EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED NATION’S MISSIONS IN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF UNAMSIL, MONUC, AND UNAMID

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

By

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**Effectiveness of United Nation’s Missions in Africa: A Comparative Assessment of UNAMSIL, MONUC, and UNAMID**

Major David Kimaiyo Chemwaina Tarus, Kenya Army.

UN missions in Africa reflect the changing nature of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations which involve large scale deployment of UN peacekeepers to settle mostly intrastate conflicts. The main question this thesis addresses is “What are some of the factors that determine the success or contribute to the failure of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa?”

The UN has been called upon to intervene and to “maintain peace and security” in Africa on many occasions by providing resources and peacekeepers. However, without a framework of intervention to resolve such conflicts, UN peacekeeping operations have been inconsistent at best resulting with some mission failure and some successfully celebrated.

Based on a thorough assessment of the three case studies of UNAMSIL, MONUC, and UNAMID, the author has identified eight factors which, in his view, can contribute to the effectiveness of UN missions in Africa. These factors are effectiveness of the UN mandates, control of natural resources found in the mission area which fuel conflict, commitment to peace agreements by main actors, capacity and capability of the UN missions peacekeepers, effectiveness of economic embargoes and sanctions, the influence by main actors and cooperation of regional actors, effectiveness of UN leadership in the mission and effectiveness of regional organizations’ intervention in the mission area before the deployment of UN peacekeepers.

**Subject Terms**

Effectiveness of United Nations’ Missions in Africa Case Study, UNAMSIL, MONUC, UNAMID, UN Missions in Africa, UNSCR.

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**Abstract**

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Thesis Title: Effectiveness of United Nation’s Missions in Africa: A Comparative Assessment of UNAMSIL, MONUC, and UNAMID.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement).
ABSTRACT

EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED NATION’S MISSIONS IN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF UNAMSIL, MONUC, AND UNAMID, by Major David Kimaiyo Chemwaina Tarus 145 pages.

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Based on a thorough assessment of the three case studies of United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), and the United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the author has identified eight factors which, in his view, can contribute to the effectiveness of UN missions in Africa. These factors are effectiveness of the UN mandates, control of natural resources found in the mission area which fuel conflict, commitment to peace agreements by main actors, capacity and capability of the UN missions peacekeepers, effectiveness of economic embargoes and sanctions, the influence by main actors and cooperation of regional actors, effectiveness of UN leadership in the mission and effectiveness of regional organizations’ intervention in the mission area before the deployment of UN peacekeepers.
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<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance</td>
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Defence Forces</td>
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<td>ADFL</td>
<td>Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>APC</td>
<td>Armored Personnel Carrier</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
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<td>CFC</td>
<td>Ceasefire Commission</td>
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<td>CITS</td>
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<td>COE</td>
<td>Country Owned Equipment</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CTO</td>
<td>Compensatory Time Off</td>
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<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament Demonstration Resettlement and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Darfur Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>FAR</td>
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<td>FDLR</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
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<td>HCA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement</td>
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<td>HF</td>
<td>High Frequency</td>
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<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>JEM</td>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<td>JSR</td>
<td>Joint Special Representative</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<td>Light Support Package</td>
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<td>MCPMR</td>
<td>Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution</td>
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<td>MGS</td>
<td>Military Group Site</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
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<td>NCP</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>NMRD</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
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<td>PEO</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
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<td>RCD</td>
<td>Congolese Rally for Democracy</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>South African Development Community</td>
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<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General</td>
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<td>SLA</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Army</td>
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<td>SLM</td>
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<td>SPLA</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

UNAMID…is an unprecedented joint operation. It reflects our shared determination to end the tragedy in Darfur once and for all.
— UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon

Background

Peace keeping is a core function of the United Nations (UN). Its ability to conduct peacekeeping is a remarkable instrument developed by the UN as a way to assist countries in conflict to create a lasting peace. To date, the United Nations has established a total of 63 peacekeeping operations around the world. The UN has been successful in some of these missions, others have continued to operate for many years and some have failed to achieve their mandate. The UN has tried its best to meet the demands of the different conflicts and changing political landscape. Most of these UN peacekeeping missions have taken occurred after the Cold War period. Indeed, the post-Cold War world has turned out to be disorderly and dangerous. The challenge posed by conflict-prone states is likely to persist into the foreseeable future. According to the Failed States Index 2009, there are no fewer than 40 failing states today, many of which are the source of the world’s worst problems of instability, conflict and violence (Herbst 2009, 21).

As of 31 January 1988, the UN was still engaged in five long-term peacekeeping missions. One was an intrastate and four were interstate missions. The long-term missions are Kashmir to observe the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan; Cyprus; Korea; and the other two peacekeeping operations were one in the Middle East.
and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) of 1948 which was to oversee a truce agreement between the newly created state of Israel and Palestine. These operations typically involved lightly armed troops from small UN member states.

The other issue is that early peacekeeping operations (PKOs) normally responded to mostly traditional interstate conflicts, but in recent times, peacekeeping operations are more often established to resolve intrastate conflicts, which have become internationalized. In the last 20 years since the end of the Cold War, the number of UN peacekeeping operations of this multi-dimensional scope numbered 41 missions in contrast with 16 that the UN ran between 1945 and 1989 (Herbst 2009, 22). Eight of them addressed interstate issues, and thirteen peace operations dealt with complex intrastate conflict (Ghali 1995). The African continent currently hosts nearly half of all the active UN peacekeeping missions with 81 percent of 54,000 UN peacekeepers currently serving in Africa. Four of the five largest operations, with a total of over 50,000 peacekeepers are in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Southern Sudan, Liberia, and Cote D’Ivoire (Faris 2006, 34). Accompanying this increase in the number of peacekeeping missions was a fundamental change and expansion in the nature of the missions. Intrastate conflicts were the result of increased ethno-political boundaries, lack of legitimate governments and political leaders and the emergence of armed groups. The main protagonists in most of these intrastate conflicts were not only the regular armies but included groups of armed militia. Most of these conflicts were characterized by “random” killings, and large outflow of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Traditional peacekeeping mainly serves to preserve a previously agreed upon truce or agreement between opposing armed forces (Hurdt 1995, 103). The fundamental
peacekeeping guidelines laid down during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 and remain relevant are:

1. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) must authorize the operations.
2. Conflicting parties must agree on UN involvement.
3. The UN must be neutral toward both parties.
4. Coercive force may be used by peacekeepers only for self-defense.
5. Participation is on a voluntary basis and must exclude states with interests in the conflict (Meisler 1955, 335).

UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa (1997 to 2010)

Between 1997 and 2009 UN has seen an increase in peacekeeping missions in Africa more than any other continent. Africa has been a giant laboratory for UN peacekeeping and has tested the capacity and political resolve of the 15-member UNSC. Since 1960, UN has deployed 26 peacekeeping missions in Africa as shown in figure 1 (United Nations 2010e). The objective is to focus on three mission case studies, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Tabulated in Annex A to this thesis is the list of past and present UN PKOs in Africa.

Of the UN missions conducted in Africa, some were successful and closed down while others have been running for many years without any signs of accomplishing their missions. Some have just been established recently. For example, the UNAMID was established in 2007. The basic requirements to run a successful UN peacekeeping
operation, as described by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, are as follows:

1. A clear and practicable mandate (resolution) for action.
2. The determination and contributions of member states to implement the resolution.
4. Effective command and control arrangements.
5. Adequate financial and logistical support to see the operation to a conclusion (Ghali 1992, 50).

Africa’s principal regional organization, the African Union (AU) and sub-regional organization, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have been looking forward to assuming conflict management responsibilities. The AU has undertaken peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Somalia, and Sudan, while ECOWAS has conducted operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire. The other sub-regional organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Community of Saharan and Sahelian States have been busy. African troops may be available, but they are not yet self-sustaining and often lack logistical support (Holt and Shanahan 2005, 9).

Some operations enjoyed a greater degree of success while others have been controversial and counter-productive. Unfortunately, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) did not demonstrate a political will and a resolve to act in the Darfur mission. Severely lacking amongst Africa’s regional organizations are the adequate structural,
institutional, and military resources to independently prepare, execute, and sustain effective peacekeeping missions (Taft 2006, 13).

This thesis will examine the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and how the UN can better resource and utilize the UNAMID mission to achieve a lasting peace in Darfur.

Problem Statement

The UN has tried to make this world a peaceful place and many lessons have been learned from previous peacekeeping missions. The nature of current peacekeeping missions has changed drastically from traditional peacekeeping to the complex multi-dimensional operations. Currently, the UN is running extremely complex missions, some which have lasted for more than a decade. Despite the complexities of the conflicts, many countries are risking the lives of their soldiers in order to bring peace to conflict areas. Most of the missions involve the large-scale deployment of UN troops. Ever since the UN was established in 1945, it has established many peace keeping operations, with Africa accounting for the highest number of these missions. Unfortunately, only few of the UN missions have been successfully handled or resulted in a lasting peace. Currently there are 6 UN missions running in Africa as shown in figure 1. How can the UN better resource and utilize PKO missions in Africa to be more effective and successful?
The African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed under the auspices of the AU and later the UN approved the deployment of UN peacekeeping mission to take over from AMIS. These two missions were to address the Darfur conflict but did not bear much fruit. The UN established a hybrid mission, called United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which took over in 1 January 2008. As of yet, a peaceful situation has not been achieved. There are isolated cases of killings and hijackings reported periodically. Having worked with AMIS and UNAMID, it is evident that there are more issues that the UN can address. Everybody wishes to have a strong, adequately funded

Figure 1. Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Missions

and resourced UN mission which is able to carry out its mandate. The research will focus on the UNAMID mission and compare it with two other case studies the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) using identified variables which are discussed in chapter 2.

**Proposed Research Question**

The main thesis statement is: How can the United Nations better resource and utilize PKO missions in Africa, such as UNAMID, to be more effective and successful in setting the conditions for a lasting peace? Comparison case studies of UNAMID and two UN missions in Africa focusing the analysis using the following variables:

1. The effectiveness of the UN mandates of the mission.
2. Effective control of natural resources found in the mission area that fuel the conflict.
3. Commitment to the peace agreement by the main actors to the conflict.
4. Effective complete or partial economic sanctions in the mission.
5. Influence by external actors and cooperation of regional actors.
6. The characteristic and capacity of the mission’s peacekeepers.
7. Effective UN leadership in the UN mission.
8. Effectiveness regional organization intervention in the mission.

**Secondary Questions**

In answering the primary question, the following secondary questions will be addressed:
1. What factors determine the success of UN missions in Africa?
2. What are the key similarities and differences between UN missions in Africa?
3. What role has regional organizations played in resolving conflicts in Africa?
4. Can UN military action effectively set the conditions for long term political settlement in African conflict areas?
5. What are the challenges facing UN peacekeeping missions in Africa today?

Objectives/Significance

The objective of this research is to analyze and examine some of the factors that have contributed to the success and failure of UN missions in Africa, and how these missions can be better resourced and structured to effectively resolve the conflicts. In this study, the researcher shall then suggest recommendations on the possible issues which need to be addressed for a lasting peace to be achieved in Darfur. This research will compare the UNAMID in Sudan with the MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone with the hope of determining how to better achieve mission success in conflict resolution.

Assumptions

The main assumption in this thesis is that, the UN will continue to employ peacekeeping forces as a primary means of conflict resolution in Africa.

Scope and Limitations of the Research

The major limitation during the study was little literature has been written about the Darfur conflict from 2007 to present. The researcher will not be able to visit the DRC and Sierra Leone. However, his previous experience and photographs he took while in
Darfur from March 2007 to February 2008 will be the primary reference source of information for the Darfur conflict. In addition, the researcher will gather more secondary information from books on Darfur, the DRC and Sierra Leone conflicts, the United Nations, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) documents, periodicals, journals, and newspapers. The scope of the research was restricted to African conflicts between the periods 1992 to February 2010. Any new development occurring in the field touching on this study after February 2010 will not be considered.

**Delimitations**

The scope of this thesis calls for a necessary delimitation. The purpose of the research is not to provide for an accurately measured assessment of the African conflicts. Its objective is to identify the effectiveness of UN missions in Africa and make recommendations of actions that can assist in African UN missions becoming more successful and bringing a lasting peace.

**Definition of Key Terms**

For increased clarity and common reference, some key terms are defined as follows:

- **Africa**: The common geographical delimitation of the African continent.
- **Conflict**: A situation that arise when individuals or groups identify a goal they want to secure in order to satisfy material interests, needs or values, and these perceptions lead to actions that come up against the interests, needs and values of others.
- **Darfur**: Encompass the three states of Western, Southern and Northern Darfur.
**Genocide:** Any act committed with the intention of destroying in whole or part a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.

**GoS Soldiers:** Government of Sudan armed military soldiers deployed in Darfur which include Army, Air force and Police.

**Great Lakes Region:** Means the group of states within or bordering the Great Rift Valley system of East and Central Africa (Lusaka Peace Agreement 1999).

**Hybrid:** An authorized joint contribution of African Union and United Nations peacekeepers in Darfur.

**Internally Displaced Persons:** Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or man-made disaster and who have not crossed an international border (Darfur Peace Agreement 2006, 7).

**Interahamwe:** Armed militia who carried out genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

**Janjaweed:** Armed Arabs nomads who ride on horses and donkeys that are commonly viewed as proxy forces of the GoS in Darfur.

**Peace Enforcement Operations:** The application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order as defined in the UN Charter and typically referred to as chapter 7 operations (JP 3-07.3 2007).

**Peacekeeping Operations:** Are military operations undertaken with the consent of all the main parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of
an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement commonly referred to as chapter 6 operations (JP 3-07.3 2007).

**Sanctions:** These are measures not involving the use of force applied in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such measures are commonly referred to as sanctions or embargoes. Their legal basis is emphasized in order to underline that the purpose of sanctions is to modify the behavior of a party that is threatening international peace and security and not to punish or otherwise exact retribution (United Nations 2010).

**State:** Is identified by territory, people, government, sovereignty and must be have international recognition.

**Summary and Conclusion of Chapter 1**

United Nations peacekeeping operations have changed significantly thus warranting larger and more robust UN Forces. This is as a result of the complex nature of conflicts in the current era. The Darfur conflict started in 2003, and the AU took some efforts by establishing a force to address the conflict. The various actors of the Darfur conflict are well armed and the region is so vast that these peacekeeping forces were outstretched logistically, and personnel wise that the force could not be effective. With the assistance of the international community, the force transitioned into a hybrid force in 2008. UNAMID is a more robust peacekeeping force which will be the largest UN mission ever. Regrettably, the force still lacks the required resources to effectively patrol and provide security to the civilians in Darfur. All in all, the Darfurians are highly optimistic that UNAMID has what it takes to set conditions for a long term peace in Darfur.
Chapter 2 will examine the various variables selected for use in the research methodology and discuss the associated literature pertaining to successful UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. The review will include the author’s personal experience in African peacekeeping missions in Sudan, AMIS and UNAMID. This will provide an appropriate starting point on how African UN missions can be better resourced and utilized to effectively establish a lasting peace in Africa.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Protection of civilians and bringing peace to Darfur define the main purpose of UNAMID’s mandate.

— Henry Anyidoho, UNAMID Deputy Head of Mission, 30 June 2008.

This chapter will examine the various variables selected for use in the research methodology and discuss the associated literature that is relevant to answering the primary and secondary research questions presented in chapter 1. It will also discuss the literature pertaining to successful UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. The literature review includes relevant published books, UN reports and resolutions, internet sources, journals, newspapers reports, and the author’s personal experience while in Darfur, Sudan.

The UN and regional organizations have established peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to resolve many conflict areas in Africa. The missions which have been undertaken in Africa between 1993 and 2010 (post Boutros Ghali Reforms period) are: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Central African Republic (CAR), Morocco (Western Sahara), Eritrea, Burundi, Mozambique, and Namibia among others. Most of these missions involved large-scale deployment of peacekeepers. Unfortunately, only a few of these PKOs have been successfully handled resulting in a lasting peace (Ogada 2008). Two missions UNAMSIL and MONUC are selected as a case study in this thesis and will be compared with UNAMID in Sudan. These three African missions were as a result of intrastate civil
conflicts. They involved a variety of tasks ranging from ending succession in mineral-rich Congo, to facilitating the feeding of starving people in the war-torn Somalia, to disarming and demobilizing soldiers in poverty-stricken Mozambique, to managing a transition to independence in apartheid-ruled Namibia, to registering voters for a self-determination referendum in the sands of Western Sahara (Adebayo and Landberg 2007).

The primary question to be addressed is: How can the United Nations better resource and utilize UN peacekeeping missions in Africa to be more effective and be able to set conditions for a lasting peace? Comparison case studies of MONUC in the DRC, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, and UNAMID in Sudan will focus the analysis using the following variables that are identified immediately after the following secondary questions:

The secondary questions to be addressed are:

1. What factors lead to the success of UN missions in Africa?
2. What are the key similarities and differences between the three UN missions?
3. What impact has regional organizations played in resolving conflicts in Africa?
4. Can UN military action effectively set the conditions for a long term political settlement in African conflict areas?
5. What are the challenges facing UN peacekeeping missions in Africa?

Variables Selected and Explanation

The successes and failures of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa are often contingent on domestic and regional dynamics. A number of variables are identified and selected in order to analyze what factors are most likely to contribute to successful peacekeeping missions in Africa. It is necessary to note that the presence or absence of
some of the factors do not necessarily determine the outcome of the mission. The variables being analyzed are:

1. Effectiveness of the UN mission mandate.
2. Effective control of resources found in the mission area that fuel the conflict.
3. Commitment to the peace agreement by the main actors to the conflict.
4. Effective complete or partial economic sanctions in the mission.
5. Influence by external actors and cooperation of regional actors.
6. Characteristic and capacity of the UN mission’s peacekeepers.
7. Effectiveness of UN leadership in the UN mission.
8. Effectiveness of Regional Organization intervention in the mission.

To be able to understand these missions better, each case study will be analyzed to include the general overview of the country, context, and description of the UN mission in each country - looking at the variables identified. It is worth noting that the absence of these factors is not an automatic determinant of the outcome of these peacekeeping missions. All the factors will clearly not be met in every case of success or failure (Adebajo and Landsberg 2000). At the end the thesis, a summarized account of the selected variable in each country and how they relate to each other will be presented.

Variables Being Analyzed

Effectiveness of the UN Mission’s Mandate

Mandates are not easily defined or quantifiable; a concrete legal definition of a mandate does not exist. A working definition is a request or direction for action by the UN Secretariat of other implementing entity, which derives from a resolution of the UN Security Council, General Assembly or one of the other relevant organs. Mandate serves
various functions. Some request reports, while others request operational activities in the field (United Nations 2006).

The majority of traditional peacekeeping operations are established according to Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, which means these missions had been invited in by the warring factions and authorized to use force only for purposes of self-defense. The objectives of these PKOs were to observe, monitor, and facilitate the implementation of the peace agreements. The term Peace Support Operation (PSO) was later coined by the military to cover peacekeeping (chapter 6) and peace enforcement (chapter 7) operations. Currently, the term PSO is used more widely to embrace not only peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but also those related aspects of peacekeeping pertaining to conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building, and humanitarian operations. This is because modern conflicts, as earlier stated, are more of intrastate and have become complex in nature (Vladimir 2002).

Chapter 6 and “one-half” is not a provision of the UN Charter but is a notional concept applying to the multi-dimensional operations which, while originally mandated under chapter 6, are forced by realities in the field to not be as peaceful as a chapter 6, but almost requiring a level of force needed for chapter 7 operations. An example of such an operation includes when humanitarian convoys need to be defended by UN forces (Mihalas 2006, 28).

Chapter 7, on the other hand, is essentially coercive and designed to deal with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression perpetrated by sovereign states. The UNSC is empowered through this chapter to investigate alleged violations and determine measures to be taken against the state concerned. These
measures include provisional ones without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned (Article 40), political and economic pressures (Article 41) and the use of force (Article 42). Peace enforcement operations are normally delegated to a military alliance of states willing to take the lead to enforce the UN mandate (United Nations Charter).

The UNSC determines the mandate for a mission. It is therefore important to know what type of mandate was authorized by the UNSC for the UN mission in the respective area and their effectiveness since the two mandate chapters are different in terms of use of force. Chapter 7 is more robust than chapter 6. The challenge has been the exploitation of the weakness in mandates by warring parties often leading to death of UN peacekeepers and/or locals. UN missions therefore need to be straight forward, operational, and have effective mandates.

The United Nations Operations Mission in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) is an example of a successful mission. The then UNSG described the accomplishment of its mandate as a remarkable achievement (The Blue Helmets 1996, 337). A number of factors contributed to its success ranging from clarity of the UNOMOZ mandate, a strong commitment to peace and reconciliation demonstrated by the Mozambican people and their leaders, consistent support provided crucial diplomatic and financial support to the peace process and UN had an effective and energetic UN Special Representative, Mr. Aldo Ajello (Adebajo and Landsberg 2000).

In contrast, UN troops of United Nations Operations Mission in Somalia II were quarantined at Mogadishu Airport by militias without a response from the UN forces due to lack of a clear mandate. In 2005 between March and May, the Bangladesh contingent
in MONUC in the DRC lost 10 peacekeepers due to an ineffective mandate (United Nations 2010).

Effective Control of Natural Resources Found in the Mission Area that Fuel the Conflict

Africa has failed to utilize the abundant God given natural resources wisely for the betterment of its people. Instead competition for oil, diamonds, and other precious resources in Africa by local, regional, and external parties continue to play a crucial role in some African conflicts either in suppressing conflicts or sustaining them to facilitate access to the resources. As the conflicts take place in countries where systems of taxation have collapsed and physical infrastructure has been destroyed, trade and any form of business are cut off and a climate of insecurity arises that prohibits investment. The parties to the conflict have to seek alternative, exploitative forms of financing themselves and their operations. Most actors raise their money through looting and plundering through illegal trading in resources such as narcotic drugs, arms, oil, diamonds, illegal immigrants, cigarettes or alcohol through support from sympathetic states and other networks established.

Natural resource looting is the uncontrolled and often results in the illegal extraction of natural resources; this commonly occurs during extended conflicts. In this context, the natural environment is often badly impacted and has a role in sustaining the conflict thus making the mission unsuccessful. Those who benefit from such conflicts are surrounding governments or international arms merchants and dealers exploiting minerals from the states in conflict. The control of these resources provides finance to the various factions and gives them a means to sustain and prolong the conflict.
Commitment to the Peace Agreement
by the Main Actors to the Conflict

Peace agreements are seen to have both past and present functions. They must end the fighting and at the same time lay the foundation for sustainable peace. Traditionally, most studies on intrastate peace agreements have concentrated on the first function, assessing whether an agreement succeed in ending violence and prevented a relapse into war (Oliver, Hugh, and Woodhouse 1999).

In the *An Agenda for Peace, 1992* by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN concludes that peace agreements can contribute to peace building by including provisions for reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting political participation. Almost ten years later, the UN Secretary-General took a similar position. At the 2001 Fourth High-level UN-Regional Organizations Meeting on the Framework for Cooperation in Peace-building, the Secretary-General proposed a process to ensure that peace settlements mediated by the UN and regional organizations included commitments by the parties to the conflict to concerted post-conflict action with respect to good governance, democratization, human rights and sustainable development (Ghali 1992).

Effective Complete or Partial Economic Sanctions in the Mission

In the interest of maintaining peace and security, the UNSC can issue sanctions, an international response that is stronger than a diplomatic note but falls short of a declaration of war. The mandate for use of this instrument has been with the UN Charter since 1945. The goal is to influence states and non-state actors in the targeted country but also to avoid negative humanitarian effects (Wallensteen, Staibano, and Eriksson 2003).
Sanctions usually consist of a ban on the sale and shipment of products to a country and on the purchase of its exports. Economic sanctions are usually the most important of all sanctions imposed on a country. They imply “the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade and financial relations” (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990, 9). These are preventive or enforcement measures against any state and are sanctioned by the UNSC. For example, the UN reached a consensus on the use of mandatory economic sanctions during the Rhodesian crisis between 1965 and 1979. In 1965, the Rhodesian government issued a unilateral Declaration of Independence; the UNSC immediately called on all UN members to impose voluntary sanctions on Rhodesia. A year later, these sanctions became mandatory for all countries that had signed the UN Charter, Article 25 of which states that all UN members have agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the UNSC (Rossignol 1996).

Economic sanctions as punitive measures have the potential to be an effective tool. They may help to encourage political dialogue and diminish the protagonists to sustain a prolonged fight. The imposition of arms embargo in particular, can help to diminish the availability of arms with which to pursue a conflict by making the acquisition of weapons more difficult and more expensive (United Nations 1997, 25).

Influence by External Actors and Cooperation of Regional Actors

The variable of external actors will focus on conflicts in a state that is being actively supported and sponsored or influenced by external actors. Some actors are known to supply arms to the belligerents they favor, thereby making the conflicts more
deadly and making difficult to achieve and preserve peace. Due to the permeability of African borders, many conflicts have received overt support and sanctuary by external states and actors thus making the conflicts internationalized. State armies are sometimes replaced by private security forces, personal militia and bandit gangs, where the armed no longer wear uniforms, there are no frontlines and no separation between civilians and the military (Gotab 2002, 38).

For example, state and non-state actors have on occasion caused UN peacekeeping operations considerable difficulties that have threatened missions. When the intervening powers do not include the neighboring countries, it is critical that the neighbors be required to deny sanctuary to any factions.

The Characteristic and Capacity of the UN Mission’s Peacekeepers

The non provision of adequate manpower, equipment and other materials resources is identified by this study to be a challenge leading to ineffectiveness of UN missions in Africa. This variable will therefore address the capacity of UN peacekeepers in terms of adequate funding, adequate strength of personnel, equipment and logistical support. These resources are the core of the mission planning and readiness, and are crucial to the overall success of the mission. Each troop contributing country (TCC) provides its own contingent owned equipment (COE) ranging from arms, ammunition, food, transport, and communication equipment.

All peacekeeping operations require significant commitment on the part of the TCCs, specifically the willingness to accept financial costs for purchasing and maintaining country owned equipment (COE) and dealing with personnel casualties. All
UN members must always consider participating in these operations in the interest of promoting international and regional stability. For effective deterrence, it depends on force capability and will. To deter the belligerent, the UN force must be able to convince the rebels that they have less military capability.

In the African context, South Africa has been identified as one state that is capable of executing effective peacekeeping operations on the continent. This is evident by the fact that South Africa’s military capabilities appear impressive (Shelton 1997, 2). Peacekeeping missions are expensive to operate. Many member states are more and more reluctant to participate in UN peacekeeping operations because of the high costs involved. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali confirmed that some member states refused to take part in future operations until they are paid. He summarized the problem before the UNSC in 1996 saying “You give me a mandate for a peacekeeping mission. But you do not give me the troops and the money I need to implement that mandate” (Jane’s Defense Journal 1997, 21).

Pieterse opines that policy makers and military leaders lump their criticisms and needs together under the rubric of resources and inadequate control capacity compelled by a mismatch between mandates and the resources required to carry them out (Pieterse 1997, 89).

Effectiveness of UN Leadership in the Mission

The Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) is a senior UN representative in the field and is a functional extension in the field of the Secretary-General (SG). The SRSG is a potentially valuable asset to the SG in pursuit of the reform process. The SRSG’s position is important and could enhance UN effectiveness (Hooper
The first responsibility for the SRSG is to implement the mission’s mandate. The SRSG is often at the centre of the operational relationships in the field among the UN Secretariat, the wider UN family of agencies, funds and programmes, other international organizations, the parties to the conflict and donor countries. The SGRG’s authority could be enhanced by involving him in meetings between the SG and parties, member state as well as through visible support from the SG within and outside the UN system.

In the UNSC’s 1997 reform proposals include a number of measures aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of field-based peace building operations (United Nations 1997). These operations or missions are usually headed by officials chosen by the SG and holds the title of Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). Whatever form the peace agreements take, they mark tentative end to the fighting and a new phase in the peace process. The SRSG’s overarching purpose is to help prevent the re-occurrence of violent conflict and to help advance the peace process. The SRSG, in most circumstances, is called upon to help consolidate the peace process by working to bring all parties to the table, including those who may have been excluded during the previous phase of negotiations (Generic Guidelines for a Strategic Framework Approach for Responses to and Recovery from Crisis 1997).

Effectiveness of Regional Organization Intervention in the Mission

Besides UN peacekeeping in Africa, the African Union (AU), and several sub-regional organizations (i.e. ECOWAS or SADC), have also contributed significantly to peacekeeping efforts on the African continent. With the UN often overstretched and politically hamstrung, African regional organizations and actors have not only shown a
greater propensity to quickly intervene, but have also demonstrated a significant willingness to endure casualties to their personnel, thereby reducing the likelihood of failed missions (Nguyen 2002, 481).

The proximity of the regional organizations (ROs) to the theater of conflict gives them incisive knowledge into the genesis of those conflicts and of the key players involved. The ROs are not only inherently endowed with cultural sensitivity and local knowledge of their region, but these factors provide them with a better ability to utilize early warning systems (Lepgold 2003, xiii). While the UNSC was deliberating over whether the violence in Darfur equated to genocide, for example, the AU was sending 4,000 troops to the region.

The March 1999 UN Report also acknowledges some of the advantages of using regional organizations in resolving disputes such as their better knowledge about the root causes of a conflict as well as parties and personalities involved in the conflict. They may be more flexible than the UN in the allocation of resources and are able to deploy assets, including troops, faster than the UN. The UN’s report further states that rich regional organizations are able to provide adequate resources to support their own operations (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 1999, 12).

Author’s Personal Experience in Darfur

The author served as an AU Military Observer with AMIS from 15 February 2007, and later with UNAMID, from 1 January 2008. He witnessed AMIS being rehatted to form a hybrid UN force, UNAMID. He also witnessed the operational challenges facing the peacekeepers in the mission. As an operations officer in Darfur, Sector 7, the major operational challenges that contributed to the ineffectiveness of AMIS were its
mandate, the terrain and weather, funding, insufficient troops, and inadequate communications and logistics (Tarus 2007).

Mandate of the Mission

The mandate of AMIS included monitoring and observing compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCA) of 8 April 2004, to include all such agreements in the future, and to assist in the process of confidence building. AMIS was also required to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to their homes, in order to assist in increasing the level of compliance of all parties with the HCA and to contribute to the improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur (Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement 2004).

This mandate was grossly inadequate and led to the underperformance of AMIS. The mandate of the force did not take into consideration the operational capabilities of the various forces on the ground and this led to a lot of unfounded expectations from the locals. When these expectations were not met the locals got disappointed. This disappointment eventually led to frustration and apprehension against the force. There was growing animosity against the force that resulted in incidences of hatred and acts of violence against AMIS and UNAMID. The AU was unable to review the mandate and improve on the force until UNAMID took over in 2008 (Tarus 2007).

Terrain and Weather

The geography of Darfur represented a difficult terrain for the AMIS forces to operate in. The terrain in Darfur is generally a flat featureless typical of the arid region.
One of the greatest challenges is its sandy nature. This proved extremely difficult to operate in. There were cases of vehicles getting bogged and troops falling sick as a result of sand. The weather, on the other hand was equally harsh, with high temperatures in the day and low temperatures at night. Most of the troops came to the mission area unprepared for that type of weather and terrain. This made it difficult for the operation (see photo 1). During the rainy season, the wadis are filled with water and there are no bridges over them. This, coupled with the sandy nature, created marshy areas in the rainy season making it difficult for operations and resulted in very little activity during the rainy period. Thus, there is a need to have increased air mobility and engineer efforts.

Figure 2. Patrol from Zalinge stuck for 3 days

Insufficient Troops Capacity

The Darfur region is vast covering an expanse approximately the size of France. The 7,000 peacekeepers of AMIS were grossly inadequate to fully deploy and have a
presence over the entire region. The force was unable to effectively monitor and report on the HCA violations in Darfur. The force was so thinly deployed such that it had no reserve force to cater for unforeseen contingencies. This contributed to the failure to react to the Haskanita attack of 30 September 2007 where the team site was overrun by rebels resulting in the death of 10 peacekeepers. Air assets were provided by civilian contactors who were not willing to take risks which limited them from flying at night. For example, Sector 7 had 3 team sites. One team site, Mukjar, was about 160 kilometers away from the other nearest team site. In case of any attack on this team site, reinforcement would take 6 hours to arrive by road (Tarus 2007).

Inadequate Communications and Information Technology Systems

Another major problem that confronted AMIS was inadequate communications and information technology systems (CITS) to enhance command and control. The Motorola hand-held radios provided were not adequate for the principal staff. The few available had weak batteries which could not hold charge for long making them unreliable. The few high frequency (HF) radio sets were installed only in few vehicles making mobile communications difficult during patrols. Monitoring of these patrols became very difficult. Many camps had no satellite telephones (VSAT) or internet facilities. Communications with such camps were difficult which also affected the efficiency of AMIS. The importance of communications in such operations cannot be over emphasized, and implications of inadequate CITS were far reaching (Tarus 2007).
Logistics and Funding

AMIS did not adopt the integrated logistical system and hence all the resources were centralized at the mission Headquarters. Their distribution to sectors and team sites was inflexible. Resources could have been decentralized down to sector level to enable them to be administered at team sites. Additionally, AMIS did not have the means to supply the mission. It relied on the use of helicopters that were leased from a civilian contractor. These helicopters had limited payload and made resupply flights to each location only once a week. These supplies were often inadequate and by the end of the week the locations were barely able to function with what was available (Tarus 2007).

The greatest challenges the AU faced was the lack of funds to support the troops. The AU did not have enough funds to maintain the mission. Military observers worked for as many as 6 months without payment of their monthly mission allowances (MSA). This inability to pay MSA promptly significantly affected the performance of the personnel. On several occasions military observers and civilian police had to postpone their compulsory time off (CTO) as they had no money to travel and visit their families. With the hostile nature of the Darfur environment and the difficulty in the personnel communicating with their families, not being able to go for time off had negative effects on them and affected their performance (Tarus 2007).

The representatives of parties to the conflict were deployed to work alongside AMIS personnel. The lack of MSA payments to these representatives had grave consequences as well. This was evident at times when they would threaten to boycott working with AMIS and even attack AMIS camps. The party representatives saw AMIS as money-making venture and they prolonged the crisis so that they would continue to
earn more money. The representatives were required by the parties to render a certain percentage of their MSA to the party. Thus AMIS was indirectly funding the crisis. In the light of this the parties now had means of getting money and were not willing to resolve their differences. This even led to the emergence of other factions who would then send their representatives to AMIS so they could also get paid (Tarus 2007).

The mission Headquarters, down to sector levels, had no funds for their operations. The sectors relied on the AMIS Headquarters for resources down to stationery which was often not forthcoming. This also greatly hampered the smooth running of AMIS and limited the efficiency of the force.

Summary and Conclusion of Chapter 2

Africa has been the center of activity of conflict and multilateral efforts to resolve them. The UN deployed many peacekeepers to prevent conflict, impose peace agreements and protect civilians. A successful mission depends on the ability to deliver timely and practical results on the ground. A number of variables have been identified and discussed as to how they can contribute to successful UN missions in Africa.

The next chapter will evaluate the methodology employed to evaluate the effectiveness of African UN missions.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter shall discuss and examine the research methods available for the analysis of this thesis. The chapter will outline the specific design method used during the conduct and analysis of the research. This methodology is a qualitative research design, since the qualitative method intends to explain the relationship of the variables listed below as they apply to the three case studies. By using both primary and secondary sources of information and data, this research design will seek to addresses the primary question of how the UN can better resource and utilize UN missions in Africa to be successful. The following 8 variables are identified and evaluated:

1. Effectiveness of the UN mission’s mandates.
2. Effective control of natural resources found in the mission area that fuel the conflict.
3. Commitment to the peace agreement by the main actors to the conflict.
4. Effective complete or partial economic sanctions in the mission.
5. Influence by external actors and cooperation of regional actors.
6. The characteristic and capacity of the mission’s peacekeepers.
7. Effectiveness of UN leadership in the mission.
8. Effectiveness of Regional Organization intervention in the mission.

Congruence Method

The congruence method, which is a subset of qualitative analysis, allows for contested data to be analyzed and compared within each case study. This will facilitate
the researcher’s ability to extract the impact of the various relational characteristics without necessarily finding multiple case studies that are compared on an even plane in order to measure the accuracy of the hypothesis. The congruence method tests a hypothesis’s ability to predict “whether the variables vary in the expected directions, to the expected magnitude, along the expected dimensions, or whether there is still unexplained variance in one or more dimensions” (George 2005, 181; Andrew 2008).

The use of case studies is traced back to the 1900 dominant style of social research in the United States. It is also associated with World War II debates on understanding conflict using qualitative and quantitative methods (Tadese 2008). A great deal of peace research uses case studies, explicitly or implicitly, therefore it is important to be aware of critiques about it. It is argued that case studies have a possibility of sloppy biased findings because they signify a mistaken belief that numbers are more valid and reliable than just words. Another weakness is that, in case studies, it is not always possible to generalize from a single case study (Yin 1989, 21).

This approach requires the synthesis of a lot of information and material. Using the comparative method of analysis facilitated the choices of the case studies. However, this approach will occasion certain criticism and controversy, but it does represent a vibrant and immediate way of understanding the historical perspective. Nugent refers to the unavoidable elements of subjectivity and generalization inherent in the approach. He acknowledges that it can create problems from a strict academic/scientific point of view (Nugent 2001, 205).
Case Study Selection and Justification

The UN Charter empowers the UN Security Council (UNSC) with the authority and responsibility to take collective action to maintain international peace and security. By extension, the UNSC authorizes all UN peacekeeping operations. Traditionally, all peacekeeping operations are placed under the UN’s operational command even though peacekeepers remain members of their own respective Armed Forces and accountable to their nation’s national command authority. Some exceptions prompted the UNSC to authorize regional organizations, such as ECOWAS and the AU, to undertake peacekeeping or peace enforcement tasks (Othieno 2007, 3). Africa has had its fair share of difficult and relatively successful UN peacekeeping missions. It has not been as successful as it should have been.

In this thesis, the United Nations’ missions identified as the case studies areas are the United Nations’ Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in the DRC and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in Sierra Leone. The two case studies will be compared with UNAMID in Sudan. Both MONUC and UNAMSIL missions were selected as case study areas since they were established by the UN through a UNSCR when the two countries were involved in intrastate conflicts. The two missions are in Africa, one in West Africa and the other in the Central Africa region. To reduce temporal variance, the two missions were established in the same period and resourced similarly. UNAMSIL and MONUC were both established in 1999. UNAMSIL is used to represent a successful UN mission since it achieved a ceasefire and facilitated the country to realize peace from conflict. In the DRC, continuing insecurity in the eastern provinces reflects an incomplete political process despite the holding of
successful general elections in 2006. The growing insecurity forced the UN to spend most of 2007 dealing with the humanitarian crisis triggered by the upsurge of fighting, instead of focusing on the long-term peace consolidation process (Annual Review of GPO 2008, 5). Additionally, MONUC is still up and running. The mission is still struggling to consolidate its achievements in conflict and peace has been elusive. This mission is selected to represent a failed UN mission or at least one that increasingly appears not to have succeeded.

Each UN mission could or could not be having similarities between the approaches used in trying to solve the conflicts, but will provide a suitable baseline to assess the effects of the selected variables and outcomes. The two missions will be analyzed against the eight identified variables mentioned earlier to facilitate a comprehensive comparison with the resourcing of UNAMID. The analysis will focus on the process and outcome of each mission separately in chapter 4. Then they will be compared to UNAMID.

Method of Research/Criteria of Analysis

Anne-Marie Ambert et al., asserts that the qualitative method trades comparative objective studies of a range of subjects for depth, to facilitate understanding on a more finite sampling. The study is centered on “what people do or believe, think, and make meaning, rather than focusing on what people do or believe on a large scale” (Andrew 2008). According to Ambert, another benefit is that qualitative research enables the researcher to analyze data from the macro to the micro level without risking analytical integrity by comparing the proverbial apples to oranges. At times, some of the variables
do not have standard measures; rather they show behavior, attitudes, opinions and beliefs (Ambert 1998, 880).

The identified variables will be assessed individually in each case study. Each variable will be measured subjectively on a scale of 1 to 5. The higher score will indicate better or positive influence of the variable in making the mission more successful while the lower score will indicate how less the variable contributes towards the success of the specific UN mission.

**Analytical Rigor**

Rigor is formally defined as the quality of being strict and inflexible (Neufeldt 1988, 1156). When applied, rigor is often used to describe a process. In information analysis, rigor, or analytical rigor, reflects an assessment of process quality, affording communication about the process, rather than the product of analysis (Zelik, Patterson, and Woods 2007). One cooperative effort to identify a definition of analytical rigor describes it as the “application of precise and exacting standards . . . to better understands and draw conclusions . . . based on careful consideration or investigation” (Military Operations Research Society 2006).

Data available for each of the case study missions in this thesis is adequate to allow for an equitable comparison of the cases and facilitate a qualitative evaluation of the missions. By using other UN data to confirm or dispute the author’s analysis, this will facilitate a relatively objective method that will study a subjective environment. It will paint a relatively accurate picture on successful missions in Africa in relation to resource availability.
Because the sample is small, the criteria are usually subjective and immeasurable and results always include data as a result of subjective analysis instead of data obtained through controlled tests (Crawford 2002, 2). Even with the explanation of each variable score, this comparison has many factors that inevitably affect each item, preventing a purely objective analysis of the characteristics.

Unit of Analysis and Scoring of Variables

As indicated earlier, this research is a qualitative analysis. The information obtained from each of the identified variable will be subjected to systematic analysis. UN missions in Africa are affected by many factors differently. Analyzing each mission independently, the variables will be awarded points accordingly. This effort of scoring in each variable gives only a rough approximation and methods of collecting information are less structured. The points awarded are usually subjective and immeasurable. Effort will be put in place in order to carefully research and explain each variable in each mission. The results will then be entered in the scoring matrix.

Effectiveness of the UN Mission’s Mandate

Each mission is established by the UN Security Council and given a mandate with specified tasks. A mandate must understand the complexities of the specific UN mission. This study will consider the UN mandate of the mission and focus the analysis on the clearness and feasibility of the mandate and whether it was able to achieve the tasks or requirements. The mandate will be analyzed from the time the mission began to the conclusion of the mission or the current state of affairs.
In view of continued attacks on UN peacekeepers, the UN needs to develop and negotiate a robust mandate with the warring parties before it undertakes any mission. The acceptance of robust mandates by all actors in the conflict would signify their level of commitment to the peace process. The most effective mandate which is related to the spectrum of issues in the mission and matched by the operational capabilities of the UN forces deployed will be awarded the highest score closer to 5 and a score closer to 1 is awarded to the least effective or deficient mandate that do not facilitate or contribute to the achievement of peace and a successful mission.

Effective Control of Natural Resources Found in the Mission Area That Fuel the Conflict

Africa is blessed with abundant natural resources. The massive revenue from the sale of resources should be used to benefit and lift the living standards of the people and not individual warlords of rebel groups. Most rebel groups any war-torn country generally control and pilfer the country’s natural resources in order to provide funds to purchase arms and run the operations of the movement. The trading of the natural resources is usually illegal and this calls the UN peacekeepers to be mandated to prevent the rebels from exploiting the country’s resources. These resources can be the center of gravity without which the operations of the rebels cannot be sustained.

Two contrasting examples to help bring the issue of natural resources into focus are Botswana and Sierra Leone whereby 30 years ago, they had the same level of per capita income. They both received enormous income from the diamond they mined in their countries. The government of Botswana succeeded brilliantly in harnessing these revenues for economic growth in the country making Botswana not just the fastest
growing economy in Africa for many years but was the fastest growing economy in the world. The revenues from Sierra Leone’s diamonds stirred up violent political contests which destroyed the country. The economy collapsed, and the country is at the bottom of the Human Development Index. The difference between the two countries’ per capita incomes are now an astonishing ten-to-one (Collier 2004).

The scoring of this variable will be done on a scale of 1 to 5. A higher score will be assigned to the mission that effectively managed to control the influence and use of the country’s natural resources found in the mission area from being used to benefit and support the rebels. A less score of value will be awarded to a mission with less control of the resources.

Commitment to the Peace Agreement by the Main Actors to the Conflict

Peace agreement as a tool plays a critical role in resolving conflicts. They serve has roadmaps and provides legal and political leadership for reforms that may help establish a ceasefire, lay a foundation for sustainable peace, and help end conflict in a country. In many missions, peace accords and ceasefire agreements are signed by government officials and the rebels. At times, the rebels whether forced or not can be committed to the peace agreement and peace realized. A commitment to the agreement is the most critical issue and not just the signing of it.

In assessing this variable, the willingness of rebels, to become committed to the peace agreements set will be considered. This variable will then be scored on a scale of 1 to 5 points. The higher score will be awarded to the mission that achieved a higher degree
of commitment to the peace agreement and a lower value will be awarded to one which indicates least commitment. The respective scores will then be entered in the table 1.

Effective Complete or Partial Economic Sanctions in the Mission

This variable is analyzed bearing in mind that sanctions mandates are recommended and issued by UNSC and has to be implemented and its compliance monitored accordingly. The sanctions may involve selective travel sanctions on senior leaders, arms embargo, flight restrictions and ban on trading on specified natural resources believed to be crucial in prolonging and fueling conflicts. It is important that there is compliance by all parties affected.

To be included in the analysis is the effectiveness of the UN monitoring mechanism to make sure that sanctions are affected and not violated. This variable will then be scored on a scale of 1 to 5 points. The higher score closer to 5 will be awarded to the mission that had effective UN sanctions and a lower value of 1 will be awarded to the mission which had less effective UN sanctions.

Influence by External Actors and Cooperation of Regional Actors

In conflicts, the influence of neighboring countries and other external actors play an important role towards a lasting peace. The external actors may support the government and others may provide support in terms of funding, weaponry, and training to the rebel groups. Other regional actors may provide sympathy and sanctuary to the rebels opposing the government of the day.
The scoring of this variable will be done on a scale of 1 to 5. A higher score awarded to the mission will indicate that external actors had less influence to the peacekeeping mission and a lower score indicates the mission which received reasonable support to the external actors and neighboring countries. The scores will be entered into table 1.

The Characteristic and Capacity of the UN Mission’s Peacekeepers

The capabilities and characteristics of each UN mission are different. The mission mandate is achievable when the UN peacekeepers have the capability in terms of manpower, equipment and logistics. UN missions need to be adequately funded, resourced and given the authority to undertake tasks assigned in the mandate.

The scoring of this variable will be done on a similar scale to other variables, 1 to 5. A high score of 5 is awarded to the mission with adequate and well resources UN peacekeepers and a score of 1 is awarded to a poorly resourced mission.

Effectiveness of UN Leadership in the Mission

UN leadership in any UN mission is represented by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) whose responsibility is to implement the mission’s mandate. The SRSG is usually appointed by the Secretary-General and is responsible to consolidate the diplomatic and the peace processes in the mission area. Peacekeeping mission cannot succeed unless backed a political peace process, the domain of the SRSG. This may include establishing consent, dialogues and consultations, ceasefire agreements, carrying out elections and striking a balance on contagious issues.
The scoring of this variable will be done on a similar scale of 1 to 5. A higher score awarded to the mission with an effective SRSG and a score of 1 to the mission with an ineffective SRSG. The scores will be entered into table 1.

Effectiveness of Regional Organization Intervention in the Mission

The effort of regional organizations is significant in normalizing the situations in a conflict area in the event that UN is overstretched. These regional organizations are also able to react quickly and intervene long before the UN steps in despite their weaknesses. The UNSC will always take some time deliberating on whether to establish a UN mission or not.

In assessing this variable, scoring will be done on a scale of 1 to 5. A high score of 5 is awarded to the mission with an effective ROs intervention and 1 to a mission with less effective intervention. The scores will be entered into table 1 for comparison and interpretation.

Display of Results

Each variable will be assessed uniformly on a score of 1 to 5. This is because each factor affects the success of the mission differently independent of the other variables. The even scoring range will also avoid bias on one variable being treated as more important than the other and for ease of analysis. By scoring the matrix horizontally, the final results of the validity test remain hidden until each characteristic or variable assessment is completed in chapter 4 to reduce the author’s ability to influence the results (Andrew 2008).
Table 1 portrays the array of the data in a tabular metric format. The eight variables to be analyzed have already been identified and defined in chapter 2. The relevant data is used from the other sources mentioned earlier as evidence and those results noted and recorded in table 1. Each score will then be justified according to each variable. The total in the last row for each of the three missions ranges between 8 and 40. The mission whose value is closer to 8 represents an ineffective mission and the one with score value closer to 40 as the most successful UN mission. When the results of the analysis have been summed up in the table, it will be easier to rank the mission in terms of success. The totals will serve as a measure on what it takes for a general assessment of a successful UN mission in Africa. Any deviation if any will be explained in the analysis as each case study as evaluated in chapter 4 in order to determine those variables that appear to have a significant impact on whether or not African UN peacekeeping operations will be successful or not. The deductions would then be used to build recommendations that could contribute to successful UN missions in Africa.
Table 1. Sample Table of Matrix for Scoring Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables to be analyzed</th>
<th>MONUC</th>
<th>UNAMSIL</th>
<th>UNAMID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of the UN mission’s mandates</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective control of natural resources found in the mission area that fuel the conflict.</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to the peace agreement by the main actors to the conflict</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective complete or partial economic sanctions in the Mission</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence by external actors and cooperation of regional actors</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The characteristic and capacity of the mission’s peacekeepers</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective UN leadership in the mission</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of Regional Organization intervention in the mission</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
<td>(1 – 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(8 – 40)</td>
<td>(8 – 40)</td>
<td>(8 – 40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

Summary of Chapter 3

The methodology used in this thesis is the qualitative method and the sources used are both secondary and primary data. Eight variables, representing possible key indicators of a successful UN mission in Africa, are assessed. These variables, as mentioned earlier, are: effectiveness of UN mission’s mandates; effective control of natural resources found in the mission area that fuel the conflict; commitment to the peace agreement by the main actors to the conflict; effective complete or partial economic sanctions in the mission; influence by external actors and cooperation of regional actors; the characteristic and capacity of the mission’s peacekeepers; effective UN leadership in the mission; and effectiveness of regional organization intervention in the mission. These variables are evaluated against three case studies.
The analysis and results of the study will be discussed in the chapter 4. Using the literature review and selected variables discussed in chapter 2, and the methodology discussed in this chapter, the study will present, in chapter 4, the possible answers to both the primary and secondary research questions posed in chapter 1. The findings of this study will lead to conclusions and recommendations on what needs to be put in place in order to ensure that African peacekeeping missions, especially UNAMID, are successful.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes the data gathered during the research. The focus shall be on the three UN mission case studies of UNAMSIL, MONUC, and UNAMID. These missions are assessed using the variables identified in chapter 2. This will lead to chapter 5 containing the conclusions and recommendations for improving the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, and recommendations for further study.

Case Study of United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

The first peacekeeping mission to be analyzed is UNAMSIL. This mission was established on 22 October 1999 vide UNSCR 1270. The mandate of UNAMSIL was to cooperate with the government of Sierra Leone and others parties in the implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement (United Nations 1999c).

Background of the Sierra Leone Conflict

The country of Sierra Leone (figure 3) is located in Western Africa. It borders Guinea to the north and Liberia to the south. It has an area of 72,325 square kilometers about the size of South Carolina (Krabacher 2009, 255). The United Kingdom (UK) granted this country independence on 27 April 1961. Sierra Leone’s primary source of foreign exchange is natural resources that include rutile, titanium, iron ore, bauxite, gold and diamonds. The economy consists of agriculture, exportation of raw materials, and light local industry. Alluvial diamond mining remains the main source of hard currency earnings accounting for nearly half the exports. In 2009, after 6 years of recovery from
the civil war, the GDP was 4.53 billion US dollars, yielding a per capita income of 900 US dollars. Thirty five percent of the population is literate with an annual population growth rate of 2 percent (CIA World Fact Book 2010). Its economy quickly disintegrated due to poor, weak and corrupt leadership, and the country’s currency became worthless. The failing economy led to the collapse of government services as civil servants went unpaid, schools closed and the basic infrastructure collapsed. The government could not afford to import fuel oil and the country went without electricity for months. It is this time that a new force entered and dominated the affairs of Sierra Leone (Hirsch 2001, 30).

Figure 3. Map of Sierra Leone
The Sierra Leone conflict dates from March 1991 when fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), headed by a former army corporal Foday Sankoh, launched an attack from east of the country near the border with Liberia, to overthrow the government. He was actively supported by Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and used Liberia as their base. Since 1991, the people of Sierra Leone suffered greatly at the hands of the RUF. During the more than a decade of fighting, the RUF killed and maimed thousands of Sierra Leoneans. When the conflict started, the Sierra Leone military, with support from the ECOWAS and its military observer group ECOMOG, tried to defend the government and destroy the rebels. In 1992, the Sierra Leone Army toppled the government. In 1995, the UN Secretary General appointed a special envoy, Mr. Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia) to the region who, working with AU and ECOWAS, was able to get the army to relinquish power and allow elections to be held in February 1996. In February 1996, the army relinquished power to the newly elected president, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. Sankoh signed the Abidjan Peace Accord on 30 November 1996. In 1997, the military staged another coup and were joined by the RUF who had consolidated the control over large parts of eastern Sierra Leone (Woods 2008, 32).

This anarchy in Sierra Leone eventually led to external military interventions sanctioned by the ECOWAS and the UN in order to end human suffering. The UNSC imposed an arms and oil embargo on Sierra Leone in October 1997 and authorized ECOWAS to ensure its implementation by use of the ECOMOG forces (United Nations 1997). As negotiations failed and the ECOMOG forces continued to be attacked by the RUF rebels, ECOMOG launched offensive operations Sandstorm and Tigerhead against
the RUF collapsing the rebels and removing them from Freetown. President Kabbah was reinstated as the president of Sierra Leone on 10 March 1998 (Woods 2008, 42).

On 13 July 1998, the UN established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL); vide UNSCR 1181 to monitor the military and security situation. However, conflict continued in Sierra Leone and was terminated on 22 October 1999 (United Nations 1998) The RUF held control of much of the countryside, the diamond-producing region, and most of the capital of Freetown. ECOMOG was again used to eject the rebels from the capital city.

The Lomé Peace Accord was signed on 7 July 1999 by president Kabbah, the RUF, and AFRC thus creating a Government of National Unity (GNU). On 22 October 1999, the UNSC authorized the termination of UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL was established in Sierra Leone on 22 October 1999, vide UNSCR 1270. The new and larger mission was comprised of about 6,000 peacekeepers to assist the government in carrying out the provisions of the Lomé Accord. The UN force was further reinforced to a force of 20,500 of both military and civilian police. Since 2000, the international community, in particular the UN, played a key role in sustaining peace in Sierra Leone (United Nations 1999c).

UNAMSIL was plagued by missteps and failure. In 2000, some UN soldiers were killed and hundreds more captured and held hostage by the RUF. The hostages included some Kenyan and Zambian contingents and were later released after the international community pressured the Liberian President Charles Taylor to intervene. In May 2002, successful elections were held in Sierra Leone and UNAMSIL’s mandate ended. The civil war in Sierra Leone was officially declared over in January 2003. Former rebel
leader Foday Sankoh died in UN custody on 30 July 2003 while awaiting trial thus escaping justice for the crimes he committed (Keen 2004, 288).

The Effectiveness of the UN Mandate of UNAMSIL

UNAMSIL was established by UNSCR 1270 on 22 October 1999 (United Nations 1999). Operating under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, UNAMSIL was mandated to carry out the following tasks:

1. Assist with the implementation of the peace agreement;
2. Assist the government in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program;
3. Ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel;
4. Monitor adherence to the ceasefire of 18 May 1999;
5. Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
6. Support the operation of UN civilian officials; and
7. Provide support, when requested, with regard to elections as constituted in the constitution of Sierra Leone (United Nations 1999).

On 7 February 2000, the UNSC revised the mandate and extended the mandate for a further 6 months. It also expanded the strength of UNAMSIL force to 11,100 peacekeepers. The mandate drastically changed and the concept of operation which changed from peacekeeping operation to peace enforcement. This was due to series of crises created, in part, by the piecemeal arrival of peacekeepers, ambiguity in command and control structures, and poor equipment and minimal training of some of the contingents. Encouraged by lack of UN response to the attack on peacekeepers, the RUF took hostage over 500 peacekeepers (Fawcett 2002). With ECOMOG being the UN
peacekeeping operation force in the operation, its limited mandate and military weaknesses left the RUF in control of the eastern and southern parts of the country. The mandate of the UNAMSIL force was vague and difficult to achieve given the commitment of resources. The UN force could not enforce the fragile ceasefire agreement and that is why it had to be revised several times to suit the situation in Sierra Leone.

UNSCR 1289 of 2000 was notable for authorizing UNAMSIL to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence. The revised mandate included requirements:

1. To provide security at key government installations, important intersections, and airports;
2. To facilitate the free flow of people, goods, and humanitarian aid on designated roadways;
3. To provide security at the DDR sites;
4. To coordinate with and assist Sierra Leone law enforcement bodies in carrying out their duties;
5. To safeguard weapons and ammunition recovered from ex-combatants, and assist in the disposal of same.

The UNSC authorized UNAMSIL to take the necessary action to fulfill the additional tasks and affirmed that, in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the government of Sierra Leone (United Nations 2000c; Woods 2008).
On 19 May 2000 and 30 March 2001, the UNSC further expanded the size of the peacekeeping force to 20,500. The proposed increase of peacekeepers and tough economic measures indicated to the rebels and their allies that UNAMSIL would respond with force when attacked or challenged. It has been acknowledged by those who followed the progress of peace in Sierra Leone that until UNAMSIL was strengthened by a brigade-sized contingent from Pakistan and an air component from Russia, together with the presence of a sizeable UK army training team of 200 personnel, no reasonable progress towards achieving the given mandate was feasible (Malan, Rakate, and McIntyre 2001).

The relative ease with which RUF and AFRC guerillas were able to attack the capital and spread terror in the countryside, without relinquishing their hold over the diamond mines, serves as an indicator of the inadequacy of the peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. The RUF took advantage of the mandate weakness to renege on its commitment to negotiate, disrespecting the Lomé Peace Accord in place, and feeling confident attacking and capturing the UN peacekeepers highlight the inadequacy of the mandate. It required a strong British showing to get the RUF back on track to negotiate and allow UN peacekeepers to fulfill the mandate (BBC News 2000). After analysis, a score of 4.0 is awarded to UNAMSIL (table 3) in this variable of effectiveness of its mandate. The mandate became clear and achievable after it was revised by UNSC in 2000 and peacekeepers increased.
Effective Control of Natural Resources Found in the Mission Area that Fuel the Conflict.

Sierra Leone is rich in natural resources such as diamonds, gold, oil, iron ore rutile, bauxite, and titanium. This is their primary source of foreign exchange. Private companies, sponsored by corrupt government officials, diverted the mineral trade for their own benefit and bankrupted the state treasury leaving the country in dire straits. From a high of over 2 million carats officially exported in 1970, legitimate diamond exports dropped to 595,000 carats in 1980 and to only 48,000 in 1988 (Sesay 1993, 295). Since diamonds were easy to smuggle, one study estimated that 97 percent of diamonds from Sierra Leone were carried out of the country illegally in the 1980s (Smillie 2007). Many soldiers were not paid on a regular basis leading to very poor morale, a reluctance to perform dangerous military tasks, and the use of extortion, corruption and diamond smuggling to supplement their incomes (Woods 2008, 49).

The RUF took control of the diamond mines in southern and eastern Sierra Leone. Sankoh approached Taylor and struck a deal to exchange arms for diamonds. Taylor likewise needed funds to finance his operations in Liberia. Taylor had established a network of illegal buyers from various countries like Belgium and India. It became the principal means to fund the war in Sierra Leone. Diamonds were easy to transport, hide, and easy to convert into money. Sankoh believed that if he could deny diamond revenues to the state, then he could cripple the government and force a negotiation with the RUF and the government (Woods 2008, 19). The sale of diamonds played a critical role in financing, supporting, and sustaining the RUF in the conflict in Sierra Leone. This variable score is valued at 3.5 points out of 5. The smuggling of diamond across the border to Liberia was to some extent controlled by the peacekeepers.
Commitment to the Peace Agreement by the Main Actors to the Conflict

The Lomé Peace Agreement, concluded in July 1999, focused largely on political and security issues, much of it drawn upon the 1996 Abidjan Agreement. It contained various mechanisms for reconciling its political parties, and disarming the various armed factions in the country. It was also based on the assumption that the key political and military leaders in Sierra Leone were prepared to set aside their long standing differences and work together. This agreement failed and led to the third wave of external military intervention by the UN and British Government. The agreement removed the death sentence of the RUF leader Foday Sankoh and granted him the position of vice president as well as chairman of the Commission for Strategic Resources. It further called for the transformation of the RUF into a political party and the establishment of a government of national unity with 4 cabinet posts for the RUF. UNOMSIL and ECOMOG operating, under the new UNSC mandate, were to oversee disarmament and demobilization. The commission was to regulate and sanction all exploitation, sale, and export of diamonds, gold, and other resources that were determined to be of strategic importance. The Abuja Agreement of November 2000, signed by the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, reaffirmed the validity of the Lomé Agreement as the framework for the restoration of genuine and lasting peace in Sierra Leone. The parties declared an immediate ceasefire, to be monitored by UNAMSIL, which would have unhampered access throughout the country. The parties to the conflict made a commitment to disarm, demobilize, and resettle all combatants. The government committed to accelerating the restructuring and training of armed forces. The Lomé Agreement guaranteed UN officials and UNAMSIL unhindered and safe access to all areas in the country despite isolated insecurity where
the RUF attacked and captured UN peacekeepers. The support of British soldiers in May 2000 managed to keep UNAMSIL on the path of success. They managed to drive away the RUF rebels. The Lomé Agreement was not popular in Freetown because the RUF leaders were not held accountable for the atrocities they had committed. The ceasefire was reviewed and reconfirmed in May 2001 (Woods 2008, 32). A score of 3.0 is awarded to UNAMSIL. The amnesty granted was necessary for the peace agreement to be reached. This resulted in a ceasefire which was monitored by UNAMSIL.

Effective Complete and Partial Economic Sanctions in the Mission

The UNSC first imposed an arms and oil embargo in Sierra Leone on 8 October 1997 when the junta failed to step down (United Nations 1997). The UNSC adopted Resolution 1343 on 7 March 2001 that demanded the Government of Liberia to expel all RUF members, end financial and military support to the RUF, cease direct and indirect import of rough diamonds, and ground all Liberia-registered aircraft until registration and ownership could be updated. It further demanded that other countries refuse to allow “conflict diamonds” to enter into the world market (United Nations 2001b).

In May 2001, sanctions were imposed on Liberia because of its support for the rebels, and UN peacekeepers began to make headway in disarming the various factions. The US then led the effort to impose a full-scale embargo on diamond trading in Liberia (Woods 2008). The DDR process in Sierra Leone rapidly became more effective in mid 2001 after the diamond embargoes took effect and after UNAMSIL began to aggressively challenge the RUF (Keen 2005, 287; Woods 2008). A score of 3.5 is awarded to this
variable since UNAMSIL was able to break the link of conflict diamonds from reaching the market in Liberia.

Influence by External Actors and Cooperation of Regional Actors

The influences of external actors have, on occasion, caused UN peacekeeping operations considerable difficulties that have threatened the success of the missions. When the intervening powers do not include the neighboring countries, it is critical that the neighbors be required to deny sanctuary to any factions. The RUF was established in Liberia with active assistance of Charles Taylor’s NPFL (Adekeye and Keen 2000). Burkina Faso and Liberia provided support to RUF in terms of arms and sanctuary. Guinea did not provide active support to RUF but neither was it able to deny its territory to RUF fighters (Woods 2008). The parallel UK force in support of the mission was initially unsuccessful but later improved and helped stabilize the mission. Their intervention was crucial to the mission.

The illegal trade in diamonds that financed much of the 10-year civil war in Sierra Leone had attracted the attention of Al Qaeda terrorists during the UNAMSIL mission. Douglas Farah, the bureau chief for the Washington Post in West Africa broke the story on 1 November 2001 relying on information provided to him by journalist Cindor Reeves who was a younger brother of Charles Taylor’s first wife (Farah 2004).

Elections were finally held in May 2002 and in June 2003, the UN ban on the sale of Sierra Leone diamonds expired and was not renewed. The UN disarmament and rehabilitation program for Sierra Leone's fighters was also completed in February 2004
Characteristics and Capacity of the UNAMSIL Peacekeepers

The UN converted a large contingent of Nigerian, Ghanaian and Guinean troops from ECOMOG to form the UNAMSIL peacekeepers. The other countries that provided contingents in the mission included India, Jordan, Kenya, Pakistan, Zambia, and Bangladesh. Nigeria argued in the UN that its military should provide the commander since they had prior experience and knowledge of Sierra Leone. However, the UN, for the sake of impartiality, insisted that Major General Vijay Jetley from India be the commander. UNAMSIL suffered from an inauspicious beginning as it deployed to Sierra Leone. Peacekeepers from the various member states arrived in Freetown in waves over several months beginning in January 2005 (Galic 2007). The UNAMSIL peacekeepers deployed to Sierra Leone with inadequate logistical capabilities. The lack of capability contributed to the long delay between the signing of the Lomé Agreement in July 1999, the UN authorization of the mission in October 1999, and the actual arrival of UNAMSIL forces in January 2000. They lacked basic infrastructure and self-sustainment to include tents, vehicles, and communication equipment. On 7 February 2000, the UNSC revised the mandate and extended it for a further 6 months. It also expanded the size of UNAMSIL force to 11,100 peacekeepers (United Nations 2000).

The mission was mandated under chapter 6 and later enhanced to chapter 7 due to the violent nature of the conflict. The failure of UNAMSIL to use force against unco-operating armed groups between February and April 2000 undermined their credibility in
the eyes of all parties (Woods 2008). The capture of 500 peacekeepers by the RUF in April 2000 in Kono essentially brought the mission to a standstill. British troops intervened in May 2000 and managed to set UNAMSIL on the path to success (Fifth Report on UNAMSIL 7 March 2000).

In 2001 and 2002 the UNAMSIL mission grew in strength and reached 17,500 troops, the largest peacekeeping mission in the world at that time and became increasingly effective. They were able to target the illicit diamond trade which was the financial source of so much of the fighting in Sierra Leone (United Nations 2001a). A score of 4.0 is awarded to UNAMSIL on this variable. The mission capacity and capability were enhanced on many occasions thus achieving the mission mandate.

Effectiveness of UN Leadership in UNAMSIL

The SRSG of UNAMSIL was Oluyemi Adeniji, a Nigerian diplomat who had served as the UN Special Representative in the Central African Republic (CAR). In 1995, UN Special Representative James Jonah, mediated a peace settlement between the government, the RUF and other warlord groups. A change in the military government in January 1996 also proved important as the new head of state, Julius Maada Bio, made a greater commitment to making peace with the RUF than his predecessor. In February 1996, the conflict in Sierra Leone was resolved, elections were held, and Ahmed Tejah Kabbah was sworn in as president. In November 1996, UN special envoy Berkanu Dinka assisted in negotiating a peace agreement (Abidjan Accord) between the government and the RUF. However, the military staged a coup in May 1997 and disposed President Kabbah exiting him to Guinea. The army joined forces with the RUF and formed a junta (United Nations 1999, 1). Another UN Special Envoy, Francis Okelo of Uganda, and
other negotiators tried but failed to persuade the junta to step down. The UNSC then imposed an oil and arms embargo on 8 October 1997 and authorized ECOWAS to ensure its implementation using ECOMOG (United Nations 1997).

Sierra Leone provides a model for the integrated office concept, not least because of the role of Alan Doss, the former Deputy SRSG, who is also the current SRSG in MONUC, and Victor Angelo, the SRSG in UNAMSIL. Mr. Doss stressed the importance of coherent thinking and the need to involve the development and humanitarian agencies in decision-making. The partnership was effective in Freetown (Twenty sixth UNAMSIL Report 20 September 2005). This mission had able UN representatives and the variable is awarded 3.5 points.

Effectiveness of ECOMOG Intervention in Sierra Leone

ECOMOG was instrumental in conducting peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone between 1998 and 2000. ECOMOG’s intervention was the second after Executive Overcomes in April 1995. The intervention by ECOMOG was an attempt by regional African nations to solve their own internal problems. It was therefore an important milestone on the maturation of African states as controlling their own destiny free of non-regional actors. To its credit, ECOMOG was endorsed not only by the UN, but by Africans themselves. Although it was later marred by political and military shortcomings, ECOMOG was a promising alternative to the UN peacekeeping missions (Abdullah 2004, 231-7).

On 23 October 1997, the ECOWAS Committee of Five on Sierra Leone held talks in Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, and signed a peace plan which, among other things, called
for a ceasefire to be monitored by ECOMOG and if approved by the UNSC, assisted by UN military observers. ECOMOG forces deployed from Liberia to Sierra Leone (United Nations 1999b). By January 1998, the ECOMOG peacekeepers drawn from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali numbered about 9,000. In February 1998, in response to an attack from junta forces, ECOMOG peacekeepers launched an assault that collapsed the junta’s control over Freetown. The ECOWAS peace plan for Sierra Leone provided for the following:

1. The reinstatement of the legitimate government of President Tejan Kabbah within 6 months.
2. Immediate cessation of hostilities.
3. Cooperation of the junta with ECOMOG in order to enforce the sanctions peacefully.
4. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants.
5. Provision of humanitarian assistance.
6. Return of refugees and internally displaced persons.
8. Modalities for broadening the power base in Sierra Leone (US institute of Peace, ECOWAS 6-month peace plan for Sierra Leone, 23 October 1997 to 22 April 1998).

On 6 January 1999, rebel fighters from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the RUF overwhelmed the ECOMOG defenses and ingressed into Freetown. ECOMOG’s shortcomings became most evident when it failed to halt the advance of resurgent rebel forces into Freetown in January 1999. The ECOMOG units were again
plagued by poor morale and poor discipline. Eventually in October 1999 the UNSC announced the mandate for a UN led peacekeeping force, UNAMSIL, which formerly ended the deployment of ECOMOG (Malan, Rakate, and McIntyre 2001).

The UN appreciated the efforts of ECOMOG for its indispensable contribution towards the restoration of democracy and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Sierra Leone. ECOMOG appeared to have quickly achieved a stunning success (Woods 2008, Final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone). The UN further highly commended the forces and the governments of its contributing states for their courage and sacrifice, and encouraged all states to assist the contributing states further in meeting the costs they have incurred in making possible the deployment of ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone. The final intervention in Sierra Leone was by the United Nations and Great Britain as they attempted to bring order in the country (United Nations 2000).

This variable is awarded 3.5 points out of 5 due to the fact that with insufficient resources, inexperienced soldiers, and lack of external support, ECOMOG made some success and experienced failures too. They tried as much as possible to create favorable conditions for the peaceful resolution of the Sierra Leone civil war. They however succeeded in reinstating the constitutional order and legality by restoring President Kabbah to power and evicting the rebels from the capital. After the UN took over, ECOMOG continued to support the UN in an effort to stabilize the country by implementing peace process and training the new military forces.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the 3rd largest African country after Sudan and Algeria with an area of 2,344,858 square kilometers. It lies within the Great Lakes region within Central Africa and is bordered by the Central African Republic (CAR), Zambia, Angola, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville. As per the census estimates of July 2009, the DRC had a population of 68,692,542 (Wikipedia website 2010). It was formerly known as Zaire. The DRC can be distinguished between the Republic of Congo by using Congo-Kinshasa (the capital) while the other is Congo-Brazzaville. It is a multi-ethnic country which became independent from Belgium in 1956 and is endowed with a lot of natural resources ranging from gold, timber, copper, diamonds, and other strategic minerals. The current conflict in the DRC between the government and various rebel groups began on 2 August 1998. MONUC was established in November 1999 to help bring peace in the war-torn DRC. The DRC remains an epicenter of conflict in the region and the MONUC is still operational. It is estimated that more than 5 million people have died in the DRC due directly to this ongoing conflict. The situation in the DRC continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the Great Lakes region (United Nations 2008).
Figure 4. Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Background of the Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict

The conflict in the DRC originated in the decades of misrule of the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. The proximity causes of the conflict were the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the defeat of Hutu regime which fled into the DRC along with millions of refugees. A mass of Hutu refugees crossed the common border into the DRC along with the defeated Former Rwandese Army (FAR) and the Hutu political militia called the Interahamwe, which was responsible for the killings of Tutsi’s in Rwanda. Upon crossing the border into the DRC, they established refugee camps a few kilometers from the Rwandese border from where they continued to launch attacks into Rwanda killing civilians and destroying property with the support of Mobutu’s regime. The attacks intensified in 1995 and September 1996. The Rwandese Army advanced into eastern
Congo overrunning all the camps. Rwanda and Uganda led the successful rebellion that brought together four rebel groups in the DRC to form an anti-Mobutu alliance, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) under Laurent Desire Kabila. Finding the Zairian military weak and lacking popular support, the Rwandese-led force advanced across the DRC to the capital Kinshasa in May 1997. That marked the end of the Mobutu regime. Laurent Kabila became the president and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Kabila, on taking power, did not meet the expectations of his supporters. He was also seen as a dictator and authoritarian.

The current conflict between the DRC government and the various rebel groups that included the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), began on 2 August 1998, from the far central eastern province of Kivu. They were supported by the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda (Kabemba 1999, 10). The group also included members of the Banyamulenge, the Congolese of Rwandese origin.

In August 1999, the conflict took a new dimension when President Kabila requested for military assistance from the SADC member countries. The countries that offered troops included Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Angola. These countries opposed to the Ugandan and Rwandese intervention moved their troops into the DRC to support the Kinshasa government. On 10 July 1999, the DRC along with Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe came together in Lusaka, Zambia to sign a ceasefire agreement to end the hostilities in the DRC. The following month the MLC, under Jean-Pierre Bemba, and the RCD rebel groups signed the accord. However, the conflict in the DRC continued despite the signed agreement (Burgess 2007, 14).
MONUC in the DRC was established by the UNSC vide UNSCR 1279 dated 30 November 1999 and the mission is still ongoing (United Nations 1999d). The mission headquarters is in Kinshasa, the capital city of the DRC. The mission has two liaison offices, one in Pretoria, South Africa and the other one in Kigali, Rwanda. The mission logistics base is in Entebbe, Uganda. MONUC is the largest and most complex mission in UN history and the most challenging. The country is large in size as big as the United States east of the Mississippi River, has little infrastructure, and has a large number of armed groups, some controlling parts of the country (MONUC 2009).

MONUC is a multinational mission with the contributing countries from all over the world. The contributors of the military personnel are Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yemen, and Zambia (MONUC Journal Facts and Figures 2009, 18).

In 2009, the DRC’s military, backed by around 20,000 MONUC peacekeepers, began an offensive against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in a deal to boost ties with neighboring Rwanda. Many members of the FDLR participated in the Rwandese genocide in 1994 and continue to operate in eastern DRC. The eastern DRC conflict has cost nearly 900,000 civilians displaced, about 1,000 dead and about 7,000 women and girls raped. However, “Military operations have not
succeeded in neutralizing the FDLR, have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in the Kivu area and have resulted in an expansion of National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) military influence in the region” (Bavier 2009).

### The Effectiveness of the UN Mandate of the MONUC Mission

The UN established MONUC on 30 November 1999, by transforming the UN Liaison Personnel in the DRC into a UN mission under Chapter 7 of the Charter of the UN and delegated appropriate mandate and responsibility (United Nations 1999). On establishment, MONUC’s mandate included the following elements:

1. To monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the agreement;
2. To establish and maintain continuous liaison with the headquarters of all the parties’ military forces;
3. To supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the parties’ forces;
4. To develop an action plan for the overall implementation of the ceasefire agreement by all concerned;
5. To work with the parties to obtain the release of all prisoners of war and military captives and remain in cooperation with international humanitarian agencies;
6. To supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the parties’ forces;
7. To monitor compliance with the provision of the ceasefire agreement on the supply of ammunition, weaponry and other war-related material to the field;
8. To facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring;

9. To cooperate closely with the Facilitator of the National Dialogue, provide support and technical assistance to him, and coordinate other United Nations agencies’ activities to this effect;

10. To deploy mine action experts to assess the scope of the mine and unexploded ordnance problems, coordinate the initiation of the mine action activities, develop a mine action plan, and carry out emergency mine action activities as required in support of its mandate (United Nations 1999).

The current UNSCR 1856 mandated MONUC as a priority and working closely with the government of DRC, the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel, and UN personnel and facilities. Since the situation in the DRC continues to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region, the mission will act under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (United Nations 2008a).

A score of 2.5 is awarded to MONUC mission for this variable. This score reflects the fact that the UN mandate is clear and adequate however, civilians in eastern DRC continue to suffer in the hands of armed rebels. Many are still in IDP camps and peace is still elusive.

Effective Control of Natural Resources Found in the DRC that Fuel the Conflict.

DRC’s rich natural resources include timber, diamond, copper, gold, cobalt, uranium, and coltan. The Congo civil conflict has been driven for more than a decade by the violent struggle for control over the country’s vast natural resources. Local militia backed by Uganda, Rwanda, and mining multinationals got supplies of food, money, and
military equipment in exchange for smuggled resources (Global Policy Forum 2004). The rebels were being funded by proceeds of smuggled gold and tin. Most of the gold deposits were in the hands of the rebels who used the proceeds to buy arms and to sustain the rebels in the field. Most of the gold was shipped to Dubai through Uganda. The gold trade is one of the most significant avenues of direct finance for the rebels as the profits in the smuggling operation runs into several millions of US dollars. Uganda was a key conduit from the DRC to the external world market in United Arab Emirates (UAE). Once the gold left Dubai in UAE, it was untraceable. A Human Rights Watch report in 2005 revealed that gold that arrived in Uganda with no documentation indicating that it left the country as a legitimate export. The UN applied sanctions to two gold-trading companies that operated in Uganda but gold still managed to go through a small network of individuals. It is evident that between 1995 and 2006, gold was among one of Uganda’s principal exports. This has made gold Uganda’s third largest export, even though Uganda clearly lacks the ability to produce large quantities of gold locally. The UN investigated and found out that Uganda and Rwanda were themselves guilty of illegal resource exploitation in the DRC during the war, when they backed some factions (Nduru 2005).

On 22 December 2008, the UNSC recognized the link between the illegal exploration of natural resources, the illicit trade such as resources, proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the major factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa, in particular in the DRC. Financial profits from natural resources played a significant role in promoting conflict in the DRC. In this respect, MONUC is awarded a score of 3.5 out of 5 in this variable.
Commitment to Peace Agreement by all Main Actors to the Conflict

The main actors in the DRC conflict are the government of the DRC, the RCD, and the MLC. However, there were many other armed groups (OAG) in the DRC which included former Rwandese Armed Forces (ex-FAR), Allied Defence Forces (ADF), Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Uganda, Uganda National Rescue II (UNRF II), Interahamwe, FUNA, Forces for the Democracy in Burundi (FDB), UNITA and FDR.

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement held on 6 August 1999 in Lusaka, Zambia was attended by the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, RCD, and MLC. In the Agreement, the parties noted the commitment of the DRC government, the RCD, the MLC, and all other Congolese political and civil organizations to hold an all inclusive National Dialogue aimed at realizing national reconciliation and a new political dispensation in the DRC. All the parties agreed to a ceasefire among their forces in the DRC. This agreement meant the effective cessation of hostilities, military movements and reinforcements, as well as hostile actions, including hostile propaganda, and was to be effective within 24 hours after signing of the agreement (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999). Due to the humanitarian crisis in many parts of the DRC, they resolved that parties shall facilitate humanitarian assistance through the opening up of humanitarian corridors and creation of conditions conducive to providing urgent humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, refugees, and other affected persons. Once the RCD signed the agreement, UN deployed 90 UN military liaison personnel in the DRC (Burgess 2007).

The UNSC, acting under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and in collaboration with the AU, was requested to constitute, facilitate and deploy an appropriate peacekeeping force in the DRC to ensure implementation of this Agreement; and taking into account
the peculiar situation of the DRC, mandate the peacekeeping force to track down all
armed groups in the DRC. In this respect, the UNSC was to provide the requisite mandate
for the peacekeeping force. All parties committed themselves to the process of locating,
identifying, disarming and assembling all members of armed groups in the DRC.
Countries of origin of members of the armed groups, committed themselves to taking all
the necessary measures to facilitate their repatriation. Such measures included the
granting of amnesty in countries where such a measure was deemed beneficial. It
however, did not apply in the case of suspects of the crime of genocide. The Parties
assumed full responsibility of ensuring that armed groups operating alongside their troops
or on the territory under their control comply with the processes leading to the
dismantling of those groups (Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 1999).

After securing the withdrawal of foreign forces in the DRC, South African
peacemakers, with UN assistance, turned to the various warring parties inside the DRC
and negotiated with them to resolve their differences and end the conflict. Since 2002,
considerable progress has been made to achieve lasting peace in the DRC. The
constructive engagement by South Africa culminated in the landmark signing in Pretoria
of the global and all-inclusive agreement between the belligerents in the DRC conflict on
16 December 2002. This paved way for the setting up the transitional government of
national unity in June 2003, which attracted the various warring parties in the DRC
(Department of International Relations, South Africa).

The UN pledged to assist the parties to abide by their commitments under the
agreement, including the establishment of a government of national unity to be followed
by elections. In 2003, the peace process went beyond the Lusaka framework. MONUC
began a new stage of engagement and cooperation with parties indigenous to the DRC. A score of 3.0 is awarded to MONUC in this variable. This score is further reinforced by the fact that all the parties cooperated in agreeing to a ceasefire among all their forces in the DRC.

Effective Complete or Partial Economic Sanctions

Minerals and arms smuggling worth millions of dollars persist in the DRC, despite the international sanctions, thus fuelling the conflict. The independent experts monitoring UN sanctions in the DRC report that the mainly Rwandese Hutu rebels of FDLR continue to exploit gold and cassiterite in Kivu provinces with the help of trading networks in Uganda, Burundi and the United Arabs Emirates, while regular arms deliveries come from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Sudan. The UN applied sanctions to two gold-trading companies that operated in Uganda but gold still managed to go through a small network of individuals (Nduru 2005). Experts are calling for UNSC to strengthen the authority of MONUC in monitoring the arms embargo, and to reiterate its request for Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia to provide data on all flights to or from the DRC (Congo Planet 2009).

In July 2003, the UNSC instituted a 12-month arms embargo over areas in the DRC’s eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu (UNSCR 1493, 2003). On 30 September 2009, the UNSC extended and expanded the arms embargo and related sanctions in the DRC, which have been in place since 2003, for another one year up to November 2011. The council members unanimously voted to adopt the resolution for the continuation of sanctions which consist of arms embargo against armed groups that are not part of the government’s integrated army known as the FARDC. But with an area the
size of Western Europe and porous borders, the UN has had difficulty implementing the sanctions. It also mandated the Group of Experts to develop recommendations and guidelines for buying and processing of lucrative mineral products in eastern part of the country (Congo Planet 2009).

The increase of MONUC peacekeepers to 16,700 would allow MONUC to step up the protection of civilians under imminent threat and be able to conduct aircraft inspection, without notice, on cargo planes and other traffic in North Kivu and South Kivu and Ituri in fulfillment of the ban on arms trading in the area. MONUC was also mandated to collect and dispose of arms and material found in the DRC in violation of the international sanctions (Burgess 2007). A score of 2.0 is awarded to MONUC.

Influence by External Actors and Cooperation of Regional Actors

Uganda and Rwanda are the major external actors in the DRC conflict. The two countries have a national security interest in the DRC that is to stop the incursions of armed groups based in DRC. They have accused the UN and the DRC troops of failing to control rebel groups that occasionally launch attacks across their borders. Rwanda and Uganda also continue to intervene covertly in the DRC’s internal affairs (Global Policy Forum 2003). Several militias continued to conduct guerilla operations in the DRC as MONUC was deploying and carrying out its mandate. The various armed groups in the DRC as earlier noted, include ex-FAR, ADF, LRA, UNRF II, Interahamwe, FUNA, FDD, and UNITA. In 1998, Rwanda and Uganda attempted to overthrow Kabila’s government when Kabila turned against the Rwandese-led force which overthrew Mobutu. In August 1998, forces from Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia came and
supported Kabila. This intervention by foreign forces led to war throughout the country and displacement of millions of civilians. The DRC was divided into the west controlled by the government supported by the three countries of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia versus the east where rebels operated, backed by Uganda and Rwanda forces (Burgess, 2007). Foreign armies in the DRC sought rewards from the country’s rich mines, with Uganda and Rwanda clashing militarily three times in the mineral rich Kisangani region causing the deaths of hundreds of civilians. If DRC had been a stronger state, the two countries Rwanda and Uganda would not have been in a position to invade the DRC twice in a year (Kabemba C. 1999, 11).

After a year of fighting, the Lusaka Peace Accord, hosted by SADC, was signed which called for the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of foreign forces, the disarming of warring parties, and the formation of a government of national unity. On 4 December 2002, an agreement was reached at Sun City, South Africa for the withdrawal of the Rwandese, Zimbabwean, Angolan, and Ugandan forces from the DRC (UNDP 2004). A score of 3.5 is awarded to MONUC has the influence of many external actors especially the neighboring countries had a big role to play in the conflict in the DRC.

Characteristics and Capacity of MONUC Peacekeepers

On 24 February 2000, the UNSC passed resolution 1291 authorizing the expansion of MONUC to include armed peacekeeping and a maximum of 5,537 military personnel for MONUC (United Nations 2000b). This force was relatively small to cover such a large state where considerable fighting was still going on. The UNSCR 1291 provided for 500 military observers and civilian staff who would be responsible for human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, child protection, political affairs,
medical support, and administrative support to the mission. MONUC managed to deploy in Kinshasa and urban areas and later to other areas of the DRC gradually (Burgess, 2007). Secretary-General Kofi Annan later proposed an adjustment of MONUC structure and deployment to shift the emphasis of its activity to eastern DRC, and to enhance disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, and resettlement and integration (DDRR) capacity through the creation of a “forward force.” The force would comprise of two robust task forces, based in Kindu and Kisangani on the Congo River, as well as a reserve battalion, river units and specialized support units.

On 4 December 2002, the UNSC expanded MONUC to a level of 8,700 military personnel in two task forces. This increase was intended to provide the capability to deal with continued warlord activity in eastern DRC and help end the humanitarian crisis in the DRC (United Nations 2002).

In July 2003, it further increased the strength of MONUC troops to 10,800. The eastern DRC was still unstable (United Nations 2003). In September 2004, Secretary-General Annan recommended more than doubling the number of peacekeepers to 23,900 and 507 police to meet the continuing challenges in the eastern DRC. On 1 October 2004, the UNSC authorized additional 5,900 peacekeepers and raised the number of peacekeepers from 10,800 to 16,700 for MONUC. Annan commented that the move would contribute to improvement of the mission’s operational capabilities which was under-sourced (United Nations 2004).

Inadequate funding and logistics inhibited the deployment of an adequate level of peacekeepers required for the UN mission. MONUC has a strength of about 17,000 peacekeepers which was far below the recommended 24,000 owing to lack of funds
To demonstrate its capability, after the killings of Bangladesh peacekeepers in Ituri in 2005, UN peacekeepers were authorized to use force against rebels. UN forces sought out the perpetrators and dealt with them accordingly (Burgess 2007).

In terms of resources, MONUC peacekeepers lacked the much needed aircraft to protect civilians. The mission needed 16 helicopters and transport aircraft like, C-130s, which were to be donated by the UN member states. The UNSC voted in December 2008 to send an additional 3,000 soldiers and more air assets to MONUC. After repeated delay, additional troops began arriving in October 2009 but there is little progress to acquire helicopters and a cargo plane for the mission (Daily Nation 1 November 2009).

By the time MONUC mandate was extended by another year, up to 31 December 2009, it had had a total of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel, and 1,050 personnel of formed police units (United Nations 2008). A score of 3.5 is awarded to MONUC.

Effectiveness of UN Leadership in MONUC

Mr. Alan Doss has spent his entire professional life in the service of the UN working on peacekeeping, development and humanitarian assignments in Africa, Asia and Europe as well as UN Headquarters in New York. He is currently the SRSG of the UN in the DRC and also Head of the UN peacekeeping mission MONUC. The mission is deeply engaged in the peace process in the DRC and provides support to the country as it seeks to end the decade-long conflict. Throughout the country, the mission is promoting human rights, the protecting of women and children, reforming of state institutions and the holding of democratic elections.
Mr. Doss has served in many UN positions in many parts of the world including Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia. When UNAMSIL was organized, Mr. Doss was the Deputy Special Representative in the mission and served concurrently as the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative where he provided oversight for reintegration of war affected populations, UN support for the disarmament program, and the restoration of state authority, governance reform and the national recovery program. His appointment, following the Brahimi Panel on UN peace operations in 2000, was aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of such operations through better coordination of UN peacekeeping, humanitarian and development activities in country (United Nations 1999).

Immediately prior to his current assignment to the DRC, he was the SRSG of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The UN mission provided extensive security and political support for the 2005 national elections in Liberia, which saw Ellen Sirleaf being elected as Africa’s first female president (Wikipedia 2010). A value of 3.0 is awarded to this variable.

Effectiveness of SADC Intervention in DRC

The UN and other regional organizations, like AU and Southern African Development Community (SADC), have been instrumental in supporting peace efforts in the DRC. The DRC is a member of SADC and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). But as Kofi Annan had noted, in order to be effective, any UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, whatever its mandate, will have to be large and expensive (Report to UNSG 1999). After a year of fighting, the SADC countries ousted the Lusaka summit of 6 August 1999 and led in negotiating the withdrawal of foreign
forces, the disarming of warring groups, and the formation of a government of national
unity (MONUC 1999). A score of 2.5 is awarded out of 5 points.

**Case Study of United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)**

Sudan is located in North Africa and shares borders with CAR, Chad, the DRC, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, and Uganda. It has an area of 2,505,810 square kilometers. It is the largest country in Africa, in terms of size and landmass and is the tenth largest in the world. Darfur is a region in the western region of Sudan with an area of 493,180 square kilometers (Wikipedia 2009).

Sudan as a country has a myriad of conflicts ranging from the long running South Sudan conflict between the central government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) which has been active for more than 29 years. Sudan has had security problems with Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Egypt, border issues with Libya and the complicated Chad-Sudan conflict resulting from Darfur. The Darfur conflict in Sudan is one of the most horrific and heartbreaking scenarios of genocide ever recorded. The security of Darfur is the responsibility of the GoS, but the government has failed to take responsibility. Instead, it has refused to accept that genocide was committed in Darfur and that the Darfurians need human security. Human security is a people-centered approach that has gained considerable attention in recent times but is missing in Darfur. Human security complements state security and is concerned with the individual and community rather than the state (Ogata 2001).
Background of the Darfur Conflict

The Darfur conflict began in February 2003 when two rebels groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) took up arms together and attacked government military targets. These groups complained that the Darfur region, which is predominantly inhabited by Muslim African farmers, remained undeveloped and neglected by the Arab dominated Islamic regime in Khartoum (Wikipedia, Sudan 2009). But instead of addressing the problem, the government responded by mobilizing a proxy armed Arab militia, known as the Janjaweed (men on horseback), drawn from indigenous Arabs to contain the conflict. With government support and weaponry, the Janjaweed took the advantage and launched a series of brutal attacks in villages murdering and raping women, targeting the indigenous black African communities and burning villages. The helicopters and fighter bombers then followed. The Janjaweed, on horseback and donkeys, would assist the military to attack and burn villages, killing principally young men and forcing survivors to flee to areas protected by police (Prunier 2005, 100).

According to the UN, about 300,000 peoples have been killed while 2-3 million remained displaced from their homes and now live in refugee and IDP camps dotted all over the Darfur region. With these results, the conflict then was internationalized. Darfur shares the international border with Chad and the CAR. The conflict spilled over into Chad and CAR with the three countries trading accusations of supporting each other’s rebels.

The Janjaweed attacked the locals and foreigners too. Since the AU personnel deployed in 2004, 32 peacekeepers have been killed, over half of them in 2007.
Additionally, 69 aid workers have been abducted, 37 relief convoys have been attacked, and 61 humanitarian vehicles hijacked by January 2008 (UNAMID Factsheet 2008).

The Darfur conflict is barely a decade old with many actors within and outside the region. UNICEF, among other agencies, has been working tirelessly despite the insecurity to provide the desperately needed food, shelter, and medicine to refugees and IDPs. On several occasions, significant attacks have been directed towards those humanitarian agencies severely curtailing humanitarian operations in the region. The region has been devastated by the conflict and at the moment a peaceful solution has not been reached despite having had two peacekeeping missions, AMIS in 2004, which was

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Figure 5. Map of Sudan (Darfur).

predominantly made of African countries and now the African and UN hybrid mission UNAMID since 2007.

**Analysis of United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)**

This mission was formally established by the UNSC on 31 July 2007 through the adoption of UNSCR 1769, which authorized the establishment of the AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur, referred to by its acronym UNAMID, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter for an initial period of 12 months (United Nations 2007). UNAMID was established on 31 July 2007 and formally took over from AMIS on 31 December 2007. The mandate was extended on 31 July 2008 with the adoption of UNSCR 1828 for a further 12 months, until 31 July 2009 (United Nations 2008a). The current mandate was extended on 13 October 2009 until 15 October 2010 vide UNSCR 1891 (United Nations 2009a).

The mission was formed by the successful strengthening of AMIS in the implementation of the Light Support Package (LSP) and the Heavy Support Package (HSP). The mission’s headquarters is in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. It has sector headquarters in El Fasher, El Geneina, and Nyala. The mission will have up to 55 deployment locations throughout the three states of northern, western, and south Darfur. The UN, in July 2008, authorized the deployment of 26,000 peacekeepers in Darfur making it one of the largest UN peacekeeping missions. Its budget of $1.7 billion for the fiscal year 2008-2009 is the largest of UN peacekeeping operations (UNAMID 2009).

The GoS blocked the deployment of the full protection force and rejected peacekeepers from several non-African countries knowing very well that most African
countries’ militaries are underequipped for such a complex mission. Additionally, President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan was indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague on 14 July 2008 for the atrocities committed in Darfur. This further complicates the Darfur crisis (Wikipedia 2009, Darfur #ICC).

The Effectiveness of the UN Mandate of UNAMID

The GoS accepted the deployment of UNAMID in Darfur in June 2007. The deployment was then formally established by the UNSC vide resolution 1769 dated 31 July 2007. UNAMID was established under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter titled Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, commonly referred to as peace enforcement operations (Randy 2002). Chapter 7 authorizes the use of military force to be directed against a state or belligerent parties whereas strict adherence to chapter 6 limits the use of force only for self defense (United Nations 2009b). UNAMID was established and mandated for an initial period of 12 months. It formally took over from AMIS on 31 December 2007 on the Transfer of Authority (TOA). The UNAMID mandate was further extended on 31 July 2008 with the adoption of UNSCR 1828 for a further 12 months, until 31 July 2009. The current mandate was extended until 15 October 2010 vide the UNSCR 1891 of 2009 (United Nations 2009a).

UNAMID was granted the core mandate to provide protection to civilians. It was also mandated to provide security for the humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying the implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contribute to the promotion of human rights, and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting the situation along the borders of Chad and the CAR.
Despite the mandate granted to UNAMID, peacekeepers have continued to be killed. On 5 December 2009 for example, 5 Rwandese peacekeepers were ambushed and killed by unidentified armed persons while supplying water to the needy IDPs (Bavier 2009). In view of the precarious and unpredictable security situation in Darfur, it is awarded a score of 2.0 out of 5 for this variable.

Effective Control of Natural Resources Found in Darfur that Fuel the Conflict.

Unlike Southern Sudan, the region of Darfur has no major strategic financial natural resources. The main source of conflict in Darfur is over land. The African farmers want to farm it but the Arab pastoralists want to graze on it. According to Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, in their book, *Darfur: The New History of a Long War*, they said that there was some truth that links the Darfur conflict and the demand for natural resources. The serious drought and famine of 1984-85 led to localized conflict that generally pitted pastoralists against the farmers in the struggle for diminishing resources, culminating in the Fur-Arab war of 1987-89 (Flint and De Waal 2009, 26).

Desertification added significantly to the stress on the livelihoods of pastoralist, forcing them to move from place to place in search of pasture for their animals. In Darfur, Arab tribes are basically pastoralist nomads while the Fur tribe are farmers. Most Arabs are armed with small arms weapons. The Arabs would move and graze their livestock on cropland without consent leading to conflict. The land resource is not the main contributor of the ineffectiveness of the mission in Darfur which resulted in the deaths of many civilians. The score of 4.0 is awarded for UNAMID.
Commitment to Peace Agreement by Parties to the Darfur Conflict

Parties to the Darfur conflict are the Sudanese government where the GoS military plays an important role, the Sudan Liberation Army (Minni) led by Minni Minawi from the Zaghawa tribe (De Waal 2007, 155), the Sudan Liberation Army (Wahid) led by Abdel Wahid from the Fur tribe (De Waal 2007, 141), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Khalil Ibrahim, the Chadian rebels, the Janjaweed and other smaller armed groups which fragmented from the main rebel parties. These factions are armed and fight against each other. The DPA was the most comprehensive agreement in its coverage on issues affecting Darfur (DPA 2006). In May 2006, the SLA(M) signed the peace agreement with the government, while the rest, including the JEM, did not sign it (De Waal 2007, 279).

The Janjaweed is headed by their powerful leader Musa Hilal and is composed of Sudanese Arabs (Flint and De Waal 2008, 35). The government armed and trained these Arab tribes to fight against non-Arabs. The Janjaweed are given small salaries, food and horses by the GoS (Tarus 2007).

The dominant force in the Darfur conflict is the GoS which is found in all sectors. During the height of Darfur hostilities in 2003-04, the GoS war efforts consisted of the following elements: the army, the Janjaweed, military intelligence and the air force. The overall coordination was in the hands of the Minister of State for the Interior, a young security officer from the Kodorfan region called Ahmed Mohammed Haroun. He was given enough money he demanded and much latitude with the militia he directed. In May 2007, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Ahmed Haroun on 42 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity in his position as a manager of...
the Darfur Security Desk and coordinator between the government’s army and security forces, and the militia (Flint and De Waal 2008, 123). The GoS has been clearly implicated in promoting the violence in Darfur.

The SLA(M) is organized in small highly mobile units. It uses hit and run tactics to demoralize the GoS forces and acquire critical supplies. The SLA(M) does not hold ground but denies the GoS access to larger areas by attacking its officials and blocking the main roads. They are found in the general area of Kabkabiya, Zalinge, El Geneina, and Nyala. The JEM are associated with the Zaghawa tribe also neighboring Chad and have similar objectives as the SLA(M). The JEM is headed by Khalil Ibrahim Mohammed and was formed in the 1990s after the expulsion of African Muslims in government by President Al Bashir. It is smaller than SLA(M) in number and adopts similar tactics as the SLA. The JEM did not sign the DPA.

**Darfur Peace Agreement**

One of the biggest obstacles to the Darfur peace process has been fragmentation among the rebel movements, and the fact that many groups have demanded their representation. The Darfur peace process began in September 2003 with a 45-day ceasefire between the GoS and SLM/A. This peace process continued in April 2004 with the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire. The JEM joined the negotiation process at that point, and the meetings shifted to Abuja, Nigeria, in August 2004. The first major dilemma on the question of who was to be represented arose when the National Movement for Reform and Democracy (NMRD) split away from the JEM and demanded representation at the talks. The AU, supported by its partners decided not to allow the NMRD to join the negotiations. Instead, the AU invited the NMRD to join the peace
process after an agreement had been reached at the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC). The main reason for turning away the NMRD was the fear that if any new faction was recognized, this would encourage the rebel movements to fragment and any ambitious commander or political leader to form a breakaway faction and demand a seat at the table (De Waal, 2008). The second major dilemma was who to recognize as the leader of the SLA. At the beginning, Abdel Wahid al Nur was acknowledged as the chairman. But by the fifth round in Abuja, he was using his authority as the Chairman to reject SLA commanders who came to the talks. The commanders represented real groups on the ground and wanted a stake in the negotiations, as part of the SLA. Abdel Wahid pushed them aside and refused to contemplate any dilution of his authority as chairman. The AU chose to recognize both Abdel Wahid and Minni Minawi as leaders of different groups in the SLA. At a meeting in Nairobi, Kenya in November 2005, the US tried to bring the two factions together and failed. It then persuaded them to at least adopt a common negotiating position which lasted only a couple of months. During the last round in Abuja, a group of 19 delegates from Abdel Wahid’s faction split and tried to seek recognition from the AU. The AU refused on the grounds that it would only recognize the two SLA leaders, but it allowed the “Group of 19” (G-19) to stay in Abuja and engage in informal discussions, in the hope that it would rejoin Abdel Wahid (or one of the other groups) and find a means for joining whatever agreement was signed (Darfur Peace Agreement 2006).

In the implementation of these agreements, there were many activities to be monitored and verified including the disarmament of the Janjaweed, the disengagement and redeployment of GoS forces, and the demilitarized zones around IDP camps. Because
it had signed the DPA, the GoS was required to disarm the Janjaweed and redeploy its forces. But the SLA(W) and the JEM, which did not sign the agreement, were not required to disengage and withdraw their forces, and therefore did not have any role in monitoring and verifying GoS actions under the DPA Security Arrangements (De Waal 2007, 245).

Having been spurned by Abdel Wahid of SLA(W) and Khalil, the AU could not turn away those senior members of the SLM(W) and the JEM who wished to come forward and express their support for the peace agreement. The AU also did not want to create any further splits in the rebel movements. The AU decided two criteria for allowing individuals to sign the “Declaration of Commitment.” Either they had to be accredited delegates to the peace talks, or military commanders or political leaders known to AMIS in Darfur (De Waal 2007).

One of the toughest questions in the negotiations in Abuja that led to the DPA was how to control and disarm the Janjaweed and other armed militias in Darfur. Long-term peace and security in Darfur requires the control of all the militia and armed forces, some of which have terrorized Darfurians since the 1980s, and some of which were only recently established. The responsibility for disarming the Janjaweed and other armed groups falls on the GoS. Throughout the Abuja talks, the rebel movements insisted that since the GoS had armed this militia it was their responsibility to disarm them. In the peace talks, the movements argued strongly that some of the Janjaweed had been absorbed into paramilitary groups including the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) and the police. The rebel movements demanded a mechanism to deal with all the rebel groups in Darfur, whether or not they could be called “Janjaweed.” This was included under a
section called “Reform of Selected Security Institutions.” The DPA speaks of the Janjaweed and other armed militia. However, the negotiators at Abuja were well aware that there were many militias that were not Janjaweed and did not pose the same kind of threat to the civilian population (De Waal 2007). For the Janjaweed to be neutralized and disarmed, and the people of Darfur to live in peace and safety, much more will be needed than a signed Agreement. The good faith of the GoS and rebel movements is essential. Effort to persuade the other rebel groups involved to sign the DPA failed and this influenced further deterioration of the security situation in Darfur.

Meanwhile there was renewed violence and fragmentation of the rebel movements into smaller independent factions. This further complicated the ability to bring the non-signatory factions to conform to the DPA. The growing complexity of the conflict, coupled with lack of resources and funding for AMIS, inspired the African Union Peace and Security Council to request for a transition to a UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO). The UN force was then formally established by the UNSC vide UNSCR 1769 dated 31 July 2007 (United Nations 2007).

The peacekeeping operation in Darfur is still fragile due to the UN’s inability to engage sufficient resources to compel the various warring parties to sign and abide by the DPA. On 20 February 2010, Sudan agreed to a ceasefire framework agreement with the JEM in Djamena, Chad. The meeting set out terms for negotiations that could still fail if it sees signs of bad faith from Khartoum. This was in return of president Bashir’s offer to cancel death sentences handed over to JEM prisoners who had attacked Khartoum in 2008 (Jennifer Z. Deaton, CNN, 21 February 2010). A score of 2.5 is awarded to
UNAMID whereby two of the main actors, GoS and SLA(M) committed themselves to the peace agreements while JEM and SLA(W) did not.

Effective Complete and Partial Economic Sanctions
The UNSC imposed an arms embargo on all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed operating in Darfur, on 30 July 2004 with the adoption of resolution 1556 (United Nations 2004a). The sanctions regime was strengthened with the adoption of UNSCR 1591 of 2005 which expanded the scope of the arms embargo and imposed additional measures, including a travel ban and an asset freeze on four individuals comprised of 2 rebel leaders, a former Sudanese Air Force chief and the leader of a pro-government militia (United Nations 2005). The arms and related materials of all types include weapons, ammunition, military vehicles, military and paramilitary equipment, military vessels and aircrafts of all types, and spare parts of the mentioned items (United Nations 2005). A score of 1.5 is awarded to this variable.

Influence by External Actors and Cooperation of Regional Actors
While the GoS, rebel groups and the Janjaweed are the main actors in the Darfur conflict, there are various other external actors in the conflict. The Chadian rebels, supported by the Chadian government, are involved in the conflict. They are active along the common border of Chad and Sudan. Libya and Chad supported the Chadian rebels. The Chadian authorities, members of the Armed forces and other armed groups operate across the border. Most of the Arab Chadians form a large part of the Janjaweed militia force. Thousands of refugees from Darfur have fled to Chad to escape the Janjaweed atrocities. In May 2007, following a series of border clashes between the two countries,
Sudanese President Hassan Al Bashir and Chadian President Idriss Deby signed a reconciliation agreement committing each of the parties to refrain from supporting rebels in the other country (Mail and Guardian 2007).

On the external side, because certain powers are interested in natural resources, the conflict is sustained by their actions. The main countries involved are China and Russia. In the African context, actors like Chad and Eritrea are interested in tribal unity, while Egypt and countries of the Arab League wish to maintain Arab unity. Russia and China are among the major weapon suppliers of Khartoum (World Tribute 2007).

The parties to the Darfur conflict are the GoS military and local factions namely: the SLA(M) led by Minni Minawi, SLA(W), JEM led by Mohammed, the Janjaweed, and other smaller armed groups which fragmented from these main parties. All these factions were armed and fought against each other within Darfur. Only SLA(M) and the GoS signed the DPA. The conflict spilled over to Chad and CAR where thousands of refugees fled to avoid the bloodshed. In the CAR, 200,000 people have been forced out of their homes near the Sudan border. An additional 236,000 refugees crossed into Chad to avoid the bloodshed in Darfur. Chad accused Sudan of supporting the Chadian rebels that attacked the Chadian capital in 2006 (Kristof 2006, 7A). A score of 3.0 is awarded as a reflection of the relatively minimal amount of external support that is fueling the conflict.

Characteristic and Capacity of UNAMID Peacekeepers

The Darfur region is very large covering an area approximately the size of France. The 7,000 man strength of AMIS was grossly inadequate to fully deploy and have presence all over the region. It was composed of 3 infantry battalions from Rwanda, 3 infantry battalions from Nigeria, an infantry battalion from South Africa, an infantry
battalion from Senegal, a company from Gambia, and a military police detachment from Kenya (Appiah-Mensah 2006, 4). The force was therefore unable to effectively monitor and report on the HCA violations that were going on in the Darfur region. The force was stretched out thin and had no reserve to respond to any eventualities. This contributed to the force being unable to react to the Haskanita attack of 30 September 2007 whereby the whole camp was overrun by heavily armed rebels leaving a trail of death and destruction (Polgreen 2007). Seven peacekeepers, two military observers and one civilian police were killed in the Haskanita attack. The rebels also stole AMIS vehicles, equipment, and ammunition. Instead of responding to attack and to recover AU equipment, AMIS evacuated Haskanita camp and closed it. One relief worker said, “It’s indicative of complete insecurity. These groups are attacking anybody and everybody with total impunity” (Gentleman NT 2007, A5). AMIS air assets were provided by contracted civilians who were not willing to risk their lives to carry out reinforcement flights and had flight safety rules limiting them from night flying.

Figure 6. Nigerian soldiers evacuating an injured soldier on 1 October 2007 Source: Maj David Tarus’ photograph collection, 2007.
AMIS had divided the region into eight sectors with three or four team sites in each sector. One infantry battalion was deployed in each sector. Due to the vastness of the area, the forces were inadequate (Tarus 2007). Table 4 shows the country and strength of units and Military Group Sites in the eight AMIS sectors.

**Table 2. AMIS Deployment by Sectors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Strength/State/MGS</th>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Strength/State/MGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sector 1</td>
<td>1 Bn from Rwanda in Zam Zam, Tawilla, Shangil Tobaya, Umm Kadada</td>
<td>Sector 5</td>
<td>1 Bn from Rwanda in MGS Tine, Kulbus, Umm Baru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector 2</td>
<td>1 Bn from Nigeria in MGS Nyala, Kas, Khor Abeche, Marla</td>
<td>Sector 6</td>
<td>1 Bn from South Africa MGS Kutum, Malha, Mellit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector 3</td>
<td>1 Bn from Nigeria in MGS El Geneina, Mournei, Masteri, Forobaranga</td>
<td>Sector 7</td>
<td>1 Bn from Rwanda MGS Zalinge, Nertiti, Mukjar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector 4</td>
<td>1 Bn from Rwanda in MGS Sortony, Saraf Umra, Kabkabiya</td>
<td>Sector 8</td>
<td>1 Bn from Nigeria in El Daein, Haskanita, Muhajeria, Labado, Shearia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNAMID reorganized AMIS deployment from 8 sectors to 3 sectors in order to strengthen its command and control arrangements in readiness for the full deployment of the UNAMID force. On 21 October, 2007, the 8 sectors of AMIS were disbanded. Sectors 1, 4, and 6 were merged and re-designated Sector North with its HQs in Zam Zam. Sectors 2 and 8 were merged and re-designated Sector South with its HQs at Nyala while Sectors 3, 5, and 7 were merged and re-designated Sector West with its Headquarters at El Geneina. The three new sectors boundaries were set to conform to the existing boundaries of the three Darfur states. All military group sites (MGS) were re-designated Military Observer Team Locations (MT Locs) while the Force Headquarters remained in El Fasher (Agwai, Force Commander AMIS, 2007).

Figure 8. Operational Deployment of AMIS

Source: AMIS (Operation Brief to Observers, El Fasher, AMIS: 2006).
UNAMID took over all the equipment and personnel of AMIS on 1 January 2008. The force was supposed to have consisted of 17,300 military personnel and 3,300 civilian police officers. As stated earlier, the first phase involved the LSP then the HSP before the UNAMID took control of the Darfur mission. The deployment of the UNAMID additional forces then started to trickle in depending on the goodwill of the UN’s 192 members to send troops (Lederer 2007). As shown in Annex C, the timeline for transfer of authority was set to be completed after about 150 days after the Mandate Day (M) by the UNSCR adopted 31 July 2007.

Although UNAMID inherited most of the equipment from AMIS, UNAMID still lacks adequate and appropriate ground transport. In 2005, Canada provided AMIS with 105 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) which are currently being used by UNAMID. Most of them were unserviceable and required experienced drivers to operate them. Under AMIS, no night patrols were carried out except by the South African battalion in Sector 5. UNAMID must control Darfur by having 24-hour patrols to prevent the armed rebel groups’ freedom of action. This is equipment dependent. UNAMID continues to face shortfalls in troops and critical transport and aviation assets (UNAMID 2010, 1). On 5 December 2009, a platoon of UNAMID peacekeepers, distributing water outside an IDP camp in Shangil Tobaya, were ambushed by armed persons resulting in the death of 2 peacekeepers from Rwanda. The injured were immediately air-evacuated to El Fasher and the patrol did not respond to the attack. UNAMID only denounced the attack and left it to the GoS to identify, arrest, and bring the perpetrators to justice. This attack brought the number of killed UNAMID personnel to 22 since the mission assumed its tasks in January 2008 (UNAMID 2009).
UNAMID needed 24 helicopters to make the forces more mobile. Without this tactical air lift, quick deployment of troops to deal with crises and deployment of observers to conduct investigations in insecure areas would not be possible. The inability of African countries to commit enough resources to support peacekeeping efforts in Darfur will ultimately render the entire UN operation ineffective. On 20 February 2010, the JSR Professor Gambari announced the presence of 80 percent of the forces and 72 percent of the police elements of the UNAMID in Darfur. He said this when he witnessed the arrival of 5 planes from Ethiopia to UNAMID (United Nations 2010d). UNAMID was poorly resourced to be able to effectively operate in Darfur. A score of 2.5 is awarded to UNAMID on this variable.

Effectiveness of UN Leadership in UNAMID

The UN raised alarm on the crisis in Darfur in 2003 and finding a lasting solution has been a top priority for the UNSC and two consecutive Secretary Generals. Under the auspices of AU, and with the support of UN and other partners, the DPA was signed on 5 May 2006. All along intensive diplomatic and political efforts to bring the non-signatories into the peace process continue (Darfur Peace Agreement 2006).

A UN-AU Technical Assessment Team was established by the UN through UNSC Resolution 1679 dated 31 July 2007 to assess the requirements for strengthening AMIS in order to enhance its ability to implement the DPA and a possible transition to a UN peacekeeping operation (United Nations 2007).

On 16 November 2006, the AU, in consultation with the international community, decided among other things to establish a three phased approach to enhance AMIS peacekeeping efforts in Darfur. The first phase was the deployment of the UN LSP to
AMIS designed to enhance the AMIS command and control structure, support the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and assist in liaison and monitoring. The second phase was the HSP designed to complement the LSP. It included the deployment of military enabling units, military force multipliers, police and civilian personnel to AMIS. It was also to provide substantial aviation and logistic assets to enhance AMIS’s efficiency and effectiveness. The last phase was the transitioning of AMIS to UNAMID. In addition, more operational elements and enabling units would deploy to enhance operational effectiveness and strengthen the command and control structure (UN and Darfur Factsheet).

The Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Darfur, Jan Eliason, appointed in December 2006, was engaged in intensive shuttle diplomacy alongside his AU counterpart Mr. Ahmed Salim Ahmed in pursuit of the political process. The benchmarks of their efforts were an end to violence, a strengthened ceasefire ensured by peacekeepers, improvement in the humanitarian situation, and an end to the marginalization of Darfur through an inclusive peace agreement, with power and wealth-sharing provisions (UNAMID 2009).

The UNSG Ban Ki-moon and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping, appointed Professor Ibrahim Gambari of Nigeria as the Joint African Union-United Nations Special Representative for Darfur (JSR), with effect from 1 January 2010. Professor Gambari replaces Rodolphe Adada (Congo), who served as JSR from the mission’s inception until July 2009. The UN Secretary-General paid tribute to the work of Mr. Adada in leading the mission through its challenging establishment phase. He also expressed appreciation to Henry K. Anyidoho, who served as Officer-in-Charge of the
UNAMID since Mr. Adada’s departure. Professor Gambari brings to Darfur extensive diplomatic skills, UN experience, and knowledge of the Africa region. He is currently the SG’s Special Adviser on the International Compact with Iraq and other Political Issues and has served in Myanmar. He previously held the position of Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs and Special Adviser to the UNSG on Africa. From September 2002 to February 2003, Professor Gambari served as the SRSG and Head of the United Nations Mission to Angola (United Nations 2010b).

Already Professor Gambari on 21 March 2010 concluded a two-day session of Darfur peace discussions in Paris, France with high-level French government officials, diplomats, and Abdul Wahid the head of the SLA(W). Professor Gambari briefed the French government officials and the diplomats on the peace process and the way forward, as well as the primary goals of the mission. The French officials pledged their support to the JSR’s priorities in implementing the mandate of UNAMID. Professor Gambari encouraged the SLA(W) leader to join the peace process. He also requested greater cooperation on the ground with UNAMID, to allow humanitarian aid agencies better access to verify and assess the situation in specific areas. Mr. Al-Nur expressed his support in establishing a good working relationship with UNAMID (United Nations 2010c). A score of 2.0 is awarded to UNAMID in this variable.

Effectiveness of African Union Intervention in Darfur

AMIS deployed in Darfur in 2004 on the basis of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCA) of 8 April 2004 (De Waal 2007, 376). Its mandate was to monitor and observe compliance with the HCA and all such agreements in the future and to assist in the process of confidence building. AMIS was also required to contribute to a secure
environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes. They were further to assist in increasing the level of compliance of all parties with the HCA (AMIS 2007, 3). It was also to contribute to the improvement of the security situation throughout the Darfur region. This led to the establishment of the AMIS with only military observers (MILOBS) and civilian police monitors (CivPol) along with a military protection force. AU peacekeepers, consisting of 7,500 soldiers and police from Rwanda, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa, began arriving in the Darfur region in 2004. This mandate was grossly inadequate which led to the failures of AMIS. The mandate of the force did not take into consideration the limit on its operational capabilities which led to unfounded expectations from the locals. AMIS forces lacked communication equipment, vehicles, airlift, logistics, and intelligence capabilities to be able to stop the militia attacks. When these expectations were not forthcoming the locals got disappointed. This disappointment eventually led to frustration and apprehension against the AMIS force. There was growing animosity against the force that resulted in incidences of hatred and acts of violence against it. The AU was unable to review the mandate and improve the capability of the force. Their rules of engagement (ROE) did not allow them to challenge rebels.

The most successful role for AMIS was the protection of groups of women from the Janjaweed as the women collect firewood needed for cooking. The AU deployment to Darfur, the first test of AU forces, has been a failure. In May 2006, the AU brokered the DPA between the warring parties in Darfur. Other parties failed to conform to the agreement. In June 2006, the AU and UN agreed that a UN force should take over the peacekeeping in Darfur. However, the Sudanese government, led by President Bashir,
refused to cooperate with the UN, claiming that a foreign force on its territory would violate its sovereignty. Some members of the GoS feared the possibility that the UN troops would be mandated to execute the arrest warrant on behalf of the ICC or see the mission expanded into other directions (De Waal 2007, 380). On 31 December 2007, AMIS transitioned to UNAMID. The AU intervention in the Darfur conflict is commendable. A score of 3.0 is awarded to UNAMID in this variable.

**Display of Results**

A summary of the results of the analysis is as displayed in table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables to be analyzed</th>
<th>UNAMSIL</th>
<th>MONUC</th>
<th>UNAMID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The effectiveness of the UN mandates of the mission</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective control of natural resources found in the mission area that fuel the conflict</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to the peace agreement by the main actors to the conflict</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective complete or partial economic sanctions</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence by external actors and cooperation of regional actors</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The characteristic and capacity of the mission’s peacekeepers</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective UN leadership in the mission</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of Regional Organization intervention in the mission</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(28.0)</td>
<td>(23.5)</td>
<td>(20.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Score</td>
<td>70.00</td>
<td>58.75</td>
<td>51.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Source_: Created by the author.
Interpretation of Results

The assessment of the effectiveness of the UN missions in Africa has revealed mixed results when the three missions are compared. In general UNAMSIL scored higher, bearing in mind that the mission has already closed down and had been characterized as a successful mission since Sierra Leone is now generally peaceful. MONUC is rated at above average while UNAMID which started barely two years ago seems to be trailing badly at slightly above average. In the author’s opinion the AU and UN need to focus on this mission more seriously. The variables with the largest range of differences are on the effectiveness of the UN mandate, the economic sanctions, the UN leadership in the mission, and the characteristic and capacity of the UN peacekeepers in the mission. In the variable of effectiveness of the UN mandate in the mission area, UNAMSIL appear to lead in terms of effectiveness where it scored 4.0 points followed closely by MONUC with 2.5 points while UNAMID scored 2.0 points. Like UNAMSIL experience, UNAMID continue to receive additional troops and resources periodically depending on what the African countries can provide. All the three missions ran under Chapter 7 of the UN mandate. However, the UNAMSIL mandate appears to have adequately addressed the needs of the mission progressively despite initial mission failures. Initially, UNAMSIL had many weaknesses and was humiliated by the RUF when it captured its peacekeepers. The UNSCR 1289 of 2000 expanded the strength of UNAMSIL while UNSCR 1313 of 2000 and 1346 of 2001 further strengthened the mandate of the mission. Thus UNAMSIL became robust and decisive in terms of meeting the UN mandate in Sierra Leone with the assistance of the British forces that extricated the UN hostages, intimidated the RUF, and trained a more capable and competent
military force. UNAMID seems to lack robustness of the UN forces as peacekeepers continue to be targeted by rebels where they get killed without much response to the attacks by UN forces. UNAMID has the mandate to be robust and the peacekeepers do not need to seek the consent from the warring parties in order to carry out its mandate. MONUC looked like a mission that was capable of becoming successful being the largest UN mission at the time. The mission was severely under-sourced but with the available peacekeepers, it managed to move to eastern DRC where the worst fighting and humanitarian crises were taking place. MONUC has a long way to go before success can be claimed and attainment of the mandate realized. There are good indicators that the mission might be successful in the near future.

The contrasting results in the three missions clearly illustrate the importance of a realistic mandate coupled with an adequate commitment of resources and manpower. Inadequate capacity and capability of the deployed UN peacekeepers in the three missions was noted and represent a big difference. The UNAMSIL and MONUC strength of peacekeepers was increased gradually on several occasions by the UNSC as the missions progressed. This allowed the missions to rectify the weak areas. There is a glaring limited capacity of UNAMID in terms of resources, personnel capacity, and equipment capabilities for the mission at the moment. The mission may not be able to effectively react to any emergency situation at the moment in case the security situation worsens. It may not achieve its mandate in its current state unless all the proposed requirements in terms of personnel and equipment are met. The mandate must be matched with resources in order to be effective. The major limiting factor in Darfur is when the Government of Sudan refused to allow countries outside Africa to contribute
troops to the Darfur missions. At the same time, many African do not have the capacity to provide some of the required resources and equipment to UNAMID mission. The DRC and Darfur are large areas which require many troops to effectively man it.

It is also important to note that the UN peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report became more robust with broader mandate and tougher ROEs. The missions also saw a large commitment of resources and peacekeepers as we have seen UNAMSIL and MONUC expansion. The great disappointment is in Sudan where AU deployed AMIS which proved ineffective due to lack of resources in general. The UNSC took long before they intervened. China blocked enforcement action to stop the conflict in Darfur basically due to Chinese oil interests in Sudan. As a result of some of these, UNAMID scored poorly in many variables.

It is clear that natural resources in the conflict areas are used by rebel groups to support their operations and fuel the conflicts thus reducing the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. The control of such resources from being used by rebels can mitigate the effectiveness of a mission in conflict areas. UNAMSIL managed to effectively reduce the black diamond market across Liberia thus cutting off the rebel’s financial support. The issue of natural resources is significant in MONUC too. It is only in Darfur that the natural resource, which is land, had no monetary value and does not play a significant role in the conflict as the diamonds and gold in Sierra Leone and the DRC.

The DRC and Darfur are two conflict areas with the highest number of rebel groups. These groups contributed to some extent to lack of commitment by the warring parties to honor the established peace agreements. A faction like SLA(W) in Darfur had
considerable influence in the mission area and never signed the peace agreement. JEM is another strong group which is dragging its feet in signing and honoring the agreement. The good indicators are that in February 2010, JEM signed a framework of the peace agreement.

In Sierra Leone, the RUF, being the only belligerent party in Sierra Leone, was easier to be committed to the agreement. For MONUC, the two major rebel groups signed the peace agreement but several other armed groups were not signatories of the peace agreement.

On the economic sanctions and embargoes imposed by UN in the mission areas, it is clear that due to the porous and extensive borders, sanctioned items like diamond, gold and arms in UNAMSIL, MONUC, and UNAMID respectively were not very effective. This could be due to the porous borders which are not manned. The black market trade in Liberia for the Sierra Leonean diamonds was at least reduced to manageable levels after the rebels were denied the control of the mines. This variable is scored low since sanctions were not used effectively in resolving the conflict.

The presence of experienced UN representatives in the mission area is of great importance. The envoys and special representatives’ ability to work with other countries, rebel groups, and organizations played an important role. Mr. Doss, currently in the DRC, contributed to the successful mission in Sierra Leone by being able to negotiate with rebel group warlords and state officials and helped convince them to make peace. With his experience, MONUC is likely to be successful in due course. The UN representation in Darfur scored low. This means UN representatives in Darfur need to put pressure on the warring parties to resume peace negotiations.
The regional organizations, despite their weaknesses, at least proved that they are available and ready to contribute in resolving conflicts however little it may be. ECOMOG, SADC, and AU intervened in Sierra Leone, the DRC, and Darfur respectively. The regional organizations managed to intervene in the conflicts before UN deployed peacekeepers in the conflict areas. Their positive contribution has been noted.

Summary and Conclusion of Chapter 4

This chapter analyzed data gathered from the research on the effectiveness of African UN peacekeeping missions by analyzing each of the three case studies using the eight variables identified by the author.

Africa’s ambitions of making a meaningful contribution to continental peace and security have been lofty and unrealistic with a proposed peace keeping capacity that often exceeds any competence they have now, or could have in the near future as AMIS has demonstrated.

A summary of the assessment of the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in Africa reveals mixed results. UNAMSIL, despite being a success story that should be emulated by the other running African UN missions, had its own setbacks ranging from incremental resourcing and strong external support from the neighboring state of Liberia which provided sanctuary and support to RUF. Sierra Leone has finally achieved peace and tranquility. MONUC has indicators of being successful with time.

Despite the presence of peacekeepers in Darfur, the killing of peacekeepers and civilians continue. Sudan continues to use military aircraft to bomb villages in the pretence of bombing rebel bases. The mission has proved ineffective at the moment with peacekeepers themselves becoming targets. Lack of strategically enabling assets has had
a great impact on the mission’s emergency response. The mission needs to be fully resourced and reviewed periodically for UNAMID to achieve its mandate.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The UN peacekeeping effort in Africa is commendable since it is clear that
countries in conflict, like Sierra Leone, can be rescued from collapse. The UNAMSIL
mission in Sierra Leone, MONUC in the DRC, and UNAMID in Sudan demonstrate that
in the final analysis, the success of such peacekeeping missions is dependent on several
factors. Some of these factors include the following: having a clear operating UN
mandate, effective control of natural resources that fuel the conflict, willingness of the
main internal and external actors to respect and implement the peace agreements put in
place, commitment and provision of peacekeepers and adequate resources from the start
of the mission, timely intervention by regional organizations, and effective UN
representatives to guide in the peace process.

Alongside with the three case studies of the DRC, Sierra Leone, and Sudan
highlighted in this thesis, there are several other examples of UN mission worth
analyzing for example United Nations Mission in Mozambique, Liberia and Angola. The
DRC mission is an example of a very complicated mission as it is one of the largest UN
missions in current times. This mission has provided an excellent case study as an
unsuccessful mission when analyzed in conjunction with the Sierra Leone and Darfur
conflicts.

The Sierra Leone case study is an example of a mission whereby the UN
intervened to resolve the conflict as quickly as possible, conducted successful elections
and handed over power and governance to the Sierra Leoneans with resounding success.
The UN success in Sierra Leone indicates that the international community is capable of
resolving conflicts successfully. UNAMSIL has thus become a model for a successful UN mission in Africa. The efforts that were expended there should now be directed to MONUC and UNAMID in order to achieve success.

Regional organizations get credit for intervening before the UN took over despite scarce resources. On a more positive note, some of the deficiencies AMIS had suffered in Darfur are the result of inadequate funding and resourcing. Not to be repeated, UNAMID needs to be adequately funded, pay soldiers’ allowances, acquire and maintain equipment, and conduct regular patrols and success will be achieved. With the hybrid nature of UNAMID, it has the advantage of involving the UN, which has conducted numerous peacekeeping missions and has the skills, experience and assets to help overcome some of the challenges the mission is facing.

The UN treated the three missions differently bearing in mind that the permanent members of the UNSC hold veto power on commitment and deployment of UN missions. The UN decline began with the collapse of peace enforcement in Somalia in 1993, Rwanda in 1994, and Bosnia from 1992 to 1995. African forces have intervened and stabilized conflicts in many conflict areas but eventually needed UN for financial and logistical support and reinforcement. Initially in the 1990s, UN used to established missions under chapter 6 and faced failure. The mission mandate was improved on several occasions to make it successful. In Sierra Leone, UN moved in quickly and decisively to keep peace and has continued to boast the MONUC in the DRC to meet the mandate. Interests of the permanent members of the UNSC came to play especially in the Darfur conflict in Sudan. Adequate consensus by the permanent members can cause the UN to provide the most suitable framework for effective intervention in conflicts either
independently or in conjunction with capable regional organizations like ECOWAS and AU.

**Recommendations**

The following recommendations are made in order to facilitate the effectiveness of UN missions in Africa, especially UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan:

1. Sanctions should be placed on individuals as well as companies who conduct trade in illegal goods in the conflict areas. These companies need to be blacklisted and countries found to be siding and facilitating the conflict punished.

2. The international borders of the affected states should be secured and neighboring countries supported to deny sanctuary to fleeing hostile forces. This needs to be part of the objective of a mandate in an intervention. Such as Liberia’s aid to the RUF, a military intervention into a neighboring country may be needed to neutralize the negative impact of that neighbor on the conflict. This will mean more troops for the mission and broadening of the mandate for Darfur to be able to cover the Chad and the CAR borders.

3. The UN also needs to deal with the fact that Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) may have their own political agendas and needs to closely monitor their actions of their peacekeepers. UN observer forces have had considerable success in the past, indicating that the UNAMID can successfully monitor efforts of the TCCs.

4. It is recommended that the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) be enhanced. The objectives of the ACOTA are to develop and improve African military capacities to be able to deploy and conduct peace support and humanitarian relief operations in Africa and other areas of the world when
called upon. Thousands of African peacekeepers are trained in basic military skills such as military policing, infantry tactics, human rights awareness, and engineering. By improving their military skills, the African peacekeeping forces would be able to respond quickly to crises to provide humanitarian or peace support operations. Once trained, forces combine into multinational units to conduct operations under the auspices of the AU, the UN, or regional security organizations. This will make the forces more effective. With time, African countries will be able to solve the continent's security problems. This is an excellent initiative that can provide increased capacity to African peacekeepers.

5. In Darfur, the AU and UN need to periodically review the operational effectiveness of the peacekeepers. They should have direct and close involvement and make sure that the mission is adequately equipped with the required materials, resources, and peacekeepers to decisively contribute to success of the mission. Inability to commit enough resources from donor countries to support the UNAMID may eventually render the mission ineffective. The mission is in dire need of attack helicopters and night vision capability to UNAMID peacekeepers to match the rapid reaction capacity and be able to take total control of the mission area. The region is vast with poor infrastructure. The UN cannot conscript troops to be sent to UN missions like in Darfur. It has to rely on UN member countries to voluntary contribute the troops and resources. Restricting the contribution of resources for the mission to be predominantly African in origin will not work since most African countries do not have the capacity and capability to do it by themselves. Partners and countries with those capabilities should be requested to assist.

6. Pressure must be put on the Sudanese government by the international community to compel Sudan to accept willing Western countries to provide the much-
needed resources for UNAMID. Sudan should also facilitate prompt customs clearance of shipped UN and TCC equipment to the mission area without unnecessary delay in her port and airports.

7. There are too many weapons in the wrong hands in Darfur. Having some tribes and the Janjaweed armed while others are not is not acceptable. The UN needs to exert more pressure on Sudan and the rebel groups to commit themselves to disarmament. To be effective, like Sierra Leone, UNAMID peacekeepers should conduct the DDR.

8. The UN must not establish a peacekeeping mission without a clear framework, clear political goals and a coherent operational plan. Without a framework, the UN peacekeeping missions will drag for many years and will be overwhelmingly expensive to run. Once peacekeepers are landed, it is the UN’s responsibility to ensure that the peacekeepers are adequately equipped and secure to achieve the mandate. Considering the combat position of belligerent parties and their reaction to UNAMID activities, a more aggressive posture is required. This is bound to occur if a more robust and well-equipped force is deployed in Darfur.

9. The UN needs to take into account that countries in conflict also face a crisis in governance. The UN should be in a position to help rectify the broken government systems. As the UN tries to bring peace, it should equally focus on reconstruction, good governance that is accountable and equitable, the protection of human rights and respecting the rule of law. This will facilitate the country in getting back on its feet and avoid going back into conflict.

10. The GoS needs to be subjected to real pressure. A new sanction on the prohibition of offensive military flights in Darfur needs to be imposed to put a check on
military aircraft that the GoS regularly uses to bomb villages in Darfur causing civilian deaths and suffering under the pretence of bombing the rebels.

11. UNAMID should have access to any part of Darfur without any restrictions from the rebels which control those areas. The poor infrastructure should also be developed to facilitate easy access to all parts of Darfur. All the IDPs should also be allowed to and assisted in returning back to their homes. Their security should be guaranteed.

12. Lack of support from the major powers and permanent members of the UNSC can undermine UN operations in areas of conflict but the mission can still be turned around and made successful. The UNSC members need to be fair in taking adequate consensus among themselves for the purpose of quick legitimate intervention and for the sake of peace. This should also be applicable even if regional organizations have stepped in to stabilize the situation. UN still remains the most viable world security organization with the structures, resources and international legitimacy to act and produce success.

**Recommended Area for Further Study for Comparisons of Results**

It is difficult to accurately analyze the case studies missions. This thesis has only presented some of the possible variables that can contribute to a successful UN missions in Africa. It is recommended that other areas of research need to be done on the effectiveness of UN missions in Africa along the lines of this thesis but using a different methodology based on the use of questionnaires from persons who took part in the missions in order to confirm or deny the findings of this thesis. The analyzed results realized can then be used to compare, confirm, and validate the data variables and results.
of this thesis. The difference in the methodology used may provide a more accurate analysis than the case study.
APPENDIX A

Present and Past UN Peacekeeping Operations in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Full UN Mission Name</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>UNASOG</td>
<td>United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group</td>
<td>May – June 1994</td>
<td>Chad, Libya</td>
<td>Chapter VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
<td>Apr 1989 – Mar 1990</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Chapter VI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX B

CHAPTER VII TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, including the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

**Article 48**

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

**Article 49**

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.
Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security (United Nations, Chapter 7 of the Charter of the UN).
APPENDIX C

UNAMID DEPLOYMENT FRAMEWORK

By M+30 (31 August, 2007): decision on Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) selection and force composition.

By M+90 (31 October, 2007): establish Force Headquarters (FHQ) and Sector Headquarters (SHQ) initial capabilities; deploy 2 x additional AMIS battalions and Heavy Support Package (HSP) advance elements.

By M+120 (30 November, 2007): deploy further HSP elements and start to deploy Hybrid early effect package.

By M+150 (31 December, 2007): early effect package starts operations and Transfer of Authority (TOA) takes place.

APPENDIX D

TIMELINE OF MONUC DEPLOYMENTS AND MANDATE HISTORY


24 February 2000: Phase II: MONUC established; Chapter VII mandate; 3,400 troops and 500 observers to monitor ceasefire and disengagement (1291).

15 June 2001: MONUC police force created to advise and train the Congolese police force (1355).

9 November 2001: Phase III: MONUC scaled down mobile force; disarmament & demilitarization focus (1376).

3 December 2002: New DDR ops; troop expansion to 8,700 (1455).


28 July 2003: Robust mandate expansion; increased military strength to 10,800 (1493).

12 March 2004: Committee established to monitor arms embargo compliance (1533).

1 October 2004 Phase V: Military force restructured, expanded by 5,900 troops; mandate re-conceptualized and clarified under Chapter VII to use preventative force; tripartite commission system established (1565).

15 May 2007: Phase VI Post-Transition: continues tasks from UNSCR 1565; expands mandate to include post-transition challenges in security sector reform and effective governance; requests benchmarks for drawdown and mentions “exit strategy”;

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maintains 17,030 military, 760 MILOBS, 391 police trainers, and 6 FPUs of 125 officers a unit/total 750 officers (1756).

## APPENDIX E

### TIMELINE OF THE DARFUR CRISIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb 03</td>
<td>SLA and JEM begin to campaign against the marginalization of the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-Apr 03</td>
<td>SLA launch surprise attacks on towns in northern Darfur including El Fasher. Refugees begin arriving in Chad. Large numbers of civilians flee their homes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 03</td>
<td>The SLA and the GoS reach a fragile ceasefire agreement hosted in Abeche, Chad. Army moves to quell rebel uprising in western Darfur; more than 100,000 people seek refuge in neighboring Chad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 03</td>
<td>Ceasefire agreement completely breaks down. Major GoS offensive begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 04</td>
<td>GoS, SLA, and JEM rebels agree on a 45-day ceasefire. They later agree to foreign ceasefire monitors from the AU and EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 05</td>
<td>GoS, SLA, and JEM sign “Declaration of Principles” at Abuja peace talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 06</td>
<td>DPA signed by GoS and Minawi but rejected by Wahid and JEM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 06</td>
<td>Britain and the US introduce a UNSCR to send UN peacekeepers to Darfur. Sudan’s ruling party rejects the draft resolution a week later. UNSC votes to create a UN peacekeeping force of up to 22,500 UN troops and police in Darfur, despite opposition from Khartoum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 06</td>
<td>Sudan agrees to a UN-AU force for Darfur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jan 07</td>
<td>GoS and Darfur rebels agree to a 60-day ceasefire and a peace summit sponsored by the AU and UN as steps towards stopping the violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Feb 07</td>
<td>ICC’s chief prosecutor names first two war crimes suspects in Darfur. Khartoum says the ICC has no jurisdiction and later rejects arrest warrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 07</td>
<td>At least 65 people are killed in a cross-border raid by Janjaweed militia in eastern Chad. Up to 8,000 civilians are driven from their homes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 07</td>
<td>Rebels kill 5 AU peacekeepers in Darfur, the deadliest single attack on the force since 2004. The US and Britain threaten Sudan with sanctions and other punitive measures unless it agrees to accept a robust UN peacekeeping force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jun 07</td>
<td>The AU says Sudan has agreed to the deployment, mandate, and structure of combined UN and AU peacekeeping force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Aug 07</td>
<td>The UNSC authorizes up to 26,000 troops and police for Darfur and approved the use of force to protect civilians. Rebels agree on “a common platform” for talks with the GoS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Sep 07</td>
<td>Haskanita AMIS camp is attacked resulting in death of 10 peacekeepers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jan 08</td>
<td>UNAMID takes over from AMIS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 08</td>
<td>Aerial bombings of Western Darfur according to UNHCR, which also blames the Sudanese army and the Janjaweed for attacking civilians since 8 February.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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