

Mapping the Human Terrain in Afghanistan

A Monograph
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Abstract

MAPPING THE HUMAN TERRAIN IN AFGHANISTAN by MAJ Kevin R Golinghorst, U.S. Army, 74 pages.

From the initial invasion in 2001 through the ongoing counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army has been challenged with truly understanding the socio-cultural dynamics of the local populace which has become known as the human terrain. The foundational theory, historical examples, and evolving military doctrine related to COIN has continually emphasized the importance of a population-centric approach but has often lacked the necessary detail on how this can be accomplished. In an attempt to help fill this void, the U.S. Army established the Human Terrain System (HTS) in 2006 which met initial resistance and developmental challenges as a new proof of concept program. While concurrent efforts by the Civil Affairs community with their Civil Information Management (CIM) initiatives have made steady progress, the full civil common operating picture at varying levels has yet to be realized. Lastly, the entire Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) community also has much to offer in providing a whole of government approach to understanding the human terrain in Afghanistan. Therefore, the U.S. Army must first integrate both programs, HTS and CIM, internally and then direct increased collaboration within the external JIIM community in order to develop a more comprehensive approach. The ultimate success of combined COIN operations in Afghanistan and the long-term stability of the country depend on the ability to understand this complex human terrain.

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Introduction

When I took a decision or adapted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant - and many an irrelevant - factor. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards - all were at my finger-ends.¹ - Colonel T.E. Lawrence, 26 June 1933

The complexity of the counterinsurgency (COIN) in Afghanistan has proven to be a daunting challenge for the U.S. Army since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in the fall of 2001 and has required military organizations to consider one of the most critical aspects of the conflict, the ‘human terrain’² or the indigenous civilian population. Through years of combat experience, it has become evident that acute cultural awareness has become vital to successful full spectrum operations. Despite the fact that both the history of conflict and recently revised military doctrine have pointed to the population being key to COIN operations³, the military and it’s nations collective resources have yet to fully understand the diversity of the people let alone assemble and display the many pertinent ethnographic layers of this nation. While generalized maps and written reports have documented the big picture overview of the situation and underlying tensions amongst the populace, the vastness of the terrain and variety of its makeup has made a detailed analysis extremely challenging. Without a formal census conducted since 1979 and a recently delayed attempt to conduct a new one⁴, the true makeup of Afghan society is still elusive and as fragmented as the people themselves.

¹ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Lawrence of Arabia*, (Da Capo Press, 1989), 388.

² This first published use of the phrase ‘human terrain’ has often been credited to Ralph Peters, “The Human Terrain of Urban Operations,” *Parameters*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Spring 2000), 4-12. <http://www.usamhi.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/00spring/peters.htm> (accessed March 18, 2010).

³ “At its core, COIN is a struggle for the population’s support. The protection, welfare, and support of the people are vital to success” from Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 15 December 2006), 1-28.

⁴ Pia Heikkila, “Afghan census cancelled due to security fears,” (*UK Guardian*, June 11, 2008), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/11/afghanistan.internationalaidanddevelopment/print> (accessed February 27, 2010).

Military forces from the United States had initially deployed as OEF forces mainly in the central and eastern portions of the country. The broader coalition of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), primarily from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contributing nations, has been steadily expanding their operations from the initial United Nations (UN) mandate. This expansive, non-contiguous battlefield with widely dispersed coalition formations has definitely challenged the continuously evolving commands at varying levels to fully understand this complex operational environment (OE). As additional troops are added to the mission and they spread further South and West in greater densities, LTG Rodriquez, Commander of the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) recently highlighted the imperative that units understand their role at knowing all aspects of the “terrain,” and how this will prove critical in winning the ongoing COIN fight.⁵ This was demonstrated in Iraq by a task force who occupied an area that they knew little about. They quickly developed a system for Human Terrain Mapping (HTM) and later published their lessons learned for others to build upon.⁶ While this unit can be lauded for virtually starting from scratch in a newly assigned area of Baghdad and developing their own techniques and systems, this should not be a mission that is ‘ad hoc’ and recreated by each new unit on the modern battlefield. The recently updated Field Manual (FM) 5-0, The Operations Process, describes the collective challenge of gaining and maintaining a continuous ‘situational understanding’ using mission command and the operations process.⁷ This must be enabled by a coordinated and synchronized effort by commanders and their staffs at all

⁵ Jim Garamone, “General Wants Troops Ready for ‘Complex Human Terrain,’” (*American Forces Press Service*, December 14, 2009), <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=57115> (accessed February 27, 2010).

⁶ This unit used Command Post of the Future (CPOF) as explained by LTC Jack Marr, MAJ John Cushing, MAJ Brandon Garner, and CPT Richard Thompson, "Human Terrain Mapping: A Critical First Step to Winning the COIN Fight," (*Military Review*, March-April 2008), 18, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art017.pdf (accessed March 07, 2010).

⁷ Department of the Army, FM 5-0, *The Operations Process, (Final Approved Draft)*. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 25 February 2010), 1-4.

levels to better visualize, describe, and direct actions in today's complex OEs. Included in this manual is a significant section titled 'cultural understanding' which may refer to the local population, a coalition force, or even partnered civilian organizations.⁸ This new doctrine emphasizes the overall importance of culture and socio-cultural data to a unit in their ability to accomplish their assigned mission. To gain and maintain this situational and cultural understanding, the Army has many varying capabilities within and attached to its units to help them develop an adequate understanding of the OE over time.

Organic military intelligence (MI) staffs at varying levels have historically attempted to provide the cultural intelligence required to understand the local population. However, their primary mission of describing the physical terrain and weather, and their obvious focus on the enemy often distracts from a holistic approach of describing the human dimensions of society such as tribal structures, political systems, and economic factors. The rapid relocation of enemy-focused units from one area of operation (AO) to another and the rotational nature of transitioning the missions from one unit to another after set deployment periods also complicate the ability of the staff to fully comprehend and pass on the cultural aspects of an AO over the long-term. The recent release of a thought-provoking but critical article co-authored by MG Flynn, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of ISAF highlighted the current challenges of the intelligence community in meeting the needs of the force during COIN and Stability Operations.⁹

In contrast, the primary focus of the Civil Affairs (CA) community has traditionally been to enhance a unit's understanding of the civil populace by investigating the causes of instability and recommending non-lethal actions to target civil vulnerabilities. Through relational, temporal, and

⁸ Department of the Army, FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, 1-5.

⁹ MG Michael T. Flynn, CPT Matt Pottinger, and Paul Batchelor, "Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan," (*Center for a New American Security (CNAS)*): January 2010), <http://www.cnas.org/node/3924> (accessed March 17th, 2010).

geospatial analysis, CA attempts to be the subject matter expert (SME) on the local population within an assigned AO. Civil Information Management (CIM), one of the five core tasks of Civil Affairs Operations (CAO)¹⁰ is but one of the tools a CA team can provide the commander. However, this is a capability that has yet to be developed and implemented to its full potential based upon many factors to include inadequate force structure, geospatial expertise, and varying command and control (C2) networks in disparate theaters of operation.

With these apparent gaps, by 2006 the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) developed and fielded a proof-of-concept program in cooperation with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to serve the joint community in improving the military's ability to understand the highly complex local socio-cultural environment in areas of conflict. The result was the Human Terrain System (HTS)¹¹ which consists of 5-8 person Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) at the Brigade level and a more robust Human Terrain Analysis Team (HTAT) at the Division level. All teams also have access to a country-specific Research Reachback Center (RRC) which provides deep analytical and problem-solving support. The intent is to provide units with access to a wide body of academic knowledge in order to rapidly address social, political, economic, historic, and cultural issues in their area of responsibility that affect their operational decisions.

The U.S. Army did not synchronize the hardware and the software developed for either program, nor did they direct common database format or structure for the sharing of civil information collected by both organizations. Unfortunately, both programs have become stove-piped systems that do not integrate well into existing operations and intelligence (O&I) reporting

¹⁰ Department of the Army, FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 29 September 2006), 1-2.

¹¹ *Human Terrain System*, <http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/htstimeline.html> (accessed February 15, 2009).

systems. Investigating existing previous historical experiences and/or current initiatives of other Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may also provide insight regarding how to provide a more comprehensive civil assessment of an area in conflict¹². Before either system fully matures, CIM and HTS must come to a common understanding and agreement of how each program plans to operate and identify opportunities to integrate their databases and learn from each other's experiences. If the U.S. Army facilitates integration of HTS and the CA community with the wider JIIM network through a standardization of the collection, storage, and access to centralized repositories of ethnographic, cultural information accessible to all organizations, then each will contribute to a more comprehensive approach to understanding and visualizing the human terrain.

Hypothesis & Methodology

The purpose of this monograph is to investigate the organizations and systems that the U.S. Army has in place to help soldiers and leaders understand requisite cultural information for conducting successful COIN operations. The primary research question that will bound this author's research is: should the U.S. Army integrate the distinct initiatives within the HTS and the CA community's CIM to provide a more comprehensive approach to understanding and visualizing the socio-cultural aspects of the local civilian population in Afghanistan? This monograph also seeks to answer the secondary inquiries of what historical examples might inform these current initiatives and what other JIIM resources or other organizations are contributing with similar capabilities.

¹² The creation of Economic, Political and Intelligence Cells (EPICs) modeled after a successful program the Marine Expeditionary Force maintained in Fallujah, Iraq is encouraged by Dan Green, "The Taliban's political program." (*Armed Forces Journal*, Springfield, VA: November 2009), 36-37, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/11/4294842> (accessed March 20, 2010).

If the U.S. Army standardizes the collection, storage, and access to ethnographic and cultural information between the HTS and CA community, it will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the human terrain. By first focusing internally within its own service and then working externally with other partners, the end result will be a more streamlined, integrated approach to representing the human terrain in the contemporary operational environment (COE). One such example of this recommended closer collaboration will be demonstrated by evaluating the recent focus and progress finally being made in understanding the OE in Afghanistan which this case study will highlight.

While the debate over the population being the real center of gravity (COG) in a COIN environment continues,¹³ the expectations and desires of the people are undoubtedly often at the heart of such struggles. Therefore, this monograph will first investigate historical attempts to understand and report on the civil considerations in an area of conflict. A review of the existing theoretical literature and scholarly writings on COIN operations will highlight the need for specific ethnographic information and increased cultural understanding. While a brief review of the more well-documented authors will be highlighted, an investigation into a few more recent authors and their assertions will also be uncovered and emphasized in the context of this monograph. Other recent activities of HTS and CIM will also show the steady development and parallel progression in both programs but highlight the continuous need for improvement through increased collaboration or potential integration of both communities.

This paper will analyze how the U.S. Army currently attempts to understand and visualize the human terrain with a geospatial context on the modern battlefield. The approach

¹³ A typical debate in military conversations is demonstrated eloquently online by COIN expert David Kilcullen, "Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency," (*Small Wars Journal*, January 27, 2007), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/two-schools-of-classical-count/> (accessed March 20, 2010) and HTS team member Dr. Donald Holt, "Afghan Village Militia: A People-Centric Strategy to Win," (*Small Wars Journal*, September 2, 2009), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/afghan-village-militia-a-peopl/> (accessed March 21, 2010).

used in this work is the single case study methodology focused on Afghanistan with a comparative analysis of two distinct organizations that assert responsibility in delivering this vital information. The research is supported by U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and Army doctrinal publications, reference material, and official documents as well as previous related research, relevant interviews, and surveys of repositories of human terrain information.

This monograph will use past scholarly research to provide a theoretical foundation for understanding what factors should be considered in the human terrain. It will investigate the proposed research question to improve the ability of the U.S. Army to capture, store, and share cultural information. This monograph will also leverage the expertise of other institutions and academic works that have found success in integrating existing geospatial data and portraying the relationships of the people to their land.

In conclusion, this monograph will assess how the HTS and CA communities are individually conducting their respective missions, identify areas of redundancy among organizations, and highlight the potential benefits of a coordinated effort. The author will also suggest where improved organizational design, knowledge management techniques, and integrated, unclassified databases could prove effective in integrating their desperate attempts at understanding and visualizing the human terrain. Ultimately, the goal is “to achieve unity of effort (and ‘unified action’) through cooperation and coordination among all elements of the force – even those not part of the same command structure.”¹⁴

Literature Review

Much has been written about irregular warfare (IW) and more importantly COIN but the challenge with this exponentially increasing volume of sources is determining relevance and

¹⁴ While ‘unified action’ was later added in FM 3-0 in 2008, this concept is covered previously in 2006 with the concepts of ‘unity of effort’ in Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 2-3.

applicability of theory in an environment rife with uncertainty. Determining what conditions are significant and how to apply the principles of COIN in a particular situation or context can be a challenge. While this paper does not attempt to cover the entire spectrum of conflict nor even all of these specific areas of focus, it will highlight the aspects of each that focus on the population and their affect on the battlefield. Many well-known authors and practitioners have documented the multiplicity of challenges and opportunities in this seemingly more common form of unconventional warfare. However, in many situations only a few key areas are emphasized and other pertinent items for contemplation are given less attention when one must cover the entire gamut of possible considerations. This paper seeks to focus on a few key items that serve as enablers for the main tenants of COIN doctrine to flourish on the modern battlefield.

Two well-known, foreign authors, David Galula and Roger Trinquier, have captured the interest and respect of many COIN practitioners with their simple yet poignant observations and recommendations involving war among the people in Algeria.¹⁵ More recent contributions by authors such as John Nagl and Bard O'Neill have confirmed the lessons from past conflicts in Malaya, Vietnam, Central America, Africa and the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as fights that center around the population. As will be emphasized later in this monograph and confirmed by these cited authors, the populace is the center of gravity in COIN operations. Active advisors such as David Kilcullen and Mark Moyar have also made significant written contributions to such aspects of understanding the fundamentals of leadership in a COIN environment. While Galula and Trinquier (French Army) and Nagl (U.S. Army) and Kilcullen (Australian Army) have the military experience to back up their writings, O'Neill and Moyar

¹⁵ Both are cited as 'The Classics' in Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, Annotated Bibliography -1, and as "Readings for COIN Tactical Leaders in a Time-Constrained Environment" in Appendix B of Department of the Army, FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 21 April 2009), B-1.

have also worked closely within defense at the National War College and Marine Corps University respectively.

Several other notable authors are also worthy of mention that have considerable potential for significant contributions to this discourse on COIN. These include knowledgeable experts from the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL), the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). First of all, Barak Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber built upon an earlier *Military Review* article¹⁶ and published a full text on ‘Operational Culture for the Warfighter’ in 2008 that is obviously being promoted by the USMC at Quantico, VA but is also being used in courses taught by the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Nearby at FMSO, a retired Foreign Area Officer (FAO) and respected analyst, Geoff Demarest, published a book on ‘Property & Peace’ that investigates the relationship of the people and their land and elevates formal land-use systems as a critical aspect of reducing conflict that is often underemphasized. The most recent contribution comes from NGA analyst Doug Batson, who recommends going beyond just mapping and instead ‘Registering the Human Terrain’ by strengthening land tenure and property rights in volatile countries. These sources will further develop those areas briefly highlighted by the more well-known COIN authors and help add to the theoretical foundation for the evolving doctrine on COIN understanding that “the application of principles and fundamentals to deal with each (context of an insurgency) varies considerably.”¹⁷

¹⁶ Barak A. Salmoni, “Advances in Predeployment Culture Training: The U.S. Marine Corps Approach,” (*Military Review*, November-December 2008), 79-88, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20061231_art014.pdf (accessed March 18, 2010).

¹⁷ This is often a misconception about published COIN doctrine but is stated very clearly up front on the inside cover of Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, Foreword.

Intellectual and Doctrinal Foundations for Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations

While intellectual theory and military doctrine do not always agree, both, along with history, should be considered when deciding what actions to take in the future. This section will expand on the literature review with further analysis on how to capture the pertinent layers of information about the population, how to portray that geospatially when appropriate, and then collaborate with others that have undertaken similar initiatives. While the written narratives by COIN professionals can be quite exhaustive and the specific recommendations in joint and service doctrine surprisingly sparse, the intent is to glean the pertinent aspects to put some successful techniques into practice that will enable a more collective understanding of one of the increasingly critical aspects of modern warfare, the human terrain.

Considerations from COIN Authors

French authors and former military commanders, David Galula and Roger Trinquier, published their seminal works on COIN warfare in the mid-1960s. While neither used the exact term of “human terrain,” the intent was the same when Trinquier advised “a prior study in depth to determine the areas into which we ought to direct our efforts. The study should gather information on the physical, economic, and human geography”¹⁸ in order to better focus a unit’s action in a particular area. Galula posits that given the asymmetric nature of a revolutionary war or insurgency, logic forces the insurgent “to carry the fight to a different ground where he has a better chance to balance the physical odds against him. The population represents this new ground...(and) thus the battle for the population is a major characteristic of the revolutionary

¹⁸ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, (London, England: Pall Mall Press, Ltd., 1964), 28, <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp> (accessed on March 17, 2010).

war.”¹⁹ Whether one uses the terms ‘human geography’, ‘population as the new ground’, or ‘human terrain,’ the focus of one’s efforts in this type of unconventional warfare is fairly clear. In describing the nature of the cause, Galula explores the natures of potential problems that the insurgent may exploit including political, social, economic, or racial and even points out that “the problem may even be artificial so long as it has a chance to be accepted as a fact.”²⁰

Nearly forty years later at the turn of this century, John Nagl explores the challenges of modern conventional military forces in facing this type of guerilla warfare amongst the people and highlights two different approaches to counterinsurgency, the direct and indirect approach.²¹ With the direct approach, the counterinsurgent would focus annihilating the enemy guerilla force versus focusing on the support of the people for the insurgents with the indirect approach. The latter approach would require a much more intensive understanding of the population. This is simplified of course from Galula’s four general courses of action that he points out are not mutually exclusive in which he adds infiltrating the insurgent movement to try and make it ineffective and building up or reinforcing the legitimate government.²² These further reinforce the need to understand how the people, including the enemy and those who support them. This was again emphasized by another respected COIN advisor, David Kilcullen, when he advised COIN leaders to ‘know your turf’ with a focus on the people and their interaction in an assigned area of operation (AO) and warns: “neglect this knowledge, and it will kill you.”²³ This first

¹⁹ David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1964), 7-8.

²⁰ Galula., 22.

²¹ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 26-28.

²² Galula, 64-65.

²³ Modeled after T.E. Lawrence’s ‘Twenty-Seven Articles,’ FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* provides both documents as appendices from what was first published as David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” (*Military Review*,

‘article’ sets the foundation for all further planning, organization, and actions in a COIN environment and must be a continual focus for leaders at all levels. This is confirmed by operational leaders who agree that “this entire process (of working with local counterparts) will be frustrating only if you do not endeavor to understand the nature of the ‘human terrain’ in which you are operating.”²⁴ Mark Moyar chooses to focus on the ‘leader-centric’ aspects of COIN as he covers the highlights of a series of nine distinct periods of conflict. As an example, in the chapter covering ‘The War in Afghanistan,’ he documents the challenges in establishing and maintaining the proper ethnic balance within the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and civil service.²⁵ The preferred merit-based recruitment of both military and civilian Afghan leaders had to be precariously balanced with an instituted ethnic quota system and the propensity for connected officials to dispense appointments to extended family, friends and political allies. Each of these authors and situations help to demonstrate the complexity but importance of all facets of human dynamics to include the enemy, friendly forces, host nation officials, and ultimately the entire general population of the country under consideration.

The challenge of course is how to characterize this ‘human dimension’ of the environment as termed by Bard O’Neill where he categorizes the ‘human environment’ into demography, socioeconomic conditions, political culture, and the political system.²⁶ He highlights the more obvious urban and rural contrast within the demography with the less visible ‘vertical divisions’ of society being race, ethnicity, and religion and ‘horizontal divisions’ being

May-June 2006), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/COIN/repository/28_Articles_of_COIN-Kilcullen%28Mar06%29.pdf (accessed March 21, 2010).

²⁴ This had been highlighted previously by LTC Richard A. McConnell, Major Christopher L. Matson, and Captain Brent A. Clemmer, “The MiTT and Its “Human Terrain:” Transitioning the Iraqi Army into the Lead,” (*Field Artillery Magazine*, January-February 2007), 11-14. http://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/2007/JAN_FEB_2007/JAN_FEB_2007_PAGES_11_14.pdf (accessed March 21, 2010).

²⁵ Mark Moyar, *A Question of Command*, (New Haven, CT; Yale University Press, 2009), 191-211.

²⁶ Bard E. O’Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, 2nd Edition, Revised. (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 1990). 71.

class or caste. The seams of these societal fault lines are frequently the root causes of an insurgency especially “when one group enjoys disproportionate political or economic power and benefits relative to other groups.”²⁷ He cautions how rival groups amongst these societal divisions may cause problems when one or more disadvantaged group is incorporated into insurgent ranks. He also instructs that the internal structure of societal groups may vary between hierarchical, pyramidal, and segmented structural configurations which will allude to how conducive the structure is to organization and power.²⁸ O’Neill does a fine job of introducing the various socio-economic factors of the human environment as well as providing brief descriptions of historical examples or even current challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan that help translate the theoretical concepts to practice. He even later revisits the topic near the end of his book with a chapter on ‘Government Response’ in which he concludes that “the resolution of social and economic problems, often at the root of insurgencies, depends on political decisions”²⁹ but that unfortunately, government officials don’t always fully assess their own human environment in their policy decisions and thus continue to fuel the popular support of the insurgent.

Building upon O’Neill’s overview of this vital area of concern, Dr. Barak Salmoni and Dr. Paula Holmes-Eber further detail what they deem the five operational culture dimensions for planning and execution: the physical environment, economy, social structure, political structure, and belief systems. As so aptly endorsed in the foreword by Marine General J. N. Mattis, “the U.S. and our allies face a complex but earnest threat...(in which) fundamental to our adaption to today’s conflict...demands a keen understanding of culture.”³⁰ Their goals with this text are to

²⁷ O’Neill, 79

²⁸ Ibid., 80.

²⁹ Ibid., 167-169.

³⁰ Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber, *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications*, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008), vii.
<http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/mcu/mcupress/opculture.pdf> (accessed March 18, 2010).

provide the theoretically sound framework but also translate the basic cultural principles into applicable tools in an actual OE anywhere in the world.³¹ While not meant to replace doctrine, it intends to prepare others to think systematically about culture during professional military education (PME) and pre-deployment training. While the authors cite the military metaphor of the human terrain and provide their own definition, they mainly demonstrate some possible limitations in misleading others with “a two-dimensional representation (of culture on a map) that does not account for dynamic socio-cultural conditions.”³² They do admit that the term does possess some useful applications in that most warfighters will already think in terms of topography so this analogy will be familiar to the military. These authors also submit that many aspects of culture can be added to a map in a practical manner such as demographic and social features and specific locations of physical structures that have symbolic value to the local population. Most importantly, this resource provides a solid construct that links the more exhaustive anthropologic foundation of understanding human beings and the ways they interact with simplified but a solid and straight forward construct in how to capture, analyze, and portray the human dynamics of a particular AO. The five main operational culture dimensions are further subdivided into 3-6 succinct components that can provide the additional detail required to further understand the environment. Lastly, this text provides specific questions for consideration within each dimension and broken down in detail by each component that are provided within each chapter of the book and summarized in total as an appendix titled ‘Culture Operator’s Questions.’³³ While not exactly in line with any specific U.S. Army process or existing guidance, this resource provides an extremely useful framework and some specific tools for leaders to be better prepared and equipped for the collection and portrayal of the human terrain.

³¹ Salmoni and Holmes-Eber, 2.

³² Ibid., 33-34.

³³ Ibid., 307-319.

While not as focused on the entirety of the human terrain challenge, two noteworthy analysts raise related issues on the common linkage of people to the land. Dr. Demarest takes on the broader and longer term view of property and its relationship with conflict in the world with a particular interest and expertise of countries in Central and South America. These lessons are more narrowly refined by Mr. Batson regarding the need for the establishment of sound cadastre systems in country requiring stability and reconstruction as he instead focuses specifically on Afghanistan. Both resources are enlightening studies into one of the more significant causes of conflict that often goes underappreciated on the battlefield.

The concept and importance of the relationship of people and the land is one that is often taken for granted in most Western societies where comprehensive, bureaucratic processes already document in writing these ‘social contracts’ that Dr. Demarest ardently describes in his book.³⁴ He emphasizes the requirement for formalized property systems that will work to minimize violence and tyranny or at least leave the tracks that can be followed to effectively deal with human rights violations that are so prevalent in those countries without developed land records. He asserts that “the United States will be more successful in whatever expeditions it takes to guide the prospects of other lands if it focuses a little less on the election of leaders and a lot more on the creation of peaceful property systems...(as) electoral democracy will not be sufficient to provide long periods of internal peace.”³⁵

These broader concepts on property are narrowed in scope and directly applied to the current situation in Afghanistan with Mr. Batson’s specific recommendations to incorporate cadastral and land administration expertise into the reconstruction and stability capabilities of the

³⁴ Geoff Demarest, *Property & Peace*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), 2008), <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Property-and-Peace.pdf> (accessed March 20, 2010), 5-8.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 15-16.

United States government. His detailed study of cadastre as a land information system and a specific Land Administration Domain Model (LADM) as a possible future international standard provides insight into the current state, potential, and urgent need for improved conditions concerning property accountability and conflict resolution in Afghanistan. He illuminates the interagency efforts of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and even the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in working with Afghan institutions to develop the capability for land administration.³⁶ While not a specific requirement of the military, understanding and helping to enable this next step of building the capacity of ‘registering the human terrain’ would go a long way with related efforts of ‘mapping the human terrain’ and ultimately improving stability in a country in conflict.

Current State of Doctrine

The major works for consideration for COIN within U.S. Army doctrine include FM 3-0, Operations (February 2008); FM 3-07, Stability Operations (October 2008); FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations (September 2006)³⁷; FM 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (July 2007); FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (December 2006)³⁸; FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency (April 2009); FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (August 2003); FM 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/*Battlespace* (October 2009);³⁹ and recently approved FM 2-0, Intelligence (March 2010). At the Joint level, JP 3.57, Civil-Military Operations (July 2008) has been aided by the recent additions of JP 2–

³⁶ Douglas E. Batson, *Registering the Human Terrain: A Valuation of Cadastre*, (National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC) Press, 2008). www.dia.mil/college/pubs/pdf/10279.pdf (accessed March 20, 2010), 119-123.

³⁷ FM 3-05.40 is under revision and is expected to be renumbered to FM 3-57 when published.

³⁸ FM 3-05.401 and FM 3-24 were developed in conjunction with the USMC as multi-service, Marine Corp Reference and Warfighting publications, MCRP 3-33.1A and MCWP 3-33.5, respectively.

³⁹ FM 2-01.3 was also developed in conjunction with the USMC as MCRP 2-3A.

01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (June 2009) and JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations (October 2009) and ensures that the entire Joint force is committed to a common framework. Lastly, in order to understand perspectives from key coalition partners, recent initiatives from the British Army to update their own approach to Stability Operations will be considered.

While not specific to COIN, the U.S. Army's capstone doctrine manual, FM 3-0 describes the many influences on the OE for the future in which

complex cultural, demographic, and physical environmental factors will be present, adding to the fog of war. Such factors include humanitarian crises, ethnic and religious differences, and complex and urban terrain, which often become major centers of gravity and a haven for potential threats. The operational environment will be interconnected, dynamic, and extremely volatile.⁴⁰

Published in February 2008, this manual also details the operational and mission variables that help describe the OE: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) and mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC)⁴¹. While this capstone doctrine highlights the abilities of CA units and personnel to conduct detailed assessments, it clearly includes civil considerations as part of the intelligence warfighting function.⁴² However, for further analysis of civil considerations, it references CA doctrine FM 3-05.40 for additional information on the categories: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). FM 3-05.401 goes into even more depth by recommending civil-military operations (CMO) planners apply fourteen detailed political-military (POLMIL) factors to each each of the operational variables in order to describes the effectiveness, vulnerabilities,

⁴⁰ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 27 February 2008), 1-4.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 1-5 thru 1-9 and 5-5 thru 5-8.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 3-12 and 4-4.

susceptibilities, and the accessibility of each system.⁴³ FM 3-24 also covers this to some extent in a section on describing the effects of the OE⁴⁴ but the recent addition of FM 3.24.2 expanded on the need for cultural competence and situational awareness and included a section on the analysis of civil considerations using ASCOPE as well with practical examples for consideration from each category.⁴⁵ Both civil consideration matrices and overlays are encouraged to capture both the detailed, analytical narratives but also quick-reference, graphical portrayal of the pertinent information needed when trying to understand and describe the perspectives of the population, the insurgents, and the counterinsurgents.

As the proponent manual for ‘civil considerations,’ FM 6-0 had previously detailed ASCOPE and highlighted the implications of including the population as part of a units ‘relevant information’ in building the common operating picture (COP).⁴⁶ Specified ‘exceptional information’ collected to answer the commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR) includes elements of both enemy and friendly information as priority intelligence requirements (PIR) or friendly force information requirements (FFIR) but tends to neglect the importance and focused collection of information about the human terrain. PIR and the intelligence community that habitually manages them are often more concerned about how the unit sees the opponent or adversary rather than the entire environment to include the population. FM 3-0 elevated the importance of civil considerations but simply recommended including such information within PIR which often groups it with often classified information about the enemy.⁴⁷ While an interim

⁴³ Department of the Army, FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 05 July 2007), 3-5 thru 3-12.

⁴⁴ Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 3-3 thru 3-12 and B-3 thru B-10.

⁴⁵ Department of the Army, FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*. 1-18 thru 1-26, 1-8 thru 1-16, and A-5 thru A-6.

⁴⁶ Department of the Army, FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 11 August 2003), B-8 thru B-12.

⁴⁷ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations*, 5-9.

draft of a revised FM 6-0 was released in 2009, more emphasis on the ‘civil considerations’ and the challenges of managing this information in a COIN environment may need to be included before a final update is published.

After years of wartime experience, U.S. Army intelligence doctrine was recently updated from previous versions of FM 2-0 and FM 2-01.3 to finally include the increased emphasis of cultural awareness and civil considerations using ASCOPE.⁴⁸ As delineated in FM 3-0, FM 2-0 asserts the lead for civil considerations but not necessarily how to provide this other than a brief discussion of area, regional, or country studies and specified studies that are as detailed and in-depth as time allows.⁴⁹ These manuals do provide relevant updates that highlights the emerging capabilities of biometrics, the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A), HTATs, and red teaming and explains the pertinent aspects of geospatial-intelligence (GEOINT) and open- source Intelligence (OSINT) and their contribution to the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), particularly with COIN.⁵⁰

As an integral part of a COIN, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, introduced the importance of detailed conflict assessment and reinforced the need for ‘unified action’ amongst the interagency effort in supporting a legitimate host nation government during IW.⁵¹ An entire appendix is dedicated to a process developed by USAID called the tactical conflict assessment and planning framework (TCAPF) in which survey results are displayed and analyzed in order to

⁴⁸ Department of the Army, FM 2-0, *Intelligence*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 23 March 2010), 1-19, 5-4 and A-2, as well as in Department of the Army, FM 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 15 October 2009), 3-15 thru 3-20, 7-3, B-14, and C-5 thru C-6.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, vi and 1-9

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 1-23 thru 1-27, 8-1 thru 8-5, and 11-1 thru 11-8 and Department of the Army, FM2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 15 October 2009), Appendix C and D.

⁵¹ Department of the Army. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 06 October 2008), 1-3 thru 1-6, 4-13, and Appendix D.

identify, prioritize, and target the causes of instability in a measurable and immediately accessible manner. Such methods are currently being employed by 5-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) in southern Afghanistan to consistently gauge the state of the population and assist the host nation government in relieving the main sources of grievances.⁵²

The update and consolidation joint civil affairs doctrine into JP 3-57 in 2008 provided a streamlined framework for each of the service's civil affairs capabilities and a common frame of reference for the establishment of CIM across the force where there was no mention of this in the previous 2001 version.⁵³ JP 3-24 reinforces the importance of the 'information and cognitive dimensions' of the OE⁵⁴ and introduces the concept of 'sociocultural factors' to civil considerations and how they along with CIM are paramount in the COIN environment. Again, while not specific to COIN, JP 2-01.3, dedicates an entire section to 'support during stability operations and irregular warfare (IW)' and the increased emphasis on sociocultural factors and specifically provides some great recommendations of techniques in 'mapping human factors' by using both a network but also geospatial perspective.⁵⁵ These sources reinforce the need for incorporating both detailed systems analysis and visual depictions in combination for the effective visualization of civil information on the modern battlefield.

While keeping up with our own U.S. Army and Joint doctrine can be challenge in itself, other allied nations have been evolving their terminology and emphasis as well. With NATO

⁵² Task Force Stryker, "Governance, Reconstruction, & Development (GR&D) – Interim Report: The First Six Months," (Kandahar, Afghanistan: GR& D Fusion Cell, January 15, 2010), 14, 26, 34-45.

⁵³ Department of Defense (DOD), Joint Publication (JP) 3.57, *Civil-Military Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 08 July 2008), xi-xii, I-10, I-13, II-14, and Appendices A and B.

⁵⁴ Department of Defense (DOD), Joint Publication (JP) 3.24, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 05 October 2009), xxii-xxiii, V-10 thru V-11, and VIII-1 thru VIII-14.

⁵⁵ Department of Defense (DOD), Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16 June 2009), IV-1 thru IV-14.

COIN doctrine, AJP-3.4.4, Allied Joint Publication for Counterinsurgency (COIN), still under development and only a proposal for a possible COIN Standardisation Agreement (STANAG), one still must consider key partners and their input into the framework for future operations. As a primary example, the United Kingdom (UK) is currently undergoing a considerable emphasis to update the doctrinal foundation of their military. Much of British COIN doctrine is appropriately drawn from past experiences and the enduring lessons of notable Generals Sir Frank Kitson and Sir Rupert Smith but is also evolving with the changing global environment. A recent Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, *UK Stability Operations*, released in November of 2009 specifies ‘Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution’ in which the concept of employing HTTs is highlighted. Gen Petraeus’ Multinational Force – Iraq COIN guidance is even quoted as he advises to “map the human terrain and study it in detail.”⁵⁶ This source also recommends methodologies that balance the use of both detailed, written analysis along with human terrain analysis tools such as geospatial products to help visualize the links between and within groups with samples provided of both techniques.⁵⁷ A draft British Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) titled ‘Operations in the Land Environment’ gives even more prominence to the ‘human terrain’ with it being a critical component of the intelligence picture when describing the OE and the need for civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) frameworks with the increasing centrality of an inter-agency approach to operations.⁵⁸ Due for release in May 2010, the proposed manual differentiates HTM from solely providing a geospatial product showing the distribution of ethnic, sectarian or tribal groups in a geographic area but highlighting a greater understanding of

⁵⁶ United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence (MOD), Joint Doctrinal Publication (JDP) 3-40, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, (Shrivenham, England: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, November 2009), 3-5 and 4A-3.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 9-9 thru 9B-1.

⁵⁸ United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence (MOD), Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP), *Operations in the Land Environment (DRAFT)*, (Shrivenham, England: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 17 December 2009), iii, viii, 3-1, 3-9, 3-10, 3-14.

the people which is a more forensic discipline. Human terrain analysis (HTA) is defined as a process that is part of the intelligence cycle that should shape pre-deployment training and ultimately build upon intuitive and individual skills required to increase the situational awareness in an assigned AO. This resource reinforces the concept that the population “cannot be disassociated from the ground, either symbolically or physically, as that is where they live.”⁵⁹ While a rather basic statement, it is a profound concept that must continue to be further explored as previously discussed. Lastly, this manual also recommends the ASCOPE analysis tool as a useful framework which coincides with the U.S. Army doctrine and particularly the Civil Affairs communities’ concentration on civil considerations.⁶⁰ The complementary nature of this allied doctrine is encouraging and a positive step towards ‘speaking the same language’ in ongoing and future coalition operations.

⁵⁹UK, MOD, ADP, *Operations in the Land Environment*, 3-16 thru 3-19, 4-7, and 10-9.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 6-A-2.

The State of the Human Terrain System (HTS)

With the theoretical and doctrinal foundation for a population-centric COIN approach established and the historical and recent wartime experiences necessitating an understanding of the 'human terrain' realized, the challenge becomes how units develop organizations and systems to assess the population on the modern battlefield. Besides just the maneuver units themselves with their associated intelligence organizations at the company through corps level, additional specialized assets have been added to assist in this endeavor. While only a concept within the Department of Defense (DOD) and at the Joint Staff in late 2004, a series of Military Review articles by Dr. Montgomery McFate in 2005 raised the visibility of historical attempts to incorporate anthropology with COIN⁶¹ and the need for an organizational solution for cultural knowledge.⁶² Senior military leaders such as General Peter Chiarelli, as Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad during 2004-2005 and later the Multinational Corps-Iraq from 2006-2007, affirmed this academic debate and elevated the operational need for an additional capability when emphasizing that "we needed to develop a keen understanding of demographics as well as the cultural intricacies"⁶³ and "understanding the effect of operations as seen through the [local] culture and psyche is the foremost planning consideration for every operation."⁶⁴ The HTS program quickly developed an organizational structure under the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2) and funding from JIEDDO in 2006, and by

⁶¹ Montgomery McFate, "Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship," (*Military Review*, March-April 2005), 24-38.

⁶² Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson, "An Organizational Solution for DOD's Cultural Knowledge Needs," (*Military Review*, July-August 2005), 18-21.

⁶³ Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow, and CPT Don Smith. "The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century," (*Military Review*, September-October 2006) 8, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20061031_art005.pdf (accessed March 27, 2010), 8.

⁶⁴ CPT Nathan Finney, *Human Terrain Team Handbook, Version 2*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Human Terrain System (HTS), 2008), 2.

the end of that same year, four teams were deployed to Iraq and one to Afghanistan as a ‘proof of concept.’ A very thorough review which branded HTS as “a COORDS for the 21st Century” was published in the fall of 2006 again by Military Review and revisited the historical lessons, which most notably covered the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (COORDS) program in Vietnam, but also highlighted the enduring need for this type of capability. Dr. Kipp and his colleagues detailed the HTTs, their deliverables to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), and their reachback capability, but also drew appropriate attention to the benefit of having an element that aided during the transitions of units in an assigned AO.⁶⁵ While the HTS program website highlights a series of articles published in 2007-2008,⁶⁶ the U.S. Army seemed to be waiting to see how these teams would actually perform on the battlefield before fully committing. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) eventually provided some brief insight into the use and effectiveness of HTTs in short, documented debriefs in early 2008 and finally published a full CALL Handbook by spring of 2009.⁶⁷ While additional thorough academic research conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Sept 2008 and also at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) in May 2009 illuminated various aspects of HTS, this section intends to update the status of the continued growth and development of the HTS program in support of current operations.

While at NPS, USMC Capt Eric Schaner focused his thesis using a knowledge management theory to assert the validity of the HTT capability in the context of COIN or nation

⁶⁵ Kipp et al., 12-15.

⁶⁶ *Human Terrain System*, “In the News” Section.

⁶⁷ Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), *Commander’s Guide: Employing a Human Terrain Team in Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Handbook No. 09-21*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, March 2009).

building paired with a detailed case study on one specific HTT (IZ6) in Iraq.⁶⁸ In conjunction with additional capabilities of a Civil Affairs unit and embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT), he demonstrated that the HTT improved the BCT's competitive advantage by creating, sharing, and harnessing knowledge of the population and advanced a population-centric strategy through improved social interactions with the population using three narrative examples.⁶⁹ Schaner does appropriately caution against two sources of opposition to the HTS program over the long-term. The first includes an external, academic opposition by an informal Network of Concerned Anthropologists (NCA) and second, an internal dissention within the U.S. military which would reject the need for civilian expertise but instead argue for increased uniformed Civil Affairs capabilities or improved cultural competency across the entire force. Both concerns have come to fruition with the larger, more established American Anthropological Association (AAA) following up from its expressed disapproval of the HTS program in October 2007 by publishing a final report in October 2009 that concluded that HTS "...can no longer be considered a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology."⁷⁰ Lastly, considerable debate has been generated by a former USMC Intelligence, now Foreign Area Officer (FAO), MAJ Ben Connable, in his scathing critique of how HTS may undermining sustainable military cultural competence and ensuing online blog.⁷¹ A more recent written opposition by an active-duty, U.S. Army CA MAJ

⁶⁸ Capt Eric Schaner, *The Human Terrain System: Achieving a Competitive Advantage through Enhanced "Population-Centric" Knowledge Flows*, (Master's Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Sep/08Sep_Schaner.pdf (accessed March 21, 2010).

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 50-67, 77-79.

⁷⁰ American Anthropological Association (AAA), *Final Report on The Army's Human Terrain System Proof of Concept Program*, (Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with US Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC), October 14, 2009), 3, <http://blog.aaanet.org/2009/12/08/aaa-commission-releases-final-report-on-army-human-terrain-system/> (accessed March 27, 2010).

⁷¹ MAJ Ben Connable, "All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence," (*Military Review*, March-April 2009), 57-64. http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/military_review/archive/2009/03/04/all-our-eggs-in-a-broken-basket-

Rachel Sullivan questioned the investment of resources that could be used to further increase capabilities within the uniformed force.⁷² While some of their concerns can be substantiated and are worthy of consideration, the more productive arguments that seem to resonate with most individuals include how to best integrate the unique capabilities of a dual civilian-military HTS rather than dismiss it.

In a former SAMS monograph, MAJ Grant Fawcett published a more balanced assessment of HTS in which he concluded that while HTS was making a positive impact at the operational level, or BCT in a COIN environment, it is not likely having a significant impact at the tactical level at the battalion and below. He alleges that HTTs aren't large enough to provide consistent, substantial support to the platoon and company level where a majority of the contact with the population occurs.⁷³ While acknowledging the positive outcomes of the HTS program, Fawcett does make several reasonable recommendations including continuing to infuse both doctrine and education for all soldiers to increase the level of cultural understanding across the force, appointing additional cultural advisors at lower levels, embedding an ethnographic research capability within the BCT and Division, and better integrating human terrain information into current and future C2 systems.⁷⁴ The consensus is clear that a comprehensible understanding of culture and the human terrain is necessary but the means to get there seems to be still in dispute.

[how-the-human-terrain-system-is-undermining-sustainable-military-cultural-competence.aspx](#) (accessed March 20, 2010).

⁷² MAJ Rachel D. Sullivan, *Human Terrain Teams: Duplicating Existing Competencies and Responsibilities of Civil Affairs Forces*, (Special Operations Element Essay, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), May 2009).

⁷³ MAJ Grant S. Fawcett, *Cultural Understanding in Counterinsurgency: Analysis of the Human Terrain System*, (AMSP Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), 40.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 41-47.

Incremental Improvements

While the HTS program has admittedly gone through some growing pains and received its share of questionable press,⁷⁵ several initiatives and developments have yielded positive momentum for the program. One of the significant lessons learned by the first team to deploy to Afghanistan was the need for improved country immersion training prior to deployment.⁷⁶ While the desire is for individuals hired to deploy on a HTT to have some working knowledge of the country of interest and preferably appropriate, basic language skills, the reality has been that there hasn't been a large willing, available pool of fully-qualified professionals ready to join the program. A training relationship with the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO) was developed with their Center for Afghanistan Studies (CAS) to teach Afghan culture, history, and Dari language classes. This three week portion of the longer 4-5 month training cycle is an excellent example of partnering with a nearby academic institution that allowed for an improved cultural foundation for all HTT members prior to deploying to a specific region within the country. The number of teams in Afghanistan expanded from that original proof of concept HTT to five HTTs supporting Battalion and BCTs, and a HTAT at the Division level by May 2009. Another major positive program shift in the summer of 2009 transitioned a majority of the contractor positions to become government employees.⁷⁷ While temporarily a bit disruptive, this was vital to reestablish legitimacy of the program and control the rising pay scales. In December 2009, the support in Afghanistan included nine HTTs (one being embedded with the Marine

⁷⁵ Authors Alberto Gonzalez, David Price, and John Stanton have been exceptionally critical of the HTS program in professional journals and recently published books.

⁷⁶ MAJ Robert Holbert, HTT AF-1, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 11, 2009.

⁷⁷ AAA, 12.

Corps), the HTAT, and a new theater coordination element (TCE) at the Corps level.⁷⁸ This expansion continued to 18 teams by the end of March 2010 and is expected to reach 27 teams by fall of 2010 with the coinciding uplift of forces for the theater.⁷⁹ This agile, responsive growth and incremental changes to the program demonstrate positive improvements for HTS.

More importantly than just increasing the quantity of support, the quality of the HTS contributions has been elevated recently as well. The country-specific Afghanistan Research Reachback Center (RRC) has become more visible to the broader community by publishing an informative blog⁸⁰ in 2009 on Intelink-Unclassified. While still a password-protected intelligence community (IC) site, this is at least a step in the right direction that of making their analysis available to more than just their deployed HTTs. Other unclassified websites including the original but static HTS webpage, a more robust site by Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI), HTS Intellipedia page, Facebook pages, and an informal online ‘human terrain forum’ each have their merits of providing information about HTS but not actual analysis from any of the deployed teams. Ultimately, these multiple online sites may lead to confusion on which is the best resource for current information about HTS. Researchers have published an official, in-depth study of Pashtun tribes that was presented by Dr. Michael Weltsch of the Afghan RRC during a COIN Center Webcast in January 2010.⁸¹ This report cautioned against the growing popularity of relying solely on tribal engagement as recently suggested by U.S. Army Special Operations MAJ

⁷⁸ Grace V. Jean, “Army’s Anthropology Teams Under Fire, But in Demand.” (*National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Business and Technology Magazine*, February 2010), <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ARCHIVE/2010/FEBRUARY/Pages/Army%E2%80%99sAnthropologyTeamsUnderFire,ButinDemand.aspx> (accessed March 23, 2010).

⁷⁹ Neal Hanley, Director of the Afghan RRC, e-mail message to author, March 22, 2010.

⁸⁰ HTS Afghanistan Research Reachback Center, https://www.intelink.gov/blogs/_hts-a/ (accessed March 28, 2010).

⁸¹ Afghanistan Research Reachback Center, “My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun ‘Tribes’ in Afghanistan,” White Paper, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Afghanistan Research Reachback Center (RRC), Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2, U.S. Army, September 2009), http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/COIN/coin_dco_briefings.asp (accessed March 28, 2010).

Jim Gant posted on the blog of author and historian Steven Pressfield.⁸² The white paper demonstrates the distinct differences between the structures of tribes in Iraq in contrast with the largely Pashtun society in the AF-PAK region. While not providing a silver-bullet solution, tribal dynamics will be important to any planned action in Afghanistan but in varying degrees throughout the country and caution is advised in overestimating the directive authority of tribes. As succinctly summarized in a recent Tribal Engagement Workshop, “Commanders must tailor their methods to local needs and situations and must therefore have appropriate operational flexibility to enable their approaches.”⁸³

Lessons Learned

While initial CALL reports focused on the specific makeup of an HTT, where they would best be incorporated within organic BCT staff, and the possible input that could be expected into planning, most advice was fairly generalized. Until recently there has not been a detailed description of the types of effective HTT input that have made the difference for a unit. Using the Small Wars Journal (SWJ) as an appropriate unclassified, freely-accessible online forum, a Brigade Commander and members of his HTT provided a thorough description of a recommended Tribal Configuration Matrix⁸⁴ that included four interrelated elements:

- A Tribal Map showing approximations of tribal (at the “Ashira” level) territory
- Tribal Leader Baseball Cards
- Social Network Link Charts for tribal leaders
- A Tribal Database correlating leaders, areas, and contact information

⁸² MAJ Jim Gant, “A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan: One Tribe at a Time,” (Los Angeles, CA: Nine Sisters Imports, Inc., December 2, 2009), http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/themes/stevenpressfield/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf (accessed March 28, 2010).

⁸³ Tribal Engagement Workshop (Fredericksburg, VA: *Small Wars Foundation*, March 25, 2010), http://smallwarsjournal.com/events/tew/docs/TEW_Summary_Report_v1.pdf (accessed April 10, 2010).

⁸⁴ COL Jeffrey A. Sinclair, Bud P. Cook, and Hamad Abdelnour, “The Tribal Configuration Matrix,” (*Small Wars Journal*, March 21, 2010), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/03/the-tribal-configuration-matrix/> (accessed March 21, 2010).

This type of transparency and sharing of open-source methods that have proved successful is exactly what is needed to help other leaders and even HTTs in training prepare for the possible solutions that could be replicated elsewhere. This article demonstrated the importance of a combination of products, both visual and narrative in form, that were dynamic and informative at all levels as leaders from the company up to the BCT focused on the transition from COIN to Stability Operations and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) in their AO. Prudence was also cautioned elsewhere on SWJ when readers were reminded that “it is essential that we approach the challenge informed by our experiences in Iraq, not dominated by them.”⁸⁵ With that said, HTS cannot rely on discovery learning within each team and must continue to recommend best practices that have proved successful for others whether from experiences in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The HTS program will likely continue to evolve and grow in the near future. The ability of units to effectively incorporate this small but unique capability into their organic standing formation will likely be based on their leadership and willingness to incorporate similar lessons learned from previous BCTs. While no single technique used in COIN can be repeated in a different environment and be expected to achieve comparable results, this should not limit a unit nor HTT from trying to replicate best practices and proactively learn from one another.

⁸⁵ Dan Green, “Going Tribal: Enlisting Afghanistan’s Tribes,” (Small Wars Journal, August 2, 2009), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/08/going-tribal-enlisting-afghani/> (accessed March 21, 2010).

The Potential for Civil Information Management (CIM)

Much as with HTS, previous academic research with CIM, more specifically Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Civil Reconnaissance (CR), has provided insight into the success with and future potential for an improved CIM capability for the U.S. Army. Both MAJ Jose Madera's analysis of CIM in support of COIN in Columbia and MAJ Kevin Burke's focus on CR in separating the insurgent from the population are informative and contribute to the attempts of the Civil Affair community to advance the effectiveness of this core task of CIM for their branch. This section attempts to update their research and acknowledge the continuing progress that maneuver units, the active-duty 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, and select U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) CA Brigades, have made with respect to their GIS and CIM initiatives.

Establishing a Geographic Information System (GIS) for CIM

While at SAMS in 2006, MAJ Madera investigated the potential value of GIS in assisting the Government of Columbia's COIN efforts and as a framework for using it as a tool in other environments just as CA doctrine was being updated to formally incorporate CIM.⁸⁶ He substantiated the value of GIS but acknowledged the challenges of establishing this COP for the commander with varying organizational structures, C2 systems, and classification levels. He acknowledged the emerging doctrine of GEOINT and its potential contributions as long as it remained primarily open-source or unclassified.⁸⁷ The importance of linking human factors to the physical terrain was also highlighted with a combination of ecological analysis along with the social sciences. While early efforts by CA units in Iraq, Afghanistan, and within the United States involved implementing various systems, the common denominator was the ability to

⁸⁶ MAJ Jose Madera, *Civil Information Management in support of COIN: a Case for the Use of GIS in Columbia*, (AMSP Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2006), 65-67.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 27-29.

geospatially-reference all civil information being collected. Most importantly, MAJ Madera's work emphasized the value of a GIS-based CIM when operating over an area for a long duration such as with COIN operations.

A recent successful initiative in Afghanistan demonstrated a proactive use of stand-alone ArcGIS-based tool titled the "Stryker ASCOPE Decision Maker" by 5/2 SBCT. This database has been developed to map out significant civil features in their AO in specific layers of information organized by ASCOPE. LTC Gaydon, the battalion commander, noted that it enabled better planning and decision-making in their AO.⁸⁸ In a more detailed update from the 364th CA Brigade from their end of tour after action review (AAR) in Iraq illustrated the continuing challenges with consolidating both civil information collected by CA units but also the entire deployed force.⁸⁹ This AAR specified a directive by United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) for the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) system to be used as the database of record for all CMO reporting. Training, manning, network access, database classification, and sharing data with civilian organizations continued to be issues in building that civil COP. However, substantial progress is still being made to capture, fuse, analyze, and disseminate pertinent civil information available to include not only significant structures such as infrastructure projects and facilities but also key leader engagements (KLE) and any other information fulfilling any of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). While a significant investment in time and resources is being made, a better technical solution is still desired and being considered for the future.

⁸⁸ LTC Patrick Gaydon, Commander of the Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 5-2 SBCT, e-mail message to author, March 24, 2010.

⁸⁹ MAJ Donavon A. Nigg, *Civil Information Management (CIM) After Action Report (AAR)*, 364th Civil Affairs Brigade, (Camp Victory, Iraq: 10 December 2009). <https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=984167&lang=en-US> (accessed March 25, 2010).

The Civil Affairs Operating System (CAOS)

While at NPS in 2007, MAJ Burke detailed the tactical task of conducting CR but also tied this to the larger issue of what information to collect and the challenges of how to effectively relate and display such information geospatially, relationally, and temporally.⁹⁰ While he warned against keeping such civil information out of the intelligence community, he covered similar themes of needing better standard operating procedures (SOPs), a warehouse for the data, and improved training for both those planning and conducting CR.⁹¹ MAJ Burke also briefly covered the Asymmetric Software Kit (ASK) that has been used effectively to aid in HTM primarily by the Special Forces community.⁹² Developments since then include two major initiatives to improve some of these lagging symptoms of CIM. First, a Joint CIM (J-CIM) Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E) program was initiated in August 2008 with sponsorship by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in order to provide a non-material solution to the operational issue of the lack of common procedures for managing civil information.⁹³ This joint test runs through July 2011 and is expected to provide published, joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) that will leverage relevant existing standards. However, this process will also yield recommended solutions that span the spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).⁹⁴ In a distinctly separate but interrelated joint program called the Mapping the Human Terrain (Map-HT) Joint Capability

⁹⁰ MAJ Kevin Burke, *Civil Reconnaissance: Separating the Insurgent from the Population*, (Master's Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 51-66, http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2007/Dec/07Dec_Burke.pdf (accessed March 28, 2010).

⁹¹ Burke, 80-82.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 27, 30, and 75.

⁹³ Lt.j.g. Theresa Donnelly, "JSOTF-P Selected for Civil Affairs Evaluation Test Program," (Zamboanga, Philippines: February 17, 2010), <http://jsotf-p.blogspot.com/2010/02/jsotf-p-selected-for-civil-affairs.html> (accessed March 29, 2010).

⁹⁴ See 'Appendix A - DOTMLPF Analysis' for more details on this pertaining specifically to CIM and the 'human terrain.'

Technical Demonstration (JCTD), a material solution is being sought that is seeking to satisfy the operational requirements of both the CA community and HTS. This 3-year process will also provide practical experience through a series of utility assessments where lessons can be captured and then be transitioned to the programs of record (PORs) within the respective service network architectures, such as with DCGS-A.

While these joint capabilities are being developed, the 95th CA Brigade has been progressing concurrently with their own existing framework for capturing and sharing civil information which they have named the Civil Affairs Operation System (CAOS).⁹⁵ Using handheld, mobile GPS devices called the GATER to ‘collect,’ desktop versions of GATER program to ‘fuze,’ and connecting users to an online database named the Worldwide Civil Information Database (WCID) to ‘store’ civil data, they are developing a system that allows a multitude of users to have access and the ability to ‘analyze’ their data. While still a standalone system managed by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Reachback Operations Center (UROC), the information is mirrored on both unclassified and classified networks and produces geospatially structured data in multiple export formats, including the incorporation of the USAID initiative for TCAPF surveys. While still an emerging project, this may prove to be a viable solution for the U.S. Army to connect multiple agencies on multiple classification levels for an improved understanding of ‘civil considerations’ on the modern battlefield.

⁹⁵ MAJ William Rice, “95th CA Brigade: The Civil Affairs Operating System,” (pamphlet and presentation from a Socio-Cultural Dynamics Working Group (SCDWG) Video-Teleconference (VTC), November 19, 2009).

A Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) Approach for Afghanistan

What we call the human terrain in Afghanistan is extraordinarily complex...we depend on good information and an understanding of the people if we hope to succeed.⁹⁶

- LTG David M. Rodriguez, IJC Commander

The U.S. Army must ultimately come to terms with what resources it has available and organize to provide the best solution for providing its various levels of command with the best possible 'civil information.' However, there is a much larger network of capabilities and resources that are accessible to better understand the 'human terrain,' especially when focusing on the specific case study of Afghanistan. As suggested in a report on 'Understanding Human Dynamics,' the DOD must "institutionalize the best of current programs and processes" and "develop more coherence in its efforts to enhance its human dynamics awareness."⁹⁷ What has come to be known as the JIIM environment could even be expanded to include both the 'commercial'⁹⁸ and 'academia'⁹⁹ realms or JIIM-CA. With respect to understanding the complex, dynamic human terrain of Afghanistan, the range and expanse of varying cultural programs and products that are available to U.S. Army soldiers and organizations is expansive. Unfortunately, the ways to obtain the desired, specific information that will be pertinent to one's mission is not always very clear. By first surveying the resources available within the joint and multinational

⁹⁶ LTG David M. Rodriguez, "Supporting the Afghan Environment," (*The Afghan Hands Blog*, Kabul, Afghanistan: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), March 2010), <http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/the-afghan-hands-blog/commanders-blog/supporting-the-afghan-environment-david-m.-rodriquez-ijc-commander.html> (accessed March 21, 2010).

⁹⁷ Department of Defense (DOD), "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics," (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics, March 2009), vii-viii.

⁹⁸ As suggested by Dr. Christopher R. Paparone, "Working Out at the JIIM: Embracing the Commercial Sector as First Among Equals," (*Army Sustainment*, Fort Lee, VA: Volume 42, Issue 2, March-April 2010), http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/jiim_commercialsec.html (accessed March 30, 2010).

⁹⁹ Recommended to reference the private sector as 'industry' and include 'academia' by MAJ Jeffrey Thomas, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, October 12, 2009.

military communities, then becoming aware of the capabilities of the interagency and intergovernmental organizations, and lastly highlighting the commercial sector/industry and academic communities, an improved understanding of the Afghanistan OE can be realized.

Joint and Multinational

The joint services each have their unique approach and focus when trying to ensure cultural competence and an understanding of the human terrain on the modern battlefield. Rather than limiting one's resources, the most advantageous approach is to combine all available assets. For example, the United States Air Force (USAF) Air University established a very useful website for Socio-Cultural and Language Resources. The Air Force Culture and Language Center is highlighted along with many other studies, recommended research and theory, U.S. government and university resources, language, courses, guides, programs; and other relevant links.¹⁰⁰ With respect to Afghanistan specifically, the USMC has also invested heavily into two distinct country-overview books, one which is an exhaustive 238-page Handbook published by the Marine Corps Intel Activity (MCIA) and the second which is a 112-page For Official Use Only (FOUO) Operational Culture for Deploying Personnel prepared by the CAOCL which is part of their Training and Education Command (TECOM). This organization has also produced a corresponding 2-day course pertaining to this text with fully developed lesson plans and study guides which builds upon the basic 2-hour program provided by the U.S. Army TRADOC Culture Center (TCC). The TCC has published more recent overview presentations of both Afghanistan and Pakistan as of February 2010 that complement the more in-depth MI Anthropology: Afghanistan course offered online by the University of Military Intelligence. The

¹⁰⁰ United States Air Force (USAF), "Socio-Cultural and Language Resources," Air University, (Montgomery, AL: Air Education and Training Command, August 17, 2009), <http://www.au.af.mil/culture/index.htm> (accessed March 21, 2010).

TRADOC Intel Support Activity (TRISA) also provides a PMESII analysis of Afghanistan in their OE Assessment (OEA) first conducted in 2007 and also being currently reviewed and updated. Another often unknown or overlooked Army resource includes the comprehensive regional geography of Afghanistan published by the United States Military Academy (USMA) immediately following 9/11 in October of 2001.¹⁰¹ Lastly, the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC) has recently created an Afghanistan-Pakistan (AF-PAK) Regional Expert Training Program with courses of varying lengths from two days to two weeks intended for intelligence professionals but with content available online for use by anyone for self development or training others. Each service has worked hard to provide the appropriate detail of information and analysis for their own service members but these products are available and should be encouraged for us by all interested professionals.

At the combatant command level, the combination of joint and multinational efforts becomes more integrated. This is evident at the new CENTCOM AF-PAK Intelligence Center of Excellence (COE) in which a Human Terrain Analysis Branch (HTAB-formerly 'team') is dedicated to building ethnic/tribal maps and providing this information online in multiple formats.¹⁰² In a special report titled a 'Sociocultural Framework for Afghanistan,'¹⁰³ the visual ethnographic product that accompanied the detailed narrative of the Afghan society came from

¹⁰¹ COL Eugene J. Palka, ed, *Afghanistan: A Regional Geography*, (Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering; United States Military Academy, West Point, NY: 5 October 2001). <http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/geo/Publications/Afghanistan.pdf> (accessed March 18, 2010).

¹⁰² Grace V. Jean, "'Culture Maps' Becoming Essential Tools of War," (*National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA)*, Business and Technology Magazine, February 2010), <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ARCHIVE/2010/FEBRUARY/Pages/%E2%80%98CultureMaps%E2%80%99BecomingEssentialToolsofWar.aspx> (accessed March 23, 2010).

¹⁰³ Ben Pierce and Tyson Le Monte, "Joint Intelligence Cell Central (JICCENT) Special Report - A Sociocultural Framework for Afghanistan," (*JICCENT Intelligence Publication*, Tampa, FL: 08 Sep 2009), https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/USCENTCOM_Intelligence_Directorate_Afghanistan_Pakistan_Intelligence_Center_of_Excellence_Division_Human_Terrain_Analysis_Branch (accessed March 9, 2010).

the Australian national mapping agency, Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO) as it was deemed the best available product.¹⁰⁴ In the UK, the Defense Geographic Centre (DGC) also produced quite an advanced version of an Afghan Tribal Groups map and the importance of cultural understanding to the British military to include the value of embedded cultural advisors is more thoroughly described in a British Army Review (BAR) article from the summer of 2009 in which the author attempted to “develop tribal mapping and information on the power dynamics within the” AO.¹⁰⁵ The UK has recently developed a new capability, the Defence Cultural Specialist Unit (DCSU),¹⁰⁶ which is structured quite similarly to HTS but has also been compared to the American Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell (PACC) and related Afghan Hands program developed by the US Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) to be able to focus appropriate personnel and resources on the AF-PAK region.¹⁰⁷ An All Partners Access Network (APAN) group established by the PACC is a good demonstration of yet another unclassified, collaborative network but one that attempts to reach beyond the normal defense-related community and welcomes civilian input and involvement. This common focus on the region by each of the services and varying coalition nations illustrates the need to develop compatible doctrine, training, TTPs, and knowledge management (KM) networks to be able to consolidate resources and increase the collective understanding of all interested partners.

¹⁰⁴ See Appendix B for various examples and descriptions of ethnographic, population density, and language maps from various sources with Appendix I.d providing the map discussed here.

¹⁰⁵ Lieutenant Mike Martin, “The Importance of Cultural Understanding to the Military,” (*The British Army Review*, Number 147, Summer 2009), 44-49.

¹⁰⁶ United Kingdom (UK), Ministry of Defence (MOD), “Military develops its cultural understanding of Afghanistan,” Defence Policy and Business, February 24, 2010, <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/MilitaryDevelopsItsCulturalUnderstandingOfAfghanistan.htm> (accessed March 31, 2010).

¹⁰⁷ Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell (PACC). “What is the PACC?” *Intelink*, August 27, 2009. <https://www.intelink.gov/sites/pacc/Shared%20Documents/What%20is%20the%20PACC.pdf> (accessed March 31, 2010).

Interagency and Intergovernmental

The civil-military capabilities that can be leveraged toward the complex challenge of understanding Afghanistan is immense but nearly overwhelming to properly direct individual leaders or organizations to the most pertinent information depending on where the unit is projected to be operating in Afghanistan. Both Interagency and Intergovernmental organizations provide a multitude of opportunities for greater understanding prior to deployment and possible reachback through developed relationships built up over time.

One of the primary resources of the interagency not listed specifically in Appendix A of FM 3-07¹⁰⁸ but highlighted in FM 3-24¹⁰⁹ is the widely networked Intelligence Community (IC). An initiative to establish Social-Cultural Dynamics (SCD) Working Group led by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and efforts by NGA to refine the tradecraft of a future Human Terrain Analyst (HTA) are movements in the right direction to define terms, train analysts, and develop long term plans for the entire world's hot spots. However, with the appropriate directives to provide timely OSINT, as well as handle classified information, the IC has tremendous resources which should be more focused on providing operational support to the Warfighter at the appropriate scale and level of detail required. USAID is another agency working to partner at the appropriate levels such as with CA units within Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and in some instances with maneuver elements partnered with newly created District Support Teams (DSTs) in Afghanistan. This allows tactical units to collaborate with and draw upon expertise in the TCAPF established to identify the underlying causes of instability and conflict in their shared AOs, develop programs to reduce the instability, and measure the effectiveness of executed

¹⁰⁸ Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations in Stability Operations are detailed in Appendix A of Department of the Army, FM3-07, *Stability Operations*, A-1 thru A-15.

¹⁰⁹ Intelligence in Counterinsurgency is covered in detail of Chapter 3 in Department of the Army, FM3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 3-1 thru 3-35.

projects.¹¹⁰ Recent initiatives in Afghanistan have worked to establish an unclassified network for information sharing on political and economic developments named Tabulae which is linked to an unclassified version of the CIDNE database named INDURE (for the International Distributed Uniform Reporting Environment). NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has produced similar intergovernmental attempts to connect the network of multinational partners in the civil-military community by establishing the Afghanistan Country Stability Picture (ACSP) and the Civil Military Overview (CMO) websites. Such initiatives are encouraging but may just be redundant attempts at introducing new technologies unless it is embraced by a majority of partners in Afghanistan and is synchronized with existing networks on multiple security domains. Another example of a multi-organization effort includes what has become known as the ‘Rich Contextual Understanding (RCU)’ project. In the summer of 2009, a ‘deep dive’ was requested by ISAF in order to more clearly understand the distinct challenges within three selected provinces from the varied regions of Afghanistan. Over 300 people from twelve organizations contributed to this analytical effort to provide these strategic leaders with an assessment down to the district level of Helmond, Paktika, and Konduz provinces. These cooperative investigations included collaborative analysis that produced an improved appreciation for the local population living in these selected areas. While many other agencies obviously have resources to contribute as well, these are just few examples. It illustrates that there is no set format or formula for the appropriate balance of engagement and involvement that must be gained through cooperation and collaboration to enable the comprehensive and whole of government approaches respectively.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ More information is available in Appendix D: Interagency Conflict Assessment Overview of Department of the Army, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework,” (Washington, D.C.: Military Affairs, August 11, 2008), http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/ma/tcaf.html (accessed March 31, 2010).

¹¹¹ Department of the Army, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, 1-4 thru 1-6.

Commercial and Academic

Proposed areas of commercial or private sector activities and the academia won't necessarily be referenced in doctrine but may serve quite usefully when used appropriately. Non-profit, public policy research organizations, media sites, and commercial companies such as the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Christian Science Monitor (CS Monitor), and the National Geographic Society (NGS) are but three categories and examples of the private sector that contributes analysis and unclassified resources. Many military and civilians will reference these in preparation or even during deployments to better understand the OE with freely accessible products such as order of battle (ORBAT) analysis, detailed elections reports, and various versions of maps.¹¹² Additionally, literary resources such as the classic book, *Afghanistan*,¹¹³ and more recent, *Culture and Customs of Afghanistan*,¹¹⁴ both provide excellent comprehensive narrative analysis that are required for a more complete understanding of the current makeup and development of the complex society in Afghanistan. Even more recent commercial publications such as *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* have been recommended "as a remarkable account of the human terrain that is Afghanistan" and "is one of the books that our deploying officers and staff non-commissioned officers should read before deploying into Afghanistan."¹¹⁵ More selective readings such as Sarah Chayes, *The Punishment of Virture*, have been recommended for units deploying to Southern Afghanistan, and *Afghanistan, Arms and*

¹¹² See example maps from each of these organizations in Appendix B – Maps for I.e, I.m, and I.n.

¹¹³ Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton University Press, 1973).

¹¹⁴ Hafizullah Emadi, *Culture and Customs of Afghanistan*, (Wesport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005), 7-78.

¹¹⁵ Referring to the book by Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan*, (W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 2009) in a book review by LtCol Michael D. Grice, "The Human Terrain of Afghanistan," (*Marine Corps Gazette*, December 2009), <http://www.marinecorpsgazette-digital.com/marinecorpsgazette/200912/?pg=80#pg80> (accessed on March 31, 2010).

Conflict, which examines armed groups, disarmament and security in a post-war society, includes focused research and analysis in six provinces similar to the RCU project.¹¹⁶ These resources from the media and even a local or military library often provide a good, broad foundation of understanding so that further analysis and collaborative research will be more productive.

Online academic portals can be also be excellent sources of more current unclassified civil information such as anthropological data, occasional papers, and provincial overviews from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and their Program for Culture and Conflict Studies (CCS). This can be linked to additional online training through another distinct NPS program, Leader Development & Education for Sustained Peace (LDESP) which also offers short-duration, 2-3 day seminars for units as well. These types of educational opportunities provided by academic institutions provide the depth and additional perspectives that military training only may not be able to achieve. Additional links for JIIM-CA online research and coordination can be found under the ‘Resources’ section with a network approach to learning recommended to fully survey what’s available before focusing on only one or a few organizations.

While HTS and CA teams will be providing direct support to Brigades and Divisions across the Army while deployed, units will be even better prepared for the dynamic OE in Afghanistan by establishing a multi-level approach to learning prior to deployment. This same dynamic flow of information both horizontally and vertically throughout the organization and a growing understanding of the OE by all will need to continue throughout the duration of the mission. This type of JIIM-CA preparation will be critical to how a unit successfully executes their mission as a learning organization using the same techniques.

¹¹⁶ MG Nick Carter, Commander of 6th UK Division in Kandahar, Afghanistan recommended inbound units to read Sarah Chayes, *The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the Taliban*, (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2006) and co-authored by a former HTT member killed in Afghanistan, Michael Bhatia and Mark Sedra, *Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict: Armed groups, disarmament and security in a post-war society*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008).

Recommendations and Conclusion

You must understand your Operational Environment...it is intimate knowledge of the *Human Terrain* that is paramount.¹¹⁷ – GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, ISAF Commander

While the debate over the proper doctrinal terminology for ‘civil considerations’ or ‘human terrain’ continues,¹¹⁸ senior commanders within the CENTCOM theater of operations repeatedly refer to this human dimension being key to our potential for success in Afghanistan. This strengthens the need for improved unity of effort and direction on how we collectively intend to gain and maintain a clearer understanding of this new key terrain and leads to several conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis conducted in this monograph. First of all, theory, history, and doctrine all clearly articulate the importance of the local population in a COIN environment. Secondly, the HTS program has had a challenging development but continues to make incremental improvements that make it an increasingly effective capability for the U.S. Army at the BCT. Next, while the intelligence warfighting function may have the doctrinal responsibility for consolidating the ‘civil considerations’ on the battlefield, the CA community should have the lead for establishing the civil COP with their evolving initiatives with CIM. Lastly, the entire JIIM community including additional enablers such as the commercial sector and academia are a tremendous resource if carefully approached and properly synchronized. By improving what the U.S. Army, the entire JIIM network, and future research will focus on, a more comprehensive approach to understanding and visualizing the socio-cultural

¹¹⁷ GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, “COMISAF/USFOR-A Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training Guidance,” (Kabul, Afghanistan: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 10 November 2009), 2, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/COIN/repository/COMISAF_COIN_Training_Guidance.pdf (accessed March 28, 2010).

¹¹⁸ Individuals on military internet forums such as Battle Command Knowledge Systems (BCKS) caution against using terms that are not adopted in doctrinal manuals as in Harold Orenstein, “Use of the term ‘human terrain,’” (BCKS: Human Terrain/Cultural Awareness Professional Forum, December 22, 2008), <https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=715041&lang=en-US> (accessed March 31, 2010).

aspects of the local civilian population in Afghanistan may be realized. The current approach of uncoordinated, disparate efforts will continue to produce inadequate attempts to understand local conditions that enable the insurgency. By not properly informing units of what's already available, developing standards for others to follow, and consolidating efforts so that an increased understanding of the local civil considerations can endure the rotation of units, the ability to execute an effective COIN campaign is unlikely and will ultimately risk the successful transition to a stable Afghan government.

A Service Solution

The U.S. Army must better integrate its existing capabilities and initiatives with both HTS and CIM. While overly-criticized by the vocal few from the outside, the HTS program has generally proven its worth by anecdotal evidence and support from BCT Commanders and staffs who have had actual experience working with them from inside the Army. While some units may be more accepting of this type of civilian expertise and advice than others and not all HTTs have likely represented the program equally, the general potential for their overall positive contribution remains constant. While the capability was established fairly quickly and has grown quite substantially, a more comprehensive review of this program may be necessary to see where it best fits within the defense hierarchy. Keeping an operationally-focused, deployable capability within a TRADOC G2 (Intelligence) organization is not an optimal solution and is one that should be re-evaluated by the U.S. Army. As the Civil Affairs community continues to mature this core task of CIM, the U.S. Army would be better served if the positive aspects of HTS were more closely integrated rather than separate as they are now. With the possible expansion of CA to continue in the near future, the U.S. Army should look to integrate the unique civilian capabilities of HTS into its more traditional military structure. At a minimum, the coordinating staffs of both organizations should be directed to coordinate their efforts in the following areas: training their respective cadre of individuals, consolidating best practices for portraying the human terrain in

assigned theaters, and establishing a unified system for how units within the U.S. Army will gain and maintain an improved unclassified repository of civil information that will solve everyone's understanding of 'civil considerations' in the COIN environment.

Collaboration and cooperation

While the U.S. Army has the potential to make some improvements that will significantly increase its ability to understand and capture the human dimension within its assigned theaters of operation, it does not need to look merely inward for potential solutions. The other services, various coalition partners, and multiple civilian and defense related organizations have potential resources and expertise that if properly referenced first and continuously included in a collaborative process may yield a network-based solution that produces more comprehensive results. The intelligence community should continue to expand OSINT initiatives that provide unclassified analysis and products that balance their long-term, strategic focus with the necessary operationally-focused support require in the current conflicts, particularly in Afghanistan. National GEOINT agencies such as NGA, DGC, and DIGO must continue to move beyond traditional focus of mapping the physical terrain and expand capabilities to support this challenge of understanding and visualizing the human terrain. The PACC and associated Afghan Hands program is still emerging but has proven to be a quite informative organization and one that must continue to receive the active support and collaboration within the Joint community to improved focused integration of efforts pertaining to the AF-PAK region. The RCU project that initially focused only on three select provinces should be expanded to include all key terrain districts and other areas of interest as determined by the IJC. Such research related efforts can contribute to and be synchronized with the assigned operational units attempt to collect recent conflict related metrics using techniques such as the USAID TCAF. These broader historical perspectives and more discrete current assessments will likely yield a more holistic approach to understanding the challenges of the local populace and will be mutually beneficial to all participants. Organizations

at all levels must be networked at much as possible and focused on the collective mission of stability operations especially within the regions that they are assigned as best described in a recent report highlighting their The Stability Operations Information Center (SOIC) in Regional Command – West (RC-W).¹¹⁹ Temporal and regional reports produced by 5/2 SBCT also serve as excellent examples to sharing open source analysis and updates to the wider community of interested organizations. Lastly, one of the most critical tasks that must be completed in Afghanistan as soon as possible, probably even more imperative than another election, is a thorough census. While definitely considered to be a multi-agency challenge that has been delayed for too many years, a census is crucial to Afghanistan because of the following reasons in that it will provide: basic socio-economic data required for post war reconstruction in the country, data to ensure equitable distribution of resources in terms of gender and other factors, and statistics critical for local area development.¹²⁰ This clearly demonstrates that the challenge of understanding the human terrain is not solely the problem of the U.S. Army but must include a JIIM approach that initially contributes to understanding the OE for COIN operations but that is ultimately focused on setting up the Afghan government for success in the long run.

While the focus of this monograph has been on the current COIN environment, the lessons learned in mapping the human terrain in Afghanistan will likely be relevant to future conflict as well. Just as the critical investigation of past conflicts, development of applicable military doctrine, and attempts at applying the relevant tenets of theory has not always provided

¹¹⁹ COIN Advisory & Assistance Team (CAAT), “The Stability Operations Information Center (SOIC): Comprehensive Understanding for Comprehensive Operations,” (Herat, Afghanistan: Regional Command (RC) West, March 9, 2010).

¹²⁰ United Nations (UN) Presentation, “Afghanistan Census Data Processing,” October 15, 2008. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/country_impl.htm (accessed March 21, 2010)

flawless results in executing current COIN operations, this monograph seeks to contribute to our continued attempts at improving our training, organizations, and processes of understanding the human terrain on the modern battlefield. While the Army seeks to integrate its existing capabilities of intelligence, HTS, and CA at varying levels, ultimately it should be for the sake of the safety and well-being of the currently deployed soldiers and their associated civilian populations that they are working with that the urgency of this task should be undertaken. The effective collaboration of multiple organizations and agencies will be required and is necessary to see that the best techniques of mapping the human terrain are captured, shared, and applied across the country of Afghanistan. A JIIM approach will require organizations to not only focus on their own capabilities but more importantly understand how their efforts can contribute to the wider, shared understanding at multiple levels. This is a critical task that must be better understood and executed by all as the success of our COIN operations in Afghanistan and the future stability of the Afghan government depend on it.

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APPENDIX A – DOTMLPF Analysis

Introduction

The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process provides a solution space that considers solutions involving any combination of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF).¹²¹ It systematically details the issues to be considered whenever establishing a new national security capability. This DOTMLPF analysis describes a recommended operational approach to improving the system for mapping and understanding the ‘human terrain.’

Doctrine

While joint and Army doctrine do a good job of emphasizing the ‘civil considerations’ of METT-TC by using ASCOPE analysis and including the importance of cultural awareness, understanding, and competence, the ‘human terrain’ has yet to be referenced or deconflicted with these other terms. Senior military leaders and published authors continue to use this term without the doctrinal foundation or common understanding of what this encompasses. Host nation information requirements (HNIR) should be included in future doctrinal updates to commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) and specifically priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and continued synchronization with the intelligence community and their focus on SCD is required. Allied doctrine is emerging that recognizes the importance of the ‘human terrain’ and U.S. doctrine should as well in future reviews of FM 3-24, JP 3-24, and related manuals. Integration of efforts with the Intelligence Community (IC) and their socio-cultural dynamics working group (SCDWG) should be continued and strengthened.

¹²¹ Description of DOTMLPF analysis and access to the JCIDS is located at: <https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=28870> (accessed March 28, 2010).

Organization

The current construct of a TRADOC organization repeatedly deploying small teams of civilians at all levels of command into hostile countries should not be an indefinite solution. Recommend that the HTS become a program of record and consider transitioning into the growing Civil Affairs community. The projected growth of the active-duty Civil Affairs should continue to emphasize the growing need for a consolidated CIM architecture and improved procedures for the collection, consolidation, visualization, and understanding of open source socio-cultural information to assist Commanders in understanding the human dimension of a COIN environment.

Training

Develop training that crosses organizational boundaries meaning HTS should continue to explore opportunities to work with other Army organizations, such as CA, and academic institutions such as SAMS and UNO. Civil Affairs CIM teams should continue to develop GIS expertise through NGA training opportunities and work with maneuver units at updating appropriate 'civil information' into CIDNE rather than relying only on CA teams to enter appropriate information about the 'human terrain.'

Material

Both HTS and Civil Affairs should decide upon a common unclassified, handheld system based off recent J-CIM JCTDs with the capability to be synchronized to an online, networked database available to a maximum number of partners. 'Civil information' collected should be pertinent to understanding the 'human terrain' and must be mirrored onto classified networks for

accessibility and analysis by military units on their own command and control systems to provide a civil COP on multiple networks.

Leadership and education

Leaders at all levels must direct the consistent collection and analysis of ‘civil information’ with appropriate HNIRs for an improved understanding of the ‘human terrain’ in order for varying organizations to achieve unity of effort. Initiative should be allowed and encouraged to determine better techniques and procedures with best practices shared across the force so that each unit does not need to come up with their own new way of understanding the ‘human terrain.’ Professional military education (PME) must continue to focus on cultural competencies and understanding the capabilities of both attached and organic organizations such as HTS, Civil Affairs Teams (CAT), and Brigade Terrain Teams.

Personnel

Develop distinct positions in deployed HTTs and training billets that fit into possible military career paths for active-duty Civil Affairs, Intelligence, and/or Engineer officers, NCOs, and soldiers to keep the civilian-military mix amongst HTTs and attract quality talent for this important developing capability.

Facilities

Replicate C2 systems used in deployed theaters at the training and simulation centers. Integrate the known challenges and proposed technology solutions of developing and managing ‘civil information’ and providing a civil COP at varying levels of command. Showcase best practices from the field and highlight the importance of sharing information on unclassified as well as classified networks.

1.a Country Analysis – Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)¹²²

While no longer freely available online from the CIA webpage or even from their well-known World Factbook, this early map of the Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan seems to be the standard that most other ethnographic maps are based. Updated from a 1992 version, both are available for sale but no longer viewable online (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-publications/afghanistan.html>). However, this exact product was used by the Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering at the United States Military Academy (USMA) in their publication titled, *Afghanistan – A Regional Geography*. It deftly combines aspects of the native language with the varying ethnic groups in a simple color scheme.

URL: <http://www.dean.usma.edu/departments/geo/Publications/Afghanistan.pdf> (accessed March 18, 2010).

1.b. Regional/Country Analysis – Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

FMSO is located at Fort Leavenworth, KS and is a part of the U.S. Army TRADOC G2. Inordinate detail is provided with this ethnographic portrayal of Afghanistan but analysis of neighboring countries is deemphasized and muted. While this country-wide product may provide additional detail, the clarity of the information may be lost on most average consumers of this map. The attempt to multiple levels of tribal groups on one layer can be difficult, especially at this scale. An enhanced capability with this product has been the ability to view online with limited GIS functionality or download as an Adobe Reader Portable Document Format (pdf) in which the multiple layers of information can be turned on and off to simplify or combine groups as desired. The ability to access their site required military credentials however so while not even marked with any classification, it is not likely to be found via most searches or accessible to most interested individuals working at the unclassified, open-source level.

URL: <https://www.intelink.gov/sites/fmsogis/gis/centcom/Pages/AfghanistanEthnographicMap.aspx> (accessed March 9, 2010).

1.c. Regional/Country Analysis – Defence Geographic Centre (DGC)

Another example, which comes from the national mapping agency of the United Kingdom (UK), attempts to display the Tribal Groups of Afghanistan but also includes primarily the Pashtun spillover into Pakistan in the East as well as the Iranian influence in the West. The detailed breakdown of major groups and sub-groups in the left-hand column is a good resource to have directly on the map and addition of the shaded characterizations of religious groups provides additional dimension that proves useful. By not bounding most of the tribal labels, this helps prevent the consumer from misinterpreting the product and thinking that there are clear division between the tribal groups. However, releasing this product with the caveat of “Limited Distribution” can be troublesome however as this requires each user to go back and receive approval to share with other partners for unclassified collaboration.

¹²² COL Eugene J. Palka, ed. *Afghanistan: A Regional Geography*. Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering; United States Military Academy. (West Point, NY: 5 October 2001).

1.d. Regional/Country Analysis - Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO)¹²³

This product provided by the Australian Government is one of the better but typical examples of an attempt to characterize the human terrain of the entire country of Afghanistan by displaying the major ethnic divisions. Including the analysis of neighboring countries in the region helps provide the context or connections of the people across traditional, western-drawn boundaries. The fact that this was used in a USCENTCOM Social Cultural Framework report produced by the Human Terrain Analysis Branch (HTAB, formerly Team or HTAT) demonstrates the coalition collaboration that occurs at the Combatant Command (COCOM) level.

URL: https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/USCENTCOM_Intelligence_Directorate_Afghanistan_Pakistan_Intelligence_Center_of_Excellence_Division_Human_Terrain_Analysis_Branch (accessed March 9, 2010).

1.e. Country/District Analysis – Christian Science Monitor (CS Monitor)¹²⁴

In a brief online article of the CS Monitor, a staff writer demonstrated how voting patterns in Afghanistan show strong overlap with ethnic identity during the August 2009 presidential election. While the other map showed elections results by district, this map subdivided the country by district with the distinct colors representing the largest ethnic group in each particular district. Unfortunately, other than a brief source name, there is no clear way to obtain the background information on how this map was created and it's timeframe thus it's accuracy. Also, unless one is very familiar with the country already, it may be difficult to determine where the provincial and regional boundaries lie for further analysis.

URL: <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/1231/Is-power-in-Afghanistan-returning-to-ethnic-fault-lines> (accessed March 19, 2010).

1.f. Country/District Analysis – Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)

This 2007 tribal map was also provided online by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Program for Culture & Conflict Studies (CCS) as an Adobe Reader PDF format with the ability to zoom into the Southern, Eastern, or Capital Region within each particular file. From there, the user can navigate between provinces with a breakdown of the majority tribe by district provided. While somewhat useful, this can provide a limited, misconstrued understanding of the tribal dynamics as a simple majority will not show illustrate the underlying competing tribal dynamics at the district level. Combining provinces by region within Afghanistan into one downloadable file was helpful though as a quick reference for a general overview at that level of analysis and should be continued with any future products.

URL: <http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/ExecSumm.html> (accessed March 9, 2010).

¹²³ Ben Pierce and Tyson Le Monte, "Joint Intelligence Cell Central Command (JICCENT) Special Report 09-018 A Sociocultural Framework for Afghanistan," *JICCENT Intelligence Publication*, Tampa, FL: 08 Sep 2009.

¹²⁴ Ben Arnoldy, "Is power in Afghanistan returning to ethnic fault lines?" *Christian Science Monitor*. (Khan Neshin, Afghanistan: December 31, 2009).

1.g. Province Analysis – Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)

This updated version of a provincial tribal map was created by NPS CCS in 2008 and provides a more natural representation of the tribal boundaries spanning district borders. This illustrates that these tribal ties rarely follow formal district boundaries determined by the government. While the tribal names and coloring can get quite complex to decipher at first glance, the more one studies and begins to understand the complex dynamics and linkages, the more useful a product like becomes to help digest the complexity of this environment. A more local grouping by tribe and color scheme is suggested to ease the understanding of each province and the transition from one province to another as the colors don't often match.

URL: http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Tribal_maps.html (accessed March 9, 2010).

1.h. Province Analysis – Tribal Liaison Office (TLO)¹²⁵

Tribal Liaison Office (TLO) is an Afghan NGO aiming at improving local governance, stability and security in the Southeast and South of Afghanistan. This map was included in a report TLO published titled, “Three Years Later: A socio-political assessment of Uruzgan Province from 2006 to 2009” as an annex describing the tribal areas of Uruzgan Province. This product does a good job showing the overlap of tribes in many areas of the Province along with a mixed tribe area near the provincial capital of Tirin Kot. It also shows how not all of the country is highly populated but instead grouped into more habitable portions of the rugged terrain.

URL: http://www.nrc.nl/multimedia/archive/00250/TLO_Uruzgan_Assessm_250835a.pdf (accessed March 28, 2010)

1.i. Province Analysis – RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division¹²⁶

This product was included in a presentation delivered by Arturo Munoz from the National Security Research Division of the RAND Corporation as part of a 10-day Afghanistan-Pakistan Foundation Course conducted by the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC). In addition to annotating the dominant tribal population by district, the assessed loyalty of each is added as well. This type of analysis important but could be controversial and will potentially change over time.

¹²⁵ Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “*Positive results after three years in Uruzgan*,” (September 24, 2009), http://www.minbuza.nl/en/News/Newsflashes/2009/September/Positive_results_after_three_years_in_Uruzgan (accessed March 28, 2010).

¹²⁶ Arturo Munoz, “Afghan Briefing for the MEU,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, September 14, 2009).

1.j. Community Analysis – CENTCOM AF/PAK Intelligence Center of Excellence

This is a snapshot from Google Earth with the data provided in a KML format of only one of the layers of information that the CENTCOM team offers on Intellipedia-Unclassified of the ethnic makeup at a very decentralized, local community-level. This ethnicity layer illustrates the dominance of the various Pashtun tribes in Kandahar Province along with smaller Baluch and Hazara enclaves. This along with supertribe, tribe, clan, division, and other factions layers provided from a COCOM perspective can help in deciphering the complex human landscape in a region with an unsurpassed level of detail. This discrete nature of the population footprints and overlap of tribal boundaries shows more realism and complexity of the human terrain but because it seems sparse compared to population density plots, it still may be incomplete. This version of providing ethnographic information also requires a user to be able to stay zoomed into a smaller level of scale and also become comfortable with the software and layers of information provided so as not to get too overwhelmed with all information at once but also not get falsely informed by only viewing a portion of the information and get the wrong impression of the reality on the ground.

URL: https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/USCENTCOM_Intelligence_Directorate_Afghanistan_Pakistan_Intelligence_Center_of_Excellence_Division_Human_Terrain_Analysis_Branch (accessed March 9, 2010).

1.k. District Analysis – 1-91 Cav, 173rd Abn Bde, Regional Command-East (RC-E)¹²⁷

This example tribal map was provided by MAJ Nathan Springer in his *Small Wars Journal* article in which he describes a bottom-up approach to representing the human terrain with their understanding of the tribes in two districts in Northeast Konar Province. When compared with the broad-brush general overviews, this gives a more detailed picture to the complexity and challenges of the human terrain in Afghanistan at the lowest levels.

URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/03/implementing-a-populationcentr> (accessed 09 March 2010).

1.l. Country/City Analysis – Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report¹²⁸

Another general overview is provided, this time from a supposed National Geographic Society (NGS) product that actually cited the Center for Afghanistan Studies (CAS) at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (UNO). This is a classic example of an academic institution feeding the commercial world and then cited by the Congressional Record Service (CRS) in a recent report for Congress. One highlight of this product is an attempt to add the ethnic make-up of the major urban population centers which is often quite mixed as seen here. The challenge with all of these statistics of course is the accuracy and even identifying a source of the original information.

URL: <http://www.crs.gov/Pages/subissue.aspx?cliid=2675&parentid=29> (accessed on March , 2010).

¹²⁷MAJ Nathan Springer, “Implementing a Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Strategy Northeast Afghanistan, May 07 – July 08,” *Small Wars Journal*, March 01, 2010.

¹²⁸ Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, (Washington, DC: January 27, 2010).

1.m. Country/City Analysis – Institute for the Study of War (ISW)

While strikingly similar, this civilian adaptation of the previous NGS work gives no credit to the source of its information. While the simplified color scheme and addition of provinces, major cities, and terrain features improves the usefulness of this analysis, the obvious trend is that most organizations are just recreating similar products based off previous work.

URL: <http://www.understandingwar.org/map/afghanistans-ethno-linguistic-groups> (accessed March 9, 2010).

1.n. Regional/Country Analysis – National Geographic Society (NGS)

While provided online by Christian Bleuer, a PhD student at The Australian National University's Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (The Middle East and Central Asia), this was supposedly created by the NGS and is found on a lot of sites and resources including a recent Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Publication for Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs). For example, that official military-related document cites an alternate unclassified site (<http://www.hopeforafghanistan.com/page2.htm>) which doesn't even cite the original source of this quite aesthetically pleasing product.

URL: http://easterncampaign.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/ethnic_map.jpg (accessed March 9, 2010).

1.o. Country Analysis – Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*¹²⁹

This ethnic map demonstrates the detailed analysis that likely served as an example for many of the previous updated, colorful examples from FMSO and DIGO. Coming from Louis Dupree in his classic book, *Afghanistan*, this highlights the challenge of understanding all of the tribal dynamics on a national level. The scale and complexity of “Mapping the Human Terrain in Afghanistan” must be balanced with every product that is used. A system to confirm and update such tools at multiple levels needs to be developed if this challenge is to ever be realized.

1.p. Country Analysis – Warlord Power/Influence from 2002-2004

These maps illustrate the challenge of the central government to exert their influence over the local populace when existing prominent figures or warlords assert their power and control over the decentralized regions. They also demonstrate the dynamic nature of this power/influence over time and “until the Kabul government can field a strong, standing army and police force that is loyal to the government, such decentralization will prevail.”¹³⁰

1.q. Country Analysis – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

These maps show the historical challenge of dealing with refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) with more recent updates available online from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

URL: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486eb6>

¹²⁹ Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton University Press, 1973).

¹³⁰ Report on OEF Sociological Demographics, (July 20, 2005), 12.

2.a. Country Analysis – University of Texas (UT) at Austin Map Collection

This useful but dated product from UT at Austin's famed map collection provides a good overview of where the greater densities of Afghan population are centered on the major cities and road networks. While dated as of 1982, it is based on a 1960 source and like most online products; this does not provide much background details on where this information came from.

URL: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_pop_1982.jpg (accessed March 25, 2010).

2.b. Country Analysis – Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS)

This product gives a general overview of the averaged population density summarized from LANDSCAN 2000 using reduced 'settled area' classifications based on settlements and agricultural land polygons created by AIMS. Landscan is a probability estimate of ambient population computed from population estimates and terrain/manmade features. Landcover source: FAO 1993 National Landcover of Afghanistan. It is available on the AIMS website along with additional survey dates and estimates to include tabular data in spreadsheet format if required.

URL: http://www.aims.org.af/maps/national/population/population_density_2002.pdf (accessed March 19, 2010)

2.c. Regional/Country Analysis – National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

This more current and detailed population density map of Afghanistan's Southern Region was produced by NGA. The addition of boundaries and names provinces, districts, and major cities provides the additional situational understanding that is necessary when orienting to a more specific area for analysis. This type of product needs to be available at the lowest level possible at varying scales and custom area of coverage. In order to better know and protect the people of Afghanistan, it will be imperative to first know where they are located and in what densities.

3.a. Country Analysis – Afghan Geodesy and Charting Head Office (AGCHO) and CSO

This dated product found on AIMS from 1985 demonstrates that even during the Soviet occupation from 1979-89, government offices such as the Afghan Central Statistics Office (CSO) and AGCHO were cooperating and producing products for their country. While there are no clear delineations of where the dominance of one language ends and another begins, this product gives the main areas where the various languages are most prominent. It is important to note that both Dari and Pashtu are both considered to be the dual-national languages in Afghanistan.

URL: http://www.aims.org.af/maps/national/national_atlas/01_languages.jpg (accessed March 19, 2010).

3.b. Regional Analysis – Intellipedia-U, AFPAK Language and Culture Training

This modernized but more generalized product provides a wider overview of both Afghanistan and Pakistan (AFPAK) with Pashto and Balochi being the main shared languages (and ethnic groups) shared between the two countries. This also notes that Dari is a specific dialect of the wider Persian language spoken throughout Iran and the broader Middle-East region. Uzbeki, Turkmeni, Nuristani, and Pashai are the other prominent languages considered to be still spoken within Afghanistan.

URL: https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/AFPAK_Language_and_Culture_Training (accessed March 19, 2010)

Resources

This section provides an extensive list of the online resources used in research and recommended for others preparing for deployment to Afghanistan:

- Afghanistan Central Statistics Office (CSO)
<http://www.cso.gov.af/>
- Afghanistan Country Stability Picture (ACSP)
<http://gis.nc3a.nato.int/ACSP/applogin.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2fACSP%2fIndex.aspx>
- Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS)
<http://www.aims.org.af/>
- American Institute for Afghanistan Studies (AIAS)
<http://www.bu.edu/aias>
- Afghanistan-Pakistan Regional Expert Training Program (from JMITC)
https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Afghanistan-Pakistan_Regional_Expert_Training_Program
- Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)
http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=25
- All Partners Access Network (APAN)
<http://community.apan.org/> (Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell (PACC) Group)
- Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS)
<https://forums.bcks.army.mil/> (Professional Forums-Civil Affairs and PSYOP Net, COIN Operations, Human Terrain/Cultural Awareness, MI Space, and Red Team Central)
- Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/index.asp> (Search for Afghanistan)
- Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL)
<http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl/>
- Center for Afghanistan Studies (CAS) at the University of Nebraska Omaha (UNO)
<http://world.unomaha.edu/cas/>
- Central Command (CENTCOM) Human Terrain Analysis Branch (HTAB)
https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/USCENTCOM_Intelligence_Directorate_Afghanistan_Pakistan_Intelligence_Center_of_Excellence_Division_Human_Terrain_Analysis_Branch
- Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) (NATO ACT Civil Military Overview)
<https://www.cimicweb.org>
- Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center
<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/COIN/index.asp>
- Culture of Afghanistan Training (from Intellipedia)
https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Culture_of_Afghanistan_Training
- Defense Language Institute (DLI) Afghan Language Portal
<http://www.dliflc.edu/LangPortal/index.html>
- Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)
<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/> or <https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/FMSO> (Afghanistan)
- Human Terrain Forum (HTF)
<http://www.humanterrainforum.com>
- Human Terrain System (HTS) and Afghanistan Research Reachback Center (RRC)
<http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/default.htm>, <https://www.intelink.gov/blogs/hts-a/>,
<http://hts.gtri.gatech.edu/>, and https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Human_Terrain_System
- Institute for the Study of War (ISW)
<http://www.understandingwar.org/> (Afghanistan Project)
- INDURE/Tabulae (INTAB - Unclassified version of CIDNE & USAID communication network)
<https://www.indtab.com> and <https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Tabulae>

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
<http://www.isaf.nato.int/>

Leader Development & Education for Sustained Peace (LDESP) Program at NPS
<http://www.ldesp.org/public/home.cfm> (Afghanistan)

Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Program for Culture and Conflict Studies (CCS)
<http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/> (Afghanistan)

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) AFPAC Issue Management
https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/NGA_AFPAC_Issue_Management

Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell (PACC)
https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Pakistan_Afghanistan_Coordination_Cell

Rich Contextual Understanding (RCU) Project in Afghanistan
https://nsii.sharestreet.net/x_pakaf/default.aspx or initially <http://tinyurl.com/pakaflogon>
(Request access using Username: pakaf / Password: #DataPassword1)

Socio-Cultural Dynamics Working Group (SCDWG)
https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/Socio-Cultural_Dynamics

Small Wars Journal (SWJ)
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/>

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Culture Center (TCC)
<https://icon.army.mil/apps/tcc/index.cfm> (found on Intelligence Knowledge Network (IKN) under 'Training Toolkit')

Tribal Analysis Center (TAC) – Cultural and Geographic Research
<http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/Research-Completed.html>

University of Military Intelligence (MI Anthropology: Afghanistan online training course)
http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/DOD_Authorization.asp

University of Texas (UT) at Austin Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html>

Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, multi-service, joint, or other pertinent definitions for this monograph.

Section I – Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAA	American Anthropological Association
ACSP	Afghanistan Country Stability Picture
ACT	Allied Command Transformation (NATO)
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ADT	Agribusiness Development Team
AF-PAK	Afghanistan-Pakistan
AGCHO	Afghan Geodesy and Charting Head Office
AIAS	American Institute for Afghanistan Studies
AIMS	Afghanistan Information Management Services
AO	Area of Operation
APAN	All Partners Access Network
ASCOPE	Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events
ASK	Asymmetric Software Kit
BCKS	Battle Command Knowledge System
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
C2	Command and Control
CA	Civil Affairs
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAO	Civil Affairs Operations
CAOCL	Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning
CAOS	Civil Affairs Operating System
CAS	Center for Afghanistan Studies (at UNO)
CAT	Civil Affairs Team
CCIR	Commander's Critical Intelligence (or Information) Requirements
CCS	(NPS Program for) Culture and Conflict Studies
CENTCOM	Central Command
CIDNE	Combined Information Data Network Exchange
CIM	Civil Information Management
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
COE	Center of Excellence
COG	Center Of Gravity
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CONOP	Concept of Operations
COP	Common Operating Picture
CR	Civil Reconnaissance
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CS Monitor	Christian Science Monitor
CSO	Central Statistics Office (Afghanistan)
DA	Department of the Army
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency

DGC	Defence Geographic Centre (UK)
DIGO	Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (Australia)
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DOD	Department of Defense
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities
DSF	District Stability Framework
FAO	Foreign Area Officer
FFIR	Friendly Force Information Requirements
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	Field Manual
FMSO	Foreign Military Studies Office
FOUO	For Official Use Only
GEOINT	Geospatial Intelligence
GIS	Geospatial Information System
HNIR	Host Nation Information Requirements (HNIR)
HTA	Human Terrain Analyst
HTAB	Human Terrain Analysis Branch (at CENTCOM)
HTAT	Human Terrain Analysis Team
HTF	Human Terrain Forum
HTM	Human Terrain Mapping
HTS	Human Terrain System
HTT	Human Terrain Teams
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
INDURE	International Distributed Uniform Reporting Environment
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace
ISW	Institute for the Study of War
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IW	Irregular Warfare
J-CIM	Joint - Civil Information Management
JCTD	Joint Capability Technology Demonstration
JICCEN	Joint Intelligence Cell Central Command
JIEDDO	Joint IED Defeat Organization
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational
JMITC	Joint Military Intelligence Training Center
JP	Joint Publication
JT&E	Joint Test and Evaluation
LDESP	Leader Development & Education for Sustained Peace (Program at NPS)
KM	Knowledge Management
MapHT	Mapping the Human Terrain
METT-TC	Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available, Time available, and Civil considerations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	Network of Concerned Anthropologists
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NGS	National Geographic Society
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
OE	Operational Environment
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom

O&I	Operations and Intelligence
PACC	Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirements
POLMIL	Political-Military
PME	Professional Military Education
PMESII-PT	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical environment, and Time
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RCU	Rich Contextual Understanding
RRC	Research Reachback Center
SCD	Socio-Cultural Dynamics (or factors/information)
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSTR	Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction
STANAG	Standardisation Agreement (NATO)
TCAPF	Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework
TCE	Theater Coordination Element
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UFMCS	University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies
UK	United Kingdom
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNO	University of Nebraska Omaha
UROC	USACE Reachback Operations Center
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAR	U.S. Army Reserve
USMC	United States Marine Corps
WCID	Worldwide Civil Information Database

Section II – Terms and Definitions

- assessment (Army) The continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation. (FM 3-0)
- civil affairs operations (joint) Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 3-57)
- civil considerations The influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. (FM 6-0)
- civil information Information developed from data with relation to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organization, people, and events within the civil component of the commander's operational environment that can be fused or processed to increase DOD/Interagency/intergovernmental organizations/nongovernmental organizations/indigenous populations and institutions situational awareness, situational understanding, or situational dominance. (FM 3-05.40)
- civil information management Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other United States Government and Department of Defense agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. (FM 3-05.40)
- coalition (joint) An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 5-0)
- coalition action (joint) Multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. (JP 5-0)
- command (joint) The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. (JP 1)

command and control

(Army) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders perform command and control functions through a command and control system. (FM 6-0)

command and control system (Army)

The arrangement of personnel, information management, procedures, and equipment and facilities essential for the commander to conduct operations. (FM 6-0)

commander's critical information requirement

(joint) An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision-making. The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. (JP 3-0)

commander's visualization

The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will achieve that end state. (FM 3-0)

common operational picture

(Army) A single display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest tailored to the user's requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command. (FM 3-0)

control

(Army) 1. In the context of command and control, the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander's intent. (FM 3-0) 2. A tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy. (FM 3-90) 3. An action taken to eliminate a hazard or reduce its risk. (FM 5-19) 4. In the context of stability mechanisms, to impose civil order. (FM 3-0) [See JP 1-02 for joint definitions.]

counterinsurgency

(joint) Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (JP 1-02)

engagement

(joint) A tactical conflict, usually between opposing, lower echelon maneuver forces. (JP 1-02)

exceptional information

Specific and immediately vital information that directly affects the success of the current operation. (FM 6-0)

friendly force information requirement (joint)

Information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities. (JP 3-0)

host nation information requirements

Information the commander needs about host nation institutions or organizations in order to develop plans, make decisions, and to integrate military and civilian activities in order to achieve popular support for legitimate government. Depending on the circumstances, information on status of local governance, economic development, infrastructure, or security forces could be HNIR. (Steffan, Pendall, and Franz, 3)

human terrain Information about the physical security, economic security, ideology and belief systems, authority figures, and organizations relevant to major social groups in the area under study. This information comes from open source, unclassified collection and is referenced geo-spatially, relationally, and temporally to enable the creation of various “maps” of the human dynamics in areas where the U.S. has committed forces or other U.S. government officials. (Human Terrain System CONOP, Proof of Concept, 4 Apr 2007)
The element of the operational environment encompassing the cultural, sociological, political and economic factors of the local population. (Human Terrain System Terms of Reference, 29 January 2008)

Those cultural aspects of the battle space that, due to their static nature, can be visually represented on a geographic map. Human terrain is static with respect to change over time; rigid with respect to fluid human relationships; and limited to representing behavior in only two dimensions. (Salmoni and Holmes-Eber, 2008)

human terrain analysis

The analysis of the human terrain information through multiple social science methodologies in support of the Commander’s operational decision-making process. (Human Terrain System Terms of Reference, 29 January 2008)

A multidisciplinary scientific approach to describe and predict geospatial and temporal patterns of human behavior by analyzing the attributes, actions, reactions and interactions of groups or individuals in the context of their environment. (Definition Established by the Defense Intelligence Socio-Cultural Dynamics Working Group)

influence In the context of stability mechanisms, to alter the opinions and attitudes of a civilian population through information engagement, presence, and conduct. (FM 3-0)

information superiority

(joint) The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. (JP 3-13) [Note: In this context, adversary also refers to enemies.]

information system

(Army) Equipment and facilities that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. This includes computers—hardware and software—and communications, as well as policies and procedures for their use. (FM 3-0)

interagency coordination

(joint) Within the context of DOD involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of DOD and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

irregular warfare

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over a population. (FM 3-0)

knowledge management

The art of creating, organizing, applying, and transferring knowledge to facilitate situational understanding and decision-making. Knowledge management supports improving organizational learning, innovation, and performance. Knowledge management processes ensure that knowledge products and services are relevant, accurate, timely, and useable to commanders and decision makers. (FM 3-0)

leadership

The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization. (FM 6-22)

METT-TC

A memory aid used in two contexts: 1. In the context of information management, the major subject categories into which relevant information is grouped for military operations: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations. (FM 6-0) 2. In the context of tactics, major variables considered during mission analysis (mission variables). (FM 3-90)

multinational operations

(joint) A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16)

operational environment

(joint) A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

PMESII-PT

A memory aid for the variables used to describe the operational environment: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time (operational variables). (FM 3-0)

priority intelligence requirement

Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decisionmaking. (JP 1-02)

(joint) An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment. (JP 2-0) [Note: In this context, adversary also refers to enemies.]

relevant information

All information of importance to commanders and staffs in the exercise of command and control. (FM 3-0)

situational awareness

Immediate knowledge of the conditions of the operation, constrained geographically and in time. (FM 3-0)

situational understanding

The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the mission variables to facilitate decision-making.

socio-cultural dynamics

Information about the social, cultural and behavioral factors characterizing the relationships and activities of the population of a specific region or operational environment. (Definition Established by the Defense Intelligence Socio-Cultural Dynamics Working Group)

sociocultural factors

The social, cultural, and behavioral factors characterizing the relationships and activities of the population of a specific region or operational environment. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-01.3) (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

socio-cultural information

Information about the social, cultural, and behavioral factors characterizing the relationships and activities of the population of a specific region or operational environment. (Human Terrain System Terms of Reference, 29 January 2008)

stability operations

(joint) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

synchronization

(joint) The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. (JP 2-0)

system

(joint) A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. (JP 3-0)

unified action

(joint) The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

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