Army Transformation: Optimizing Command and Control for the 21st Century

A Monograph
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AY 2010

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The purpose of this monograph is to determine if the Army missed an opportunity to reduce a level of command as a part of Army Transformation. This monograph demonstrates that the Army failed to maximize Transformation and reduce a level of command in accordance with its modularity concept developed between 2003 and 2005 and espoused as late as the 2005 Army Posture Statement.

This monograph explores the historical lineage and culture and how it applies to Army decision making over the last one-hundred years. It then reviews the concept of Network Centric Warfare and the potential to flatten organizations within the military according to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense. The analysis then shifts to the Army’s Transformational application of this concept: shifting to a brigade-centric organization, reducing a level of command, and changing the culture within the Army. The monograph presents what the Army achieved through Transformation and identifies the “roadblocks” to achieving the initial design. The monograph then proposes a method to reap the benefits of the concepts of Transformation, applied to today’s stability focused environment, while retaining the vital lineage and culture of over two-hundred years of Army history.
Title of Monograph: Army Transformation: Optimizing C2 for the 21st Century

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Abstract


The purpose of this monograph is to determine if the Army missed an opportunity to reduce a level of command as a part of Army Transformation. This monograph demonstrates that the Army failed to maximize Transformation and reduce a level of command in according with its modularity concept developed between 2003 and 205 and espoused as late as the 2005 Army Posture Statement.

This monograph explores the historical lineage and culture and how it applies to Army decision making over the last one-hundred years. It then reviews the concept of Network Centric Warfare, its prominence at the turn of the twenty-first century, and the potential to flatten organizations within the military according to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense. The analysis then shifts to the Army’s Transformational application of this concept: shifting to a brigade-centric organization, reducing a level of command, and changing the culture within the Army. The monograph presents what the Army achieved through Transformation and identifies the “roadblocks” to achieving the initial design. The primary issue focuses on the inverse relationship between the Napoleonic designed hierarchical system the U.S. Army developed to fight major theater wars versus the requirements the Army faces today based on predominately stability operations. The monograph then proposes a method to reap the benefits of the concepts of Transformation, applied to today’s stability focused environment, while retaining the vital lineage and culture of over two-hundred years of Army history.
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Introduction

Whether focusing on tactics, doctrine, capabilities, or technology, nations change their force structures and methods of fighting battles, engagements, and wars over time to maintain an advantage over potential adversaries. Early in the twenty-first century, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld viewed the need to change the U.S. military to meet the challenges of a post-Soviet Union world and the Information Age, grouping together his intended changes under the term “Transformation.” Although the conceptual basis of Transformation preceded the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Secretary remained committed to the process, and he accelerated its implementation. At a speech to the National Defense University on January 21, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld outlined his goals and the challenges he believed he faced in transforming the military after the events of September 11, 2001.1

The Secretary focused Transformation on “new ways of thinking, and new ways of fighting.” In a humorous anecdote, the Secretary described the President’s surprise upon Rumsfeld’s return to the Secretary of Defense role with a concept of Transformation that included bringing back the horse cavalry to remove the Taliban from Afghanistan. The Secretary used this example to highlight his thoughts on new ways of thinking and fighting; the cavalry reappeared as part of the United States Army presence in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), but not in its traditional role. Rumsfeld’s Transformation focused on technology and new ideas, and in his mind, this was a fantastic example of how his Transformational concepts could achieve national goals. The Special Forces, acting as forward air controllers in Afghanistan with their Northern Alliance Allies, brought the most sophisticated precision weapons on earth to remove the Afghanistan Taliban government in the most efficient and effective way possible: on

horseback. The Secretary did not believe that technology was the only or the most critical element of Transformation; rather, he believed it was only one part of a larger concept involving different ways of approaching problems.

Secretary Rumsfeld highlighted the need for the Department of Defense (DOD) to adapt to the post-Cold War environment. His thoughts focused on the complexity of the post September 11, 2001 age and the uncertainty that the nation faced in defining its current and potential enemies. The idea of strategic deterrence served the nation well for almost fifty years and led to the demise of the Soviet Union, but it no longer served as the universal solution to the threats the U.S. faced.

The Secretary also addressed his concerns regarding the threats to Transformation. The primary threat he identified was the DOD itself. The Secretary, in his second term as the Secretary of Defense, viewed DOD culture as risk averse and resistant to change. Many within the department believed it should not change in a time of war, but Rumsfeld opposed this view, believing that the Global War on Terror was the perfect catalyst to spur change. He further clarified this conviction by observing that the more time passed from the events of September 11, 2001, the more entrenched DOD would become in their comfortable pre-September 11 mindset:

I am confronted by people who come to me with approaches and recommendations and suggestions and requests that reflect a mindset that is exactly the same as before September 11th. They understand that September 11th occurred, but the power of this institution to continue what is is (sic) so great that we all need to be reminded and indeed jarred to realize the urgency that exists.

The analysis presented here focuses on the U.S. Army’s implementation of Transformation throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, focusing on the command

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3 Rumsfeld, “21st Century Transformation.”

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.
and control (C2) echelons at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. The capstone documents that provide evidence to support the argument include the Army Transformation Roadmap 2004 (ATR 2004), the Army Campaign Plan 2004 (ACP 2004) and revisions, the Army Posture Statement 2005 (APS 2005), and the Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity (Volume 1 Version 1 OCT 2004). Collectively, these documents guided the changes to the Army’s C2 structure. In particular, the APS 2005 specifically states the desire to reduce a level of command based on redundant capabilities:

We are also eliminating an entire echelon of command above the brigade headquarters, moving from three levels to two. Doing so removes redundancies in command structure and frees additional personnel spaces for use elsewhere.6

Yet, this intent to change the Army’s C2 ultimately led to nothing more than what Secretary Rumsfeld feared in January 2002, a return to the same, pre-September 11, 2001 organizations including headquarters at the division, corps, and army levels.7

The Army missed an opportunity to change its C2 structure to meet the requirements of a changed environment despite the intent Secretary Rumsfeld described in Transformation’s guiding documents and reinforced in the Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR) of 2001 and 2010. This monograph analyzes that missed opportunity by reviewing the U.S. Army’s C2 history from the beginning of the twentieth century through today, considering the primacy of Network-Centric Warfare’s (NCW) relationship to Transformational thought, and reviewing the evolving threats facing the United States, all within the context of Army Transformation’s original goals.

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7 Department of the Army, Draft Development of Modular Force Designs in Perspective. 2010. 9-12. The author of this monograph interviewed the author of the draft document capturing Transformation in FEB 2010 to gain an appreciation for the work to document this process.
This analysis enables a comparison of the actual outcome of Army Transformation to Secretary Rumsfeld’s original intent, and a recommendation for further study.\(^8\)

As the Army designed its transformation concept, it looked towards creating a brigade-centric force from a division-centric force. This critical conceptual shift moved the focus away from the division, identifying the brigade combat team (BCT) as the building block for the Army. The centrality of the division to the Army’s history made Transformation’s goals a significant cultural shift for the Army. Therefore, Transformation faced the likelihood of resistance from multiple actors both within the Army and outside the service.\(^9\)

Jed Babbin identified this in his 2003 article “Purge of the Princelings?” in which he summarized the resistance Secretary Rumsfeld encountered across the DOD, but in particular from the Army. Babbin described Chief of Staff of the Army General (Retired) Shinseki’s active resistance to Transformation, going so far as to “slow-roll” the process by developing a thirty-year timeline for the Army to achieve Transformation goals. In an effort to force the Army to change its culture, the Secretary removed Shinseki and took the highly unusual step of announcing Shinseki’s retirement a year early, and recalled a retired officer, General (Retired) Peter Schoomaker, to replace him. Nevertheless, a foundation for continued resistance remained in the form of the officer corps selected for advancement during Shinseki’s four years as the Chief of Staff.\(^10\)


\(^10\)Jed Babbin, “Purge of the Princelings?,” *National Review Online*, August 14, 2003, [http://article.nationalreview.com/269598/purge-of-the-princelings/jed-babbin](http://article.nationalreview.com/269598/purge-of-the-princelings/jed-babbin) (accessed March 18, 2010). Excerpts from the article: “Let me run things my [Shinseki’s] way and I'll make you look really good on the Hill. But forget about transformation. The Army doesn't need it, and we don't plan to do it.” Shinseki…and the Army stood fast against change, insisting that its 1950s Cold War culture and configuration should remain. In essence, Shinseki chose irrelevance, taking the Army off the table as a tool of national policy and defense. Shinseki's choice of irrelevance was demonstrated convincingly in the Afghan campaign. When Big Dog asked what the Army would need to defeat the Taliban, Shinseki wanted at least six months
United States Army History: Regiment through Army

The United States Army adjusted its force structure over the past one hundred years to meet various challenges and to incorporate new technologies. The focus of this analysis is the twentieth century, but the importance of lineage and the Army’s culture is central to decision making regarding U.S. Army force structure. Colonel (Retired) Douglas Macgregor, a leading advocate for transformation, captured this thought in his testimony to Congress in July of 2004:

…a discussion of Army Transformation without a note on Army service culture would miss a key element in the transformation process. Whenever an Army Chief of Staff makes a pronouncement, regardless of whether the pronouncement is based on sound analysis…every officer knows that in order to be promoted, he or she must sign on unconditionally for the ‘party line’…One experienced observer of Army experimentation remarked to me that current programs remind him of the queen’s declaration in Alice in Wonderland: ‘First the verdict, then the trial.’¹¹

Considering this primacy regarding decision-making, the regiment is the U.S. Army’s baseline organization and can trace its roots back to the British Army of the colonial era. Divisions, corps, and armies existed during the American Civil War, but the first peacetime, permanent division came into existence prior to World War One (WWI). While the corps and army organizations to assemble and move what amounted to the entire Army. When the Afghan campaign began on October 5, 2001 — less than a month after 9/11 — the Army (except for the Rangers and other Army special ops, who performed superbly) watched from home. Privately, Shinseki called the Afghan campaign a "police action," something the Army shouldn't be involved in. Shinseki's departure doesn't end the problem. His legacy is an Army of rigidity, commanded by his faithful. In four years as chief of staff, Shinseki personally chose about 40 colonels for promotion to general each year, as well as a proportional number of generals for promotion to two-, three-, and four-star ranks. These hundreds of generals were promoted based on their fealty to Shinseki's view of what the Army should be, and how it should fight. In Shinseki's view, the Army was only meant to fight wars such as World War II in which massed armies met, or to engage in the feckless U.N. peacekeeping missions. Only those who agreed with that view were given stars under Shinseki. It is that view — and those who insist on it — that the Army most urgently needs to shed…Soon after he was named, Schoomaker — through the acting chief of staff, Gen. John Keane — began the job of ridding the Army of obstacles to change. So far, at least six of Shinseki's cadre have been given their walking papers. Among them are some of the worst obstacles to progress…”

remained fairly stable over the last century, the Army frequently adjusted division organization to facilitate change.\textsuperscript{12}

The Army employed its first type of division, the “square” division, during WWI. It contained two brigades with two regiments each, and numbered about 28,000 men. This formation proved unwieldy in combat due to its large size, so the Army changed the division to a triangular organization prior to WWII. While the triangular structure possessed significant advantages over its square predecessor, many Army and government officials resisted the change, delaying its implementation to the period immediately preceding WWII. This foreshadowed the primary reason for Secretary Rumsfeld’s concerns about twenty-first century Transformation: if history provided any indication, Transformation faced the risk of failure due to the military culture’s resistance to change.\textsuperscript{13}

In his work \textit{Evolution and Endurance: The US Army Division in the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century}, Richard Kedzior describes this cultural resistance to change: “It is interesting to note that the Lassiter Committee wished to retain the brigade-based square division in part because the triangular design would have eliminated the brigade command billets filled by brigadier generals.”\textsuperscript{14} Based on this concern and internal debates within the Army itself, the Army retained an inferior command structure for twenty years. Ultimately, General Marshall approved the change to triangular divisions in 1939, seven years after their development and testing, and the Army fought WWII with divisions composed of approximately 15,000 troops.\textsuperscript{15} The change also

\textsuperscript{12} Draft Development of Modular Force Designs in Perspective, 9-12; AUSA briefing 26 SEP 05, US Army Center of Military History: Unit Designations in the Modular Army; Richard Kedzior, \textit{Evolution and Endurance: The US Army Division in the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century}. [RAND, 2000], ix-xi and 1-6.

\textsuperscript{13} Kedzior, \textit{Evolution and Endurance}, 7-17; Draft Development of Modular Force Designs in Perspective, 9-12


\textsuperscript{15} Jonathan M. House, \textit{Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century}. [Lawrence, University of Kansas Press: 2001], 96-104.
eliminated the brigade headquarters, and the regiment remained a distinct echelon above the infantry battalion.\textsuperscript{16}

Significantly, the primary problem with the square division was its size: it was cumbersome to deploy and maneuver.\textsuperscript{17} The smaller and more agile triangular infantry division structure remained in effect through the Korean War. The armored division came into existence during WWII and these divisions reintroduced the brigade headquarters as tactical commands to employ task-organized battalions. The Army also modified the armored division organization to optimize it for combat based on its battlefield performance. In 1943, the Army added a third brigade headquarters and adjusted the battalion mixtures of infantry and armor to improve task-organization abilities of the armored division commander.\textsuperscript{18}

After WWII and Korea, the Army adjusted to a new division structure, the Pentomic Division, which existed from 1953 to 1961. The Army tailored this formation for the atomic battlefield and soon discovered the organization’s many flaws when considering its capabilities to fight a Major Theater War (MTW). With the onset of the Vietnam War, the Army returned to the triangular design with the Reorganization Objectives, Army Division or ROAD. The ROAD design was flexible and incorporated the air cavalry divisions of the time. Based on its experience

\textsuperscript{16} Kedzior, Evolution and Endurance, 13-18; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 127.

\textsuperscript{17} Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 95; ironically, the Army continues to struggle with these same problems to this day, and they provide much of the rationale for its modern Transformation effort—see Department of the Army, Army Transformation Roadmap 2004: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities, 2004, 1-1 to 1-3; “Strategic Responsiveness: New Paradigm for a Transformed Army,” Defense Report from AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare, DR 00-3, October, 2000: GEN(R) Shinseki’s transformation intent stated on June 23, 2000: “The world situation demands an Army that is strategically responsive. The Army’s core competency remains fighting and winning our Nation’s wars; however, the Army must also be capable of operating throughout the range of conflict—to include low intensity operations and countering asymmetric threats. It must, therefore, be more versatile, agile, lethal, and survivable. It must be able to provide early entry forces that can operate jointly, without access to fixed forward bases, and still have the power to slug it out and win campaigns decisively. At this point in our march through history, our heavy forces are too heavy and our light forces lack staying power. Heavy forces must be more strategically deployable and more agile with a smaller logistical footprint, and light forces must be more lethal, survivable, and tactically mobile. \textbf{Achieving this paradigm will require innovative thinking about structure, modernization efforts, and spending.}” Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{18} Kedzior, Evolution and Endurance, 15-21.
in the Vietnam War and perceived defeat, the Army returned its focus to MTW and the Soviet threat, creating the Army of Excellence (AOE) division to execute the new Air-Land Battle doctrine. The primary division was the heavy division, of which there were two types: armored and mechanized. The main difference in determining their type was the number of mechanized infantry or armored battalions in each division. The Army also created a light division, but designed it to be much smaller, consisting of only 10,000 troops, as opposed to almost 15,000 in the heavy division. This made the light division easier to deploy to stability and support operations and it became the Army’s answer to deal with smaller-scale contingencies than the MTW anticipated in central Europe.19

The AOE force structure remained in place until the Army began the Transformation process at the end of the twentieth and the start of the twenty-first century. Since its creation, the division served as the primary focal point for grouping tactical formations and redesigning units as doctrine changed, and its lineage makes it difficult to remove from the Army force structure. According to Richard Kedzior:

The name “division” is important to the Army, but a term not possible to define precisely. Considering the amount of change that the division has undergone, its endurance implies a semantic tradition (i.e., the division remains because the word “division” is held in high regard). The Army’s history is inextricably tied to it, therefore it would be difficult to discard. Despite drastic changes in size, shape, and capability throughout history, the division remains. No hard and fast rules govern the organization of a fighting force that carries the word “division”: one can add or subtract any components and resources from the design to meet battlefield or peacetime needs. Nevertheless, during the twentieth century, the division has generally been an independent unit commanded by a major general consisting of all of the combat arms and combat support assets necessary for a sustained effort to destroy an enemy in ground combat.20

Corps and armies can trace their lineage back to the nineteenth century, but they too did not become fixtures in the U.S. Army until the twentieth century. Corps headquarters serve as

19 Ibid, 23-41; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 239-351 and 390-397.
20 Kedzior, Evolution and Endurance, 2. Emphasis added.
tactical or operational-level headquarters that command and control between three and five divisions. Armies and army groups fought in WWII primarily at the operational level of war, commanding and controlling corps. They ultimately became operational level headquarters for the U.S. Army in the 1980s, serving as the physical entity to oversee the operational level of war recently introduced into Army doctrine. The corps and army echelons remain part of Army force structure today with the corps still a tactical or operational headquarters and the army performing a service component role, and only occasionally a combat role as a land component or joint headquarters for a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC).

At the end of the twentieth century, the Army’s C2 structure centered on the division, corps, and army echelons. These structures served the Army well throughout one-hundred years of full spectrum conflict, including two world wars. When it sought to adapt its force structure to meet new threats or execute campaigns, the Army most frequently adjusted the division organization. However, as the world transitioned from the Industrial Age to the Information Age and the Soviet Union collapsed, leaders within the DOD who thought like Secretary Rumsfeld saw an opportunity to improve the military’s mid-level management. This process involved a stream-lining or flattening of C2, enabled by Information Age technologies and a common operating picture which enhanced the commander’s situational awareness and understanding. These information technologies improved C2 capabilities, thereby justifying a reduction in size of headquarters staffs. Clausewitz’s theory of war, and particularly his concepts of fog and

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22 US Army Center of Military History: “Unit Designations in the Modular Army;” Department of the Army, *FM 3-0 Operations*, 2008. Levels of War outlined 6-3 through 6-15, pages 6-1 through 6-4. Although FM 3-0 does not specifically define the headquarters to a level of war, it discusses the levels of war; *Army Transformation Roadmap 2004*. Figure 3-5, page 3-5 describes the linkage between the levels of war and the headquarters.

friction, enjoyed renewed interest as they came under attack by the concept of “Network-Centric Warfare (NCW).”\textsuperscript{24}

**Network-Centric Warfare**

As a primary means to achieve change, some members of DOD turned to innovations in the business world for insight into enhancing organizational efficiency.\textsuperscript{25} Vice Admiral (Retired) Arthur K. Cebrowski championed the cause of “Network-Centric Warfare” (NCW) in the late 1990s, and his prominent position within the DOD enabled him to convince Secretary Rumsfeld to adopt NCW as a means to change the way the DOD approached warfare in the Information Age.\textsuperscript{26} *Business Week* explained Rumsfeld’s Doctrine in 2003 as:

\dots information-based, flexible, Internet-savvy, high-tech, decentralized, partnered-up, global. The American corporation? No, the American military. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld may not be the deftest of diplomats, but his fight to remake the U.S. military to deal with post-Cold War realities is laudable. And controversial.\textsuperscript{27}

This doctrine sought to maximize the capabilities NCW promised, and Secretary Rumsfeld appointed Cebrowski as the director of the DOD Office of Force Transformation. Cebrowski expressed clear views on the use and value of information: “The centralized control of information itself is a folly which will subvert the great advantage that America has in information technology and processes. The power of information is derived from access and


\textsuperscript{27} Editorial, “Digital War: The Rumsfeld Doctrine,” *Business Week Online*, April 7, 2003, [http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_14/b3827114_mz029.htm](http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_14/b3827114_mz029.htm) (accessed on March 18, 2010).
speed, not from control and management.”

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the Army found itself mired in debate concerning the future force and the role of divisional and corps headquarters within that force. Some advocated flattening the organization by combining the division and corps echelons to capitalize on the capabilities promised by technology and NCW. These advocates referred back to the business community and their ability to restructure corporate headquarters by eliminating portions of middle-management. Based on the Army’s challenges with deploying quickly to support operations in the former Yugoslavia, illustrated by the experience of TASK FORCE HAWK, some participants in the debate advocated for a leaner, more deployable formation with abilities to connect quickly to joint C2 structures. Using NCW, a new, improved brigade could deploy more rapidly and overwhelm enemy forces using a common operating picture and “smart” weapons. Detractors of this approach viewed NCW as nothing more than a fantasy that ignored the uncertainties of armed conflict. In their view, Clausewitz’ fog and friction of warfare remained immutable; and NCW would contain the same information imperfections that led Clausewitz to these key insights. According to this view, implementation of NCW within the Army pre-ordained failure.

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30 Richard Kedzior, Evolution and Endurance, 4-6. Actual text of his argument: For the first time since 1900, serious discussion and study are being undertaken that contemplate-and often advocate-eliminating the division echelon from the organizational hierarchy. Some argue that the time has come to make a great leap in combat capability by embracing the reorganization phenomenon that has swept through the business community-using technology to “flatten” organizations-to establish a brigade-size independent fighting unit (5000-6000 personnel) as the preeminent US Army fighting force and structuring.
Colonel (Retired) Douglas A. Macgregor emerged in the late 1990s as a pioneer of Transformation concepts. In his book *Breaking the Phalanx*, Macgregor recommends an improved, autonomous brigade capability organized around three combined-arms battalions, a reconnaissance squadron with organic army aviation, a strike battalion (artillery), and support troops led by a brigadier general. Although Macgregor acknowledged some of the potential of NCW, he also cautioned against believing that NCW could provide clarity on the battlefield to enable Army planners to reduce the size of the BCT to two maneuver battalions: a change the Army ultimately adopted in its heavy and light BCTs.31

The problem that NCW advocates argue modern armies face is a change in the nature of the threat from a static, well-known enemy, to an evolving, opaque enemy. Due to this change, NCW’s proponents asserted the C2 structures built for the former would not work for the latter. According to David S. Alberts, another developer and leading advocate for NCW, this fundamental problem shift, and the accompanying re-allocation required of decision responsibilities, forces the Army to re-look its C2 organizations. Although Alberts visualized in the 1990s a twenty-first century Army fighting in a complex environment, today’s C2 structures remain fixed to the twentieth century and a known environment.32

Tremendous technological advances have come about in all spheres of military activity, forever changing how to fight while intensifying and broadening the battlefield environment. Would-be division eliminators argue that, with the current state of military technology and human capital, now is the time to make the next great progression in warfighting, by designing new combat and support organizations to take full advantage of existing capabilities and potential synergies. They assert that a fighting force of the division’s size is no longer necessary to achieve high levels of firepower and destructiveness; in fact, the large, layered command structure and logistical needs of such an immense organization may hinder the achievement of the full combat potential of its component parts. Finally, they say, the division’s unwieldy size hampers the Army from having what it really needs; agile and responsive forces, able to deploy quickly to the world’s trouble spots and halt aggression in its critical early stages; Clausewitz, *On War*, 119-121.


32 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes. *Understanding Command and Control*, DOD Command and Control Research Program, Washington, D.C., 2006, 84 and 220. Actual text: To date we have identified the need for an Information Age transformation. However, transformation has been
Network Centric Warfare remains a controversial issue more than a decade after its inception. Despite the contentious nature of the ongoing debate, there remains reason to believe concepts from the business world may offer insights into improving Army C2 systems or structures, and NCW delivered on some of its promises. The future of NCW is vital to empowering C2 nodes to exist in the complex environments of the anticipated future; particularly the conduct of stability and support operations. NCW proved instrumental in the development of the Unit of Employment X (UEX) and Unit of Employment Y (UEY) through 2005, but to date, the military leadership continues to struggle with understanding, embracing, or implementing this concept.33

Setting the Conditions for Transformation

Army culture is a difficult thing to identify, define, and most importantly, change. As stated by Chief of Staff of the Army Schoomaker in the ATR 2004:

The challenge above all is one of mindset, because decades of planning and preparation against set-piece enemies predisposed American Soldiers to seek certainty and synchronization in the application of force. Now, Soldiers operate under conditions where uncertainty and ambiguity are the rule. As elusive and adaptive enemies seek refuge in the far corners of the earth, the norm will be short-notice operations, extremely austere theaters of operation, incomplete information and, indeed, the requirement to fight for information, rather than fight with information.34

33 Army Posture Statement 2005, 8; Draft Development of Modular Force Designs in Perspective, 5. Secretary White (in 2003) believed that the concepts had changed little from the existing corps and division headquarters structures and he suggested that the power of new information technology should allow the Army to flatten or eliminate command and control echelons by pushing functions down to the lowest level for execution.

This statement highlights the inverse relationship between MTW and stability operations. MTW consists of top-down planning, and fighting with information gained from an operational approach developed at the national level and planned from the strategic to the tactical level. By contrast, stability operations consist primarily of bottom-up planning, and local commanders fighting for information. The Army’s current hierarchical C2 system remains most relevant to the MTW environment and does not facilitate a “bottom-up” approach, especially when detailed command is an option and division and potentially corps commanders see themselves as “tactical” commanders.

As the Army began the Transformation process, several realities guided its execution. The Army optimized its C2 to fight MTW throughout the twentieth century while believing that if the Army could defeat German Army in WWII and the Soviet Union in a MTW, it must be capable of conducting any other type of operation. This decision did not optimize the Army for the threats it faced as it entered the twenty-first century, and the debate at that time highlighted this difference in thinking

The genesis of the requirement to change provided the critical element of Transformation discourse. Secretary Rumsfeld’s vision, grounded in NCW, required a lighter, more deployable force that could meet a full spectrum of threats, from stability and support operations to MTW. The Army began its Transformation at the end of the twentieth century, but the Army’s culture, clearly grounded in a C2 mechanism established over the past one hundred years optimized for


36 The Army struggled with the concept of stability operations for years, the naming convention changing numerous times (Unconventional Warfare, Low Intensity Conflict, and Operations Other than War before reaching Stability Operations). Stability Operations did not become a peer of Offense and Defensive Operations in “Full Spectrum Operations” in Army Doctrine until 2008 with the update of FM 3-0.
mid to high intensity conflicts (the World Wars, Korea, and OPERATION DESERT STORM), struggled to implement its own form of Transformation.

**Army Transformation**

**Overarching Concepts**

The ATR 2004 identifies three guiding components to the Army’s Transformation strategy: (1) Transformed culture through innovative leadership and adaptive institutions; (2) Transformed processes – risk adjudication using the Current to Future force construct; and (3) Transformed capabilities for interdependent joint operations enabled by force transformation. These three components identified a need to “change” the culture, adjust the force with the focus on the current force before the future force, and improve the Army’s ability to conduct joint operations.

Translating these goals to C2, the ATR 2004 identified the cultural shift from the division-centric AOE organization to the brigade-centric transformed organization under the joint-capable UEx with a further cultural shift of reducing the levels of command above the BCT from three to two. This resulted in a new significance for the BCT, which would serve as the building block for the new brigade-centric (as opposed to division-centric) Army, and theoretically, would possess the organic capability to operate on an independent basis for relatively short periods. The Army also sought to grow the force from thirty-three to forty-eight BCTs to achieve a rotational force for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)/OEF. The resulting growth in independence and capability of the BCT merits a closer analysis.

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38 Ibid, 3-1 through 3-19.
The Brigade Combat Team

Army Transformation primarily focused on the concept of the BCT from its inception. The underlying premise behind forming BCTs was to move the Army away from its division-centric base forged over the last one-hundred years. This shift in focus required standardization of the BCTs into three primary groupings: Heavy, Light, and Stryker. These groupings provide the Army flexibility to respond to the full spectrum of conflicts and make rotational work far easier than the different Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) AOE brigades.

Figure 1: Transformation BCTs

To simplify the process further and provide permanent capabilities at the brigade level that the AOE brigades previously received through temporary task organization, the Army removed many of the divisional headquarters and assigned their battalions directly to the BCT. Therefore, the

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39 Ibid. Figure 3-3, page 3-4.
Division Support Command (DISCOM), Division Artillery Brigade (DIVARTY), and the Division Engineer Brigade (DIVENG) all ceased to exist under Transformation.40

A secondary goal during Transformation was to “Grow the Army” without increasing its end-strength. The goal was to expand the Army from 33 Brigades to 48 BCTs. To accomplish this, the Army reduced the number of maneuver battalions in the heavy and light BCTs from three to two. To offset the resulting loss in personnel strength, the Army added a cavalry squadron to give the BCTs an increased reconnaissance capability, a weakness previously identified in the AOE structure. The Army approved the BCT construct and the Army built the first BCT in the 3rd Infantry Division after OIF I. The Army continues to strive to achieve the 48 BCT Active Component force, currently reduced to 45 BCTs because of manpower shortages, but many Army leaders expressed concern about the reduction from three maneuver battalions to two.41

A third stated goal of transformation was to improve the independence of each BCT, thus freeing itself from a direct link to a “patch-linked” specific divisional headquarters and achieving the cultural shift to a brigade-centric force.

The decisive effort of Army transformation is the creation of modular, combined arms maneuver brigade combat team (units of action), or BCT(UA), of which there are three types: Heavy (armored/mechanized), Stryker and Infantry. As part of this transformation, the Army migrates capabilities that were previously found at divisions and corps to the BCT(UA) — the building block of combat forces in the Future Force. Each type of UA will be of standard configuration. These UAs will gain improved force packaging, sustainability, battle command and situational awareness while retaining the same lethality as the larger, task-

40 Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, Figure 1-4, page 1-10.

41 Department of the Army, “Modular Brigade Combat Teams: Task Force Modularity White Paper Part III” (draft), 15 July 2004, 20. Within the white paper, the authors debate the strengths and weaknesses of the new BCTs. They contrast the force structures and weapons systems. The weaknesses they identify include: the BCTs should have a third maneuver battalion; that combat effectiveness increases in proportion to ground maneuver platoons; and cite endurance and flexibility as additional advantages of additional battalions; In his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on 15 July 2004, Colonel (R) Maegregor outlines his concerns of small BCTs with only two BNs, Army Transformation: Implications for the Future
organized brigade combat teams. These units will serve as the foundation for a land force that is balanced and postured for rapid deployment and sustained operations worldwide.\textsuperscript{42}

To meet this concept, the Army designed the UEx and the UEy with the goal of streamlining the levels of command above the BCT from three to two.\textsuperscript{43}

**The Unit of Employment X (UEx) and Unit of Employment Y (UEy)**

The combination of the division and corps structures required a cultural shift based on the recent one-hundred year history of the U.S. Army. As the planners designed these structures over several years, the general officers determining the fate of the UEx and UEy raised the significant issues of the effect on Army lineage and headquarters’ increased span of control under the new construct. In short, these two issues provided the primary rationale that overturned the conceptual work on Army Transformation, ultimately resulting in the Army retaining its legacy C2 echelon structures.\textsuperscript{44}

The ATR 2004 stated the goals of the UEx and UEy,

Between now and 2010, two standing echelons will replace the existing structure of divisions, corps and echelons above corps. These echelons are currently designated UEx, which normally has tactical and operational control of units of action, and UEy, which normally provides the Army’s functional capabilities to the joint force commander. While the natural tendency is to think of these echelons as linear improvements to the division and corps, the UEx and UEy are not. Both higher echelons will be modular entities designed to employ a tailored

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\textsuperscript{42} Army Transformation Roadmap 2004. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, 3-5.

mix of forces and will integrate joint functions by design. Both headquarters will also be able to work directly for the joint force commander.\textsuperscript{45}

To further cement the Army’s position, the Army Posture Statement in February 2005 stated:

We are also eliminating an entire echelon of command above the brigade headquarters, moving from three levels to two. Doing so removes redundancies in command structure and frees additional personnel spaces for use elsewhere.\textsuperscript{46}

Figure two (below) illustrates this stated goal and demonstrates that the designers recognized the desire to consolidate a level of command. The focus of Army Transformation with regard to C2 seemed to be on consolidating the division and corps levels into one high tactical or low operational level of command with the UEy replacing the Army Service Component Command (ASCC).

\textbf{Figure 2: Transformation C2 ATR 2004}\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Army Transformation Roadmap 2004}, 3-5.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Army Posture Statement 2005}, 8.
\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Army Transformation Roadmap 2004}. Figure 3-5, page 3-5
The debate reached its decisive point in 2004 and 2005. The ATR 2004 and APS 2005 both directly stated the goal to reduce a level of command and the APS 2005 went so far as to identify the duplication of efforts at the division and corps levels. Nevertheless, the Army chose to retain a structure made up of divisions, corps, and armies. A complicated set of factors led to this decision.

In early 2005, planners from the Department of the Army, Forces Command, Training and Doctrine Command, and the Combined Arms Center agreed that streamlining the chain of command from three levels to two was not feasible or optimal. It remains unclear to what degree Army culture and the Army’s roots in its longstanding three-echelon structure factored into this decision, because the Army did not produce a document specifying the rationale for the change, but several concerns emerged. Among these were span of control, inability for a two-star UEx to serve as the basis of a joint headquarters, and the desire to separate the UEx into tactical and operational headquarters. To date, no Army official document explains this decision, but the Combined Army Center’s draft *Development of Modular Force Designs in Perspective* (February 2010) alludes to the concerns expressed by senior leaders as the modular C2 structure proposed to consolidate the division and corps and potentially remove one of the echelons:

By May of 2004, TF Modularity had completed initial modular designs based on the CSA’s guidance and began traveling throughout the Army to present their work to Army leaders and determine issues in the designs. The TF also sought input through “Devil’s Advocate” Panels, unit feedback, Combatant Commander input, and various modularity ICTs. From the initial input, it appeared that key aspects of the modular concept lacked universal acceptance, including the elimination of the Corps echelon, the two-TAC (tactical) division command post, and the lack of organic aviation in BCTs. In particular, there was significant resistance to the elimination of the corps echelon. In May of 2005, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) announced the decision to retain an intermediate three-star echelon between division and theater army, effectively retaining the corps headquarters, although without any of the separate brigades associated with the AOE Corps design.48

This agreement led to the development of a two-star UEx, a three-star UEx, and UEy above the BCT.⁴⁹

Lieutenant General (Retired) Lovelace, the Department of the Army G3 at the time of Transformation, acting with the Chief of Staff of the Army’s approval, made the decision to return to the division, corps, and army structures in May 2005 and the Army Campaign Plan (Change 3 dated May 12, 2006) officially removed the terms UEx and UEy from the Army’s lexicon and re-established the division, corps, and army naming convention. With this, the concept of consolidation of a level of command ended.⁵⁰

**Brigade and Above Organization in the Current Force**

The current Army is well on its way to streamlining itself into three basic types of BCTs and growing the Army to over 40 Active Component (AC) BCTs as outlined in the ATR 2004. The Army partially implemented the UEx and UEy concept by standardizing the division and corps headquarters, but never eliminated a level of command; however, the Army did adjust its hierarchy. Divisions report directly to U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) and corps are strictly warfighting headquarters. The concept of independent BCTs able to operate and deploy separate from their parent divisions exists, but the history and relationship of the parent division to each of “their” BCTs still exists and inhibits a complete transformation to a “brigade-centric”

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⁴⁹ Memorandum for Commanding General, US Army Combined Arms Center, SUBJECT: Re-Design of the Unit of Employment (X) to function as a 3-Star Command, May 19, 2005: Text from document: After further discussion with the Chief of Staff, Army, it is apparent that the current 2-star UEx design is not optimum to function in the role of a 3-Star UEx with the primary mission as a JTF or JFLCC. During the 6 May video tele-conference, TRADOC and FORSCOM agreed that the 2-Star UEx design must be modified to account for the change in primary mission as a tactical warfighting command (2-Star UEx) to that of an operational level (3-Star UEx)…ICW this effort, request a re-look of the current 2-Star UEx and the UEy designs to determine whether any efficiencies (redundancies eliminated) can be gained given the new capabilities that are being added to the new 3-Star UEx design. In particular, reassess the need for all 2-Star UEx to be JTF and JFLCC capable; see the Draft Development of Modular Force Designs in Perspective, 9-12.

⁵⁰ Army Campaign Plan (Change 3 20060512) specifically removed UEx and UEy from Army lexicon and returned 2-star-UEx to Division, 3 star-UEx to Corps, and UEy to Army.
organization. Figure three shows the revised Army C2 structure in the modular force history from the Army’s Combined Arms Center.

Figure 3: Modular force post-2005 decision to create two UEx HQs

For the BCT, there are multiple problems with the numbered BCT concept under a division. Distance is a significant problem for BCTs not co-located with their parent division, as is often the case for BCTs that deploy under different divisions in support of OPERATION NEW DAWN (OND) (formerly OIF and OEF). Thus, at any given time, a BCT can have up to three higher headquarters to include their home station division, their temporary division headquarters (while deployed), and potentially an installation commander, to deal with to coordinate movement or operations. After considering each divisional staff and installation staff is bigger than

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51 Draft Development of Modular Force Designs in Perspective, 11-12.
52 Department of the Army G37, AC Operational Units BRAC and GTA Endstate FY 13, April 28, 2008. Slide depicts Army force stationing. Multiple BCTs are not co-located with their parent HQs; Memorandum for GEN George W. Casey Jr., CSA, SUBJECT: Division Commander Comments on Modularity Issues, January 5th, 2010, 1-3
its BCT staff counter-part and the responsibility for execution remains at the BCT, the questions to ask are what has the Army optimized its C2 structure to achieve, and how much mid-level management is too much?53

Another issue with the modular Army BCT concept is small BCTs create a requirement to maintain levels of command and additional structures across the Army to enable them. The small BCTs require divisions to provide C2 based on historical spans of control – a problem foreseen by the early UEx planners. Further complicating the issue, the additional BCTs each require additional headquarters structures to C2 the various small elements and additional support assets that link them to the next level of support. In his article, “Why Small Brigade Combat Teams Undermine Modularity,” based on his work on Transformation at Ft. Leavenworth in 2005, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Stephen Melton identifies the inefficiencies of the BCT C2 structures that ultimately force the Army to create additional levels of command and additional support relationships. His analysis highlights the divisional aviation and support brigades required for each division and the fact that divisional artillery brigades are standard for heavy divisions. Essentially, the same divisional structure exists as in the AOE, but with reduced brigade capabilities.54

To highlight his concerns, Melton used OMNI FUSION 2005 as a case in point. During the exercise, it took over 35,000 Soldiers in a modularized division with supporting troops to achieve the same results as a pre-modularized, 21,000 Soldier division with supporting troops. His concise conclusion could not better state the problems that small BCTs created: “The small BCTs are causing a proliferation of combat support and combat service support Sustainment Unit of Actions (SUAs) and retention of unnecessary personnel in division and corps.

53 Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity, B-1 and C-3. Original UEx design had 957 personnel and BCT HQs had 167 or almost six to one ratio.

headquarters…SUAs are creating a situation in which the Army needs a corps’ worth of tail to support a division’s worth of tooth.”

In its attempt to create additional BCTs for rotational purposes in OIF/OEF, the Army actually created a problem of additional headquarters and combat support and combat service support units and the cascade effect creates an Army with additional BCTs under a division headquarters that lack or share combat support and combat service support units. It is not possible to employ every division in the Army and their subordinate BCTs simultaneously in a MTW because there are not enough support brigades and assets to meet the requirements. Colonel Brian Watson captured this in his monograph “Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively: the Case for Greater Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force”: “the active force is capable of generating ten UEx using the forty-three BCTs, but it can only generate three UEx with a maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) . . . the lack of MEBs . . . significantly degrades the ability of the land force to surge the full range of combat and stabilization capabilities needed in future warfare.” By “Growing the Army” to over forty BCTs, the Army created a problem of multiple smaller headquarters which did not produce more Soldiers “on the line,” but instead created a span of control issue and headquarters predominance.

Another issue with the BCT is the in-lieu-of solution that cavalry and field artillery units often perform in stability operations. The reconnaissance squadrons and field artillery battalions performed as light infantry in OIF and planners at division level and above continue to consider BCTs as having four maneuver battalions for stability operations (two 800-man infantry battalions, one 360-man cavalry squadron, and one 320-man field artillery battalion). Using the cavalry squadron and artillery battalion in light infantry roles creates several problems. The first is the fact that the Soldiers in these two organizations are not trained infantrymen and neither is as

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55 Ibid.

large as an infantry battalion. The second is using these organizations in infantry roles degrades the Soldiers abilities to conduct their primary mission and over time, young Soldiers miss the fundamental training required of their Military Occupation Specialty (MOS). These organizations atrophy over time while not providing the capability infantry bring to stability operations. To quote one BCT S3 in conversations with division G3 planners, “a battalion is not a battalion, is not a battalion!”

To exacerbate the problem, the retention of the division, corps, and army structure complicates the responsibilities of these headquarters in stability operations which the QDRs and the senior leadership intend to optimize the current force to meet. The Army created a C2 structure not capable of full employment in a MTW and not optimized to conduct extended stability operations. The resulting structure therefore represents the worst of both worlds.

**Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Levels of War in Major Theater War versus Stability Operations**

The fundamental problem is the Army’s headquarters and its functions within the levels of war. The headquarters functions required for the current stability operations in OND/OEF are vastly different than those functions required to execute MTW. The figure below shows the Army’s view, on the left, of the functions of a headquarters in a high-intensity conflict of offensive and defensive operations. The author’s contention, backed by the concepts in FM 3-24 and experiences gathered by Army officers within OIF, is that the levels of war shift in stability operations: the tactical level of war expands, and many of the traditional roles actually reverse themselves. Brigadier General Batschelet, the Fourth Infantry Division chief of staff and current

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58 Melton, “Why Small BCTs are Undermining Modularity,” 59.
deputy commander, discussed this shift in “Breaking Tactical Fixation: The Division’s Role” in the November-December 2009 volume of Military Review. Batschelet highlights the lack of Army doctrine on the division, the last official Army FM is dated 1996, seven years before modularity and five years since, and his interpretation that the role of the modular division shifted to one of an operational-level headquarters as opposed to a tactical one:

“Today’s division headquarters has broken the ties to Cold War structures… The division headquarters overlaps the operational and strategic levels of war in new ways… Resisting the tactical pull and remaining in the operational sphere is decisive… The division staff, almost more than its commander, must start and finish securely planted in the operational realm.”

Expanding this thought, tactical level commanders have access to better and more timely information, to make decisions not made at their level in MTW.

In conventional MTW, planning is predominately top down, as seen in operations including the invasion of Normandy, OPERATION MARKET GARDEN, the Inchon Landing, and ground operations in OPERATION DESERT STORM. However, in irregular war or stability operations, most of the planning is actually bottom-up. FM 3-24 states, “…strategic goals must be communicated clearly to commanders at every level. While strategy drives design, which in turn drives tactical actions, the reverse is also true.”

TRADOC PAM 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, furthers this point when addressing operational art in stability operations as opposed to MTW:

In the past, dealing with complexity was the writ of generals and admirals, usually performed by strategic leaders down to the commander of a theater of operations in charge of a campaign. Today, commanders at much lower levels must master these skills. Consider, for instance, the recent experience of Colonel Sean MacFarland, commander of 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division. In June 2006, Colonel MacFarland was ordered from Tal Afar in northern Iraq to Ramadi in the west. “I was given very broad guidance,” he said. “Fix Ramadi, but don’t destroy it. Don’t do a Fallujah.” He had to determine how to forge relationship with the residents and take the city back from insurgents without launching a general assault. It was his responsibility to share his understanding of his piece of the overall problem with his superiors, not the other way around. He is not the only brigade commander who has used operational art. Some of what the average battalion commander does today is much more like operational art than tactics. Commanders at lower echelons will face ill-structured problems like this where the burden of understanding is squarely on their shoulders alone. Doctrine needs to adjust to this reality.

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61 FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 2006, 4-4.

62 Department of the Army, TRADOC PAM 525-5-500 Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, January 2008. Page 12. Emphasis added. The above paragraph is contrasted in the following paragraph describing MTW: In contrast, had the North Atlantic Treaty Organization defended Western Europe from a Warsaw Pact attack in the 1980s, the commander of the Central Army Group would have exercised operational art and framed the problem for his subordinates. By the time orders trickled down to a brigade commander, like Colonel MacFarland, the situation paragraph of his division’s operations order
TRADOC PAM 525-5-500 addresses the inverse relationship and its affect on doctrine, but more importantly, the Army’s C2 structure needs to reflect this reality as well.

Individual engagements by small unit leaders, sections, squads, platoons, and companies are the critical elements in a stability operation. Although there are “campaign plans” from division and above headquarters in OND/OEF, most of these plans are actually more policy and/or general guidance as opposed to the specific concepts, as addressed above. There are no specific tasks to maneuver units in the joint force commander’s campaign plan to achieve a specific purpose like those normally found in shorter-duration operations in conventional, high or mid-intensity warfare plans or orders. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report 08-1021T states that the successful “Surge” campaign was a strategic campaign plan as opposed to an operational campaign plan and the implications for the corps an division supporting campaign plans are evident:

In contrast, activities at the operational level establish objectives that link tactics on the ground to high-level strategic objectives. The development of a campaign plan, according to doctrine, should be based on suitable and feasible national strategic objectives…a campaign plan should provide an estimate of the time and forces required to reach the conditions for mission success or termination. Our review of the classified Joint Campaign Plan, however, identified limitations in these areas, which are discussed in a classified GAO report.

The GAO contends that the Joint Force Headquarters responsible for the “Surge” effectively did not provide its subordinate headquarters with an appropriate campaign plan focused at the operational level of war and one may draw the conclusion that the subordinate corps and divisional planners used the strategic concepts in producing their operational and/or tactical campaign plans.

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63 Based on classification, the author generalizes the campaign plans from personal experience in OIF 07-09.

The Army’s Capstone Concept 2009 outlines the threats and capabilities required to meet the Army’s vision of the future environment from 2016 through 2028. The document outlines the inverse relationship through what it terms “network enabled mission command”:

Decentralized operations associated with mission command will require leaders at lower levels of command to assume greater responsibility for the accomplishment of the joint force commander’s campaign objectives. Leaders must integrate their efforts with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners and string actions and activities together into campaigns. Because it will be important to aggregate the wisdom of leaders at lower echelons to adapt operations and retain the initiative, leaders must be sensitive to the operational and strategic implications of their actions and be prepared to make recommendations to senior commanders as they develop the situation through action and identify opportunities. The Army must revise its leader development strategy to prepare leaders through training, education, and experience for these increased responsibilities.65

“Lower-level leaders” gain this increased responsibility because it is not possible for the division, corps, or army to understand a BCT, battalion, or company’s operational environment better than those units themselves in stability operations. Linking joint force commander’s objectives to “lower-level leaders” implies a more direct relationship and the potential rises for multiple layers between the two to create friction. Based on this, the current structure does not optimize C2 for ongoing stability operations, but rather encourages “detailed command” because the BCT is operating at the traditional divisional level and the division and corps functions merge at the operational level.66

Issues with higher headquarters are not new, and to quote a Prussian soldier’s thoughts on the Prussian General Staff of Moltke’s era (1860-70s), “A mass of do-nothings trying to look important is always repulsive, especially when they act friendly, wish you success, appear to

65 Department of the Army, Army Capstone Concept, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, 2009, 29-30.

66 FM 3-24, Annex A. The focus of FM 3-24 is on design for all leaders across the entire C2 structure. Design by its nature is based on understanding an environment and constantly updating this assessment. The lowest level of headquarters is the only one truly able to gain deep understanding about a local environment and its people. Annex A also focuses on planning, executing, and assessing in Stability Operations. The annex specifically identifies the need to execute “Mission Command,” and repeatedly refers to actions at the company level and even training and empowering NCOs.
agree with everything, yet feel duty-bound to comment on things they know absolutely nothing about. "67 If the Army truly wants to live up to the guidance from the last series of QDRs and its Capstone Concept, and focus on the current fight, then it should re-examine the functions of the BCT, division, and corps to ensure that the Army is not creating a C2 structure that actually instigates the same perception of the U.S. Army’s staffs that the Prussian soldier had of his. Translating this to today’s terms, fourteen previous and current division commanders recommended a re-examination of the responsibilities and functions of the BCT and division staffs in their Transformation After Action Review (AAR) to the Chief of Staff of the Army in January 2010.68

Post-transformation, the UEy became the Army Service Component Command (ASCC). The Army must execute its administrative functions under the “new” or “old” ASCC, so it is outside the scope of the remainder of the monograph to address the strengths and weaknesses of the “new” ASCC. Therefore, the following conclusions and recommendations focus on the BCT, division, and corps structures and the author’s view that there is potential to reduce these to two levels based on the current conflicts the Army is fighting while not exposing the Army to failure in a MTW.

**Recommendations**

To complete the Transformation process and reap its full potential benefit, the Army should retain the division, corps, and army levels of command; however, it should reduce the levels of command by removing a tactical echelon. To accomplish this, the Army should transform battalions to regiments (infantry, combined arms, and Stryker only) and remove the

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68 Memorandum for GEN George W. Casey Jr., CSA, SUBJECT: Division Commander Comments on Modularity Issues, January 5th, 2010, 5: Modularity is a great concept, but it is time to relook the balance between Brigade and Division staff responsibility and functionality, while conducting an analysis of the ability of each to perform assigned missions.
BCT level of command (however, the Army should retain battalions and brigades for non-combat arms branches). Further, it should maintain the division, but make this a brigadier general-level command. Figures five and six below depict the recommended structure. Under this new construct, the corps and army remain in their current configuration with a three-star and four-star commander respectively. Major Kenneth Burgess advocates many of these concepts in his work “Transformation and the Irregular Gap” of the November-December 2009 installment of Military Review:

The Army’s organizational structure should become flatter, further empowering lower-level leaders and encouraging lateral communications. Simply expanding the number of subordinate battalions and companies would be a start to force these changes. An even bolder move would be to cut an entire layer of hierarchy out of a tiered command structure that pre-dates Napoleon. This paradigm shift would be truly transformational.69

The Army should also expand the role of the installation command by assigning divisions to the installation for training, readiness, and oversight. Further, the Army should create corps level headquarters for each of the GCCs that conduct operational-level planning, and also retain the strictly war-fighting deployable corps that focus on training for and deploying to a specific theater (in the current fight, OND/OEF). This proposed concept optimizes the U.S. Army tactical forces for the current fight, streamlines the chain of command by removing a level of command, enables the new divisions to work for one commander in garrison and another in conflict, while enabling the corps headquarters to focus on a region or train and deploy in support of a specific conflict. This provides the additional benefit of creating a foundation to expand the division, with a major general in command, with brigade headquarters returning to meet the threat of a MTW. Although not the focus of this monograph, the ability exists to incorporate the Army National Guard with the AC divisions to prepare for MTW and ensure synergy.

Figure 5: Proposed C2 concept

Figure 6: Proposed Infantry Division with three Regiments and support battalions
Proposed Regiments

The Army should replace the current infantry, combined arms and Stryker battalions with regiments commanded by a lieutenant colonel (in effect, this returns the regiment to the active force in reality as opposed to in name). Support unit companies should align under the regiment or battalion. Furthermore, the Army should return to the triangular concept by increasing the number of regiments in a division (formerly a BCT) from two to three. The proposed reorganization eliminates the cavalry squadron and field artillery battalion headquarters as part of a BCT, but retains a cavalry troop and field artillery battery under the division’s special troops battalion, commanded by a combat arms or combat support lieutenant colonel. Frequently, cavalry squadrons and artillery battalions are used in infantry roles in stability operations. Removing the battalion headquarters removes the temptation to use these forces in an infantry role, while retention of a cavalry troop and artillery battery under the special troops battalion keeps a necessary combined arms capability within the proposed division. The Army should also pool cavalry and field artillery capabilities as support brigades in the same manner currently done with field artillery brigades. As GCCs identify a requirement for additional capabilities if regions within a stability operation transition to a mid to high intensity conflict, corps headquarters possess the capability to employ support brigades or task organize them under a division. The combat support and combat service support concepts should remain unchanged.70

Proposed Divisions (Division Lite vs. Division 2005)

To simplify the discussion of divisions, the term Division Lite refers to the proposed division and Division 2005 refers to the current post-Transformation Division. Under Division Lite, the division returns to the center of gravity for the Army due to the elimination of the BCT

as a command structure. The Division Lite is roughly one-third the size of 15,000-personnel historical divisions, and half the size of the light division under AOE.\textsuperscript{71} This concept reduces the division to the most basic building block optimized for stability operations in the most likely conflict in the early twenty-first century. The proposed regimental structures under the Division Lite optimize it to excel in stability operations, but provide an improved capability over the BCTs in the current force to conduct mid-intensity conflict because of the return of three maneuver units and an ability to interject additional capabilities if the situation warrants.

As GCCs determine additional requirements, support brigades provide the capability in total or piecemeal. Artillery, cavalry, or any other type unit can rapidly organize under the C2 of a Division Lite. To facilitate this concept, brigadier generals command the Division Lite and colonels become the deputy commander and chief-of-staff. Although not using these terms, Colonel (Retired) Macgregor advocated a brigadier general commander of a combined brigade-divisional formation in \textit{Breaking the Phalanx}.\textsuperscript{72} Another issue raised by the division commanders in their Transformation AAR to the Chief of Staff of the Army was the fact that BCT commanders are not trained for the job and many had career paths that the general officers believed failed to prepare the post-battalion commanders to take command of a BCT.\textsuperscript{73}

The proposed C2 arrangement provides for training at all levels of command; lieutenant before captain and company command; major before lieutenant colonel and battalion command; deputy commander as a colonel prior to brigadier general command of a Division Lite. The structure of a Division Lite staff could grow from the current BCT staff as Headquarters, Department of the Army G1 reallocates personnel savings from removing a layer of command across the Army to meet the requirements of an expanded role of installation staffs and the new

\textsuperscript{71} Kedzior, \textit{Evolution and Endurance}, 49.
\textsuperscript{72} Macgregor, \textit{Breaking the Phalanx}, 81.
\textsuperscript{73} Memorandum for GEN George W. Casey Jr., CSA, SUBJECT: Division Commander Comments on Modularity Issues, January 5\textsuperscript{th}, 2010, 2-3.
C2 structure. The Army flattens its organization while addressing one of the primary concerns of the division commanders. This flattening optimizes the Army for stability operations while maintaining the capability to conduct mid-intensity conflicts and dominating opponents for years to come.

The Division Lite facilitates decentralized operations in stability operations. General officers may carry great weight in conversations with locals and with foreign military leaders, but subordinate commanders’ gain a deeper local appreciation directly related to knowing the population, the critical leaders, and how the local community functions. Currently, company, battalion, and brigade commanders influence the operational environment more quickly and directly than the first general officer at the division-level (still a tactical level in doctrine). This creates friction since the commanders best suited to make the decision are at the lower three levels but none of them are general officers. Replacing the BCT commander with a brigadier general facilitates oversight and decision-making at the lowest possible level while retaining the company and battalion commanders essential to working with locals. Figure seven displays the proposed C2 structure with an analysis of the proposed rank structure in figure eight. By removing a mid-level headquarters, the responsibilities of the headquarters in the tactical level of war expands while ensuring the Army can adjust rapidly to meet the threats of a mid to high intensity conflict.
Proposed Army C2 Structure

Figure 7: Proposed C2 Structure

74 Army Transformation Roadmap 2004, Figure 3-5, page 3-5. Right portion of slide author created based on his view of what the Army headquarters responsibilities should be in stability operations.
Figure 8: Proposed C2 Structure with associated ranks

The removal of a layer of command places one general officer in charge at the tactical level of war and places a general officer in charge at the operational level of war where currently the Army arguably has two general officer commanders. The cultural problem associated with the current structure is the fact that division commanders and their deputies often view their role as tactical level commanders based on the MTW functionality of the AOE divisions they progressed through in their company and field grade years. The Division Lite concept capitalizes on this concept, simplifies the roles of division and corps headquarters, tactical versus operational, and places a general officer in charge of executing and supervising regimental (battalion) and company commanders in stability operations. Further benefits include reducing staff requirements and “oversight,” since the Division Lite eliminates an entire level of staff and the corps headquarters must prioritize information requirements of the Divisions Lite since their operational scope is too large to conduct detailed command. Mission command becomes the
default method of command out of necessity and the operational level commander can only focus on specific tactical level issues critical to operational level success.

While optimized for stability operations, the Division Lite is larger than the current BCT and is capable of expanding to meet MTW requirements. To achieve this growth, major generals return to command the division, brigades return to the command structure (commanded by colonels) and battalions could return to fall under regiments. This gives the Army great flexibility to use the current structure in the most efficient way possible today while generating options to expand the Army quickly with a cadre already in place to fight a MTW and reintroduce a necessary command-level to control and facilitate major combat operations. The argument that the Army cannot rapidly expand to meet the threats of a MTW has no basis in history. The Army grew from five active component divisions to thirty-one between 1939 and 1941, and grew to eighty-nine divisions, all in the field, by the end of WWII.75

The Army should not keep C2 structures on the basis that it best prepares the nation for a MTW in the current environment. Can the current Army fight a MTW, or is it only capable of fighting a mid-intensity conflict like OPERATION DESERT STORM. Almost twelve percent of the U.S. population mobilized to fight WWII.76 Using this benchmark, a MTW of this proportion in today’s terms requires an Army of thirty-four million based on the 2000 census.77 Retaining ten divisions and three to four corps provides only a small fraction of the overall requirement to fight and win a twenty-first century MTW of similar scale to those of the twentieth century.

To illustrate this point, engaging in MTW with Russia or China, the two primary conventional threats found in the National Defense Strategy of 2008, requires national

75 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 143-172, in particular, Table 12 on page 157, and Table 13, page 171.
76 Number Magnitude Benchmarks: Contemporary and Historical, Savannah State University.
77 Ibid.
mobilization at levels similar to those of WWII. Our existing 500,000-strong active Army most likely could not conduct a MTW against either of these potential foes given their huge populations and historical reliance on an attrition style of warfare. The current U.S. Army is struggling to conduct long-term stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; by comparison, Nazi Germany’s roughly 150 divisions composed of three million men could not maintain control of just the European portion of Russia in WWII.

Hierarchical organizations require delineation of responsibilities and the underlying functionality of the installations should expand under the proposed Division Lite. To facilitate training, resourcing, and organization, along with reducing friction of dealing with multiple “higher” headquarters under the current structure, installation command should assume responsibility of each of the Division’s Lite to enable division commanders to prepare for and then deploy under a tactical corps for contingency operations abroad.

**Proposed Corps and Armies**

The corps and army structures should remain as they currently exist, but change their conduct of CONUS-based operations. The corps should focus on employment as an operational-level command that focuses on war fighting. The underlying assumption focuses on inevitable conflict for the foreseeable future. For organizational purposes, each Geographic Combatant Commander should control a corps headquarters, aligned to it for operational and tactical planning. This alignment would leave four active component corps headquarters to serve as expeditionary headquarters. Translating this concept to today’s operational environment, one corps headquarters would serve as the operational headquarters for OND and OEF, respectively, while the other two corps headquarters would remain available for deployment. This concept

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capitalizes on the current Army corps concept, but improves operational level training and environmental understanding.

Batschelet describes this lack of operational training and focus:

Campaigning over the last half decade has left an indelible mark on Army professional discourse and doctrine. When it comes to counterinsurgency operations, we are a small-unit Army…Combat and transformation have caused America’s land-power leaders to make the tactical level of war their focus for close to a decade…Attention to the tactical level—specifically the brigade combat team and below—has unnecessarily diverted attention away from the operational level of war.80

After a year of training, the corps headquarters could deploy to a theater and provide the best supervision and guidance possible to the Divisions Lite. As for the corps aligned to a GCC, the key portion of this arrangement is sizing the headquarters appropriately to facilitate designing and planning while not creating an unnecessarily large staff. These headquarters serve as campaign designers and transfer planners for the operational execution to the expeditionary corps headquarters.

The critical function that FM 3-24 defines in stability operations is design instead of planning. Within the design framework, understanding the environmental frame and constant re-framing is essential to understanding the problem and how to implement the solution frames. The best way to achieve this is to align a corps headquarters for planning for each of the GCCs while maintaining a pool of corps headquarters capable of deploying in support of contingency operations in any of the GCC’s operational environments. This creates the C2 structure to focus on gaining this conceptual understanding, provides a permanent relationship to enable re-framing, and actually gives the GCC a headquarters a capability to conduct operational level contingency planning with force requirements to facilitate rapid force projection from the Continental United

80 Batschelet, “Breaking Tactical Fixation: The Division’s Role,” 35.
States (CONUS) or overseas installations into a conflict within a GCC’s operational environment.  

**Expanding the Role of Installations and Improving Functionality**

The final component of the recommendation to restructure the Army’s C2 organizations would require a culture change within the Army. By implementing the previous portions of the recommendation, the Army would be well on its way to optimizing itself for the current conflict and establishing the structure to expand upon should a MTW become necessary. Further, operational-level corps headquarters would provide design capability to GCCs and improve long-term and mid-term planning for expeditionary corps. The final stream-lining of capabilities making up this recommendation requires assigning the Divisions Lite in CONUS to installations instead of FORSCOM. This facilitates the corps focusing on operational design and planning, and eliminates the current concept of having three headquarters “coordinate” deployment, training, and reset under the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. Although this requires a paradigm shift within the Army, it creates a functionality that de facto already exists albeit with multiple levels of management, and improves the force generation capabilities of a CONUS-based expeditionary Army.

Under the current framework, BCTs plan and execute the phases of ARFORGEN through the installation and Division 2005 headquarters. Implementing the Division Lite, assigned to a CONUS installation and with the brigadier general in command, breaks the linkage that the current numbered brigade in a Division 2005 has and it keeps the executing headquarters from having up to three superior headquarters to answer to. The proposed Division Lite has a brigadier general responsible for tactical oversight and coordinating actions with the home station for deployment, training, and reset purposes. This concept strengthens the already critical link

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81 *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, Chapter 4 and Annex A.
between the home station and its tenant units, and it enables the expeditionary corps to focus on operational planning and warfighting.\textsuperscript{82}

Another recommendation the division commanders provided to the Chief of Staff of the Army concerning modularity concerned the lack of a training relationship between the division commander and his BCT commanders. As the BCTs and the divisions deployed off cycle from one another, division commanders identified building and maintaining relationships, and growing the subordinate commanders as distinct challenges. One division commander pointed out that none of his BCTs were serving under his deployed command and therefore all his BCT and battalion commanders were unfamiliar to him. This demonstrates the alignment of numbered BCTs to divisions fails to facilitate officer development and actually creates friction as deployed commanders attempt to maintain contact with their patch-linked subordinate commanders. To further cloud the issue, Divisions 2005 provide training guidance to their BCTs that do not necessarily match the area of operations that one or any of their BCTs are actually going to deploy to. Based on deployment schedules, the division may deploy “off cycle” from one to all of its BCTs and maintaining relationships across the globe is difficult at best.\textsuperscript{83}

To facilitate this culture shift, it would be necessary to take successful brigadier general Division Lite commanders and assign them as major general installation commanders to supervise and mentor Division Lite commanders. This enables a training, readiness, and oversight relationship between a successful post-Division Lite commander and the currently assigned Division Lite commander. In this role, the major general installation commanders may also serve as the division commander should the requirement exist to expand the Army to meet a MTW. In

\textsuperscript{82} The author served as an IBCT S4 for deployment from a non-co-located “patch-linked” division and non-co-located deployed division and as the IBCT plans officer for re-deployment, reset and training.

\textsuperscript{83} Memorandum for GEN George W. Casey Jr., CSA, SUBJECT: Division Commander Comments on Modularity Issues, January 5\textsuperscript{th}, 2010, 2-3.
this relationship, the Army achieves a division-centric force in the spirit of the brigade-centric force it strived but failed to achieve in Transformation.

**Division-Lite Post Implementation**

The Division Lite organization offers numerous advantages. It optimizes the Army’s command structure for current, stability-focused operations while improving the Army’s ability to conduct mid-intensity conflict, and it positions the Army to rapidly expand to meet the threat of a twentieth-century type MTW. The Division-Lite lives up to the historical lineage of the Army by retaining the culturally sensitive pieces, the regiment and division, while incorporating the concepts of NCW and achieving the Transformation stated goal of achieving a “brigade-centric” force only through the time-honored modification to the division. Further, it capitalizes on the modular concepts by establishing divisions optimized for stability operations but capable of integrating additional capabilities to conduct mid to high intensity conflict. Additionally, the Division-Lite facilitates general officer command and decision-making at the tactical level of execution, and reduces the high level of command duplication at the tactical and operational levels referred to in APS 2005. Further, it reduces the potential for detailed command in a stability operations environment. Finally, it aligns operational level C2 capable of implementing design to GCCs and provides the Army with four expeditionary corps headquarters focused on warfighting since the Divisions-Lite are assigned to installations for home station training, deploying, and reset purposes. By placing successful, post-Division Lite commanders in installation commander positions, Division-Lite commanders work for one commander at a time and this also provides them a sounding board when preparing for full spectrum operations. This recommendation does not fully take into account the Army National Guard, but there is potential to translate the same theory to the National Guard and actually have the Guard brigades round-out the AC divisions to facilitate MTW training. Figure nine displays a summary of the recommendation against the last one-hundred years of Army C2 structure.
Justification for Recommendation

Did the Army Transformation result in modular, independent formations that transitioned the Army from a division-centric force to a brigade-centric force? In the course of this monograph, three criteria emerge as critical in determining the recommendation for the best long-term Army C2 structure. The first is the C2 structure’s ability to enable subordinate commands the ability to operate with optimal oversight. This includes the conclusions reached by Martin van Creveld in his work *Command in War*, essentially centralization versus decentralization linked to the Army’s doctrine with regard to “detailed command” and “mission command.” Also included is the issue of span of control as identified by Army doctrine and the base-line documents.

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84 MTW = Major Theater War, Mid = Mid Intensity Conflict, LIC = Low Intensity Conflict; Under Concept ATR 2004, the UEx is listed as a “?” because the two or three star level of command was never determined until the decision to implement the post-Transformation structure which maintained both.
associated with Army modularity. The second criteria is the ability of the C2 structure to meet the most likely threats facing the U.S. and the armed forces while enabling a rapid transition to meet the most dangerous threat of MTW. The final criteria assesses the underlying concept outlined in the Army’s Transformational documents from 2004 to 2005 to return to the lead question, did the Army create a brigade-centric organization?

Martin van Creveld’s Command in War is an analysis of command over time. The core of the issue van Creveld raises in his work is uncertainty; specifically, the commander’s ability to deal with that uncertainty. The first method represents centralization and the second represents decentralization. Based on his analysis of 2,500 years of warfare, van Creveld reaches the conclusion that decentralization is far more effective than centralization when dealing with uncertainty. He cites the Roman legions, Napoleon’s Grande Armee, the Prussian armies under Moltke in the 1860s, and the storm-troopers under Ludendorff’s German army in WWI all as examples of decentralization at its epitome. Specifically, van Creveld states in the conclusion to his work:

So long as command systems remain imperfect – and imperfect they must remain until there is nothing left to command – both ways (centralization vs decentralization) of coping with uncertainty will remain open to commanders at all levels. If twenty-five centuries of historical experience are any guide, the second way (decentralization) will be superior to the first (centralization).85

The Army’s doctrine in FM 6-0 furthers van Creveld’s argument by espousing “mission command” over “detailed command.” Decentralized, informal, and flexible are characteristics of mission command. Detailed command is the opposite; commanders using detailed command believe that they can impose their will across the battlefield. By centralizing decision-making, detailed command attempts to remove the uncertainties of the battlefield. FM 6-0 continues by specifically addressing the weakness of detailed command in stability and support operations:

85 Martin van Creveld, Command in War, 274. Portions in parenthesis for clarity.
Detailed command is ill-suited to the conditions of stability operations and support operations. Commanders using its techniques try to provide guidance or direction for all conceivable contingencies, which is impossible in dynamic and complex environments. Under detailed command, subordinates must refer to their headquarters when they encounter situations not covered by the commander’s guidance. Doing this increases the time required for decisions and delays acting. In addition, success in interagency operations often requires unity of effort, even when there is not unity of command. In such an environment, detailed command is impossible.86

Doctrine states that decentralized is the optimal C2 arrangement and that mission command is the optimal command approach across the full spectrum of operations, but most importantly, in stability and support operations. The Army’s C2 structure should facilitate this for all commanders or the risk of detailed command rises. The Army Capstone Concept furthers this by introducing “network enabled mission command” as a critical element of the future capabilities of the Army. This concept highlights the importance of decentralization and the increased responsibilities of “lower-level” commanders.87

Army doctrine states that the span of control is two to five subordinate units. The ATR 2004 adjusted this figure to up to six subordinate units under a UEx with the ability to further advance this number in stability and support operations. BCTs and divisions in OIF proved this theory by conducting C2 of more than six subordinate units.88 Batschelet describes the extended span of control of the Multi-National Division in Baghdad between 2007 and 2009 beyond the doctrinal six maneuver elements:

Currently, Multi-National Division-Baghdad controls six maneuver brigades [September 2009]. At one point, ten operated in the province. The headquarters leadership also integrates into the division efforts and controls key enablers

87 Ibid, Paragraph 1-80, page 1-18; Army Capstone Concept, 29-30.
88 The author’s BCT conducted C2 of nine battalions during OIF 07-09.
envisioned in doctrine: a military police brigade, an engineer brigade, a combat aviation brigade, and a civil affairs battalion.\textsuperscript{89} The significance of small unit operations during stability operations supports the rationale for this increase in C2 capabilities. Battalions, companies, platoons, and squads are usually the critical units in stability operations with the brigades, divisions, corps, and armies working out of fixed facilities in relatively fixed Areas of Operation.\textsuperscript{90} Batschelet reaches this conclusion by explaining the Multi-National Division – Baghdad history his division explored. Essentially, they concluded that the divisional mission and end state did not change over three rotations, but each divisional headquarters, to include his own, spent an inordinate amount of energy attempting to build its own campaign plan. This further solidified his opinion that the true focus of the current division should be in the operational realm.\textsuperscript{91}

The Army’s doctrine, particularly FM 6-0, and van Creveld agree that decentralization, or mission command, is the optimal solution for C2 arrangements.\textsuperscript{92} Retaining a BCT and division headquarters structure does not optimize the Army for the stability operations it is currently fighting or can expect to face in the environment anticipated in the QDR as most likely in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, maintaining multiple echelons of headquarters at the tactical level in stability operations forces higher headquarters to employ direct command to influence the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{89} Batschelet, “Breaking Tactical Fixation: The Division’s Role,” 39.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Department of the Army, \textit{FM 5-0}, 2005, F-5, page F-2; \textit{FM 6-0} recommends 2-5 subordinate units as well; \textit{Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity}, 1-34, page 1-11 “The UEx controls up to six BCTs in high- and mid-intensity combat operations, and may control more BCTs in protracted stability operations.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Batschelet, “Breaking Tactical Fixation: The Division’s Role,” 37. Seeing the problem with a deeper and longer view sets the stage for the division in its operational context. Commanders, staffs, and flags rotate in and out of operational environments, but the mission remains nearly the same. Before the 4th Infantry Division deployed to Baghdad in November 2007, its staff researched earlier Multi-National-Division Baghdad mission statements and commander’s intent statements dating to November 2004. The similarities were striking. Each successive division flag that assumed Multi-National-Division Baghdad’s mantle consistently focused on securing the population, enabling the host nation security forces, and transitioning to civil governance. The conditions continue to change, but the mission and end state have proven reassuringly consistent.
\item \textsuperscript{92} \textit{FM 6-0}, 1-16 and 1-18; Martin van Creveld, \textit{Command in War}. 274
\end{itemize}
battlefield. To remain relevant, the division headquarters must impose itself upon the BCTs, particularly given limited top-down information and cross-boundary coordination. Referring back to Batschelet, he identifies the “common” misnomer that “tactical” troops gain of their leadership and then states that the division is not a tactical headquarters, but its primary function is to bridge the gap between the BCT and the corps:

> A common critique of Army senior leaders is that many revert to “Squad Leader 6 [detailed command].” As the division commander walks the ground and drives the same routes as his Soldiers do, day in and day out, he sees the operational environment through a tactical lens… At the end of the day, though, the division commander fights to retain the operational perspective, while regularly communicating with the tactical and strategic worlds. The division commander and staff are the only elements that regularly span all of these levels and synchronize the efforts across them.93

The very fact that Batschelet has to defend the division headquarters and its commander as a “Squad Leader 6” raises the question of what division commanders roles and responsibilities are? This “common critique” would not exist if there was not some degree of truth in it and to counter the argument using a centralized approach to operations, the Australian Adaptive Campaign Planning 2008 states:

> Conventionally, land forces have been organised to generate large scale effects against similarly structured adversaries. To achieve these effects, traditionally land forces have been organised to fight homogenously as battlegroups, brigades, divisions and corps which in turn has demanded a relatively high degree of central control. As a consequence, land forces lack the ability to adapt at the same rate as a smaller more agile adversary. Therefore, an alternative approach is required to position the Joint Land Force to learn and adapt more quickly than its adversaries, both at the individual and collective level.94

To further the argument against a U.S. division functioning at the operational level of war, the Australian Adaptive Campaign 2008 continues:

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93 Batschelet, “Breaking Tactical Fixation: The Division’s Role,” 40.
In the contemporary conflict environment combat has diffused across the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command so that tactical actions increasingly have strategic consequences and strategic decisions directly impact on tactical actions. This has always been possible but is increasingly becoming the norm. As a consequence, some military observers have questioned the relevance of the operational level of command in the future.\textsuperscript{95}

Batschelet makes the case that the division operates at the operational level of war along with a corps headquarters and each of those historically were centered at the tactical level of war, but others advocate that the operational level of war is shrinking if not becoming non-existent. The role of the modular division is unclear and there is no modular doctrine defining what the divisions’ functions are and there is evidence that Army culture and lineage drove the retention of the division and corps as opposed to operational requirements. Identifying the fact that the perception of the tactical Army sees division commanders as “Squad Leader 6” sends a clear message when the functionality of the division obviously is not understood by subordinates. The Army needs to define the long-term functionality of the division and corps in today’s Army or look to re-examine their utility and function to optimize oversight of subordinate units and the threats facing the country.

To further cloud the issue of the current command structure, the Army has two “spans of control.” One is traditional and the other is under stability operations. The span of control limitation is not as relevant in stability operations as in MTW based upon the adjusted Army doctrine in the Guide to Modularity and the Army’s experience conducting stability operations. Referring back to Batschelet’s experience in the Fourth Infantry Division, its span of control of maneuver BCTs reached ten along with multiple other supporting brigades.\textsuperscript{96} This mismatch drives the question to what the Army should optimize itself to fight, the MTW or the stability operation?

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid, 20-21. Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{96} Batschelet, “Breaking Tactical Fixation: The Division’s Role,” 39.
The threat facing the U.S. and its armed forces evolved over the last twenty-five years. The Soviet Union is gone and with it the likelihood of major combat operations on the scale of the 1980s in central Europe. Stability and support operations represent the most likely missions for our Army in the foreseeable future and the 2001 and 2010 QDRs both address this shift in thinking. The QDR 2001 and Secretary Rumsfeld’s Transformation speech specifically outlined the need to shift from a “threat based” to a “capabilities based” model to determine force structure for our armed forces. The QDR 2010 specifically addresses the movement from a two-major regional conflict Army to one capable of a wider range of options and focused on the current stability operations in OND and OEF.97

In short, U.S. forces today and in the years to come can be plausibly challenged by a range of threats that extend far beyond the familiar “major regional conflicts” that have dominated U.S. planning since the end of the Cold War. We have learned through painful experience that the wars we are in are seldom the wars that we would have planned… it is no longer appropriate to speak of “major regional conflicts” as the sole or even the primary template for sizing, shaping, and evaluating U.S. forces.98

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97 Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, iii-vi; Rumsfeld, “21st Century Transformation.” Specific text from the Secretary’s speech: Well before September 11th, the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense were in the process of doing just that. With the Quadrennial Defense Review, we took a long, hard look at the emerging security environment and we came to the conclusion that a new defense strategy was appropriate. We decided to move away from the "two major theater war" construct for sizing our forces, an approach that called for maintaining two massive occupation forces capable of marching on and occupying capitals of two aggressors at the same time and changing their regimes. This approach served us well in the immediate post-Cold War period, but it really threatened to leave us reasonably prepared for two specific conflicts and under-prepared for the unexpected contingencies of the 21st century. To ensure we have the resources to prepare for the future, and to address the emerging challenges to homeland security, we needed a more realistic and balanced assessment of our near-term warfighting needs. Instead of maintaining two occupation forces, we will place greater emphasis on deterrence in four critical theaters, backed by the ability to swiftly defeat two aggressors at the same time, while preserving the option for one massive counter-offensive to occupy an aggressor's capital and replace the regime. Since neither aggressor would know which the president would choose for a regime change, the deterrent is undiminished. But by removing the requirement to maintain a second occupation force, as we did under the old strategy, we can free up resources for the future and the various lesser contingencies which we face, have faced, are facing and will most certainly face in the period ahead. The Army’s vernacular constantly changes. For the purpose of this monograph, the terms major regional conflict and major theater war are interchangeable and refer to large scale warfare between nation-states in line with World War I, World War II, or the expected World War III between NATO and the WARSAW PACT.

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. referred to the changing nature of threats facing the U.S. in his work “An Army at the Crossroads” in 2008 and in testimony to Congress in 2009. His recommendations acknowledge the primary threat facing the U.S. today is not the conventional MTW, but Islamic terrorists, and he recommends a shift to structuring the force to meet this immediate threat while hedging against the MTW threat.99

Throughout the twentieth century, the U.S. Army was oriented primarily on waging conventional warfare against a similarly armed great power…The U.S. currently faces three major strategic challenges that will dominate its defense policy over the next decade or longer: defeating Islamist terrorist groups, hedging against the rise of a hostile and more openly confrontational China, and preparing for a world in which there are more nuclear-armed regional power.100

Secretary Rumsfeld went so far as issuing a DOD directive 3005.05 outlining the importance of stability operations and placing them above the threat of a MTW in determining the military future in November of 2005:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.101


100 Kepinovich “An Army at the Crossroads,” XI; Kepinovich “The Future of U.S. Ground Forces,” portion of testimony on March 26, 2009: Given the advent of an era of persistent irregular conflict, with its emphasis on manpower-intensive operations on land, the Army is destined to play a central role in U.S. defense strategy. The Service will need to build on its hard-won expertise in conducting these kinds of operations, whether they go by the name of stability operations; foreign internal defense; internal defense and development; stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations; counterinsurgency; or irregular warfare.4 At the same time, the Army must also hedge against a resurrection of rivals who look to challenge its dominance in more traditional, or conventional, forms of warfare. Emphasis added.

Using history as a lesson, the U.S. averaged two MTWs in each century of its existence. The eighteenth century saw the American Revolution; the nineteenth century had the War of 1812 and the American Civil War; the twentieth century had WWI and WWII. Along with the two World Wars, one might debate whether the Korean War, Vietnam War, and Persian Gulf War also count as MTWs and thus shift the average to upwards of three MTWs per century. The last three did not require the same national commitment that the world wars did. According to the Congressional Research Service Report RL 30172, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2004,” the average number of conflicts United States armed forces participated in per century is between twenty and twenty-five. Using these approximate values, MTWs make up about 10-15% of all conflicts and predict the likelihood of stability operations and MTWs in the twenty-first century.102

Has the U.S. Army optimized its current C2 structure for the current fight while enabling a rapid expansion to meet the threat of a MTW? Napoleon developed the brigade-division-corps-army structure to fight MTWs in Europe.103 The Army created the same structures prior to WWI to fight a MTW in Europe. This structure remained through the last one-hundred years to meet the threats of WWII and the perceived threat of a World War III in Europe with the Soviet Union. The current force structure proved itself again in OPERATION DESERT STORM, a Muslim Army attempting to fight on European-terms, but the deeper issue is that OND(OIF)/OEF are both essentially stability operations. Each have a longer running time than any of the world wars while the threat of a MTW subsided since the fall of the Soviet Union finally reaching national

102 Richard F. Grimmett, “Instances of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2004”, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RL30172, October 5, 2005. United States has declared war 5 times or roughly twice per century. Using Korea, Vietnam, and/or Persian Gulf War, the number would at most rise to three times per century. The author takes liberty in reducing the number of conflicts down to a rough number. The actual numbers are far higher, but several are extremely limited at best.

strategic documents with this acknowledgement in the 2001 and 2010 QDRs. Both the current and previous Secretary of Defense are focused on fighting and winning today’s wars, highlighted by the DOD placing stability operations as its priority in DOD Directive 3005.05, and notable defense experts outline the changed face of the threat to the U.S., yet the Army remains wedded to a C2 structure designed for MTWs in Europe.

The third criteria and one of the goals of Army Transformation was the shift from a division-centric to a brigade-centric organization. Unfortunately, the Army missed this opportunity and continued with the numbered BCTs assigned to divisions. To quote a current division commander is his response to a Transformation AAR to the Chief of Staff of the Army in January 2010, “There’s nothing tougher than watching ‘your’ BCT go off to war with another Division…”\(^{104}\) This statement strikes at the failure of the Army to create independent BCTs. Further in the document, the division commanders recommend “to synch brigade deployment with their division “patches” on the patch chart whenever possible”\(^{105}\) While the Army intended to move to a brigade-centric organization, with divisions remaining in the structure and BCTs numbered under those divisions, the Army’s culture overcame the requirement to change and a division-centric organization remains.

**Closing**

Secretary Rumsfeld had a vision at the turn of the twenty-first century and pushed the Army into Transformation despite resistance internal to the Army and the DOD. The inflexible culture of the Army was the primary reason for the resistance to change. Sacred cows, the regiment and division, along with a culture resistant to change based on over one-hundred years of predominately successful warfare set the stage for a conceptual battle between the

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\(^{105}\) Ibid, page 6.
Transformational thinkers and the leadership rooted in the past. Ultimately, the Army accomplished several of the stated goals of Transformation to include the modularization of the force and the semi-achieved goal of shifting to the basic building block at the BCT-level. Unfortunately, the Army left the BCTs as numbered brigades under parent divisions and the Army did not complete the cultural shift away from a division-centric organization.

The proposal revisits the decision regarding C2 structures and recommends optimizing the arrangement to meet the current threats facing the U.S. while preparing the Army to grow to meet the threat of a MTW. The proposal also achieves many of the identified Transformational goals while retaining many of the lineage-based organizations. The Army identified the need to change and spent years developing new concepts and new ways of fighting that it ultimately abandoned. The window remains open for the Army to reorganize its forces for the current fight while hedging against a more lethal threat through a MTW.
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