VEOs within Somalia itself.

Countering VEOs in terms of piracy off of the coast of Somalia from the landmass itself is also a concern addressed by U.S. strategists. The U.S. strategy for
dealing with piracy as outlined by the NSC, however, deviates from the standard method of building indigenous capacity to combat the threat, instead opting for three lines of action that address piracy in the short-term. The defined lines of action are: (1) prevent pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain to piracy; (2) disrupt acts of piracy consistent with international law and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag States; and (3) ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their actions by facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag, victim and coastal States, and, in appropriate cases, the U.S.. These lines of action focus on “immediate operational measures to prevent, disrupt, and punish acts of Somali pirate organizations,” short term objectives facilitated by a “global partnership” primarily through DA. The plan does address a longer term “whole of government” approach to capacity building as a way forward to combating piracy, stating that the short term methods will be supportive of “longer-term initiatives aimed at establishing governance, rule of law, security, and economic development in Somalia.” These initiatives are never defined or addressed further in this strategy document, leaving the defined short-term goals as the way ahead for battling piracy.

Despite the various programs established to build Somali capacity and that of the region, Somalia continues to lead the various world lists of failed states. The common consensus as to why Somalia remains a safe haven and primary operating base for VEOs is its lack of governance. The current government, the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), controls little more than a few districts of the capital Mogadishu and constantly faces attacks by armed groups. Consequently, this lack of governance restricts regional capacity building efforts to those countries outside of Somalia and not
to Somali security forces, themselves. The various SFA programs that demonstrated marginal success in the region did so because they partnered with governments that, while weak, still enjoyed legitimacy and some minimal level of functionality.89 Per SFA doctrine, the HN is the critical actor in SFA programs. Thus, in truly failed states like Somalia where there is a complete absence of a functioning security sector, there is little venue for absorbing capacity-building efforts.90 By definition, SFA efforts in this environment should be unsuccessful.

Second, the reliance of SFA on collaboration across the interagency toward a common goal is illustrated by SFA efforts in and around Somalia. The importance of utilizing all of the instruments of national power for success in Somalia is clear, however to this point, the majority of the capacity building has been conducted by DOD and DOS with disjointed efforts by numerous other agencies. Insufficient interagency coordination detracts from, rather than adds to, effective U.S. military capacity building. The integration of EIPC and ACOTA into the GPOI framework streamlined parts of the institutional structure, but U.S. support still comes from a variety of independent budgets and offices including at least three in the DOS, and several in the DOD. This leads to a duplication of effort and actually hinders progress more than it helps.

SFA efforts have been significantly increased in eastern Africa since 9/11, with a primary focus on the failed state of Somalia and the VEOs that operate within and around its porous borders. The result of these efforts is a Somalia that maintains its status as a failed state, where the transitional government can only marginally control parts of the capital, and a U.S. policy that is fragmented across the interagency to deal with regional actors in order to “contain” the problem. Most recently, based on the increase in piracy,
U.S. policy has shifted more towards a DA policy reminiscent of 1993. The result has been the same, with acts of piracy continuing to climb and terrorist elements moving about the land with relative impunity.91

Security Force Assistance in Colombia

Colombia represents a cacophony of problems, aside from being one of the major suppliers of cocaine and heroin to the U.S. Colombia is a potentially failing state whose border, primarily with Venezuela, represents an ungoverned area. It is constantly battling VEOs within its borders, although these VEOs represent something different from the Islamic Radicalists found in the Middle East and parts of Africa. Colombia has had a history of political turmoils, manifested in numerous civil wars and punctuated by a ten-year period known as La Violencia that began in 1948. Marxist guerrilla groups, primarily the FARC and the smaller ELN, emerged during La Violencia and have had a military presence throughout large areas of Colombia since the mid 1960’s, particularly along the country’s borders with Panama, Venezuela, and Ecuador. These groups, particularly the FARC, maintain the ability to challenge the central government increased significantly in the 1980s and 1990s, as revenue from illicit activities enabled them to expand their military capabilities to the point that in the mid-1990s the FARC was able to defeat Colombian government forces in battles and actually overran some Colombian military bases.92

The U.S. began advising Colombian military forces during the 1960s in order to defeat the insurgent movements seeking to overthrow the legitimate government and establish a new regime. These advisory efforts were primarily conducted by SOF and aimed at the FARC and the ELN. The first major operation undertaken by
these advisory forces was Plan Lazo, which called for “broad civic action programs within the violence zones and an improved antiviolence system, which coupled with military action, would target for elimination the leading bandit elements of quasi-guerilla forces.” U.S. military involvement consisted of mobile training teams and a small number of SF operating with Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations support. The critical component of Plan Lazo was that while unsuccessful, it was a product of the Colombian government and demonstrated itself as a key actor as part of the SFA effort. Plan Lazo was holistic in nature and supported the Colombian government’s own SSR plan.

With the explosion of the drug trade in the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. efforts in Colombia turned from SFA in support of the going COIN to a counter narcotics focus. SOF forces continued to conduct SFA missions, but lack of unity of effort between the U.S. elements conducting operations and their Colombian counterparts hampered success. This would change in 1998 with the election of President Andres Pastrana, who developed Plan Colombia, a complete social overhaul of Colombian society. The plan included a demilitarized zone for the FARC, which would prove to be a significant drawback, but just as with Plan Lazo, was formulated by the Colombian government. The U.S. contribution came in the form of economic support, equipment, personnel, and training provided by SF, all components of SFA. It also established the interagency condition through its assignment to the DOS for implementation.94

The demilitarized area in the middle of Colombia created an untenable situation for the Colombian government, increasing the power of the FARC, increasing its control over the drug trade, and subsequently making it a more dangerous force for the
Colombian government. The failure of this aspect of Plan Colombia led to the election of President Álvaro Uribe in 2002. He subsequently abrogated the agreement for the demilitarized area and attempted to assert control in the area through military operations. This reprioritization of effort took the form of a rewrite of Plan Colombia enacted by the Colombian government, which was a combination of two previous strategies attempting to seek a balance between civic action and development, counter-drug, and extending governance actions of the past while simultaneously increasing the number of police in municipalities across the country and effecting a new joint military operation called Plan Patriota, which dedicated around 18,000 soldiers to attack the FARC in former demilitarized area. Once again, the critical point is the Colombian government created the plan.

June 2004 illustrated the success of the SFA operations in Colombia. Colombia launched 17,000 Colombian soldiers on its most ambitious military offensive into the FARC heartland, the former demilitarized area. Progress was such that Colombia’s military was capable of developing and exercising command and control (C2) over a four-pronged attack. The main effort conducted a methodical advance into the former demilitarized area and other south-central areas of previously ungoverned space. Three other operations supported the main effort and included: the interdiction of narcotics in Putumayo and the FARC lines of communications leading into Ecuador; clearing operations in Cundinamarca and Meta to maintain the security of the capital; and operations in Arauca and along the oil pipeline to keep the oil flowing and pressure the ELN.
While Colombia remains a nation in turmoil, their capacity to handle their own affairs is steadily increasing, in considerable part due to the contributions of SFA. Plan Patriota can only be considered successful, as it set the conditions for the demobilization of the AUC (systematic demobilization of the AUC between 2003 and 2006 and the subsequent extradition of 15 AUC leaders to the U.S. in 2008. The Colombian military has taken its toll on the FARC, as well. While the FARC has not officially demobilized, it has been cut in half with more than 12,000 have done so since 2002 with 3,027 demobilizing in 2008 alone. Many of the fighters cite the efficacy of the Colombian military among the reasons for their demobilization. Furthermore, the government and armed forces of Colombia have met criteria set by the U.S. Congress related to human rights. The U.S. military set out to not only advise their Colombian counterparts tactically, but also laid the foundation for human rights and the respect of law. As a result of their efforts, the armed forces are second only to the Church as the most respected institution in Colombia.

In addition to the military instrument of power that defines SFA, operations in Colombia were further facilitated by the diplomatic effort that supported Plan Colombia. It has been previously mentioned that the Government of Colombia (GOC) was critical to the development of all security plans and took a leading role in their execution, despite being classified as a potentially failing state. Additionally, the DOS, through the American Embassy in Bogotá, successfully coordinated the interagency actors, GOC, and the military to provide direct support to Plan Colombia. Particularly in the governance realm, these efforts were critical as the interagency worked to legitimize the GOC by controlling corruption. Through these efforts, the GOC passed legislation that targeted
money laundering and the path of money corresponding with narcotics trafficking. Investigative teams were created within the Office of the Prosecutor General to pursue allegations of corruption and an Anti-Corruption Task Force Unit was created to pursue public corruption allegations.\textsuperscript{102} This was critical to the successes of the Columbian military, as progress in governance demonstrated that the military was working for a legitimate civilian authority, thereby garnering legitimacy for the military as well.

The actions of the DOS to coordinate a collaborative effort during the execution of Plan Colombia were essential to the success of the activity. Unity of effort ensured that all elements, to include the GOC, were working toward a common goal, facilitated efficiency in operation, and minimized duplication of effort. While Colombia has not completed its transformation, it is well on the way toward becoming a viable, contributing member of the international community through consistent, coordinated action to achieve this endstate.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., viii.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{4}Ibid., 26.
\item \textsuperscript{5}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{6}Ibid., 27.
\item \textsuperscript{7}General Martin E. Dempsey, “Address to the Command and General Staff College” (Lecture, Eisenhower Auditorium, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 March 2010).
\end{itemize}

10 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07.1, I-1.

11 Ibid., I-3.

12 Ibid., I-7.


14 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.1, v.

15 Ibid., 1-1.


18 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.1, 1-7.

19 Wick, 2.

20 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.1, 6-4.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 1-2.


25 Ibid., 4.


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28 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.1, 1-2.

29 Ibid., 1-8.
30 Ibid., 1-1.

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36 Godson et al., 5.

37 Foreign Policy.

38 Wyler, 4-5.

39 Ibid., 4.

40 Angel Rabasa et al., *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 3.

41 Ibid., 10.

42 Ibid., 8.

43 Ibid., 9.

44 Ibid., 12.

45 Ibid., 16.

46 Ibid.


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Angel Rabasa et al., 169.

Piombo, 7.

Ibid.


87 Ibid., 3.


89 Thomas Dempsey, 22-23.

90 Ibid., 22.

91 Shinn, 40.

92 Angel Rabasa et al., 244.


94 Ibid., 25.

95 Ibid., 26.

96 Angel Rabasa et al., 244.

97 Matelski, 26-27.


101 Teicher, 17.

CHAPTER 5
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This study examined the efficacy of SFA within the context of VEOs and failed and failing states by first examining the doctrine behind the method of building partner capacity through SFA and defining the concepts of VEOs and failed and potentially failing states. This doctrine was then critically reviewed through the analysis of two historical SFA operations, one involving the failed state of Somalia and the VEOs that operate within its borders, and the other the potentially failing state of Colombia and the VEOs that operate there. While the Somalia and the Colombia case studies include important information on SFA within the context of failed and potentially failing states respectively, neither provides specific recommendations for improvement of SFA as a method. The recommendations presented here apply these lessons based on the current strategic method and how to adjust doctrine to achieve the desired results within the current conceptual model.

Interpretations of Findings

In the analysis of current Interagency, Joint, and Army doctrine, this study identifies four specific problems with respect to SFA. First, the taxonomy of SA programs in doctrine restricts SFA to only the military instrument of national power, effectively marginalizing it as a singular method for building capacity. While the other elements of national power are addressed in doctrine, they are addressed primarily as components of other SA programs or vaguely as points for coordination with interagency partners. They are not addressed as integral components of a holistic program that
supports the HN’s SSR. Second, the concept of SFA is predicated on the participation of the HN as a primary actor in the process, yet neither the Department of the Army nor DOD includes the capability to directly affect the governance line of operation as a core competency. This is a critical shortcoming when dealing with failed states or if no legitimate government exists. The result is to marginalize SFA as an effective method of building partner capacity. Third, SFA requires the coordination of a broad spectrum of interagency partners without identifying an architecture to facilitate this collaborative effort. Unity of effort is assumed to exist in something akin to a parallel command structure of interagency organizations where there is no unity of command. This is a problem critical to the execution of SFA and has been consistently identified as problematic in analyses of both historical and contemporary operations. Finally, appropriation of funds for SFA is derived from multiple sources and allocated across uncoordinated agencies. The previously discussed assumption of unity of effort without unity of command is purported to exist along budgetary lines as well. However, as before, lack of unity of command proves problematic in the accomplishment of unity of effort in budgetary execution as well.

The case study on SFA in Somalia further reinforces the doctrinal analysis of SFA through the identification of two major problems related to the conduct of SFA in failed and potentially failing states. First, the lack of legitimate governance coupled with the inability to address governance issues precluded the efficacy of SFA operations in Somalia, an example of a failed state. The second problem relates directly to the vital importance of unity of command. These identified problems clearly and directly support the first three findings identified during doctrinal analysis. Lack of interagency
coordination, while disruptive and inefficient under ideal circumstances, can prove catastrophic when conducting SFA in a failed state. The TFG in Somalia barely exists, and is certainly not functional. It is a prototype for governments of failed states and requires a coordinated whole of government approach to achieve any level of legitimacy.

The case study on SFA in Colombia further reinforces the problems identified during the doctrinal analysis as well as supporting identified differences between SFA in failed states and SFA in potentially failing states. First, operations in Colombia demonstrated that the integration of a legitimate HN government is vital to the success of SFA, specifically with respect to SSR planning. The GOC exemplified the possibilities achievable by a proactive government that takes a vital interest in the formation of its own SSR and IDAD programs and participates in these programs as a key actor. Despite setbacks from questionable strategic decisions early on, continued involvement by the GOC resulted in the success of the program and the stabilization of the country. The second success demonstrates the criticality of unity of command. In Colombia, extensive U.S. government involvement led to a de facto lead agency relationship being established under the purview of the DOS and exercised through the embassy in Bogota.¹ This resulted in unity of effort throughout the operation as well as reinforcing the whole of government concept in the execution of SFA operations.

Recommendations

Based upon the analysis of current SFA doctrine and the contrast of SFA efforts in the failed state of Somalia and the potentially failing state of Colombia, changes are needed to SFA doctrine and interagency interoperability. The following

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recommendations support a whole of government approach to capacity-building executed within a structural framework that facilitates efficiency and unity of effort.

SFA doctrine is unduly restrictive with respect to the elements of national power. SFA should be expanded to encompass all of the elements of national power. Current doctrine explicitly excludes governance and economic issues from the conduct of SFA operations. This is problematic in two areas: integration of the HN into SFA operations and execution of the mandate to sustain FSF advances. First, the integration of the HN into SFA operations is critical because it is the HN that is the supported entity. A failed state is one whose government is incapable of effective governance. A key doctrinal proposition verified by this study is that the key actor in SFA is the HN government. A failed state effectively has no government, and, as a result, the U.S. government proponent for SFA does not have a HN counterpart to work through to affect governance issues. If these facts are true as this study concludes, then SFA, as currently defined, is an ineffective method for building partner capacity in failed states, just as it was in the Somalia case study. Secondly, SFA doctrine denotes the sustainment of local, HN, or regional security forces as a critical component of the SFA mission. Sustainment of security forces inherently includes both governance and economics issues, as the sustaining institutions are generally governmental agencies which rely on the economy for the assets with which to sustain the forces. The exclusion of these issues from Army and Joint SFA doctrine presents an untenable dichotomy to the executing force.

This study will propose several recommendations to address these shortcomings. The first recommendation is to incorporate a whole of government approach formally into SFA doctrine. Modifying SFA doctrine in this manner will require a collaborative
effort between the Department of the Army, DOD, and the interagency, similar to the current collaboration of the joint community to standardize the SFA concept within DOD. SFA doctrine should more closely resemble that of FID, which includes all of the elements of national power in support of a country’s IDAD. The primary difference in the two is that SFA is a supporting effort of a country’s holistic SSR, not just in support of internal defense. The lead agency for SFA must possess the competencies to address governance issues in order to set the conditions for SFA advances. This is particularly true in failed states, where a legitimate government must be established and then supported with extraordinary measures in order to conduct SFA operations. Specifically excluding governance and economic issues from SFA, as does current doctrine, inhibits the SFA concept from being successful in failed states and those states where a government exists but needs assistance to become capable and legitimate. Looking again at the Somalia case study, one of the primary reasons that SFA has to this point been unsuccessful is the lack of a legitimate government to which assistance can be provided and that can be a partner in SFA efforts.

The formal incorporation of the whole of government approach to SFA is only part of the solution, however. Adding responsibility requires the addition of the means to apply towards these requirements. Current SFA doctrine specifies that a collaboration of interagency actors is important to achieve SFA objectives. This collaboration requires significant coordination across interagency boundaries and cultures to synchronize operations. Historically, insufficient interagency coordination impedes capacity-building efforts. U.S. funding for SFA routinely comes from a variety of independent budgets and agencies operating without any single supervising authority providing oversight,
coordination and guidance. This condition creates inefficiency, competing priorities, and duplication of effort. Additionally, the requirement for coordination in this model rests with the various personalities involved because it is not grounded in any type of formal structure that gives legitimate authority to any one agency as the lead. This lack of interagency coordination is a systemic problem that was denoted not only in the Somalia case study, but also in contemporary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The recommendation for solving this problem is twofold – (1) formalizing the command relationships between the various involved agencies and (2) reprogramming budgetary appropriations to centrally manage SFA funding. While doctrinal updates in the first recommendation are achievable through the initiative of DOD in a collaborative effort with the applicable interagency partners, this recommendation falls outside the scope of DOD and must be addressed by the executive and legislative branches of government. Command relationship formalization for the interagency actors would bring the multitude of interagency actors, to include the armed forces, under a single decision-making authority in much the same manner as the Goldwater-Nichols Act formalized the concept of the joint headquarters in the armed forces. This is not to suggest that a separate level of bureaucracy should be established at the national level to oversee all of the various departments and agencies of the federal government. The problem currently resides at the operational level. Current SFA doctrine operates under the principal of unity of effort without unity of command, with the only common decision making authority being the President. As previously mentioned, this is problematic when conducting operations as unity of effort at the operational level is predicated on the interpersonal skills of the leaders of the various agencies. Formalizing a system for
interagency integration at the operational level in a framework similar to that of a joint headquarters, would tremendously increase interagency interoperability.

Formalization of unity of command could be accomplished in a number of ways. The two recommendations set forth in this study are the lead agency method and the joint, interagency task force method. They provide the clearest path to a robust system that can be readily implemented based on comparable joint structures which are currently being used. The lead agency method is characterized by assigning one agency as the lead for SFA operations with all other agencies reporting to it. It also gives the head of the lead agency overall decision-making authority for SFA operations in the designated area of operations. Although informal, SFA operations in Colombia provide a good example of the lead agency structure. All SFA operations in Colombia were coordinated by DOS through the American Embassy in Bogota. While technically the ambassador did not have authority over all of the agencies involved, he exercised “personal power” to coordinate all activities in support of a common objective. The lead agency for each situation should be selected based on the characteristics of the operational environment. For a hostile environment in the midst of high-intensity conflict, as in Iraq or Afghanistan, the appropriate lead agency may be a military joint headquarters. Conversely, in a less hostile environment where the threat is more irregular in nature or in the absence of military conflict, the DOS may be the preferred agency working through the embassy. In either case, the National Command Authority should formalize the command relationship during planning to give the decision maker legitimate authority similar to TACON or OPCON. Manning the lead agency with representatives from each interagency activity, much in the manner of a military joint manning document will give
the lead agency the necessary manpower to control operations and insure that all agencies’ interests are represented. A major advantage to this recommendation is the utilization of pre-existing agencies with minimal requirements for additional manpower. An important disadvantage is the potential utilization of an agency for C2 that is ill-suited for that role.

A second, but similar, method for formalizing a single decision-making authority is the creation of a separate joint, interagency task force. The principle behind the task force’s creation is the same as that of a lead agency, only the structure would change. Instead of choosing one agency to take the lead, the National Command Authority would create a separate task force, complete with a separate manning document, to exercise C2 over the operation. The concept is very similar to the creation of a joint task force (JTF) in the armed forces, only with interagency personnel assigned as well as military. The advantage to this recommendation is that it would create a separate entity whose sole mission is capacity building and that can be tailored to provide the requisite level of C2. The disadvantage is that it builds a completely separate level of authority within an institution with an already bloated bureaucracy. In addition, it would require additional manpower from numerous agencies who are already short-staffed for the missions that they are currently assigned.

Coupled with the formalization of the command structure is the integration of funding for SFA operations under a central programming authority. As funding appropriation falls under the purview of the legislature, Congress would exercise responsibility for the execution of this recommendation, but the proposal would need to be formulated for the administration by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in
the White House. Currently, SC programs are funded through various agencies, with each agency operating independently based on the source of funding for its particular program. For example, according to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, DOS maintains authority for appropriation of all foreign assistance funding Title 22 funds.² This seems, on the surface, to clearly provide what is recommended here. However, there are exceptions to this rule. DOD may fund training of foreign militaries with operation and maintenance funds when the purpose of the training is to enhance interoperability, familiarization, and safety training.³ While technically this type of funding may not be used for SFA, significant gray area exists when determining what training is interoperability, familiarization, and safety and what is SFA. The second exception does relate specifically to SFA, and is the congressional appropriation or authorization to conduct SFA. This exception allows DOD to fund foreign assistance operations if Congress has provided a specific appropriation or authorization to execute the mission.⁴ Currently, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces.⁵ Additionally, Congress may appropriate additional funds to commanders for conducting more complex stability operations, such as the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Iraq Freedom Fund, and Commander’s Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction.⁶ The complexity of funding expands almost exponentially when all of the different sources of funding, which are normally allocated to separate offices or departments throughout the agencies over which there is little operational oversight, are taken into consideration.
The recommendation is that after formalizing a unitary command to exercise oversight of the SFA operation, that agency should be given control over all the funding for the operation. Allocation of funding in this manner will facilitate oversight of spending as the funds are appropriated for various projects in accordance with the campaign plan of the controlling organization. This will mitigate duplication of efforts and inefficiencies currently experienced due to multiple independent funding sources.

**Recommendations for Further Study**

During research and analysis, three areas for further study became apparent: the selection criteria for lead agency status in support of SFA operations, the manning requirements for a joint-interagency task force; and the development of a “Goldwater-Nichols” type interagency integration act. The first area concerns the criteria for designation of lead agency status in support of SFA, or greater stability operations, in the COE. While DOD maintains a wealth of resources and the capability to project power quickly, it may not necessarily be the appropriate choice for lead agency in all cases due to current lack of expertise outside of the military element of national power. Environmental, political, and legal factors should be closely examined to determine the lead agency and possibly when transition should occur from one lead agency to another. This centralization subsequently requires the analysis of appropriate manning levels for a joint-interagency task force for the C2 of SFA operations, which this thesis addresses as a recommendation. This type of organization is a departure from current doctrine, although it somewhat resembles the JTF concept currently adopted by the armed forces, only to include the interagency in a more permanent capacity. The previous issue leads to the third, which is the collaboration of the interagency across bureaucratic borders, which is a
common problem addressed throughout this research as well as in contemporary political debate. This problem, like the joint-interagency task force concept, is not addressed in current doctrine or policy and is divergent from current interagency culture. Further research in any of these areas should focus on the attainment of greater levels of collaboration, coordination, and interoperability holistically across the interagency and not be limited simply to the concepts of SFA support proposed in this study.

Conclusion

While building partner capacity is a legitimate method to achieving the strategic objective of promoting security, operationalizing the method to achieve a whole of government solution remains problematic. The taxonomy for the myriad SA initiatives in existence seems to be partially predicated on funding and partially on purpose, unnecessarily stratifying the process. The doctrinal solution to this complex problem is unstructured collaboration between international, interagency, and joint partners operating in parallel toward an assumed common goal. The primary problem with this method is that it is environmentally dependent. The lack of formal structure means that the efficacy of the process is predicated on the ability of various personalities to reach agreed-upon courses of action that are executed independently, but that are mutually supportive. Additionally, the doctrinal separation requires these numerous agencies to operate in concert in separate programs funded by independent sources. Under ideal conditions, these doctrinal abnormalities would prove difficult to coordinate. With respect to the conduct of SFA within failed states, the lack of a structurally defined framework to deal with the absence of the HN results in SFA as currently structured being an ineffective method for building partner capacity.
The recommended changes offered in this study attempt to reconcile the doctrinal anomalies and develop a framework in which joint, interagency, and international partners can coordinate and collaborate to achieve a common objective. By incorporating a whole of government approach formally into SFA doctrine, agencies executing SFA operations will have the necessary competencies defined within a doctrinal system to deal with not only countries that have some form of legitimate governance, but also those failed states with no effective governance. This will enable agencies to be much better prepared. Formalizing the command relationships between the various involved agencies will effectively remove the current process of ad hoc collaboration and replace it with a single decision-making authority to insure unity of effort throughout the operation. Finally, reprogramming budgetary appropriations to centrally manage SFA funding through the designated decision-maker will further enhance the unity of effort by increasing efficiency and mitigating duplication of effort while increasing oversight of authorized programs. These recommendations, while contrary to the culture of the interagency and military communities alike, are necessary to further refine the method chosen to build partner capacity in order to promote security. When aligned beside the prospect of the proliferation of VEOs in failed states, the benefits of change far outweigh the costs.

1Hartung, 6.

2Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.1, B-4.

3Ibid., B-5.

4Ibid.

6Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.1, B-4.
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