In a rush to “do something” after the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the Department of Defense (DOD) created the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies—the first of what would become five regional centers and a self-described “model” for the others. Reinvented on the remains of the disbanded U.S. Army Russian Institute in the beautiful Bavarian resort of Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, the Marshall Center’s original raison d’être was to help the postcommunist states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia grapple with civil-military relations, democracy, and human rights.

The Marshall Center was initially envisioned as a single, stand-alone institution answering to the Secretary of Defense through U.S. European Command. Of the five DOD regional centers, it has several unique characteristics: it is a bilateral organization located on foreign soil, it supports three combatant commands as well as the German ministry of defense, it assumes Army Title 10 responsibilities to train foreign area officers, and it operates in parallel with adjacent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) educational institutions.

These distinguishing features, along with the geopolitical evolutions and revolutions of the past decade, have created a complex regional security landscape in the Marshall Center footprint. However, because its strategic objectives have not been rigorously evaluated over the last decade, the Center cannot clearly articulate them. It has achieved notoriety over the years and has frequently been the focus of scandal. Critics have accused it of being a waste of money, where no serious academic work occurs for either students or faculty. With its practical autonomy, minimal oversight, and the absence of functional rivals, this DOD regional center has never had its survival seriously challenged. Certainly, the Marshall Center has a broad supportive constituency—

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The George C. Marshall European Center: Proven Model or Irrelevant Prototype?
Mission Accomplished—or Avoided?

Government bureaucracies are formally charged with specific missions and usually have considerable freedom in defining their tasks and the capabilities they need to pursue. “Mission creep” occurs when an organization moves from well-defined or achievable missions to ill-defined or impossible ones. Faced by an unclear or unstated shift of objectives, mission creep often begins at the strategic level in an environment of gradual and perhaps unclear or unrecognized modification. These adjustments are often not stated explicitly, nor is the organization involved (or its assigned tasks) formally reevaluated. Mission creep also occurs from the bottom up when the situation on the ground changes dramatically. Moreover, it can serve as a means of survival to sidestep more difficult challenges in favor of chasing easier tasks to manage. Mission creep began to infect the Marshall Center when it unilaterally added “neighboring states” to its mission statement by encroaching into the portfolios of the other incognizant DOD regional centers. It has been unwilling to perform needed missions because it continues to focus on traditional activities that are unrealistic, unnecessary, and unwanted. The lack of geographical boundaries between the regional centers makes it difficult to pinpoint responsibility for a particular issue and inadvertently encourages expansion and replication. The German ministry of defense de facto endorses this encroachment because Berlin lacks such a forum outside of the Marshall Center. Defense Secretary guidance to “transform the Regional Centers from their original post–Cold War status to 21st century organizations capable of meeting the challenges of the post-9/11 world” has substantively been ignored.

The Regional Situation

Although the post-Soviet space is a disintegrating zone, with countries and subregions drifting in various directions, security developments remain interrelated in important respects. They are hinged together by strategic triangles and security complexes connected to a continuous periphery on the Russian border. This region has split into two camps—revolutionary pro-Westerners and conservative traditionalists. Dimitri Trenin stated that Russia’s leaders have given up on one hand, and supporting forces in a combustible but strategically important part of the world, on the other. Regime change by means of political manipulations poses a threat to all Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) nations, particularly Russia. As CIS Executive Committee chairman Vladimir Rushailo stated, “The techniques aimed at toppling national authorities are fit to be on the list of challenges and threats of the 21st century.” Political leaders in the region fear that Western-educated youngsters could be turned into revolutionaries. Embattled elites want to manipulate nationalistic tendencies and to create an alternative to mass democracy movements. Viewed through this prism, one might suppose that the Marshall Center’s unstated mission is to create a cadre of believers who will oppose undemocratic practices when they return to their respective countries.

Validating the Assumptions

To plan an effective strategy, assumptions must be formulated and clearly stated. Once assumptions are scrutinized and validated, any plan has a chance to succeed. Objectivity is usually ensured by making assumptions explicit enough to be examined and challenged. The Marshall Center does not formally state any planning assumptions. Coercion and the adoption of submissive, uncritical attitudes create an organizational environment vulnerable to manipulation and the promotion of dogma from above. There is consistent reference to two “implied” assumptions: one is that the sheer quantity of participants will promote change in the region through “critical mass”; the other is that it is possible to change minds and (hardened) post-Soviet attitudes. It would be encouraging to encounter a substantial body of research that provides support for this thesis of achieving critical mass, but it does not exist.

Can one really change attitudes? Nicholson Baker sees a mind change resulting from a slow, almost unidentifiable shift of viewpoint rather than any single argument or sudden epiphany. As he sees it, these so-called jolting insights are usually things that we discern only after the fact, becoming stories that we eventually tell ourselves and others to explain our change of mind. He identifies seven factors that can aid in changing minds but acknowledges the paradox that while it is easy and natural to change one’s mind in the first years of life, it becomes difficult to alter one’s mind as the years pass. One can never predict with certainty whether attitude shifts
will take place, but it seems safe to say that mind changes are only likely to occur when all seven factors pull in a mind-changing direction—and are most unlikely to occur when all or most of those factors oppose the mind change. Effecting enduring changes in a particular mind, or thwarting backsliding, is extremely difficult.¹⁰

Why do governments expose military officers to foreign military education in the first place? Fear of military intervention in politics prompts some governments to educate soldiers. Research has demonstrated that “coup-proofing” by emphasizing technical expertise in professional military education can help to isolate officers from undue interest in the civil sector.¹¹ Transferring values about military professionalism, human rights, and civil-military relations is difficult to measure but is probably not effective unless other institutions in the client country also support change. A paternalistic approach by the United States at the Marshall Center to an unequal power relationship with client countries further supports such unflattering views of American programs. Values consistent with those taught by the United States are unlikely to be much influenced.

In a related study outlined in William Easterly’s new book, the author suggests that the world’s official aid agencies have been recycling the same unworkable aid plans for the last 50 years.¹² The do-gooders’ fundamental flaw, he argues, is that they are “planners,” who seek to impose solutions from the top down, rather than “searchers,” who adapt to the real life and culture of foreign lands from the bottom. The planners believe in the “Big Push”—that is, an infusion of foreign aid and advice that will lift poor countries past the poverty trap and into prosperity. In promoting change, the planners are almost always wrong, according to Easterly, because they ignore cultural, political, and bureaucratic obstacles.

Easterly’s most powerful criticism is reserved for the planners who advocated “shock therapy” free-market reforms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Free markets cannot be imposed from outside, he insists, citing the example of the inefficient Soviet-era plants that survived their entry into the market era via their communist bosses’ genius for bartering and cronyism. “The Soviet-trained plant managers at the bottom outwitted the shock therapists at the top,” he writes. Other studies show that U.S. assistance projects designed to strengthen civilian control of the military have not made much progress in addressing goals, primarily due to a lack of interest by former communist governments.¹³

Certain other concepts are key. Consider the distinction between the words training and education. One might argue that the terms are synonymous, but there is a significant qualitative difference. While training is more concerned with teaching what to think and what the answers ought to be, education is about teaching how to think and what the questions ought to be. But the Marshall Center believes that the primary purpose of its courses is neither education nor training but instead a “networking” opportunity for the international audience to build internal relationships. While the length of an educational or training course is usually tied to desired outcomes, the pseudoscience of this “networking opportunity” requires approximately 12 weeks to break down barriers and to establish relationships. The Marshall Center confuses the purpose of networking, which is to create strong bonds between the participants and their ministries with the U.S. Government, not between the individual participants who befriend each other over the course of 12 weeks in Garmisch.

**Bilateral Approach**

The Secretary of Defense assigned priorities to the five DOD regional centers. Serving as a strategic communications tool, the regional centers are tasked to counter ideological support for terrorism, harmonize views on common security challenges, and educate on the role of defense in civil society. But this tasking presents a serious dilemma. If the purpose of the Marshall Center is to educate participants on security and defense issues, then pooling resources with like-minded European Union countries makes good sense. If the mission is to promote U.S. policy as a strategic communications platform, then there is a problem, which undermines the rationale for a “unique German-American Partnership.” As the only bilateral regional center located outside the territory of the United States, the Marshall Center has fallen victim to the increasing divergence of opinion and contradictory policies promoted by the United States and Germany; many countries today are looking for ways to counter global U.S. dominance. While boasting of an international faculty from several European nations, the Marshall Center’s ability to accomplish its stated
mission to explain and promote U.S. policies is often undermined by European nationals who are directed by their governments to challenge American security policies in the seminar room. Under the guise of a bilateral partnership, each time the United States presents its opinion on an issue, the alternate German point of view is presented to the audience. As a “unique” bilateral institution, it must achieve consensus with German policies, thereby representing U.S. interests less forcefully. Rather than focusing on the needs of a largely Russian- and English-speaking audience, it squanders substantial translation and interpretation resources on a largely non-existent German participant pool. A bilateral agreement requires Germany to fund 11.5 percent of operating costs even though it gets “50 percent” of the time on the podium.

Propaganda or skewed information does not effectively change attitudes. Information that appears to be propaganda may not only be scorned but may also turn out to be counterproductive if it undermines a country’s credibility. Consider Charlotte Beers, a former advertising executive who, when tasked in late 2001 by the State Department to promote American values to Muslims, devised several naïvely perky advertisements featuring American Muslims extolling U.S. multicultural tolerance. The ads were a public-relations disaster and have been ridiculed with some justification by Muslims and Westerners alike.14

**Missing the Target**

A key measure of success is reaching the target audience. The Marshall Center recruitment strategy focuses mostly on demographics. It boasts that military, older, and male is less desirable than civilian, young, and female. Yet there is no candid assessment to determine if applicants are really agents of change. The Center often trains retirees, secretaries, relatives of previous participants, and others without promotion or influence potential. Candidates often lie about their actual employment or job title, which are rarely checked. Supply exceeds demand, yet quotas continue to increase, and the quality of participants steadily falls. A survey of graduates would indicate serious questions on their qualifications. The Marshall Center vigilantly hides this reality behind anecdotes, sound bites, and flashy Web sites. The absence of priority countries such as Russia, which has not elected to participate seriously, reflects a disturbing trend in the suspect pool of graduates in recent years.

To maintain the artificial demand, the Marshall Center retains a generous budget to shuttle its leadership practically full-time to regional capitals. This activity is not coordinated with higher headquarters and is conducted independent of any theater security cooperation plan. No other DOD security cooperation program requires this type of expensive self-promotion. The stated goal is to meet with government officials to bolster and diversify recruitment for Marshall Center residence courses, solicit ideas for future Marshall Center projects, meet with senior U.S. and German embassy staff in order to engender closer cooperation in recruiting participants, and host a reception for alumni in order to maintain and solidify contact with the existing graduate base. During these trips, the consistent opinion of countries visited is that they cannot support the quotas they are given.

**Drive to Reduce Oversight**

The typical bureaucracy is much less happy if it must do things that are difficult and especially if it must do them under the watchful eyes of countless oversight bodies. Because planning and supervisory responsibilities for the Marshall Center are not clearly defined, ill-considered objectives are implemented largely without control at substantial cost. The absence of politico-military expertise at the Center increases the severity of the problem. Although the lack of oversight has directly benefited infrastructure expansion and the steady growth of annual budgets, it has also contributed to wasted resources, needless redundancy, questionable priorities, and possibly even strategic failure. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency has assumed responsibility for managing all regional centers and is struggling to implement badly needed reforms. Part of the problem is that the Marshall Center has deliberately insulated itself from urgent political and strategic pressures to resist transformation by “discounting” what it hears from the field: the governments, the ministries, and the U.S. Embassy country teams located in the region.

**FAO Interns**

During the Cold War, the U.S. Army Soviet foreign area officer (FAO) was the best among his peers.15 He had to be; the stakes were high, and the Soviet Union was not available for hosting in-country training. When the Marshall Center was established, it absorbed the U.S. Army Russian Institute and its Title 10 mission to train FAOs. Today’s successor to the Soviet FAO training conducted at the Marshall Center pales in comparison. The mission has evolved from educating potential FAOs on-site to “coordinating” their education in the field throughout Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

The Marshall Center confuses its mission to train officers in FAO skills with supporting combatant command theater security cooperation goals. It is not account-
able to the U.S. Army for the quality of FAO training and uses FAOs mostly as training aids in its international student seminars. Without the FAO program, American officers generally would not participate in Marshall Center resident courses. At less than 5 percent, U.S. representation in resident courses is mostly limited to FAO interns or Marshall Center employees.

Results fail to impress; FAO Russian language skills atrophy while based in Garmisch as reflected in test scores.29 Instead of focusing on Eurasia, FAO interns waste valuable training time learning about their own country and its security policies. FAO interns have distinctly different demographics than those of their foreign counterparts in the resident courses. The FAO program is tasked to prepare officers to serve the interests of DOD and the U.S. Army, while the Marshall Center educates foreign nationals on national security issues, allowing those individuals to return to their home country with a better understanding of Western civilian and military issues. The trend over the past 3 years averages one to two FAO interns arriving at the Marshall Center every 6 months for the 18-month program. In 2002, even the Marine Corps stopped using the Marshall Center for its FAO training. This Cold War legacy approach to Army FAO training and its associated U.S. faculty overhead continues in Garmisch, instead of progressing to in-country training opportunities that already exist in Russia, Ukraine, and other locations. In-country training programs offer Eurasian FAO interns distinctly different demographics than those of their foreign counterparts in the resident courses. The FAO program is tasked to prepare officers to serve the interests of DOD and the U.S. Army, while the Marshall Center educates foreign nationals on national security issues, allowing those individuals to return to their home country with a better understanding of Western civilian and military issues. The trend over the past 3 years averages one to two FAO interns arriving at the Marshall Center every 6 months for the 18-month program. In 2002, even the Marine Corps stopped using the Marshall Center for its FAO training. This Cold War legacy approach to Army FAO training and its associated U.S. faculty overhead continues in Garmisch, instead of progressing to in-country training opportunities that already exist in Russia, Ukraine, and other locations. In-country training programs offer Eurasian FAO interns distinctly different demographics than those of their foreign counterparts in the resident courses.

A Potemkin Village?

Imagery oftentrumps substance. What bureaucrats and courtseans want us to believe often has little to do with reality, but the Marshall Center would humble Grigori Aleksandrovich Potemkin. He built elaborate fake villages in order to impress Catherine the Great on her tours of Ukraine and the Crimea in the 18th century. Preoccupied senior officials and delegations are invited to conduct short, scripted “fly in–fly out” visits to the Marshall Center. Upon arrival, they are whisked through the beautiful gold-plated facilities, provided a cursory glance at students, presented briefings taking liberal credit for every possible success, and then sent on their merry way, never suspecting that they, like Catherine the Great, may have been duped. The point here is that these junkets are largely superficial, and because of time and space constraints, the busy visitors are not presented with any opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the rosy picture being presented. Distinguished visitors are deceived into believing that the Marshall Center is a serious platform to convey important messages, when in fact the audience is rarely attentive and frequently incoherent.

Recommendations

The Marshall Center has failed to adapt and transform in the face of disruptive change in the strategic environment in which it operates. Incentives and constraints have pushed it to overstate benefits and underestimate costs. Under pressure to ignore and discount disturbing indicators of ineffectiveness, it has worked relentlessly to create a myth of progress and impact but remains a lost opportunity in practice. The failure has everything to do with its early successes, conventional wisdom, and institutional memories that continue to proffer the myth of success. These shortcomings affect the Center and its ability to coordinate, implement, and synchronize strategic objectives effectively with its many higher headquarters. The Center is an obsolete prototype but, if transformed, can make a major contribution in supporting DOD security cooperation goals. Following are 10 recommendations that could make the Marshall Center relevant again.

Relocate and Discontinue the Bilateral U.S.-German Partnership. The significant long-term differences and contradictions in political-military perspectives make the U.S.-German partnership vis-à-vis the Marshall Center obsolete. Eliminating requirements for German translation/interpretation could free up more resources for Russian. Eliminating the bilateral nature of the Marshall Center would reduce the pressure from Berlin to overlap with other DOD regional centers on global issues and improve the focus of programs important to the United States. The legacy of the U.S. Army Russian Institute in Garmisch inhibits its serious participation from the Russian Federation.

Disinvest and Shift Eurasian U.S. Army FAO Training to Eurasia. Better, cheaper, and shorter training opportunities already exist in Russia and Ukraine. Eliminate FAO faculty overhead and focus on Marshall Center core competency to conduct programs with international elites and potential future leaders.

Refocus Core Competency on the Russian-speaking Region. Too much of what the Marshall Center does replicates the activity of NATO educational institutions. Much of what NATO offers is not useful to Russian-speaking officers because of the language barrier. The Marshall Center should move away from subsidizing NATO country participation and focus on the Russian-speaking officers because of the language barrier.

Reduce the Length of Courses. Combatant commands, U.S. Embassies, and the countries in the region have tried to communicate the futility of attracting the right participants to courses exceeding 4 weeks in duration. By shortening programs, the Marshall Center might begin to attract quality. Reduction in resident courses can free up faculty to conduct high-impact programs in the region in support of theater security cooperation objectives, while improving prospects to obtain U.S. military participation.

Focus on Interoperability. DOD security cooperation guidance requires all activities to yield demonstrable significant benefit toward achieving U.S. security objectives. It directs
that DOD should discontinue or deemphasize activities with nations where cooperative activities are unlikely to provide benefits and concentrate on those nations that are likely to participate in coalition efforts. A focus on supporting interoperability as opposed to achieving “critical mass” or “attitude changes” might sell itself and eliminate the need for the vast marketing and public relations apparatus.

Shift Emphasis from Resident Education to Outreach Events. The poor quality of Russian-speaking participants begs for a shift in bringing faculty and other tools into the region. It should expand outreach and reduce focus on tired resident programs. The Marshall Center could function as a coordinating body for organizing events such as bilateral wargames and other high-impact security cooperation activities. Curtail the “push” of pet outreach events that are not needed or wanted, and instead collaborate with combatant commands and country teams to address real requirements.

Consider Efforts to Reform Military Education in the Post-Soviet Space. To break the grip of old culture, one must seize control of the schools. Many countries in the post-Soviet space are suffering from arrested development in their military educational systems, which perpetuate Soviet mindsets. The Marshall Center could serve as a coordinating body for organizing events such as post-Soviet wargames and other high-impact security cooperation activities. Curtail the “push” of pet outreach events that are not needed or wanted, and instead collaborate with combatant commands and country teams to address real requirements.

Establish an Interagency Center for Security Cooperation Lessons Learned. Thru study and collaboration with other organizations, the Marshall Center might provide recommendations on how best to use limited resources for maximum effect. This analysis could improve definitions and clarify demand. Such an organization could study which programs across the interagency community (including allies and NATO) really get results and why. There is a great need to develop a systematic approach to determining strategic goals for international education programs and a strategic plan to achieve those objectives.

End the Endemic Mismanagement and Strategic Confusion. Start over. Integrate Marshall Center activity into theater security cooperation planning at the combatant command. Shift Mongolia to the Asia-Pacific Center and reduce the number of combatant commands interacting with the Marshall Center by one-third. Eliminate the cronyism and patronage that has plagued Marshall Center hiring and promotion practices. Reduce the number of non-U.S. personnel on the faculty and increase military billets. Prevent repetitive assignments of military officers and deny requests for serving military officers to retire and remain on the payroll. Review the conditions originally set forth in the Marshall Center charter for mission accomplishment—and consider that an exit strategy might be a good thing. **JFQ**

**NOTES**

1 Regional centers as defined under Section 184 of Title 10, United States Code, are operated and designed by the Secretary of Defense for the study of security issues relating to specified geographic regions and serve as forums for bilateral and multilateral communication and military and civilian exchanges with regional nations. They have been established for all major regions of the world and, in addition to the Marshall Center, include the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies.


5 For example, the mission of the nearby NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, is to conduct courses, training, and seminars in support of NATO’s current and developing strategy and policy. The NATO Defense College in Rome is the Alliance’s premier academic institution and offers an array of academic courses, research projects, and outreach programs. Its core competency is the Senior Course and associated shorter courses tailored to specific audiences. It concentrates on high-level political-military issues that confront both civilian and military leadership at the Alliance and national level and strives to promote debate, seek consensus, and master the skills needed to succeed in a multinational environment.

6 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia Leaves the West,” *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 4 (July/August 2006).


12 William Easterly, *The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good* (New York: Penguin, 2006).


15 Army foreign area officers are warriors who provide focused regional expertise to the joint warfighter. They possess expert military knowledge of the region, advanced language skills, and a studied cultural and political understanding, which enable them to increase success and reduce risk across the full spectrum of operations from major combat to stability operations. They operate decisively in uncertain environments, often independently, as a valuable force multiplier to commanders and senior leaders from the tactical to the strategic level. Above all, they are Soldiers.

16 See Defense Language Proficiency Test scores for Marshall Center FAOs from 2002 to present. Almost half fail to achieve graduation standards.