SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: AN ENDURING U.S. ARMY STRUCTURE

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Throughout the past century, the U.S. Army has engaged in advising foreign forces, now known by the doctrinal term Security Force Assistance (SFA). In each case, advisory units were assembled ad hoc and, following the mission, the effort was disbanded. Given recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and considering the future nature of conflict, the U.S. Army has a need for a permanent Security Force Assistance capability. Further, this capability is best captured by an enduring structure. The structural solution employed in current overseas contingency operations is to imbed advisory teams into existing organizations from theater level to Brigade Combat Team, as opposed to having separate organizations under independent command and control, such as an ‘Advisor Corps.’ This research project will analyze the various recommendations for conducting SFA in the 21st Century and conclude with a feasible recommendation on the way ahead to achieve an enduring capability.
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Our Nation’s security is inextricably tied to the effectiveness of our efforts to help partners and allies build their own security capacity. We have had several key successes, including the development of Iraqi Security Forces and more recent improvements in Afghanistan’s security forces. Yet, all too often, American capacity-building efforts have been constrained by a complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, unwieldy processes, and an inability to sustain efforts beyond a short period.

―Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, June 2009¹

Defense Secretary Gates opened his June 18, 2009 memorandum to National Security Advisor General (Ret) James Jones with this statement. The complete memorandum, entitled, “DoD Review of Building the Security Capacity of Partner Nations” lamented the lack of timeliness in delivering quality training and assistance programs to Foreign Security Forces (FSF) during current overseas contingency operations. Despite the references to the successes in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gates went on to identify “a series of inadequate and under-resourced training programs for Afghan security forces” which “hampered stabilization and reconstruction” as well as “overly bureaucratic approaches to building and sustaining Iraq’s security forces.”²

Although the memorandum took a whole of government approach, the Secretary also made recommendations for the military, with specific implications for the U.S. Army. These included possible military career fields to track expertise in Partner Capacity Building (PCB) as well as the military having the ability to employ teams of personnel with the necessary skills to “augment organizations in building partner capacity in support of overseas contingency operations.”³

The Army cannot afford to discard the operational and organizational lessons learned and professional expertise gained among its conventional forces during current
operations, but must instead make additional strides to make the doctrine and structure for SFA enduring. This research project will analyze the various recommendations for conducting SFA in the 21st Century and conclude with a feasible recommendation on the way ahead to achieve an enduring capability.

SFA Challenges during Current Overseas Contingency Operations

The Army’s role in partner capacity is as an integral part of the overall effort of Security Force Assistance (SFA). Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1 (Security Force Assistance) dated May 1, 2009 defines SFA as “the unified action to generate, employ and sustain local, host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.” The Army has traditionally accomplished its SFA responsibilities by assisting Foreign Security Forces with advisors imbedded in indigenous security formations.

Despite a history of advising foreign forces, the Army found itself unprepared to assume its SFA responsibilities in Afghanistan and Iraq. It had a limited pool of trained and ready personnel, no organizational structure for conventional forces, nor any prepared doctrine or even tactics, techniques and procedures to provide to soldiers assigned to advisor duties.

Organizing for SFA has undergone several revisions in Afghanistan since the effort began in 2002. In May of that year, the Office of Military Cooperation, Afghanistan became the Office of Security Cooperation, Afghanistan which in April, 2006 was re-designated Combined Security Transition Command, Afghanistan (CSTC-A). CSTC-A had primary training and development responsibilities for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). One of CSTC-A’s subordinate units was Tack Force Phoenix, responsible for institutional training of the Afghan National Army (ANA).
The advisory effort started with small transition teams assembled from both the active and reserve components. Reserve component teams were assembled and trained at Camp Shelby, MS and Camp Atterbury, IN prior to deployment. When teams deployed, however, they were often broken up and dispersed to fill vacancies and teams did not have ANSF unit assignments until after deployment. More formalized training came later when the Army established the TT training mission, first at Fort Hood, TX, then at Fort Riley, KS.

In late 2009, Anthony Cordesman pointed out deficiencies in ANSF development that had since been corrected in Iraq, a mission that had started later. These included the failure to develop unit level training and the false assumption that ANSF units are "mature" upon leaving the training base. He insinuated that the U.S. did not take ANSF development seriously until 2009, writing that only then "that the U.S. has focused on the fact that newly created, entire units get their primary training and combat capability after they leave the formal training center and go in to the field."\(^6\)

Cordesman’s insinuation that the U.S. did not take ANSF development “seriously” may be excessively harsh, but it is a reasonable conclusion based on the resources that were dedicated to the mission. As late as November 2008, the Army lacked the ability to fill transition team requirements above 50 per cent in Afghanistan.\(^7\) Also, by 2007, the U.S. was still relying on contract support to train Afghan police and it wasn’t until that year that the police received “effective paramilitary training from the U.S. military.”\(^8\)

The North Atlantic Council endorsed a new command structure for Afghanistan in the summer of 2009. The new structure addresses some of the ANSF development
issues. On November 12, 2009, the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command (IJC) reached Full Operating Capacity (FOC). The IJC, a subordinate command to ISAF, is responsible for the day to day operations of coalition forces in Afghanistan and conducts embedded partnering with fielded Afghan forces. The NATO Training Mission, Afghanistan (NMT-A), merged with CSTC-A, officially activated on November 21, retains force generation and initial institutional training requirements and exercises command and control of the re-named Combined Task Force Phoenix (CJTF Phoenix). Under the plan, CJTF Phoenix retains operational control (OPCON) of Embedded Transition Teams (ETTs) and Police Mentor Teams (PMTs). The regional commands have tactical control (TACON) of these teams.\(^9\)

In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) took the initial lead on the reconstruction of Iraq’s security sector. Though the debate about the effects of CPA Order Number 2, which dissolved the Iraq Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Armed Forces on May 23, 2003, could be the subject of a separate study, it would be unfair to hold the CPA wholly responsible for the early failures to develop a credible Iraqi security apparatus. The military, unprepared for missions related to Partner Capacity Building (PCB), holds a fair share of the blame.

CJTF-7 did, in fact, have a large responsibility for ISF capacity building as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) fell directly under its command and control. The task force was also de facto responsible for much of the police.\(^10\) Major problems occurred largely due to the fact that “CPA and CJTF-7 often had differing views and pursued conflicting initiatives”\(^11\) when it came to developing Iraq’s security capability. As a result, the initial development and training of the New Iraq Army (NIA) did not go well.
MG Paul Eaton had arrived in Iraq two months after the fall of Saddam’s regime with only five officers to establish the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), subordinate to the CPA. However, CENTCOM never tasked any trainers to be part of the mission and instead, the CPA had to rely on contractors to accomplish the bulk of the tasks. Vinnel was awarded the primary contract and sub-contracted out to SAIC for recruiting and MPRI for training.¹²

Thomas Ricks referred to the period from mid-2003 to mid-2004 as “a year of indirection and collapse in the training and development of the Iraqi Army.”¹³ Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Jack Keane would agree, saying, “We lost about a year, to be frank about it.”¹⁴ Defense analyst Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was even more frank about it, writing, “No single mission is more important than security, and no Iraqi popular desire is clearer than that this mission be done by Iraqis…The U.S. has been guilty of a gross military, administrative and moral failure.”¹⁵

In January 2004, MG Karl Eikenberry, dispatched by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, led a security assessment team to determine the state of development of Iraqi Security Forces. After reviewing the results of more than half a year of CPA efforts, Eikenberry recommended that the U.S. military assume all responsibility for the training and employment of these forces.¹⁶

Following Eikenberry’s recommendation, the CMATT and the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) were placed under CJTF-7 in spring, 2004, just prior to the end of the CPA’s mission and the transfer of sovereignty to an Interim Iraqi government. Perhaps a last testament to the early failures to develop Iraq’s security
sector came in April 2004, when the new 2\textsuperscript{nd} battalion of the Iraqi Armed Forces, ordered to Fallujah, basically refused to fight and disintegrated after contact with Shiite militias before even getting out of Baghdad.

On June 6, 2004, the effort to train and develop Iraqi security forces took a turn for the better when LTG David Petraeus assumed command of the Multi-National Security Transition Command, Iraq (MNSTC-I) which controlled both CMATT and CPATT and itself fell under the newly established Multi-National Forces, Iraq (MNF-I). Petraeus recognized that the focus of MNSTC-I should be on preparing Iraqis for internal rather than external security and for counter-insurgency rather than maneuver warfare against a conventional foe.\textsuperscript{17} MNSTC-I employed advisor teams to coach, teach and mentor Iraqi forces, sometimes hand-picked from among officers and NCOs in theater or from back in CONUS, where many from the Army had been assigned to Training Support Brigades (TSBs) and the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). These early ISF advisors were “hastily provided by the services without prior preparation to serve as advisors.”\textsuperscript{18}

On February 15, 2005, MNSTC-I formed the Iraq Assistance Group (IAG), another organization related to improving SFA. The IAG was a small joint command, eventually transferred to Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). The unit’s mission was to organize and train Transition Teams and to assign them to their counterpart Iraqi units in the Army, Special Police Commandos (later the National Police) and Department of Border Enforcement (DBE). Two years later, the IAG would assume the SFA coordination mission for the corps.
In June 2006, then BG Dana J.H. Pittard became the first active component commander of the IAG. In the fall of that year, all training and deployments of transition teams for both Iraq and Afghanistan was consolidated at Fort Riley, KS under the auspices of the 1st Infantry Division’s 1st Brigade, using a 60-day training program. As MG Pittard commented on the effects of the Fort Riley training mission and the operations of the IAG, “We put discipline into the system of training, deploying, and employing transition teams.”

It was a much needed discipline that came after almost five years in Afghanistan, three years in Iraq, and a long history of employing advisors.

**Historical Precedence and Lessons Learned**

In fact, the Army had over one hundred years of experience training, partnering and advising foreign security forces. Better known historical examples include the rather small Korean Military Advisory and Assistance Group (KMAAG) experience before and during the Korean War and the more robust efforts of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in Southeast Asia. Lesser known examples include a long term SFA effort in the Philippines that lasted from 1899 until World War II, Free French forces and Chinese forces during World War II, and in Greece and Turkey after World War II. In reference to the Army’s history of advising, Professor John Bonin of the U.S. Army War College wrote, “Fortunately, the US Army has done this task before; unfortunately, it did not capture that experience in doctrine.”

Vietnam provided the most recent “experience” of the challenges of preparing conventional military forces as advisors for the Army to draw upon. As early as March 1965, even before the escalation of U.S. combat forces to the country, Dr. Gerald C. Hickey published a RAND study of advisory efforts in Vietnam. Hickey collected his data in the field, living with and interviewing advisors at all levels over a ten month
period in 1964. Three findings are particularly prescient and have become lessons re-learned during current operations.

The first was pre-deployment training and preparation for personnel designated as advisors. Training for this mission is not something that can be accomplished rapidly. Among the RAND study findings were that advisors were poorly trained in cultural understanding, language and the use of interpreters, the military traditions affecting the thinking of their counterparts, and generally how to perform the advisory task. The study recommended “instruction in the history, economics, ethnic composition, major religious sects, and general customs of the country…” and further identified that advisors “even after they know their assignments, often are not taught the requirements of their jobs.”

A second telling result of the RAND study was that the advisors were isolated from their American chain of command, which led to a lack of understanding of their roles, missions and challenges even among the senior leadership of MACV. Many advisors had the perception that they had no vertical chain to depend on for resources or assistance and there was also minimal lateral communication between advisors in the field. Making things worse, advisors often felt blamed by their American superiors for the failures of their counterparts, adding to the feeling of isolation and low morale.

The third lesson was related to the second in that the findings indicated that advisors were generally unmotivated to perform their tasks and simply marked the time off their calendars until the end of their tours. Many were simply deemed unsuitable for the assignment to begin with. The study therefore recommended that if advisor duty could not be made strictly voluntary, then at the least the military should screen
candidates to determine their suitability to perform effectively as advisors. The study recommended that the military impose selection criteria that would include determining an individual’s capacity for foreign language, adaptability to foreign culture, and a temperament that was disposed to sharing hardships and dangers with personnel from other cultures.24

Periodic reviews of advisor selection and training continued through the war. In June, 1966, another study was conducted to review the effectiveness of the advisory program. The study recommended that “special attention should be directed to the selection and preparatory training of officers designated as…advisors, including a twelve-week language course and a six week civil affairs advisor course.”25

Intensive reviews of advisor organization and employment, such as have occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan, are nothing new either. Several reviews were conducted in Vietnam to develop the right skill sets and organizations for advisors. BG Edward O. Flannagan Jr., Training Director at MACV, supervised a major review of advisor strength and requirements in 1967. This review resulted in team augmentation with expertise in intelligence, engineer and combat service support operations. By 1971, however, the standard Military Assistance Team (MAT) consisted of five advisors and all were combat arms.

A second 1967 study, dubbed Project 640, determined that there was no single agency responsible for coordinating advisory efforts. As a result of the study, BG Donnelly P. Bolton was designated the Chief of Staff, Military Assistance Command, Military Assistance (MACMA). MACMA’s mission was to “supervise, co-ordinate,
monitor, and evaluate, in conjunction with appropriate agencies, the joint advisory effort in Vietnam and the Military Assistance Program for the government of Vietnam."\(^{26}\)

**Lack of an Enduring Structure post-Vietnam**

Following the deactivation of the last of the Vietnam MATS in 1972, the Army discarded preparing conventional forces personnel for advising FSF. The mission fell entirely to the Special Forces, for whom Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Unconventional Warfare (UW) were Special Operations Force (SOF) unique missions and SF core competencies. According to Bonin, “the creation of U.S. Special Operations Command and of Special Forces as a branch of the Army in 1987 contributed to this view."\(^{27}\) The successes of the FID mission by the Operational Advise and Training Teams (OPATTs) in El Salvador seemed to reinforce that this was the way of the future.

Several SF officers were critical that they had not been involved from the beginning in training Iraq's Security Forces and pointed to the initial difficulties as proof that the conventional Army was ill-suited for SFA.\(^{28}\) Where major SFA efforts are required, however, there have simply never been sufficient Special Forces personnel to assume the task alone. As a case in point, by the end of 1965 in Vietnam, Special Forces advisor teams made up roughly 21 per cent of all advisor teams in the field at the sub-sector level and less than 12 per cent at the sector level (Vietnam was divided into 43 sectors).\(^{29}\) These SF advisor teams were primarily at the local (village) level, with Vietnamese Special Forces units, or with the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) units, originally formed by the CIA.
Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement recommended some type of an enduring capability for stability operations in their article “A Return to the Army’s Roots: Governance, Stabilization, and Reconstruction”. They wrote, “All Army forces-not merely the civil affairs or special operations communities-will, to some degree, be involved in stability operations essential to the achievement of strategic victory.”\textsuperscript{30} They stress that the nation cannot accomplish strategic objectives in future wars until there exists a legitimate, credible, security environment.

Retired Marine Colonel Thomas X. Hammes examined the continuing evolution of the character of warfare. He called each step in the evolution a “generation” of warfare and contends that the modern world has seen four generations. He believes that maneuver warfare, or 3\textsuperscript{rd} generation warfare (3GW) will rarely, if ever, exist in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century for the United States. Instead, enemies of the U.S., particularly transnational terrorist groups will make up for their military technological disadvantages by engaging in fourth generation warfare (4GW), such as we faced in Vietnam and are now facing in Iraq and Afghanistan. He writes that U.S. forces required to fight and win a fourth generation war will require “infantry units capable of operating as small units….and finally to live with and advise counterpart units of an indigenous force.”\textsuperscript{31}

Michael J. Meese and Sean M. Morgan stress in their article “New Requirements for Army Expert Knowledge: Afghanistan and Iraq,” that “the adaptation of war-fighting skills to a more ambiguous security environment will require soldiers to be just as decisive, but far more discriminating in their use of violence.”\textsuperscript{32} Further, that in stabilization operations the center of gravity is the attitude and actions of the local...
citizenry whose support is essential to long term strategic success.” Therefore, “Army leaders must develop their ability to work…with indigenous security forces.”

Positive Momentum and Proposed Solutions to SFA Structure

After nearly eight years of SFA effort, the 2009 battalion command selection list in the Maneuver, Fires and Effects category identified 33 Lieutenant Colonels and promotable Majors for assignment as Transition Team leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan. These board selections reinforced two of the Army Chief of Staff’s directives on transition team duty. First, that quality officers man these positions and second, that these positions are battalion command equivalents, thereby making the officers eligible for subsequent selection to Senior Service College, promotion to Colonel and selection to brigade level command. Whether or not this will be a trend of future selection boards, the 2009 selections confirm that the Army considers duty as a Transition Team leader in Iraq and Afghanistan vitally important duty and reinforces the lesson learned that quality personnel are essential to effective SFA.

Another move forward was the publication of FM 3-07.1. The SFA manual stresses that the Army executes SFA throughout the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace through general war. The new Army doctrine incorporates guidance from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which directed that joint forces “possess the ability to train mentor and advise FSF” and DODD 3000.05. DODD 3000.05 directed that “stability operations are a core military mission and equal in importance to combat operations.” It also reinforces the importance of SFA, stating, “The immediate goal is often to provide the local populace with security…”

Some military and national security professionals have advocated units established solely for stability and SFA operations as the answer to a permanent
structure requirement. LTC (Ret) John Nagl, president of the Center for a New American Strategy and author of *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, a study on counter-insurgency from a historical perspective, is one with such an opinion. He has gone a step farther, advocating an “advisory corps” to address the reality and resulting resources requirements of the Army’s need for an enduring SFA capacity. The idea harkens back to COL (Ret) Don Snider, Ph.D., who advocated a constabulary corps for peacekeeping operations in 1998. Nagl credits Snider’s constabulary corps idea as the impetus behind the advisor corps initiative.

The Advisor Corps advocated by Nagl is a force of 20,000 personnel, broken down into 750 teams of 25 advisors each. The corps would have three divisions with eight division advisor teams, each with five subordinate brigade advisor teams, which in turn, would each have five battalion advisor teams. The corps commander would have the dual role of being responsible for the doctrine, training and organization for the advisor mission as well as being an adviser to combatant commanders for SFA or even as the senior advisor to a host nation Ministry of Defense.³⁸

The Advisor Corps initiative does have merit. It addresses the issue of an organization with doctrinal and training proponentcy for SFA. It also addresses the problem identified during the 1967 “Project 640” study of having a single agency to coordinate advisory efforts. However, as LTG William B. Caldwell IV, who commanded the Combined Arms Center (CAC) as the advisory corps idea circulated the Army, pointed out, “The concept here is a very specific focus: they do not do direct action; they do not command and control combat forces; they are not a combat force.”³⁹
Therein lies the problem. Nagl proposes a force of 20,000 soldiers, commanded by a Lieutenant General, suitable for one type of mission. Vice Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Peter Chiarelli does not believe that the structural answer is a corps dedicated solely to SFA. Of Nagl’s initiative he wrote, “We simply don’t have the resources to divide the military into ‘combat’ and ‘stability’ organizations. Instead we must focus on developing full-spectrum capabilities across all organizations in the armed forces.”\(^{40}\) Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement cautioned against units designed for specific operations, using stability operations in their example as, “the creation or integration of new capabilities must not relieve combat commanders of responsibility for the overarching stability operations.”\(^{41}\) The same holds true of the requirement to partner with, augment, and advise FSF.

COL Scott G. Wuestner, Chief of Operational Integration at the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) at Carlisle Barracks, PA has forwarded an alternative Army force structure, the Security Advisory and Assistance Command (SAAC). The SAAC would be a subordinate element of TRADOC under the Combined Arms Center and would be responsible for SFA doctrine and advisor training. Under the SAAC, the Military Advisory and Assistance Command (MAAC), would operate as a “deployable MNSTC-I” supporting a GCC by “executing Security Assistance operations (FMS, IMET, MTTs, etc), developing partner nation Title 10 capabilities – legal and legislative authorities – foster interagency operability, in addition to combat advising.”\(^{42}\)

The SAAC and MAAC concept represents an effective model, capitalizes on SFA lessons learned, and provides a sound structural solution. The remainder of Wuestner’s
MAAC model includes a training brigade and the Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Group (TMAAG). The training brigade’s purpose is to prevent the stand-down of a combat brigade to perform this function. This has since been executed with the creation of the 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk. The challenge of the model lies in the TMAAG, which reflects the former “external team” approach to conducting the advisory missions in Iraq. Wuestner wrote, “TMAAGs or their elements may be placed under tactical control (TACON)/operational control (OPCON) to BCTs for combat advisory missions as well.” This was the exact command relationship rejected by MNC-I in 2007. TACON and OPCON moved to attachment, attachment to assignment, and assignment to the Advise and Assist Brigade (AAB) concept.

The Advise and Assist Brigade Concept and Employment

AABs are modular BCTs augmented with advisors to conduct SFA. For Iraq, in particular, it was the advising solution that MNC-I had moved toward since late 2006. In March, 2007 all TTs were attached to the U.S. MNDs and BCTs as opposed to remaining TACON. Today, the 162nd Brigade’s only remaining externally provided TTs training for deployment to Iraq are those who will deploy in support of MNSTC-I. Advising Iraq’s fielded forces is conducted by AABs.

FM 3-07.1 addresses only the Advise and Assist brigade as a structure for SFA operations. The Army’s doctrine on SFA contends that the BCT, able to operate in permissive and non-permissive environments, “can conduct SFA across the spectrum of conflict.” It also contends that the BCT can continue to provide the host nation SFA capability with the imbedded advisors, while the BCT retains the capability to “conduct full spectrum operations independently.” This statement indicates that the AAB can
either partner with and advise FSF simultaneously or continue to advise when directed to conduct operations elsewhere.

Although able to be tailored based on the specific requirements of the operational environment, the standard augmentation package that creates an AAB consists of 48 advisors who undergo cultural, language and advisor training and are assigned to a modular BCT during pre-deployment preparations. The 48 officers (CPT to COL) and senior NCOs are capable to advise the FSF, assist in providing coalition force (CF) enablers to FSF and provide the CF with FSF Situational Awareness. The AAB represents a full spectrum capable force that arrives in an AOR with the capability to provide SFA to FSF divisions, brigades and battalions.

Is the AAB part of the solution to an effective and enduring SFA structure? MG Pittard, currently the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G3/5/7, the first active component commander of the IAG, believes so. He believes the AAB is the way to go for multiple reasons, but mainly because, “the owner of the battlespace has got to be in charge of the advisory process.” During his tenure as Commanding General of IAG, it had become obvious that there was a clear linkage between the development of the ISF as a whole and what the transition teams were doing in the field. Also, BCTs had the resources to provide the teams and better understood what was necessary in their areas of operation from a combined security stand-point. The AAB concept links the advisors to FSF development in a unified way under the command and control of the battlespace owner.

Movement toward the AAB and Residual Challenges

A precursor of things to come in terms of the Army’s current AAB organization was the “Internal” or “Out of Hide” TT. Internal TTs were assigned to their home station
units and trained and deployed with their BCTs as a team. The BCT would establish and deploy with as many internal TTs as deemed required based on the number of ISF units and their composition in sector. By contrast, “external” TTs were assigned to the IAG as their parent unit and were, after a March 2007 fragmentary order from MNC-I, attached to U.S. divisions and BCTs in sector. An external TT was any TT that had not been established from within a U.S. MND or BCT but had trained at and deployed from Fort Riley under the auspices of the 1st Division and the IAG.

MG Pittard observed as the commander of IAG that the MNDs and BCTs always resourced their internal TTs well because “they belonged to them.” One advantage of the internal TT was that they were often well augmented with security and their administration and logistical support was fully handled by their parent unit. This gave them the time to fully dedicate to their Iraqi counterparts. What they lacked in a formalized training advisor program was complemented by the unit’s Mission Rehearsal Exercise and by IAG arranging for them to attend the TT Phoenix Academy in Taji, 30 miles north of Baghdad.

COL Philip L. Swinford served as a division Military Transition Team (MiTT) leader in Baghdad from spring 2007 to spring 2008 at the height of the surge. By the time COL Swinford was in theater, MNC-I had ordered the attachment of all TTs to the U.S. units in sector. Regardless, Swinford’s team was still considered an external MiTT, as they had been assigned to the 9th Iraqi Army Division by IAG.

Swinford describes some of the challenges of being an external MiTT, including that the team was limited in its ability to perform more than one advisory task simultaneously as the team had to travel everywhere as a unit, providing their own
security. Harkening back to the excessive bureaucracy of more than one chain of command from Vietnam, the team had to do their own administration and often had more than one de facto reporting chain. Requests for information came from the U.S. MND or BCT, the IAG and even MNSTC-I assessing the effectiveness of institutional training and the impacts of new equipment fielding.

Another challenge was that Iraqi boundary changes within a BCTs AO would result in BCT resources being pulled from that Iraqi unit as well as its transition teams. If the BCT had provided a security detachment to allow the TT mobility to fully advise their counterparts, that detachment was usually pulled. Its replacement, if there was one, then had to be integrated into the team, making continuity next to impossible.

Swinford observed positive and negative aspects of internal teams as well. On the positive side, internal teams were generally well resourced by their parent BCTs and well integrated into the commander’s priorities. One drawback again dealt with boundary changes. A break in the relationship between a BCT and an Iraqi unit due to a change in battle space, and that TT was likely to be pulled and placed with an Iraqi unit that corresponded to the BCT’s AO. It was most often up to the IAG to monitor these changes, the resulting effects on Iraq units, and assist in making the adjustments through MNC-I FRAGOs.

Swinford’s identification of what could be a disadvantage of AABs is further highlighted in Afghanistan. Although the creation of the IJC and its emphasis on embedded partnering provides an example of where AABs could have a positive impact, Afghanistan provides other challenges to employment of AABs as the sole unit able to provide on the ground SFA. The AAB provides a link between the FSF and the
battlespace owner, but this assumes that, at the tactical level, the battlespace owner is the U.S. BCT commander. The multi-national regional command structure in Afghanistan and the remote areas under the control of the ANSF make ETTs, therefore, a continuing requirement.

Recommendations for a Permanent Structure

The first step of a proposed solution to an enduring structure that provides for an integrated approach is to institutionalize Wuestner’s SAAC concept for doctrinal proponency and coordination of the training efforts already in place at Fort Polk and the deployable MAAC concept to support the GCC. The 162nd BDE at Fort Polk becomes permanent, with FT Polk designated as the Army’s Security Force Assistance Center of Excellence. A logical CONUS basing solution for the MAAC, therefore, is Fort Polk. During periods where a significant advisor presence overseas is not required, 162nd cadre can be used for scenario development at any of the Army’s CTCs or to augment the Observer-Controller cadre at CTCs.

Expand the AAB concept to AA divisions and corps through FSF cells assigned to the G3 in those headquarters. Division and corps FSF cells do not need to have the same specialty skills as found in the TTs, but should have sections that correspond to the security institutions of the host nation in order for them to better coordinate with the MAAC. For example, an FSF cell in Iraq included staff proponents to synchronize SFA efforts for the Army, National Police, Iraqi Police (local) and the Department of Border Enforcement. Within each of these cells, a section worked with MNSTC-I to coordinate recruiting, institutional training, and equipping, as well as operations and sustainment. The MAAC, serving as a deployable MNSTC-I, can either coordinate with corps and below FSF cells which in turn coordinate and synchronize requirements with the AABs,
or directly coordinate with ETTs in the event there is no U.S. battlespace owner. This ensures an integrated approach to SFA. It also facilitates the rapid introduction into theater of full spectrum capable forces with immediately available SFA capabilities for the GCC.

To address those circumstances where advisors are required without the conditions for a U.S. parent unit, the MAAC needs to expand to include a Transition Integration Cell, an organization that synchronizes the advisory efforts with SFA priorities for the theater, a Transition Integration Cell (TIC). The TIC would serve as MACMA did in Vietnam and the IAG in Iraq (there is no corresponding organization in Afghanistan). The TIC would also determine the requirements for and execution of in-theater training for ETTs or the TT augmentation for AABs. This would require an expansion of the current MAAC organization concept of 116 personnel to an organization of approximately 156. The TIC would require J1, J3, J4, and J5 capabilities to handle ETT personnel and logistics issues, deployment and training synchronization, and future plans considering possible FSF expansion.

As for the advisors themselves, the Army needs to identify and track those with the expertise. Soldiers who complete advisor training at Fort Polk should be awarded an additional skill identifier (ASI), a necessity identified by Wuestner, with a suffix added for trained personnel who have actually participated in advising FSF, either with an ETT or as an AAB SFA augmentee. Wuestner also recommends advisor pro pay, a distinctive badge or tab, and maximization of the use of volunteers. These recommendations address the morale issue raised in 1965 by Hickey.
The Army cannot afford to have units on stand-by waiting for a singular type mission. Therefore, assign SFA augmentation to create one AAB for every four BCTs, or roughly one per division-sized unit. These augmentees are assigned to the BCT during the Train/Ready and Available cycles of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. This would result in an average of four AABs immediately available to deploy with 192 trained advisors and an additional twelve ready to deploy in three to six months with an additional 576. For separate ETT capability, assign advisor trained personnel ready for deployment, to utilization tours at the CTCs or TSBs, the same assignments that many of the early advisors came from during current operations.

The reserve component can also serve as a resource for additional advisor personnel, as required. At the start of efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, several of the initial trainers and advisors were reservists from the 98th and 80th Divisions (Institutional Training) or DIVITs. These organizations would be ideal assignments for reserve personnel who could be trained as advisors at Fort Polk and, if called, deployed as part of ETTs. Select National Guard BCTs can also be designated as AABs. In accordance with the ARFORGEN, this would provide an average of two additional brigades immediately available with 96 advisors.

A scenario may unfold as follows. A GCC deploys combat forces to an AOR where advising FSF is a specified or implied task. The MAAC, with its internal TIC deploys in support of the GCC to build capacity at the national level and synchronize SFA activities. Initial forces include the available AABs that arrive with imbedded capability to conduct advising and embedded partnering. Based on the situation, the TIC may coordinate for additional in-theater advisor training or assess a future
requirement for this training. The MAAC assesses the need for additional trainers or ETTs to operate separate from U.S. BCTs based on the command and control structure throughout the AOR. Advisor trained personnel are assembled and deployed as ETTs and are OPCON to the MAAC which assigns them to specific FSF units. No two scenarios will be exactly alike or have the same requirements and the MAAC will have to continue to assess and update requirements for additional SFA capability.

The main advantage of the SAAC, MAAC, AAB and ETT concept over the advisor corps is in the full spectrum capability of the AAB combined with the institutional relevance of the SAAC and the flexibility of the MAAC and ETTs. The advisor corps, meanwhile, represents significant force structure suitable only for SFA and, therefore, brings limited capability to the GCC. The TMAAG represents an excessive structure added to the MAAC concept and reverts the total advisor effort back to the pre-AAB external team approach.

By adopting the proposed structure, the Army will have the institutional and operational capability in place to be able to provide GCCs with trained, responsive SFA. Having this capability will allow the Army to maintain SFA expertise, rapidly respond to contingencies requiring SFA and assist in Secretary Gates’ vision of the Department of Defense being able to build the military capacity of partners free of excessive bureaucracy.

Endnotes


2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 LTC Michael J. Landers, “End of Tour Observations of Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) in support of the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) mission.”


11 Ibid, 15.


14 Ibid, 341.

15 Ibid, 341.


17 Ibid, 394.


19 MG Dana J.H. Pittard, TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7, telephone interview by author, December 9, 2009.

20 John A. Bonin, “U.S. Army Advisory and Assistance Training Teams: Historical Background,” U.S. Army War College (May 9, 2008), 1.


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Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, 368.


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Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement, “A Return to the Army’s Roots: Governance, Stabilization, and Reconstruction,” 261


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MG Dana J.H. Pittard, telephone interview by author, December 9, 2009.

MG Dana J.H. Pittard, telephone interview by author, December 9, 2009.

MG Dana J.H. Pittard, telephone interview by author, December 9, 2009.

MG Dana J.H. Pittard, telephone interview by author, December 9, 2009.

MNSTC-I established the Phoenix Academy in 2005 to provide advisors in-country training on the latest tactics, techniques and procedures.

COL Philip L. Swinford, Faculty, MCWAR, e-mail message to author, November 20, 2009.


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