Blue Moon Rising?

Air Force Institutional Challenges
to Producing Senior Joint Leaders

A Monograph
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Blue Moon Rising? Air Force Institutional Challenges to Producing Senior Joint Leaders

The purpose of this monograph is to examine what institutional challenges exist within the Air Force that prevent the service from producing leaders competitive for Geographic Combatant Command positions. The author proposes the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) position remains the ultimate focal point of warfighter development. Furthermore, institutional priorities early in Airmen’s career fail to put the appropriate emphasis on joint staff assignments. A brief examination of service culture shows the importance of technology, occupying the primary emphasis in its command and control doctrine. Early airpower theorists believed technologically advanced bombers would win wars independently. Experiences in World War II demonstrated that belief was not accurate. The Air Force shifted its emphasis to centralizing control of airpower to achieve the greatest efficiency and effects at the theater level. The centralized control debate reoccurred in every major war through the Twentieth Century; the Air Force remains a staunch believer in the tenet. Based on validation from Operation Desert Storm, the service sees the JFACC as the best answer to the debate. The current wing commanders’ careers show a tight timeline due to service requirements. Currently, a heavy emphasis on command exists with multiple tours at the O-6 level. Meanwhile, experience in key warfighting joint and service staff assignments is limited. If the Air Force seeks to produce joint warfighting leaders, and it should, it must create space earlier in Airman’s career for joint opportunities.
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Abstract

BLUE MOON RISING? AIR FORCE INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO PREPARING SENIOR JOINT LEADERS by Major William H. Burks, USAF, 71 pages.

The purpose of this monograph is to examine what institutional challenges exist within the Air Force that prevent the service from producing leaders competitive for Geographic Combatant Command positions. The author proposes the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) position remains the ultimate focal point of warfighter development. Furthermore, institutional priorities early in Airmen’s career fail to put the appropriate emphasis on joint staff assignments. A brief examination of service culture shows the importance of technology, occupying the primary emphasis in its command and control doctrine. Early airpower theorists believed technologically advanced bombers would win wars independently. Experiences in World War II demonstrated that belief was not accurate. The Air Force shifted its emphasis to centralizing control of airpower to achieve the greatest efficiency and effects at the theater level. The centralized control debate reoccurred in every major war through the Twentieth Century; the Air Force remains a staunch believer in the tenet. Based on validation from Operation Desert Storm, the service sees the JFACC as the best answer to the debate. The current wing commanders’ careers show a tight timeline due to service requirements. Currently, a heavy emphasis on command exists with multiple tours at the O-6 level. Meanwhile, experience in key warfighting joint and service staff assignments is limited. If the Air Force seeks to produce joint warfighting leaders, and it should, it must create space earlier in Airman’s career for joint opportunities.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAF</td>
<td>Army Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFDD</td>
<td>Air Force Doctrine Document</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFFOR</td>
<td>Air Force Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOC</td>
<td>Air Operations Center or Air and Space Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>Advanced Studies Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>Air Tasking Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPZ</td>
<td>Below-the-Promotion Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-MAJCOM</td>
<td>Component Major Command</td>
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<td>C-NAF</td>
<td>Component Numbered Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CADRE</td>
<td>Air University College of Aerospace, Doctrine, Research and Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Combat Air Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
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<td>CAOC</td>
<td>Combined Air and Space Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCJO</td>
<td>Capstone Concept for Joint Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCSAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<td>DO</td>
<td>Director of Operations</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>US European Command</td>
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<td>FEAF</td>
<td>Far East Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>FECOM</td>
<td>US Far East Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTU</td>
<td>Formal Training Unit</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>IDE</td>
<td>Intermediate Development Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPZ</td>
<td>In-the-Promotion Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>Joint Force Air Component Commander</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLC</td>
<td>Joint Learning Continuum</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<td>Mobility Air Forces</td>
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<td>Major Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWS</td>
<td>Major Weapon System</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NAVFE</td>
<td>Naval Forces Far East</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>US Northern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFDP</td>
<td>Officer Force Development Panel</td>
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<tr>
<td>OG</td>
<td>Operations Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPSO</td>
<td>Operations Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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OT&E  Organize, Train, and Equip
PACAF  Pacific Air Forces
PACOM  US Pacific Command
SAC  Strategic Air Command
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SIOP  Single Integrated Operational Plan
SOF  Special Operations Forces
SOUTHCOM  US Southern Command
SQ/CC  Squadron Commander
STO  Space Tasking Order
TAC  Tactical Air Command
TACC  Tactical Air Control Center
TRANSCOM  US Transportation Command
UCC  Unified Combatant Commander
UCP  Unified Command Plan
USAF  US Air Force
WFHQ  Warfighting Headquarters
WG/CC  Wing Commander
WG/CV  Vice Wing Commander
WIC  Weapons Instructor Course
Introduction

The time has passed when any one service can be thrown off to work out its own salvation without respect to the others, as has been the case very largely in the past with the armies and navies. Air, land and water must be hitched together under one general command and direction to provide for an efficient defense.¹

— William Mitchell, *Winged Defense*

Unity of command is a central principle in military doctrine. Viewed as an essential prerequisite to achieving unity of effort in today’s complex environment, Joint Publication ¹ defines the term in an operational manner: “all forces operate under a single CDR [commander] with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.”² Unity of command is one of nine historic principles that “guide [joint] warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.”³ In order for national leaders to guarantee that forces in the field adhere to the principle while striving to meet given objectives, they must designate a joint force commander (JFC) with proper and sufficient command authority over the assigned or attached subordinate forces required for the task.⁴ While simple in concept, the US military did not formally codify this idea at the theater-strategic level until after World War II.

Shortly after V-E Day in 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to keep the unity of command construct inherent in General Dwight Eisenhower’s Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force in post-war Europe. Eisenhower became the new Commanding General, US Forces, European Theater, leading all US forces in Europe. On the other side of the world, service interests coupled with the dynamic personalities of General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz prevented the Pacific theater from having a true single JFC overseeing


³Ibid., I-2 – I-3.

⁴Ibid., II-3.
operations. The Pacific debate continued after the cessation of hostilities as the military tried to delineate areas of responsibility between the Army’s Far East Command, “functionally organized for the occupation of Japan,” and the Navy’s “geographically organized Pacific Command.” The deliberation over functional (mission and force centric) versus geographic organization of forces aligned the Army and Army Air Forces (AAF) in favor of the former, primarily due to concerns about General MacArthur being potentially deprived of forces he needed to conduct the occupation of Japan; while the Navy favored the latter. The services reached a compromise known as the “Outline Command Plan” that created seven unified commands. President Harry S Truman signed the agreement on 14 December 1946 and the initial forerunner of today’s Unified Command Plan (UCP) went into effect. The current UCP recognizes unified combatant commands organized around functional mission areas and geographic areas of responsibility. At present, the Department of Defense maintains six geographic combatant commands focused on defined regions and four functional combatant commands with global responsibilities.

Shortly after President Truman’s signature on the Outline Command Plan, Congress passed the National Security of Act on 26 July 1947. The law shifted “the Army Air Force, the Air Corps, United States Army, and the General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command)” from under the US Army to a newly created US Air Force. Airpower advocates finally realized their dream of an independent service with the act’s passage.

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6Ibid., 1.
7Ibid., 12.
10Ibid., 503.
With its new independent status and the nation’s reliance on the service’s strategic nuclear capability to deter the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, one might expect to see Air Force representation among the senior leadership of the new regional commands under the UCP. However, the nation’s political leadership consistently entrusted the elder services with the senior strategic leadership positions in the regionally focused unified commands. This raises the question – what was different about the junior service that prevented its leaders from gaining the insights and experiences to be competitive for the regional unified command positions?

**Once in a Blue Moon**

Historically, the US Air Force has been absent from the geographic combatant commander (GCC) ranks. Lieutenant Colonel Howard D. Belote studied this disparity as a student at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama from 1998 to 1999. The Air University’s College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) chose to publish his findings in the CADRE paper *Once in a Blue Moon: Airmen in Theater Command: Lauris Norstad, Albrecht Kesselring, and Their Relevance to the Twenty-First Century Air Force*. Belote found that from the end of World War II through the end of the twentieth century, the nation entrusted a GCC billet to an Airman only once – General Lauris Norstad as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and head of US European Command (EUCOM) from November 1956 to December 1962. During the same fifty-five year period, thirty-six Army generals, thirty-four Navy admirals, and four Marines served at the front of Atlantic, Central, European, Pacific, and Southern Commands. As the twentieth century drew to

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a close, General Joseph Ralston became the second Airman to serve as a GCC when nominated and confirmed for the SACEUR/EUCOM billet General Norstad vacated four decades prior.\(^{13}\)

In an effort not to repeat Belote’s analysis, this paper briefly summarizes his findings to create a foundation from which to launch the rest of this study. Given the role of airpower in Iraq, Kurdistan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Kosovo during the 1990s, Belote asserts, “common sense argues that when airpower is central to a campaign or operation, an airman would bring greater familiarity with its capabilities and limitations into his command decisions.”\(^{14}\) His follow-on research question was, “What are the qualities necessary for airmen to perform effectively as warfighting CINCs [commanders-in-chief]?”\(^{15}\)

To establish a baseline of essential traits, Belote studied two well-respected and successful ground commanders from World War II – Generals Jacob L. Devers and Dwight D. Eisenhower. In his analysis, he found the common major traits to be military proficiency coupled with broad joint experience, keen political-military insight to handle complex international relations, and adroit personal skills capable of meshing a potentially disorganized group into a unified entity.\(^{16}\) In a survey of contemporary senior military leaders, Belote found they repeatedly stressed the same themes as revealed in his study of Devers and Eisenhower. “If anything, they give greater emphasis to the understanding of political-military interrelations.”\(^{17}\) Examining General Lauris Norstad’s performance as SACEUR and German Field Marshall Albrecht Kesselring’s execution as the director of Axis air, land, and naval forces in the Mediterranean from 1942 to 1944, Belote found these two airmen possessed the three main qualities described


\(^{14}\)Belote, Once in a Blue Moon, 2.

\(^{15}\)Ibid., 5.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., 12.

\(^{17}\)Ibid., 53, 63.
above and thus excelled in combatant command-type roles. His analysis demonstrated airmen had been effective leaders of joint air, land, and naval forces in the past.

**Decade of Change?**

In the decade since Belote finished his thesis, Air Force representation in the geographic combatant command has seemingly improved. Thus far in the twenty-first century, twenty-two general and flag officers have led the six geographic combatant commands (see Appendix 1). Counting General Ralston’s tour at SACEUR, Air Force generals filled four of the twenty-two billets. Two of those assignments were in US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) established on 1 October 2002 in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks. Given the NORTHCOM commander’s dual role as Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), NORTHCOM appears to be just the type of air-centric joint command that Belote envisioned as a perfect fit for Air Force leadership. However, while every NORTHCOM commander has had an aviation background, the Air Force has not been the sole provider of combatant commanders for this billet. Admiral Timothy Keating, a naval aviator, was NORTHCOM’s second commander from November 2004 to March 2007. More recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced in December 2009 that the president nominated Vice Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr. to replace the current commander, Air Force General

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18Ibid., 66.

19For the remaining eighteen command slots, the US Navy filled nine billets; US Army filled seven billets, US Marine Corps filled two billets (See Appendix 1).


Victor E. Renuart, Jr. If confirmed as NORTHCOM’s fourth commander, Winnefeld would seemingly establish an Air Force-Navy rotation for that specific GCC billet.

While NORTHCOM’s operational environment is certainly as complex as the other geographic commands, its two-part mission of homeland defense and civil support cast doubt onto whether this command would be expected to plan and lead *offensive* operations involving the simultaneous, large-scale use of air, land, and sea forces against foreign threats, conventional or irregular. Barring a major terrorist act or insurrection in which the President decides to deploy troops under the insurrection provisions of US Code Title 10, Chapter 15, NORTHCOM’s civil support mission generally seeks to augment state level authorities on an as-needed basis to restore order following a natural disaster or other public emergency. Despite the selection of two Air Force generals commanding NORTHCOM, it seems a bit premature to declare that the nation’s political leadership now views senior Airmen on equal par with their peers from the Navy and Army for assignment to lead a regional or theater joint command.

When it comes to strategic military oversight of foreign theaters, the story has pretty much been the same…until recently. On 25 June 2009, General Douglas M. Fraser assumed command of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). It marked the first time an Airman led oversight of that region and only the second of five foreign-focused combatant commands to fall under an Airman’s leadership. In reality, General Fraser is *only the third Airman* in the Air Force’s sixty-plus year history to hold the top strategic leadership position over a foreign theater.

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Research Focus and Methodology

The limited number of geographic combatant command billets entrusted to Airmen implies the nation’s political and civilian leaders do not put faith in the Air Force’s leadership development process when it comes time to select strategic level joint commanders for multimedia operations. Taking that implied assumption, along with Lieutenant Colonel Belote’s findings on the qualities necessary for Airmen to perform effectively as GCCs, this paper seeks to answer the following the question: What factors prevent senior Air Force general officers from gaining the strategic and political experience to be competitive for geographic combatant command billets?

The author proposes the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) position, despite being a proving ground for command in joint operations, remains the ultimate focal point of warfighter development for the institutional Air Force. Furthermore, institutional priorities early in Airmen’s career fail to put the appropriate emphasis on joint staff assignments in order to build the credentials necessary to be competitive. To determine the validity of the hypotheses, the author will briefly examine how the Air Force’s historical identity set the stage for today’s emphasis on the JFACC. Second, the issue of centralized control of airpower assets during conflicts has been a continual sore point between the services. A short historical summary of the debate during major conflicts in the twentieth century will lay the foundation for current Air Force organizational priorities to create standing and trained staffs capable of filling the JFACC-role in a moment’s notice. Finally, selection for and success as a wing commander are required to serve in the senior general officer ranks within the Air Force; every current four-star general in the service led at least one wing during their career. The paper will examine the biographies of current wing commanders to determine any developmental path trends.

Unity of command is a key tenet to US military forces because it enables unity of effort in joint operations. The Unified Command Plan places responsibility with theater-level strategic commanders to ensure unity of command and effort across the spectrum of conflict. Despite past successes of Airmen theater commanders, civilian national leadership appears reluctant to place Air Force officers into these strategic military positions, partly due to the service’s internal priorities and leader development processes. Understanding the influence of the Air Force’s identity is the first step in revealing what prevents its leaders from gaining the experience necessary for theater command positions.
The Influence of Air Force Identity and Culture

In his seminal book *The Masks of War*, author Carl Builder examines the institutional personalities of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. Although now two decades old, the insights Builder provides are extremely beneficial in understanding how Air Force priorities, then and now, affect the political and strategic development of its senior leaders. Rather than focus on the similarities between the services and the common characteristics of their senior leaders, Builder chose five categories, or faces, for study through which he aimed to understand the services differences.1 Each face offers valuable insights to this study.

The first face is altar of worship, which for the Air Force is technology. Builder notes the airplane was always a technological marvel. Technological advances expand the flying envelope while yet unsolved challenges place limitations on aircraft performance.

If the Air Force is to have a future of expanding horizons, it will come only from understanding, nurturing, and applying technology. There is a circle of faith here: If the Air Force fosters technology, then that inexhaustible fountain of technology will ensure an open-ended future for flight (in airplanes or spacecraft); that, in turn, will ensure the future of the Air Force.2

Today, one needs to look no further than the service’s public recruiting website to see that technology is still central to the Air Force identity.3 Holographic images greet the visitor extolling how various mission areas in the service have moved from the realm of science fiction to reality. Following a link to learn about the Air Force, the visitor has a chance to experience the service’s latest exploits in technology. A virtual hangar exalts the mission, capabilities, and specifications of stealthy F-22A and F-35 fighter aircraft, tilt-rotor CV-22s, remotely piloted aircraft, and robots

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2Ibid., 19.
designed to protect lives while diffusing explosive devices. Technology is the centerpiece to the recruiting effort.⁴

Technology’s influence, beyond simple platforms and gadgets, lives in the service’s doctrine. In current Air Force doctrine, technology (science) is central to the concept and execution of command and control (C2):

The art of commanding Air Force forces lies in the ability to effectively integrate people, systems, and processes to enable sound decisions and produce the desired effects that support achievement of national objectives. . . .

Military forces of the United States have had and expect to continue to have a technological advantage over our adversaries, both in weapons capabilities and in the C2 systems that facilitate their employment. There is a continuing requirement to develop and enhance our fundamental concepts for effective C2, commensurate with our technical advantages. . . .

The technology element, covers the equipment, communications, and facilities needed to overcome the warfighting problems of integrating actions and effects across space and time. Technology elements tend to dominate C2 doctrine, because advanced technology characterizes American warfare. (emphasis original)⁵

The Air Force C2 construct visualizes the commander as the center of a five-piece puzzle, surrounded by Airmen, information, C2 processes, and the enabling C2 technology.⁶ Contrast that view with Army’s description of C2, which acknowledges the commander’s use of a system to assess, decide on, and direct actions. Army doctrine calls this concept Battle Command. Here the human element takes a more central role. The commander’s ability to understand and visualize the situation (art) forms the foundation for describing and direct actions (science) to achieve

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⁴Builder notes that multiple military services use advanced technology weapon systems “to attract and retain and good people.” Builder, Masks of War, 14-16.


⁶Ibid., 3.
objectives.\textsuperscript{7} Air Force C2 doctrine gives preeminence to technology, not experience, education, or insight, as the critical bridge to gaps in a commander’s \textit{coup d’oeil}\.\textsuperscript{8}

The second face Builder addresses is how the services measure themselves. He again notes the importance of technology; the Air Force consistently favors quality (technological advantage) of its platforms over sheer numbers.\textsuperscript{9} The current Nunn-McCurdy breech surrounding the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter offers a prime example from today. Originally projected to cost $50 million per airframe, the latest Pentagon estimates show the price rising to between $80 and $95 million; the US Government Accountability Office estimate claims $112 million apiece. Either way, the F-35 will be the most expensive procurement program in history.\textsuperscript{10} Meanwhile, F-35 manufacturer Lockheed-Martin sells new F-16 multirole fighters around the world at substantially cheaper prices. However, the F-16 no longer represents the technological advantage cherished by the USAF.\textsuperscript{11} The quest for technological superiority and quality means the Air Force must address rising costs and, likely, accept a smaller number of F-35 aircraft. The trend occurs often with the service’s aircraft procurement initiatives contributing to the perception that the Air Force’s culture revolves around the weapon systems, or technology, it pursues.


\textsuperscript{9}Builder, \textit{Masks of War}, 21-22.


Builder’s third face compares how service members value individual technological toys versus the art of war. His interviews with Army personnel revealed a pride from discussions centered on basic warfighting skills; in comparison, he found Air Force pilots wanted to discuss the individual attributes of their airplanes. “The prospect of combat [was] not the essential draw [to join the Air Force]; it [was] simply the justification for having and flying these splendid machines.”12 This narrative lives today in the Air Force’s enduring mission statement it sells to the public – “fly, fight, and win . . . in air, space and cyberspace.”13 While some may argue the initial three action verbs weave together intricately in purpose, flying airplanes still comes first in the service. A later analysis in this paper of current wing commander careers shows the emphasis on flying supersedes the service’s ability to educate its key colonel-level leaders in the joint operational warfighting arts.

The fourth masks focuses on distinctions within the services. Inside the Air Force, pilots have always dominated the senior general officer ranks leading the service. Over its history, leadership transitioned between various pilot tribes. In the 1930s, the Air Corps Tactical School openly advocated bombing as “‘the basic arm of the Air Force;’” the bomber was unstoppable. Its advocates marginalized those seeking a greater emphasis on tactical aviation.14 Despite the heavy losses from operations over Schweinfurt and Rogensburg in 1943, the emphatic belief in the bomber remained after the war, manifest in Strategic Air Command’s (SAC) Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for prosecuting a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.15 The expectation

12Builder, Masks of War, 23-24.
of total nuclear war within the service’s leadership minimized the need for developing regionally focused, joint capable commanders. In nuclear war, those agencies were irrelevant. Not until General Charles A. Gabriel’s appointment as Chief of Staff in 1982 did the Air Force have a leader grown outside the influence of SAC’s bomber tribe. Today, a mobility pilot leads the service. Regardless of tribe, Builder notes a general tendency for flyers to identify themselves as pilots, with or without reference to a specific airframe, more often than classifying themselves as officers. Overall, the association with flying a specific advanced technological airplane takes precedence over the internalized concept of a leader called to direct the nation’s wars.

The final mask has two aspects and is perhaps the most critical to the Air Force today. The first aspect is how the service views its relevancy or “the pertinence of its missions and capabilities” to the operational environment; the second is institutional legitimacy, “the confidence . . . the service [has] in its rightful independent status.” The insatiable appetite for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in the current Iraq and Afghanistan counterinsurgency efforts is challenging the relevancy of traditional bomber and tactical aviation priorities. In response, a growth in the number and importance of drone pilots is emerging in the service. Builder argues the Air Force is most sensitive to arguments against its

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19 Ibid., 27.

independent status. If naval aviation remained subordinate to the Navy, then why should aviation supporting ground forces not be subordinate to the Army?21 The debate often centered on whether airpower could truly prove decisive in combat and win wars on its own. If victory in conflict rested solely upon defeating fielded enemy forces, the pre-World War II Army Air Forces could never hope to make an effective argument for gaining independence.22 Today, senior Air Force leadership is asking the question of why the US still needs an independent Air Force.23 Air Force Basic Doctrine presents a dichotomy of thought highlighting a subtle insecurity in continually justifying the role and importance of airpower:

Ultimately, doctrine is not about whether one particular element is more decisive than another, nor about positing that element as the centerpiece of joint operations; it’s the total, tailored joint force that’s decisive. . . .

Early airpower advocates argued that airpower could be decisive and could achieve strategic effects. While this view of airpower was not proved during their lifetimes, the more recent history of air and space power application, especially since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, has proven that air and space power can be a dominant and frequently the decisive element of combat in modern warfare. Air and space power is a maneuver element in its own right, coequal with land and maritime power; as such, it is no longer merely a supporting force to surface combat. (emphasis added)24

In recognition that the harsh realities of World War II countered early airpower advocate claims of decisive results without the need for ground or naval forces, the basis for Air Force independence shifted to effectively controlling limited air assets to achieve decisive effects through the air domain.25 Controlling assets to achieve air superiority came to the forefront. Once achieved, aircraft could focus on interdiction strikes against enemy reinforcements and supplies

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21Builder, Masks of War, 27.
22Ibid.
close to or behind enemy lines, close air support (CAS) missions for ground personnel, or other prioritized requirements of the theater commander. To accomplish prioritized tasks effectively, the Air Force relies heavily on centralized control of airpower in its execution of the operational art.26 The narrative surrounding centralized control permeates and focuses the warfighting structure of the Air Force today. At the same time, the Joint Force Air Component Commander embodies the solution to the centralized control debate for the institutional Air Force.

The next section examines the historical centralized control debate and shows how current organizational structures reinforce the Air Force’s position on its key tenet. The centralized control focus shapes leader development within the Air Force in order to produce JFACCs capable of effectively managing assets in the air and space domain to meet the theater commander’s intent. As a result, the need for competent JFACCs has taken precedence over producing strategic leaders with a deep experience and competency in joint operations.

Evolution of the JFACC as the USAF Joint Warfighter

Unity of command is essential to air forces. These cannot be operated efficiently in time of war if scattered and assigned to ground or water organizations.¹

— William Mitchell, Winged Defense

Historically, there have been two competing visions within the Air Force of how war would materialize and how the service would prosecute it. First, SAC’s nuclear-focused SIOP envisioned its fleet of bombers employed via an ideal strategic attack based on the pre-World War II Air Corps Tactical School bombing concepts. Second, the Tactical Air Command (TAC), marginalized originally by the strategic bombing advocates, saw war below the nuclear level as more likely focusing its efforts on prosecuting in the conventional arena. The TAC narrative saw the decisiveness of airpower primarily in its execution of the counterair and interdiction roles.²

As SAC’s bomber vision and influence declined in the Air Force, the TAC narrative became the primary operating construct for organizing and prosecuting war in the air domain. Institutionally, the Air Force needed to ensure success in its primary domain. Success required centralized control of all theater air assets under one Airman, known today as the JFACC. This section examines the influence of the centralized control debate on the Air Force narrative. Differing opinions among the multiple services and perceived performance of the air effort during conflicts challenged the Air Force’s centralized control narrative, directly and indirectly. To address those issues, the Air Force today is taking actions to build standing JFACC staffs capable of proving their merit daily to their respective GCC. While the organizational transformation benefits traditional Air Force warfighting and command and control capabilities, it focuses the officer developmental process into a service centric construct that fails to produce competent and experienced joint warfighters at the operational and strategic levels of war.

²Builder, Masks of War, 136-138.
The Influence of Centralized Control


> The flexibility of airpower and its capacity to concentrate large quantities of firepower in a short time make it a most desirable addition to an army or navy. . . .

Airmen . . . have argued that airpower is a decisive element of war in its own right and that the full effects of airpower can only be achieved when it is centrally controlled and directed against the most vital part of the enemy, whether that part be the industrial base or the military forces deployed to a theater of war. . . . Thus, for airpower to be employed for the greatest good of the combined forces in a theater of war, there must be a command structure to control the assigned airpower coherently and consistently [thus ensuring] airpower is not frittered away by dividing it among army and navy commands. (emphasis added)³

His words still ring familiar to many Airmen in uniform today. Therefore, it is no surprise the tenets of centralized control and decentralized execution are traditionally sacred to the institutional Air Force. As Air Force Basic Doctrine points out, “Indeed, they are the fundamental organizing principles for air and space power, having been proven over decades of experience as the most effective and efficient means of employing air and space power” (emphasis added).⁴ To an outside observer, Air Force doctrine may seem arrogant when it warns that only a single Airman with a broad view of the entire theater’s challenges can best distribute limited air and space assets to meet the JFC’s prioritized objectives across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.⁵ The service views centralized control as the “essence of unity of command” and justification of its independence.⁶

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⁴HQ USAF, *AFDD 1*, 28.

⁵Ibid., 28.

⁶Ibid., 21.
World War II – North Africa

The 1942-1943 North Africa Campaign set the foundation for the Air Force’s belief in centralized control. The British experience in theater planted those roots. Constrained of resources by the high priority defense of the home islands during the Battle of Britain, British Air Marshall Sir Arthur Coningham used a small, obsolete Western Desert Air Force to support ground operations in North Africa with no guiding doctrine at the time. By concentrating limited air assets into focused formations, Coningham produced decisive effects on the battlefield and earned General Bernard Montgomery’s praise. Montgomery published Coningham’s guiding principles as a directive to his subordinate ground commanders extolling many aspects central to today’s US Air Force narrative: airpower is flexible, it has the ability to be a “battle winning factor of the first importance” when concentrated, it must be centrally controlled, and dividing air assets into small packets under separate ground commanders risks failure.7

Unfortunately, when American forces entered the North African Theater during Operation Torch, they were ignorant of Coningham’s efforts in support of Montgomery. The American effort struggled both on the ground and in the air while Montgomery’s Eighth Army enjoyed continued success.

At one point, Gen Lloyd Fredendall, [US] II Corps commander, told Lt Gen Carl Spaatz, Northwest African Forces commander, that he wanted aircraft constantly flying over his troops and concentrating only on the enemy troops immediately in front of them during an attack. This made it difficult for the Allied air forces to coordinate an attack on the German army as a whole, not to mention defeating the Luftwaffe to gain air superiority. British and American chiefs of staff were in the midst of trying to solve these disputes when [German] Field Marshall Erwin Rommel attacked the US 1st Armored Division and destroyed half of its tanks.8

Following setbacks at the Battle of Kasserine Pass, Allied forces reorganized their command structure to address deficiencies. Pursuant to the change was the centralization of combat air assets into two major groupings – tactical and strategic. Due to his previous success, Air Marshall Coningham led the North African Tactical Air Force bringing with him his guiding principles as published by Montgomery.9

Exploiting the concept of centralized control, Coningham achieved impressive results. Air superiority was his primary effort. In addition, he used air assets en-masse shifting them to and from various points in theater based on the need and the theater commander’s requirements. German Field Marshall Albert Kesselring gave Coningham high marks noting the massed use of theater assets proved decisive. Certainly his methodology had its critics; debate raged between the air, ground, and naval components in the Mediterranean over roles and support. However, the overall air commander in the entire Mediterranean Theater, Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur W. Tedder, backed Coningham and refused to parcel air assets among the various components. Tedder and Coningham maintained the only way to address the needs of ground and naval commanders was to exploit the flexibility of airpower, shifting assets between them to meet the collective greatest threat. General Momyer summarized, “The unity of airpower was not only sound in theory, but the theory stood the test of battle and proved to be the most effective method for the command and control of airpower in a theater of operations.”10

The key artifact that came from the Mediterranean experience vital to the Air Force identity narrative was War Department Field Manual 100-20, *Command and Employment of Air Power*. First, it established up front that air and land components were equal in stature; neither

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component was auxiliary or subordinate to the other.\textsuperscript{11} That recognition dismayed many ground officers who subsequently viewed the FM as “the Army Air Forces’ ‘Declaration of Independence.’”\textsuperscript{12} Second, the manual declared airpower’s flexibility was its greatest asset. When used in a concentrated manner, \textit{airpower} – not strategic bombing, interdiction, or other mission area – could produce decisive effects. FM 100-20’s most important contribution to today’s Air Force narrative came from its emphasis on centralized control under a single Airman in order to fully exploit airpower’s flexibility and realize decisive effects. Of a close secondary importance was the doctrinal establishment of overall theater commanders with subordinate land and air component commanders. The air component reported to the theater commander with doctrinal recognition the theater commander would not parcel assets out to individual ground commanders.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, Momyer’s assessment of the theater reinforces the idea that centralized control led to theater success, which in turn, validated an independent Air Force.

\textbf{Korea}

Despite the relationships established in FM 100-20, conflict in Korea saw many of the same debates resurface. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, Far East Air Force (FEAF) commander, asked General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the overarching United Nations Command and US Far East Command (FECOM), for operational control (OPCON) of all air assets supporting the war effort. North Korea’s limited industrial base favored the North African command construct. The exception in the air component


\textsuperscript{13}War Department, \textit{FM 100-20: Command and Employment of Air Power}, 2-3.
was Stratemeyer controlled and directed B-29 strategic bombers in addition to tactical aviation assets.  

In an effort to resolve the centralized control debate early in the conflict, Stratemeyer sought guidance from MacArthur. In return, he received a murky directive from the FECOM chief of staff stating FEAF “would have command or [OPCON] of all aircraft in the execution of the FEAF mission as assigned by [MacArthur while Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE)] would have command . . . of all aircraft in the execution of the NAVFE mission as assigned by [MacArthur].” The same directive went on to say when FECOM assigned missions to both components, “coordination control” was the responsibility of the FEAF. Stratemeyer viewed that as reinforcing his effort to gain OPCON of all theater air assets. NAVFE saw it along the lines of a supporting-supported command relationship. With no significant naval campaign of note, Stratemeyer wanted naval and marine air assets available to the air component for planning and utilization. Differing service opinions about mission priorities led to the initial air construct revolving around liaison officer coordination and the use of different geographic areas for the various services.

Naval efforts to maintain control of the seas and counter Chinese and Soviet threats to the fleet heavily influenced the sea service’s view of centralized control of airpower. In order to

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15 Ibid., 58.
16 Momyer quotes the Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of the supported-supporting relationship at the time as ““The commander of the supported force indicates in detail to the supporting commander the support missions he wishes to have fulfilled and provides such information as is necessary. . . . The commander of the supporting force. . . . takes such action to fulfill them within his capabilities”” (emphasis added). Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars*, 57. Current joint doctrine defines the relationship similarly: “The supported CDR should ensure that the supporting CDRs understand the assistance required. The supporting CDRs will then provide the assistance needed, subject to a supporting CDR’s existing capabilities and other assigned tasks. When a supporting CDR cannot fulfill the needs of the supported CDR, the establishing authority will be notified by either the supported CDR or a supporting CDR. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution” (emphasis added). JP 1, IV-10.
provide longer loiter time for their aircraft, NAVFE requested its portion of interdiction targets and CAS sorties be restricted to a swath of area along the eastern coast of North Korea, close to the aircraft carriers of Task Force 77. FEAF countered with the lessons-learned from North Africa: airpower was more effective used en-masse, not dispersed in small, uncoordinated groupings resulting from standing geographic distributions or dedication to ground force commanders without pressing need. Eventually in the latter part of the conflict, an improved Navy-Air Force relationship came about due to commander personalities driving closer coordination. Naval liaison officers worked within the Joint Operations Center alongside counterparts from the Fifth Air Force and had representation on FEAF targeting committee. Momyer claims this arrangement finally made FEAF “the controlling authority for all air operations,” although there is some doubt upon the absolute tasking authority of FEAF since the Navy still refused certain missions in western Korea.18

Marine air assets also presented challenges. The Marine Corps’ need for integrated air support to replace missing artillery fires during amphibious assault operations results in a special relationship between air and ground forces, a relationship further reinforced by service training methodology. The primary mission of Marine air going into Korea was CAS. While conceding the special relationship was beneficial to shore landing operations absent massed artillery fire, FEAF did not support the Marine request for geographic based areas having dedicated CAS platforms. Once ashore, FEAF wanted to use Marine aviation as part of its mass, shifting between interdiction and CAS depending on theater priorities. Marine ground commanders were upset with the loss of dedicated CAS, feeling the Air Force was not as responsive. Army ground commanders were also dissatisfied with Air Force CAS and sought for a system similar to the Marine Corps. FECOM, the JCS, Headquarters US Army, and Headquarters US Air Force all

18McNamara, Air Power’s Gordian Knot, 81, 89, 93 (n24); Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, 58-59; Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, vol. 1, 346-347.
launched separate investigations into the CAS debate. All came back with the general conclusion “that the Marines’ use of on-station air support was wasteful and the Air Force could not possibly supply the number of ground [forward air controllers] required to implement the Marine system across the whole Army.” Ultimately, FEAF allowed Marine air to support their ground units when the tactical situation allowed; otherwise, FEAF used them in the larger overall theater campaign.

The conclusions on air power in the Korean War from the Air Force perspective clearly reinforce the service’s centralized control narrative. General Momyer states matter-of-factly:

As a result of the integration of Marine air operations . . . centralized control of all the airpower assigned to the Far East theater of operation provided the flexibility that it did in the campaigns of World War II.

With the conclusion of the Korean War, airpower had again demonstrated the need for a command structure that didn’t arbitrarily divide forces between mission areas. (emphasis added)

Furthermore, the Air Force succeeded in gaining some validation from FECOM, the JCS, and Headquarters US Army its centralized control concept was sound, at least in the hotly contested CAS arena. However, not all observers were satisfied. Jealously of the relationship between Marine and naval aviators and their ground counterparts bubbled under the surface of any official policy. Naval historian James A. Field, Jr. notes the tense relationships brought

an influx of dignitaries from Washington to study the situation, to the convening of various boards of investigation, and to a discussion of the proper relationships between air and ground forces which lasted throughout the war. In the United States, the Tactical Air Command reappeared as a major functional unit of the Air Force. In the Defense Department, rumors were afoot that [Army Chief of Staff] General [Lawton] Collins was contemplating an attempt to recover Army control of tactical aviation, a possibility which . . . was not devoid of humor.

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19 McNamara, Air Power’s Gordian Knot, 87.
21 Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, 62.
There was a clear threat to aspects of the institutional Air Force remaining in the independent organization based on differing views of the service’s leadership and execution in the air domain under the centralized control tenet.

Vietnam

Vietnam presented many challenges to the Air Force; the first was gaining respect for its mission and contribution to the joint fight. The unbalanced service representation on the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) staff was a source of constant consternation. From the creation of MACV, Commanding General Paul D. Harkins, senior Army officials, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara saw the campaign as primarily a counterinsurgency operation, or ground war. Harkins, and his successor General William Westmoreland, continually populated the MACV staff with Army officers. General Curtis Lemay, the Air Force Chief of Staff during MACV’s formation, objected vociferously saying MACV was “ignorant of and unconcerned with proper air support.” Due to Air Force protests, the service filled the initial positions heading MACV’s intelligence (J-2) and planning (J-5) functions. Meanwhile, the Army-led operations (J-3) directorate rapidly outmaneuvered the Air Force-led J-5 to plan the command’s operations within South Vietnam. As combat operations grew, the staff became more and more Army-centric despite protests from other service chiefs in Washington.

April 2010). Prior to the Korean conflict, the Air Force reduced Tactical Air Command (TAC) to an operational headquarters status under Continental Air Command; it had no assigned units. Due to Congressional worries about Air Force performance supporting Army forces with the CAS mission, TAC gained control of Ninth Air Force on 1 August 1950, was charged with leading the Air Force cooperative effort with land, naval, and amphibious forces, and finally reemerged from Continental Air Command into a separate major command on 1 December 1950. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, vol. 1, 307-308.


Critics complained about Air Force leadership in the J-2 because the appointees were “specialists in strategic reconnaissance and Soviet missiles rather than in counterinsurgency.” Ibid., 52.

Ibid., 42-48, 295-299.
The second challenge again revolved around the differing service views of the centralized control of airpower. The III Marine Amphibious Force operated in the northernmost geographic ground division of South Vietnam, the I Corps area, and had authorization to conduct unified land and air combat operations. Despite repeated attempts to gain control of Marine tactical air assets, the Air Force was allowed control only if the MACV commander declared a major emergency or disaster. Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific commander, had an ally in Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC), for maintaining the integrity of the Marine air-ground team operating in the I Corps area.26 Krulak praised the result to his fellow Marines:

Today we have what we longed for in Korea. It is no accident. We have CINCPAC to thank for putting his foot down and saying, ‘No, the Marines fight as a team. I will not see them broken up.’ We have him to thank, plus the stubborn persuasion on him on by a few Marines. Today we have our [air-ground] team in its classic sense and for the first time really in combat history.27

In the battle of service identities and narratives, Pacific Command sided with the Marine Corps. The Army also successfully challenged the Air Force’s relevance and institutional legitimacy with the creation of its helicopter-based, air cavalry tactical aviation units. The Army planned to use Vietnam to validate its “concept of airmobile operations that employed Army infantry and artillery units with their own organic aviation.”28 General Harkins’ view of the fight in Southeast Asia purely as a counterinsurgency campaign without a corresponding air battle meant centralized control of all aviation assets under the air component was not necessary. CINCPAC Admiral Sharp sided with the ground services; Army and Marine aviation units took mission assignments from the commanders in the field they directly supported. They fell under the Air Force’s tactical air control system during mission execution for essentially an air traffic

26Ibid., 84, 328-330.
27Lt Gen Victor H. Krulak as quoted in Ibid., 330.
28Ibid., 56.
control relationship. Despite a 1962 CINCPAC instruction giving the air component “coordinating authority” over air units operating in his area of responsibility, senior commanders repeatedly interpreted the instruction as not requiring them to give operational control of non-Air Force air assets to the air component commander.  

Policies within the Air Force itself further hurt efforts to establish centralized control under a single air component subordinate to MACV. Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) limited the forces assigned to MACV to maintain flexibility at the overall theater level for responding to possible Chinese intervention. PACAF would exercise OPCON of any air campaign against China through its subordinate Thirteenth Air Force (13 AF) in the Philippines. PACAF assigned 13 AF assets to MACV on an as-needed basis and for a set timeframe. An additional break in Air Force centralized control operations centered on the use of Strategic Air Command’s (SAC) B-52 bombers with SAC maintaining control throughout the war. Even though the attachment of an advanced echelon from SAC to the MACV staff gave the MACV commander input on target selection, the coordination level for use legally fell between CINCPAC and CINCSAC.

Caught in the middle with the responsibility to execute, and subsequently protect the Air Force’s identity and relevance, was the actual air component to MACV. The initial component was a small advance element of 13 AF’s 2d Air Division extremely limited in scope and size due to PACAF’s desire to maintain flexibility to meet any Chinese threat. As the US presence grew in Thailand, the full 2d Air Division became the new air component to MACV in October 1962. All forward deployed air units in Thailand fell under its control. The new organization served two commanders – MACV for all air operations inside South Vietnam and 13 AF for air operations in

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29Ibid., 56-60, 68n.
Laos and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. To facilitate operations in South Vietnam in support of MACV, the Air Force employed an air operations center (AOC). While General Harkins agreed on the usefulness of coordination via the AOC, he kept helicopters under the OPCON of their respective corps commanders. CINCPAC’s decision to run the air war in North Vietnam and Laos through his navy and air force components forced yet another coordination role onto 2d Air Division, this time with Task Force-77. The start of the ROLLING THUNDER bombing campaign in North Vietnam exacerbated the multi-faceted coordination issue leaving 2d Air Division commander, Major General Joe H. Moore, often with conflicting requirements from MACV and 13 AF.32

In an effort to add emphasis to the air component’s role, General John P. McConnell, Lemay’s successor as Chief of Staff, pulled the 2d Air Division from under 13 AF in March 1966 and renamed it Seventh Air Force (7 AF). Now under the command of a three-star general on equal footing with 13 AF subordinate to PACAF and MACV. This was the final air component command construct for the remainder of the war; here William W. Momyer would serve, gaining firsthand experience for his controversial book on controlling air power.33

Momyer’s primary concern during the war, and writing afterwards, was that the lack of centralized control hampered the ability of airpower to “focus quickly upon whatever situation has the most potential for victory or defeat.”34 Furthermore, coordinating authority between services did not yield the same beneficial effects of integrated planning and execution oversight available with true operational control. The division of North Vietnam into distinct route package areas assigned to the Air Force or Navy was the very division of air power into “little packets” that Air Marshall Tedder warned against in World War II. While a route package system made

32Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars, 70-73, 78-80.
33Ibid., 80-83.
34Ibid., 107.
cycling of carrier aircraft easier for Task Force-77, an integrated plan taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of fighters, bombers, and attack aircraft would produce “unified action” capable of shifting to meet changing dynamics in the war as required. As the system developed in Southeast Asia, Momyer lamented

The command structure did not give me sufficient authority to guarantee that I could respond immediately with the full weight of Air Force and Navy airpower. . . . I could respond immediately with Air Force airpower, and I could coordinate with the Navy. . . . simply inadequate when operations must be changed rapidly and intricate details must be quickly resolved.  

In all honesty, Momyer did not have the full weight of the Air Force due to SAC’s retention of OPCON for the B-52s. Even as the 7 AF became as the dominant force headquarters during the ground force draw down in South Vietnam, policy planning for B-52 sorties remained at the theater level. Pacific Command was the only agency able to adjust B-52 priorities due to split responsibilities for route package targeting between 7 AF and TF-77. The high threat environment present in portions of North Vietnam required integrated planning to attach all the supporting air elements to ensure mission success; the coordinating relationship put in place by Pacific Command hindered complicated that effort unnecessarily. The conflict in Vietnam ended without seeing the unity of airpower advocated in FM 100-20 from World War II.  

Desert Storm

Over the sands of Kuwait and Iraq, airpower zealots found in Desert Storm the war and opportunity to excel they long dreamed about. “Airpower came of age in the sense that technology and technique finally caught up with doctrine and prophecy. The prophecies of the airpower pioneers finally came to fruition.”  

A key legislative act, the Goldwater-Nichols ____________________

35Ibid., 98.
36Ibid., 90-108.
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, influenced the historic debate surrounding centralized control of airpower assets. Breaking the influence of individual service chiefs over combat operations, the act bolstered the authority of the regional unified commanders giving them greater authority over the operational organization of forces for combat. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, head of US Central Command, shaped the centralized control debate by aligning his forces functionally instead of along service component lines; he appointed Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner, Ninth Air Force commander, his official JFACC.\(^{38}\)

Even with Goldwater-Nichols increased emphasis on “jointness” and Schwarzkopf’s decision to align forces functionally, individual service concepts on the role of airpower in combat limited the amount of “command” Horner actually exerted over the various services air assets. As in Vietnam, the Marine Corps successfully preserved its service’s combat identity based on the unity of the Marine Air Ground Task Force. The Corps viewed the JFACC as a coordinator, not commander, only giving up a minimum excess sortie capability.\(^{39}\) The Navy retained enough sortie capability for fleet defense at sea while yielding the remaining carrier aircraft to the JFACC for tasking. Due to the distance of the fleet from Iraq and with no division of airspace into route packages as in Vietnam, the situation forced the Navy to cooperate closely with the Air Force despite any service reservations, especially in order to gain access to critical air refueling aircraft. However, since the Navy failed to support the JFACC concept in the decade before the conflict, it did not possess the compatible communications equipment to receive the integrated daily flight schedule, known as the Air Tasking Order (ATO), electronically. As a


result, circumstances dictated the 800-plus page document be flown to the carriers.\textsuperscript{40} The emergence of AirLand Battle doctrine to counter the Soviet threat in Europe shaped some US Army senior officer views on the role airpower.\textsuperscript{41} As the initial air portion of the war progressed, Army commanders grew nervous about when the JFACC would target the opposing Iraqi forces in their ground sectors. However, Schwarzkopf, serving as the overall JFC and ground component commander, set the final priorities at the theater level for the use of air assets during daily meetings with Horner. Schwarzkopf’s priority as the ground component commander was the elite Republican Guard, not the frontline units facing his corps commanders.\textsuperscript{42} At the end of the conflict, the Air Force felt the decisive results proved the JFACC concept worked, regardless of whether analysts viewed the centralized air effort as controlled or just coordinated.\textsuperscript{43}

The critical aspect of Desert Storm that cemented the JFACC concept as the pinnacle joint warfighting position in the Air Force was air power’s influence on the overall war strategy. Colonel John Warden’s “Five Strategic Ring” theory for the application of airpower caught the eye of Schwarzkopf and other senior military leaders in Washington.\textsuperscript{44} While Horner and Warden did not mesh well personally, Horner did take Warden’s concept and subordinate planners from Warden’s Checkmate Division to form the basis for the JFACC air campaign.\textsuperscript{45} Rather than work linearly (i.e. destroying all targets associated with the center strategic ring then moving to the next outward ring), the air planners sought to create effects by attacking all major target

\textsuperscript{40}McNamara, \textit{Air Power’s Gordian Knot}, 126-127; Kometer, \textit{Command in Air War}, 188; Hone, Mandeles, and Terry, “Part II: Command and Control,” 154.

\textsuperscript{41}The corps commander’s plan was the driving force for air support in AirLand Battle. Meanwhile, a separate follow-on forces attack (FOFA) doctrine was emerging concurrently that called for airpower to isolate the enemy’s frontline troops by striking deeper into enemy territory. FOFA called for control of air at the theater level to ensure effective use of limited air assets. Kometer, \textit{Command in Air War}, 86.

\textsuperscript{42}Kometer, \textit{Command in Air War}, 124.

\textsuperscript{43}McNamara, \textit{Air Power’s Gordian Knot}, 132-133.

\textsuperscript{44}Warden’s theory called for violent and simultaneous attacks on an enemy’s national leadership (center ring), key production centers, infrastructure, popular support for the government, and lastly the fielded military forces (outer ring). Clancy, \textit{Every Man a Tiger}, 256n.

\textsuperscript{45}Clancy, \textit{Every Man a Tiger}, 256-265.
categories simultaneously, a concept later known as parallel warfare.\textsuperscript{46} Warden’s planners formed the core of a long-range planning cell within the JFACC’s Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). The planning functions of the TACC produced the daily ATO, thus integrating and centrally controlling airpower assets along the priorities set by General Schwarzkopf. The operations function of the TACC managed the ATO in a dynamic manner once in execution.\textsuperscript{47}

In essence, the TACC was the planning and operational centerpiece of the JFACC centralized control structure. Since Desert Storm, the TACC evolved into the modern Air and Space Operations Center (AOC). The AOC remains the centerpiece for the JFACC to exercise command and control today. “This centralization put[s] tremendous pressure on the AOC as a hub. If all of the decision making [is] to be accomplished there, it [must] be done well.”\textsuperscript{48}

**Creation of Component-Major Command/Numbered Air Force**

In today’s operational environment, it remains the Joint Force Commander’s decision on whether to align along functional or service component lines. If the JFC chooses functional components, the Air Force actively seeks to position itself to assume the JFACC position. Both Air Force and joint doctrine emphasize the ability to “plan, task, and control” joint air operations should be a major factor in the JFACC selection process, not just dual-hatting the subordinate service commander with the largest number of air assets in theater.\textsuperscript{49} It is only through the functional component role the Air Force can hope to resolve the centralized control issues General Momyer laments about in his book. At the same time, the Air Force, through the JFACC role, must be able to deliver on its promise of greater efficiency and overall effectiveness through

\textsuperscript{46}McNamara, Air Power’s Gordian Knot, 122.
\textsuperscript{47}Clancy, Every Man a Tiger, 265-280; Kometer, Command in Air War, 155-160.
\textsuperscript{48}Kometer, Command in Air War, 100-102.
\textsuperscript{49}HQ USAF, AFDD 2, xii, 7; JP 3-30, II-2.
centralized control or it invites additional debate over parceling assets to theater ground commanders.

To ensure the service and its senior leaders were able to deliver on the centralized control promise, the U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan from November 2003 announced an initiative to reorganize certain higher headquarters into focused warfighting headquarters (WFHQ). Led by a three or four star-general officer, the WFHQ would “be the airman’s single voice to the Unified Combatant Commander (UCC). This reorganization [was] designed to enhance combat capability, integrate combat staffs with AOCs, and provide the UCC an air and space focused-warfighting structure supported by state-of-the-art warfighting command and control.”\(^50\) The goal was “the development of full spectrum, joint warfighting structures linked [together] through a collaborative planning network.”\(^51\) Ultimately, the WFHQ concept divided the service’s various headquarters into two camps, one group concentrating on warfighting while the other group focused on organize, train, and equip (OT&E) functions. At the pinnacle of the warfighting groups were the leaders trained, and expected, to function as the JFACC.\(^52\)

Today, the WFHQ exists at two levels in the Air Force and supports operations across strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Component major commands (C-MAJCOMs) operate at the strategic level of war serving as the Air Force component for their respective geographic or functional combatant command. Component numbered air forces (C-NAFs) generally operate at the operational and tactical levels of war aiding in the fulfillment of service component responsibilities underneath a C-MAJCOM or functioning as the sole component commander directly to a unified or sub-unified commander if no corresponding C-MAJCOM


\(^51\)Ibid., 40.

\(^52\)The initiative is known as the Air Force Forces Command and Control (AFFOR C2) Enabling Concept within the service.
exists. While the C-MAJCOM operates at the strategic level “to support the CCDR in setting
the conditions for future success across the Area of Responsibility (AOR) . . . in ways a three-star
general might not be able to do,” it is within the C-NAF that the ability to plan, execute, task, and
command and control day-to-day joint air operations exists. The strength of the C-NAF lies in
its standing organic AOC and Air Force Forces (AFFOR) staff. “The AOC is responsible for
accomplishing strategy development, operational level assessment, detailed planning, target
development, weaponeering/allocation, Air Tasking Order (ATO) / Space Tasking Order (STO)
production, and force execution functions.” The implementation guidance established five large
Falconer AOCs, five smaller tailored AOCs “adapted for specific or unique functionality,” and
two functional AOCs. The AFFOR staff functions to aid the C-NAF commander in meeting his
service component responsibilities in a joint campaign. Essentially, the AFFOR staff oversees
the deployment of forces to the theater, beds them down, and keeps them resupplied once there;
the AOC plans, executes, and assesses the war with the forces made available by the AFFOR
staff. To increase proficiency and effectiveness, the Air Force built these organizations and
structures in fixed locations dedicated to specific unified and subunified commanders.

53 In the latter C-NAF case, it would fill componency requirements at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels of war. HQ USAF, “Implementation of The Chief of Staff of the Air Force Direction to
Establish an Air Force Component Organization” (Programming Action Directive (PAD) 06-09, HQ
USAF/A5XS, Washington, DC, 7 November 2006), 3, A-2; HQ USAF, “Implementation of The Chief of
Staff of the Air Force Direction to Transform and Consolidate Headquarters Management Functions”

54 HQ USAF, PAD 07-13, 5.

55 HQ USAF, “Air Force Forces Command and Control Enabling Concept (Change 2)” (AFFOR

56 The service created Falconer AOCs at 3 AF (Air Forces Europe), 7 AF (Air Forces Korea), 9
AF (Air Forces Central), 12 AF (Air Forces South), and 13 AF (Air Forces Pacific). Tailored AOCs existed
at 1 AF (Air Forces North), 8 AF (Air Forces Strategic – Global Strike), 17 AF (Air Forces Africa), and 23
AF (Air Forces Special Operations Forces). While not designated as a C-NAF, a tailored Falconer AOC
was created at 11 AF to support its Alaskan Command, JTF-Alaska, and Alaska NORAD region roles.
Functional AOCs existed at 18 AF (Air Forces Transportation) and 23 AF (Air Forces Strategic – Space).
HQ USAF, PAD 06-09, A-6-A-7; HQ USAF, PAD 07-13, C-2-BB-10.

57 HQ USAF, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept (Change 2), 32.
As alluded to earlier, the Air Force removed normal organize, train, and equip (OT&E) functions from the C-MAJCOM/C-NAF (warfighting) staffs, placing that responsibility with lead MAJCOMs, in order to maintain their warfighting focus and increase the ability of the component structures to meet CCDR theater objectives. Prior to the reorganization, service leaders recognized “the preponderance of . . . headquarters personnel resources [were] focused on Service-oriented Title 10 OT&E activities, including Senior Leader assignments” (emphasis added). The honed warfighting focus of the component structures seeks to increase the operational art skills of Airmen improving their ability to work with and eventually lead joint forces. The establishing directive described a nominal career progression where future senior leaders would serve within the C-NAF construct three different times during a career. This warfighting focused career development aimed to prepare members for return as commanders at the C-NAF, C-MAJCOM, Joint Task Force, and possibly combatant command levels. While the initiative adds operational level of war focus and experience Airmen’s careers, it does so through the JFACC construct. The expectation of the C-MAJCOM and C-NAF commander to assume the JFACC position is obvious in the AFFOR C2 Enabling guidance.

By demonstrating their value and capabilities to the various CCDRs in day-to-day operations and during exercises, the Air Force sought to make sure the C-NAF commanders governing the AOCs, especially the Falconer AOCs, became the natural choice for the CCDR to fill the JFACC role. While the implementation guidance defines warfighting broad enough to cover operations from day-to-day activities to major combat, it does recognize and imply that

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58 HQ USAF, PAD 06-09, 9.
59 HQ USAF, PAD 07-13, 6.
60 HQ USAF, PAD 07-13, 6.
61 HQ USAF, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept (Change 2), 7; HQ USAF, PAD 06-09, A-3; HQ USAF, PAD 07-13, 16.
“the C-NAF is the warfighter.” Informally among the senior general officer ranks, the five C-NAFs with Falconer AOCs specifically supporting geographic unified and subunified commanders were the service’s “warfighters” and fully expected to fill the JFACC role during combatant command exercise and in times of hostility. These five C-NAFs received manning priority over the C-NAFs with smaller tailored AOCs to ensure they could meet the full expectations of their CCDR and other responsibilities laid out in the guidance. The AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept initiative seeks to increase the operational art expertise of Airmen and prepare future leaders for service in senior joint command positions; however, those are byproducts of the primary institutional goal to provide CCDRs focused, technologically advanced warfighting structures capable of executing the centralized control tenet under a single Airman, the JFACC.

General Momyer’s highlighted views in this paper are still influential today and discussed among senior and retired general officers. The creation of the C-MAJCOM and C-NAF through the AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept is a specific framework to prevent those same issues involving centralized control from occurring in current and future wars. Designed to exploit air and space power fully in joint combat operations, the widespread reorganization of the C-MAJCOM/C-NAF construct demonstrates the Air Force’s institutional focus on the JFACC role. While that focus is beneficial to the organization and execution of the service’s combat mission, it remains unclear

62 Air Force doctrine says the COMAFFOR is the service warfighter. In PACAF and USAFE where both C-MAJCOMs and C-NAFs exist, it is probable the C-MAJCOM would fill the COMAFFOR role while the C-NAF filled the JFACC role. Since the statement of the C-NAF being the warfighter is found in an appendix of the PAD and not in the main instruction, it is unlikely any other official service instruction would counter the doctrinal definition of the COMAFFOR as the warfighter. HQ USAF, AFFOR C2 Enabling Concept (Change 2), 1; HQ USAF, PAD 07-13, B-2-2.

63 The Air Force General Officer Management Office confirmed the Air Force does not specifically identify any C-NAF or other general officer billets as warfighting billets; Lieutenant Colonel Charlie Underhill, Air Force General Officer Management (AF/DPG), e-mail message to author, 4 February 2010. The claim of the five specific C-NAFs being the Air Force warfighters is based on conversations with the Thirteenth Air Force commander (13 AF/CC) as well as exercise and component commander conference observations during the author’s year as the aide-de-camp to the 13 AF/CC.
what kind of long-term impact the C-NAF concept will have in driving change to officer
development and proficiency in the multi-domain joint operating environment.
Evaluating Air Force “Jointness”

In November 2005, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, signed his *CJCS Vision for Joint Officer Development*. The publication articulated General Pace’s “vision for transforming joint officer development . . . [to] produce appropriately prepared senior leadership for the capabilities-based future joint force.”¹ Essential to this transformation was recognizing the future joint officer must grasp the myriad of complexities associated with war as well as have the ability to envision potential second- and third-order effects that can confound and frustrate national efforts. To manage best those complex situations, General Pace noted the joint force requires leaders that are *strategically minded*, possess *critical thinking* skills, and are *skilled joint warfighters*. Important to note, General Pace’s vision sought to see these competencies intrinsic to the O-6 captain and colonel level in the services. In order to produce leaders possessing those competencies, the document introduced a four-pillared Joint Learning Continuum (JLC). The JLC consists of joint individual training, joint professional military education, joint experience, and self-development. The joint experience pillar stands out in that it requires successful application of lessons from the other three pillars.² Simply put, “Joint warfighting is not an academic pursuit; *its competencies must be demonstrated by practice*” (emphasis added).³ Given its importance, this section of the paper examines the joint experience pillar within the Air Force.


²Ibid., 2-6.

³Ibid., 6.
Air Force Leader Development Doctrine

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, yields valuable insight into the service’s view of leadership development. AFDD 1-1 defines leadership as “the art and science of influencing and directing people to accomplish the assigned mission.” The document recognizes the importance of experience, education and training in the development of leadership abilities. Furthermore, it advocates a deliberate force development process as the best method to produce “Airmen who possess the requisite skills, knowledge, experience, and motivation to lead and execute the full spectrum of Air Force missions.” Given the need to guide service specific leader development, the document focuses heavily on leading Air Force organizations. While there is a brief discussion on leading in a joint environment, the service-centric orientation of the document offers an organizational clue as to why Airmen currently fail to gain important strategic joint insight and experience.

Air Force doctrine describes force development occurring at three levels – tactical, operational, and strategic. The tactical level focuses on mastering an individual’s specific duty and gaining initial leadership experience while honing followership skills as well; this level takes place at the unit level or below. The operational level of force development generally occurs after intermediate development education and attempts to create the skills necessary to meet Air Force requirements from the squadron command or branch chief level up through MAJCOM staff. Doctrine places the greatest emphasis at the operational level, “It is here where warfighting is executed and the day-to-day command and control of Air Force operations are carried out.” Appropriately, the manual recognizes the necessity of broad career experience for success at higher levels of leadership, a requirement seemingly true in the joint world as well. Finally, the

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5Ibid., vi.
6Ibid., 17.
strategic level of force development makes the first mention of potentially leading joint forces by reaping the fruits produced from “seeds of leadership” planted at the tactical and operational level. Of course, the implication is an individual must plant joint “seeds” in order to be qualified and successful in a joint leadership role.

Air Force doctrine also advocates education and training as the primary methods for planting leadership seeds. Unfortunately, it neglects the value of joint assignments until educating leaders at the strategic level. The placement is unfortunate considering the document recognizes that warfighting takes place at the operational level of force development. More puzzling is the document places increased joint and coalition understanding as a principle of operational level education; however, rather than advocate the value of joint assignments, it merely suggests the increased understanding be gained from “formal education and training programs, joint and coalition wargames and exercises, and mentoring.” While finally acknowledging the value of operational assignments to the strategic level of force development, AFDD 1-1 still seems to stress service interests when developing strategic skill sets. Airmen should be able to “express Air Force views within joint, interagency, and international” environments. Even as it declares senior Airmen must be able to assess the strengths, weaknesses, and cultures of all actors involved in a conflict, the failure of AFDD 1-1 to discuss joint assignments before the strategic level of force development fails to meet General Pace’s vision of having capable joint officers at the colonel level. To overcome joint competency deficiencies, the service must utilize targeted

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7Ibid., 16-18.
8Ibid., 33.
9Ibid., 35.
10HQ USAF, AFDD 1-1, 33-35; CJCS, Vision for Joint Officer Development, 3.
senior development education seminars at military and civilian institutions that are short in
duration to strengthen individual weak areas and prepare senior leaders for potential jobs.11

**Joint Competency Evaluation Framework**

General Pace’s vision of joint officer development programs building strategically
minded, skilled joint warfighters with the ability to think critically carries forward to today’s
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). With a primary purpose of guiding force
development, the CCJO emphasizes future operations will require “greater adaptability and
versatility across the force to cope with the uncertainty, complexity, unforeseeable change, and
persistent conflict.”12 Future senior leaders must be experts in commanding at the operational
level, masters of the concepts of operational art, and capable of developing and executing national
strategy. The last requirement is the most challenging developmental concern. Here, an in-depth
understanding of all elements of national power is necessary. The CCJO notes, “Development of
that broader strategic understanding must begin early in the military education process and
continue throughout every military officer’s professional development.”13 If the expectation is the
services will produce joint-minded and proficient officers at the O-6 level already possessing a
strategic foundation, then the appropriate education and operational assignments must begin
before selection to colonel or captain.

Senior leadership within the Air Force is concerned about the service’s officer
development program producing competitive, joint qualified senior leaders capable of thinking
and executing at the operational and strategic leadership levels in the joint arena. The current

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11Major Gregory Beaulieu, Chief, Officer Force Development Branch, Headquarters Air Force
(AF/A1DD), phone interview by author, 16 March 2010.

12Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0*

13CJCS, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, 34.
Chief of Staff is employing an Officer Force Development Panel (OFDP) composed of eight three-star general officers from diverse experience backgrounds to study the issue. The OFDP is examining how current developmental programs and operational emphasis areas early in an Airman’s career limit Air Force general officers from being competitive in critical senior officer joint billets. The OFDP’s data and resulting analysis are not releasable. However, Headquarters Air Force Officer Development Branch (AF/A1D) did note they focused on certain subcompetencies found in the Air Force’s Institutional Competency List (see Appendix 2). In order to evaluate the joint exposure of Air Force’s highest-tier colonels, the author mirrored AF/A1D’s evaluation criteria and examined eighty-five current wing commanders across eight major commands within the Air Force using the framework in Table 1.

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14Major Gregory Beaulieu, Chief, Officer Force Development Branch, Headquarters Air Force (AF/A1DD), phone interview and multiple e-mail messages to author, 15-16 March 2010. OFDP is composed of the vice commanders from three separate major commands, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel & Services (AF/A1), the Military Deputy for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ), Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force (AF/CVA), Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) Commander, and the Air University (AU) Commander.

15Author used the official Air Force Portal (www.my.af.mil) to identify wings and current commanders as of 6 March 2010. The AF Portal has an organizational function allowing users to identify major commands, expand each command down to wing level, and obtain individual wing commander biographies. The AF Portal requires common access card (CAC) to access this function. General officer biographies are available through the non-restricted public site http://www.af.mil/information/bios/index.asp.
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<th>Key Operational Assignment Category</th>
<th>Joint Focused Institutional Subcompetency</th>
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<td>Warfighting Focus</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Operations, planning, strategy directorates at COCOM, JCS, Air Staff, MAJCOM, C-NAF, CAOC J/A-3/5/8</td>
<td>Operational and Strategic Art</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Expeditionary deployments plus COCOM, JCS, C-NAF, CAOC J/A-3/5/8</td>
<td>Warrior Ethos</td>
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<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Any MAJCOM-level or higher</td>
<td>Unit, Air Force, Joint and Coalition Capabilities</td>
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<td>Global, Regional and Cultural Awareness</td>
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<td>Command</td>
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<td>• Non-joint warfighting, any Air Staff, non-MAJCOM warfighting</td>
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**Current Wing Commander Career Observations**

The examination of wing commanders, all colonels or higher, based on the above framework revealed trends in three major categories – command, joint warfighting focused assignments, and Air Force staff warfighting focused assignments.16 All eighty-five wing commanders served a tour previously as a squadron commander, overwhelmingly at the lieutenant colonel level.17 Only three of the eighty-five saw their next command tour at the wing-level. Over ninety-six percent of current wing commanders held previous command billets as colonels. Thirty wing commanders are currently serving in their third, or higher, colonel-level command tour; fifteen are in their second wing command tour. By contrast, only one of the

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17Only five wing commanders came from a support career field outside flying or space/missile operations. Of those five, three served tours as squadron commanders while majors.
fourteen senior leaders from the other three military branches that served as a geographic combatant commander (see Appendix 1) during the last decade appears to have more than one O-6 command. 18 With only one institutional subcompetency related to command, “developing and inspiring others,” the service’s heavy command focus occupies valuable career time and prevents additional joint, staff, or educational type assignments to build strategic thinking and skills in the operational arts. Multiple tours at the group, vice wing, and wing commander level limit the wing commander pool from gaining a broad and deep joint experience base.

In terms of joint warfighting staff experience, the analysis reveals a mixed exposure to essential assignments. Only twenty-five current wing commanders have two or more tours on a joint staff of any kind; five officers have no joint tour at all.19 In terms of warfighting focused assignments that meet the criteria in Table 1, sixty percent (fifty-one) of the current wing commander pool served in a J-3/5/8 directorate on the Joint Staff, at a geographic combatant command, or in another warfighting focused agency. Sixteen commanders, roughly one in five, have time in the J-3/5/8 directorates on the Joint Staff. Moving down an echelon to the geographic combatant commands, seventeen commanders served on the regional staffs.20

18 Admiral Robert F. Willard’s official biography notes he commanded the USS Tripoli and USS Abraham Lincoln without noting a specific rank during either tour. The Tripoli is no longer in service and thus no official webpage exists. The official webpage for the Abraham Lincoln (www.cvn72.navy.mil) shows the current commanding officer is an O-6. The US Navy maintains no official biography for Admiral (ret) Dennis C. Blair, USPACOM commander from February 1999 to May 2002. His biography as the current Director of National Intelligence mentions only his command of the Kitty Hawk Battle Group; one-star rear admirals lead carrier strike groups today.

19 This includes assignments to the Office of Secretary Defense, the Joint Staff, geographic and functional combatant commands, and other joint credit tours regardless of warfighting focus. The five without any joint tour come from the combat air force (CAF) community – three fighter pilots, one bomber pilot, and one bomber navigator.

20 That number is lower upon further examination of commanders from a mobility air force (MAF) background. All four MAF commanders with time at the regional staffs served as the US Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) Liaison Officers (LNOs) to the GCC. In this capacity, they work for the TRANSCOM commander but serve as “the senior mobility representative [to the GCCs and] work any issue that deals with mobility including surface transportation.” A fifth wing commander served as the TRANSCOM LNO to the Combined Forces Command/US Forces Korea commander.
largest group of the current wing commanders gained exposure to joint warfighting from other joint staffs focused predominantly at the operational level of war.\(^{21}\) While more than half of the wing commander group has experience in a warfighting joint staff tour, the overall evaluation of the group shows it is a relatively light emphasis area for the Air Force with ninety percent of the group serving one tour or less.

If the Air Force fails to exploit joint tours to provide its future general officer corps experience in strategic and operational level thinking, it must rely on its own staff assignments to cover the competency gap. Historically, a perception has existed that the Air Force placed higher value on Air Staff tours than gaining joint staff time. The analysis reinforces that perception to an extent. Forty-two commanders served in some capacity on the Air Staff compared to only twenty-four on the Joint Staff. However, when looking at pure warfighting focused assignments, the numbers are comparable. Fifty-three commanders have experience in warfighting related directorates at the Air Staff, various MAJCOMs, and in the C-NAFs; just two more than served in a similar capacity on the various joint staff levels. Similar to the light experience base in joint staffs, eighty-five percent of the wing commander group has one or less warfighting focused staff tour in the various Air Force staff levels. Where the two categories overlap, there are twenty-six commanders (thirty percent) with warfighting staff experience on both joint and service staffs.

The wing commander position is the pinnacle of command in the Air Force. It is the last time a member serves close to the tactical level of war. Upon successful completion of command,

The TRANSCOM LNO billet is a highly competitive position given to officers on leadership tracks within Air Mobility Command. Colonel Mark Camerer, 3rd Wing Vice Commander (3 WG/CV) and former TRANSCOM LNO to PACOM, e-mail message to author, 19 March 2010.

While exposed to the complex issues facing the GCCs and their staffs, the TRANSCOM LNO position filters the regional warfighting focus and experience through the functional component lens. One criticism is the position keeps the individual within the mobility air force (MAF) stovepipe inside the joint world unless the individual completes an additional tour within key operations, planning, or strategy directorates at a geographic combatant command.

\(^{21}\)These assignments include tours at various levels of NATO, NORAD, different joint warfare analysis centers, the Air Land Sea Application Center, and various forward staffs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
leaders move to the staff to focus on either warfighting at the strategic and operational level of war or on meeting the “organize, train, and equip” role of the service.\footnote{It is possible for some commanders to serve a second time in a wing commander billet either immediately following their first tour or after another brief tour on staff. Of the current group, fifteen commanders are on their second wing command tour.} However, the small subset of commanders with warfighting experience on both joint and service staffs suggests the Air Force lacks breadth of experience at the O-6 level, the very level General Pace envisioned having strategically minded joint warfighters with critical thinking skills.

A look at promotion statistics shows the Air Force values tours on the Joint Staff and in the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) more so than joint experience. Statistics from 2002 to 2009 colonel and lieutenant colonel promotion boards demonstrate the Air Force selected members with Joint Staff exposure at higher rates than those with only Air Staff experience (see Appendix 4).\footnote{The trend is true for in-the-promotion zone (IPZ) and below-the-promotion zone (BPZ) categories for colonel selection boards. Board committees promoted IPZ candidates to lieutenant colonel at a higher rate all but two times; however, both instances needed only one additional candidate in order to exceed the Air Staff selection rate.} Members with OSD exposure also generally fared better than their Air Staff counterparts when meeting their in-the-promotion zone boards.\footnote{The board selected Air Staff members for BPZ to colonel at a higher percentage than OSD members; the same is true for lieutenant colonel in all but two instances. Of the nine boards examined, the committees selected one OSD colonel candidate for BPZ promotion six times and zero the other three; the boards promoted one lieutenant colonel BPZ candidate two times and zero the other seven.} While enjoying higher selection rates, the challenge lies in the fact Joint Staff and OSD representation is significantly smaller than the Air Staff pool.\footnote{The Joint Staff and OSD colonel pool for IPZ and BPZ was approximately thirty percent of the Air Staff category size; at the lieutenant colonel level, it dropped to eight percent of the Air Staff size.} The Air Force must rely on “other joint” staffs to season and expose its future senior leaders to the joint warfighting arena. Yet this “other joint” category, where candidates from the geographic combatant commands reside, saw promotion rates well below the Air Staff average on all nine boards for both colonel and lieutenant colonel candidates.\footnote{Based on the statistics, captains serving on the OSD or Joint Staff competing for major are extremely rare. Only five candidates in ten selection boards fit the categories – all promoted. Major numbers from the “other joint” category are extremely competitive with the Air Staff; the only times falling...}
last group statistic raises questions: Where does “other joint,” specifically the combatant commands, fall in the hierarchy of recommended jobs? Is the Air Force sending the wrong people to serve on GCC staffs? If the amount of OSD and Joint Staff slots available to the Air Force remains constant, how can the service exploit the “other joint” category to add joint depth to the limited number of individuals chosen to serve in highly selective staffs? The remainder of this chapter will examine the last question.

### Understanding the Rated Officer Career Timeline

Twelve of the current thirteen four-star general officers in the Air Force are pilots; this section focuses on rated career paths. The historical value and emphasis placed on flying, as well as the multiple levels of command for colonels, in the Air Force evolved into a career path for rated officers that left little room for service in key joint or air staff positions focused on the strategic and operational levels of war (see Figure 1).

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27 The Mobility Air Force Developmental Team recently placed the “other joint” category as the second highest priority, behind Joint Staff and ahead of Air Staff. Major Michael Brock, Chief, Officer and Civilian Force Development for Air Mobility Command (AMC/AIKO), telephone interview by author, 17 March 2010.

Figure 1. Typical Rated Officer Career Path to Selection Board for Brigadier General

Acronyms: MWS – Major Weapon System (i.e. type aircraft); FTU – Formal Training Unit; WIC – Weapons Instructor Course; IDE – Intermediate Development Education; SAAS – School of Advanced Air & Space Studies; OPSO – Operations Officer or Director of Operations (DO); SQ/CC – Squadron Commander; OG – Operations Group Commander; CV – Vice Wing Commander; WG/CC – Wing Commander

Source: Major Gregory Beaulieu, Chief, Officer Force Development Branch, Headquarters Air Force (AF/A1DD), e-mail message to author, 15 March 2010

Part of the emphasis on flying is due to legislative requirements. The 1996 National Defense Authorization Act establishes three tiers of active flying month requirements for rated officers to accumulate in order to receive aviation career incentive pay, commonly known as flight pay, throughout their career regardless of their current assignment. The second, or middle, tier garners the most attention in the service when discussing the release of rated officers from

29Each active flying month accumulated counts as one “gate.” For information on counting gates, see paragraph 2.7.3 in AFI 11-401, Aviation Management, Incorporating Through Change 2, 18 May 09.
tactical flying positions to staff assignments to gain exposure to higher levels of war; it establishes a 120-month minimum within the first eighteen years of aviation service.\(^{30}\) The ten-year commitment to flying coupled with six years set aside for squadron and at least two colonel-level commands consumes two-thirds of an individual’s career timeline based on on-time promotions before meeting the brigadier general promotion board.\(^{31}\) Professional military education occupies an additional two years on average with attendance at one of the select Advanced Studies Group (ASG) schools consuming a third.\(^{32}\) That leaves approximately five years available for essential warfighting staff and other developmental tours in a rated career, less if an individual earns one or more promotions below-the-zone. The current rated wing commander average for time spent on joint and service related staffs, without regard to warfighting focus, is twenty-eight months each; that consumes fifty-six months of the aforementioned five-year period. All these factors contribute to the current pool’s general characteristics of a heavy command focus and light experience in vital warfighting staff positions. Something in the career path must change if the Air Force is going to grow future leaders more adept at strategic thinking and in the operational arts with the credentials to prove it.

\(^{30}\)The first tier sets a ninety-six month gate requirement within the first twelve years of aviation service to receive flight pay uninterrupted through eighteen years of aviation service. The second tier requires 120 gates within the first eighteen years of aviation service to maintain flight pay through twenty-two years of aviation service. The third tier requires 144 gate months in the first eighteen years to maintain flight pay through twenty-five years of aviation service. AFI 11-401, *Aviation Management*, Incorporating Through Change 2, 18 May 09, 46-47.

\(^{31}\)The current wing commanders’ average time in command before assuming the current billet is approximately forty-three months.

\(^{32}\)Eleven of the eighty-five current wing commanders (thirteen percent) completed intermediate developmental education solely by correspondence. All completed senior developmental education through an in-residence program. The School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) and School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) are two of the schools within the ASG program. Twenty SAASS and one SAMS graduates serve as current wing commanders (approximately twenty-five percent).
Conclusion

This paper examined factors that prevented senior Air Force generals from gaining the strategic and political experience necessary to be competitive for geographic combatant command billets. In reality, the issue is about producing leaders with an in-depth knowledge of airpower capabilities and limitations across the full spectrum of conflict, a solid educational foundation that bolsters critical thinking and analysis skills, and sufficient joint warfighting experience to build trust with sister-service partners tackling the complex issues facing the nation. Personal experience reveals there are incredibly smart and talented individuals within the Air Force regardless of any perceptions resulting from the service’s lack of representation in the relatively small pool of geographic combatant commanders. Regardless of service, the challenge facing all senior joint leaders is how to move beyond the institutional parent service’s identity that influenced their career development. The nation needs geographic combatant commanders capable of recognizing the inherent service biases they possess in order to exploit the potential of the entire joint team in addressing complex national priorities.

One aspect of the Air Force identity clearly discernable is the love of technology. The Air Force puts technology on a pedestal, confident technology can solve the problems facing the service and the nation. The worship of technology obscures the fact that it is merely a tool. Machines do not wage war, people do. Air, space, and cyberspace assets can deter, detect, destroy, interdict, and isolate all the technological and mechanical marvels of an adversary and still not defeat him. One need only see the countless news reports of Palestinians throwing rocks against the technologically advanced Israeli Defense Force to understand. Computers do not spawn conversations amongst various actors nor develop relationships. They facilitate interactions when the human actors choose to engage. Computer programs process data and present it in a manner designed by humans for what they hope will be the rapid understanding of another person. Technology provides the Air Force with amazing “toys” that are the envy of
military forces around the world, but technology is neither omnipotent nor omniscient. Despite all the latest “gadgetry” in the world, Clausewitz’s assertion that war will not end until someone’s will is broken, ours or the adversary’s, still holds true.\footnote{Clausewitz, On War, 75, 90.} The Air Force does not need to abandon technology, but it should not worship it as the ultimate solution. For the commander, if the technological tool fails to facilitate his understanding of the situation, it is a useless artifact.

Relegating technology to its proper position will aid the service in developing holistic joint leaders. The C-MAJCOM/C-NAF warfighting headquarters initiative has a great deal of merit to the service. It provides steady-state experience in the operational arts and liaison with sister service components for joint planning. However, the technologically advanced AOCs that are part of the warfighting headquarters must not be seen as “ends” themselves, but rather must be viewed as tools, or “means,” to the overall objective of peak performance in the joint operational environment. While the warfighting headquarters effort appears to focus the institutional Air Force on the JFACC, there is value in the initiative the service should exploit.

The C-NAF construct surrounding the standing JFACCs includes critical warfighting planning functions in the AOCs and on the AFFOR staffs. These staffs are the primary location in the service where members hone their operational art skills gaining daily exposure to the strategic and operational levels of war in joint geographic combatant command environments. Personal experience in the Pacific theater revealed how close planners and strategists from all components worked together to meet the JFC’s wartime priorities. Analysis of the current set of wing commanders showed the group was weak overall in its warfighting staff experience, both within the Air Force and in the joint world. The C-NAF warfighting focused headquarters is still new enough not to have made a large impact on the group’s development, but it does present a fantastic opportunity to study, plan, and conduct operations with joint partners supporting geographic commanders on a regular basis. Regardless of the underlying motive, the JFACC-
focused C-NAF organizational structure provides joint exposure and benefits to Airmen. That said, the Air Force must use more than the C-NAF to generate experienced and seasoned joint strategic thinkers.

The service must create space in the career paths of future leaders to branch out. The amount of time and number of assignments spent in command at the colonel level is limiting leader development and interaction in the joint community. Certainly, command validates leadership credentials; but if the Army and Navy can evaluate their future flag officers based on one O-6 level command tour, then the Air Force should be able to discern leadership capability before an individual assumes their third, or greater, command billet. There can be no cookie cutter approach to leadership development however; one career path will not work for all. There may be utility in splitting leader development along organize, train, and equip and warfighting focused lines to meet the service’s varied needs. Care must be taken however not to automatically assign those lines based on the individual’s tribe. Returning to the technology debate, specific airframes do not impart strategic and critical thinking ability upon their associated Airmen. It would be folly to guide certain Airmen along the OT&E or warfighting leader developmental path simply based on their association with the combat (i.e. fighter, bomber), mobility (airlift, air refueling), and/or special operations communities within the service.

Another idea that would create time is to reduce the 120 gate-month requirement for rated officers before individuals are “released” to staff. This would be a radical change to the Air Force narrative and a direct challenge to the service’s flying culture. Dropping the number of months to ninety-six creates an instant two-year period available to spend in the joint world, with industry, or in civilian education institutions. This would expand the Airman’s perspective and provide opportunities to collaborate on issues with individuals outside the service and/or government.

One category the service should not impinge upon is education. Eleven wing commanders completed intermediate developmental education solely via correspondence. While there is no single approach to development, it would be unfortunate to see the service undercut
the importance of professional military education programs, whether they reside within the
Department of Defense or not, to create time for joint operational assignments. Close contact on a
daily basis with individuals from other services and agencies in an academic environment
generates discussion and facilitates understanding of various agency narratives and identities. In-
residence education often provides perspectives that correspondence courses cannot yield. In
addition, attendance at Advanced Studies Group schools, such as SAASS and SAMS, is another
method currently in use to provide strategic and operational thinking opportunities in a joint
academic environment. Careful placement of these graduates on staff and in the operational force
will influence the critical thinking skills and development of their peers and subordinates.

In terms of joint experience, the Air Force must place greater value on the “other joint”
staff arena, specifically the geographic combatant commands. Conversations with personnel
officers reveal this is now starting to occur. One method to create space in the career timeline that
would maintain an emphasis on education is incorporating a geographic combatant command
assignment into an intermediate or senior developmental education opportunity. An intern
program could include one year of academic regionally-focused study on a pertinent joint issue
facing the command, followed by a second year in a key operations, planning, or strategy
directorate to apply and develop further the academic knowledge gained. The combination of
education with operational experience would provide the future leader an in-depth understanding
of regional challenge(s) and real world experience managing them.

There are smart leaders in the Air Force capable of leading geographic combatant
commands. The responsibility to guide their development so that the joint community sees value
in their resume falls to the service. If the Air Force as an institution observes the propensity of the
current CCDR selection system favors comparably qualified ground and naval leaders over
Airmen for geographic combatant commands, then the Air Force must deliberately tackle and
develop its joint development process; the individual can only operate within the system’s
constraints. It may take a short-term overemphasis in the joint arena to change mindsets about
Airman leadership competencies. It should not take a “blue moon rising” for an Airman to break into key strategic leadership positions in the joint world.
## Table 2. Geographic Combatant Commanders, 2000-2009

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### APPENDIX 2: Air Force Institutional Competency List

Table 3. Institutional Competency List

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APPENDIX 3: Wing Commanders Career Analysis

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**Figure 2.** Combat Air Forces (CAF) Wing Commander Career Data

*Source:* Author derived data from official biographies found on the Air Force Portal. Common access card required.
Figure 3. Mobility Air Forces (MAF) Wing Commander Career Data

*Source:* Author derived data from official biographies found on the Air Force Portal. Common access card required.

Figure 4. Special Operations (SOF) Wing Commander Career Data

*Source:* Author derived data from official biographies found on the Air Force Portal. Common access card required.
Figure 5. Space & Missile Wing Commander Career Data

*Source:* Author derived data from official biographies found on the Air Force Portal. Common access card required.

Figure 6. “Other” Wing Commander Career Data

*Source:* Author derived data from official biographies found on the Air Force Portal. Common access card required.
### APPENDIX 4: Promotion Statistics

#### Figure 7. Air Force Officer Promotion Statistics


**Figures:**

1. Table A4.1: Promotion to Colonels (O-4) Statistics
2. Table A4.2: Promotion to Lieutenant Colonels (O-5) Statistics
3. Table A4.3: Promotion to Majors (O-3) Statistics

#### Table A4.1: Promotion to Colonels (O-4) Statistics

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BIBLIOGRAPHY


