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12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The original document contains color images.

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
   a. REPORT          b. ABSTRACT          c. THIS PAGE
       unclassified    unclassified    unclassified

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
   UU

18. NUMBER OF PAGES
   88

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
The discussion of counterinsurgency (COIN) is certainly an important and relevant topic in the world situation today. With the continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other events that continue to unfold in other nations on a daily basis, the need to examine this critical issue becomes even more vital. This edition of the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) Bulletin is focused on the theme of counterinsurgency. In order to provide a broad coverage of the topic, we have invited the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) to submit articles and make this a “joint” effort, examining both the operational and tactical level of effort.

I want to thank COL Steve Mains, Director of CALL, and the members of the CALL team for their interest and support of this issue. They have provided four articles to be included in this Bulletin. COL Mains, in his excellent CALL Director’s Message to follow, discusses each of their four articles and provides a quick summary overview with insight into each. In addition, JCOA has added six other articles and papers that help to round out this issue. Here, I will give a brief overview summary of each of these six articles.

In his article, *The Yin and Yang of Counter-insurgency in Urban Terrain*, LTC Millen, USA, begins by giving historical perspective and examples for operations in an urban environment. He then discusses the need to isolate and control the insurgency movement in order to minimize their support and sustainment. This is followed by an article by Col (ret) John Caldwell, USMC, and COL (ret) Chuck Lewis, USA, on *Winning 21st Century Conflicts: Organizing to Counter Insurgency, Terrorism, and Social Disorder*. The article examines the need to update and enhance our training, organization, and intelligence efforts to meet the demands of the 21st century environment.

*Lessons from the Counterterrorism War*, by Mr. Boaz Ganor, founder of the International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism in Israel, gives an overview of the underlying causes and philosophy of the terrorist movement. Although a short article, the insights are important to understanding the terrorist mindset, and thus combating it. Next, the Air Command and Staff College Quick-Look Paper “Malaya: A Successful Counterinsurgency Operation” and the College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Quick-Look Paper “Perspective: Airpower in Counterinsurgency Operations,” both from the Air University library, give additional historical lessons learned from the 1940s, 1950s, and Vietnam era in a COIN scenario, and with applicability to the operations of today.

The final article not summarized by COL Mains in his message is an article by LTC Jim Lacey, USA (ret), an analyst with the Institute for Defense Analyses assigned to JCOA. In his article *Slaughter of the Innocents (The Hidden Economic and Moral Consequences of Fighting ‘The Long War’ Against Islamic Terrorism)*, Mr. Lacey discusses the negative economic impacts of a drawn out conflict on both the developed and developing nations involved. He further looks at how future policy decisions will impact the future economic outlook for these nations.

*James O. Barclay, III*
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Director, Joint Center for Operational Analysis
Message from the Director

COL Steven Mains
Director
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

It is my pleasure and privilege to introduce the Army’s contribution to the current Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) Quarterly Bulletin on Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN). After Vietnam, the Army treated its COIN experiences in that conflict as anomalies, as events that would not likely happen again in the future. The Army redirected its energies and efforts toward ensuring victory in an anticipated high-intensity conflict against the Soviet Union in Europe. The Army rejected the notion that it would wage another counterinsurgency and the United States (US) political and military leaderships devised military employment doctrines that precluded the commitment of US forces unless certain diplomatic pre-conditions were met. A clear United Nations (UN) mandate to liberate Kuwait drove planning for Operation Desert Storm. The Dayton Peace Accord included an agreement by warring factions not to attack coalition forces as they executed stability and reconstruction operations in Bosnia.

The onset of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has, however, brought counterinsurgency warfare again to the forefront of the US Army military thought and practice. To wage the GWOT successfully, the US government has had to commit troops to regions whose populations are hostile to US and coalition allied forces. While US and coalition forces still execute stability and reconstruction operations similar to those conducted so successfully in places like Panama, Bosnia, and Kosovo in the 1990s, they are facing assault by violent insurgencies orchestrated by international terrorist organizations such as Al Qaida, and augmented by disgruntled former elites, religious extremists, and criminal elements. In the GWOT, we no longer have the luxury of setting pre-conditions for the employment of US forces that exclude the possibility of counterinsurgency operations. They are now a daily reality for our Service members serving in Iraq and Afghanistan and other locations across the globe. Indeed, the enemy we face has demonstrated the capability to strike us at home with deadly impact. COIN now impacts both our armed forces worldwide, as well as the civilian populations of the United States and her allies.

Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Les Grau’s article sheds new light on the way US forces must conduct intelligence analysis in the current COIN operational environment. Grau is well-known as an authority on both insurgent and counterinsurgent strategy and tactics employed during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In this article, he brings his analysis forward to the present day, highlighting the requirement for intelligence officers to engage in investigative work more akin to law enforcement than traditional military intelligence practice. Grau argues convincingly that proper use of both investigative tools and interrogation techniques, backed up by a well-organized intelligence database, are the key to conducting effective operations based on accurate intelligence.

Dr. Tom Marks’s article seeks to define the term insurgency within the context of the GWOT. Dr. Marks basically argues that over-use of the term “terrorism” can lead both political and military leaderships to ignore other underlying causes of insurgent violence, which, in turn, can lead them to overlook potentially effective strategies and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Moreover, he argues, the over-characterization of
insurgents as terrorists can often lead to abuse of populations where counterinsurgent forces operate, allowing the “astute insurgent challenger” an opportunity to mobilize additional support for the insurgent cause. Dr. Montgomery McFate’s article “Anthropology and Counterinsurgency,” complements and accentuates the themes expressed by Dr. Marks. Dr. McFate states that cultural knowledge has become an imperative for US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, because “US technology, training, and doctrine designed to counter the Soviet threat are not designed for low-intensity counterinsurgency operations where civilians mingle freely with combatants in complex urban terrain.” However, while she urges the US military to use the knowledge of cultural anthropologists, Dr. McFate at the same time views the latter as disengaged as a community from the task of assisting the armed forces in a successful prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism.

Mr. George Mordica and Mr. Louis DiMarco’s article examines urban operations (UO) and how these operations affect US strategy. They looked at where counterinsurgency came from and how it has morphed from a simple insurgency in Vietnam to the more complex version we are witnessing today in Iraq. Using four urban operations examples from Operation Iraqi Freedom they discuss UO and the insurgency. Then, in conclusion, Mordica and DiMarco discuss the implications this analysis should portend for doctrine and strategy in developing military forces and operations for the future, based on a better understanding of what is happening in Iraq and what could happen elsewhere.

The successful execution of counterinsurgency operations will remain a key to victory in the Global War on Terrorism, as long as the US continues to project forces into regions that support international terrorism. COIN is also a critical component of Homeland Defense, since terrorist organizations have proven themselves capable of striking us on our own soil. I am confident that this JCOA Quarterly Bulletin, the first dual Service-Joint edition of this publication, will be just the first in a series of future bulletins providing observations, insights, and lessons learned from US forces engaged in the Global War Terrorism.

STEVEN MAINS
Colonel, Armor
Director
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
For the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) this past summer has proven to be a period of self-assessment and adjustment as BG Barclay, our new Director, reported on board. For those of you who follow these articles this may seem like a repeat to mention our changing mission, and, to a certain extent, it is. As a relatively new organization, we are constantly shifting our mission to best align with strategic guidance, and a certain amount of change always comes with being a new organization or with a change of leadership. The major push for us is in the distribution and integration of our findings, through various venues, back out to the warfighter. Lessons learned and the analytical documentation to back it up does little good if it is posted on a web site with the premise “post it and they will come.” This has proven to be a failed strategy in the past and requires us to examine new and innovative integration methods for the future. We are allocating more and more of our resources along these integration lines. The four major integration venues are briefings (President of the United States level and below); publishing; passing our findings up through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process; and the physical integration of personnel and recent associated works from the theater of operations into exercises, experiments, and intelligence analysis. Since I have been here, we have briefed our findings to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) twice, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over ten times, and at the four star level many more times. We have published one book, *Iraqi Perspectives Project*, and several major studies such as the “Joint Combined Combat Operations” report (JCCO), formerly known as the Major Combat Operations report; the “Stability, Security, and Transition to Sovereignty Report” (SSTR); and the Hurricane Katrina Report. There is a steady flow of our findings and reports to the Joint Staff where they are sorted into groups, analyzed, and solution sets discussed and implemented. And, as mentioned in the last JCOA Bulletin, we have personnel recently back from the Central Command area of responsibility embedded into mission rehearsal exercises and URBAN RESOLVE type experiments. In addition, we feed the Joint Forces Command J2 with some of our current analysis for integration into their process. We have a draft study in the works entitled “Humanitarian Disaster Relief Operations” to help prepare organizations for future catastrophes. Thankfully, due to a quiet season as far as disaster relief operations, our last minute deployment activity has been kept to a minimum these past few months. We are, however, still deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan on a steady state basis, with little change in terms of collection at either location. However, there is a good possibility we will be adjusting the size and scope of those teams in the near future. Other short term, but resource intensive, studies continue to come our way as directed in some cases by the SECDEF. Most are sensitive in nature and cannot be mentioned by name, yet have strategic implications that will undoubtedly reach the public in some fashion. JCOA’s mission is fast paced, exciting, and evolving. The operational and strategic impacts of our work are at times hard to measure, but we believe we have the right processes in place to make a difference and, if at all possible, save lives in the long run. That is our goal and we remain focused on it throughout our daily work!

“The time for extracting a lesson from history is ever at hand for those who are wise.”

Demosthenes (384-322 B.C.)
Orator and statesman
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The Yin and Yang of Counterinsurgency in Urban Terrain

LTC Raymond A. Millen
US Army War College-Strategic Studies Institute

It is a long-standing truism that insurgencies derive their strength from the people. By extension, the struggle between the insurgency and counterinsurgency ultimately revolves around control of the population. In this regard, urban areas, be they cities or village clusters in a province, provide insurgencies with tremendous opportunities to expand.

The role of cities in insurgency warfare will assume ever increasing import as migration trends continue unabated, particularly in the developing world. Because the development of urban utilities and services has not kept pace with migration in the developing world, insurgents can tap into any consequential discontent or use the poor development to denounce the legitimacy of the government.

Modern insurgents are not compelled to subscribe to any one category of insurgency. In fact, for counterinsurgency practitioners, attempting to categorize an inchoate insurgency as fitting a certain mold can lead to military operations working at cross purposes, and a counterinsurgency strategy beset by confusion and contradictions. Certainly, there have been urban centric insurgencies as advocated by Lenin and Carlos Marighella, but the historical success rate is abysmal. And although Maoist strategy advocated growing an insurgency in rural areas, it did not eschew urban areas completely. In fact, one of Mao’s guerilla war principles specifically advises: “Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.”

Some of the most pernicious insurgencies in modern history, Malaya (1948-1960), Algeria (1954-1960), Indochina/Vietnam (1946-1975), Chechnya (1995-2000), and currently Iraq (to a degree) employed a mix of insurgency warfare in urban and rural areas in order to establish a Yin and Yang dynamic for defeating the established government. Mao’s Yin and Yang theory espouses the interactive synergism of strengths and weaknesses. In essence, the insurgent attempts to turn his weaknesses into strength and the enemy’s strengths into weakness.

In pursuit of this Yin and Yang dynamic, urban areas afford insurgents significant advantages. An urban insurgency becomes an excellent platform for propaganda because it reaches a large audience, ties down large numbers of government forces, and provides intelligence and sustenance for insurgents in rural areas. Because of these advantages, the government cannot ignore an urban insurgency and must devote substantial resources to combating it—exponentially more than the insurgents devote—which usually results in the diminution of security forces in rural areas. If forced to decide, a government will surrender rural areas to insurgents but cannot tolerate the loss of a major city. Because insurgencies in general are prolonged conflicts and urban terrain provides ample sanctuaries, more and more government forces may become embroiled in the urban conflict; the rural insurgency in turn has the freedom to establish sanctuaries un molested, progressively seize more territory including local urban areas, and eventually create the conditions for the defeat of the government security forces or cause the collapse of the government’s will through exhaustion.

This article will first focus on patterns of insurgency warfare in urban areas, drawing on salient lessons from the aforementioned insurgencies and highlighting the essential role of propaganda, provocations, terrorism, and the eventual exhaustion of the security forces. Second, this article will address the strategic and operational counterinsurgency imperatives in urban areas: progressive combing of insurgent dominated areas, establishing control, empowering the people, and inoculating the urban area from insurgent re-infiltration.

One caveat bears underscoring. Counterinsurgency operations in urban terrain are just part of the overall counterinsurgency strategy. The government cannot make retention of urban areas as the centerpiece of its campaign to the exclusion of overarching strategic factors, such as the perceived legitimacy of the government, the origins and causes that unify the insurgent movement, and the assistance of external and domestic sources to name a few. In the same regard, the military cannot remain as the primary counterinsurgency instrument throughout. Its task is to set the security conditions for the other instruments of power to take effect. In point
of fact, a counterinsurgency czar, perhaps a former police commissioner, with authority over all agencies (not just the military) is needed for the proper prosecution of the conflict. Hence, to ignore strategic factors in pursuit of tactical advantages risks strategic defeat.

Patterns of Insurgency Warfare inUrban Areas

On the face of it, conducting an insurgency in a major urban area is a daunting task. It is here that the government is most formidable and secure. In peaceful times, this is undoubtedly true, but in times of state power fluxes (e.g., the aftermath of a major war or the fall of a government) militants have an opportunity to establish a sanctuary in an urban area immediately, such as occurred in Grozny, Fallujah and Baghdad, or during the course of a widespread insurgency, such as in Algiers and Saigon. Hence, government distraction and temporary weakness creates the opportunity for urban insurgencies to take root.

At the strategic level, the urban insurgency serves as a propaganda platform and vehicle for insurgency’s legitimization. Dr. Steven Metz describes insurgency war as ‘armed theater’ where the antagonists are playing to an audience at the same time they interact with each other.”9 Within this context, urban areas represent the center stage of the conflict complete with lime lights for the international audience. Historical experience suggests that an incident in the hinterland receives scant international attention, but an incident in a city, be it an act of terrorism or clash between combatants, receives amplified, immediate, and world-wide coverage.

Insurgent provocations (atrocities, assassinations, and terrorist acts) aim to induce the government to react in a heavy handed manner for the purpose of propaganda and further alienation of the populace.10 Successful propaganda may sway domestic opinion in favor of the insurgent cause, but the real coup is to internationalize the conflict—this is the real prize because it opens tremendous opportunities for the insurgents to exploit.11 The paradox of provocations is that insurgents are rarely condemned for the terrorist acts they commit. But if the government overreacts, the domestic and international outcry is swift and vociferous. To this end, the insurgent weapon of choice is the video camera. If the insurgents can garner international sympathy, they can gain state sponsors, increase recruitment, and bring to bear increasing international pressure to fetter the government’s counterinsurgency initiatives.12 Particularly noteworthy is the insurgency’s use of the domestic and international legal system as a weapon to undercut the government’s efforts.13

At the operational level, terrorist acts serve to co-opt the population. Roger Trinquier avers that “The sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of a population...If it [popular support] does not exist, it must be secured by every possible means, the most effective of which is terrorism.”14 Trinquier continues:

The goal of modern warfare is control of the populace, and terrorism is a particularly appropriate weapon, since it aims directly at the inhabitant. In the street, at work, at home, the citizen lives continually under the threat of violent death. In the presence of this permanent danger surrounding him, he has the depressing feeling of being an isolated and defenseless target. The fact that public authority and the police are no longer capable of ensuring his security adds to his distress. He loses confidence in the state whose inherent mission it is to guarantee his safety. He is more and more drawn to the side of the terrorists, who alone are able to protect him.15

In his book, Inside the Green Berets, Charles Simpson concludes that survival is uppermost in the citizen’s mind. Allegiance to the government is contingent on its ability to protect the citizens from the insurgents as well as their standard of living. As long as they feel the insurgents have the capability to inflict retribution, the populace will reserve their support to the insurgents.16 Obviously, fear is not the only incentive for cooperation. Ideological indoctrination will create a loyal base of adherents, as Mao patiently instructed, but for the rest, intimidation is critical.17 It is little wonder that the majority of the population becomes, as described by Major General Chiarelli, fence-sitters.18

Under siege, law enforcement and local government authorities are in no position to protect the citizens. Many will already be victims of assassinations, and their successors will unlikely respond effectively. As the insurgent pattern in Malaya, French Indochina, South Vietnam, and Algeria illustrate, one of the initial acts of insurgents is the systematic elimination of urban officials in order to sever the central government’s local authority and to create a power vacuum, which the insurgent network will fill.19 By assuming the role of a local functioning government, the insurgents can assume greater administration for the prosecution of the conflict,
with greater revenues from taxation, more efficient use of labor and resources for military expenditures, and conscription.

Insurgents find natural allies with the existing criminal underground. As it serves everyone’s interest to expel government authority, petty criminals, gangs, and organized crime readily cooperate or even join the ranks of the insurgency. Accustomed to conducting illegal activities and avoiding law enforcement, these groups can eagerly assist insurgents with terrorist acts, intimidation, and extortion, as well as theft (robbery, burglary, drug transactions, etc.).

In response the government brings in the military to reassert its authority and eliminate the insurgents. Untrained in counterinsurgency warfare and unaccustomed to interacting with civilians, the military often plays into the insurgents’ hands by the indiscriminate use of deadly force, mass arrests, collective punishment, and disruption of daily life. Besides feeding insurgent propaganda, heavy handed military measures inspire a steady stream of recruits for the insurgent movement, either because of the alienation engendered by the military’s brutality, out of a romantic sense of adventure, or because the insurgent’s defiance creates a David and Goliath image. Additionally, the introduction of military forces results in a sharp increase of violence and hatred, hindering a diplomatic solution and marginalizing moderate officials—both insurgent and government. Perhaps most importantly, the social contract between the government and citizens becomes unhinged if the security forces are unable to stymie insurgent attacks while simultaneously disrupting daily commerce, services, work, and standard of living. In this way the insurgents gain a certain amount of legitimacy by framing the security forces as oppressors rather than protectors in the eyes of the populace.

Once the local populace begins providing security, intelligence, shelter, sustenance, weapons, supply, and recruits, the military cannot counter the insurgents effectively. Brigadier Gavin Bullock asserts that as long as noncombatants are present, military power becomes circumscribed because “in any future counterinsurgency operation, military action will be conducted under the critical scrutiny of the law, the media, human rights organizations, and other international bodies such as the European Court.”

The burden of time usually weighs more heavily on the shoulders of the government. An urban insurgent sanctuary provides benefits to the rural insurgents in terms of training, financing, sustenance, intelligence, and manpower. The possession of a major city also provides greater legitimacy if the insurgency can frame it as part of a popular uprising. Without urban areas, the insurgency cannot gain strength. Moreover, as Jennifer Taw and Bruce Hoffman see it, urban insurgents may seek to tie up security forces in cities for extended periods in order to give the insurgency in rural areas greater operational freedom and improve the correlation of forces. Mired in an urban conflict, the military is caught on the horns of a dilemma, which strikes at the heart of Yin and Yang. It must conclude the urban operation quickly in order to address the deterioration of security in rural areas. But by hastily concluding the urban operation, the cleansing of the urban area is incomplete and the insurgents simply continue the struggle at a pace of their choosing. If the military remains concentrated in the urban area, the rural insurgency has the leisure to gain strength. Even if the military is successful in expelling the insurgents, they have a remarkable ability to return later, starting the struggle anew. The government could raise more military units to address both the rural and urban insurgency, but in view of the prolonged nature of an insurgency, the drain on the treasury will become pronounced, leading to higher taxes and greater discontent among the citizens. Raising and training soldiers is time consuming, which the insurgents will use to their advantage to propagate. Because, in theory, upwards of a twenty-to-one ratio in security forces is needed to defeat an insurgency, if the insurgency continues to grow unabated, the government cannot keep pace. Hence, the existing security forces are compelled to scurry about the country attempting to stamp out insurgent outbreaks. This is how the military becomes exhausted and the state coffers exhausted.

**Out Yining the Yang**

The urban counterinsurgency operation is tailored to the degree of insurgent entrenchment. Naturally, early detection and action against a burgeoning underground movement is the most effective and economical way to deal with an urban insurgency, but governments rarely recognize, let alone admit, the threat of an insurgency until it has become a major threat. Usually, specific city quarters become insurgent strongholds before the government recognizes the threat, and in rare cases an entire city will fall to the insurgents before the government can react. Thus, to ensure that all
aspects of an urban counterinsurgency campaign are covered, this article will address the worst case—the liberation of a city.

Because wholesale casualties and destruction only serve the insurgent cause, the government must make an active effort to limit the damage. This approach may not be possible in view of the insurgents’ efforts to provoke the use of significant military force, but the government can use some finesse to turn the tables.

At the earliest opportunity the government should infiltrate intelligence teams (ideally people indigenous to the city) into the insurgent dominant areas. Their main mission is to collect information passively and remain unobtrusive. In preparation of the military operation, these teams identify insurgent leaders and areas the insurgents are preparing for defense through their own informants. Pinpointing the insurgent strongholds substantially helps the military shape its plan of attack.

The government prepares the political ground by waging a public awareness campaign (TV, internet, radio, newspapers, and leaflets) leading up to the military offensive. The messages are aimed at the inhabitants, which the government refers to as insurgent hostages. The economic message reflects regret that the inhabitants must suffer economic and other hardships because of the insurgents, and promises to rebuild and return the utilities once the urban area is secured and returned to normalcy. The salient feature of the public awareness campaign is to counter insurgent propaganda and attempts to portray the insurgents as victims.

The government and its security forces must bear in mind that the benchmark of success is gaining control of the urban area (the population in reality) and not simply a high body count. The government must declare this goal repeatedly in order to preempt the media’s slant that escaped insurgents signifies a failure. Understanding this vector of intent is critical to the overall counterinsurgency campaign because perceived failure enhances the image of the insurgency.

The thrust of the urban operation is to force surviving insurgents into the rural areas, placing them into unfamiliar territory, where they become fugitives without immediate access to resources and the succor of the local population. Here, the urban insurgents are at their most vulnerable state. Trinquier deduces that insurgents invest substantial time and resources into their area of responsibility, all of which is lost once they are forced into unfamiliar territory. “He cannot live among a populace he has not previously organized and subjected to his will.”

In view of this stratagem, the military’s first step is to surround the urban area in order to isolate it. Realistically, the military will not have the means (primarily due to limited numbers) to seal off the urban area completely, so many insurgents will find a way through the net, but as the Russians demonstrated in Grozny 2000, surrounding the urban area constricts the flow of logistics (supplies, reinforcements) as well as making it more difficult for insurgents to withdraw as an organized force. Moreover, the use of advanced sensors enhances the isolation of the city and provides a greater opportunity to eliminate key insurgent leaders.

Isolation is a subtle technique of inducing the insurgents to quit the urban area without a fight. During this stage, the government urges the inhabitants to depart for their own safety. Not all will depart, and adroit insurgents will try to prevent the wholesale departure of the urban population since they help shield the insurgents from military firepower, but more importantly, they become a source of propaganda as a result of collateral damage. Providing an outlet for the inhabitants portrays the government in a favorable light since it reflects the government’s concern for its citizens even if it means some insurgents will escape with them.

The government should process the temporary refugees through camps for humanitarian reasons as well as issuing identification cards and ration cards. As part of the processing, the officials ascertain the location of the individual or family’s residence (using an alphanumeric grid map of the city as described later) as part of the census and to assist in their return to their homes. Taking the time and effort to process the people prior to their return to their homes will pay significant dividends later. The processing effort may well yield some insurgents, but the government should not bank on it.

Critical to the counterinsurgency effort is inculcating into the soldier’s mind that this is not a grand cordon and search mission to uncover hidden insurgents,
weapons, and explosives but to sweep the urban area of active insurgent resistance. They need to realize that there is not an insurgent behind every dwelling door nor is every family harboring one. Bruce Hoffman asserts that historically, cordon and search operations are counter productive because they destroy property, disrupt daily routines, frighten families, and generally alienate the inhabitants. The tacit attitude of the civilians is “We are not the enemy so why are you treating us as though we are?” This is not to suggest that sweeping an urban area is not dangerous, it is a deadly serious operation, but soldiers can be on guard without terrifying the inhabitants in the process. Cordon and search operations may not propel the local populace into the arms of the insurgents, but they certainly will not result in cooperation with government forces either; without that cooperation, no intelligence will be forthcoming on the insurgent cells, and without intelligence, dismantling the insurgent network becomes infinitely more difficult.

The military’s initial sweep of the urban area is designed to eliminate insurgents intent on fighting. Incidentally, the greater the mix of indigenous security forces vice coalition forces, the greater the perceived legitimacy of the government. Because of the strategic implications of collateral damage, the choice of weapon systems is critical. The first weapon system of choice to accompany infantry is the tank (or assault gun). When properly protected and guided into firing positions by infantry, tanks provide the requisite firepower to destroy fortified buildings, bunkers, and similar fighting positions, limiting the amount of collateral damage. The psychological effect must be underscored because insurgents view these armored behemoths as daunting, especially upon observing the effects on fellow insurgent positions. The presence of tanks encourages insurgents to flee their prepared positions, limiting the amount of collateral damage. Moreover, tanks provide scant propaganda value to the insurgents because their precise direct fire capabilities are directed at the immediate insurgent threat. A large contingent of trained snipers is equally as important, not only for their precision fires but also their demoralizing effect on insurgent leadership, snipers, and key weapons (e.g., rocket propelled grenades, machine guns, and mortars). Mortars and artillery should be limited to counter battery fire if necessary, but sparingly since insurgents will claim and televise the effects of collateral damage (whether real or contrived). Moreover, indiscriminate artillery and mortar fires will assuredly turn the inhabitants against the government troops, making it much harder to gain their cooperation in the post combat phase. Mortar smoke rounds on the other hand can provide a significant edge to the military equipped with thermal sights, particularly on sniper rifles, tanks, and bunker buster weapons. Blanketing an insurgent stronghold with smoke maximizes insurgent confusion and losses with no commensurate casualties. Despite its great accuracy and effectiveness, air power should be reserved for the surrounding rural areas because collateral bomb damage is the insurgent’s most desired propaganda tool, and most readily consumed by the world. Security forces must constantly bear in mind that in insurgency warfare, the international audience tends to sympathize with the insurgents and is quick to condemn perceived excessive force by the government.

During this phase, the government must continue to win the war of ideas by means of informing and persuading the public, as well as challenging insurgent propaganda. The government must take the offensive with its public awareness campaign because simply refuting insurgent propaganda places it on the defensive, giving some credence to insurgent claims. The government must make a substantial investment in a sophisticated public awareness campaign to ensure its efforts are portrayed with accuracy. If the government loses the information war, it stands to lose international approbation or acquiescence. Embedded reporters, combat video crews, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) have a powerful effect on international perceptions of the struggle. Every instance of insurgent chicanery and violations of international law must be fully covered and repeated frequently for effect. Every government error and abuse by soldiers must equally be covered with concurrent government action in order to show the government as responsible to its citizens. Too often, governments attempt to portray themselves as infallible and appear nonplussed when errors or abuses emerge, which insurgents fully exploit for propaganda effect. The byword is: “Get ahead of the story.”

For most parts of the urban area, soldiers go door-to-door to verify the absence of insurgents. Soldiers remain polite, smile, and knock on doors for access. Culturally aware soldiers are critical in preventing unintended insults, mistreatment, as well as religious and social offenses, which can alienate the populace. Soldiers ask only a couple of key questions privately with individuals (e.g., identification of insurgent money collectors; identification of activists; or the location of odd chemical smells) and
note any evasive mannerisms.\textsuperscript{44} Because time does not permit it and because they are untrained, soldiers do not engage in interrogation of the inhabitants—this is the purview of law enforcement. However, soldiers do provide the police information about suspicious behavior or leads on insurgents. It is worth noting that denunciation of neighbors for various reasons (grudges) are common and have nothing to do with the insurgency. The police are the most experienced and trained for discerning dissembling, and as they are indigenous, they are much more likely to spot an insurgent than soldiers—especially coalition soldiers. One may be tempted to forgo the use of the military and rely on the police to regain control of the urban area, but this would be a grave error. The police are only organized and equipped to protect the citizenry in times of peace, and only the army brings the training, weapons, and organization to defeat active enemy insurgents.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{Inoculating the Urban Area}

Once the urban area is swept of active insurgent fighters, the government establishes control of the urban area and prepares it for defense against insurgent re-infiltration.\textsuperscript{46} In order to regain control of the population, the government establishes an organization to counter insurgent subversion. Trinquier recommended a neighborhood watch system (gridding) which the French successfully applied in Algeria:

1) Similar to the enemy organization, the government employs an organizational pyramid, appointing the principal leader, who applies an alpha-numeric grid system to the urban area, as well as dividing the city into districts and appointing district leaders. Each district leader further divides his district into sectors, appointing sector leaders. The process of subdivision continues down to local overseers in direct contact with, and responsible for, the inhabitants of a residential building or group of houses (4-5 families). Each pyramid leader must be vetted and held accountable for their assistants (each leader chooses two assistants) and subordinate pyramid leaders. Local police forces, which are familiar with their assigned neighborhoods, work with the pyramid leaders to investigate tips on insurgents or insurgent activities.\textsuperscript{47}

2) In conjunction with its sweep of the urban area, the military takes a census and provides this to the pyramid leadership. Once the census is complete, the local overseers are responsible for keeping the census current. Pyramid leaders should have ties to the community (business or influential family). Concurrently, using the census as a baseline, the local government establishes identification card offices to which citizens report for their identification (ID) cards and ration cards. The identification card discloses the origin of the cardholder using the gridding designation system (e.g. A.2.b.9.). Because many urban areas in the developing world do not have addresses and street names, the designation system becomes a necessity. This system permits the government to enlist the assistance of the population to identify and provide information quickly on new individuals settling in neighborhoods, that is, possible insurgents attempting to re-infiltrate.\textsuperscript{48}

3) Citizens are aware of insurgent activities but are often reluctant to inform out of fear of reprisal. Frequent contacts and meetings between the authorities and the populace are important as a means of gathering information without unduly identifying the informants. The government needs to train selected agents on techniques for passing information secretly (letter drops, telephone, dead drops, etc.). The agents are inserted into the local community in order to alert the government of insurgent agent infiltrations—the first echelon of the insurgency. Government agents, well paid and able to provide information quickly, are the best way of keeping the government apprised of enemy intentions. The best agents are former insurgents that have turned during interrogation. Since many of them have been impressed into insurgent service, they are more likely to collaborate if compensated well and provided with protection. For some, having them openly denounce their former leaders will be enough to assure their loyalty as long as they are protected.\textsuperscript{49}

Given the technological advances since Trinquier’s time, informers can provide information to law enforcement and pyramid leaders using cell phones and the internet confidentially. The government can actively enlist the help of its citizens in identifying insurgents by providing a tips hotline, website, or email address on flyers, radio, and television.

Once the government determines that control of the urban area has become manageable, law enforcement assumes the lead in rooting out remaining insurgent cells. Only a
small military presence is needed as a quick reaction force and as a trainer of the local militia. For cities, a company or battalion and for village clusters, a platoon or a squad will suffice. The rest of the military is initially deployed to the surrounding rural areas for small unit operations to hunt down fugitive insurgents and then to other insurgent areas. But there should be no doubt that the main effort of police forces should be in urban areas where they can apply their expertise most effectively in the area of greatest payoff.\textsuperscript{53} In anticipation of the critical role law enforcement will play in counterinsurgency, a substantive investment in training is necessary to expunge corruption within the police ranks. Corrupt policemen will drive people into the arms of the insurgency as readily as military heavy-handedness.

Realistically, the military and police will apprehend few insurgents during the initial sweep of the urban area. The rooting out of the insurgency cells that have gone underground relies on detective work, arrests, and interrogations. According to Trinquier, the number of interrogation teams should increase as specific citizens will likely emerge with more information once they realize their information can be given confidentially. Once the information is verified, the police and military forces are able to place additional insurgents into custody. He also advises the immediate establishment of a curfew to enhance security and restricting arrests to nighttime. Anyone caught outside during curfew is immediately detained and questioned. The police arrest suspect individuals and interrogate them immediately to determine the identity and location of their immediate superiors or contacts, which the police should arrest before the curfew expires. Ironically, in Trinquier’s experience, the higher echelon insurgency leadership and enemy intellectuals talk most easily and quickly, leading to the progressive unraveling of the insurgency network.\textsuperscript{51}

The turning of insurgents, particularly key leaders, to the government cause represents a major coup in the counterinsurgency effort. John Nagl recounts that the British employed cooperative former insurgents to persuade fellow insurgents to surrender, convince the populace that the government cause was legitimate, and to provide insights into the insurgent psyche. Moreover, rehabilitated insurgents can serve as special scouts or advisors with the military.\textsuperscript{52}

Conversely, the government should expect insurgent espionage penetration of its government agencies, law enforcement, and military forces. Insurgent use of espionage is integral to their intelligence apparatus, so the government must have a counter espionage campaign plan. The use of informants, sting operations, and undercover internal affairs officers to name the most salient means, is effective in combating insurgent espionage efforts.\textsuperscript{53}

The establishment and training of local militias (ideally one per city quarter or village) serves two purposes: the militia reacts to immediate threats, undergirded by the military quick reaction force and the police; and the militia provides a psychological boost of self protection against insurgent intimidation.\textsuperscript{54} The military trains the local militia and instructors, as well as issuing assault rifles for militiamen to maintain in their homes. Safekeeping weapons at home versus an armory permits militiamen to muster more quickly against threats and disperses the weapons, preventing insurgents from capturing small arms in a raid on the armory. While the odds are that a few militia members will defect to the insurgents with their weapons, the effect on the overall defense of the urban area will be slight, and the benefits of having a local militia far outweigh any defections.\textsuperscript{55} Trinquier stressed the necessity of militias. “Since the stake in modern warfare is the control of the populace, the first objective is to assure the people their protection by giving them the means of defending themselves, especially against terrorism.”\textsuperscript{56}

Once the populace feels relatively secure, the government can concentrate on winning the hearts and minds element.\textsuperscript{57} This is not a sequential event and may occur in some sectors while active fighting is occurring in others.\textsuperscript{58} However, before revitalization can take effect, the violence must be brought down to manageable levels. Foremost, the people must feel relatively secure from insurgent intimidation. Particularly noteworthy in Iraq is the positive correlation between urban revitalization and reduced insurgent activities.\textsuperscript{59}

As envisioned in Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) are a superb vehicle for revitalizing the local economy as well as improving utilities, services, and reconstruction.\textsuperscript{60} To provide local security, a security element should comprise the indigenous military forces, versus coalition forces, in order for the local population to draw a positive connection with the central government, thus increasing its legitimacy. Subscribing to the old adage, “teach a man to fish...” the PRT should comprise trainers of skilled labor, equipment personnel,
employment agency managers, and paymasters, as well as soliciting the expertise of other agencies, such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), international organizations (IO)... etc. The central idea is to create a job market among the local populace, which may be partially or unskilled laborers. In this manner, the PRT provides a job, gives on-the-job training, and pays salaries for work projects. Local businesses become revitalized as the local population now has spending money, and the people have a personal investment in the reconstruction projects. PRTs are the most substantive way to reward liberated urban areas, and urban areas that remain loyal for that matter. They are also integral to showing progress and restoring hope throughout the country through the public awareness campaign and normal media channels.

Local elections are essential to securing the legitimacy of the urban government and should occur as soon as possible. Many of the original authorities will have fallen victim to insurgent assassinations and new elections represents a fresh start. The census and issuance of identification cards provide sufficient, accurate prerequisites for expediting the elections. Under the auspices of UN election oversight, newly elected officials enjoy a honeymoon period of popularity, which they can use to motivate the people into revitalizing their areas.

The public awareness campaign never ends. The local government must not relax its media efforts of keeping the populace informed, using persuasion to win or maintain the allegiance of the people, and to refute insurgent propaganda. A sophisticated media campaign maintains an audience through entertainment (music, theater productions, etc.) while weaving in themes to undermine the insurgency. News stories of new construction projects, government progress, and other successes instill hope and a sense of pride. If the government is remiss in this critical counterinsurgency component, the insurgents will claim credit for improving conditions, advance their usual repertoire of conspiracies, and discredit government progress. Knowledge and hope are the insurgent’s greatest threats.

Conclusions

An insurgent seizure of a major city is a rare occurrence, but the measures described in this article can be applied against insurgent sanctuaries no matter how small or large. Hence, the government can apply them to an insurgent held city sector or village cluster. Inoculation of urban areas is not just applicable to liberated urban areas either. In fact, every urban area should be inoculated as a matter of course in order to prevent insurgents swept out of one urban sanctuary infiltrating into another.

A successfully executed counterinsurgency operation in urban terrain expels insurgents from their greatest source of recruits, sustenance, resources, and most critically propaganda. Insurgent fugitives are at their weakest in the immediate aftermath of their expulsion since they have no time to secure the cooperation of the local populace for sustenance and security. The military forces operating in small teams in the surrounding areas have an excellent opportunity to run the fugitives to ground before they have an opportunity to gain refuge. Additionally, assuming the fugitives will drift towards other insurgent dominated areas, the government can better focus its security forces against these areas, again relying on small unit operations to locate remote bases and wandering bands of insurgents for destruction by the full panoply of firepower. The inoculation of urban areas permits the military to concentrate its forces in rural areas rather than remaining enmeshed in the complex dynamics associated with urban areas.

Compatible with Andrew Krepinevich’s oil-spot strategy, counterinsurgency operations in urban areas permit the government to allocate its forces and resources in a coherent and effective fashion. By providing the urban populace with security and then securing their hearts and minds, the government gains control of the vast majority of its total population, leaving the insurgency to wither on the vine. Will this result in the capitulation of the insurgents? No, not in the conventional sense. Insurgencies have a tendency to smolder on for years even when their cause is lost. But once the tide has turned the government will find it easier to manage and eventually stamp it out without losing its soul in the process.

Endnotes

1 Bernard B. Fall, Roger Trinquier, and Mao Tsetung among others stress this facet of insurgency warfare to explain how revolutionary warfare differs from conventional warfare. It must be noted, however, that gaining compliance either through coercion or popular support is a subset of this control. Understanding this dynamic relationship between the insurgent and the populace is essential to establishing
2 Village clusters do not provide the same propaganda value as major cities, but they provide the necessary base for an insurgency to gather strength or recover from reverses. Hence in formulating a counterinsurgency strategy, the government should regard village clusters like the sectors of a city.

3 The migration trend shows that the percentage of the world’s population in urban areas has risen from 17 percent in 1950 to 50 percent in 2000 and will likely continue. Jennifer Morrison TAW and Bruce Hoffman, “The Urbanization of Insurgency,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), 3.


5 The British categorize insurgent strategies as follows: 1) Conspiratorial—urban centric coup d’état, ideally in the capital; 2) Protracted Popular War—Mao’s People’s War based in rural areas and spreading outward in three phases; 3) Military Focus—quick military success to inspire the masses to flock to the winner; 4) Urban Insurgency—an extended campaign of insurgent terrorist acts and government reprisals that lead to a mass movement and collapse; and 5) Isolated Terrorism—exploiting modern society’s complexity and high technology, militants use terrorist acts and subsequent threats of greater attacks for extortion. U.K. Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combine Arms Operations, Counter Insurgency Operations: Strategic and Operational Guidelines (United Kingdom: Ministry of Defense, July 2001), A-1-10, A-1-11;  Bard E. O’Neil, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (USA: Brassey’s, Inc., 1990) 31-50.

6 O’Neil, 57.

7 Mao Tsetung, Mao’s Little Red Book, Chapter 8, People’s War.


10 O’Neil, 80-81.


13 Trinquier observed that in order to hinder or derail counterinsurgent activities, the militants will attempt to use the legal system in their favor; that is to have terrorists recognized as criminals and insurgent members classified as “minor peacetime offenders.” A vitriolic press campaign in the home country and abroad seeks to curtail the counterinsurgency tactics by demanding a return to the peacetime laws. Trinquier, 47-48; Note also “Lesson 18: Prison and Detention Centers,” The Al Qaeda Training Manual, 17. Internet, http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm

14 Trinquier, 8.

15 Trinquier, 16-17.

16 Quoted in Bruce Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Occasional Paper, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, June 2004), 15; Trinquier reached the same conclusion. “A few brutalities, such as savagely executed preventive assassinations in the surrounding villages, will cow the inhabitants into providing the maintenance of the bands and will discourage them from giving useful information to the authorities. Trinquier, 24.

17 Mao’s Little Red Book, Chapter 4, Chapter 9, Chapter 11, Chapter 12, Chapter 13, Chapter 29, and Chapter 30.

18 Chiarelli and Michaelis, 6.


20 Organized crime can range from first generation street gangs, oriented on protecting their “turf” and engaged in petty crime to second generation street gangs, involved in drug trafficking and market protection encompassing a greater geographical area, to third generation street gangs dealing in drug marketing as a transnational criminal organization seeking political and economic spheres of domination. Max G. Manwaring, Street Gangs: the New Urban Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2005), 2. 9-11.

21 Horne noted that although the French 25th Airborne Division successfully hunted down and eliminated the core Front de Libération Nationale (F.L.N.) insurgents by the end of 1954, the profligate use of indiscriminate arrests (2,000 alone following the 1 November 1954 F.L.N. attacks), ratissages (brutal clearing operations), reprisals, indiscriminant firepower, and “collective responsibility” proved the primary incentive for F.L.N. recruitment. One completely innocent prisoner warned, “In six months’ time people like me will be overtaken. It will be too late for any pacific solution.” Prison turned out to be an excellent recruiting and training center for the F.L.N. Horne, 96-98.
By 1955 three factors contributed to increased F.L.N. recruitment: alienation provoked by French repression; F.L.N. ability to survive against French military efforts along with daring raids, proclamations, and targeted executions; and the escalation of the conflict through the use of terror, indiscriminate atrocities, and the emergence of new leaders and new policies. Horne, 129: the Palestinian Intifada demonstrates the powerful image of a small resolute resistance armed with stones facing the superbly equipped and trained Israeli Defense Forces. Within months, Israel lost its image as a victim state to one of oppressor. Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 89-110.

102-104, 111, 113-115. 11


11 Forced conscription is another recruitment tool. Insurgents can threaten to harm the recruit’s family or co-opt him/her into the conspiracy by forcing them to commit a crime, such as delivering a bomb or murdering a minor official. Horne, 133-134.


23 Urbano, *Fighting in the Streets: A Manual of Urban Guerrilla Warfare* (New Jersey: Barricade Books, Inc. 1991), 10, 12. Robert Tabor reached the same conclusion: “The population, as should be clear by now, is the key to the entire struggle...it is the population which is doing the struggling. The guerrilla, who is of the people in a way which the government soldier cannot be (for if the regime were not alienated from the people, whence the revolution?), fights with the support of the noncombatant civilian populace: It is his camouflage, his quartermaster, his recruiting office, his communications network, and his efficient, all-seeing intelligence service. Without the consent and active aid of the people, the guerrilla would be merely a bandit, and could not long survive.” Robert Taber, *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare* (Washington DC: Brassey’s INC, 2002), 11-12.


26 Explaining the difficulties in isolating and destroying guerrilla forces, Fall explains that sealing off of enemy forces required a friendly to enemy ratio of “15 to 1 or even 20 to 1, for the enemy had in its favor an intimate knowledge of the terrain, the advantage of defensive organization, and the sympathy of the population.” Fall states that in Malaya, a force of 250,000 British, Commonwealth and militia required 12 years to destroy 8,000 Communist guerrillas. Fall, *Street Without Joy*, 171-172.

27 Prior to the 2000 Battle of Grozny, the Russians employed Grozny’s former mayor, Bislan Gantemirov, and his militia to glean information on Chechen rebels in the town from the local populace. Grau and Thomas, Internet.

28 Applying some lessons learned from the previous two battles of Grozny (1995 and 1996), the Russians waged an effective information campaign in the media, “reporting their version of events and thereby keeping the populace of the side of federal forces....” Grau and Thomas, Internet.

29 Failed counter guerrilla operations served only to heighten the prestige of the F.L.N.: “a steady flow of the uncommitted began to join the F.L.N.—‘more impressed by their cunning and agility than by our ineffectual power’, comments Leulliette [a young French soldier].” Horne, 102.

30 Trinquier, 63.


32 Isolation and the noncombatant evacuation of Fallujah prior to the November 2004 battle, deprived the insurgents of the propaganda value of a large clash.

33 Major General Peter Chiarelli assessed that the insurgents in Baghdad were/are relatively few (perhaps 100 to 200 total) and cellular in organization, but this small number wreaked havoc beyond the number of active insurgents and perhaps gave the illusion of greater numbers. Chiarelli and Michaels, 6; Andrew Krepinevich assesses that determining the actual numbers of insurgents in Iraq is impossible because the difference among full time, part time, and co-opted insurgents is indistinguishable. Andrew Krepinevich, “How to Win in Iraq,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 84, No. 5 (September/October 2005), 100-101.


35 Taw and Hoffman, 21.

36 MG Chiarelli stresses this lesson from Iraq. Chiarelli and Michaels, 9.

37 This objective corresponds with the Coalition force’s desires for the operation in Fallujah. Thom Shanker and John Kifner, “Suited to Guerrillas, a Dusty Town Poses Tricky Perils,” *New York Times* (April 25, 2004), Internet.


39 A typical Chechen tactic was to move a weapon system into or near a school or hospital, fire a couple of rounds then depart quickly. The Soviet counter fire response resulted in collateral damage, which the inhabitants blamed entirely on the Soviets. Thomas, 94.

40 Bernard Fall once observed that the French in Algeria won militarily but was internationally reviled. In this sense, military victory was meaningless because the military had lost its soul. Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 7; Russia ensured its viewpoint was presented throughout the fighting in Grozny in 2000. Lester W. Grau and Timothy L. Thomas, “Russian Lessons Learned From the Battle For Grozny,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, April 2000). Internet.

41 Grau and Thomas, Internet.

MG Chiarelli criticized that siphoning off of policemen from neighborhood beats to strike force operations or bureaucratic duties had a detrimental effect on establishing an environment of security among the population. Chiarelli and Michaelis, 8.

Arguably, the security guarantee is part of winning the hearts and minds, but too often counterinsurgency strategies pay scant attention to this critical component and focus solely on reconstruction, economic assistance, medical care, etc. as though the struggle is about one of popularity rather than survival. Because of this inclination, I separate the security guarantee from hearts and minds.

As demonstrated in Iraq, the military can do these tasks very effectively (See Chiarelli and Michaelis, 10-14) but to the detriment of applying relentless pressure on insurgents. PRTs can take the burden off the military.

The Malayan insurgency continued another six years after there was no doubt of British and the new Malayan government’s success.

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Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been characterized in a number of different ways – irregular conflicts, counterinsurgency operations, security and stability operations, war on terror, and small wars. However, the traditional lexicon does not adequately describe the complexity and diversity of these modern challenges. Insurgency, defined as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict, does not appear to effectively describe the cultural, tribal, and religious elements of the hostilities. Calling it the war on terror also has its drawbacks. Terrorism, by definition, is a “method,” a means by which individuals or groups use unlawful violence or the threat of violence to intimidate and achieve political, religious, or ideological goals. Without doubt, there are numerous acts of terror - kidnappings, beheadings, indiscriminant bombings, and killing of innocent civilians - being committed by enemy combatants in the region. However, it is difficult to articulate how one plans and prosecutes a “war” against terror when some form of unlawful violence exists in virtually all societies. Likewise, it is equally difficult to identify the enemy in these clashes. In the last two years, the enemy in Iraq has, at various times, been described as Saddam’s Baath Party loyalists, Sunni radicals, Islamic jihadists, Iraqi insurgents, terrorists, and common criminals. In an effort to more comprehensively describe the character of these complex contingencies, military doctrine writers in the United Kingdom have crafted a new term: Countering Disorder, Insurgency, Criminality, and Terrorism (C-DICT) to better describe the broader aspects of these conflicts. Forces involved in irregular conflicts in the 21st century will have to be able to deal with all of these elements – insurgency, terror, and social disorder. In this paper, any reference to irregular conflict, war on terror, counterinsurgency all refer to the wider dimensions of these small wars.

Recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored that military victory does not necessarily equate to conflict resolution in the complex, irregular conflicts of the 21st century. The objectives of the Iraq War, which began as an international effort “to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people,” has shifted toward a theme of assisting in the creation of democratic institutions in the greater Middle East and winning the war on terror. Operations in Afghanistan, conducted in concert with an international coalition and the Northern Alliance, originally sought to target Osama bin Laden, the al-Qaeda network, and the Taliban regime, is now focused more on creating stability and assisting in the reconstruction of the new Afghan republic. While there is little doubt that US forces remain the most capable among conventional military forces globally, the reality is that adversaries armed with primarily small arms and employing explosives in an innovative and deadly fashion are creating significant problems for coalition security forces seeking to establish social order in these small wars in a foreign land. Furthermore, terrorist bombings in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005 highlight the challenges for security and military forces that may be called upon to defend the United States against an ill-defined, loosely confederated, transnational threat.

To be fair, the US military has made some important changes in how it views the non-linear, asymmetric threat it now faces. Defense transformation has been an important topic for DOD research and analysis over the past decade. Since the Gulf War in 1991, joint operations and training have remained a priority. Human intelligence and cultural understanding is again receiving the attention it deserves. Creation of the US Northern Command is placing increased awareness on the military’s role in homeland defense and homeland security. Information operations, interagency coordination, and multinational cooperation are common themes in military symposiums. While these are laudable efforts, progress in transforming today’s US military forces to better enable them to defeat the distributed, non-linear threats that confront the world today is still elusive. Simply put, it is unclear how well hierarchical military organizations can anticipate and react against the horizontal, distributed threat networks that confront today’s global security environment. Several areas that merit review include a reappraisal of the strategy, senior level staff manning and processes, training and rapid collection/dissemination of joint tactical and operational lessons, and military and law-enforcement relationships.
Re-examining Strategy and Military Organization

Any discussion on strategy for military organization and force employment in this war against terror carries the risk of a dialogue influenced by politics. However, as strategy is the link between objectives (ends) and capabilities (means), it is not improper to discuss whether the current strategy is appropriate, well-defined, coherent, and when implemented, will contribute to a successful outcome.

In his State of the Union address on 29 January 2002, President Bush outlined two broad objectives in the war on terror: (1) shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice; and (2) prevent terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world. He reiterated those objectives in a speech at the U. S. Naval Academy on 27 May 2005. The approach calls for protecting the United States by countering threats close to their source, protecting the strategic approaches to the United States, creating a global environment that does not tolerate terrorism, and having the ability to defend the homeland.

The US needs to have a clear strategy for achieving its objectives in the war against this irregular threat. Although the President has been clear in articulating the goals of the conflict, the US government has not been as articulate in communicating the strategy for achieving these objectives. Further, there is a potential disconnect between the stated goals and existing defense and military strategy. The 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) established three military objectives and articulated a strategy to design a force that is:

“…sized to defend the homeland, deter forward in and from four regions, and conduct two, overlapping ‘swift defeat’ campaigns. Even when committed to a limited number of lesser contingencies, the force must be able to ‘win decisively’ in one of the two campaigns.”

This approach has been commonly referred to as the 1-4-2-1 strategy. What the NMS fails to describe, however, is how this “1-4-2-1” construct applies in the ongoing war on terror.

The best declaration for the strategy for conducting the war against terror comes from the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which states:

“The United States and its partners will defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. This approach will have a cascading effect across the larger terrorist landscape, disrupting the terrorists’ ability to plan and operate. As a result, it will force these organizations to disperse and consolidate along regional lines to improve their communications and cooperation. As this dispersion and organizational degradation occurs, we will work with regional partners to implement a coordinated effort to squeeze, tighten, and isolate the terrorists. Once the regional campaign has localized the threat, we will help states develop the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools necessary to finish to task. We will deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by ensuring other states accept their responsibilities to take action against these international threats within their sovereign territory.”

While this may be a viable concept for combating the global irregular terrorist threat and shutting down terrorist camps, it does not describe a strategy for dealing with President Bush’s second objective in the war on terror: the challenge posed by regimes seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. This strategy also does not address dealing with asymmetric adversaries that blend into the local populace and lack a clearly identifiable hierarchical leadership or command/control/communications (C3) structure.

Another potential disconnect exists between strategy and resources. Lack of an articulate strategy and linkage to the resources needed for the war on terror reduces the potential effectiveness and contributions of the military. Currently, conventional and special operations forces have primarily been focused on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan – the epicenter of the conflict against terrorism. However, one has to ask whether this is the best use of US forces. Should the US consider an approach where conventional forces are assigned the responsibility of providing stability in those countries, freeing up special operations forces to engage terrorists in other parts of the world? Should US conventional forces take over the responsibility of sealing the borders in Iraq to prevent terrorists/
insurgents from entering the country, and allow Iraqi security forces, who speak the language and understand the culture, to take on the task of restoring order to their society? Is there a happy medium where US forces conduct border security, but provide a small number of fusion teams to Iraqi units to assist them in integrating intelligence and operations? An analysis linking objectives, strategy, and resources would provide an answer to the questions posed above.

A clear strategy for combating these irregular threats will also help the military determine whether its current task organization is optimized for fighting these distributed, irregular foes. Are the personnel organization and equipment suitable for these primarily urban type engagements? Do US forces have the right capabilities for providing situational awareness, assisting in identifying potential adversaries, or facilitating rapid decision-making? Failure to adapt to changing circumstances likely means the military will continue to retain its hierarchical structures.

Assessing Staff Manning

From a historical perspective, small wars have primarily been about tactical level operations, directed by small operational staffs. French military operations in North Africa in the 19th and 20th century employed mobile tactical units of approximately brigade strength to aggressively pursue Berber tribesmen. During the Philippine campaign (1898 – 1902), US officers who controlled operations understood the importance of dispersing the forces in order to protect the population, maintaining a presence in disputed areas, and providing a base for prompt, offensive actions. Even in nation-building efforts, such as the US military occupation of Cuba in 1899 – 1902, operational level staffs were not particularly large. Instead, Cubans, assisted by US military and civilian personnel, headed most of the administrative organs of government. The emphasis was on having sufficient tactical forces to respond to developing situations.

The size of US military staffs has grown significantly over the past few decades. For example, General Eisenhower’s combined staff for the invasion of Europe totaled a little over one thousand personnel, half American and half allied forces. Among the slightly more than five hundred Americans, nearly half were enlisted personnel. By comparison, today’s Army Corps or Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters alone generally exceed a thousand personnel, staffed primarily by officers. Functional and service component staffs further increase the number of commands that must be included in the coordination process.

One of the reasons staff size has grown over the last fifty years is to facilitate horizontal and vertical coordination between and within levels of commands. The requirement for near real-time situational awareness and increased complexity associated with today’s joint military operations may necessitate some staff increases. However, anyone who has served on these senior staffs would likely have amusing anecdotes about the challenges of trying to get staff actions coordinated quickly. Current joint and military staffs are bloated bureaucracies – with many officers spending the bulk of the day responding to e-mails and building Powerpoint slides. It is difficult to determine how much these activities truly contribute to a commander’s ability to make timely decisions. As a first step, the Joint Staff, combatant commanders, and the Services should examine whether the collaboration benefits and efficiencies gained from the growth in staff size outweigh the internal friction generated by complex internal staff processes.

A second reason to examine military staffing is to determine whether our current organization facilitates combat effectiveness against the current foe. Certainly, some level of hierarchical structure must exist within every military organization, and the current organizational framework has served the US well against a conventional adversary. However, given the flat, distributed structure of the adversary and its ability to take independent actions, the fundamental question is whether the large, multi-layered organizations of today’s military are sufficiently agile to rapidly respond to changing circumstances. The US military’s “centralized planning, decentralized execution” approach to operations generally fails to get inside the adversary’s decision cycle. The enemy is dispersed, autonomous, and loosely coordinated. In contrast, due to its hierarchical structure, US forces at times tend to be centralized, controlled, and uncoordinated.

There are no easy answers to this problem. History has shown that these irregular conflicts favor small unit operations and individual leader initiative. The US military needs to assess whether our current
organizational approach is best suited for fighting the formless, amorphous foe that confronts the nation today. From an intuitive standpoint, too many layers usually inhibit responsiveness, flexibility, and operational agility; and, too few layers affect operational command and control. The problem is perhaps less vexing for naval and air forces, which have adopted a net-centric approach to command. For the ground forces, however, significant challenges exist for right-sizing the organizational structure, particularly in efforts to determine how layers within the current hierarchy may be able to be augmented, reduced, or combined.

**Evolving Our Intelligence Processes**

As we have witnessed in Iraq, our intelligence focus has necessarily shifted from tracking a conventional adversary that is hierarchical, relatively known and predictable, to an opponent that is highly adaptive and uses asymmetric tactics with great success. As a result, the term “actionable intelligence” has made its way into our lexicon. Actionable intelligence is defined by the Army as intelligence “… that provides commanders and soldiers a high level of situational understanding, delivered with the speed, accuracy, and timeliness necessary to operate at their highest potential and conduct successful operations.”

In order to deliver actionable intelligence, transformational changes must be implemented to deliver the desired level of situational understanding. The first challenge is achieving a more detailed understanding of the operational environment. This is critical in understanding an adversary that uses mastery of the operational environment to his asymmetric advantage. It will require detailed analysis that is made available to forces at all echelons, and incorporate an understanding of the cultural, religious, tribal, and infrastructure aspects of the operating environment to a level of detail that has not been required in the past. Constant reassessment of the operating environment is essential and necessarily will place greater emphasis on collection of information by human intelligence assets at the tactical level. We have witnessed this in Iraq, as indicated by the significant increase in number of Tactical HUMINT Teams (THT) and HUMINT Exploitation Teams (HET) being employed by the Army and Marine Corps respectively. Significant increases in combat patrolling in the urban operational environment and their resulting patrol reports are another source of information to enhance situational awareness.

Unfortunately many of these reports are filtered out at battalion level and are never passed to higher echelons, despite the contributions the reports could have in enhancing awareness. Recognizing the intelligence potential from these patrols, the Army has adopted the concept of “every soldier a sensor” and is implementing procedural and technical solutions to incorporate the information derived for these reports into the overall intelligence picture. The heart of this challenge is not collection; it is to fully leverage the intelligence that is already being collected. Other options to improving situational awareness at the tactical level may include the use of small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) down to the lowest tactical levels.

The second order effect, resulting from the increased volume of reporting, is more robust analysis capabilities resident at lower echelons. This will require reassessment of current manning levels so that increased numbers of intelligence analysts are assigned to battalion and brigade level units, along with enhanced analytic tools to facilitate the delivery of “actionable intelligence” to commanders. This may also necessitate the re-assessment of current doctrine which dictates that national intelligence support teams (NIST) support joint task force (JTF) headquarters. A NIST is a nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from intelligence combat support agencies (Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), etc.) which is tailored to the needs of the deployed JTF commander. For example, our adversaries employ advanced communications technologies to great advantage, resulting in our increased reliance on signals intelligence collection, both from national level assets and ground based collection. A NIST-like capability below JTF level will be critical in locating an adversary that blends into the indigenous population and provides only a fleeting window of opportunity for engagement.

Finally, success against an asymmetric foe necessitates a fight for intelligence, which translates into the conduct of combat operations whose main purpose is to gather intelligence. LTG William G. Boykin, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence), refers to this concept as “operationalizing intelligence” and views the development of intelligence campaigns plans (ICP) as being essential to the successful implementation of the concept. Rather than intelligence planning being
relegated to the intelligence annex of the operational campaign plan, the ICP would stand alone and be used to conduct the intelligence campaign. The intelligence campaign will be used to win the intelligence fight – long before and long after a military conflict.

**Reevaluate Military and Law Enforcement Relationships**

If the US military hopes to be effective in these small wars to counter insurgencies, terrorism, and social disorder, it will have to rethink how it interacts with law enforcement agencies – both overseas and in the United States. External to the US, there are no prohibitions in US military forces interacting with a host nation’s police. In fact, during the early 20th century American officers and noncommissioned officers provided the leadership of many of the constabularies in the Caribbean, Central America, and the Philippines, where military forces were engaged. Since the Second World War, the US military has adopted an approach where forces are trained, organized, and equipped primarily on defeating the enemy’s military forces.

The primary reason why US forces should interact with host nation law enforcement agencies is intelligence. These local policemen speak the language, understand the culture, know the ground, and have established ties to the community. Of course, commanders will have to be aware of the potential drawbacks in dealing with civil authorities that may be linked to corruption, intimidation, and dishonest behavior. Historically, success in these irregular wars requires involvement with civil and law enforcement authorities and leveraging the talents of the local population. US military forces are not organized to effectively perform these functions.

Within the US, it is also time to initiate a national dialogue on the role of the military in national (domestic) defense. It is appropriate – the National Security Strategy establishes homeland defense as the first priority of the nation. However, the role of the military in homeland security – active forces and National Guard forces – is complex. While the existing security structures may be able to deal with limited attacks like those in Madrid and London, it is uncertain how rapidly and effectively local law enforcement and emergency management assets will be able to handle several large-scale, distributed, catastrophic incidents. The recent catastrophe along the US Gulf Coast highlights the need to reexamine the role of active forces and the requirement for a simplified, unified command and control structure in these types of disasters. The situation is even more critical when one considers that weapons of mass destruction - chemical, biological, or nuclear – could be used. The need to respond rapidly in these instances is critical – in hours, not days. A review is needed to ensure there aren’t disconnects between civil expectations, legal restrictions, and military capabilities.

**Improving Training and Rapid Dissemination of Lessons**

The enemy in the war on terror is changing and adapting rapidly. By some accounts, terrorists in Iraq are changing their tactics and procedures in response to coalition force operations in days and weeks. They have seemingly taken a page from western doctrine by creating an environment where senior leadership issues broad operational intent and allows subordinate tactical commanders to plan and conduct actions to achieve organizational objectives. In that light, US and coalition partners and their forces are confronted with many local and regional terrorist cells distributed across the globe.

US forces have long recognized the utility of lessons learned. In the past, operational forces and tactical units submitted after action reports on major evolutions and exercises. However, there were concerns that a post-event submission approach may not necessarily capture all the key lessons made as events developed. Prior to the war with Iraq, efforts were made to create a system that captures lessons on a more dynamic and recurring basis. The US Joint Forces Command established the Joint Lessons Learned Directorate (now the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA)) to capture and document lessons as operations unfold. Currently, JCOA deployed teams are capturing joint operational level lessons at multiple locations worldwide as Service-led teams are documenting tactical level lessons as they occur.

Even as the lessons learned process has improved, fundamental challenges remain. First, it is unclear who is responsible for capturing JOINT tactical lessons. With the increasing trend toward joint operations at the tactical level, it is important that joint tactical lessons, such as Air Force or Navy surveillance and net-centric capabilities in support of ground brigade/regiment,
battalion, and even company level operations, be captured in a timely fashion. Service led organizations, such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Marine Corps Lessons Learned, Naval Warfare Development Command’s Navy Lessons Learned, and Air Force Lessons Learned, are focused on the lessons relevant to their forces. JCOA is capturing joint operational level lessons. However, no organization is assigned the responsibility for documenting the best practices from joint tactical actions. Second, joint lessons should be disseminated to the field in a rapid fashion. At the tactical level, internet sites like platooncommander.com or specialoperations.com, although not officially vetted, provide a venue for small unit leaders to gain insights into tactics and procedures that may be effective. However, the US defense community needs to establish a process where joint tactical lessons are documented and analyzed quickly, salient points captured, and lessons posted to a secure website so that unit leaders up to battalion and brigade levels can rapidly reap the benefits of others experiences. Doctrine development, which takes months and perhaps years to coordinate, can follow in time. Such a process – linking lessons from current operations, training, and joint experimentation – does not exist today.

Figure 1 above highlights the integral relationship between lessons learned, joint training, and joint experimentation. To combat this distributed adversary, US forces must be able to rapidly incorporate operational lessons into the joint training syllabus—either through the existing Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) process or through frequent joint training seminars. Operating forces can use a continuous joint experimentation approach to create and dynamically assess potential solutions to counter the adversary’s changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Summary

In the turbulent world of the 21st century, there is recognition that failing states and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest security challenges. In order to be more effective in defeating the ill-defined and distributed enemies in these chaotic environments, the US should articulate its strategy and ensure that the strategy is linked to the resources needed to win these irregular conflicts. An organizational review of existing military structure is also needed to ensure staffs and units are appropriately manned to cope with this type of threat. The hope is that eliminating redundancy at large senior level headquarters will enable lower echelon units to be better staffed to accomplish the tactical actions that are the fundamental character of these small wars. The intelligence process needs to be modified to provide enhanced situational understanding.
and improved analysis at the lower echelons. The military needs to rethink how it interacts with law enforcement agencies – overseas and stateside. Finally, the training establishment needs to create a mechanism to capture the best practices for rapid dissemination to the operating forces.

Endnotes:

1 DOD dictionary of military terms.
2 Ibid.
3 UK Joint Warfare Publication 3-01 (draft).

About the Author:

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Lessons from the Counterterrorism War

A briefing by Boaz Ganor

Introduction

Unfortunately, terrorism is a vague term, so that Osama Bin Laden would say he is against terrorism. We need a clear definition. I propose that it be defined as “the deliberate use of violence aimed against civilians in order to achieve political gain.” Even for just causes, terrorism is an illegitimate tactic.

Liberal democratic states confront threats from international terrorism that are unlike anything seen previously. The threat emanates from networks of radical Islamic terrorist groups dispersed across the globe.

Keep in mind that the main aim of terrorism is not to kill and destroy but to maximize anxiety and put pressure on governments to yield on policy. This is equally true of Bin Laden, Hamas, the IRA, and other organizations. We can win each battle, but if one’s people remain afraid, we are losing.

I distinguish between two types of fear - the rational, which is connected to the actual probability of harm; and the irrational, which is connected to the possibility of threat. The second type of fear is the sort that leads to concessions. For example, while 300 Israelis died from terrorist attacks in one year, 600 Israelis died in car accidents in the same period. Yet no one considers not traveling to Israel because of the threat of being hurt in a car accident.

Origins of jihadists

The origins of this network lies with the mujihadeen in Afghanistan fighting the Soviet Union from 1979 until the Soviet exit from the country a decade later. After 10 years of war, the mujihadeen could point to an amazing victory over the superpower that soon after ceased to exist.

The mujihadeen who came to Afghanistan from around the Muslim world divided into three groups. One group stayed in Afghanistan and became the eventually nucleus of Al-Qaeda. The second returned to their home countries, Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and beyond, where they started working with local jihadist movements or joined larger Islamic radical movements. The third group wanted to return home but took asylum in Western or non-Arab/Muslim countries.

Umar Abdal-Rahman (the blind sheikh) is an example of the third category, someone who could not return to his homeland of Egypt and so settled in the United States. In 1993, he masterminded the World Trade Center bombing, which was designed to kill 50,000 people by toppling one tower on the other.

The threat is thus three-pronged. It includes a terrorist vision of unlimited carnage, carried out by men highly trained in explosives and warfare and equipped with an ideology they seek to spread at the expense of everyone else, including more mainstream Muslims, whom they regard as infidels.

These violent Islamists are limited by shortage of manpower, however, so they are patient and intend to accomplish their designs gradually. Osama bin Laden seeks first to gain control of places where the majority of his supporters are located, such as Central Asia and some Arab countries. He does not aim to conquer Saudi Arabia, Jordan, or Egypt but wants radicals from those countries to conquer them from within.

Looking at the major terrorist attacks since 11 September 2001 (9/11), most of them have occurred in Muslim countries: Turkey, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, and so on. The targets have usually been non-Muslims: Western tourists, Jews, other non-Muslim locals, and so on. These acts are aimed at shaking the stability of Muslim countries whose economies rely largely on tourism. Once their regimes shake and cave in, the next phase is to launch the final battle against the West and America.

United States - the Strategic Enemy

Jihadists see the United States as a major obstacle because its influence prevents the Islamists from achieving the first stage of their plan. It supports some of these regimes, its economic influence cannot be ignored, and it has the muscle to fight jihadists around the world. Thus, Bin Laden issues videocassettes basically calling for the United States to do two things: to withdraw its forces from the Middle East and to cease assisting Arab regimes.
If Washington were to withdraw its support, the region’s stability would be shaken – what Bin Laden wants. The 9/11 attack was not meant to destroy the United States or destroy the American economy; it was intended to create anxiety that would pressure the government to shift its policy.

Bin Laden is enamored with the use of suicide attacks, the ultimate smart bomb, a tool to maximize casualties and damage, including psychological damage. In Israel, the number of suicide attacks, as a portion of all terrorist acts is less than 0.5 percent. Yet over 50 percent of casualties resulting from terrorist attacks come from suicide bombings. It is an effective method to kill and spread fear. This makes suicide terrorism Al-Qaeda’s favorite method. When combined with non-conventional terrorism, which includes chemical, biological, or even nuclear attacks, it becomes truly frightening.

The uses of terrorism

Terrorism has a mathematic quality, requiring motivation and operational capability. Counterterrorism’s goal is to curtail both factors, and that requires being both proactive and diligent. When asked in an ABC interview years ago if he would ever use non-conventional weapons in his attacks, Bin Laden replied that he would regard it as a sin to not to use every means at his disposal to, as he put it, defend the Muslims from the infidels.

We have seen evidence of this willingness in recent years. Several terrorist operations along these lines were thwarted, such as a poison gas attack on the London Underground and a suicide bombing of the Jordanian intelligence building in Amman, to have been followed by the release of cyanide.

Note that religious sanction by Islamist clerics has been granted for such attacks, even if they lead to mass Muslim casualties, for this is seen as defensive warfare, ultimately saving the lives of even more Muslims.

Islamists are not so much fighting against American troops as they are in combat against Coca-Cola, McDonalds, the Internet, and Microsoft. They feel threatened by the embodiments of American culture. This implies that withdrawing American troops will solve nothing. More generally, defensive retreats do not result in less aggression from terrorists.

The Israeli experience confirms this. There were more successful suicide attacks prior to the partial reoccupation of the West Bank in early 2002 than afterwards. Attempted suicide attacks increased at that time but their success rate dropped off dramatically. Going on the offensive, not pulling out, was important in reducing the effectiveness of Palestinian terrorism.

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Editor’s Note: Reprinted with permission of the Middle East Forum. This article originally appeared in the Forum on May 2, 2005, at http://www.meforum.org/article/710.
Discussion. Fundamentally the insurgency in Malaya was an ideological Communist insurrection modeled initially on Russian strategies and later on the Maoist model. There are similarities between the Malayan Communist true believers and the Islamists currently operating in Iraq. Both trust that they have the perfect Weltanschauung by which to interpret the foundations and events of history, prioritize resources, and order society. In both situations, it is a battle for ideals. There is a historical context that is slightly different too. As in Iraq, the Malaya Emergency followed a time of great persecution, dictatorship, and a recent war. Like Iraq, Malaya was once a prosperous British colony. It fell to the Japanese in WW II and then, like Iraq, was crippled under tremendous oppression and state-sponsored terror for many years. The Japanese occupation of Malaya saw tremendous degradation and damage to the infrastructure, the economy, and Western credibility much like in Iraq. Malaya was a country with a single valuable and dominant resource—rubber. The parallels to Iraqi oil are striking. Malayan rubber was a strategic commodity that represented the lynch-pin of the national economy. Unlike Iraq, however, the Malayan insurgency emerged initially as an anti-Japanese movement. The Allies backed the insurgents during the war in the fight against an “outside aggressor.” Later, the military arm of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), the Malayan Race Liberation Army (MRLA), co-opted the original movement and secured significant caches of arms from the war as a logistical foundation for the post-war domestic political insurrection.

One needs to recognize first of all that the strategies employed were coalition strategies. Many think of the Malaya Emergency as a British response; however, it was fundamentally a coalition response. Many nations participated including Australia, New Zealand, and Borneo. Additionally, aboriginal peoples participated along with Gurkhas and a new national police. As in Iraq, the British had to combat the perception that they were just there for their colonial interests in rubber production. Insurgent attacks concentrated on infrastructure, coalition civilians, Malayan government officials, British functionaries, and third-party contract workers. British forces were stretched to their limits as they attempted to counter the insurgent attacks. To adapt their capabilities to the operational situation, the British frequently relied on Special Forces (Special Air Service (SAS)) to perform counterinsurgency missions.

In addition to purely military responses to the insurgent attacks, the British-led coalition established a national police, army, and air forces. Ground units pushed the MRLA into the jungles, police controlled the population, and paramilitary protected the infrastructure. Admittedly, many of the responses by coalition forces are simply untenable in today’s world. Coalition forces could hold people for two years without trial, and impose the death penalty for possession of an illegal weapon and for assisting guerrillas. The coalition also issued identification cards for anyone over twelve years of age. These cards facilitated population control by coalition and national police forces.

Part of the coalition strategy was to get a national police force to secure their nation. However, developing a significant police force to controlling and protecting the population took considerable time. By 1949, the MRLA decentralized their operations, creating compartmentalized cells to avoid detection and attacks. If large coalition forces moved into the area, they quieted down. This gave the illusion that the counterinsurgency was working, when in actuality indoctrination efforts and support for the insurgents was growing. At the time, there was much debate about coalition effectiveness. In the early years, the coalition did little to go after key links and facilitators between the population and the insurgents. Because the coalition ignored these vital components, the insurgents were able to recruit, supply, fund, and motivate support for their movement. Left unchecked, the movement developed an extensive shadow government.

In 1950 an “outside-in” strategy developed by Lt General Briggs turned the war in the favor of the coalition. Briggs realized the insurgency had three components: insurgents, links to population, and the people themselves. Counterinsurgency scholars credit four principles of the Briggs plan for effectively defeating the insurgency: (1) separation of the insurgents from the population, (2) unity of effort, (3) quality intelligence, (4) and small unit operations (Bottiglieri, 2000). To separate the insurgents from the population Briggs created resettlement camps to make local populations responsible for their own protection and
defense. The resettlement camps drove an operational wedge between the jungle-based insurgents and the population upon which they depended for food and recruits. By securing the villages and establishing population control with identifications (ID) and checkpoints, Briggs forced confrontations where the insurgents had to fight coalition forces at the seams between the jungle and the villages. This meant that the coalition no longer pursued the insurgents. They simply waited for them to show up. By 1951, violence and attacks against government supporters and mass terror against the general population increased as conditions for the insurgents deteriorated. As animosity against terror tactics grew, the insurgents shifted to assassination attempts against “enemies of the people.”

The British used national peoples, profiles, and pattern analysis, to map and track the MCP. With increased security, the British established “white areas” that were assessed to be free of insurrectionist activities and secured by local populations. In response, these sectors received greater rations, more food, and fewer restrictions. As more and more areas were declared “white,” fewer people supported the MRLA. These policies and strategies took an additional six years before the emergency restrictions were lifted. In 1947, Chin Peng took over the MRLA and pursued a Maoist strategy. His plan was to liberate areas along the jungle fringes, establish “free” zones, and finally overwhelm the state with a people’s army. This was a strategy of systematic takeover by infiltrating villages and rural centers. As such, the MRLA killed thousands more civilians (11,000) than the Japanese and British combined. Over time, the civilian population came to hate the MRLA for the death, destruction, and pain they caused more than the “colonial occupiers.” It would be 12 years before the government unilaterally declared the war over. It would be 41 years before the Communists officially stopped their insurrection and laid down their arms.

Implications for Current Operations. In Malaya, the British waged direct action operations against company size and smaller Communist fielded forces based in jungle camps. Malayan geography greatly abetted the British strategy. The jungle afforded tremendous cover for small insurgent forces, but created tremendous logistical problems for them. Surrounded by either water or unsympathetic nations, they had to live off the land—a difficult prospect in the jungle. Like in Iraq, however, they had tremendous national appeal as “freedom fighters” due to diminished Western credibility. Although tactically useful, the jungle bases denied the insurrectionists political sanctuary. Initially, they controlled areas of the country which they could force into providing them resources. But as the coalition noose forced them into the jungle, they had great difficulty even feeding themselves. The insurrectionists received virtually no assistance or sponsorship from Russia or China. This contrasts sharply with the current situation in Iraq where there is constant interference and support from groups outside Iraq.

Both insurrections rely on terror to spread fear, confusion, and destruction among civilian populations outside of their control. The Malayan insurgents slashed rubber trees and destroyed production facilities to weaken the economic output available to the government. However in the final analysis, the key issue in both Malaya and Iraq centered on sovereignty and disenfranchisement. The MCP wanted a sovereign Communist state. Most Chinese wanted a greater representation in the government. With stability as a precursor, by offering emancipation to the state and franchise to the population, much of the support for the MCP was undermined. Nonetheless, secret support could still be found in trade unions, women’s organizations, and student organizations. In Iraq, even if the general population does not endorse the insurgency, it is still vital to ferret out the elites in various organizations and identify them with those that kill other Iraqis.

The part that doesn’t fit as well in Iraq today is the fact that the MRLA was ethnically and culturally distinct from the general population. Under Japanese occupation, the ethnic Chinese minority suffered greatly. The flood of refugees that poured into the hinterlands of Malaya was mostly Chinese. Unlike in Iraq, the refugees were a difficult problem for the British, and the camps became a breeding ground for discontent and insurgency. These ethnic Chinese formed the mass of the MRLA. However, like Ike is different from Mike, the Chinese are visibly different from the general Malayan population. Additionally, most Chinese were Buddhist, whereas most Malayans were Muslim. In Iraq, there is little physical difference between Iraqis and surrounding Semitic peoples who could be insurgents. Racial, cultural, and linguistic differences however may in fact exist in the Iraqi insurgents that are difficult for Westerners to discern. Capital might be gained by identifying and highlighting these “foreign” fighters as aggressors and spoilers of the peace.
Although the death penalty for having an AK-47 might be impossible in Iraq, a national ID program could help monitor and control the population until civil society developments take a firmer hold. If the general Iraqi population turns against the insurgents, one should expect increased assassination attempts on high officials. If scarce resources need to be prioritized, allocate them to safe, secure, and compliant areas.

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Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) Bulletin

CADRE Quick-Look
Perspective: Airpower in Counterinsurgency Operations

Col Anthony C. Cain, USAF

Background:

Mythology from the US experience in the Vietnam War holds that airpower—and the US military in general—does not perform well against insurgencies. History shows, however, that when airmen apply airpower in the right way and in the right context, it can contribute significantly to achieving counterinsurgency campaign objectives. Moreover, armed with an understanding of how US airpower has performed effectively in these types of wars in the past, contemporary airpower planners can become more effective in current operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.

Discussion:

US leaders called upon airpower to assist ground forces in a type of counterinsurgency campaign at the dawn of aviation history. Anticipating the importance of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), Secretary of War Newton Baker dispatched the First Aero Squadron to assist General John J. Pershing as he pursued the Mexican bandit Pancho Villa. The fragile Curtiss JN-1 aircraft that the squadron used were ill suited to the rugged demands of the mission and they contributed little to achieving the campaign’s objectives. Pershing’s limited view of the airplane’s potential relegated it to reconnaissance and communications duties. The airmen, including Benjamin Foulois, Carl Spaatz, and William C. Sherman—all destined to wield significant influence over US airpower development—gained valuable insight into the complexities of employing airpower in harsh conditions. Far from being deterred by the bleak results achieved during the Mexican Punitive Expedition, these airmen emerged from the experience with a belief in the potential rather than in the limits of airpower.

US involvement in counterinsurgencies continued through the 1920s and 1930s with US Marine Corps (USMC) aviators providing effective service against rebels in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. USMC airmen developed tactics and procedures for providing accurate close air support to ground forces in contact with the enemy. These experiences helped sustain the Corps during the lean interwar years and provided valuable experience for the Marine Air-Ground team to build upon when war came in the 1940s.

After World War II, counterinsurgency warfare assumed greater importance because of the tensions between the two superpowers. Countries like Greece, the Philippines, and Vietnam became surrogate battlegrounds where Communist and Democratic ideologies came into conflict below the nuclear threshold. In the Greek Civil War (1943-1949), US support for the Greek National Army (GNA) included training, planning, and tactical assistance. A key feature in the ultimate success of this counterinsurgency effort was in the emergence of effective indigenous leaders among the GNA. The insurgents took advantage of remote mountainous terrain to stage their operations thus forcing the GNA to conduct complex combined arms operations. US advisors divided air operations into three categories: direct support of troops, isolation of the battlefield, and independent air operations. Ultimately, the combination of well-planned air operations, relentless pressure from ground forces, and shifting political events that denied supplies and sanctuary to the insurgents allowed the GNA to prevail over its Communist opponents. In this campaign, the US contributed advice and support to Royal Hellenic Air Force personnel who ultimately performed impressively in a successful counterinsurgency.

American advisors also assisted counterinsurgency efforts in the 1946-1956 Hukbalahap Insurgency in the Philippines. The main effort of the counterinsurgency focused on denying or removing sources of popular support from the insurgents. This required detailed analyses of the Philippine culture, society, and economy. When Philippine forces attempted to use “search and destroy” techniques—even when backed by significant airpower capabilities—the insurgents retreated to the jungle to fight another day. The path to success involved small-scale saturation patrols that kept guerrilla forces off balance. Small L-5 aircraft provided reconnaissance, air presence, and command and control capabilities for ground forces as they pushed into Hukbalahap-dominated areas. Later, World War II surplus P-51 Mustangs provided close air support service. C-47 aircraft supplied long-range patrols. Government forces gradually strangled the Hukbalahap rebels through the judicious use of lethal combat power coupled with relentless psychological pressure. This type of counterinsurgency campaign succeeded because the military campaign
afforded the government time to achieve legitimacy and stability by addressing the populace’s concerns, while simultaneously pressuring the rebels.

The US effort to defeat Viet Cong insurgents in Vietnam was complex and must be viewed through the lens of airpower development in the 1960s when the US Air Force began to favor jet aircraft over propeller-driven types. Moreover, US air doctrine that emphasized using airpower against industrial centers of gravity proved to be a poor fit for the Vietnam counterinsurgency. Because of the internal and external pressures that influenced each stage of the war, America’s Vietnam experience is far too complex to summarize in simple “lessons learned” for counterinsurgency warfare. It is clear, however, that airpower provided commanders with critical leverage during the war in the south and that, frequently, airpower provided capabilities required to defeat Viet Cong forces. Much of this success was a result of the introduction of specialized aircraft, uniquely designed originals or highly modified existing types, that allowed a tailored use of the available airpower. Aircraft like the O-1, O-2, OV-10, A-1, A-26, T-28, AC-47, AC-119, AC-130, EC-47, B-26, and drones like the QU-22 and the Lightning Bug (launched and controlled from a DC-130) enabled airpower to focus on a determined and elusive enemy.

**Observations:**

1. Air forces can contribute significantly to counterinsurgency campaigns.

2. Host government stability and legitimacy is the single factor that determines success in this type of war. Airpower should contribute significantly to this aspect of the campaign by providing constructive effects through information operations, airlift, aeromedical evacuation, and other forms of humanitarian assistance.

3. The level of effort shouldered by indigenous government forces—especially air forces—provides a conspicuous indicator of how well the counterinsurgency is progressing. If the host government cannot operate its own air force, it probably cannot blunt the psychological assault launched by the insurgents.

4. Airpower provides ISR capabilities that can help locate, identify, and track insurgent forces—services that reside in no other Service component.

5. As long as the insurgents do not make the mistake of massing forces to confront friendly ground forces, lethal air attacks will probably bolster the insurgents’ cause.

6. Air and space platforms must be tailored to match the unconventional and small scale of the counterinsurgency effort. This does not mean the platforms must be “low-tech,” only that they must be specifically designed to perform the types of missions required in a counterinsurgency rather than adapting “large war” capabilities.

From title

1 The best source for the history of airpower in counterinsurgency operations is James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson. Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003). This is the source for all of the examples used in this CADRE Quick Look.

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The College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) Quick-Looks are written by military defense analysts assigned to Air University (AU) are available electronically at the AU Research Web Site (https://research.au.af.mil) or (http://research.airuniv.edu). Comments are encouraged. Send to: CADRE/AR, Director, Airpower Research Institute, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428 or e-mail: cadre/arr@maxwell.af.mil. Quick-Look 04-5.

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The United States and its coalition allies are currently engaged in counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. While these are clearly different countries and insurgencies, they have some common features. The guerrilla war in Afghanistan grew from the remnants of the Taliban movement—a loose confederation of Pashtun tribesmen under an overarching Islamic fundamentalist banner. The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate was devoted to Pashtun dominance and the restoration of 12th-century Islamic practices.

Foreigners from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other Sunni Arab and non-Arab cultures joined the Taliban. Even Chechens, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan adherents, and Uighurs from China joined the foreign contingent, often as part of al-Qaeda. The Taliban was not a guerrilla force; it was a conventional force that fought and deployed in linear fashion using light-cavalry tactics based on pickup trucks and leftover Soviet equipment. US Special Forces, working with the main ground forces of the Afghan Northern Alliance and strike aircraft, quickly dismantled the force.

The primary Taliban combatant was not the Mujahideen warrior who had fought the Soviets for over nine years, although many of the commanders were. The primary Taliban combatant was a young man who had grown up in refugee camps while his male relatives were fighting the Soviet 40th Army.

Today, the Taliban is a fragmented force consisting of independent bands that call themselves Taliban but have little allegiance to the original Taliban leader. These Taliban, unable to match Western coalition forces in technology or conventional combat, have reverted to terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Al-Qaeda has withdrawn from most of the direct combat and has assumed an advisory and training role.

The guerrilla war remains local, Pashtun, Sunni, and disjointed, and with little apparent hierarchy and organization. The war is primarily rural, and the guerrillas enjoy sanctuary along Afghanistan’s eastern border with Pakistan. Funding is local, with some outside donations, but the bulk now comes from the drug trade. Maintaining the drug trade often justifies guerrilla activity.

The current Iraqi guerrilla war grew from a defeated hierarchical party-state structure. The army officer corps, Baathist party, and Fedayeen militia were secular state institutions drawn primarily from the ruling minority—Sunni Arab peoples. Much of the hierarchy and interrelations of the state structure remain intact in the remnant guerrilla organization. Foreign combatants, including al-Qaeda members and Chechens, have entered Iraq to fight the coalition. They do not blend in well, however, and many have since left or assumed specialized support roles such as bomb manufacturer, suicide bomber, or instructor.

The Iraqi combatants have little experience in fighting as actual guerrillas, but some do have counterinsurgency experience against Kurds and Shia Iraqis. The insurgency has a strong urban component, particularly in Baghdad, Mosul, Fallujah, Al Sulaymaniyah, Samarra, and Tikrit. The rural guerrilla war is primarily restricted to the Sunni triangle west-northwest of Baghdad. The urban guerrillas rely primarily on improvised explosive devices (IED) because their marksmanship is not good.
Iraqi guerrillas lack a ready sanctuary, but they are well funded with billions of US dollars held by Iraq’s former leaders. They have ready access to large stocks of weapons and explosives.

The military intelligence effort devoted to combating either insurgency has little in common with conventional intelligence operations in support of conventional maneuver war. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield, order of battle, templating forces, signals intelligence; measurement and signature intelligence; and electronic intelligence take different forms or are not applicable. The S2 or G2 has a different type of war and needs to take a different approach to dealing with it, much as the US approach to peacekeeping evolved during the past decade.¹

The S2 and G2 are involved in a form of police investigative work, specifically police investigations dealing with gangs and narcotraffickers. Association matrixes, network analysis, cultural analysis, genealogy, event-pattern analysis, language-pattern analysis, traffic-flow analysis, and financial-transaction analysis are police tools that should be staples of the intelligence effort in a counterinsurgency.² Adopting these tools does not imply adopting accompanying restrictions on combat lethality or local rules of engagement that apply to police forces.

Afghanistan now has an elected civilian government, and there will be one in Iraq. Converting former police states to those governed by rule of law will cause many problems, but new Afghan and Iraqi police forces are being trained and equipped to deal with local problems. The collection efforts of local police forces must also be integrated into the intelligence process. The military and police conduct covert and overt collection for different functions and under different rules. Still, raw data and intelligence produced might be mutually supportive.

Some advocate harsh, brutish measures to collect useful intelligence against terrorists and guerrillas. They point to the efficacy of torture and extraordinary means employed by the French during the 1957 battle for Algiers, concentrating on its tactical success and ignoring its strategic failure.³ This politically charged argument influenced the French presidential election of 2002. Proper investigative tools and interrogation techniques, a well-organized intelligence database, and well-trained soldiers and police should obviate and prevent any such misguided shortcuts.

Gang Warfare

Charting the guerrillas’ orders of battle, tables of organization and equipment, and line and block charts is fantasy in Afghanistan and nearly so in Iraq. In these insurgencies, intelligence personnel are tracking gangs, not constituted forces. The problem is equivalent to police determining who are in which gangs, what territories they control, and what armaments, tactics, logistics, and patterns they use. Police and Drug Enforcement Administration investigators know how to do this because they have been doing it for years.

Culture counts, and intelligence personnel need to understand the language, history, and culture of the area in which they must work. Army foreign area officers (FAO) are trained in these areas and need to be assigned to brigades, not hoarded at senior headquarters. FAOs are “the unconventional men . . ., largely out of sight . . ., carrying the load and transforming the world order.” FAOs are essential to understanding the culture, but problems remain, even when good FAOs are present.

The nature of Afghan and Iraqi societies makes the populace expert at hiding, dissimulating, and deceiving. Loyalties are to family, close associates, fellow villagers, and clan or tribal members. Census data are so dated as to be almost useless. In the case of Iraq, Baathist party membership rosters, military manning charts, police records, and Fedayeen registration books are useful; however, prime intelligence is derived from analysis of family genealogies, development of association matrixes, and contact network charts (link analysis). These techniques, of course, are less applicable to outsiders and border crossers.

Two things the police have going for them are the beat cop who has worked the neighborhood for years and police snitches who, for a fee or a favor, keep the police informed. Overt and covert closed-circuit TV (CCTV) networks, close liaison with the local police department, development of agent networks, and detailed data files on known guerrillas help the intelligence section gain local insight fast. Information technology can also help. Specialists can intercept, track, and triangulate cell phone calls. The Russians killed Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev with a beam-riding missile that locked onto his cell phone transmission. Geographic Information Systems software can use the Global Positioning System to locate sites of past ambushes and IED attacks and calculate possible future attack sites, assembly areas, safe houses,
and residences. Pattern analysis mapping software can predict sites and likely times of attack.\(^5\)

Geographic profiling, a police technique that combines spatial analysis and psychological behavior patterns of criminals, looks at such factors as distance to the crime, demographics, landscape analysis, pattern analysis, crime scene forensic analysis, and psychological criminal profiling. Ambushes, raids, IED and mortar attacks, sniping attacks, and other guerrilla actions are complex serial crimes. Police can use geographic profiling to identify separate groups or group members, provide theoretical profiles, determine likely residences or likely attack times, routes, and tactics.

Property ownership and mapping, also a valuable tool in counterinsurgency, can identify community power brokers, vested interests, and family connections. Financial transactions, cell phone transmissions, and travel patterns can also provide valuable data to intelligence analysts. Finding the guerrilla is a function of detective work. Who is he? Who does he work with? Who are members of his family, and where do they live? What is his background? Who are his associates?

Extensive data files are a boring but necessary part of finding the guerrilla. However, computer data-mining can ease the job considerably by providing assistance in incident (crime scene) analysis, optimum force deployment, risk assessment, behavioral analysis, DNA analysis, force protection, and internet and infrastructure protection.\(^6\) All the tools of police investigation are relevant. Technology makes it easier, but a lot of old-fashioned footwork and analysis is still required. Military lawyers and the supporting psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs units should be briefed regularly and visited to prevent incidents and turf issues.

The 4th Infantry Division (ID) captured Saddam Hussein based on intelligence developed from link pattern analysis. The 4th ID is the most modernized, digitized, and computerized division in the Army, yet intelligence personnel who did the link-pattern analysis did it the tedious, old-fashioned way, using pads of butcher-board paper, yellow stickies, and a large wall chart.\(^7\) Some dedicated intelligence personnel did a brilliant job, but time and energy could have been greatly reduced with current software applications and computerized databases.

Intelligence in a counterinsurgency needs a national computerized database that can be readily shared by the police and coalition military. Doing this requires uniformity in software and procedures. The database should also have a reach-back capability. A database is only as good as its data, so standard forms for felony tracking and debriefing are essential. The database should allow ready access to gang intelligence, crime/event mapping, modus operandi, and routine data such as property ownership, and telephone and financial records. Existing databases, such as those of the National Agency Center, National Criminal Investigation Service, and even LexisNexis, a commercial database for legal and other research, could serve as models.

Investigative software should be available to all subscribers, compatible with the national database, and have compartmented capabilities for classified material. Analyzed intelligence and raw data should be available on the national database. Naturally, the base should be dual-language so the host nation can participate and eventually take it over. The base should be Web-enabled and available to units training in the United States before deployment to the area.
Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) Bulletin

The police Real Analytical Intelligence Database (RAID) software might be a good start point. RAID tracks people, vehicles, weapons, events, and financial data; handles partial numbers, genealogies, and associations; links events to people and things; and has an Analyst’s Notebook for link-pattern analysis. Although RAID is designed for local law enforcement, it is Web-enabled, which gives it a statewide and nationwide capability. PATHFINDER and the Analyst’s Notebook are two Department of Defense software programs that can be modified to perform many of the same tasks.

To train analysts to work with such software and modern investigative techniques is a separate issue. Analysts require training in information-gathering, data-mining, data development, case management, link-flow-event analysis, detecting hidden assets, postseizure analysis, matrix development, chart development, pattern analysis, alternative competing hypotheses, and communications analysis. Anacapa Sciences, Incorporated, and regional High-Intensity Drug Traffic Area offices run excellent police-analyst courses. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the US Northern Command Intelligence Detachment at Fort Leavenworth run similar excellent military-analyst courses.

Nontechnical police methods also exist that could apply to counterinsurgency. The local police must be honest and respected. Police departments need to be well equipped and well trained. Police integrity is key, so higher pay, background checks, drug testing, and anticorruption units are essential, and police captains need to be accountable for the crime rates in their precincts. Confidential informants who produce information should be paid on time and their identities protected. The sites of guerrilla attacks need to be treated as crime scenes, and forensic specialists need to work for or with the intelligence community. Liaison between the police and the intelligence community is essential—just as it is among intelligence offices. Social services also play a role. Guerrillas and other criminals do not hang out in neighborhoods that are clean, safe, and in good repair.

Translators and Interrogators

Human intelligence (HUMINT) is the driving force in intelligence production and analysis in a counterinsurgency. The military does not have nearly enough FAOs, translators, and interrogators who can speak the dominant languages (Dari, Pashtu, Uzbek, Urdu, Arabic, Kurdish, Assyrian, and Farsi) in these two insurgencies. Mastery of the primary form of the language is not always enough, because local dialects frustrate effective communication. Furthermore, soldier/linguists often have little training in the culture, history, and customs of the regions.

Intelligence cells are frequently at the mercy of contract translators whose command of English (and even sometimes the target language) is spotty. If the translator is local, he has better community access and acceptance but is subject to local threats and blackmail. If the translator is an outsider, he is less a target for threats and blackmail, but also less trusted and accepted by the locals. Often people will not want to speak through a local translator because they are providing information they might not want others to know. They prefer to talk to uniformed personnel. Vetting of translators is tricky and often means that the translator never gets inside intelligence offices. Barring translators from intelligence offices limits translator input.

Working with a translator is a process that requires time and rehearsal. Just because a person speaks English and the target language does not mean he is literate. In Iraq, 60-percent of males and 70-percent of females are not educated above the 8th grade. In Afghanistan, the literacy rate is below 10 percent.

The translator must understand the topic before he can interpret the conversation correctly. The translator will frequently need crash training in military topics, civil engineering, medical treatments, or banking laws before he can serve effectively in specialized areas. Interviews should be rehearsed to ensure the translator understands the topic of conversation and has time to master unfamiliar vocabulary.

The user and translator must develop a close relationship so translators feel they have the freedom to criticize and offer constructive suggestions. (Please do not broadcast PSYOP messages during the call for prayer. Please tell your soldiers to remove their sunglasses when they talk to people. Please tell your soldiers not to point their guns at people at checkpoints.) The interrogator should schedule more time for conversations because translated conversations normally take three times as long as the same conversation would between native speakers. The translator also needs frequent breaks. Nonstop translation work is tiring, and tired translators make mistakes. Further, using multiple translators provides checks and balances to the agendas translators
have—and each ethnic and religious group has its own agenda.

Body language is another important part of communication, particularly when working through a translator. Both parties have plenty of time to study the other’s body language while the translator is working both sides of the conversation. Knowing and controlling body language can help sell the message. It is essential to know how accurate a translator is, but determining this is difficult. The easiest way is to have a fluent US translator monitor the translator. If a good US translator is not available, the interrogator can make a videotape to evaluate later. Many translators want to please the participants in a conversation, so they shade the conversation, telling each side what they want to hear. Many translators are unaware of the nuances of the English language, so “request” might become “demand.” Honest translations are critical.

The translator should not be used in a “good cop, bad cop” role. That is a task for interrogators. The translator must maintain a neutral posture and be viewed as a conduit of information, not part of the enforcement regime.

**Patrols, Checkpoints, and Drivers**

Patrols, checkpoints, drivers, and pilots can generate excellent HUMINT. However, getting the data is not an automatic process. All participants have to be regularly briefed as to what they are looking for. (What is taking place outside this mosque today? Are weapons openly displayed there? Are there more or fewer people outside the mosque than normal? How many? How did the people react to your presence near the mosque? Are there any banners displayed by the mosque? What does your translator tell you that they say? Was the mosque loudspeaker used for anything besides the call to prayer? What did the translator say the loudspeaker message was? Was anyone wearing headbands or distinctive clothing near the mosque? Did anything strike you as unusual?) Debriefing is crucial and easily neglected. Soldiers want to maintain their equipment and get some chow and rest after a mission, but the mission is not over until participants are debriefed. Timely, professional debriefing is essential because it provides information, keeps observers focused, and keeps the intelligence effort tuned to the tactical arena where the counterinsurgency is fought. Of course, there is overt collection and covert collection. A good agent net is also essential, and agents should be trained, assigned targets, briefed, and debriefed just as carefully as the soldiers in the patrol.

Checkpoints can be a good source of information. Permanent vehicle checkpoints are not as effective as mobile vehicle checkpoints because people who cannot pass a checkpoint will normally avoid it. People are more accepting of a vehicle checkpoint than a pedestrian one. While the primary objective of the vehicle checkpoint is to interdict supplies, weapons, and likely enemies, the primary objective of the pedestrian checkpoint is to gain information. Professional behavior by checkpoint personnel is especially important. Tips for successful pedestrian checkpoints include the following:

- Interview pedestrians individually and privately. Covert CCTV taping of the interview can be used to counter charges of inhumane treatment.
- Give each person approximately the same amount of time regardless of whether they are providing...
Having a system in place so individuals with lots of information can easily and confidentially contact the unit for a lengthy debriefing.

• Offer each individual coffee, tea, cigarettes, candy, or other comfort items as appropriate.

• Apologize for and explain the need for the interview or brief search.

• Organize and control the waiting area. Provide seating and place a polite, patient person in charge of it. Secure the area against attack.

• Maintain tight security but do not openly brandish weapons.

• Use a trained interrogator.

• Do not try to control too large an area or stay in one place too long.

• Do not act immediately on information a pedestrian provides if that would compromise the pedestrian’s safety or future cooperation.

• Have women present when interviewing women and have women search women.

Information Sharing

The US intelligence community is large and pervasive. Unfortunately, various agencies run their intelligence data and analysis in bureaucratic stovepipes, which run straight from the tactical level to the highest strategic levels with little sharing along the way. In theory, the community is supposed to share intelligence at the highest strategic level and then pass that information back down to the people who need it. In practice, this seldom happens. Raw data are seldom passed back—just agreed-on intelligence. Agreed-on intelligence is a homogenized product from which dissenting views and contradicting evidence has been removed or discounted so the community can have a common view. This practice might serve policy-level intelligence customers, but it does not provide timely, relevant intelligence to the tactical user.

If intelligence does come back down the stovepipe, it often arrives too late. Indeed, the tactical user often lacks clearances and tickets to get the approved product. Undersecretary of Defense Stephen Cambone is trying to change this pattern, but he has to fight decades of practice, procedures, and training to do so. The tactical
intelligence officer needs to meet, visit, and cultivate counterparts in other agencies to access raw data and preliminary analysis as it goes up the various stovepipes. Conversely, the tactical intelligence officer needs to reciprocate so the relationship is mutually supportive. Other intelligence agencies also experience difficulties with the stovepipes.

Intelligence sharing extends to neighboring units, coalition partners, sister Services, and combat service and combat service support units. Military police and truck drivers see more of the countryside than anyone and should be a prime source of information.

Getting on Top

Intelligence in counterinsurgency, which has always been a tough job, differs from intelligence for maneuver war in its more protracted nature and requirement to function more in a cultural context. Technology and modern police investigative techniques can help. Intelligence data can be generated by traditional means (such as patrols and agents), gathered as events occur, or helped along. Lots of data are necessary. Anti-American rallies should be filmed and individuals identified for follow-up action. DNA and voice files can be initiated. Ground and air sensors have improved markedly over the past decade and should be used and maintained. Cellular telephones and computer communications are an exploitable technology. Efforts should be made to make sure that these are available for the general populace and potential guerrilla alike.

Bribes and rewards often produce results if they are believed and do not get the informer killed. A good local agent network remains an essential part of counterguerrilla work. If intelligence determines that the guerrilla is buying something distinctive (name-brand backpacks, mountain boots, or explosives), perhaps electronic tags or chemical tags could be inserted before delivery. There are many ways to find the guerrilla. A comprehensive, coordinated approach, using the latest science and proven techniques, can do just that.

NOTES

2 Much of the material in this article comes from interviews with CW4 Trammell R. Davis; Captain Pat Grove, Kansas City Police Intelligence Center; Jose Jimenez, Retired Police Lieutenant, New York Police Department; Tom Mink, Senior Security Specialist, Commerce Bank; Major Robert Peters, Military Intelligence, US Command and General Staff College; Detective Phil Stockard; Midwest High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA); Sam Thompson, Midwest HIDTA; Sergeant Greg Volker, Kansas City Police Department; and Detective Shelly Volker, Midwest HIDTA. The author retains responsibility for the contents of the article.

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Editor’s Note:

This article is reprinted with the permission of Military Review, the professional journal of the US Army, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. It was originally published in the July/August 2004 issue of Military Review.
A distinction must be drawn between terrorism as a *method of action* and terrorism as a *logic of action*, Michel Wieviorka has written. Terrorism is distinguished by the latter; insurgency incorporates the former.

The key element of terrorism is the divorce of armed politics from a purported mass base, those in whose name terrorists claim to be fighting. Little or no meaningful effort goes into construction of a counter-state, which is the central activity of insurgency. In contrast, insurgencies, as Larry Cable observes, while also armed expressions of organic, internal political disaffiliation, use terroristic action principally as one weapon among many to facilitate construction of the counter-state.

This is far from an academic matter. When all manner of internal warfare is lumped under the rubric “terrorism,” crucial distinctions are lost. Focusing upon perpetrators of terror themselves can be effective in cases of terrorism as a *logic of action*, often referred to as “pure terrorism,” because the terrorists essentially are the movement. However, adopting such an approach when dealing with insurgents, those who use terrorism as a *method of action*, can be disastrous.

In particular, a focus upon rooting out “the terrorists,” as opposed to emphasizing political solutions to sources of conflict, often leads to abuse of the populace. This sets in motion a new dynamic, motivated by self-defense, that allows an operationally astute insurgent challenger for state power to mobilize additional support. It may even mobilize for pure terrorists a mass base where none hitherto existed.

Thus it seems necessary to revisit insurgency – a word which might have all but disappeared from our sights were it not for our imbroglio in Iraq. Ironically, in this, an age of terrorism, when “no more Vietnams” remains an operative maxim for at least one wing of the American political spectrum, knowledge of insurgency is as relevant as it has ever been.
The goal of an insurgency, then, is to mobilize human and materiel resources in order to form an alternative to the state. This alternative, whatever its shape, is called the counter-state. The counter-state may have much of the infrastructure possessed by the state itself, but this must normally be hidden since it is illegal. Thus the counter-state is often referred to by the term “clandestine infrastructure.”

Successful mobilization provides active and passive support for the insurgency’s programs, operations, and goals. This plays itself out thus:

• At the strategic level of war, mobilization grows out of dissatisfaction by some elite members (e.g., a group of school teachers) with existing economic, social, or political conditions.

• At the operational level of war, these marginalized elite members (i.e., they have become alienated from the system psychologically) build links with followers by bringing them into the counter-state.

• At the tactical level of war, the recruitment is done by local movement representatives, called the cadre, who address local grievances. Of course, in its earliest stages, an insurgency will see “leaders” and “cadre” as one and the same; and they will be armed. Were such not the case, the phenomenon under examination would be a social movement as opposed to an insurgency.

Signally, the local solutions are credited by the cadre to the insurgent movement. Loyalty is normally won through deeds rather than appeal to abstract principles, though the accomplishment of deeds may be explained through slogans (e.g., end hunger, eliminate poverty).

Hence legitimacy – as given tangible form in the support of the people – is the center of gravity. It must be gained in whatever proportion is necessary to sustain the insurgent movement (or end it, if one is the counterinsurgent). As in any political campaign, all levels of support are relative. The goal is mobilization such that the enemy may be defeated. This necessarily will depend as much upon the campaign approach (i.e., operational art) and tactics adopted as upon more strategic concerns of “support.”

Operational and tactical use of violence as insurgent strategy has become increasingly commonplace, especially the use of terrorism (i.e., terrorism as a method of action). Violence (in whatever form) is the most potent weapon available to insurgents, but it is normally accompanied by a variety of nonviolent means.

Historically, astute movements have recognized the efficacy of both means to the extent that they have fielded discrete units charged with “nonviolent action” (e.g., strikes in the transportation sector) to supplement “violent action.” “People’s war” in its Chinese and Vietnamese variants did so.

Insurgent movements therefore begin as “fire in the minds of men.” Insurgent leaders commit themselves to building a new world. They construct the organization to carry through this desire. Popular grievances become insurgent causes when interpreted and shaped by the insurgent leadership.

The insurgency grows if local insurgent representatives (the cadre) can establish a link between the insurgent movement and the desire for solutions to grievances sought by the local population. If the cadre is able to indoctrinate and control the mobilized local manpower, the insurgency will be strategically and operationally unified, with independent tactical action responding to higher commands. If the opposite is true, the insurgency will remain an uncoordinated, decentralized organization.

The most potent immediate cause for insurgent mobilization is self-defense. Thus the behavior of security forces is critical. Indiscipline leads to alienation and enhances the insurgent ability to recruit. Consequently, specific insurgent tactical actions are frequently planned to elicit over-reaction from security force individuals and units. Over-reaction can extend to poorly drawn rules of engagement (ROE) and even strategic and operational planning that encourages brutalization of the population.

Whatever the precise causes that galvanize an insurgent movement, the result is one of two forms of insurgency:

• Offensive insurgency – the insurgents systematically construct a counter-state that ultimately takes the place of the state.

• Defensive insurgency – the insurgents already possess a counter-state (e.g., an ethnic group or a tribal homeland) and hence seek separation from the state.
**Insurgent Doctrine**

Insurgent doctrine is critical in determining how the insurgents will actually implement the two types of insurgency. A defensive insurgency has much in common with a resistance movement, since the counter-state already exists, and will normally adopt overt techniques necessary for self-defense.\(^\text{12}\)

An offensive insurgency, on the other hand, is faced with the task of creating the counter-state from scratch. To do this, there are two basic approaches.

- A first approach is to emphasize mobilization of the masses. This course places a premium upon political action by the cadre in local areas, with strategic and operational directives coming from above. The insurgent movement that results will normally have many more cadre than combatants, because they exist only to the extent necessary to facilitate political work.

- A second approach emphasizes armed action. This course favors violence rather than mass mobilization and normally results in the combatants themselves constituting the bulk of the movement. Cadre play a much more limited role than in the mass mobilization approach (and may be completely absent, especially in the early stages of movement action).

The first approach will be sustained by a *mass base*. The second approach will have only a much smaller *popular support base*. The support base will not have the numbers of the mass base generated by the mobilization approach.

**Mass Mobilization Approach**

A mature insurgent organization of the first approach, built upon mass mobilization such as found in the “people’s war” model of the Chinese and Vietnamese, normally consists of four elements: the leadership; the combatants (often deployed, whatever the terminology, as main forces, regional forces, local forces); the cadre (often called, “the militants”); and the mass base (the bulk of the membership). The proportions relative to the larger movement depend upon the strategic approach adopted by the insurgency.

To the extent state presence has been eliminated in particular areas, the four elements can exist openly.

To the extent the state remains a continuous or occasional presence, the elements must maintain a clandestine existence.

If we examine each of the elements, we find:

- Leadership figures engage in command and control of the insurgent movement. They are the idea men and the planners. They see solution to the grievances of society in structural terms. Only altering the way the institutions and practices of society fit together will result in real change. Reforms and changes in personalities are deemed insufficient to “liberate” or “redeem” society.

- Combatants do the actual fighting and are often mistaken for the movement itself. This they are not. They exist only to carry out the same functions as the police and armed forces of the state. The combatants maintain local control, as well as protect and expand the counter-state. Combatants who secure local areas are the local forces. Combatants who link local areas and provide regional security are the regional forces. Both of these elements normally are tied to specific areas of responsibility (AOR). Main forces, in contrast, are the “heavy” units of the insurgent movement and may be deployed in any AOR. Rather than engaging in terror (the main activity of local forces) and guerrilla warfare (the main activity of regional forces), they engage in mobile warfare and war of position, both subsumed under the “conventional warfare” rubric but different in emphasis when used by insurgents.

- Cadre are the political activists of the insurgency. This does not mean they are unarmed but that they are concerned first and foremost with mass mobilization activities. They are called militants since they are actively engaged in struggling to accomplish insurgent goals. Following guidance and procedures provided by the insurgent movement, the cadre assess the grievances in local areas and carry out activities that satisfy those grievances. They then attribute the solutions they have provided to the insurgent movement itself. Deeds are the key to making insurgent slogans meaningful to the population. Larger societal issues, such as foreign presence, facilitate such action because these larger issues may be blamed for life’s smaller problems.

- The mass base consists of the followers of the insurgent movement, the population of the counter-
state. Mass base members are recruited and indoctrinated by the cadre. Mass base members may continue in their normal positions in society, but many will lead either second, clandestine lives for the insurgent movement, or even pursue new, full-time positions within the insurgency (e.g., combatants normally begin as members of the mass base before becoming armed manpower).

What results, as in any armed conflict, is a contest of resource mobilization and force deployment. In the mass mobilization approach, the combatants exist to facilitate the accomplishment of the political goals of the insurgent movement as defined by the leadership. In local areas, terror (i.e., terrorism as a method of action) and guerrilla warfare are used to eliminate resistance, either from individuals who are opposed to the movement or from the local armed representatives of the state, normally the police. Main force units, which are guerrilla units that have been “regularized,” turned into rough copies of government units, are used to deal with the inevitable deployment of the military by the state.

The purpose of main forces is to engage in “mobile (or maneuver) warfare.” The intent is force-on-force action, to destroy government main force units. This allows the insurgents to secure and expand their counter-state (which may be clandestine in all or part). The intent of mobile warfare, however, is not to seize and hold position as in conventional warfare. This occurs only in “war of position.”

- Classic mobile warfare was that fought by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) against the United States in the 1965-73 period. US forces frequently faced battalions and regiments (i.e., brigades), even as terror and guerrilla action continued.

- Classic war of position was seen in the Vietnam War three times: the Tet Offensive that occurred in January-February 1968; the Spring 1972 “Easter Offensive,” which resulted in the permanent alienation of portions of South Vietnamese territory; and the Spring 1975 offensive, which saw the fall of South Vietnam and its absorption into the larger unified Vietnam. In all of these battles, enemy divisions and even corps were utilized, with terror and guerrilla action assuming the role of special operations in support of operations.

More recently, in El Salvador, where the US successfully supported the counterinsurgency, government forces twice, 1981 and 1989, had to beat back “war of position” offensives designed to seize widespread areas, including portions of the nation’s capital. In Colombia, where the US is similarly involved in support of the counterinsurgency, the insurgents of FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) initiated their mobile warfare phase in 1996. There followed a string of Colombian Army (COLAR) defeats that culminated in a FARC “war of position” attack that seized a department capital, Mitu, in mid-1998. The relief of Mitu galvanized a military reform effort that led to government success in a half dozen major mobile war battles fought between 1998 and 2001. The largest of these involved a FARC force of eight battalion equivalents engaged by an equal number of COLAR counterguerrilla battalions (BCG). FARC consequently returned to an emphasis upon terror and guerrilla action.

In Nepal, where US assistance has played a role in government counterinsurgency, the people’s war approach adopted by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), has progressed in classic fashion. Widespread use of terror and guerrilla action has been complemented by mobile warfare to overrun government positions up to company strength. Mobile warfare targets have been chosen operationally (i.e., as part of campaign planning) to position the CPN(M) for anticipated “war of position” offensives, notably against major population centers.

Armed Action Approach

Significantly, if emphasis is upon the second approach, armed action, the political goal is to be accomplished primarily by violence rather than mass mobilization. The insurgents attempt to inflict such a level of casualties and destruction that the counterinsurgent is incapable or unwilling to continue (and its foreign supporters unwilling to stay the course). The counter-state is formed as state forces are driven from areas, giving up control of the population.

In this approach, the combatant force rarely moves beyond terrorism (as a method of action) and guerrilla warfare, with units small and more specialized, frequently no more than squad or platoon strength.
Sympathizers provide recruits for the support base but are generally involved actively only occasionally, though they are often central to the information warfare component of the insurgent campaign.

• Illustration of this approach was “The Troubles,” 1968-98, in Northern Ireland (Ulster). An initial mass mobilization approach followed by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) allowed state penetration and hence was abandoned in favor of a cellular “Active Service Unit” (ASU) methodology. At normally no more than 300-man strength, the ASU network engaged almost exclusively in terroristic actions and was sustained by a support base that numbered but in the thousands, of a total 1.5 million population in an area the size of Connecticut. Sympathizers came overwhelmingly from a minority within the Catholic community, thus from a minority within a minority. At its peak, however, this sympathetic base proved capable of mustering 17-percent of the votes in democratic elections and served to keep open to question the legitimacy of British rule, which was actually favored by a substantial majority. That terrorism remained throughout a method of action, as opposed to a logic of action, is precisely the reason why most sources, whatever popular and official “terrorists” terminology, maintained that PIRA was analytically best assessed as an insurgency. Certainly it was counterinsurgency that was the British response, with counter-terrorism as a significant sub-campaign.

Recent insurgencies have often passed through common phases of development. Not all insurgencies experience every phase, and progression through all phases is not a requirement for success. The same insurgent movement may be in another phase in other regions of a country. Successful insurgencies can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming development when favorable conditions return.

The conceptualization generally followed by insurgents is drawn from that postulated by Mao Tse-tung. It is not that taught since World War II in US special operations courses. Regardless of its provenance, the Maoist conceptualization has been used by movements as diverse as communist or Islamist insurgencies, because it is logical and based upon the mass mobilization emphasis.

It states that insurgents are first strategically on the defensive (Phase I), move to stalemate (Phase II), and finally go over to the offensive (Phase III). Strategic movement from one phase to another incorporates the operational and tactical activity typical of earlier phases. It does not end them. The Vietnamese explicitly recognized this reality in their “war of interlocking” doctrine, which held that “all forms of warfare” occur simultaneously, even as a particular form is paramount (“is the driver” might be the current terminology). Political organization occurs throughout. While on the defensive, however, in Phase I as per Mao, a movement will necessarily fight the “war of the weak,” emphasizing terrorism (as a method of action) and guerrilla warfare. It is through main force action that stalemate, Phase II, is achieved. This allows Phase III, “war of position,” to unfold.

It may be noted that the terminology is drawn from Western, especially Soviet, usage. Nevertheless, US sources in particular insist upon conceptualizing the process as “organization, guerrilla, conventional
warfare,” which misrepresents what occurs. Except as illustrated by tactical exceptions, insurgent organization does not occur without violence, certainly not at the operational or strategic levels. Insurgency is by definition an armed political movement.

This is all the more visible if the insurgents adopt the second approach, a strategy of armed action. In this case, the phases just discussed do not necessarily apply. Emphasizing the combatants envisages “level of pain” as the “driver” throughout the insurgency. There will be no need to form main force units. In this approach, campaigns (operational art) dictate tactical action, with an active support base used to make armed action possible.

**Funding Integral to Insurgency**

Insurgent doctrine, as illustrated above, is critical in determining how the insurgents will actually conduct themselves. Emphasis upon mobilization of the masses requires a greater level of resources, both human and material, than emphasis upon armed action. The former requires the resources necessary to construct and maintain a true counter-state; the latter requires only that which is necessary to sustain an armed campaign with minimal counter-state apparatus.

Distribution of effort (as measured by man-hours or “profit” gained from activity) must necessarily be in harmony with operational and tactical reality as driven by strategic approach. It is the ability to reap “windfall profits” that makes illegal activity so attractive to insurgents. While taxation of a mass base is inherently low-return, kidnapping, extortion, and drugs – to cite three prominent illustrations of activities favored by insurgents – are “high return.”

- Activities of FARC in Colombia serve well to illustrate this, with profits from single kidnappings often totaling in the millions (US $). Drugs, of course, retain the highest potential for large profits for any level of investment.

- In the case of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), CPN(M), taxing the mass base directly proved much inferior to other criminal forms of “revolutionary taxation.” Small shopkeepers in Rolpa in April 2003, for instance, cited payments of NPR 50 per month (about US 66 cents). In contrast, amounts realized from kidnapping-for-ransom were an order of magnitude greater. A case, not atypical, in Rolpa involved a small innkeeper held until ransomed by his family for NPR 30,000, or nearly US $400. Extortion proved equally lucrative for the movement, with businesses associated with the commercial economy bearing the brunt. It is this activity, extortion, which grew substantially in 2004, to the extent that it forced the shut-down of field activity of even donor-funded projects. Demands as high as 10-percent of contract value were reported, with contract value often in the millions if measured *in toto.*

It stands to reason that any insurgent movement that increasingly devotes exceptional amounts of time and effort to fund-raising (i.e., sustenance) must of necessity short-change ideological (or even armed) action. Just where this leads in the case of any particular movement is at the heart of debate in characterizing movements as diverse at PIRA in Ulster, which long has been involved in all manner of criminal activity, yet certainly remains committed to its ideological aims; or FARC in Colombia, which, through its involvement in the drug trade, has apparently become the richest self-sustaining insurgent group in history and continues to claim pursuance of “Bolivarian” and “socialist” ends (with Secretariat members continuing to speak of “socialism” as meaning “Marxist-Leninism”). FARC activities, though, have increasingly been labeled “narcoterrorist” or simply criminal by a variety of critics.

What must be measured, of course, is the “drivers” of any movement. The activities of Pablo Escobar in Medellin, for instance, at times took on an insurgent-like character, with a counter-state effectively in place and a proto-ideological agenda. These activities did not become actual insurgency, any more than did the similar proto-ideological activities of segments of the Italian Mafia in the 1990s (which at times required the deployment of the Italian armed forces in stability operations).

FARC is significant, because it continues to espouse an ideological agenda and to adopt pseudo-specialization of manpower, with some Fighting Fronts (Frente de Guerra) dedicated overwhelmingly to narcotics activity in the savannah, or llanos, an apparent majority of Fighting Fronts committed to more “traditional” insurgent activity in the mountains, or sierra, where they are required to be self-sustaining and hence must rely heavily upon kidnapping and extortion. The relationship between the two modes of operation has not been well
documented, but revolves around the use of mobility corridors (corridors de movilidad) and bases/base areas to move manpower and logistical support throughout the battle space.

A full descent into criminality negates the essence of “insurgency” as an analytical category. There is a decided tendency since “9-11,” particularly as memory fades of the copious Vietnam Era research on insurgency, to lump all internal war phenomena – whether terrorism, rebellion, insurgency, or actual revolution – into the same category, thus to return us to precisely the point of confusion and conflation we were at as the 1960s began.

Indeed, the similarity between that era and now is striking, with the significant difference that a number of policy makers and military personnel then had actual experience with: minimally, guerrilla warfare (which necessarily included terrorism as method of action); maximally, actual revolutions with their attendant insurgent action (e.g., the Chinese Revolution). Throughout history, there has been no shortage of insurgencies that have degenerated to criminality, particularly as the “movements proper” have disintegrated, and elements have been cast adrift.

From the state’s perspective, it has normally been held that such disintegration is desirable, because it takes what is truly dangerous, an ideologically inspired body of disaffiliated individuals motivated by ideology, and replaces it with what is less dangerous, a more diverse body normally of very uneven character. The former is a security threat; the latter a law-and-order concern. Still, this should not be interpreted as denigrating armed capacity of a law-and-order threat, as the various movements in the Gold Coast area of Africa would appear to illustrate.

The African groups appear to raise another issue: Criminal “warlordism,” while it may exist in a strategic posture of estrangement from the state – which some have labeled “insurgent” – should not be confused with actual insurgency. Were we to make such an analytical leap, we would be conducting “insurgent studies” on alienated, disaffiliated impoverished areas the likes of East Los Angeles or Rio de Janero.

What has long been discussed is the capacity of such areas for mobilization by insurgent actors, much as Afghanistan was appropriated by Taliban and then used as a platform of operations by al Qaeda (AQ) (be it terrorist or TNI). In the event, it has proved exceptionally difficult for insurgents to establish presence in these areas worldwide where they remain integrated into the larger state (even if “failed” or “failing”), precisely because of the barriers stand-alone criminal activity throws up to ideological mobilization.

Yet most insurgent movements have at one time or another, particularly in their early phases, established relationships with criminal elements (e.g., Mao Tse-tung in the 1920s). Ideologically sound movements regularly move against elements that seek to exploit criminal activity for personal as opposed to movement gain. Ascendance of criminality creates an altogether different level of concern and would seem to dictate stability operations (as presently conceptualized) rather than counterinsurgency (as recently discussed in the US Army’s Interim Field Manual 3-07.22). Reduced to bare bones, stability operations and counterinsurgency have much in common, but the latter certainly must place greater effort upon the classic “hearts and minds” activity that serves to divide insurgent leadership from manpower. It is precisely the ideological inspiration of insurgent leadership figures that separates insurgency from traditional rebellion and resistance.

Counterinsurgency Approach

Having examined insurgency, it is necessary to close by examining the counter – which should not be confused with counter-terrorism. Counterinsurgency is the neutralization by the state of the insurgency (which will include terrorism as a method of action) and its effort to form a counter-state.

Counterinsurgency contains an inherent contradiction, because it is imperfections of the existing system (e.g., failure of state writ to run to all areas) that feed the insurgency. Simply returning to the status quo is therefore not an option. Reform is necessary, but reform is a matter for the state, utilizing all of its human and material resources. Security forces are only one such resource. The response must be multifaceted and coordinated, yet states typically charge their security forces with “waging counterinsurgency.” This, they can not do alone.

To the contrary, the state first decides upon its goal (restoration of legitimate government writ), then produces a plan to accomplish that end. All elements of national power are assigned their roles in carrying
out the plan. The *legal framework* is put in place to enable plan implementation, and *command and control (C2) arrangements* are established.

- The legal framework normally includes a series of extraordinary measures as are associated with emergency situations or even martial law. It frequently will expand military powers into areas delegated solely to the police in “normal times.”

- Historically, effective C2 architecture has involved setting up local coordinating bodies with representation from all key parties. These run the counterinsurgency campaign in the AOR concerned, though one individual will have the lead. Minimally, such a coordinating body includes appropriate representatives from civil authority, the military, the police, the intelligence services, and (though not always) the civil population. The most effective use of coordinating bodies has given permanent party individuals (e.g., a district officer) responsibility for counterinsurgency C2 in their AORs, and given them control over any assets, whether civil or military, sent into their AORs. Reinforcing intelligence bodies, in particular, have been assigned as permanent party.

All operational and tactical elements of the multifaceted approach support the accomplishment of the strategic goal. Individual campaigns, such as attacking insurgent financing, must be coordinated and weighted as appropriate to the circumstances. There is inherent danger in mistaking an operational center of gravity (e.g., insurgent generation of funding) for the strategic center of gravity (i.e., legitimacy).

Security forces, sent into an area to engage in counterinsurgency, perform as follows:

- Strategically, they serve as the shield for carrying out reform.

- Operationally, they systematically restore government control.

- Tactically, they eliminate (through either death or capture) insurgent leadership, combatants, and cadre so that local populations (who also provide the insurgent mass base) are secure and able to engage in normal activities.

The counterinsurgency plan will secure the critical infrastructure of the state and the government’s centers of power. It will detail the scheme to reclaim what has been lost, and establish a priority of effort and timeline. A key part of the scheme will be a sub-campaign against terrorism (as a *method of action*).

As a general principle, the government moves from strength to weakness, “holding” in areas of lesser priority while successively concentrating assets in priority areas.

For the security forces, the strategic counter to insurgent organization and operational patterns is to address the insurgent approach in a correct and sustainable fashion.

- A correct approach will balance elimination of grievances (i.e., reform) and security force action that eliminates the insurgents. The security forces provide the protection necessary for the restoration of government presence and control.

- A sustainable approach is defined by the state itself. It must be willing to bear the human and fiscal cost of the approach it seeks to implement.

With a correct and sustainable approach in place, the counterinsurgent “plays for the breaks,” those shifts in the internal or external situation that work against the insurgent and favor the state. This normally involves an extended period of time, a “protracted war.” This makes it difficult for democracies to sustain counterinsurgency campaigns, particularly in the present world environment where there is little agreement upon strategic ends and means – much less operational and tactical concerns.

A state is challenged by a counter-state. No objective force level guarantees victory for either side. It is frequently stated that a 10:1 or 20:1 ratio of counterinsurgents to insurgents is necessary for counterinsurgency victory. In reality, no firm ratios exist. As in conventional war, in insurgency all correlations of forces depend upon the situation. Of necessity, however, counterinsurgency is manpower intensive.

Consequently time, which often works on the side of the insurgent, often places serious constraints upon counterinsurgent courses of action.
Conclusions

It is evident that the approach above has many elements in common with a counter-terrorist campaign. Insurgents, in fact, have often been labeled “terrorists” for the integral role terroristic action plays in their campaign for power. Yet it should be evident that terrorism as a *logic of action* – that is, terrorism as an analytic and strategic category – because it is devoid of a substantive effort to form a counter-state, is more an issue of security than of “root causes.”

The present threat of international terrorism certainly would seem to challenge this conclusion but does not. Rather, it engenders the heated debate concerning the nature of the violence: transnational terrorism (i.e., terrorist groups rooted in local causes and bases but seeking to carry out international actions); or international insurgency (i.e., an insurgency located in an area so extensive that national boundaries have little meaning to its essence). In contrast, it would probably be accurate to cite Vietnam as an illustration of what might be called “transnational insurgency” (i.e., an insurgent group rooted in local causes and bases but one which extends its actions across state boundaries).

It seems almost trite to highlight, whatever one calls the present threat, that the need for a strategic approach that embodies the elements of counterinsurgency. Entire countries must be treated as theatres of operation in the same manner that traditional counterinsurgency, waged within a nation-state, deals with affected areas.

Hence, to use an example, Pakistan’s dysfunctional educational system, which results in tens of thousands of young people being indoctrinated in Islamist sectarianism, must be addressed as a necessary component of the present GWOT (Global War on Terrorism). That Pakistan should take the lead is axiomatic; that foreign powers can and should assist is also virtually self-evident. The alternative is assistance will find itself creating elements (e.g., local forces) of the society it has been sent to assist. By nature of expeditionary action, external forces often are given the lead. This involves them in a host of activities that do not normally fall within their mission profile, from supervising elections to restoring power and conducting schooling.

What is fundamental, beyond all else, is to have a plan for approaching the threat. This naturally presupposes that both state and foreign benefactors will have carried out what Clausewitz called “the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive”: “to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” Simple in concept, even distinguishing between *insurgency* and *terrorism* has proved a challenge in the present dangerous environment of the GWOT.

Endnotes:


2 Often referred to by the term “clandestine infrastructure,” the concept of the counter-state apparently entered into the literature of internal war in the 1960s. See e.g. Luis Mercier Vega, *Guerrillas in Latin America: The Technique of the Counter-State* (NY: Praeger, 1969). More recently, the concept has been used by Arthur Mitchell, *Revolutionary Government in Ireland: Dail Eireann 1919-22* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1995), as well as by Gordon McCormick, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, California, in unpublished work.

3 This insightful definition was coined by Larry Cable; see his “Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency, and Peacekeeping Post Cold War,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 4/2 (Autumn 1993), 228-62.
This is a topic I examine explicitly in “Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): Terrorism Within Insurgent Matrix,” a chapter in a larger study dealing with counterterrorist response (Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace, forthcoming).

Definitions such as those discussed here are well within the mainstream of revolutionary studies, though they do not always mesh completely with official US government definitions. The essence of what is provided in this article was included in my submission for Chapter 1, “Overview,” in the US Army’s Interim Field Manual, FMI 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations (October 2004). Necessarily, what was issued differed in many particulars from the draft. As per US military “rules of the game,” the doctrine of subordinate organizations cannot contradict the published doctrine of superior organizations, which led to even the definition of insurgency being incomplete compared to that stated here. That such “rules” make reform or even accuracy not always possible hardly needs emphasis. Best single look at the doctrinal process with respect to insurgency is Wray R. Johnson, Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2001). Equally well done, for the US Marines, is Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps’ Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001).


Poverty alone is rarely, if ever, sufficient to sustain an insurgency. An effort to explore all available quantitative efforts to relate insurgency to variables is Tom Marks, “Insurgency by the Numbers II: The Search for a Quantitative Relationship Between Agrarian Revolution and Land Tenure in South and Southeast Asia,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, 5/2 (Autumn 1994), 218-91. Content was not as narrow as implied by the title, which simply provided a means to examine the numerous studies that sought to explain quantitatively insurgency. At the end of the day, what emerged was that the universe of studies had been unable to establish relationships that would explain even as great a percentage of the variance as could be achieved by flipping a coin. Thus qualitative measures were clearly key. This I discuss further in Thomas A. Marks, “Evaluating Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Performance,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, 11/3 (Winter 2000), 21-46.


Specifics may be found by examining the cases (Thailand, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Peru) in my Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam.

Indispensable reading on this subject, though she is discussing “pure terrorism,” is Donatella della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Her research finds the interaction between social movements and the state, later violent splinters and the state, the most salient variable in determining the trajectory of those who choose to challenge the state through violent means. A masterful summary of her thought is Donatella della Porta, “Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy,” in Crenshaw, op.cit., 105-59. This may be usefully augmented by examining Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter, eds., Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Herndon, VA: Brassey’s 1990), divides insurgency into seven “types” – anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist – a division Cable, op.cit. (p. 229) usefully simplifies in observing: “While insurgency exists in two forms, offensive and defensive, with the distinction being drawn upon the basis of the overarching political goal, a radical restructuring of the social-political matrix in the case of the former or the assertion of autonomy by a distinct social, cultural linguistic group with respect to the latter, the process which produces the end result of armed conflict is the same.”


See David Spencer and Jose Angel Moroni Bracamonte, Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran Guerrillas (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995).


It is significant that there apparently are no articles or books (on either of these cases) that have yet emerged as accomplishing our purposes of illustration.


Complete discussion may be found in Thomas A. Marks, Maoist People’s War in Post-Vietnam Asia (Bangkok: White Lotus, forthcoming).

For further details, see Marks, Insurgency in Nepal, passim.

See e.g. William Reno, “The Failure of Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone,” Current History (May 2001), 219-25. therein, Reno makes the challenging assertion, “Conflict in collapsed states is fundamentally different from wars between ideological rivals who mobilize mass followings and build ‘liberated zones’ to practice their ideas of governance.”

See Thomas A. Marks, “Urban Insurgency,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, 14/3 (Autumn 2003), 100-57. Therein, see esp. n. 56 for sources.

Excellent illustration of a national planning approach and implementation to counterinsurgency is that presently being used by the Alvaro Uribe administration in Colombia. For details see Thomas A. Marks, Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for “Democratic Security” (Carlisle: Army War College, 2005). Details of the successful Peruvian approach may be found in David Scott Palmer and Thomas A. Marks, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics: Comparing Peru and Nepal,” LIC and Law Enforcement, forthcoming.

This formulation was outlined for me by the legendary Sir Robert Thompson shortly before his death. For transcript of interview, see Tom Marks, “The Counter- Revolutionary: Sir Robert Thompson – Grand Master of Unconventional Warfare,” Soldier of Fortune, 14/10 (October 1989), 58-65/77-80. Thompson’s seminal text remains as useful today as when it was written, regardless of the precise ideology adopted by the insurgents: Defeating Communist Insurgency (NY: Praeger, 1966).

My introduction to this reality I also owe to Thompson.

For details on this particular case, see Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005).

Useful for details is I. William Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).


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Urban Operations and Complex Counterinsurgency
One and the Same

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Introduction

The conduct of military operations in a large city, in the midst of the populace, without the benefit of the powerful weapons it possesses, is certainly one of the most delicate and complex problems ever to face an army.

Colonel Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare–A French View of Counterinsurgency (1964)

In this article, we will first review history and examine urban operations (UO) and how UO affected warfare as a rule, and how these operations affected United States (US) strategy. In that same historical context we will look at counterinsurgency; where it came from and how it has morphed from a simple insurgency in Vietnam to the more complex version we are witnessing today in Iraq. Using four urban operations examples from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) we will discuss UO and the insurgency. Then, in conclusion, we will discuss the implications this article should portend for doctrine and strategy in developing military forces and operations for the future, based on a better understanding of what is happening in Iraq and what could happen elsewhere. This article will provide an overview of the success in the Strategic Cities Plan in Iraq from August 2004–January 2005 by reviewing in context the historical lessons that have led us to our current capability and the current realities of UO. The key to successful operational-level urban operations is applying full-spectrum capabilities against diverse objectives.

History’s Contribution to UO

The past 60 years of modern warfare have provided analytical, procedural, and technological tools to be successful in the urban operational environment (OE) of Iraq. Study of WW II and Cold War fighting-in-cities experiences enables the definition of essential elements of combat success in the urban environment. United States experiences in the post-WWII era and counterinsurgency situations gave the US the military tools necessary to face the complexities of simultaneously waging war and promoting peace.

The battles of Stalingrad and Metz demonstrate the critical importance of urban-area isolation. Aachen exemplifies the combined-arms nature of modern urban warfare. The examples of Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Paris suggest that urban areas may be strategic targets not necessarily in proportion to their real military value. Propaganda and media were key to the operations that occurred in Aachen and Hue. Aachen was the first Germany city captured by the allies. General Eisenhower and his staff had to carefully manage the treatment of German civilians within the city as the American media carefully scrutinized US military government detachments for any sign of coddling the enemy. The media focus on Hue gave the impression of North Vietnamese success and military prowess despite the very effective destruction of the enemy by US and South Vietnamese forces. The costly battle of Brest proved that not all urban operations are essential to the conduct of a campaign. Subsequent urban operations against French port cities were suspended. The critical strategic, operational, and tactical battle space may all be simultaneously focused in the same urban area, as at Seoul, Hue, Panama City, Mogadishu, and in the Israeli-occupied territories.

Basic operational and tactical approaches for successful combat operations

One of the most important aspects of tactical success in the conventional urban environment is combined arms and joint operations. History teaches that the tank and infantry team at the smallest level is essential to success in the urban environment. Battles such as the 1st Infantry Division’s fight for Aachen and fights such as the Marines in downtown Seoul and Hue validate the point that the psychological shock, firepower and protection of armor combined with the precision and close-combat skills of infantry can achieve effects and acceptable loss rates that are impossible for either arm to achieve alone. Brief combat in Panama City in 1989 and Mogadishu in 1993 demonstrated the commanders’ need to employ capabilities of the joint team in tactical operations. These new tactical capabilities include special operations reconnaissance and direct action,
psychological operations, information operations, and aerially delivered precision munitions. These joint capabilities permit the conduct of successful tactical urban operations across the full spectrum of potential operation types.

In addition to the tactical tools of success, historical experience demonstrates that the operational approach to conventional urban operations is necessary to shape tactical success. A first consideration for operational success is the ability to isolate the urban area physically and psychologically from external support. While German and Finnish forces encircled and physically cut off Leningrad for almost three years in 1941-43, they never psychologically isolated the civilian populace or the city’s defenders. The failure of German and Romanian forces physically to isolate Stalingrad in late 1942 resulted in catastrophe in early 1943. Another key operational consideration to be considered has been the positioning of tactical forces before a coherent defense of an urban area can be mounted. This operation is achieved through operational maneuver to gain tactical surprise. General Macarthur’s amphibious operation at Inchon positioned the US Tenth Corps deep behind North Korean forces in the southern Korean peninsula and permitted the rapid recapture of Seoul. Amphibious, airborne, air assault, and rapid armored penetration and exploitation, alone or in combination, are means by which the operational commander can position forces for tactical success. The initial approach to Baghdad in 2003 is an example of rapid mounted attack combined with airmobile operations that occurred with speed and violence, isolated the objective, and precluded the establishment of a coherent defense.

All information means have a higher density in urban areas. These information means are necessary in the functioning of an urban area and can be easily disturbed and eliminated in an urban fight. The presence of information means, combined with the strategic political sensitivity of large urban areas, must be accounted for by tactical and operational commanders. The capture and holding of Hue in early 1968 was a strategic victory for North Vietnamese forces because it became a symbol, albeit false, of the tactical success of the Tet Offensive. This misrepresentation was abetted by US media, which for weeks broadcast pictures of the North Vietnamese flag flying above the Citadel. The strategic impact of this symbol was to obscure the decisive tactical and operational victories of US and South Vietnamese forces on the ground in Hue and throughout South Vietnam in the ensuing weeks. It is essential that commanders recognize the information dimension of urban operations and aggressively address it in their plans and actions.

**Impact of high civilian population density on operations**

The urban environment’s dominant characteristics are its physical infrastructure and population. Experience demonstrates that because of these impediments, commanders must adjust their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and rules of engagement (ROE) to mitigate collateral damage and civilian casualties. Collateral damage can have an immediate impact on the population, as it did in Manila in 1945, where over 100,000 civilians died in the city fighting. Collateral damage also can have significant long term effects on the subsequent mission, as US forces assume responsibility for restoring destroyed infrastructure, rebuilding political institutions, and alleviating starvation and disease. These missions are easier if commanders and leaders at all levels think in terms of second and third-order effects of operations. Awareness of the impact of collateral damage significantly affected the ROE of US forces during operations in Panama City in 1989. This awareness was evident in the relatively low number of civilian casualties and minimized disruption of civilian systems, and it facilitated the rapid and effective transition of control to Panamanian authorities after hostilities ended.

**Counterinsurgency**

In the years following World War II, a wave of revolutionary movements, some genuinely nationalist and some proxies for Cold War communist regimes, swept various regions of the world. Many of these movements were inspired by the success of Chinese communists under Mao and used Mao’s theories as a model for revolutionary war. Mao’s revolutionary war theory therefore facilitates the analysis of insurgencies. This theory, combined with French, British, and US experience countering revolutionary warfare, provide a solid starting point for analyzing and planning operations to combat urban insurgencies using joint force capabilities. Mao’s three-stage theory of revolutionary war—political action, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare—is very flexible and encourages the insurgent to adjust his operational approach to local conditions. This theory, even if the insurgents are not consciously
followers of Mao, provides a comprehensive framework for analyzing and understanding the dynamics of revolutionary war and insurgency.

The Simple Urban Insurgency Model

Using the Maoist model to represent urban insurgency results in a construct in which the center is dominated by the urban space and its three doctrinal components: physical structures, systems, and population. Inside the urban space, overlaid on the components of the urban environment, are a small criminal element, a small insurgent element, and a large government bureaucracy that includes security and police forces. External to the urban space are nation-state and rural sanctuaries, and nation-state supporters of the insurgency (see figure 1). This generic analytic model is in general accord with Maoist theories and in actuality reflects many insurgencies, both rural and urban based, of the Twentieth Century. In particular, it can be used to describe the urban insurgencies faced by the French in Algiers in the late 1950s and by the British in urban Northern Ireland in the last third of the Twentieth Century.

Step one of urban counterinsurgency is understanding the model; step two is developing the intelligence that allows identification of the specific components of any particular insurgency, because this will ultimately guide the strategy adapted for a rational counter-insurgency. This step is the most challenging since it requires significantly different capabilities from those employed in conventional operations. However, once the analysis is complete the model provides a blueprint of the dynamic components of the insurgency, which then permits planning a counterinsurgency campaign. Maoist theory and history demonstrate that in the counterinsurgency campaign, the political component of the strategy will be the decisive effort, while the military and security aspects of the operation will be the shaping effort. In a simple insurgency, as in Vietnam,
nation state sponsors or sanctuaries, including Cambodia and Laos, were a major factor in influencing the duration of the insurgency.

Also, in this model the small insurgent element is rural based. The examples represented in the model represent what some consider systems of action rather than single events that take place once and disappear. Systems imply repetition and reaching a level with a reversal – meaning the system will simply repeat after a set back.

Past, present, and future US urban-operations doctrine demonstrate where we have come from and where we are headed in confronting UO in our operational environment. Previous urban doctrine only focused on applying military capabilities against a symmetric conventional opponent. Current doctrine and evolving urban doctrine describe the capabilities necessary for success against an asymmetric enemy. Doctrine is always undergoing change and revision, and today at a considerably faster pace than in the past. By definition, doctrine represents general guidance and is not prescriptive in nature. TTP are generally doctrinal, but evolving TTP form an essential element of planning and execution of operations against an intelligent and adaptive adversary. TTP provide the flexibility to conduct situation-dependent operations, and at the same time allow us to integrate best practices into both ongoing operations and the development of future doctrine.

Current Urban Operations Doctrine

FM 3-0, Operations, and FM 3-06, Urban Operations, were developed just prior to OIF and anticipated the changes to the OE. The transition to the new doctrine had not been fully implemented in the Army prior to our forces’ deployment to Iraq. As a result, organizations had to learn our new doctrine in the midst of on-going operations. The opportunity now exists to revisit that doctrine based on operational experience and adjust training, leader development, and education, as well as organizations, equipment, and technology for the future.

Today’s doctrine recognizes that destroying an urban area to save it is no longer a viable course of action. It emphasizes the simultaneity of stability operations with offensive and defensive operations against free-thinking, adaptive opponents seeking to gain asymmetrical advantages. Strategic and operational goals often cannot be secured by military means alone. On the contrary, the heroic and necessary actions of soldiers in an urban environment are only one part of a larger, civil-focused effort. The expertise, experience, and abilities of coalition partners and various governmental and nongovernmental organizations, applied in a synergistic unity of effort, are necessary to bring about a more satisfactory political, social, diplomatic, economic, and military outcome. All the blood, sweat, and ammunition will not be for naught unless it is part of a tightly coordinated civil-military effort.

This connection to doctrine also defines for us a significant difference between urban warfare and urban operations. “Urban operations” is more than just fighting in cities. It involves the melding of military operations into the social, cultural, and economic milieu of the populace within the city, state, or country in which US military forces are deployed. The cultural-awareness dynamic of modern military operations has been aptly demonstrated in Iraq. To use the older terms “combat in cities,” “military operations in urbanized terrain (MOUT),” and the British term “fighting in built-up areas (FIBUA)” all demonstrated the mind set of the Cold War and the post-Cold War era. “Urban operations” is in fact a better term for demonstrating the complexity of a modern urban environment and the missions that can follow us there.

Former Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak aptly described his concept of leadership at the subordinate level in UO by the term “the three-block war.” He described this concept in an article The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War, in the Marine Magazine, 14 April 2006. An urban operation, now and in the future, must be planned for undeveloped countries teaming with inhabitants, with vast cultural, economic, and religious differences; it is the task of military professionals to meet the challenges presented by this environment. The complexity and uniqueness of the current operational environment in Iraq could never have been completely planned for. There are too many variables to account for in planning and execution. One can add a complicating factor of media presence and influence, plus the constantly shifting economic, popular, cultural, ethnic, and religious factors and the impact these divergent issues have on decision making at all levels. These factors will influence both military and political solutions.

The Iraq war was planned and executed with assumptions that were largely inaccurate with regard
to how the populace would react to the overthrow of this dictatorial regime. But the unprecedented chaos that followed the rapid decapitation of the ruling regime left the Coalition Provisional Authority with a scenario worse than it was dealing with originally. The subsequent events will provide the United States with lessons that should never be forgotten and that must be taken into account in all future training, planning, and leader education. The military and political challenges attendant to the US military presence in Iraq is unprecedented in the history of warfare. The enemy’s 72–96 hour decision cycle in reaction to our current operations makes many of our doctrinal templates, intelligence processes, and to a certain extent, our entire military decision-making process (MDMP) outmoded. We must take immediate steps to review and revise the MDMP.

The historical examples cited in the beginning of this article demonstrate how long the kinetic tools (firepower) used to fight urban battles have been around. Yet the intensity, variety, and multiplicity of tools needed for one UO event have grown with the multiplying threats and the diversity of the urban environment. Social, political, cultural, ethnic, and economic dynamics are now all represented in the urban operational environment. Leaders have been forced to reevaluate the tools needed and, in many cases, use multiple kinetic and non-kinetic tools simultaneously to achieve success.

Although the general tendency in modern times has been to avoid using tank and heavy mechanized forces in cities, in fact these units have often played important roles in urban combat. The more recent events in Grozny, where Russian armored units were trapped and destroyed piecemeal by insurgent opponents, demonstrate the inherent danger to heavy armor in urban combat. Yet tactics, techniques, and procedures used in Iraq provide important lessons on how to use tank and mechanized forces effectively. Force protection and avoidance of casualties rank high in the commanders’ concerns, and the current fleet of Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles have performed extremely well in this regard.

**The Complex Urban Insurgency Model in Iraq**

We will now attempt to understand a complex insurgency that is presented by Iraq, and to offer that this insurgency is unlike any simple insurgency described already, that modern military forces have faced. There have been short term fights that portend this fight, but in truth no other example offers all the prerequisites that presented themselves in this model. Modeling the components of this insurgency reveals an unprecedented level of complexity. The complex urban insurgency model (see figure 2) is different from the simple model in that the large national and more developed local government structure which controls the urban environment is completely missing. This missing national and local government structure results in an unrestrained and unusually large and aggressive criminal element in the environment. Local militias and war lords, as well as religious clerics and their followers, represent the only authority with the disestablishment of the government at all levels. Also different from the simple model is the number of insurgencies within the insurgency. Multiple insurgencies inhabit this model, sharing the urban battlespace. These insurgencies can be pursuing different strategies to achieve competing objectives. For example, one group may be focused on political activity to build up a popular base prior to executing guerrilla operations, while a different group might be willing to deploy conventionally to defend its “turf” in the urban area. The various insurgencies may or may not cooperate with each other. If they do cooperate, such cooperation is likely to be temporary. Multiple insurgencies can also increase the number of nation-state sponsors, as well as the number and location of rural support areas and sanctuaries. Finally, this complex model accounts for an operating environment in which non-nation state sponsors outside the urban area may be supporting extra-national insurgent groups.

The implications of this model for the counterinsurgent forces are formidable. Understanding and deciphering the complexity of this insurgency is the major challenge for US forces currently stationed in Iraq. First, significant critical resources must be devoted to rapidly reconstructing indigenous urban infrastructure and governmental systems—including an indigenous security apparatus. Second, the intelligence apparatus must be able to distinguish between the various insurgent groups and identify each group’s strategy and objectives. Intelligence organizations must also be able to distinguish between insurgent activity and criminal activity. Finally, the counterinsurgency campaign must be designed to apply very diverse combinations and proportions of military capability discreetly against each different insurgent group, often within the same battlespace. Counterinsurgency forces must also conduct policing
activities to reduce the size and influence of the criminal community.

**The Strategic Cities Plan**

The vehicle to provide context to this review of the current state of urban operations is the Strategic Cities Plan developed and executed by the Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I) from August 2004 to January 2005 (see figure 3). This full spectrum campaign plan, following the end of major combat operations, provided an operational view and methodology leading up to the Transitional National Assembly election in January 2005. This election proved so successful it helped solidify and justify the government of Iraq to the Iraqi people and the world. The operational approach and insights contained in this successfully executed plan deserve closer review.

To aid in this discussion, Figure 4 lays out the multiple cities; dates of action; population, which varies considerably from city to city; the largest ethnic group represented by the city (plus an identification of the threat), and the religious influences in the city; the major lessons learned in conducting urban operations; and finally the type of force structure used to deal with the threat. All the above operations involved a joint operational approach and concern the use of coalition forces, indigenous forces, interagency, and military operations at every level.

The MNF-I campaign plan, executed beginning in August 2004, was designed to help establish security for 15 to 20 major population areas, or “strategic cities,” in order to conduct the January 2005 Transitional National Assembly elections. Based on the forces available, the military security assessment MNF-I planners developed a phased plan to reestablish security in those population centers not fully secure. The Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) and MNF-I wanted to restore or maintain government control to the cities in which the election process was threatened. The observations from five of
those recent urban operations, and the methodology used, demonstrate the complexity of the issues involved in urban operations in the operational environment.

Al Najaf was considered important due to the rising expectations of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Madi Army and the significance of the Imam Ali Shrine in Iraqi culture and religion. Al-Sadr sought legitimacy and power among the other Shiia clerics and proposed a Shiia insurgency against the IIG and the coalition. Al Sadr also called on the Madi Army to seize control of the political party and government offices, and occupy the major mosques in An Najaf and Al Kut. As a result, US and coalition forces, with limited Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) participation, conducted hasty offensive operations to restore IIF control and security to both cities. These responses required full-spectrum urban operations, including joint and precision fires, yet with rigid fire control, in order to spare significant cultural targets. The use of the ISF to clear the mosques was necessary in order to mitigate the political damage.

US Army and US Marine Corps (USMC) forces (11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU); 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF); 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division; and 1-5 Stryker Battalion (BN)) were organized for this operation. Among the

**Range of Cited Urban Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>Ethnic Group/Religion</th>
<th>Opposition Groups</th>
<th>Major Lessons</th>
<th>Type of Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An Najaf</td>
<td>Aug 04</td>
<td>563 K</td>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>Madi Army, Shiite tribal group, criminal element</td>
<td>Marine-Army ground operations</td>
<td>Full-spectrum operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarra</td>
<td>Jul-Oct 04</td>
<td>201 K</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Large unemployed young men pop., foreign fighters</td>
<td>Precision counter-insurgency, security restoration</td>
<td>Counter-insurgency security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad (Sadr City)</td>
<td>Sep 04</td>
<td>2.2 Mil*</td>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>Madi Army, large criminal element</td>
<td>Precision fires, counter-insurgency security (An Najaf and Samarra)*</td>
<td>Counter-insurgency security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>Nov 04-Jan 05</td>
<td>1.6 Mil</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Sunni disenfranchised FRE**, foreign fighters</td>
<td>Using Samarra model</td>
<td>Counter-insurgency security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallujah II</td>
<td>Nov-Dec 04</td>
<td>256 K</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Wahabi sect foreign fighters, criminal elements</td>
<td>Full-spectrum urban combat (An Najaf lessons applied)</td>
<td>Full-spectrum operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Each operation provided lessons and TTP for the next engagement

** Former regime elements

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**Figure 3**

**Figure 4**
issues that surfaced in these operations were problems in communications and fires. The fight in the al Najaf cemetery, in effect a city within a city, was fierce; the adaptive leadership of small units paid big dividends for US forces, as did the use of armored vehicles. Logistical resupply, movement capability, and training were all issues of concern for the future use of the ISF. One of the keys to the success of this operation was the political isolation of Muqtada al-Sadr by the prominent cleric al-Sistani.

Sadr City represented a unique problem as a city (15 by 10 blocks) within the city of Baghdad. The Madi Army, after its rejection from An Najaf, settled in to control Sadr City. The Shia population in this section of Baghdad supported Al Sadr as an anti-coalition leader. The grid-like make up of the city, just kilometers from the coalition Green Zone, provided some unique tactical challenges to the 1st Cavalry Division. High-impact civil projects and local input to these projects added to the overall stability of Baghdad, at the same time that Sadr City was cordoned off for urban combat operations. The selected use of precision fires and air strikes in Sadr City allowed the majority of Baghdad to continue in its reconstruction. The 1st Cavalry Division leadership adapted well to the situation, organizing combined-arms teams that performed their mission in modified armored packages. These units adjusted their tactics, techniques, and procedures in response to enemy actions.

Mosul had to be revisited during this campaign due to the second round of fighting in Fallujah. Initial operations in Mosul led to the conclusion that the city was ready for the Transitional National Assembly elections. Many of the foreign fighters initially located in this northern former Kurdish city had joined the fight for Fallujah. Now the insurgents attempted to show the inability of the IIG to provide security in Mosul by attacking Iraqi National Guard and Police Services, hoping at the same time to draw coalition forces away from the Fallujah fight. The units involved in Mosul included the 1st Stryker BCT, 25th ID, which had replaced the 1st Brigade, 25th ID; and 1st BN, 24th Infantry Regiment. These units executed sustained combat operation in the western side of Mosul, which the MNF-I had long suspected anti-Iraqi forces were using to launch attacks on US and Iraqi bases and patrols. On 10 November insurgent activity spiked throughout the city and included attacks on Iraqi police stations and other local security forces. The fight for control lasted most of the afternoon, and at the end of the day not a single police station remained in insurgent hands. On 11 November, the initiative passed to the US forces, and they moved into a neighborhood known for harboring insurgents. Initial operations in Mosul were reactive and conducted as an economy-of-force action until six US battalions returning to Mosul provided the security necessary for the Transitional National Assembly elections to proceed. Intimidation continues to be a reality of Mosul.

Fallujah II provides a view of the heart of Sunni resistance to the IIF and the coalition. Former regime elements and foreign fighters controlled the city. A large portion of the inhabitants were followers of the Wahabi sect; Fallujah also represented an extremist tribal hotbed. During the first incursion into the city, Fallujah had a population of approximately 300,000 civilians, but Coalition Provisional Authority officials believed that 70-90 percent of this population had fled the city. The civilian flight followed the first Fallujah operation, when attempts to control the city were political in nature and then culminated in the attempted use of a surrogate force (the Fallujah Brigade) to bring order to the city. After this operation failed and preparations began in earnest to find a coalition military solution, escape routes were opened and a focused information operation was launched to encourage civilian evacuation. This left a 2000–3000 strong group of hardcore insurgents entrenched in the city at the time of the joint and combined assault.
The offensive operation, PHANTOM FURY, was launched on 8 November 2004. Approximately 10,000–15,000 troops from the USMC (1st MEF) and US Army (1st Cavalry Division), as well as specially trained Iraqi forces, participated in this deliberate assault. The attack included weeks of aerial bombardment and the use of Iraqi forces to seize specific targets such as the hospital and bridges. This deliberate operation, well rehearsed and executed, benefited in execution from lessons learned at An Najaf. Among these was the use and control of UAVs to provide real-time intelligence and direct fires in the city. One technological piece of equipment that helped to sort out the airspace used by the Marines to good effect was the USAF remote-operation video-enhanced receiver (ROVER). Successful combat operations led to the destruction of the majority of the enemy force and paved the way for the repatriation of the civilian population. Major rebuilding projects followed as part of the next phase of urban operations.

Conclusion:

Taken together, the five operations of the Strategic Cities Plan provide a window into the planning and execution of urban operations in the operational environment that is Iraq. The keys to success in this UO plan were using the right combination of resources for each city and sequencing the operations properly. Any UO of the future must emphasize the collection and dissemination of actionable intelligence before, during, and after the commencement of operations. Analysis indicates other ingredients for success in contemporary and future urban operations include adaptive leadership at all levels by culturally well-trained and politically aware soldiers. Officers and battle staffs must be tactically sound and flexible. UO can only be successful with situationally cognizant small units. Joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) operations are becoming the norm, as demonstrated by each of the examples. The implications of JIM operations should be reflected in all future doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) development.

Technology in many instances is making us more efficient in what we do, but not necessarily more effective in asymmetric operations. Technology helps, but it does not eliminate the nastiness of the urban fight. You can fly all the UAVs over an urban objective you want, but it still boils down to soldiering on the ground to get the job done. Dissemination of critical information, analysis of select information to ensure success, and the dilemma of information overload are all factors that should be considered in any discussion of UO. Technology is an important positive factor in urban operations – used correctly it can influence the success of an operation – but technology in itself is not a magic bullet. Technology is only as good as the operators, planning, and execution of it’s employment, and only after a thorough accounting of its success or failure.

An important element in UO success is the application of full-spectrum JIM operational capabilities against diverse objectives, in many cases simultaneously. The insights presented in Figure X blend the historical perspective of urban operations with the perspective of contemporary urban operations in Iraq, and identify some of the emerging trends that will help us develop a better force for coping and winning the urban operations of the future.

The success of urban operations in Iraq has been a function of commanders and planning staffs discreetly analyzing each situation and applying solutions that are appropriate to each specific UO environment.

From an historical perspective, OIF is unprecedented in scope and complexity. It will influence the way in which we approach all DOTML-PF aspects of future urban operations.

Insights for contemporary urban operations from both a historical context and emerging context are provided for comparison and discussion below.

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SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS
(The Hidden Economic And Moral Consequences of Fighting ‘The Long War’ Against Islamic Terrorism)

James Lacey
IDA Analyst

The radical Islamic attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11) instantly killed three thousand people, and condemned many millions more to hideous and slow deaths in the five years that have followed. In the next few decades terrorists will kill tens of millions more without even resorting to a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Most of these millions of needless deaths will, as usual, be visited upon the world’s most disadvantaged populations and a significant portion of them will be in the Arab world. In an ironic twist of fate, the very measures that the developed world has taken to defend itself from terrorism is causing increased poverty, widespread malnutrition, and countless premature deaths in the developing world. However, these are just some of the mostly unconsidered effects of terrorism. Others, which are doing almost invisible, but still catastrophic, damage to the United States include: decreasing United States (US) competitiveness, reduced wages for American workers, reduced capital formation for new businesses, decreasing levels of global trade and investment; and slower US as well as international economic growth.

To date, most of the rather sparse discussion of terrorism and economics has focused on the narrow topics of terrorist financing and the fiscal costs of fighting terrorism, or recovering from a terrorist strike. These are important but capture only a sliver of the overall economic effects of a sustained terrorist assault. However, since most analysts think only in these terms, the assumption has grown over time that developed nations rapidly shake off the economic effects of a terrorist strike; after all, the Stock market was higher a month after 9/11 then it was just before the attack.

This assumption is wrong. Not only are the economic effects of terrorism far greater than commonly assumed, they also tend to linger for years or decades afterwards. Moreover, while Islamic terror has a deep and prolonged economic impact on developed nations, it is proving truly catastrophic for most of the underdeveloped nations, who possess only a limited capacity to absorb systemic economic shocks.

Immediate Effects

The most immediate effects of a terror strike are also the most visible; the destruction of property and the loss of life. By their very nature terrorist attacks are designed to magnify both, in order to maximize fear and ensure as much media coverage as possible. In practical terms, however, anything less then a WMD will have only a negligible effect on the world’s accumulated capital stock, or make much of a dent in global population. Of course, each human life is priceless and, though it may appear heartless to place a price on an individual, it is important that we think of life in purely economic terms in order to make rational judgments on the overall effect of terrorism. Therefore, if we can look beyond the terrible personal grief each loss engenders, we will see that the practical economic effects of the loss of such small segments of the population (compared to the 300 million in the United States) are, in the short term, negligible. Even 9/11, the most costly terrorist attack ever, killed less then .00001 percent of the US population. We lose more than ten times that a year in highway accidents.

This does not mean that some attacks do not cause human losses which have an immediate and outsized economic effect. For instance 9/11 hit the bond-trading firm Cantor Fitzgerald very hard. Since this firm was one of the major players in the government bond market a large amount of trading expertise was lost, and this did have a substantial disruptive effect on the market for a sustained period. For the most part though, the system rapidly replaces losses and efficient markets quickly return.

Additionally, most terrorist attacks cause relatively insubstantial amounts of property damage. Israel, for example, prides itself in wiping away all evidence of a terrorist strike by the following morning. This is, of course, manifestly untrue of a mega-event such as 9/11. However, in the $12 trillion US economy even destruction of this magnitude can be coped with and absorbed. Exempting a series of mega-attacks or a WMD, even a sustained terror campaign on American soil would have only an insignificant impact on accumulated capital stock.
Ongoing Effects

The truly damaging economic effects of terrorism are not a direct result of any specific incident. Rather, they are the result of later reactions to events and the changes societies undertake to protect themselves. In this regard, the economic effects of terrorist strikes often mirror those of natural disasters. For instance, the San Francisco earthquake was an immediate economic disaster for that region of the country (though there was a mini-boom associated with reconstruction) and caused a severe economic dislocation that lingered years. However, though the earthquake was over in minutes and reconstruction was completed within a few short years the effects never ended. Even today, a century later, the memories of that event still exact an economic cost. For instance, builders have to undertake the additional cost of earthquake-proofing all new construction and no one would advocate placing a nuclear power plant on the San Andreas Fault no matter how advantageous the site is otherwise.

Since there are a multitude of safer building locations in the United States to choose from the national impact of avoiding the construction of nuclear reactors in San Francisco is small. Unfortunately, project relocation is not a viable alternative strategy against terrorism. Since the threat is not isolated to one region every locality is suddenly a potential target for a catastrophic incident. Without any inherently safe area, defending against terrorist threats that can strike at anytime or any location becomes infinitely more complicated and costly than adjusting for natural disasters.

Analyzing the Effects

The most ironic part of radical Islam’s war with the West is that, seemingly unbeknownst to them, they are doing far more damage to their own societies then they are doing to their intended targets. According to the United Nations, growing numbers of Arabs are falling below the poverty line each year and almost 40 percent of Arab children, living outside the oil-rich states, are moderately to severely malnourished. Given the fact that Arab population growth will continue to accelerate for the foreseeable future, the region’s best hope of relieving millions from dismal economic conditions is a spurt of sustained economic growth.

Regrettably, unless macro conditions change soon, there is no hope growth will ever take place at the level required just to keep up with an increasing population. While there are many reasons why the region’s economic growth continues to lag, one of the most critical is the lack of foreign direct investment (FDI). In recent years, only seven tenths of a percent of the world FDI has flown into the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In fact, barely one percent of the FDI sent to the developing world finds its way to the MENA countries. Moreover, since most of the FDI that does enter the region goes to the oil rich countries, these already depressing overall totals greatly overstate the amount of investment available to uplift the poorest of the poor.

When it comes to economic development, FDI is a proven driving force. During the early stages of their development the Asian Tigers often, for example, saw over 40 percent of new investment and capital accumulation coming from FDI. In many cases FDI still makes up a quarter of new investment capital in rapidly growing areas of the world. Just as important as this inflow of funds is the knowledge transfer that almost always accompanies it. Investors rarely just send money. They send professional expertise and cutting edge business methods along with the cash in order to guarantee the highest possible capital returns. By being at the bottom rung of the FDI ladder, MENA not only forgoes much needed investment capital, they also lose the knowledge necessary to make their businesses competitive in a global economy.

Most analyses of the lack of FDI in the region blame it on poor investment climate and low potential returns. Radical Islamic terrorism is rarely mentioned in any of these analyses. This is a strange oversight since the proof that terrorism severely restricts FDI flows to an affected area is not disputed. In a 1996 paper Enders and Sandler showed that Spain lost over $500 million in FDI and Greece $400 million between 1976-1991 due to internal terrorist threats. All other things being equal, only irrational investors place capital in a location where such investment is likely to make them targets of terror. Without a compelling reason, such as oil, superbly rational investors will remain unwilling to underwrite the terrorism risk and will continue to shun the region. In fact, since terrorism became a major concern in the late 1990’s the Arab region’s percent of global FDI has fallen by close to 50 percent. Since there have not been any other changes in the region that would help account for this reduced flow, it can be safely assumed that fear is a strong influencer. If that fear could be
erased and the lesser developed Arab countries were able to recoup just the FDI that terrorism has cost them, they could easily add one percent to their annual growth rates.

A one percent growth may not sound like much, but if sustained year after year the effects can be massive. As Jeffrey Sachs points out in his book, The End of Poverty, the United States since 1820 has grown at a sustained rate of 1.7 percent a year while sub-Saharan Africa has grown at 0.7 percent over the same period. This one percent difference has led to a 25-fold improvement in living standards for the United States, while sub-Saharan Africa has seen only a three-fold improvement. A measly one percent growth has meant the difference between what the average American currently enjoys as compared to the average African. Clearly, Islamic terrorism is robbing the Arab people of much of their future economic potential.2

Though lack of FDI is crippling for developing nations, industrial nations are not immune to terrorism’s affects on their own FDI. In a globalized economy, where capital can flow freely, investors have a wide array of locations available to send their money. In a seminal paper on the topic, Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal estimated that a developed country subject to terrorist threat forfeits five percent of the total FDI that would have gone there had there been no threat. The study also found that in the period shortly after a major terrorist attack, the drop-off of FDI that flows to a country could be much more severe. For instance, FDI made up almost 16 percent of new capital formation in the United States in the year before 9/11. Two years later that figure was under 2 percent before bouncing back up due to a combination of an improving economy and a lack of successful terrorist strikes since 9/11. Of course, most of this lost FDI money found its way into other investments around the world. So the pain, in this case, was felt by the United States and not necessarily by the global economy, except in cases where capital went to investments with inferior returns in order to avoid the risk of terrorism.3 However, the United States cannot long tolerate a threat that greatly reduces the $200 billion in FDI that flows to it annually and is used to build factories, employ five million workers, and deepen the country’s technology base.

Besides crippling FDI, terrorists do severe damage to the people they profess to be standing up for by making international trade more costly. Even since the classical model of trading was introduced by Adam Smith and David Ricardo, economists have repeatedly demonstrated that increased international trade improves the welfare of all citizens involved. Reduced trade friction and decreasing costs have lifted literally billions out of extreme poverty in just the past couple of decades. Continuing this growth in international trade will be the determining factor for any hope of bringing another billion persons out of extreme poverty in the next decade. By definition then, anything that hampers global trade, while it inflicts costs on the developed world, causes incredible suffering on the world’s most vulnerable citizens.

These costs are already beginning to mount up. Initiatives such as the International Shipping and Port Security Codes, established by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in the wake of 9/11, are being hailed by security experts without anyone giving much thought to their prolonged economic impact. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates that compliance for ship owners will cost $1.3 billion initially, and $750 million annually thereafter. Bringing just developing countries’ ports up to code will cost $300 million, and much more for developed nations. There exists a real likelihood that developing countries will have trouble meeting these standards, particularly when they are coupled with initiatives like “know your partner,” which favors large established firms in the developed world. Taken as a whole, security initiatives are starting to shunt many developing countries into the “slow lane” for future trade growth. Millions of persons who could have raised themselves out of poverty on the back of increasing international trade are being denied the chance by the cost of defending against future terrorist threats.

Economists’ estimates on the overall increase of trading costs resulting from anti-terror policies vary, but the consensus hovers at about a 2.5 percent increase since 9/11. An amount that effectively wipes out all of the gains made in the Uruguay Round of trade talks, which were hailed as a boon to the world’s poor. Furthermore, the World Bank estimates that each one percent rise in the cost of trade leads to a global trade reduction of 3 percent, or $300 billion. Though world trade is still increasing, these estimates indicate that it would have been close to a trillion dollars higher today if 9/11 had never happened. This loss of trading opportunities not only slows economic growth and costs jobs, it also has a strong negative affect on both inflation and knowledge
transfer. In the United States, where international trade accounts for 10 percent of our gross domestic product (GDP) and 15 percent of our annual growth, anything that stalls trade growth immediately translates into lost jobs and a slowing economy.

Developed nations are better able to bear these costs, but even for them the economic effects of fighting terrorism are more insidious than most people understand. Numerous media stories about how the US shook off the economic effects of 9/11, or how muted the market response was to the Madrid and London attacks, overlook how terrorism slowly undermines the long-term health of even the richest nation. For instance, American workers are paid substantially higher wages than workers in the developing world because on average their productivity is about eighty times greater. Anything that reduces the productivity of American workers will, according to the iron laws of economics, lower their pay and erode living standards. So, a multi-hour transport delay at the Mexican or Canadian border, or a ship that waits days to clear port security, equates to considerably more than a minor hindrance. Each delay plays havoc with the just-in-time delivery systems of our most competitive industries, thereby forcing firms to endure costly production line stops, or undertake the expense of holding large inventories on order to compensate for disrupted deliveries.

Everyday over a half million vehicles and $1.5 billion in goods crosses the Canadian border. After 9/11 delays were so bad that several auto factories had to completely shutdown. Things have since improved, but disruptions still occur on a regular basis and each incident reduces the productivity of the American worker just a little more, until the cumulative total becomes quite substantial. Adding injury to injury, the average American worker suffers further when firms push these additional costs on to consumers. In a vicious cycle, defending against terrorism is thereby contributing to lowering the wages of the American worker, while at the same time increasing the cost of the products he buys. Proof that the war on terrorism is already having this effect can be found in the just released Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances. In the three years following 9/11, the median income of US households fell by over two percent after growing by more than ten percent in the two four year periods prior. Furthermore, the study found that the growth in average household wealth had slowed by three-quarters since 9/11.

The damage does not end there. Trans-regional terrorism is hurting America and other Western nations in a number of other ways that are barely accounted for in most terrorism related economic analyses. The most obvious is the so-called “terror premium” that is paid on each barrel of oil. With oil supplies tight, any disruption will cause an immediate and severe price hike. This risk comes in many forms, such as natural disasters that take production capacity off line, or political events that reduce supplies from a major producer. However, the threat of terrorism also weighs heavily on trader’s minds. While there is no precise way to measure the size of this premium, experts place it anywhere between five dollars and twenty dollars a barrel. If we apply only the lower range of the estimates ($5) that extra cost still equates to a loss of close to a half a percent of potential GDP growth annually – in addition to increased inflationary pressure.

When the effects of lost FDI flows—increased trading costs, decreased productivity growth, and the terror premium—are added together, it is clear that the United States is already giving up about one percent of its annual future GDP growth for the foreseeable future. Keep in mind that there is only a one percent difference over the past two hundred years between the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa. Clearly then, burdening future generations with an unfinished war on terror will significantly degrade their potential quality of life. However, since most people and policy makers are concerned primarily with their own generation and time, it is important to understand the more immediate effects that a one percent loss of potential growth has. Over the course of a decade, the United States would forgo close to three trillion dollars in economic growth (about the size of the entire German economy) and the average worker would lose out on close to $15,000 in pay. Moreover, the federal government will give up close to a trillion dollars in additional tax revenue that could have gone a long way towards paying for the social benefits the baby-boom generation will be expecting over this period. Even in Washington a trillion dollars is a lot of money.

Unfortunately, the cost of terrorism does not end there. Rough calculations indicate that even a one percent rise in security spending by the US Government and private industry will subtract another half a percent growth every five years. Though this spending does have some positive economic effects it tends to divert funds that would be better employed in private sector capital formation.
The threat of trans-regional terrorism also has prolonged effects on a number of critical industries. For instance, tourism suffered a marked drop-off after 9/11 from which it has only barely recovered. In countries where the threat of daily terror is high, tourism has almost collapsed. Estimates vary, but between them Israel, Spain, and Egypt forfeit over three million visitors a year because of the ongoing terrorist threat in those countries. Besides the direct costs borne by the travel industry as a whole, there is also a massive trickle down effect on other industries, such as aircraft manufacturing.

Even more crucial is the threat terrorism presents to the global financial system. Because stock markets rapidly rebounded after every major terrorism attack many have been lulled into a false sense of security. As a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) spokesman said after 9/11, “The markets did what they do best; they assessed, and responded to the crisis rationally. Unlike human beings, capital markets are capable of absorbing great shocks quickly.” The speaker seems blissfully unaware of how close we came to financial meltdown that day. What saved us was not the market, but the government’s rapid response to the crisis. The Federal Reserve pumped a $100 billion dollars of new liquidity and guaranteed all interbank payments, while at the same time the Executive Branch and Congress opened the fiscal taps wide. Happily, the Federal Reserve was able to coordinate a similar response among the rest of the G-8 nations, thereby halting a threatened global financial panic. Without this massive intervention it was very likely that the markets would have imploded. But costly government intervention did not end there. Besides keeping the market afloat, it also took a huge government financial injection to ensure the survival of critical industries directly or indirectly affected by the 9/11 strikes – insurance and airlines.

This time the United States and the world got lucky. No one knows for sure if the system could withstand a similar magnitude shock more directly focused on the financial system. While this system has proven resilient enough to weather some mighty blows, there is a tipping point where just one more incident will bring the entire edifice crashing down. The threat of this total systemic failure is what keeps central bankers awake at night. So to insure against this possibility regulators are forcing the financial industry to undertake substantial and expensive actions to mitigate their operational risk to a terrorist attack. Most major banks have been encouraged or forced to duplicate expensive backroom operations offices in Delaware, Florida, or Texas. Moreover they are being required to cumulatively spend billions on redundant systems and networks.

The biggest loss to the economy is the billions of dollars that federal and international regulatory bodies are forcing banks to hold in reserve to mitigate operational risk. While the final rules are still being negotiated in Basle, it is apparent that regulators, with an eye towards terrorism, want banks to put aside a large amount of their capital against this risk. Every dollar of capital a bank is forced to set aside because of terrorist threats is one less that is available for loans that lubricate and grow the economy. In fact, the Federal Reserve has long used bank reserves as one of its primary tools to regulate the speed of economic growth. Because of the way money is created in our system the size of the reserve requirement imposed on banks has almost geometric effect on money supply growth. When banks are forced to hold more reserves, growth slows dramatically; less, and growth skyrockets. The longer banks are forced to put aside extra capital because of the risk of terrorism the greater the drag on future economic growth.

**Future Policy**

When the President or Secretary of Defense talks about a “long war” against terrorism, it is doubtful that they are aware of the full cost of a multi-generational conflict. If this war continues and terrorism remains a major threat for two generations, then the United States will forfeit over half of its potential growth over that period. Specifically, whatever point we would have arrived at by 2050 will now be pushed well into the next century. Of course, America will adapt to these circumstances and most of the economic erosion will be invisible to the average American. What will be noticeable, however, will be America’s continuing loss of competitiveness relative to nations that do not undertake the same long-term economic burdens. What will also slip below the radar screen, as it so often does, is the needless poverty and premature deaths of millions, possibly billions, of people in the developing world who will be denied opportunities due to slowing global economic growth.

After examining the deleterious effects of a prolonged struggle, it becomes easier to make the case that the
most economically efficient and most humane way to fight the war on terror is to spend whatever is necessary now and apply all of the resources required to make this as short a fight as possible. This will, of course, be costly in the short-term, but the dividends the United States and the world will reap over the years will more than make up for it. This is not necessarily a call for increased military spending, since it can be justifiably claimed that $400 billion is an adequate level of funding for the task at hand. Rather, it is a call to adequately fund a number of initiatives from better and more robust strategic communications to rebuilding our alliance structures. There is much that can be done to move the Arab world in a different direction, but only if we make a concerted effort to do it immediately.

Continuing to accept the long-war scenario is probably the worst of all choices. The Cold War was of course the most recent such conflict and no one doubts that it had a huge negative effect on both sides. While the Soviet Union may have been the first to collapse from economic exhaustion, many commentators of the period saw it as a near run thing for a long while. And though the West may have won that long struggle, it is interesting and sad to contemplate how much economic growth was forfeited, and how much extra suffering was endured because funds were shifted to less productive military efforts and away from investments that would have grown the American and global economy. In the case of the Cold War this may have been a necessary trade-off, since there was no other practical way to defeat Soviet Communism short of a devastating nuclear war.

This, however, is not true of the Global War on Terror. While the cost of winning will be high it is doable without the risk of a major global conventional war or nuclear war – at present anyway. This is not an argument of “guns or butter.” Rather, unless billions are spent on the concentrated use of all elements of national power now, we will be willfully giving up trillions of dollars worth of “butter” in the future. Moreover, a long war scenario makes it almost inevitable that sooner or later our enemies will one day acquire a weapon of mass destruction. When a couple of million people are instantly incinerated in a major American city a decade or two from now, everyone will look up from the ruins and suddenly realize that fighting a long war was a very dumb thing to do. In the end, the most humane way to fight the war on terror is to do what is required to bring the conflict and all associated suffering to a rapid conclusion. This will often require forceful and decisive military action. But, it will also mean the employment of all of our will and national assets towards rapidly reversing the ongoing collapse of Arab civilization. Achieving this will be expensive but, in the medium to long-term, it is the only course that makes economic and moral sense.

In the time it took you to read this article between 10 and 20 children died from circumstances directly linked to the effects of terrorism. Fighting a long war when we have the resources and capability to make a winning all-out effort is both morally wrong and economically stupid.

Endnotes:

2 The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, Jeffrey Sachs, Penguin Press, New York, 2005
3 Terrorism and the World Economy, Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal, October 2005

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Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship

Montgomery McFate, J.D., Ph.D.

Something mysterious is going on inside the US Department of Defense (DOD). Over the past two years, senior leaders have been calling for something unusual and unexpected—cultural knowledge of the adversary. In July 2004, retired Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., wrote an article for the Naval War College’s Proceedings magazine that opposed the commonly held view within the US military that success in war is best achieved by overwhelming technological advantage. Scales argues that the type of conflict we are now witnessing in Iraq requires “an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation.”

In October 2004, Arthur Cebrowski, Director of the Office of Force Transformation, concluded that “knowledge of one’s enemy and his culture and society may be more important than knowledge of his order of battle.” In November 2004, the Office of Naval Research and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sponsored the Adversary Cultural Knowledge and National Security Conference, the first major DOD conference on the social sciences since 1962.

Why has cultural knowledge suddenly become such an imperative? Primarily because traditional methods of warfighting have proven inadequate in Iraq and Afghanistan. US technology, training, and doctrine designed to counter the Soviet threat are not designed for low-intensity counterinsurgency operations where civilians mingle freely with combatants in complex urban terrain.

The major combat operations that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime were relatively simple because they required the US military to do what it does best—conduct maneuver warfare in flat terrain using overwhelming firepower with air support. However, since the end of the “hot” phase of the war, coalition forces have been fighting a complex war against an enemy they do not understand. The insurgents’ organizational structure is not military, but tribal. Their tactics are not conventional, but asymmetrical. Their weapons are not tanks and fighter planes, but improvised explosive devices (IED). They do not abide by the Geneva Conventions, nor do they appear to have any informal rules of engagement.

Countering the insurgency in Iraq requires cultural and social knowledge of the adversary. Yet, none of the elements of US national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, or economic—explicitly take adversary culture into account in the formation or execution of policy. This cultural knowledge gap has a simple cause—the almost total absence of anthropology within the national-security establishment.

Once called “the handmaiden of colonialism,” anthropology has had a long, fruitful relationship with various elements of national power, which ended suddenly following the Vietnam War. The strange story of anthropology’s birth as a warfighting discipline, and its sudden plunge into the abyss of postmodernism, is intertwined with the US failure in Vietnam. The curious and conspicuous lack of anthropology in the national-security arena since the Vietnam War has had grave consequences for countering the insurgency in Iraq, particularly because political policy and military operations based on partial and incomplete cultural knowledge are often worse than none at all.

A civil affairs officer speaks with Iraqi tribal leaders at the Civil-Military Coordination Center in Baghdad, 12 May 2003.
A Lack of Cultural Awareness

In a conflict between symmetric adversaries, where both are evenly matched and using similar technology, understanding the adversary’s culture is largely irrelevant. The Cold War, for all its complexity, pitted two powers of European heritage against each other. In a counterinsurgency operation against a non-Western adversary, however, culture matters. US Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) (interim) 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations, defines insurgency as an “organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in an insurgency [emphasis added].” Political considerations must therefore circumscribe military action as a fundamental matter of strategy. As British Field Marshall Gerald Templar explained in 1953, “The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but rests in the hearts and minds of the . . . people.” Winning hearts and minds requires understanding the local culture.

Aside from Special Forces, most US soldiers are not trained to understand or operate in foreign cultures and societies. One US Army captain in Iraq said, “I was never given classes on how to sit down with a sheik. . . . He is giving me the traditional dishdasha and the entire outfit of a sheik because he claims that I am a new sheik in town so I must be dressed as one. I don’t know if he is trying to gain favor with me because he wants something [or if it is] something good or something bad.” In fact, as soon as coalition forces toppled Saddam Hussein, they became de facto players in the Iraqi social system. The young captain had indeed become the new sheik in town and was being properly honored by his Iraqi host.

As this example indicates, US forces frequently do not know who their friends are, and just as often they do not know who their enemies are. A returning commander from the 3d Infantry Division observed: “I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness. I knew where every enemy tank was dug in on the outskirts of Tallil. Only problem was, my soldiers had to fight fanatics charging on foot or in pickups and firing AK-47s and RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades]. Great technical intelligence. Wrong enemy.”

While the consequences of a lack of cultural knowledge might be most apparent (or perhaps most deadly) in a counterinsurgency, a failure to understand foreign cultures has been a major contributing factor in multiple national-security and intelligence failures. In her 1962 study, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, Roberta Wohlstetter demonstrated that although the US Government picked up Japanese signals (including conversations, decoded cables, and ship movements), it failed to distinguish signals from noise—to understand which signals were meaningful—because it was unimaginable that the Japanese might do something as “irrational” as attacking the headquarters of the US Pacific fleet.

Such ethnocentrism (the inability to put aside one’s own cultural attitudes and imagine the world from the
perspective of a different group) is especially dangerous in a national-security context because it can distort strategic thinking and result in assumptions that the adversary will behave exactly as one might behave. India’s nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 came as a complete surprise because of this type of “mirror-imaging” among CIA analysts. According to the internal investigation conducted by former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David Jeremiah, the real problem was an assumption by intelligence analysts and policymakers that the Indians would not test their nuclear weapons because Americans would not test nuclear weapons in similar circumstances. According to Jeremiah, “The intelligence and the policy communities had an underlying mind-set going into these tests that the B.J.P. [Bharatiya Janata Party] would behave as we [would] behave.”

The United States suffers from a lack of cultural knowledge in its national-security establishment for two primary, interrelated reasons. First, anthropology is largely and conspicuously absent as a discipline within our national-security enterprise, especially within the intelligence community and DOD. Anthropology is a social science discipline whose primary object of study has traditionally been non-Western, tribal societies. The methodologies of anthropology include participant observation, fieldwork, and historical research. One of the central epistemological tenets of anthropology is cultural relativism—understanding other societies from within their own framework.

The primary task of anthropology has historically been translating knowledge gained in the “field” back to the West. While it might seem self-evident that such a perspective would be beneficial to the national-security establishment, only one of the national defense universities (which provide master’s degree level education to military personnel) currently has an anthropologist on its faculty. At West Point, which traditionally places a heavy emphasis on engineering, anthropology is disparagingly referred to by cadets as “nuts and huts.” And, although political science is well represented as a discipline in senior policymaking circles, there has never been an anthropologist on the National Security Council.

The second and related reason for the current lack of cultural knowledge is the failure of the US military to achieve anything resembling victory in Vietnam. Following the Vietnam War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff collectively put their heads in the sand and determined they would never fight an unconventional war again. From a purely military perspective, it was easier for them to focus on the threat of Soviet tanks rolling through the Fulda Gap, prompting a major European land war—a war they could easily fight using existing doctrine and technology and that would have a clear, unequivocal winner.

The preference for the use of overwhelming force and clear campaign objectives was formalized in what has become known as the Weinberger doctrine. In a 1984 speech, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger articulated six principles designed to ensure the Nation would never become involved in another Vietnam. By the mid-1980s, there was cause for concern: deployment of troops to El Salvador seemed likely and the involvement in Lebanon had proved disastrous following the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut. Responding to these events, Weinberger believed troops should be committed only if US national interests were at stake; only in support of clearly defined political and military objectives; and only “with the clear intention of winning.”

In 1994, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell (formerly a military assistant to Weinberger) rearticulated the Weinberger doctrine’s fundamental elements, placing a strong emphasis on the idea that force, when used, should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy. The Powell-Weinberger doctrine institutionalized a preference for “major combat operations”—big wars—as a matter of national preference. Although the Powell-Weinberger doctrine was eroded during the Clinton years; during operations other than war in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia; and during the second Bush Administration’s pre-emptive strikes in Afghanistan and Iraq, no alternative doctrine has emerged to take its place.

We have no doctrine for “nation building,” which the military eschews as a responsibility because it is not covered by Title 10 of the US Code, which outlines the responsibilities of the military as an element of national power. Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, was not finalized until February 2003, despite the fact the US military was already deeply engaged in such operations in Iraq. Field Manual 3-07.22—meant to be a temporary document—is still primarily geared toward fighting an enemy engaged in Maoist revolutionary warfare, a type of insurgency that
has little application to the situation in Iraq where multiple organizations are competing for multiple, confusing objectives.\textsuperscript{11}

Since 1923, the core tenet of US warfighting strategy has been that overwhelming force deployed against an equally powerful state will result in military victory. Yet in a counterinsurgency situation such as the one the United States currently faces in Iraq, “winning” through overwhelming force is often inapplicable as a concept, if not problematic as a goal. While negotiating in Hanoi a few days before Saigon fell, US Army Colonel Harry Summers, Jr., said to a North Vietnamese colonel, “You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield.” The Vietnamese colonel replied, “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.”\textsuperscript{12} The same could be said of the conflict in Iraq.

Winning on the battlefield is irrelevant against an insurgent adversary because the struggle for power and legitimacy among competing factions has no purely military solution. Often, the application of overwhelming force has the negative, unintended effect of strengthening the insurgency by creating martyrs, increasing recruitment, and demonstrating the “brutality” of state forces.

The alternative approach to fighting insurgency, such as the British eventually adopted through trial and error in Northern Ireland, involves the following: A comprehensive plan to alleviate the political conditions behind the insurgency; civil-military cooperation; the application of minimum force; deep intelligence; and an acceptance of the protracted nature of the conflict. Deep cultural knowledge of the adversary is inherent to the British approach.\textsuperscript{13}

Although cultural knowledge of the adversary matters in counterinsurgency, it has little importance in major combat operations. Because the Powell-Weinberger doctrine meant conventional, large scale war was the only acceptable type of conflict, no discernable present or future need existed to develop doctrine and expertise in unconventional war, including counterinsurgency. Thus, there was no need to incorporate cultural knowledge into doctrine, training, or warfighting. Until now, that is.

On 21 October 2003, the House Armed Services Committee held a hearing to examine lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. Scales’ testimony at the hearing prompted US Representative “Ike” Skelton to write a letter to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in which he said: “In simple terms, if we had better understood the Iraqi culture and mindset, our war plans would have been even better than they were, the plan for the postwar period and all of its challenges would have been far better, and we [would have been] better prepared for the ‘long slog’ . . . to win the peace in Iraq.”\textsuperscript{14}

Even such DOD luminaries as Andrew Marshall, the mysterious director of the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, are now calling for “anthropology level knowledge of a wide range of cultures” because such knowledge will prove essential to conducting future operations. Although senior US Government officials such as Skelton are calling for “personnel in our civilian ranks who have cultural knowledge and understanding to inform the policy process,” there are few anthropologists either available or willing to play in the same sandbox with the military.\textsuperscript{15}

The Current State of the Discipline

Although anthropology is the only academic discipline that explicitly seeks to understand foreign cultures and societies, it is a marginal contributor to US national-security policy at best and a punch line at worst. Over the past 30 years, as a result of anthropologists’ individual career choices and the tendency toward reflexive self-criticism contained within the discipline itself, the discipline has become hermetically sealed within its Ivory Tower.

Unlike political science or economics, anthropology is primarily an academic discipline. The majority of newly minted anthropologists brutally compete for a limited number of underpaid university faculty appointments, and although there is an increasing demand from industry for applied anthropologists to advise on product design, marketing, and organizational culture, anthropologists still prefer to study the “exotic and useless,” in the words of A.L. Kroeber.\textsuperscript{16}

The retreat to the Ivory Tower is also a product of the deep isolationist tendencies within the discipline. Following the Vietnam War, it was fashionable among anthropologists to reject the discipline’s historic ties to colonialism. Anthropologists began to reinvent their discipline, as demonstrated by Kathleen Gough’s 1968 article, *Anthropology: Child of Imperialism*, followed by Dell Hymes’ 1972 anthology, *Reinventing
Anthropology, and culminating in editor Talal Asad’s *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*.\(^\text{17}\)

Rejecting anthropology’s status as the handmaiden of colonialism, anthropologists refused to “collaborate” with the powerful, instead vying to represent the interests of indigenous peoples engaged in neocolonial struggles. In the words of Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak, anthropologists would now speak for the “subaltern.” Thus began a systematic interrogation of the contemporary state of the discipline as well as of the colonial circumstances from which it emerged. Armed with critical hermeneutics, frequently backed up by self-reflexive neo-Marxism, anthropology began a brutal process of self-flagellation, to a degree almost unimaginable to anyone outside the discipline.\(^\text{18}\)

The turn toward postmodernism within anthropology exacerbated the tendency toward self-flagellation, with the central goal being “the deconstruction of the centralized, logocentric master narratives of European culture.” This movement away from descriptive ethnography has produced some of the worst writing imaginable. For example, *Cultural Anthropology*, one of the most respected anthropology journals in the United States, commonly publishes such incomprehensible articles as “Recovering True Selves in the Electro-Spiritual Field of Universal Love” and “Material Consumers, Fabricating Subjects: Perplexity, Global Connectivity Discourses, and Transnational Feminist Research.”\(^\text{19}\)

Anthropologist Stephen Tyler recently took fourth place in the Bad Writing Contest with this selection from *Writing Culture*, a remarkable passage describing postmodern ethnography: “It thus relativizes discourse not just to form—that familiar perversion of the modernist; nor to authorial intention—that conceit of the romantics; nor to a foundational world beyond discourse—that desperate grasping for a separate reality of the mystic and scientist alike; nor even to history and ideology—those refuges of the hermeneuticist; nor even less to language—that hypostasized abstraction of the linguist; nor, ultimately, even to discourse—that Nietzschean playground of world-lost signifiers of the structuralist and grammatologist, but to all or none of these, for it is anarchic, though not for the sake of anarchy, but because it refuses to become a fetishized object among objects—to be dismantled, compared, classified, and neutered in that parody of scientific scrutiny known as criticism.”\(^\text{20}\)

**The Colonial Era**

From the foregoing discussion, it might be tempting to conclude that anthropology is absent from the policy arena because it really is “exotic and useless.” However, this was not always the case. Anthropology actually evolved as an intellectual tool to consolidate imperial power at the margins of empire. In Britain the development and growth of anthropology was deeply connected to colonial administration.

As early as 1908, anthropologists began training administrators of the Sudanese civil service. This relationship was quickly institutionalized: in 1921, the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures was established with financing from various colonial governments, and Lord Lugard, the former governor of Nigeria, became head of its executive council. The organization’s mission was based on Bronislaw Malinowski’s article, “Practical Anthropology,” which argued that anthropological knowledge should be applied to solve the problems faced by colonial administrators, including those posed by “savage law, economics, customs, and institutions.”\(^\text{21}\) Anthropological knowledge was frequently useful, especially in understanding the power dynamics in traditional societies. In 1937, for example, the Royal Anthropological Institute’s Standing Committee on Applied Anthropology noted that anthropological research would “indicate the persons who hold key positions in the community and whose influence it would be important to enlist on the side of projected reforms.” In the words of Lord Hailey, anthropologists were indeed “of great assistance in providing Government with knowledge which must be the basis of administrative policy.”\(^\text{22}\)

Anthropology as a tool of empire was, however, not without its detractors. In 1951, Sir Philip E. Mitchell wrote: “Anthropologists busied themselves [with] all the minutiae of obscure trial and personal practices, especially if they were agreeably associated with sex or flavoured with obscenity. There resulted a large number of painstaking and often accurate records of interesting habits and practices, of such length that no one had time to read them and [which were] often, in any case, irrelevant. . . .”\(^\text{23}\)

**The World War I Era**

After the classic age of empire came to a close, anthropologists and archeologists became key players
in the new game in town—espionage. Their habits of wandering in remote areas and skill at observation proved to be quite useful to the government. Although a number of anthropologists worked as spies during World War I (including Arthur Carpenter, Thomas Gann, John Held, Samuel Lothrop, and Herbert Spinden), the most famous was Harvard-trained archaeologist Sylvanus Morley, who had discovered the ancient city of Naachtun and had directed the reconstruction of Chichén Itzá while serving as head of the Carnegie Archaeological Program from 1914 to 1929. Morley, who was one of the most respected archeologists of the early 20th century, was also the “best secret agent the United States produced during World War I.”

In 1916, when German agents were allegedly attempting to establish a Central American base for submarine warfare, the Office of Naval Intelligence recruited Morley, who used archeological fieldwork as cover to traverse 2,000 miles of remote Central American coastline, enduring “ticks, mosquitoes, fleas, sand flies, saddle-sores, seasickness, bar-running, indifferent grub, and sometimes no grub at all, rock-hard beds, infamous hostelries, and even earthquakes.” While Morley and company found no German submarine bases, he did produce nearly 10,000 pages of intelligence reports documenting everything from navigable shoreline features to the economic impact of sisal production.

Morley’s activities were not well regarded by many anthropologists. On 20 December 1919, Franz Boas, the most well-known anthropologist in America, published a letter in The Nation, to the effect that Morley and others (although they were not named directly) “have prostituted science by using it as a cover for their activities as spies. A soldier whose business is murder as a fine art . . . accept[s] the code of morality to which modern society still conforms. Not so the scientist. The very essence of his life is the service of truth.”

A German Jew by birth, Boas was an adamant pacifist and an outspoken critic of the war, writing multiple editorials and newspaper articles expressing his opinion that World War I was a war of imperialist aggression. (Ironically, many of Boas’ students, including Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict went on to work for the military in roles Boas would have, no doubt, questioned.)

For his public allegations against the unnamed anthropologists, the American Anthropological Association censured Boas in 1919. The criticism of Morley by his peers for his espionage activities and the resulting scuffle within the American Anthropological Association (AAA) foreshadowed the reemergence of the issue of covert anthropological support to the US Government during the 1960s.

The World War II Era

During World War II, the role of anthropologists within the national-security arena was greatly expanded. Many anthropologists served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the institutional predecessor to both the CIA and Special Forces. Anthropologists served in a research capacity and as operatives. Carleton Coon, a professor of anthropology at Harvard, trained Moroccan resistance groups in sabotage, fought in the battle of Kasserine Pass, and smuggled arms to French resistance groups in German-occupied Morocco. His book about life in the OSS, A North Africa Story: The Anthropologist as OSS Agent, contains a highly amusing account of developing an IED in the shape of a donkey dropping.

Other anthropologists also saw direct action: British ethnologist Tom Harrisson parachuted into Borneo to train indigenous guerrillas to fight the Japanese. Cora
Du Bois, who served as Chief of the Indonesia section in the OSS Research and Analysis Branch, became the head of the Southeast Asia Command in Ceylon, where she ran resistance movements in Southeast Asian countries under Japanese occupation. Du Bois received the Exceptional Civilian Service Award in 1945 for her work with the Free Thai underground movement.

Perhaps the most famous anthropologist who served in the OSS was Gregory Bateson. Bateson, a British citizen, spent many years conducting ethnographic research in New Guinea, the results of which were published in 1936 as *Naven*. At the beginning of World War II, having failed to find a position with the British War Office, Bateson returned to the United States and was recruited by the OSS, where he served as a civilian member of a forward intelligence unit in the Arakan Mountains of Burma.

In addition to intelligence analysis, Bateson designed and produced “black propaganda” radio broadcasts intended to undermine Japanese propaganda in the Pacific Theater. He found the work distasteful, however, because he believed that truth, especially the unpleasant truth, was healthy. Despite his misgivings about deceitful propaganda, Bateson was a willing and competent operative. In 1945, he volunteered to penetrate deep into enemy territory to attempt the rescue of three OSS agents who had escaped from their Japanese captors. For this service, Bateson was awarded the Pacific Campaign Service Ribbon.

Bateson had remarkable strategic foresight concerning the effect of new technology on warfare. While in the Pacific Theater, he wrote to the legendary director of the OSS, “Wild Bill” Donovan, that the existence of the nuclear bomb would change the nature of conflict, forcing nations to engage in indirect methods of warfare. Bateson recommended to Donovan that the United States not rely on conventional forces for defense but to establish a third agency to employ clandestine operations, economic controls, and psychological pressures in the new warfare. This organization is, of course, now known as the Central Intelligence Agency.

Later in his career, Bateson was allegedly involved with a number of experimental psychological warfare initiatives, including the CIA’s Operation MK-Ultra, which conducted mind-control research. It is generally accepted that Bateson “turned on” the Beat poet Allen Ginsberg to LSD at the Mental Research Institute, where Bateson was working on the causes of schizophrenia.

Among anthropologists, Bateson is generally remembered not for his activities in the OSS, but as Mead’s husband. In 1932, he met Mead in the remote Sepik River area of New Guinea. After conducting fieldwork together in New Guinea, Bateson and Mead coproduced ethnographic films and photodocumentation of Balinese kinesics.

Like her husband, Mead was also involved in the war effort. In addition to producing pamphlets for the Office of War Information, she produced a study for the National Research Council on the cultural food habits of people from different national backgrounds in the United States. She also investigated food distribution as a method of maintaining morale during wartime in the United States. Along with Bateson and Geoffrey
Gorer, Mead helped the OSS establish a psychological warfare training unit for the Far East.34

Like Bateson, Mead had reservations about the use of deceitful propaganda, believing that such methods have “terrible possibilities of backfiring.” Mead’s larger concern, however, was the “tremendous amount of resentment” against using anthropological insights during the war. In particular, she noted that using anthropologists to advise advisers is ineffective; to be useful, anthropologists must work directly with policymakers.35

In 1942, Mead published *And Keep Your Powder Dry*, a book on US military culture. According to Mead, Americans see aggression as a response rather than a primary behavior; believe in the use of violence for altruistic, never for selfish purposes; and view organized conflict as a finite task to be completed. Once finished, Americans walk away and move on to the next task. William O. Beeman points out that Mead’s observations of US national strategic character seem to be borne out by the current administration’s characterization of the conflict in Iraq as a defensive war, prompted by the imminent threat of weapons of mass destruction ready for imminent use and undertaken for altruistic reasons, such as “bringing Democracy to Iraq,” that would be short and limited in scope.36

In 1943, Benedict, Mead’s long-time friend and collaborator, became the head (and initially the sole member) of the Basic Analysis Section of the Bureau of Overseas Intelligence of the Office of War Information (OWI), a position Benedict sought to use “to get policy makers to take into account different habits and customs of other parts of the world.” While at OWI, Benedict coauthored *The Races of Mankind*, a government pamphlet which refuted the Nazi pseudo-theories of Aryan racial superiority. Conservative congressmen attacked the pamphlet as communist propaganda, and the publicity surrounding it led to the sale of 750,000 copies, its translation into seven languages, and the production of a musical version in New York City.37

Benedict also undertook research on Japanese personality and culture, the effect of which cannot be overstated. Near the end of the war, senior military leaders and US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt were convinced the Japanese were “culturally incapable of surrender” and would fight to the last man. Benedict and other OWI anthropologists were asked to study the view of the emperor in Japanese society. The ensuing OWI position papers convinced Roosevelt to leave the emperor out of the conditions of surrender (rather than demanding unconditional surrender as he did of dictators Adolph Hitler and Benito Mussolini).

Much of Benedict’s research for OWI was published in 1946 as *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, considered by many as a classic ethnography of Japanese military culture, despite Benedict never having visited the country.38

Since fieldwork in the traditional sense was impossible during wartime, culture had to be studied remotely. The theoretical contribution of World War II anthropologists to the discipline is commonly known as “culture at a distance.” Following the war, from 1947 to 1952, Mead, Benedict, and others established a research program at Columbia
University. Working under contract to the US Office of Naval Research, anthropologists developed techniques for evaluating cultural artifacts, such as immigrant and refugee testimonies, art, and travelers’ accounts, to build up a picture of a particular culture. 39

Most of the culture-at-a-distance studies were rooted in the premises of developmental psychology, such as that the so-called national character of any group of people could be traced to commonalities in psychological development processes. While some of their conclusions now seem ridiculous (for example, Gorer’s “swaddling hypothesis” to explain the bipolar swings in Russian culture from emotional repression to aggressive drinking), other research results were not only accurate but useful in a military context. 40

Small Wars

In January 1961, US President John F. Kennedy met with national security adviser Walt Whitman Rostow to discuss various national-security threats. Kennedy and Rostow turned their attention to the subject of Vietnam, and Kennedy said: “This is the worst one we’ve got. You know, Eisenhower never mentioned it. He talked at length about Laos, but never uttered the word Vietnam.” 41

Kennedy and Rostow’s discussion (and Kennedy’s approval of the “Counterinsurgency Plan” for Vietnam 10 days after taking office) was inspired by Major General Edward G. Lansdale’s report on the situation in Vietnam. Lansdale, who was widely believed to have been the model for Alden Pyle in Graham Greene’s The Quiet American, was a former advertising executive who almost single-handedly prevented a communist takeover of the Philippines. Lansdale helped install Ngo Dinh Diem as president of the American-backed government of South Vietnam and, later, ran Operation Mongoose, the covert plot to overthrow by any means necessary Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba. 42

Much of Lansdale’s counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines can best be described as applied military anthropology. For example, in the 1950s, as part of his counterinsurgency campaign against the Huk rebels of the Philippines, he conducted research into local superstitions, which he exploited in “psywar”: “One psywar operation played upon the popular dread of an asuang, or vampire. . . . When a Huk patrol came along the trail, the ambushed silently snatched the last man of the patrol. . . . They punctured his neck with two holes, vampire-fashion, held the body up by the heels, drained it of blood, and put the corpse back on the trail. When the Huks returned to look for the missing man and found their bloodless comrade, every member of the patrol believed that the asuang had got him and that one of them would be next. . . .” Lansdale noted that such tactics were remarkably effective. 43

During the Huk Rebellion, the real guerrilla-warfare expert was Captain Charles Bohannan, who later coauthored one of the best studies of practical counterinsurgency, Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience. Bohannan, who fought as an anti-Japanese guerrilla in New Guinea and the Philippines during World War II, remained in the Philippines as an Army counterintelligence officer. He was a natural pick for the team when Lansdale returned to the Philippines in 1950. Bohannan continued to work with Lansdale in Vietnam (and apparently Laos) throughout the 1950s and 1960s, serving as deputy commander of the covert “Saigon Military Mission” that Lansdale headed. Quite likely, Bohannan was also the military planner for the Bay of Pigs. 44
Bohannan had completed advanced graduate work in anthropology and was a strong advocate of local cultural knowledge and “total immersion” during training and operations. He was particularly interested in “operations intended to influence the thinking of people.” In 1959, for example, he was a member of the secret US “survey team” sent to Colombia to evaluate the insurgency and provide a plan for US-Colombian action. Much like anthropologists conducting fieldwork, the team traveled more than 23,000 kilometers and interviewed more than 2,000 officials, civilians, and guerrilla leaders. Their three-volume report reviewed the history of the violence, the underlying socioeconomic conditions, and issued recommendations for social, civil, and military reform to the Colombian and US governments.

Bohannan was a believer in the use of minimum force in counterinsurgency. In an unpublished 1964 paper from a Vietnam posting, he objects to totalitarian methods of counterinsurgency as being potentially counterproductive: “Mass arrests, wholesale searches, and other seemingly easy methods of “population control” can only strengthen opposition to the government.” And, according to Lansdale, overwhelming force was simply not effective for fighting an insurgency: “Only unabashedly totalitarian governments, Communist or colonialist, with relatively unlimited resources, can seriously think of, or attempt, killing or capturing most of the insurgents and their supports.”

Bohannan’s mentor, Rufus Phillips (a former CIA operative who later headed the Rural Affairs Section of the U.S Agency for the International Development Mission in Vietnam) observed in a 1964 memorandum that the US military was bound by “conventional military thinking.” The American command was guided by neither a British-style dedication to a political objective—however abusive the measures used to achieve it—nor any particular interest in the nonmilitary side of US counterinsurgency: “Everybody talks about civic action and psychological warfare, but little command emphasis is placed on it and it is not understood. The major emphasis remains on ‘killing Viet Cong’.”

The Vietnam War

Despite the authority of men like Lansdale and Bohannan within high-level military and policy circles during the Vietnam War, the military preference for overwhelming force frequently trumped the hearts and minds aspect of counterinsurgency. Anthropologists such as Gerald Hickey, who went to Vietnam as a University of Chicago graduate student and remained throughout the war as a researcher for the RAND Corporation, found that their deep knowledge of Vietnam (valuable for counterinsurgency) was frequently ignored by US military leaders who increasingly adopted a conventional war approach as the conflict progressed. Hickey’s career raises a number of issues that even now plague anthropological research in a military context, such as the politics of research inside the beltway, the inability to change counterproductive policies, and backbiting by other anthropologists hostile to the military enterprise.

Hickey, who wrote Village in Vietnam, a classic ethnography of a southern Vietnamese lowland village, was recruited by RAND in 1961 to produce a study funded by DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency]. The study followed the newly established Strategic Hamlet Program that sought to consolidate governmental authority in pacified areas through a defense system and administrative reorganization at the village level. Central to the study was the question of how highland tribes could be encouraged to support the South Vietnamese Government.

Hickey’s research indicated that the strategic hamlets might be successful if farmers saw evidence their communal labor and contribution of time, land, and building materials actually resulted in physical and economic security. Although Hickey’s observations were probably correct, his views were often dismissed as too pacifistic. When Hickey debriefed Marine General Victor Krulak, the general pounded his fist on his desk and said, “We are going to make the peasants do what’s necessary for strategic hamlets to succeed!” As Hickey noted, peasants have many methods of passive and active resistance, and force is often counterproductive as a motivator. Disliking the results of the study, the Pentagon pressured RAND to change the findings and, in the interest of impartial research, RAND refused. In the end, none of Hickey’s findings were implemented, and the Strategic Hamlet Program was a failure.

In 1964, a major uprising of Montagnard highland tribal groups occurred under the banner of FULRO (The
United Front for the Struggle of Oppressed Races). Although the Montagnards sided with the United States against the communist north and were supplied by (and fought alongside) US troops, they violently opposed the South Vietnamese Government’s efforts to control their region and assimilate the population.

Dealing with the revolt was a major imperative for the military and the South Vietnamese Government because the central highlands were of strategic importance and included the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which was the main North Vietnamese infiltration and supply route. Hickey, who had worked closely with the Montagnards for years, advised the senior commander of US forces in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, on the reasons for the rise of ethno-nationalism among the tribes and how to cope with the revolt. Hickey also successfully acted as an intermediary between highland leaders and the US and South Vietnamese governments.51

As the war dragged on, Hickey became increasingly frustrated with the military-strategy viewpoint held by officers such as US Army General William E. Depuy, who believed a war of attrition would defeat the communists. Hickey’s view was that the war in Vietnam was a political struggle that could only be resolved in political terms, not through pure military force. As an anthropologist, he recognized that elements of Vietnam’s own culture could be used to promote peace between the existing nationalist political parties, religious groups, and minorities—none of whom welcomed communist rule.

In a remarkable paper titled “Accommodation in South Vietnam: the Key to Sociopolitical Solidarity,” Hickey explored the indigenous Vietnamese cultural concept of accommodation. While Taoist roots of the Vietnamese value system stressed individualism, in the Vietnamese worldview, accommodation was also necessary to restore harmony with the universe. In Washington, D.C., Hickey’s views on accommodation were treated as heresy. In 1967, at the conclusion of Hickey’s brief to a Pentagon audience, Richard Holbrooke said, “What you’re saying, Gerry, is that we’re not going to win a military victory in Vietnam.” Because it did not conform to the prevailing view of the conflict, Hickey’s message was promptly dismissed. Regardless of the improbability of a military victory, to US leaders, “accommodation” meant “giving in,” and that was not an acceptable alternative. In the end, the American solution to the conflict was the use of overwhelming force in the form of strategic bombing and the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, neither of which resulted in victory.52

For his “ethnographic studies,” “contributions to the enhancement of US Advisor/Vietnamese Counterpart relationship,” and “presence and counsel during periods of attack by Viet Cong Forces and Montagnard uprisings,” Hickey was awarded the medal for Distinguished Public Service by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Despite his medal (or perhaps because of it), Hickey was not able to get an academic job when he returned to the United States. He was refused a position at the University of Chicago by fellow

Vietcong guerrillas in a hidden tunnel, circa 1966.
anthropologists who objected to his association with RAND. Ironically, Hickey was also forced out of RAND because it was no longer interested in counterinsurgency. Following the lead of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, RAND was no longer going to undertake research on unconventional warfare, but turned its attention to “longer-range problems of tactical, limited war and deterrence under the Nixon Doctrine.”

Project Camelot

Testifying before the US Congress in 1965, R.L. Sproul, director of DARPA said: “It is [our] primary thesis that remote area warfare is controlled in a major way by the environment in which the warfare occurs, by the sociological and anthropological characteristics of the people involved in the war, and by the nature of the conflict itself.”

The recognition within DOD that research and development efforts to support counterinsurgency operations must be oriented toward the local human terrain led to the establishment of the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) at the American University in Washington, D.C. With anthropologists and other social scientists on staff, SORO functioned as a research center into the human dimension of counterinsurgency. Many SORO reports took a unique approach. In 1964, the Army commissioned an unusual paper titled “Witchcraft, Sorcery, Magic, and Other Psychological Phenomena, and Their Implications on Military and Paramilitary Operations in the Congo.” Authored by James R. Price and Paul Jureidini, the report is a treatise on paranormal combat, discussing “counter-magic” tactics to suppress rebels who are backed by witch doctors, charms, and magic potions.

In 1964, SORO also designed the infamous Project Camelot. According to a letter from the Office of the Director of the Special Operations Research Office, Project Camelot was “a study whose objective [was] to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world.” The project’s objectives were “to devise procedures for assessing the potential for internal war within national societies; to identify with increased degrees of confidence those actions which a government might take to relieve conditions which are assessed as giving rise to a potential for internal war; [and] to assess the feasibility of prescribing the characteristics of a system for obtaining and using the essential information needed for doing the above two things.”

Project Camelot, which was initiated during a time when the military took counterinsurgency seriously as an area of competency, recognized the need for social science insights. According to the director’s letter: “Within the Army there is especially ready acceptance of the need to improve the general understanding of the processes of social change if the Army is to discharge its responsibilities in the overall counterinsurgency program of the US Government.”

Chile was to be the first case study for Project Camelot. Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung was invited to design a seminar for Project Camelot. Although he refused, he shared information about the project with colleagues. Meanwhile, Hugo Nuttini, who taught anthropology at the University of Pittsburgh, accepted an assignment for Project Camelot in Chile. While there, he concealed Camelot’s military origin, but word leaked...
out. Protests arose from Chile’s newspapers and legislature and the Chilean Government lodged a diplomatic protest with the US Ambassador. In Washington, D.C., following congressional hearings on the subject, McNamara canceled Project Camelot in 1965.

**The Thai Scandal**

Shortly after the Project Camelot scandal, the issue of clandestine research surfaced again in Thailand. In March 1970, documents that appeared to implicate social scientists in US counterinsurgency programs in Thailand were stolen from a university professor’s file cabinet. The documents were given to the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam and were subsequently published in The Student Mobilizer. A number of anthropologists and other social scientists were allegedly gathering data for DOD and the Royal Thai Government to support a counterinsurgency program that would use development aid to encourage tribal villages to remain loyal to the Thai Government rather than joining the insurgents. Although anthropologists claimed to have been using their expertise to prevent Thai villages from being harmed, heated debates took place within the AAA’s Committee on Ethics.  

As a result of Project Camelot and the Thai scandal, government funding and use of social science research became suspect. Anthropologists feared that, were such research to continue, the indigenous people they studied would assume they were all spies, closing off future field opportunities abroad. Many anthropologists also believed the information would be used to control, enslave, and even annihilate many of the communities studied. The result of these debates is the determination that for anthropologists to give secret briefings is ethically unacceptable. The AAA’s current “Statement of Professional Responsibility” says: “Anthropologists should undertake no secret research or any research whose results cannot be freely derived and publicly reported. . . . No secret research, no secret reports or debriefings of any kind should be agreed to or given.” These guidelines reflect a widespread view among anthropologists that any research undertaken for the military is de facto evil and ethically unacceptable.  

**The Perils of Incomplete Knowledge**

DOD yearns for cultural knowledge, but anthropologists en masse, bound by their own ethical code and sunk in a mire of postmodernism, are unlikely to contribute much of value to reshaping national-security policy or practice. Yet, if anthropologists remain disengaged, who will provide the relevant subject matter expertise? As Anna Simons, an anthropologist who teaches at the Naval Postgraduate School, points out: “If anthropologists want to put their heads in the sand and not assist, then who will the military, the CIA, and other agencies turn to for information? They’ll turn to people who will give them the kind of information that should make anthropologists want to rip their hair out because the information won’t be nearly as directly connected to what’s going on on the local landscape.”  

Regardless of whether anthropologists decide to enter the national-security arena, cultural information will inevitably be used as the basis of military operations and public policy. And, if anthropologists refuse to contribute, how reliable will that information be? The result of using incomplete “bad” anthropology is, invariably, failed operations and failed policy. In a May 2004 *New Yorker* article, “The Gray Zone: How a Secret Pentagon Program Came to Abu Ghraib,” Seymour Hersh notes that Raphael Patai’s 1973 study of Arab culture and psychology, *The Arab Mind*, was the basis of the military’s understanding of the psychological vulnerabilities of Arabs, particularly to sexual shame and humiliation.  

Patai says: “The segregation of the sexes, the veiling of the women . . . , and all the other minute rules that govern and restrict contact between men and women, have the effect of making sex a prime mental preoccupation in the Arab world.” Apparently, the goal of photographing the sexual humiliation was to blackmail Iraqi victims into becoming informants against the insurgency. To prevent the dissemination of photos to family and friends, it was believed Iraqi men would do almost anything.  

As Bernard Brodie said of the French Army in 1914, “This was neither the first nor the last time that bad anthropology contributed to bad strategy.” Using sexual humiliation to blackmail Iraqi men into becoming informants could never have worked as a strategy since it only destroys honor, and for Iraqis, lost honor requires its restoration through the appeasement of blood. This concept is well developed in Iraqi culture, and there is even a specific Arabic word for it: al-sharaf, upholding one’s manly honor. The alleged use of Patai’s book as the basis of the psychological torment at Abu Ghraib, devoid of any understanding of the broader context of
Iraqi culture, demonstrates the folly of using decontextualized culture as the basis of policy.\textsuperscript{63}

Successful counterinsurgency depends on attaining a holistic, total understanding of local culture. This cultural understanding must be thorough and deep if it is to have any practical benefit at all. This fact is not lost on the Army. In the language of interim FM 3-07.22: “The center of gravity in counterinsurgency operations is the population. Therefore, understanding the local society and gaining its support is critical to success. For US forces to operate effectively among a local population and gain and maintain their support, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, including its history, tribal/family/social structure, values, religions, customs, and needs.”\textsuperscript{64}

To defeat the insurgency in Iraq, US and coalition forces must recognize and exploit the underlying tribal structure of the country; the power wielded by traditional authority figures; the use of Islam as a political ideology; the competing interests of the Shia, the Sunni, and the Kurds; the psychological effects of totalitarianism; and the divide between urban and rural, among other things.

Interim FM 3-07.22 continues: “Understanding and working within the social fabric of a local area is initially the most influential factor in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Unfortunately, this is often the factor most neglected by US forces.”\textsuperscript{65}

And, unfortunately, anthropologists, whose assistance is urgently needed in time of war, entirely neglect US forces. Despite the fact that military applications of cultural knowledge might be distasteful to ethically inclined anthropologists, their assistance is necessary.

Notes:

12. The 1923 Field Service Regulations postulate that the ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces and that decisive results are obtained only by the offensive. The Regulations state that the Army must prepare to fight against an “opponent organized for war on modern principles and equipped with all the means of modern warfare . . . .” The preference for use of offensive force is found continuously in US military thought, most recently in FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), which says: “The doctrine holds warfighting as the Army’s primary focus and recognizes that the ability of Army forces to dominate land warfare also provides the ability to dominate any situation in military operations other than war”; Richard Darilek and David Johnson, “Occupation of Hostile Territory: History, Theory, Doctrine, Past and Future Practice,” conference presentation, Future Warfare Seminar V, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 18 January 2005; Peter Grier, “Should US Fight War in Bosnia? Question Opens an Old Debate,” Christian Science Monitor, 14 September 1992, 9.


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Editor’s Note:

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Joint Lessons Learned

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