Gauging the Fullness of Our Full Spectrum Operations

A Monograph
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14. ABSTRACT
Officer education is a major component in the preparation for the next war. The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is the Army’s principal institution for educating field grade officers. War’s chameleon nature sometimes denies and frustrates the ability of nations to accurately predict and prepare for the next war. The major dichotomy plaguing the prediction and preparation for the next war is major conventional combat operations and irregular warfare. Army doctrine currently places these supposed polar opposites within the full spectrum of operations. This research examines how well CGSC prepared officers for full spectrum operations in two historical case studies. This monograph argues that CGSC failed to prepare officers for full spectrum operations. Three significant factors contributing to this failure are the nature of the strategic environment and how it informs senior leaders and CGSC; the incidence of normal theory of civil-military relations; and multi-layered cognitive dissonance amongst Army senior leaders and within the Army officer corps. The strategic environment facilitates the nation’s ability to differentiate between national survival and national interest as it prioritizes national security concerns. The strategic, foreign policy-making conversations between Army senior leaders and the President underscore the importance of civil-military relations. The complexity of the strategic environment and the civil-military relationship can create dissonant ideas for individuals and the institution. This monograph concludes with recommendations for officer education to address these three concerns.

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Officer education is a major component in the preparation for the next war. The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is the Army’s principal institution for educating field grade officers. War’s chameleon nature sometimes denies and frustrates the ability of nations to accurately predict and prepare for the next war. The major dichotomy plaguing the prediction and preparation for the next war is major conventional combat operations and irregular warfare. Army doctrine currently places these supposed polar opposites within the full spectrum of operations. This research examines how well CGSC prepared officers for full spectrum operations in two historical case studies. This monograph argues that CGSC failed to prepare officers for full spectrum operations. Three significant factors contributing to this failure are the nature of the strategic environment and how it informs senior leaders and CGSC; the incidence of normal theory of civil-military relations; and multi-layered cognitive dissonance amongst Army senior leaders and within the Army officer corps. The strategic environment facilitates the nation’s ability to differentiate between national survival and national interest as it prioritizes national security concerns. The strategic, foreign policy-making conversations between Army senior leaders and the President underscore the importance of civil-military relations. The complexity of the strategic environment and the civil-military relationship can create dissonant ideas for individuals and the institution. This monograph concludes with recommendations for officer education to address these three concerns.
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Section 1

Introduction

The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) first opened its doors as the School of Application of Infantry and Cavalry (SAIC) in 1881. The school sprang from General Sherman’s and other Army leaders’ experiences in the Civil War and their realization that Army officer development had to change. Haphazard heuristics would no longer suffice on a battlefield where technology was rapidly shaping future conflicts. Thus, “the establishment of SAIC at Leavenworth marked a significant watershed in US military history” as the school “consciously promoted postgraduate education and peacetime training for Army officers and changed the concept of learning from the one based solely on trial-and-error and wartime experience.” Since its inception and through its many permutations, CGSC has neither closed its doors nor absolved itself of its mission for preparing officers.

How well has CGSC prepared officers for full spectrum operations when warfare tended to be other than conventional such as prior to Vietnam and after the Cold War? An answer to this may be that CGSC failed to prepare officers for full spectrum operations because of the strategic environment, the Army’s senior leadership displayed cognitive dissonance toward counterinsurgency, and the officer corps adhered to the “normal” theory of civil-military relations.

Today’s CGSC mission states the purpose is to “educate and develop leaders for full spectrum joint, interagency and multinational operations, act as lead agent for the Army’s leader development program, and advance the art and science of the profession

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2 Ibid., 15.
of arms in support of the Army’s operational requirement.”³ Full spectrum operations became doctrine in February 2008 with the publication of the latest version of Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations. This milestone gave the impression of a novel conception of warfare that challenged previous attempts and iterations of the Army’s capstone operational doctrine.⁴ German theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted throughout On War that the nature of war has many guises, calling it “more than a true chameleon.”⁵ Regardless of theoretical confirmation, unconventional or irregular warfare played a poignant role in U.S. American history starting with the American Revolution and continuing with Reconstruction, the Indian Wars, and the Philippine Insurrection. These experiences provided ample opportunities for generations of officers to not only codify, but embrace, at an institutional level, warfare as something other than a conventional construct. In fact, the exact opposite seems to have occurred. Warfare appears to have been conceptualized primarily as a series of engagements between uniformed combatants representing nation-states.⁶ This single idea filtered other information which was perhaps contrary to institution’s assessment of reality.

There is general consensus that the United States attempted to fight the conflict in Vietnam in a conventional manner. Historian Brian M. Linn offers the perspective that senior leaders saw “irregular war as an organizational problem – one that could best be

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⁴ Army Capstone doctrine include FM 3-0 and previously FM 100-5. This monograph looks at the capstone doctrine within case study boundaries, FM 100-5 (1954, 1962 and 1993)


⁶ The 1962 version of FM 100-5 recognized a spectrum of war as having three nodes. On one end is the conflict using elements of national power short of using military force. This was cold war. Its opposite is general war, which envisioned the unrestricted application of military force. At the spectrum’s center was limited war, which was anything involving military force save its unrestricted application. FM 100-5 Field Service Regulations: Operations. (February 1962), 4-5. In the previous edition to FM 100-5, “the basic doctrine of Army operations is the defeat of an enemy by application of military power directly or indirectly against the armed forces which support his political structure.” FM 100-5 Field Service Regulations: Operations. (September 1954), 5.
solved by turning indigenous forces into carbon copies of the US Army.” 7 Department of Defense (DOD) analyst Andrew Krepinevich offers a blunt judgment that “the United States was neither trained nor organized to fight effectively in an insurgency conflict environment.”8 This was despite evidence, prior to the direct American involvement in Southeast Asia, that the enemy was not fighting in a purely conventional capacity. American involvement in Vietnam was not the result of a surprise attack at dawn on a Sunday morning. This echoes of Clausewitz’s counsel that, “War never breaks out wholly unexpectedly, nor can it spread instantaneously.”9

National survival ought to loom foremost in the military mind. This trait is part of the military officer’s professional competence, the goal of which is to “estimate the threat as accurately as possible… and to stress the dangers to military security.”10 The threat is necessary as an impetus to maintain the military establishment and expend national resources toward preparing to meet that threat, which directly feeds into the army’s institutional perception of war and its perceptions for how it will train for war. Linn’s book, The Echo of Battle, speaks directly to the US Army’s capacity for perceiving war and the logic of its system. Linn contends that, “Appreciating a national way of war requires going beyond the narrative of operations, beyond debates on the merits of attrition or annihilation, firepower and mobility, military genius or collective professional ability. It requires the essential recognition that the way a military force conducts war very much depends on how it prepares for war.”11 Linn implies that an investigation is needed in

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9 Clausewitz. On War, 78.


11 Linn. The Echo of Battle, 3.
how the Army learns from its experiences and applies those lessons to the future. Krepinevich, in *The Army in Vietnam*, concurs and adds that the Army's approach to war is key to understanding this condition of being inefficient and ineffective in a “low-intensity” conflict.  

Professional militaries must embody the distinguishing characteristics of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. The corporateness of the military manifests itself in how it “formalizes and applies the standards of professional competence and establishes and enforces the standards of professional responsibility.”  

In the United States Army, this responsibility falls on the shoulders of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). It exists for the expressed reason of educating and preparing officers for service to the nation. Since its inception in 1881, the college has evolved with the changing times. Originally, the “ultimate objective... aimed to create an elite, highly skilled officer corps, particularly the staff, educated in the art of warfare, who could adapt to technological advances such as the breech-loading rifle.” Through the course of two World Wars and the burgeoning status of the nation on the world stage, CGSC’s scope also changed. In the late 1950s, nuclear weapons replaced breech loading rifles as the new technology that needed to be mastered and in 1955 with the creation of the Continental Army Command (CONARC) as its higher headquarters, CGSC became charged with “the development of doctrine for all of the combined arms and services.”  

Also in reaction to the fast-paced technological change of the era, Chief of Staff of the Army General George H. Decker formed a new command at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,

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the Combat Developments Command (CDC) with the responsibility for “determining the Army’s future needs and developing broad policies and concepts to meet them.”  

Significantly, it is not simply a matter of defining a threat and preparing for it. There are many contributing factors to how a nation prepares for war. Military professionals do not just extrapolate pertinent lessons and distill these lessons into doctrinal prose. Hence historian and political scientist Eliot Cohen’s assertion that, “The reality of battle is often obscure.” This is due in large part to individuals having a voice in determining what is pertinent. No two people necessarily experience the same events during a conflict and perceive them in the same way; as a result there is no basis for determining objectively what contributed to success or failure. Linn, in *The Echo of Battle*, postulates that “the army has developed three distinct intellectual traditions that together make up the army way of war.” These three traditions shape the peacetime intellectual debate as much as the actual wartime service because the traditions form a composite interpretation of the past, its perceptions of present threats, and its prediction of future hostilities. Linn’s idea resonates with Systems Engineer Peter Checkland, who offered the observation that, “The complexity of problematical situations in real life stems from the fact that...they contain multiple interacting perceptions of reality, world views.”

This monograph offers insight into the Army’s way of war. From the moment the President made the decision to invade Iraq, the specter of Vietnam rose from its grave.

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19 Ibid., 233-234.  
Not originally linked to the metaphor, but two years longer in the tooth, Afghanistan is also drawing those comparisons. These specters challenge the idea that conventional warfare lies at the heart of the Army’s experience. Learning how the Army got into these situations is as important as learning how it got out of these situations. The myth of the renaissance is well-recited, but it has not necessarily set the Army up for long term success. Coming out of the Vietnam experience, the Army, as part of its self-proclaimed renaissance, purposefully relegated irregular warfare to a secondary role. In Professor Richard Swain’s words, “The shattering experience of the loss of the war in Vietnam conditioned the doctrinal revolution in the US Army in the 1970s and 1980s.”\textsuperscript{21} The impact of this decision resonated thirty years later. Until very recently, the Army continued to view conventional operations as the \textit{sine qua non} of warfare.

Seeing warfare as a dichotomy, and not a striation of hues, unnecessarily handicaps officers in a profession where mental agility is as valuable as physical prowess. It is important to understand the reasons why this institutional blind spot occurs and to gird the institution for such pitfalls in the future.

\textbf{Methodology}

This monograph examines two eras, 1959-1964 and 1997-2001. This monograph’s organization includes five sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 discusses the Army’s history with the full spectrum of operations and the Army’s way of war. Information for this came primarily from secondary sources such as historians and theorists. Sections 3 and 4 are the case studies, specifically answering the research question. They each focused on the curriculum, civil-military relations, senior leader perspectives, and the strategic environment. Information about the strategic environment

came from a mix of primary and secondary sources. National security documents from both eras, such as NSC-68, Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and National Security Strategies, were available on the internet. For the discussion on senior leaders, primary source material was available in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), specifically for the commandants of the 1950s and 1960s. In the latter day era, the archival material was either not there or classified in a non-attribution status. These commandants, however, wrote articles for the *Military Review*, which provide insight into their messages and ideas. The CARL also contains extensive archival material on the curriculum and its development during the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, the CARL contains every *Military Review* in either hardcopy or in digital format. This is also true for capstone doctrine. Section 5 contains a comparison and analysis of these case studies. The monograph ends with conclusions and recommendations.

**Terminology**

Since 2007, the Army has focused on full spectrum operations. Doctrine defines full spectrum operations as Army forces combining offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action – lethal and nonlethal – proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment.22 This was not the case in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the Army and the nation entered Vietnam.

Using contemporary principles for understanding the environment does not necessary obviate the possibility that a pre-existing idea may present an obstacle to full

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understanding. Such an occurrence is cognitive dissonance, which psychologist Leon 
Festinger argues occurs when two cognitions (ideas) have incongruent relations.23 This 
situation creates pressure to reduce the dissonance by either changing one of the ideas 
or changing behavior. Either solution may prove ineffective. As a result, dissonance 
persists. For this monograph, one example of cognitive dissonance is the decision to 
embrace the strategy of flexible response and engage in a counterinsurgency fight in 
Vietnam.24 This was dissonant with the Army’s cognition of itself and of war as being 
conventional. This situation occurred again forty years later with the operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Festinger’s theory focuses almost exclusively with the individual. He 
recognizes that cognitive dissonance arises from the variety of sources that provide the 
individual with his cognitions (ideas), which include the different aspects of reality: 
physical, social, and psychological.25 One can extrapolate that culture, whether 
institutional or group, feeds directly into the individual’s social reality and that it is 
possible then for entire groups to possess dissonant cognitions. The emergence of 
cognitive dissonance stems from individual tolerance for the dissonance.26 The cognitive 
dissonance this monograph discovers therefore may be in individual instances, but 
results by and large from institutional sources.

Eliot Cohen defines the normal theory of civil-military relations as a division of 
labor between soldiers and statesmen.27 This delineation of responsibilities sets the

1957), 4.

24 Flexible Response was a National Military Policy formulated by Maxwell Taylor to replace 
Massive retaliation and enable “the United States… to respond anywhere, anytime, with weapons and 
Brothers, Publishers 1960), 146; Counterinsurgency is “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, 
psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.” FM 1-02, *Operational Terms 


26 Ibid., 268.

condition for a lack of consonance between national and military strategy with the result that national objectives are not achieved.

Limitations

This monograph is limited to an analysis of CGSC and the environment surrounding CGSC from 1959 to 1964 and from 1997 to 2001. Implicit in studying these two eras is the evolution of terms and their meanings. As defined above, full spectrum operations is a term with a particular meaning in today’s setting. As noted earlier, the colloquialism may be found in period texts of several eras, but it may not have the same resonance as it does today. Specifically, the 1962 version of 100-5 set a spectrum of war between cold, where hostilities do not yet occur, to limited, where hostilities do not involve nuclear weapons, to general, which involved unrestricted use of resources.\(^28\)

This monograph searched for emphasis on warfare as being other than conventional.

This monograph is also limited to studying the Regular Course or Resident Course in modern parlance rather than the Associate or Mobilization Courses as they existed in the 1950s and 1960s. This limitation is with the understanding that other courses or schools within the United States Army may have attempted to prepare officers and soldiers for duty in Southeast Asia. CGSC was, however, responsible for the broader population and with the eventual escalation of forces into Vietnam, it was this population which grappled with the intricacies of counterinsurgency and full spectrum operations.

Section 2 – Who We Are Is What We Did

The United States Army and Full Spectrum Operations, 1776-1950

Historian Russell Weigley’s assumption that “what we believe and what we do today is governed at least as much by the habits of mind we formed in the relatively

\(^{28}\) FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations: Operations*, 1962, 4-6.
remote past as by what we did and thought yesterday” is pertinent to this analysis and forms the basis for the following discussion. From its inception during the American Revolution through the onset of the Cold War, the US Army’s experience was not exclusively in conventional warfare. As Historian Andrew Birtle notes, “the Army has spent the majority of its time not on the conventional battlefield, but in the performance of myriad operations other than war.” This perception is partially the result of improperly bounding the subject material. For example, American Civil War historians tend toward emphasizing the war’s conventional aspects and the glories of its battles. Unconventional aspects of the conflict are rarely juxtaposed with the popular mention of battles such as Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. Political analyst Anthony Cordesman notes that “a real history of the Civil War would have to cover the entire period from at least 1860 to 1877.” Historian Lawrence Yates cites legislation passed during President Andrew Johnson’s administration that effectively put the Army in “complete control of implementing reconstruction.” During this period, federal troops, organized into five districts, maintained order, provided security, initiated comprehensive measures to set up new state governments, hold elections, ensure the rights and welfare of the newly


31 Unconventional warfare arguably paralleled conventional battles during the Civil War. The most notorious is John Mosby’s Rangers, as an example of uniformed guerrillas, but his example only obscures other non-uniformed partisans, mostly farmers, that confounded Union operations in the South. Mark Moyar, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 15-32.

freed slaves, and revolutionize the South’s economic infrastructure. Clearly, conventional warfare paradigms did not mesh with this scenario.

Framing issues aside, the fact remains that the US Army has a plethora of experience in the full spectrum of operations. As Army Lieutenant Colonel James Campbell observes, “Asymmetrical conflict, insurgency, stability operations, and constabulary operations in ungoverned or poorly governed space are not new at all… they are the norm.” Recalling that doctrine defines full spectrum operations as Army forces combining offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations, the many names for Army actions fall under this umbrella. This includes what Birtle refers to as the Constabulary Years from 1865 to 1898, when he quotes an Army officer in the 19th century, that “in reality, the Army is now a gendarmerie – national police.” The Reconstruction of the South was nothing less than a stability operation in modern parlance.

Yates takes a slightly broader view, focusing specifically on the American experience with stability operations. He asserts that “if American armed forces have fought fewer than a dozen major conventional wars in over two centuries, they have, during the same period, engaged in several hundred military undertakings that would today be characterized as stability operations.” Yates organizes the US military’s experience into four periods. Two are relevant in this monograph: the nation’s first century (1789-1898) and the Small Wars experience (1898-1940).

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34 James D. Campell, “Making Riflemen From Mud: Restoring the Army’s Culture of Irregular Warfare.” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2007), 2-3.


During the nation’s first century, Yates characterizes the stability operations conducted by the army as those focused on either building or securing the country’s infrastructure.\textsuperscript{37} Linn complements this characterization, by this definition of “unconventional warfare,” which consisted of partisan and guerrilla operations, and punitive expeditions that were simply a “continuation of America’s long-standing struggle between colonists and native inhabitants.”\textsuperscript{38} Specifically, prior to the Civil War, Yates lists the Second Seminole War as an example of when the military had to adapt its tactics, techniques and procedures to succeed in the swamps of Florida.\textsuperscript{39} This necessity for continuing to balance warfare with peacekeeping duties continued after the Civil War when the Army became involved in Indian affairs in the Great Plains, Northwest and Southwest.

Unconventional warfare and stability operations did not occur exclusively, however, in the Continental United States. President McKinley took the United States onto the world stage with the Spanish-American War. This provided the Army with the opportunity for broadening its perspectives on distant shores. Despite taking European-style actions, the experience was not purely conventional as the military government imposed by Washington on Cuba focused on cleaning up the country and refashioning its political, economic, social, and military institutions in America’s image. There was a slightly different experience in the Philippines, where American policies instigated a Filipino nationalist uprising. Yates notes that the US-Philippine War began conventionally in 1899, but the insurgents quickly adopted guerrilla tactics and forced the

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{38} Linn, \textit{The Echo of Battle}, 68.
\textsuperscript{39} The Second Seminole War occurred from 1835 to 1842 as part of the US government’s policy to relocate Native American groups living east of the Mississippi River to the western territories (55). Yates, \textit{The US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005}, 4.
US to devise effective counter-guerrilla measures to secure American rule and governance of the archipelago.\textsuperscript{40}

The Philippines case study provides numerous lessons on how the Army learned and adapted to a foe operating with a home field advantage. Historian Robert Ramsey notes that initial policies and inclinations were not successful in the early phase. The US viewed itself as shouldering the “white man’s burden,” but when resistance persisted, the Army returned to a conventional approach of removing the problem, namely, killing and capturing. It took another year, under General Arthur MacArthur, for the Army’s counter-guerrilla policies to gain traction.\textsuperscript{41}

After the turn of the century, America’s interventions overseas continued with China’s Boxer Rebellion, fighting the Bolsheviks in White Russia, and the occupation of Vera Cruz.\textsuperscript{42} Previous unconventional experience facilitated American operations. For instance, General Adna Chaffee, commander of American occupation zone in China, used his western frontier and Cuban experience to guide his policies.\textsuperscript{43} All of these


\textsuperscript{42} The Peking Relief Expedition marked the Army’s first overseas contingency operation. The Army administered Peking first through military courts and using military troops for policing actions and later by re-establishing the Chinese police and judicial institutions. They also supervised the “repair of roads and buildings, installed street lighting, established hospitals and schools, and closed opium dens. Birtle, \textit{US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941}, 148-149; Coalition pressure from Great Britain and France during World War I was the impetus for the American expeditions to Northern Russia at Archangel and at Vladivostok in Siberia. At both locations the American forces primarily protected supplies, fought Bolsheviks, protected lines of communication, and attempted to bring stability to their respective regions. Ibid., 209-218; This campaign originated out of the President’s desire “to teach the South American republics to elect good men!” Ibid., 192.

\textsuperscript{43} While still dealing with the Philippines, President Roosevelt tasked the Army with “another major constabulary mission” in Cuba. This nation-building mission came as the result of an appeal for American aid because of a revolution emerging due to fraudulent elections. Birtle, \textit{US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941}, 168-169; Yates, \textit{The US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-200}, 64.
expeditions represented limited objectives and hence, war far short of the total national
struggles for survival.

World War II, the epitome of conventional and total warfare, was also not exclusively conventional. The Army derived significant unconventional experience from both the Pacific and European theaters. Some of this involved fighting with the French resistance against Nazi Germany, fighting against the Japanese in the Philippines after the fall of Bataan, or fighting in Burma with the Chinese against Japan. Significantly, the Army’s first counterinsurgency doctrine originated with a Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann, who fought the Japanese in the Philippines. 44

Immediately after the war, the UN charter notwithstanding, peace did not immediately settle over the globe. Fighting continued and not always conventionally. American roles and attitudes towards policing the commons changed. Historian Andrew Birtle characterizes much of America’s experience as advisory, citing the Chinese Civil War, which ran from 1945-1949, and the Greek insurgency, during the same period as the bulk of military experience in the immediate aftermath of World War II. 45

As evidenced above, the United States Army’s history was not exclusive to conventional warfare. Experience, however, is not necessarily indicative of desires or focuses. In fact, despite its broad experiences in warfare, the American Army’s normative perception of war remained contrary to its experience.

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45 While Birtle notes that the experience gained by Volckman and institutionalized in FM 31-15 was too late to aid the advisory effort in Greece, the Greek Insurgency more resembled conflicts the US would encounter in Vietnam and other places where a myriad of social issues simmered beneath the surface and attempted to shape the country. Ibid., 42.
The American Way of War

There are many nuances to a national way of war. These include how the army fights, perceives itself, and interacts with its civilian masters. Sociologist Carl Builder argues that “the dominant concepts of war held by military institutions have a significant effect upon the kinds of forces they acquire and train, and therefore, upon the kinds of wars they are prepared to fight and that these dominant concepts of war probably serve their peacetime institutional interests rather than serve their preparedness for the next major war.”

There are several different perspectives on the “American Way of War” as informed by Builder’s construct.

Russell F. Weigley, the originator of the term, states that the American Way of War through most of American history has been a strategy of annihilation. The Army in Vietnam supports Weigley when Krepinevich argues that the Army Concept of War, reflecting how it trains and organizes its troops for battle, is a focus on mild-intensity, or conventional war, and reliance on high volumes of firepower to minimize casualties. Focusing on the conventional aspects of war is contrary to the preponderance of the Army’s experience and representative of the impact of non-traditional combat on the Army’s doctrine. Birtle observes that “other constabulary experiences greatly interfered with the Army’s ability to prepare itself, both organizationally and intellectually, for modern warfare” and that even the finest officers, Generals Pershing and Leonard Wood, worried about the diversion and pressed for a reorientation of Army training toward conventional operations. Pershing and Wood are examples of the Army’s internal narrative focusing on a favored form of warfare versus an un-favored form,

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47 Weigley, The American Way of War, xxii.
which is an important perception to acknowledge. Their perception may be attributable to how they wanted Europe to view the United States. Fighting small wars on the frontier was not achieving for the United States any global respect, but having a mass conventional army on par with European nations achieved that to some degree.

The way an army fights is directly representative of how it perceives itself. Carl Builder uses five aspects in understanding the military services: altars for worship, concerns with self-measurement, preoccupation with toys versus arts, degrees and extent of intraservice distinctions, and insecurities about service legitimacy. These characteristics are often implicit in the service’s character and not recognized by the service members themselves. Builder’s theory is important because it portrays the Army as the most subservient of the three services and hence, the most likely, due to its relative security, to obey its civilian leadership. There are aspects of his theory, though, which are contradictory and thus lend themselves to cognitive dissonance. Specifically, Builder says the Army measures itself based on size and focuses more on soldiering skills than toys and technology. While these two aspects may not be strictly mutually exclusive, there is also no defined causal link between them.

Brian Linn offers a theory of competing traditions to explain how the Army perceives itself. Linn’s theory involves the three distinct personalities noted earlier, as

50 Builder, The Masks of War, 17-30. Builder considers the Army’s altar of worship to be the country, with service as its means, which contrasts tradition for the Navy and technology for the Air Force. In regard to measuring themselves, Builder says the Army is the “most phlegmatic,” conditioned to growing and shrinking, most likely concerned about “end strength of its active component.” The Army’s end strength during peacetime serves as a barometer for how well the service is doing, which really reflects its estimation of itself. This barometer, however, does not necessarily correlate to effectiveness in war. With regards to toys versus arts, the Army, again in contrast to the Navy and the Air Force, “takes greater pride in the basic skills of soldiering than in their equipment.” While intraservice distinctions are not pertinent to this discussion ideas of institutional legitimacy and relevance are absolutely relevant. Builder considers institutional legitimacy to be “the confidence of the service in its rightful independent status and the pertinence of its missions and capabilities.” He asserts that the Army is the most secure of the three services, despite the Air Force challenge following World War II.
the Guardians, Heroes, and Managers.\textsuperscript{51} This theory has important consequences when viewed in contrast to Builder's argument and the notion of civil-military relations. Linn notes that "civilians erroneously assume that individual officers, and certainly generals, speak for the entire service when they articulate the Army's mission and strategy."\textsuperscript{52} Instead of the service writ large, the officer is representing one of the three martial traditions. Hence, an officer from the “manager” tradition may not be focused on the soldiering, but on technological systems and the size of the force while an officer from the ‘heroes’ tradition is not concerned with force structure and only obsesses on soldiering skills. The potential for cognitive dissonance is significant if the personalities serving in senior leadership positions do not maintain a balance between the three traditions.

Finally, historian Antulio Echevarria provides an additional perspective to the civil-military relationship endemic in the American Way of War. He observes that “despite some evident exceptions, Moltke’s segregated grammarian approach to war – rather than Clausewitz’s view of policy and war as a logical continuum – seems to bear the greater resemblance to the American tradition of warfare.”\textsuperscript{53} Echevarria’s assertion implies that the Army viewed its responsibilities in war as a football handed off to them from the quarterback, who just called the play. The ball remained in their hands until the completion of the play or in this case the completion of the war. Krepinevich references

\textsuperscript{51} Linn, \textit{The Echo of Battle}, 5-8. Guardians represented the rationalism of the Renaissance. War, for them, was both art and science. These contrasts with the Heroes, representing romanticism, who emphasized the human element and the intangibles, like genius, experience, courage, and morale that go with it. Finally the Managers focused on organizational aspects of the army and its relation to war, which represent progressivism.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 235.

\textsuperscript{53} Clausewitz uses the metaphor of grammar twice in \textit{On War}. He asserts that war is a form of expression by politicians and while it may have its own grammar, it does not have its own logic. Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, 605. Grammar represents, to Echevarria, a system of rules. Hence Moltke is more Jominian than Clausewitian in his application of war. Antulio J. Echevarria III, “War’s Second Grammar,” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2009), 1; Antulio J. Echevarria III, “Toward an American Way of War,” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2004), 2.
this perception as isolated spheres, political and military when he alludes to an Army leadership that was “accustomed to being given its objective by the political leadership and then having a relatively free reign in achieving it.” Cohen’s normal theory resonates with both Krepinevich and Echevarria. It postulates an analogy with the statesman as only the setter of goals, not accounting for how objectives and strategic methods may change. The military man becomes merely an executor, who views the war and the military as his domain and any attempts at civilian control as micro-managing. Normal theory potentially counters Builder’s argument that the Army is most likely to countenance civilian control, especially when personality clashes between civilian and military leaders exacerbate the relationship.

Section 3 – Case Study 1: 1959-1964

Strategic Setting

The decade following the Second World War directly influenced American involvement in Vietnam. A confluence of factors in the strategic environment set the stage to include the immediate threat perceived as communism and embodied by the Soviet Union, the role of the United States as one of two superpowers, and the arrival of nuclear weapons and peripheral technology, which redefined total war. To understand the strategic setting, it is necessary to look at the world through the lens the actor used as he was going through it. Doing this achieves a perspective in the Marxian sense, as part of historical waves and on-going legacies, rather than as a discrete block of time as history is apt to present it. Hence the events, years and decades previous to 1959,

56 “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.” Karl Marx, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, (London: The Electric Book Company, 2001), 7.
influenced actors’ perceptions, options, and choices, just as the result of their action would influence actors in the future.

No document better describes the idea of the United States, locked in an ideological battle for survival with the Soviet Union, than National Security Council Document 68 (NSC 68). This document clearly defined the principle threat to the United States as the Soviet Union which was “animated by a new fanatic faith, anti-thetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.” The risk of conflict became “endemic,” waged as it was by the Soviet Union through “violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency.” NSC-68 invoked the Constitution as it reaffirmed the nation’s fundamental purpose as “assuring the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded on the dignity and worth of the individual.” Professor and historian John Lewis Gaddis notes that the authors of NSC-68 believed in the Soviet Union’s conventional superiority in arms as well as the likelihood that they would close the gap in nuclear weapons. NSC-68 and the psychology that created it did not dissipate with time as the buzz word for the next several decades became “containment.” The result was that NSC-68 placed the United States in a state of undeclared war with the Soviet Union and this perception governed and influenced decisions related to how the United States addressed itself toward the world and changes in technology.


58 NSC-68, 3.

59 Ibid.

60 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 96.
Containment fell under one of two subsidiary policies. NSC-68 defined containment as seeking “by all means short of war to 1) block further expansion of Soviet Power, 2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, 3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin’s control and influence, and 4) foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system.” The Korean War served as a double entendre reinforcing the implementation of NSC 68 and, consequently, the perceptions held by the United States about the nature of the Soviet communist threat.

NSC-68 also influenced the United States’ role as a superpower. Russell Weigley states that emerging from World War II as one of two superpowers resulted in new international responsibilities for the United States that “entailed permanent participation in world politics and permanent, not intermittent, employment of the armed forces to serve national policies.” This demanded a change in how the United States viewed its armed forces and how it would subsequently use its armed forces to obtain policy objectives. Weigley summarizes that before 1945, elements of a deterrence strategy were secondary to using the armed forces in active pursuit of its objects, while after 1945, a strategy of deterrence became paramount. More than just deterrence, foreign policy during the Cold War involved influencing other nations to join one side against another. Now every action the United States took was part of a propaganda campaign to the rest of the world about its virtues relative to the evils perpetrated by the Soviets.

Finally, nuanced into every conversation, whether about the Soviet Union specifically or the new world in general, technology played an important part. Implementing the deterrence strategy varied from President to President, specifically

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61 NSC-68, Section IV, A.
64 Weigley, The American Way of War, 367.
their different methodologies for the integration of atomic and nuclear weapons. The integration of nuclear weapons profoundly impacted the Army and CGSC, precisely because different senior leaders saw the integration differently.

**Senior Leaders**

Presidents provide, as the Commander-in-Chief, the ultimate guidance for the Department of Defense.\(^6^5\) This guidance changes with each Administration and its perception of the strategic environment. NSC-68 influenced the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations (and others) albeit subconsciously or not. Eisenhower and Kennedy took significantly different approaches in light of NSC-68.

President Dwight Eisenhower based his strategy, called the “New Look,” on three propositions: the Cold War was going to last for a long time, the US must remain strong economically and militarily, and due to the unlikelihood of another world war, the Cold War effort should remain in the political and psychological arenas.\(^6^6\) As a result, in the wake of the Korean conflict, the United States adopted a "military posture that emphasized nuclear capability through air power rather than ground combat."\(^6^7\) National Security Council Document 162/2 defined the boundaries of the containment policy and bolstered strategic airpower as its means.\(^6^8\) The official military strategy became known as “massive retaliation.”\(^6^9\)

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The Army Chiefs of Staff under President Eisenhower did not like massive retaliation or its consequences. NSC 162/2 and cuts in the Army’s end strength by 100,000 soldiers demanded changes to the Army’s organizational structure. General Matthew Ridgway, the Army Chief of Staff “challenged the very rationale of Eisenhower’s defense policies, while reshaping the Army in the image of their own vision of… warfare.” General Lyman L. Lemnitzer voiced in 1955 that due to reduced budgets and manpower strengths “the very survival of the Army… is at stake,” which harkens to Builder’s theory that Army strength is a barometer for Army officers on the health of the organization. The reorganization of the Army structure to the Pentomic Army took eight years (the entire Eisenhower tenure in office) to complete and left Army leaders feeling the Army was not doing well.

An enigmatic personality, in and out of the Army, General Maxwell Taylor played an integral role in shaping American foreign and military policy during both Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s administrations. Taylor served as Chief of Staff under Eisenhower and is ultimately responsible for the Army’s official acceptance of the Pentomic Army. After he left the service, however, Taylor coined the term “flexible response” in his book *Uncertain Trumpet* and laid out the framework for the strategy. The book oddly met a

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70 Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 279.
72 Ibid., 21.
73 The final divisional end-strength was approximately 4,000 soldiers less than the Army employed in Korea. For more on the different permutations and evolution of the Pentomic divisional structure during this era see, Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 263-286.
74 Taylor replaced Ridgway as Chief of Staff, who only served one term, albeit with a wavier for his age since he was past the age of 60. It is plausible then that Taylor came into his position with the pre-approval from Eisenhower that he would get the ball moving on the Army’s reorganization. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 270-271.
lukewarm response at CGSC, while General Lemnitzer received it more warmly. Taylor later served the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations in variety of capacities, in and out of uniform. Ironically, Taylor represented through three administrations, considerable consistency in his policies and perspectives.

Changes in the world and within the United States Army resulted, predictably, in changes at Fort Leavenworth, which began with the arrival of CGSC Commandant Major General Lionel McGarr in 1956. According to Dr. Ivan Birrer, an educational planner at CGSC for over twenty years, McGarr's mandate as the new commandant was specifically to get the College "into the present century." Birrer noted that some of this change was already underfoot since reorganization into the Pentomic Army and a directive for increased instruction on atomic warfare the curriculum.

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76 The publication of *Uncertain Trumpet* instigated a series of memorandums by McGarr into formulating an “objective” stance on General Taylor’s opinions. He opines that the process for formulating such an opinion took too long and could not aid General Lemnitzer during a press conference when he addressed the book. Lionel C. McGarr. Office of the Commandant Note to the Assistant Commandant, Chief of Staff, Future Plans Officer, CGSC Form 181 (Rev). (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 4 January 1960), 1; __________. Office of the Commandant Note to the Assistant Commandant, Chief of Staff, Future Plans Officer, CGSC Form 181 (Rev). (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 6 January 1960), 1; __________. “The Uncertain Trumpet.” Memorandum for the Assistant Commandant. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 8 February 1960), 1; __________. Improvement in Military Review. Memorandum for the Assistant Commandant. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 17 March 1960), 1; __________. “The Uncertain Trumpet.” Memorandum for the Assistant Commandant. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 18 March 1960), 1; Binder makes the case that Lemnitzer approved the concept wholeheartedly, but disdained the actual term in favor of his own. L. James Binder, *Lemnitzer: A Soldier for his Time*. (Washington: Brassey’s, 1997), 243.

77 Kennedy first as Taylor to chair an investigation into the Bay of Pigs fiasco, which later parlayed into a recall onto active duty as military representative to the President, then as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and finally as Ambassador to South Vietnam. John M. Taylor, *An American Soldier: The Wars of General Maxwell Taylor*. (California: Presidio Press Inc, 1989), 230-297.

78 Changes in the world include: ascension of the United States to a superpower with global responsibilities; nuclear weaponry and peripheral technology such as rockets and missiles; bi-polar world. Pentomic Army is the most significant change within the Army during this period.


80 Concurrently, beginning with the previous tenure of Major General Garrison Davidson and accelerated under McGarr, the school was changing its instructor style from mass lecture halls to small
McGarr possessed a holistic vision with regards to changing the curriculum and preparing officers for the future. In a speech at the annual Founder’s Day dinner, McGarr remarked “Fort Leavenworth’s revised organization and reoriented curriculum together with its modernized educational philosophy have placed the emphasis on forward-looking doctrine and its use in improving the ability of our students to think soundly, decide logically, and operate forcefully on the battlefields of the future.”

The Department of the Army validated General McGarr’s improvements in the 1958 Officer Education and Training Review Board led by Lieutenant General Edward T. Williams. Until 1960, external reviews focused not on content, but were instead focused on efficiency and efficacy toward eliminating needless redundancy and creating a comprehensive approach toward officer education. Indeed Dr. Birrer notes that despite periodic external assessments and excluding exceptional instances of direct orders from CONARC, the curriculum was entirely the prerogative of the Commandant.

Despite the emphasis on nuclear technology, McGarr found a place for guerrilla warfare in the curriculum. A faculty memorandum in 1957 established “the basic guidance for the incorporation of Aggressor guerrilla warfare into the 1958 instruction” and placed guerrilla warfare in the context of what is contemporarily called compound groups. Needless to say, Birrer described this time at Fort Leavenworth as nothing less than turbulent. Doughty, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer,” 39.

81 Founder’s Day is the commemoration of the beginning of the United States Military Academy, which usually takes place on or around March 168; Department reorganization occurred during McGarr’s tenure, which involved organizing curriculum by departments, which was not previously the case. The curriculum had not changed substantially in nearly forty years and was as a result nearly inflexible to change. Lionel C. McGarr. Special Report of the Commandant. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1959), 2-7.; Dr. Birrer also has comments on this transition. Doughty, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer,” 52-53; Lionel C. McGarr. “Remarks by Major General Lionel C. McGarr at Founder’s Day Dinner, 156th Anniversary USMA 15 March 1958.” In Addresses by Lionel C. McGarr, Major General U.S. Army Volume 1: 3 August 1956-2 May 1958. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College) 283.


83 Doughty, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer,” 81.
warfare. McGarr felt, that in the foreseeable future, wars against the communist forces would involve fighting not only their conventional forces, but also their partisan or guerrilla assets. McGarr’s perspective was not completely in harmony with actual events in the Greek Insurgency and the Philippine Insurgency.

McGarr’s tenure demonstrates that while CGSC was reasonably nested within the strategic intent formulated by the President and his perspective on the strategic environment, he also shared the Army leadership’s filters. The directives for changes to the curriculum occurred in 1956 when McGarr arrived at Leavenworth, which is evidence of the tensions between the Army leadership and Eisenhower. McGarr attempted to nest himself within the intent of not only CONARC, but also the President. Hence, at the point where the rubber meets the road, Fort Leavenworth’s education reform and relevance appears to have been more than an exercise in following orders than in previous years.

Typical of politics, President John F. Kennedy attempted to break sharply from Eisenhower’s Administration, which included adhering to Taylor’s ideas of “flexible response.” Flexible response “proposed to meet communist aggression at the level of

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violence at which it was initiated.”

Through flexible response, Kennedy saw potential in developing a specific capacity in the Army to deal with guerrillas or insurgents. Kennedy viewed the new strategy as an improvement on massive retaliation, which “had not provided the nation with a credible deterrent against communist adventurism.” The two Army Chiefs of Staff who worked under President Kennedy, Generals George H. Decker and Earle G. Wheeler, saw it differently. The Army leaders supported flexible response since this reaffirmed the significance of ground forces in the nuclear age, restored their dignity, and allowed the Army to drop the automatic use of nuclear weapons to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. This new strategy gave the Army a wedge in budget debates and necessitated new formations, specifically the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) initiative under Decker. Up to this point the military leaders, specifically the Army, were on board with Kennedy, but it was on the point of counterinsurgency that they diverged and their cognitive dissonance becomes evident. Krepinevich cites not only General Decker, but also General Lemnitzer, the JCS Chairman, and Earle Wheeler, who followed Decker, as having contrary opinions on counterinsurgency. To these officers, the Soviet Union was the main threat to the United States and President Kennedy was using the “international communist conspiracy” as fuel to justify his commitment to the Ngo Dinh Diem

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88 Ibid., 21.


90 The development of the ROAD division began actually before Kennedy took office, but after the Presidential election of 1960. The essential change between the PENTOMIC division to the ROAD division being the restoration of command and control elements below the division headquarters. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 300.

91 General George Decker, Army Chief of Staff from 1960-1962, countered a presidential lecture to the JCS on counterinsurgency, "Any good soldier can handle guerrillas;” General Earle Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff from 1962 to 1964, stated that "the essence of the problem in Vietnam is military;” General Taylor felt that counterinsurgency was "just a form of small war” and that "all this cloud of dust that's
Major General Harold K. Johnson served as Commandant of CGSC during Kennedy’s term. He arrived with the intent to “establish a tone of general conduct and deportment, including the intellectual and moral attributes of an officer.” Not surprisingly in the wake of the Pentomic Army Johnson took the opportunity during his tenure to investigate theories on “role of ground forces, the appropriate balance between firepower and maneuver, and the most effective structure for the infantry division.” Johnson felt the purpose of the armed forces was to “maintain, restore, or to create an environment of order or a climate of stability within which government under law can function effectively.” Control, subsequently, came from closing with and defeating the enemy. Beyond the ethical imprint he resolved to bring to the college, Johnson’s most substantial alteration to the curriculum was a reduction in classroom hours devoted to the nuclear battlefield and the elimination of “the automatic use of tactical nuclear weapons in favor of a more flexible consideration of their use.” This change implies that the curriculum, to this point, indoctrinated students to first use tactical nuclear

coming out of the White House really isn't necessary;" something we have to satisfy."Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 36.


95 Ibid., 130-37. Historian Lewis Sorely notes in his biography of Johnson that the Commandant continually emphasized the need for students to question materials the faculty presented. This became a colloquialism, “challenge the assertion.

96 Sorley, Honorable Warrior, 137.
weapons above all else. Recent improvements in the conventional forces by Secretary McNamara made these changes possible.97

Upon Kennedy’s assassination, President Lyndon Baines Johnson inherited his Cabinet, subordinate leadership, strategic environment and policies engaging that environment. Importantly, he did not make any efforts to change any of the internal organization in the White House or among his top advisors.98

**Civil Military Relations**

Leaders, whether civilian or military, set the tone for organizations and they indelibly leave their imprint even after they leave the position. The years from 1959 to 1964 spanned three Presidents and their respective subordinates, who superficially displayed different aspects of the civil-military relationship, but in actuality, demonstrated the normal theory of civil-military relations.99 Civil-Military relations are a vital aspect for sound national security policy.100 It is at this point, the meeting between the civilian politician and the military officer, where strategy is formulated, debated, approved, interpreted, and presumably executed. Inefficiencies or a lack of efficacy in the process may result in less than desirable consequences. As an inherently human process, personal relationships provide the most poignant example of the reason theories diverge

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97 These improvements include the transition from the Pentomic Army to the ROAD Army and defense budget increases, not all of which happened as quickly as the Army expected when Kennedy took office. Sorley, *Honorable Warrior*, 137; Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower*, 303.


99 As defined earlier, the normal theory describes the political and military spheres as being essentially separate. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 31

100 Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 1.
from reality. \textsuperscript{101} Personality conflicts blind the casual observer to a situation that is not necessarily abnormal.

Professor Dale Herspring’s thesis about civil-military relations is that presidential leadership styles create tension when they violate military culture. \textsuperscript{102} Eisenhower’s, Kennedy’s, and Johnson’s relationships with their generals exemplify this violation. Eisenhower’s leadership style distanced himself from general officers who were previously used to direct access to not only him as a person, but also to the office of the President. Eisenhower, as President, used the Secretary of Defense as his primary conduit to the service chiefs. The service chiefs’ real issue, which Herspring does not necessarily address, is the rising role of the Joint Chiefs after the National Security Act of 1947. Defense Secretary Wilson’s primary relationship was with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Radford. Lemnitzer notes that Eisenhower almost exclusively interacted with Radford. \textsuperscript{103} This arrangement is all structural, though, and does not undermine the fact that Army leaders expected the normal theory to exist. Ridgway is specific in his memoirs about the civil-military relationship he envisioned, but that he failed to see it materialize during his tenure, namely that the politician provides the objective and the military professional advises on the ways and the means. \textsuperscript{104} What Ridgway and others felt they lost was the discourse space with the President and that having made their case, that he would accept it. Hence, branch parochialism permeated the senior ranks and demonstrated institutional cognitive dissonance. Army senior leadership believed

\textsuperscript{101} “The personalities of statesmen and soldiers are such important factors that in war above all it is vital not to underrate them.” Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, 94.

\textsuperscript{102} Herspring, \textit{The Pentagon and the Presidency}, 18.

\textsuperscript{103} Binder, Lemnitzer, 248.

\textsuperscript{104} Ridgway is specific in his ideas and remarks that his assumption of command speech included his thoughts on such matters, but evidently fell upon the deaf ears of Secretary Wilson. Matthew B. Ridgway, \textit{Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway}, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 271-2.
the political sphere should value military advice, but they really believed that their advice should be heard and accepted. This is normal theory.

A consequence of Army leadership’s experience with Eisenhower was that it opened that leadership to the Congressional branch toward which they had been, historically, aloof. This trend toward Congress continued as Kennedy’s relationship with the military was, in many ways, worse than Eisenhower’s. Herspring attributes his difficulties to his leadership style, which reinforced the military’s application of the normal theory. Kennedy specifically isolated the military chiefs when he appointed Maxwell Taylor as his military representative. This isolation came hand-in-hand with a degree of micro-managing that horrified the military and resulted again in their resistance to the President’s ideas on Vietnam and counterinsurgency.

The Johnson Administration experienced then the culmination of difficulties stemming from the previous two administrations and was exacerbated by Johnson’s abrasive personality. First, General Harold K. Johnson’s nomination hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee demonstrated that the military was becoming exceedingly more open to the Legislative Branch versus their previous loyalty to the Executive. General Johnson offered the perspective that “my first obligation is to the defense of my country, that when I appear before this committee or any committee of Congress, it is incumbent upon me to be completely honest with the Congress and to respond to any questions that I am competent to answer.” Chairman Richard B. Russell

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105 Herspring notes that prior to the Truman Administration the Army leaders felt loyalty primarily to the President, as Commander-in-Chief, and distanced themselves from Congress. Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency, 117.

106 Herspring, The Pentagon and the Presidency 148. Kennedy’s decision stemmed directly as a result of the Bay of Pigs in 1961.
clarified that this meant “to make a full statement outlining (Johnson’s) personal view based on his very broad experience” and Johnson agreed. 107

The tenor of civil-military relations during this era appear to represent a significant movement of the military culture away from seeing the President, as Commander-in-Chief, as their chief patron toward establishing a more solid relationship with Congressional leaders.

Command and General Staff College

As senior leaders interpreted the strategic environment differently and interacted in a dysfunctional manner, CGSC educated and prepared its students for that same strategic environment. It is important to investigate, how, in light of the turmoil at the strategic level, CGSC performed this mission.

Curriculum does not represent either CGSC’s primary responsibility or method for educating its students. Birtle defines doctrine as “that body of knowledge disseminated through officially approved publications, school curriculums, and textbooks that represents an army’s approach to war and the conduct of military operations.”108 The Combat Development Center’s role in formulating and approving the Army doctrine and CGSC’s professional journal, Military Review, represent two other venues for educating and fostering dialogue. This overview of CGSC from 1959 to 1964 will take these aspects into consideration.

Through the 1950s, counterinsurgency involved a relatively miniscule share of the curriculum. Krepinevich claims that “In 1959-60 and 1960-61 the 3 hours of instruction devoted to counterinsurgency warfare consisted of a class on how to defeat

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partisans in the Army's rear area during conventional operations. This does not fairly represent what the school attempted to accomplish or the conditions in which they attempted to accomplish it. First, Krepinevich does not account for the strategic context. The school viewed warfare in three forms (general, limited and situations short of war), which dealt specifically with the degree of nuclear involvement in each case.

Secondly, counterinsurgency, or in their parlance unconventional warfare, instruction encompassed not only guerrilla, but also psychological, warfare. The curriculum included specific courses like “Introduction to Unconventional Warfare, Introduction to Psychological Operations, Anti-Guerrilla Operations in a Limited War, Develop and Use of Guerrilla Potential in a Limited War, and Unconventional Warfare Planning and Operations in a General War.” The caveats of the subject being in either limited or general warfare are important because it reflects their compound warfare mentality as well as thirty three hours in instruction, not three. Finally, there is the overall context within the Army. In 1962, the Educational Survey Commission (or Eddleman Board) interviewed Deputy Commandant Brigadier General Bill Train, who stated, “We are the first school to have counterinsurgency as a course of study.”

McGarr maintained an adaptive environment during his tenure, paying attention to end-of-course evaluations and student critiques. Students, young majors coming from and returning to the field army, offered poignant and unfiltered insights into the Army.

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110 General war was unrestricted use of nuclear weapons, while at the other end of the spectrum, situations short of war did not involve any nuclear weapons. The 1954 version of FM 100-5 supports this interpretation. Lionel C. McGarr. *Special Report of the Commandant.* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1959), 36.


during this era. They provided a barometer of where the school saw the future and the reality they experienced. Evaluating the 1959 course, several students recommended more instruction on guerrilla warfare, specifically in strategy, tactics, and vis-à-vis the Cold War.\footnote{Robert H. Schellman. “Additional Pertinent Comments Extracted from US Army Questionnaires Not Included in Detailed Examination.” \textit{Evaluation, /9 Regular Course}. Disposition Form, DD Form 96. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 10 SEPT 1959), 2.} The comment did not completely fall upon deaf ears. Preparing for the 1961 curriculum, McGarr offered guidance that the school “aggressively further develop the concept of Unconventional Warfare doctrine and refine instruction in this area both in DAA and in applicatory instruction through the curriculum.”\footnote{Lionel C. McGarr. \textit{/I Curriculum Guidance and Instructions for Developing the Commandant’s Decisions on /I Curriculum}. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 21 September 1959), 20.} This guidance did not, however, result in an increase in the hours of instruction for the 1960-1961 academic year as the devoted hours remained at thirty-three.\footnote{U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. “Program of Instruction for 250-A-C2, Command and General Staff Officer Course 1960-61.” (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 July 1960), 59-60.} This apparent intransigence is difficult to explain. A few months after General McGarr issued his planning guidance, the chairman of the planning board, Colonel Robert H. Schellman, gave further guidance, “(Unconventional warfare) assumes ever increasing significance for the present and future battlefield… The College \textbf{must} continue to exert its leadership in this area within the assigned scope of the College mission.”\footnote{Robert H. Schellman. \textit{MEMO FOR RECORD}. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 6 November 1959), 8.} Despite this recognition, he directed that “no additional hours are allocated for specific UW instruction. The phased expansion of instructional effort in this field will be accomplished through the integrated UW instruction in other courses and sub-course.”\footnote{Robert H. Schellman. \textit{MEMO FOR RECORD}. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 6 November 1959), 1.}
The effects of this guidance can be seen in subsequent Programs of Instruction (POIs), beginning in the 1962-3 academic year, wherein the school specifically accounted for counterinsurgency training. The students graduating that year received the same 33 hours as their predecessors, but the College now accounted for the “Principles of War,” “G2 Responsibilities, Functions, and Activities,” and others as well. The College, hence, reflected cognitive dissonance. Their students communicated the importance of guerrilla warfare. The Commandant resonated that importance, yet its actions reflect something different. According to Birrer, the College never reacted towards contemporary conflict and that the conflict in Southeast Asia never really impacted the school even at the height of the buildup. The focus remained on Europe, but Birrer cautioned that was true of any war due in large part to the “rigid, required core curriculum” that existed. He implied that an electives-based or integrated program might have provided the flexibility to address contemporary concerns.

The strategic environment though did impact CGSC students and their perspective on unconventional warfare’s importance, which appear contradictory. The first strategic context change occurred in January 1961 when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced his nation’s support for wars of national liberation. The school did not noticeably react but neither did the students coming from the field and the reason could be the second change, which occurred six months later with the Berlin Crisis which reoriented the United States back on the Cold War.

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121 Doughty, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer,” 106.

General Harold K. Johnson, who became Commandant in 1960 as the College planned for academic year 61/62, believed that the curriculum was and should remain “oriented toward the reality of our national policy.”\textsuperscript{123} In the same memorandum, he stated emphatically that “under current US policy the most likely area for employment of US forces in a major war is Europe. Virtually all other areas are candidates for less than total war forces as far as Army forces are concerned.”\textsuperscript{124} Student recommendations about the curriculum’s focus on unconventional warfare in the 1960’s course noted a statistical acceptance of 90% favorable responses. Specifically, a student noted that the coverage was good, but “lacked the depth to provide appreciation and understanding.”\textsuperscript{125} Neither these statistics, nor the tenor of the comments, were uncommon through this period. The most poignant comment on the subject of unconventional warfare that demonstrates the zeitgeist of the era comes after the 1963 Regular Course. The evaluation of course-end questionnaires revealed that 58% of students felt prepared for their future assignments.\textsuperscript{126} The 42% that felt the school’s curriculum only prepared them in a limited fashion were officers assigned either to civil schooling, specialist assignments or to duties in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{127} The actual students’ comments are particularly revealing. One student commented that “Counterinsurgency operations as a subject was

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\item \textsuperscript{123} Harold K Johnson, “Task 6 (Parts I and II), /2 Planning Memorandum Number 3.” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 31 October 1960), 2.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 1.
\item \textsuperscript{125} U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. “Summary of Student Comments: Regular Course /1.” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1961), 5.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Francis W. O’Brien, \textit{Evaluation of Course-End Questionnaires /3 Regular Course}. Disposition Form. DD Form 96. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 5 July 1963), 1.
\item \textsuperscript{127} O’Brien, \textit{Evaluation of Course-End Questionnaires /3 Regular Course}, 1.
\end{itemize}
well taught. Caution must be exercised in order to not go overboard since less than 1% of the Army is involved in this operation.”

While a few others noted the need for more on the subject, it is evident that in 1963, Vietnam and counterinsurgency were peripheral to the Army’s main mission and its primary threat to the United States, which was in Europe. This situation persisted despite the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, clamoring for the Army to focus on counterinsurgency. The Army’s reaction is evidence of institutional cognitive dissonance and normal theory. The service, after surviving on meager rations during the Eisenhower Administration, remained focused on Europe despite the growth in budget and resources provided by Kennedy.

Doctrine plays a huge role in educating students. At this point in time, with Combat Developments Command at Fort Leavenworth, it was the College’s responsibility to write the doctrine they would instruct to their students. Through the majority of this case study, the 1954 version of FM 100-5 remained the predominant doctrinal influence in the military. Its table of contents demonstrated the role and perception of unconventional warfare in the Army since it was placed in Chapter 11: Special Operations. The manual defined special operations as “those operations in

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129 Kennedy had several National Security Action Memorandum (NSAMs) outlining the importance of counterinsurgency and his focus on Vietnam. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy’s name appears at the author of many NSAMs, but the authority still originated with President. John F. Kennedy, National Security Action Memorandums, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/NSAMs.htm (accessed on 9 March 2010).

130 Birrer notes that when CDC moved to Fort Belvoir the change did not affect the curriculum because the practical matter of writing the doctrine remained at Leavenworth for sometime afterwards. Doughty, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer,” 89.

131 This field manual places unconventional warfare apart from conventional warfare subjects of the offensive, defensive, and security. This conceptual dichotomy is emblematic of the specialist theme, which began permeating the Army during and after World War II. FM 100-5. Field Service Regulations: Operations. 1954, 2.
which the characteristics of the area of operation, the nature of the operation, special
conditions under which the operation may be conducted, or a combination of these
factors require special or specially trained troops, special techniques, tactics, materiel, or
an emphasis upon certain considerations.¹³² Doctrine set the framework for officers to
understand counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare as apart from conventional
warfare. The 1962 iteration of FM 100-5 gave considerably more attention to the subject,
devoting one chapter to unconventional warfare and a separate chapter to “Military
Operations Against Irregular Forces.”¹³³ This latter chapter retained the notion of
compound warfare and expressed its purpose as “providing broad doctrine and
principles for the employment of combined arms forces against irregular forces blocking
or hampering the attainment of U.S. objectives.”¹³⁴ Doctrinally, the idea of compound
warfare was the mindset taken into Vietnam.

As noted by Birtle’s definition of doctrine above, professional journals play a
significant role. McGarr understood this and relied on the Military Review to have officers
“Keep Pace with the Future.”¹³⁵ Professional forums are important for intellectual
development and adaptation. There is evidence, however, that these journals were not
necessarily the fount of intellectual freedom that one may presuppose. In 1950, the
Assistant Director of Instruction, Colonel Kenneth Sweany, set the policy that those
articles for publication needed endorsement from section chiefs within the school. The
guidelines included: “1) the relative excellence of the article compared with others in the
journal, 2) the suitability for publication in an official Army document such as the Military

¹³³ Ibid., 2.
¹³⁴ Ibid., 136.
¹³⁵ McGarr instituted a series of articles under the aegis of “Keeping Pace with the Future,” which
he inaugurated on April 1957 by summarizing the changes ahead for CGSC. Lionel C McGarr, “USA
Command and General Staff College Keeps Pace with the Future,” Military Review XXXVII, no. 1 (April
1957): 3.
Review, and 3) its consonance with doctrine as taught at the College.¹³⁶ This policy, therefore, stifled any potential of dissenting views on official Army policy. Simply noting the absence of a “Letters to the Editor” section exemplifies the lack of feedback or discussion the journal sought to engender. General McGarr reinforced this policy in 1960 when he noted that, “we should not, however, necessarily or blindly respond to suggestions resulting from such a sampling unless the ideas are fully compatible with our mission.”¹³⁷ The problem is again context and, at this point in time, McGarr and others believed in the nobility of their rank to decide what was right for their students. Education was not a two-way street.

Section 4 – Case Study 2: 1997-2001

Strategic Setting

The entire decade of the 1990s are significant for understanding the Global War on Terrorism. As the first post-Cold War decade, the 1990s provided the United States, its Army and by extension the Command and General Staff College with more difficulty than the era prior to Vietnam. The 1990s were not only about the beginning of the post-Cold War era, but they were also the post-Desert Storm era. These two events had significant repercussions as the Army tried to understand its place in the world and amid theories about the “end of history,” which portended the cessation of ideological conflicts via the globalized spread of democracy.¹³⁸ Articles such as those by Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington emphasized the end of the unifying threat represented by the Soviet Union and codified by NSC-68. The message from the United States and within

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the United States was one of victory and an expectation of a “peace dividend.” The absence of a unifying and easily-defined threat resulted in disagreements and in a multi-polar world rather than a uni-polar world, which the United States presupposed. The polarity of the world aside, the purpose for the military and a comprehensive national and military strategy became questionable in the post-Cold War era and resulted in the downsizing of the military. Lessons learned by other nations from Desert Storm deviated from the United States Army, which latched onto the idea of information and technological dominance. Nations like India and China determined they could neither achieve parity with nor follow America’s path and that pursuing an asymmetric response was the best course of action. Statements such as these, and involvement in a range of overseas military interventions, did not sway the United States from continuing to upgrade an Army based on the Desert Storm and Cold War paradigm.

**Senior Leaders**

The key senior leaders influencing CGSC from 1997 to 2001 were two US Presidents, two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, two Chiefs of Staff and five CGSC Commandants. Unlike that of the previous case study, the Chairman’s role vastly increased in the policy arena. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 permanently relegated

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140 In 1996, Indian Chief of Staff General K. Sundarji reportedly said the principal lesson from the Gulf War was that possessing nuclear weapons was a requirement before confronting the United States. McKenzie makes the point though that even prior to the conclusion of the Cold War, nations with limited military capacity used techniques to mitigate the United States’ capabilities. This trend only continued and escalated with the demise of the Soviet Union. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. *Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR*. McNair Paper 62. (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2000), 22; Similar sentiments emanated from China during the same timeframe of the mid-1990s, William Schneider Jr. “Asymmetric Military Aspirations and Capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China.” *US-China Economic and Security Review Commission*. (Washington DC: The Hudson Institute, March 2007), 5.
service chiefs to service concerns and solidified the Chairman’s role as principal military adviser to the President.

President Bill Clinton did not distance himself far from his predecessor George H.W. Bush, agreeing that the United States needed to maintain global leadership in the Post-Cold War era. He did not, however, define this leadership or where the leadership in the global arena would go. In fact, foreign policy objectives did not broach his list of nine chief priorities for his first year in office. In terms of leadership, Clinton rarely attended National Security Council meetings where foreign policy was formed. As a result, actions during his Administration offered a contradictory picture because the Administration involved the military in four significant conflicts in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Yet there is no evidence of a cogent strategy stringing these efforts together or defining their purpose in terms of national interest.

Lacking military experience, Clinton relied on civilian and military specialists for foreign policy-making. One of the most influential voices during the Clinton Administration was that of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell, who is attributed with formulating a doctrine for employing military forces abroad in the pursuit of national foreign policy. The so-called Powell Doctrine is reflected in an article he wrote in 1993 for Foreign Affairs when he echoed the current zeitgeist noted earlier,

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144 Herspring notes that while he involved the US in Bosnia and again in Kosovo to stop genocide, Clinton avoided sending US troops to Rwanda. Ibid., 331.

“Democracy is the most powerful political force at work in the world today.” He poignantly demonstrated in this article that United States’ new strategy was now regional rather than global and as a result the United States would deal with these as individual crises. Powell addressed all of the elements of national power, but underscored the military as the most important.

Two important themes emerge from Powell’s article that set the stage for the remainder of the decade. First is the idea of the two war strategy. Powell stated that “prudent planning requires that we be able to deal simultaneously with two major crises of this type.” The second important theme supports the first and is the idea that the United States Army would transition from a purely threat-oriented to capabilities-oriented force. These ideas are resident in the inaugural Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 1997, which recognized the range of threats and noted that “US forces must plan, train, and prepare to respond to the full spectrum of crises in coalition with the forces of other nations.” Despite recognizing the full spectrum of crises, the 1997 QDR remained a bastion of conventional thinking with the three tenets of winning two major theater wars simultaneously, technological combat upgrades, and fiscal executability.


148 The important wording in this article is Powell’s repeated use of the word crisis as a replacement for threat. Powell observed that “these crises have spanned the range of extremes” from humanitarian actions to the use of limited force to the use of massive force (Persian Gulf War) Powell, “US Forces: Challenges Ahead,” 33.


151 In the Secretary’s Message, Cohen describes the future force as different in character and references Joint Vision 2010, which has four “new” operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics. Cohen, Quadrennial Defense Review Report.
dissonance began at the top with Secretary William S. Cohen who stated, “technology will transform the way our forces fight, ensuring they can dominate the battlefield with a decisive advantage at all times across the full spectrum of operations from peacekeeping and smaller scale contingencies to major theater war” and apparently did not account for enemy actions not occurring on battlefields.152

General Dennis Reimer, as Army Chief of Staff, echoed the QDR strategy during testimony before Congress on the Army’s challenges for preparing for the two-war contingency. His primary message was that the Army was then suffering in its attempts to modernize and fulfill the national strategy due to budgetary constraints.153 A year later Reimer testified that as a “strategy-based force,” the Army was going to focus on “transforming from an Industrial Age force (crafted for the Cold War) into an information-age Army designed to meet the national security challenges ahead.”154 Reimer’s plan for modernization focused on essentially conventional capabilities. The buzz words were to “digitize” and maintain “combat overmatch.”155 At no point, however, did Reimer, as the Army Chief of Staff, address the nature of conflicts the Army was likely to meet or the threats likely to emerge in the future.156 He did not even address the then current involvement in the Balkans or lessons learned in Somalia a few years before as signposts on the road to the future. Likewise, the 2000 Army Posture Statement said that “the


156 While Reimer did not mention any of the MOOTW operations occupying the Army’s time, he did reference Desert Storm and the Battle of 73 Easting, nearly a decade prior at the time of his testimony. Ibid., 5.
Army is executing a comprehensive plan for achieving full spectrum dominance in the 21st Century” that does not necessarily address or recognize the full spectrum of conflict and its implications in the nature of war.157 General Shinseki changed little with the 2001 Army Posture Statement, which raised the idea of the Objective Force.158 The Objective Force was the embodiment of the Army which General Reimer had envisioned only a few years before providing “conventional overmatch and a greater degree of strategic responsiveness.”159

Due to the attacks on September 11th, President George W. Bush’s initial strategies and concepts for foreign policy fell off the radar and became irrelevant. Despite campaign promises to exit from nation-building activities around the world, Bush, in his first six months, pledged the United States to follow through on its commitment to its NATO allies.160 His next largest foreign policy initiative was a missile defense for the United States amid dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin.161 After the attacks, Bush’s policy did not substantially change and the 2001 QDR echoed themes espoused by Powell nearly a decade prior, specifically the need to move from a threat-based model to a capabilities-based model.162


159 Ibid., 12.


162 The QDR notes that the capabilities-based model focuses on what enemies may fight like, but also hedges against the need to maintain military advantages in key areas. Donald H. Rumsfeld. *Quadrennial Defense Review*. (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 13-14.
During the Bush and Clinton Administrations, five commandants served at the CGSC. Two of the Commandants, Lieutenant General Montgomery Meigs and Lieutenant General William Steele, each published articles in Military Review during their tenures. Their publications offer insights into the zeitgeist not currently available in other mediums, such as speeches they gave, due to confidentiality clauses. General Meigs’s article in 1998 provides an example of the future Army leaders wanted to see, specifically, “a major military competitor eager to take advantage of regional turmoil… possibly bankrolling sophisticated computer hackers who seek to foster chaos in the area of operation (AO) by attacking regional commercial and government computers, as well as the US forces’ command, control, communications, computer and information (C4I) systems. Then again, the paymaster for the cyber terrorists might be the regional drug syndicate.”\textsuperscript{163} The solution for the peacekeeping mission assigned to the US forces is, according to Meigs, more gunnery and maneuver training.\textsuperscript{164}

A few years later, General Steele addressed the essential leadership element for success in full spectrum operations, emphasizing that “technology is not the only part of the equation.”\textsuperscript{165} Steele did not deviate though from the focus that battlefield dominance is the cornerstone of the Army and he failed to address the other elements of national power necessary for success in counterinsurgency and stability operations. This is ironic given the impetus for his article is the Army Training and Leadership Development Panel, which he specifically addressed and to which this case study will attend in the CGSC section.

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\textsuperscript{164} The purpose of Meigs’ article is to introduce the University After Next (UAN), which represented a virtual research library meant to complete the commander’s situational understanding and offer a reach-back capability to provide answers as questions and uncertainty arose. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{165} This article was done in conjunction with the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP), part of which stemmed from a massive attrition of junior grade officers from the Army. William M. Steele and Robert P. Walters Jr. “Training and Developing Army Leaders.” Military Review. July-August 2001, 2.
}
The absence of a defined threat is a common thread through the 1990s amongst the senior leaders’ visions of the strategic environment and their design for the military. While capabilities-based models are the focus, the leadership never defines, specifically, what those capabilities should be or the environment for their employment, until the 2001 QDR. In the execution of daily business, the understanding of full spectrum conflict appears to be lost between the joint-level of command and the service component command level. Generals Reimer and Shinseki evinced cognitive dissonance when they vocalized the need to transform the Army into a capabilities-based force, but instead focused their actions on making a conventional force more technologically advanced.

Civil-Military Relations

Similar to the first case study, the years from 1997 to 2002, while only spanning two Presidents demonstrated the application of the normal theory of civil-military relations. The Clinton Administration era was not a period of harmony between the Executive Office and the military. Herspring describes the tension as a result of Clinton’s disorganized leadership style, a perception that the President did not respect the military, and the military’s perception that the President viewed the military as social experiment guinea pigs. This is primarily a result of normal theory. Colin Powell gives an account in his autobiography of a discussion with the President Clinton, specifically on the gay-ban and potential course of action. Importantly Powell states, “I had the impression he agreed with me. I was wrong.” Agreement is not pertinent for healthy civil-military relations. The President has the prerogative and responsibility to make the

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166 The 1992 Presidential campaign offered the military the majority of it fodder for understanding Clinton, specifically his Vietnam-era protests and draft-dodging that played out loudly in the media. The supposed fact that the President’s number 1 priority for the military upon taking the oath of office was lifting a ban on gays emboldened military leaders with the impression that the President viewed them as a social experiment. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency*, 331.

best decision for the military. Powell, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has the responsibility for providing the best professional guidance and range of options. Agreement is not a requirement. Powell demonstrates what is pertinent to civil-military relations, which is discourse space. Army officer John McLaughlin determined from his research that “civilian supremacy over the military was firmly preserved during the Clinton Administration.”

While the Clinton era emanated an aura of chaos regarding control of the military, the George W. Bush Administration evinced the opposite. These tensions, though, arose not necessarily between the Commander-in-Chief and his generals but instead between the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the generals. Rumsfeld’s tact permeated through his staff and their handling of the military establishment as well. Journalist Andrew Cockburn notes specifically that the military’s reaction to Rumsfeld’s “point man on transformation,” Stephen Cambone, as being “if we were being overrun by the enemy and I had one round left, I’d save it for Stephen Cambone.”

Personality conflicts have a tendency to obscure what may be proper civilian control because one group may perceive the personality conflict as the result of disrespect or outright abuse. Be that as it may, while Clinton evidently disagreed with

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168 Discourse space is an analysis of the interaction between the political and military elements during the policy-making process. This idea dovetails with Clausewitz’ counsel to not allow military advice to dominate political policy (see Clausewitz, Book VI, ). Kobi Michael, "The Dilemma behind the Classical Dilemma of Civil-Military Relations: The "Discourse Space" Model and the Israeli Case during the Oslo Process," *Armed Forces and Society* 33, no. 4 (July 2007), .


170 Shinseki is the only Army Chief of Staff pertinent to this case study. There is a definite trend of tension between the Army general officers and Rumsfeld that continues after Shinseki’s departure. (See also, Patrick J. Buchanan. “The Generals’ Revolt. Antiwar.com April 15, 2006.” Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency*, 405.

Powell, he allowed the discourse space for the military senior leaders to provide advice. Contrarily, Rumsfeld appeared categorically opposed to having any discourse space with his military senior leaders, a situation permitted by George Bush through either omission or commission.\(^{172}\) It appears then, that not only did the Clinton Administration enjoy arguably healthier civil-military relations than the Bush Administration, but that normal theory persisted throughout them both.

**Command and General Staff College**

The 1997 QDR espoused themes of technological dominance and conventional conflict and while using the words “full spectrum operations”, the QDR actually visualized conflict as discrete blocks. The curriculum at CGSC from 1997 to 2001 echoed the 1997 QDR and remained nested within the overall strategic concept. CGSC viewed warfare as distinct blocks between conventional and unconventional. Additionally, the threat assessment focused mostly on Krasnovia, a pseudo-Soviet country with Cold War doctrine. This explains, in part, Linn’s criticism of the army leadership after the Gulf War and that they did not move beyond the Soviet-American clash.\(^{173}\)

The deviation in perspectives between the joint level and the service component resonated at CGSC. In 1997, the common core curriculum focused on combined arms, division and corps operations, resource management, operational war-fighting, history, leadership, and culminated with a grandiose practical exercise.\(^{174}\) Of the 637.5 hours of core instruction, only 57 hours dealt with Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) during the C500 *Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting II* module.\(^{175}\) Not surprisingly,

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\(^{172}\) Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency*, 404.

\(^{173}\) Linn, *The Echo of Battle*, 224.


\(^{175}\) DJMO is the legacy of the DJCASO from the 1960s, which was also responsible for unconventional warfare education. Department of Joint and Multinational Operations. “C500 Fundamentals
this instruction was resident in the department responsible for CGSC’s Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and specifically addressed “all learning areas prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Service Intermediate Level Colleges.”

During the next three years, the C500 block of instruction changed very little with regards to the number of hours dedicated or the content of the curriculum. The College presented this instruction on MOOTW as an entity mutually exclusive from conventional operations.

The College’s culminating exercise, Prairie Warrior (PW), focused entirely on conventional operations and offers an example on how the CGSC Commandants nested the course within their higher chain of command’s vision. PW’s initial objectives included “assessing functional CP responsibilities, leadership skills and conduct of joint and combined operations.” Just as the Army began looking toward technology to provide the keys for success on the future battlefield, so PW evolved beginning in 1994 when it became a “venue for Training and Doctrine Command’s battle laboratory excursions.”

In 1998, PW’s objectives were “to plan, conduct and sustain joint and multinational combined arms operations and to emphasize corps and division levels of a combined

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and joint TF (JTF).”\textsuperscript{180} Hence, while the College acknowledged a spectrum of conflict, institutional cognitive dissonance regulated the spectrum to discrete blocks executable by specialized troops as technology and efforts to “digitize” blinded leaders to the possibilities enemies may confront the United States with in the future.

Student evaluation of this curriculum is somewhat confusing due to the method of questions and the statistical analysis the College pursued. For instance, the 1999-2000 C500 evaluation asked two open ended questions of what was the most beneficial and the least beneficial learning experience of C500.\textsuperscript{181} Statistically, the responses are deceiving. The evaluation reports that 17\% of their sample population of 190 students felt that MOOTW was the least beneficial learning experience.\textsuperscript{182} However, perusing the actual comments of the 190 students surveyed revealed that negative comments focused on methodology of instruction or too little time devoted to the subject.\textsuperscript{183} These comments reveal an interest among students in MOOTW.

Students demonstrated their interest in the full spectrum of operations in other ways. Unlike during Case Study 1, there is a second aspect to the curriculum in Case Study 2 that must be addressed, specifically the electives program. For instance in 1997, 637.5 hours comprised the core curriculum and the electives consumed an additional

\textsuperscript{180} The implied intent though was student familiarization with technologies being fielded in the Army. The scenario COL Moilanen describes takes place in a fictional island in the Philippines with clear lines of responsibility drawn between special operations conducting foreign internal defense and conventional students conducting combined arms operations. Ibid., 101.

\textsuperscript{181} Course evaluations also tended towards focusing on efficacy of instructional methods rather than instruction content. The questions also tend to be tautological and focus on stated terminal learning objectives rather than questioning those learning objectives. Development and Assessment Division. “Term 1, AY 1999-00, End-Of-Course Evaluation C500 Operational War-fighting.” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 19 January 2000), 41.

\textsuperscript{182} Development and Assessment Division. “Term 1, AY 1999-00, End-Of-Course Evaluation C500 Operational War-fighting.” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 19 January 2000), 41

\textsuperscript{183} Table 3 in the Appendix shares some of the comments in the “least beneficial section,” that deny complete credibility to the statistics revealed in the course evaluation.
189 hours, as a minimum.\textsuperscript{184} The electives program, or Advanced Application Course (AAP), contained 139 courses taught by the six different departments in the College.\textsuperscript{185} In 1997, of these 139 elective courses, 11 dealt with full spectrum operations.\textsuperscript{186} The important aspect is that the core curriculum did not change significantly from 1997-2001, while the number of electives dedicated to full spectrum operations increased. Students voted with their feet and sought education where the core curriculum was deficient.

Birtle’s quote on doctrine is no less relevant in the 1990s than it was in the 1950s. Two Army capstone doctrine manuals dominated intellectual thought during this period. The first is the 1993 version of FM 100-5 and the second is the inaugural FM 3-0 that emerged in June 2001.\textsuperscript{187} Doctrinally, the Army still believed through the remainder of the 1990s that the “tactical level of war is concerned with the execution of battles and engagements. On the battlefield, the primary focus of the tactical commander is winning battles and engagements in which he executes maneuvers and fires to achieve a specific objective.”\textsuperscript{188} The manual specifically reinforced the dichotomy between conventional war and everything else. When FM 100-5 addressed the range of operations it said, “The prime focus of the Army is war-fighting, yet the Army’s frequent role in operations other than war is critical.”\textsuperscript{189} It was not until 2001 that FM 3-0 changed the perspective. Now the Army believed, “Army doctrine addresses the range of full spectrum operations across the spectrum of conflict. Army commanders at all echelons


\textsuperscript{186} Table 1 in the Appendix reveals the full tabulation of core curriculum and elective hour dedication to full spectrum operations.

\textsuperscript{187} The new operations manual nomenclature represents further effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act as Army doctrine is now in line with Joint doctrine.

\textsuperscript{188} FM 100-5 Operations. June 1993, 1-3.

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 2-0.
may combine different types of operations simultaneously and sequentially to accomplish missions in war and MOOTW.\textsuperscript{190} The implications for commanders were clear. When conducting full spectrum operations, “commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations to accomplish the mission.”\textsuperscript{191} Sadly, this change was too late to inform commanders beyond powerpoint bullets, to the philosophical level of how to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq. The result was that the officers planning and executing operations in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom continued to see warfare as discrete forms of conflict, as CGSC taught them, not necessarily as the new doctrine espoused.

As noted in the previous case study, professional journals are pertinent for the dissemination of doctrine, as forum for professional development and growth, and as an outlet for junior voices to be heard. \textit{Military Review} offered a voice emblematic of the \textit{zeitgeist} from 1997 to 2001. The articles within its pages reflect the QDR’s themes of conventional operations and technological dominance, most of which came from senior leadership, but also a creeping evolution toward something more. A notable example is General Hugh Shelton’s argument that the “ultimate goal for future joint warfighting is decisive operations - the ability to win quickly and overwhelmingly across the entire range of operations…full-spectrum dominance.”\textsuperscript{192} Contrast that with the article General Shinseki penned with Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera in mid-2000 and the intellectual foundations for FM 3-0 are evident. Shinseki and Caldera addressed the need for Army leaders “to attain the mental and physical agility operationally to move forces from stability and support operations to war-fighting and back.”\textsuperscript{193}

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\textsuperscript{190} FM 3-0 \textit{Operations}. 14 June 2001, 1-14.
\textsuperscript{191} FM 3-0 \textit{Operations}. 14 June 2001, 1-16.
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During this timeframe, however, articles came from the field on experiences in Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo directly contrasting much of the Army vision in 1997, but facilitating its evolution into the Army’s vision for 2001. Very little input came from CGSC, specifically. Students at the School of Advanced Military Studies conducted studies and wrote articles that provided the vanguard for intellectual progress. One example of this is then-Major Robert Shaw’s article that analyzed Operation Uphold Democracy and demonstrated that “OOTW principles are an extension of war-fighting doctrine.” For the intellectual center of the Army though, the bulk of the energy seemed committed toward preserving the status quo rather than toward exploring new horizons.

Section 5 – Analysis and Comparison

Comparison and Analysis

These case studies demonstrate that the strategic environment, senior leader’s cognitive dissonance, and the normal theory of civil-military relations affected CGSC’s ability to prepare officers for full spectrum operations. The strategic contexts for each case study appear to be a strong and invasive influence on the United States, Senior Leaders, and subsequently on CGSC. In the first Case Study, the Soviet threat during the Cold War focused national attention, both military and civilian, and provided a unifying goal. Dr. Birrer clearly stated that there was “no specific tradition at changing as a result of ongoing conflict, not Korea…but Europe was the focus.” This was so much the case that when the Eisenhower Administration gave way to Kennedy, the Army and certainly CGSC failed or refused to change their focus. Conversely, the second Case Study demonstrates that the strategic environment after the Cold War provided no

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196 Doughty, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer,” 23.
unifying cause. Senior leaders, civilian and military, groped after an azimuth for the military to follow, finally devolving to creating a capabilities-based force. Not surprisingly, CGSC during the 1990s remained oriented on a Cold War era mentality, which senior leaders disguised by focusing on technological upgrades and digitization. The importance of the strategic context cannot be understated. In the first case study, leaders from the President to the Commandant at CGSC, clearly defined the strategic environment and designed a military for countering that threat. The changes in the Army, while not necessarily popular, continued throughout the 1950s and into 1960s, substantively with the Pentomic Division evolution and finally into the ROAD concept. A clear definition did not exist during the second case study and so the military did not change, either organizationally or doctrinally. In both case studies, CGSC executed a curriculum in accordance with the environment envisioned by its senior military leaders.

Understanding the strategic context is only part of the equation. Once senior leaders understand their environment, they must also agree on the way forward and so any discussion involving senior leaders must also involve civil-military relations and their cognitive dissonance. There is little evidence that civil-military relations changed from 1959 through 2001. The military continued to operate on the normal theory. Changes or perceptions of change are a result of personality conflicts and resultant media attention. The strength of character on the part of senior leaders, typically the President, determined whether the relationship was functional and balanced. For instance, Eisenhower established the precedent that he would fire Army leaders that attempted to slow-roll his policies, such as redesigning the Army for the nuclear battlefield. Kennedy never demonstrated strong leadership and his stand-offish relationship clouded and undermined any discussion involving senior leaders.

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enabled the Army to slow-roll his emphasis on counterinsurgency. By contrast, Clinton’s lack of leadership and subsequent lack of foreign policy vision left the Army to founder without external pressure for the entire decade.

It terms of cognitive dissonance, in the first case study, normal theory was an enabler. Senior military leaders opined against the budget realities of massive retaliation, but then chafed against the Kennedy’s micromanagement when the budget began to flow in their direction. By contrast, in the second case study, military senior leaders preached full spectrum operations or crises, but only focused on building a more digitized version of their 1991 conventional army.

The United States Army Command and General Staff College is a confluence of traditions without the strategic environment, civil-military relations, and senior leader cognitive dissonance playing a role. By itself, the institution is neither easily changed nor its course easily altered. One significant change that did occur was the elective program, which allowed the College more flexibility in the second case study than in the first. Students, who saw counterinsurgency and full spectrum operations as emergent long before doctrine and curriculum did, were able to find electives to satisfy their needs. Likewise, the *Military Review* was slightly more recognizant of emergent trends from the field in the second case study than in the first case study. Doctrine in both case studies remained woefully behind the curve. Publishing new doctrine in 1962 or in 2001 did not suddenly alter the filters of every soldier, noncommissioned or officer, in the field. They indelibly continued to hold many antebellum perceptions long after changes in doctrine and organizational modifications. The result, in the both cases, was intellectual rigidity in the field.

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198 Doughty, “Dr. Ivan J. Birrer,” 106.
Conclusions

CGSC failed historically to prepare officers for full spectrum operations for the reasons discussed throughout the paper. In both case studies, the strategic context influenced how the students and cadre at CGSC perceived the threats and what was relevant for them once they left the institution. Krepinevich, critical of the Army, believed that “the military reversals in Vietnam during the early 1960s ought to have resulted in the Army's modifying its approach to insurgency.” Such an assertion is unrealistic because the imminent threat for the United States, its Army, and specifically CGSC was never Vietnam, but Europe.\textsuperscript{199} In the second case study, there was no imminent threat and so the military chose a capabilities-based path that gave the flavor of change without the substance of change. This is a cautionary tale because it does not recognize the most limited resource available to the Army in preparing for war, which is time. There must be an intellectual adjustment to learn about one’s foe and devise a proper strategy.

Civil-military relations, specifically the normal theory, contributed in both cases to CGSC’s failure. Carl Builder’s assessments of the US Army as the most devoted to service to the nation and as the most secure of the armed service appear inaccurate. The Army, like any institution or bureaucracy, is self-interested and motivated towards its own ends. Therein, perhaps, lays another level of cognitive dissonance. Senior leaders in the first case study, particularly the Army Chiefs of staff, clearly did not appreciate losing their voice to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. That voice, in whatever form, must serve the President, which senior leaders were not able to digest because of normal theory. Normal theory, though, contradicts Clausewitz, who counseled that

\textsuperscript{199} Krepinevich, \textit{The Army and Vietnam}, 38.
“subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that has created war.”\textsuperscript{200}

Cognitive dissonance played a role in both case studies as well. In the first case study, Army leaders consciously prioritized Europe over anything else. This decision reduced dissonance somewhat within the Army but dissonance remained between the Presidents and the Army leaders as the Commander-in-Chief attempted to force a strategy Army leaders did not like.\textsuperscript{201} While the same foreign policy impetus from the President did not exist in the second case study, neither did the same level of awareness among Army leaders. At the Joint and Senior Army levels, leaders spoke convincingly about the future of warfare but their actions betrayed conventional intentions. Cognitive dissonance remained substantively higher as the missions the Army executed directly contradicted the Army’s focus and the curriculum at CGSC.

**Recommendations**

Military officers must be complexity-oriented and intellectual in order to understand the myriad of factors in their strategic environment influencing their lives. The Army and CGSC must play an active role toward educating and creating such individuals. Focusing simply on tactical proficiency is the realm of noncommissioned officers. Officers, claiming to be “knuckle-draggers,” whether tongue in cheek or not, who only focus on tactical proficiency and deny the operational and strategic realms, and their inherent complexities, are abdicating an essential professional role. General McGarr quoted then-Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor, that the military leader “must be a student of warfare with an imagination capable of projecting forward the principles of the

\textsuperscript{200} Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, 607.

\textsuperscript{201} “Dissonance almost always exists after an attempt has been made, by rewards or punishment, to elicit an overt behavior that is at variance with private opinion.” Festinger, \textit{A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance}, 261.
past to the specific requirement of the future. He must be able to visualize the effects of new weapons and to pattern tactics and organizations appropriate to the battlefields of the future.”

Officer education must change to meet this goal.

Officer education needs to address civil-military relations, specifically rather than generally. Doctrine of the 1950s preached that war “is a political act, its broad and final objectives are political; therefore, its conduct must conform to policy and its outcome realizes the objectives of policy.” No one, including Clausewitz would disagree with that statement. The friction point comes in the discourse space among senior leaders. Acknowledging the persistence of the normal theory in civil-military relations is essential. Army leaders must receive training and support because, “exercising leadership from a position of authority in adaptive situations means going against the grain.”

Understanding the nuances of the relationship between political master and military servant will allow future officers to offer the best advice to political leaders.

Officer education, specifically at the field grade-level and above, must emphasize history and theory rather than doctrine. Doctrine is the synthesis of history and theory, which places it inexorably behind the times. Leaders, particularly professional officers, must not only be able to transcend doctrine, but must be able to do so instinctively. Such ability will allow the Army to learn at a faster pace and avoid fundamental surprises.

Currently, doctrine and an overwhelming focus on technology suppress the disorder of war and blunt the instrument for learning.

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203 FM 100-5 Field Service Regulations. 1954. 7.


205 Fundamental surprises are… No learning after fundamental surprise can occur when societies or organizations have the resources needed to suppress disorder and thus return the system to its old order, without learning any fundamental lesson. Tzi Lanir, Fundamental Surprises: The National Intelligence Crisis. (Tel Aviv: Center for Studies Hakkibutz Hameuchad Publication, 1983), 120.
Officer education can also address the cognitive dissonance plaguing the Army with regards to conventional focus versus counterinsurgency focus. The current debate between Professor Gian Gentile and former Army officer John Nagl is a case in point.\textsuperscript{206} While the debate is important, it is a false dilemma. Seeing the choices as a dichotomy makes the dissonance between them persist even after a decision is made.\textsuperscript{207} By educating officers to have the flexibility to move within full spectrum operations, CGSC can reduce the negativity between the alternatives and reduce the dissonance permanently.

The full spectrum of conflict will continue in the future as long as war is a possibility. The Army, and specifically CGSC, must prepare officers for full spectrum operations by educating them to understand the strategic environment, to be comfortable with civil-military relations, and to be aware of cognitive dissonances.


\textsuperscript{207} Decisions should reduce dissonance, unless the choice is between negative alternatives. In such an instance the choice continues to persist after the decision and so dissonance remains. Festinger, \textit{A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance}, 35-36.
APPENDIX

Table 1.

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Core Curriculum Hours(^{208})</th>
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**Table 3.**

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<td>A</td>
<td>The sequencing of the MOOTW analysis individual exercise and the MOOTW campaign brief needs work. Inability to discuss deductions limited work on the campaign brief. Due to this, my learning of MOOTW operations was curtailed. It appears the individual graded exercise took priority over the more beneficial learning environment created in the MOOTW campaign brief. MOOTW seems like an afterthought in the lesson plan. The least beneficial learning exercise in C500 was the MOOTW analysis take-home exam. MOOTW should be conducted similar to the MTW Campaign Plan with small groups completing the analysis and developing the Campaign Plan step-by-step.</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>The Sudan MOOTW ex. Lacked sufficient guidance, mission, &amp; realistic setting to make it useful. The exercise needs further development. Increase the time allocated for MOOTW The MOOTW lecture should be conducted at the beginning of the MOOTW session. This would be helpful when conducting the MOOTW phase of training</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>All of C500 was beneficial but not enough time to do MOOTW scenario so benefit was limited. MOOTW analysis needs a better format Least beneficial – MOOTW analysis – while a good exercise, more time could be devoted to this event.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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