

## EURABIA: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS A. SALO  
United States Army

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USAWC CLASS OF 2010

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

# Report Documentation Page

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

|  |                                    |                                     |                            |  |                                 |
|--|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|--|---------------------------------|
| 1. REPORT DATE<br><b>30 MAR 2010</b>   |                                    | 2. REPORT TYPE                      |                            | 3. DATES COVERED                         |                                 |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE<br><b>Eurabia: Strategic Implications for the United States</b>                                      |                                    |                                     |                            | 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER                      |                                 |
|  |                                    |                                     |                            | 5b. GRANT NUMBER                         |                                 |
|  |                                    |                                     |                            | 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER               |                                 |
| 6. AUTHOR(S)<br><b>Thomas Salo</b>   |                                    |                                     |                            | 5d. PROJECT NUMBER                       |                                 |
|  |                                    |                                     |                            | 5e. TASK NUMBER                          |                                 |
|  |                                    |                                     |                            | 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER                     |                                 |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)<br><b>U.S. Army War College ,122 Forbes Ave.,Carlisle,PA,17013-5220</b> |                                    |                                     |                            | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER |                                 |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  |                                    |                                     |                            | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)         |                                 |
|  |                                    |                                     |                            | 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)   |                                 |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT<br><b>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.</b>                     |                                    |                                     |                            |  |                                 |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  |                                    |                                     |                            |  |                                 |
| 14. ABSTRACT<br><b>see attached</b>  |                                    |                                     |                            |  |                                 |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS  |                                    |                                     |                            |  |                                 |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:  |                                    |                                     | 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT | 18. NUMBER OF PAGES<br><b>36</b>         | 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON |
| a. REPORT<br><b>unclassified</b>   | b. ABSTRACT<br><b>unclassified</b> | c. THIS PAGE<br><b>unclassified</b> |                            |  |                                 |

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# **PROPERTY OF U.S. ARMY**

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

## **EURABIA: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Salo  
United States Army

Colonel Charles Van Bebber  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Salo

TITLE: Eurabia: Strategic Implications for the United States

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 15 March 2010      WORD COUNT: 7,728      PAGES: 36

KEY TERMS: Islam, Muslim, Middle East, Europe, Values, Interests, Demographics, *Jizya*, *Dhimmitude*, Democracy, Culture, Bat Ye'or, Arab

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Europe is transforming to Eurabia – a unified European superstate that is the cultural and political appendage of the Arab/Muslim world. Eurabia is the product of the realization of a long held desire of European elites to balance the power of the United States and the encroachment of Islamic values into the fabric of European liberal democratic ideals. An increasing Muslim population is demanding inclusion of their Islamic values at the same time they are unwilling or unable to modify their Islamic beliefs to fit within a secular political construct. This threatens to alter the foundation of common values and interests upon which America's relationship with Europe is built. U.S. strategic thinkers and policy makers must evaluate the transatlantic relationship and consider that in Eurabia, key partners once considered reliable on many issues may no longer be so reliable; forcing America to find new partners or accept a different relationship with Europe.

## EURABIA: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Europe is no longer Europe, it is 'Eurabia'

—Oriana Fallaci<sup>1</sup>

Europe is transforming into Eurabia - a “cultural and political appendage of the Arab/Muslim world that is fundamentally anti-Christian, anti-Western, anti-American, and anti-Semitic.”<sup>2</sup> These are the words of Bat Ye'or, an Egyptian born, British scholar who in 2005 published *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis*, an exhaustive study on this transformation of Europe. The concern of Bat Ye'or and others who are calling attention to the changes taking place in Europe is that Europeans are surrendering their principles and values to those of Islam. Noted Italian author Oriana Fallaci warns that “the moment you give up your principles and your values...the moment you laugh at those principles and those values, you are *dead*, your culture is *dead*, your civilization is *dead*. *Period* [emphasis added].”<sup>3</sup>

The idea of Eurabia is contentious and is by no means universally accepted. The reaction by Eurabia detractors has been to either dismiss it out of hand or to brand the idea as a racist form of Islamaphobia; labeling those who ascribe to the idea as neo-conservative conspiracy theorists who see Muslim immigrants in Europe as the modern day embodiment of the boogeyman. However, the idea is important enough to warrant serious consideration; for example the *Economist* magazine covered the topic in several articles in its June 24, 2006 edition. No matter what position one takes on the idea of Eurabia, there are aspects to it that should cause American senior leaders and policy makers to take pause, evaluate what is happening in Europe, and then consider the potential strategic implications for the United States.

This paper argues that the transformation of Europe into Eurabia will challenge America's relationship with Europe on two levels. The first is at its core – at the level of shared values and common interests. Changes to European demographics will alter the values base of Europe putting common interests based on those values at risk. The second is on the geo-political level. The fulfillment of Eurabian geo-political aspirations will put Europe, as a political entity, in a position to take a more independent path on the international stage and to directly challenge the United States. The end result will be that the United States will either accept a relationship with Europe that is more like the one it has with its Middle Eastern and other Muslim allies, or it will have to find new partners.

### Background

There are two key conditions that created Eurabia: first, European – specifically French – strategic maneuvering to restore its influence and to balance the power of the United States post World War II; and second, European response to the oil and gas crisis of the early 1970s. While these conditions are primarily political and economic endeavors, the results have created the institutions and policies that have affected Europe on the social and cultural level as well, especially when combined with the impact of changing demographics in Europe.

Bat Ye'or describes post World War II - era actions taken by France and its Gaullist practitioners of *realpolitik* to restore France's influence and prestige as “two convergent policies, which they hoped to implement both in Europe and in the Arab-Muslim world: the unification of Europe as an international counterweight to America and an alliance with the Arab and African Muslim world.”<sup>4</sup> The European Union (EU) and the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) are the manifestation of that purpose.

The EAD was jointly created by France (under the auspices of the European Economic Community (EEC)) and the Arab League in the midst of the 1974 oil and gas crisis. The EAD, created ostensibly to improve understanding between the West and Middle East, synchronizes the efforts to converge Europe with the Islamic states of North Africa and the Middle East.<sup>5</sup> It is a working body comprised of a number of committees responsible for broadening the cultural understanding between Europe and the Islamic world. The decisions and recommendations of the EAD committees are routinely adopted by member states of the EU and generally reflect the positions of the Arab side of the committees.

*Eurabia* was the name of a journal published in the mid-1970s by the European Committee for Coordination of Friendship Associations with the Arab World. Bat Ye'or, who has written extensively on the history of Jews and Christians living under Islamic rule, borrowed the term *Eurabia* to describe Europe's transformation into a civilization of *dhimmitude*<sup>6</sup>. In her book *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis*, she describes *Eurabia* as Europe's evolution

... from a Judeo-Christian civilization, with important post-Enlightenment secular elements, into a post-Judeo-Christian civilization that is subservient to the ideology of jihad and the Islamic powers that propagate it. *Eurabia* designates a new entity – with political, economic, religious, cultural, and media components – superimposed on Europe by powerful governmental lobbies.<sup>7</sup>

The word *dhimmitude* is related to the Arabic word *dhimma*, which is a pact or contract between the Muslim state and a non-Muslim subject. The members of such a tolerated community are called *dhimmis*. In Arabic the word *dhimmi* refers to non-Muslims that have accepted subordination to Islam. The modern application of the *dhimmi* consists of Jews, Christians and other religious minorities in the classical



Islamic state who are second class citizens. These minorities accept their status as second class citizens in lieu of the alternative of not being a citizen at all.<sup>8</sup> The idea of subordination in the context of Eurabia is not as a consequence of Islamic conquest of the West through a third wave of Islamic expansion, but rather a more subtle encroachment of Islam into the West.

During the first two waves of Islamic expansion, 622-730 AD and 1071-1683 AD, conquered populations had to convert to Islam or submit to Muslim rule (*dhimmitude*) and pay a protection tax - *jizya*. The *jizya* is the “poll tax traditionally paid in Islamic societies by non-Muslim peoples as a sign of their submission to Islam.”<sup>9</sup> *Jizya* comes from the Qur’anic verse 9:29:

Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the *Jizya* with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.<sup>10</sup>

The *jizya* has been traditionally interpreted, in both literature and in practice, to indicate the symbolic expression of humiliation and subordination of the *dhimmi*.<sup>11</sup> This idea is very much alive in modern Jihadist philosophy. In an interview with Al-Jazeera television, Mustafa Abul-Yazeed, al-Qaeda’s third in command, commented while discussing possible negotiations with the United States that

If the Americans agree to our conditions: leave Muslim nations, stop supporting Israel, stop supporting oppressive regimes in the region, and stop killing Muslims and release prisoners. If they met these conditions we would offer a long truce, say ten years. Then we will ask them to become Muslims and if they refuse, we will impose the *Jizyeh* or tax. And if they refuse we will fight them. This is our view of peace and we don’t think they will agree, so we should prepare for the fight.<sup>12</sup>

There are signs that the idea of *jizya* is not only present in the jihadist movement as one might expect, but it is also present within European Muslim populations. In

Norway, Oslo imams preach that Muslims should expect welfare benefits as a form of *jizya*.<sup>13</sup> Under the concept of *jizya*, these payments are the tribute due to the spiritual superior from the humiliated spiritual inferior – the *dhimmi*.<sup>14</sup> Within the Eurabian context, the idea of the *jizya* and *dhimmitude* is partly manifested in the European social welfare system.

Contrary to the notion of immigrants being a boon to economic activity, many immigrants end up on the welfare rolls in their new homeland. In France and Germany, an estimated 40 to 50 percent of their Muslim youth respectively are unemployed but not impoverished. Rather, they receive a wide range of social benefits.<sup>15</sup> In Belgium, the generous Belgian welfare system allows Muslims who receive social welfare benefits to live quite comfortably and because of low property values actually own their own homes.<sup>16</sup> These social welfare payments are themselves seen as the *jizya* – as are the tens of millions of dollars of aid provided by the EU to Middle East regimes and institutions.

Muslim populations throughout Europe are increasing. The world of demography can be very tricky and one should be cautious of relying too specifically on demographic predictions. In simplistic terms, demographers study changes in human populations. Demographic projections tend to be linear, but because humans are complex creatures that form complex population systems they rarely act as predicted. The habit of projecting current trends into the future seldom holds true in the face of demographic realities, i.e. nature gets a vote so to speak.<sup>17</sup> But the value of studying demographic changes lies not in accurately predicting them, but also by inferring how the trends might combine in different ways to form more enduring frameworks within which future

strategic partnerships might be formed. With that in mind, we know that the Muslim population of Europe is increasing multi-fold. Recognizing and analyzing this change is important to understanding the risk to the underlying values and interests of European society.

Determining the exact size of the Muslim population is difficult for a number of reasons. Few European states have gathered comprehensive data on the number and nature of the Muslim presence within their national borders, with a number of states prohibiting questions on religion in censuses and other official questionnaires.<sup>18</sup> Because of political sensitivities, many nations are not forthcoming with the information that they do have. And lastly, there is no straightforward definition of Europe.<sup>19</sup> But while accurate numbers are difficult to ascertain, we can nevertheless establish general trends.

Timothy Savage reports that in 2003, according to data compiled in the U.S. Department of State's Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, more than 23 million Muslims resided in Europe, which comprised approximately 4.5 percent of the population. In that same article, Savage reports that in 1982 there were 15.6 million Muslims living in Europe – about 3.2 percent of the population.<sup>20</sup> These figures are for all European States not including Turkey. This is an increase of 7.4 million people or 1.3 percent. A more recent study compiled by Houssain Kettani shows a similar trend. His 2010 report of estimated Muslim population states that Muslims comprise 6.74 percent of the population. Of the approximately 735 million people in Europe, 49.5 million are Muslim. This compares to the 23 million in 2003 shown above. From 1982 to 2010, the Muslim population of Europe increased by 26 million.<sup>21</sup>

While the numbers are sizeable, Muslims still only make up a small portion of the population. Nevertheless, current predictions have it rising dramatically over the coming decades. Most demographers predict that by 2020 Muslims will be 10 percent of the total European population and as much as 20 percent by 2050.<sup>22</sup> As stated earlier, staking too much on the precision of the predictions is ill-advised, but the trends show that European Muslim population increases are outpacing the rise in total population of the corresponding country; therefore, it is an inescapable conclusion that Muslim populations will make up an increasing percentage of the population for several decades to come.<sup>23</sup>

As Muslim immigrants move into Europe they bring along with them their unique customs and cultures which are as varied as the homelands from whence they emigrated. What binds all of these immigrants together is their shared Islamic identity. Earlier waves of Muslim immigrants were from urban areas and tended to be more educated and professional respective to the societies that they left and were generally more receptive and willing to adapt to Western culture and values. Recent immigrants, however, are from more rural areas and bring with them more orthodox and traditional ways of life. Their beliefs, as well as their values, are often at odds with those of Western society.<sup>24</sup>

There is also a rising identification with fundamentalist Islamic ideas among younger, second – and third – generation Muslim immigrants. The Pew Forum reported that in a 1997 survey of 1,200 young Turkish Germans, 56 percent said that Muslims should reject Western ways in favor of Islam.<sup>25</sup> How these differing values conflict with

European values and the degree to which they impact or shape future European national interests is the concern.

### Eurabia – Impacts and Consequences for Europe

The Europe of today is different than the Europe of two centuries ago. The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus once said that “change alone is unchanging.”<sup>26</sup> All societies change and Europe is no different. The changes that have taken place over the past fifty years might be considered evolutionary rather than revolutionary; considering that the change that has occurred in Europe has come about through an advancement or maturation of already held values and beliefs. However, the immigration and demographic forces acting on Europe today will inevitably cause a more dramatic change; both culturally and politically.<sup>27</sup> The very different values base of Muslim immigrants, combined with the changes spurred by rising Muslim populations and decreasing native populations risk a fundamental alteration of European values and interests – causing a revolutionary vice an evolutionary change.

European values, like those of their American counterparts, are largely based on the principles found in liberal democracy. In brief, a liberal democracy is a representative form of government founded upon a constitution that provide a number of protections and rights including the protection of individual liberties, the rule of law and due process and many others. The rise and encroachment of Islamic values in Europe are beginning to challenge key attributes of liberal democracy, especially the protection and equality of the individual, religious freedom and tolerance, freedom of expression, and equality among all people.

It is commonly understood that the central element of liberal democracy is the protection of the individual. Angela Merkel, in her 2009 address to a joint session of the

U.S. Congress, reaffirmed the importance of the individual and individual rights when she stated the U.S. / European partnership was based "... not only on shared history and interests, but more importantly on a common basis of shared values, in particular the common idea of the individual and the inalienable rights of the individual."<sup>28</sup>

A catalyst for arguing the incompatibility of Islam with the protection of the individual and western tradition is the criticism that Islam is unfair to women. The wearing of the *hijab*, or traditional head covering that Muslim women wear is currently at the center of the debate in Europe. Those who take the position that Islam is unfair to women contend that the head cover is the outward expression of the subjugation of women – while those who disagree maintain that it is a matter of choice and religious expression. But the more serious condemnation comes from those who see *Shari'a* law (discussed below) as codifying discrimination against women. Indeed, in some Muslim countries where *shari'a* is part of the judicial system, special amendments to law have been enacted to protect woman against those aspects of *shari'a* that are especially detrimental to women's rights.<sup>29</sup>

In the context of the examination of Europe and Eurabia and the effects of the latter, the rule of law is closely aligned with the premise that laws are of man and not of God or of church. The doctrine of multiculturalism that permeates the thinking of Western elites is at the heart of what makes Eurabia possible.<sup>30</sup> In the name of tolerance and multiculturalism, European countries are willingly instituting the spirit of, and in some cases directly implementing, *Shari'a* law within the Western judicial system. Core principles – such as the freedom of expression – are being grossly modified under the influence of *Shari'a* law and Islamic ideals.

*Shari'a* law influences the legal code of most Muslim countries. It is derived from the Quran and the Sunna – the teachings and the traditions of the Prophet Mohammed – and it guides all aspects of Muslim life.<sup>31</sup> *Shari'a* law is religious in nature and its compatibility with western democracy's secularist ideals is a topic of heated debate.<sup>32</sup> In any case, *Shari'a* is making inroads into Europe and is playing a significant role in the transformation of Europe into Eurabia.

A recent court case in Italy clearly demonstrates how *Shari'a* is encroaching into western judicial systems. Three members of a Maghrebi family (father, mother, and eldest son) were accused of beating up and sequestering their daughter/sister because she wanted to live a 'Western' life, had dated a non-Muslim and was living a life that did not conform to the culture of her family. In the first trial the three were sentenced for sequestration and bad treatment, but on appeal the family was acquitted by a higher court because the court deemed that the young woman was beaten up for 'her own good'. In a later stage of the case, the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation ruled in favor of the family, upholding the lower courts acquittal.<sup>33</sup>

The United Kingdom has taken the Italians one further, allowing *Shari'a* courts to exist within their legal system. According to a report in the *Times of London*, *Shari'a* courts have been set up in five locations with two more planned (as of September 2008), and the rulings of the courts are enforceable with full power of the British judicial system through the county courts or High Court.<sup>34</sup>

Freedom of the press and freedom of expression are central parts of Western principle and are considered essential for the proper functioning of a democracy. The ability to freely criticize or protest against the government, or any other aspect of

society, and to express ones ideas through word, art or other form is one of the most strongly guarded Western ideals. However, this is incompatible with Islamic values. Codified in *Shari'a* law is an explicit prohibition from criticizing Islam, the Prophet Mohammed, and in some cases *Shari'a* itself.<sup>35</sup>

Where this Muslim value enters the equation of Eurabia is Europe's willing subordination of this core value to that of an Islamic value. The very well publicized reaction of Muslims throughout the world and in Europe to the February 2006 publication by a Danish newspaper of cartoons depicted the Prophet Mohammed and the reaction of Western media demonstrates the battle over Western values. Some newspapers and media outlets rushed to defend their most cherished right by reprinting the cartoons; others however, were quick to surrender to by refusing to reprint the cartoons. Their actions, purportedly out of respect for Muslim culture might also be described in a Eurabian context as a self-loathing appeasement of a civilization that no longer believes in its own values.<sup>36</sup>

Nowhere is this self-loathing more clearly demonstrated than in the circumstances of European response to the publication of the bestselling book *The Rage and the Pride*, by Oriana Fallaci. Her impassioned defense of Western civilization earned her death threats from across the Muslim world. The reaction from Europe's ruling elite was to prosecute her as a criminal. After failing to have her extradited to Switzerland so she could be prosecuted under Swiss anti-racism statute, Islamic groups successfully prevailed to have her prosecuted in Italy. In 2005 an Italian judge ordered her to stand trial for defaming Islam, but prior to the trial, Oriana Fallaci passed away in September 2006.



As liberal democracies, European countries are largely considered to be secular, believing in religious freedom and of some form of separation between church and state. While not strictly the case, religion is not a government enterprise and it is limited to the private sector.<sup>37</sup> So how does Islam fit into a secular Europe? The importance of this topic has generated an intense discussion within the Muslim scholarly community. These discussions show that there is an internal struggle of how to fit Islam within the European secular, political construct. Dr. Rainer Brunner of the University of Freiburg in Germany examined this debate in detail in his paper "Forms of Muslim Self-perception in European Islam". He points out that this discussion is "largely without precedent, as this question did not arise in classical Islamic law. Muslims were not expected to live permanently in non-Muslim countries...."<sup>38</sup> Brunner examines three examples to illustrate the debate: adopting the French concept of *laïcité*, making European Muslim identity dependent on preservation of traditional legal prescriptions, and the Central Council of Muslims in Germany charter reflecting Muslim attitudes towards Western society. Brunner notes that Muslims in a secular Europe face considerable challenge considering their strong social commitment to Islam.

The argument that Muslims can function like any other religious community in a *laicist* society such as France, with its strict separation of state and religion, is challenged. As Rainer rightly points out "...the debate over laicism in the Islamic world inevitably falls back on the old dichotomy of belief (=Islam) vs. unbelief (-laicism), because most Muslims are not able to imagine a separation between religion and politics...."<sup>39</sup> The other main element of the debate is the willingness of Muslims to try and adapt to a European construct. The Munich Islamic Center spokesman, Ahmad von

Denffer, a German convert to Islam expressed this when he stated "...there could be no doubt that striving for enforcement of Islamic law, as demanded by the Koran, has to remain the ultimate goal of all Muslims."<sup>40</sup> Denffer, further states that the:

... renovation of [Islamic] law and its application to the European environment means an uncompromising return to pristine Islam, an Islam that has to be purged of all accidental and secondary influences of its traditional interpreters. The demand for a return to the ideal state of early Islam ... is a standard argument of all traditionalist and fundamentalists ....<sup>41</sup>

The idea is not only resident in academic or pundit circles, the same can be seen vividly expressed on demonstrator's placards during Islamic demonstrations in cities across Europe.

The rising fervor of Muslims in Europe expressing the supremacy of Islam and the encroachment of Islamic ideals on the secular European state is causing Europeans to question whether Islam is really compatible with core Western values, such as democracy, tolerance and individual rights.<sup>42</sup> There is an increasing recognition – on both sides – that their respective values are challenged by the other and that what is at stake is nothing short of their identity.<sup>43</sup> Europeans are coming to realize there is a developing conflict between their multicultural hospitality with Muslims' demands for more control, greater entitlements, and preservation of their Islamic Identity.<sup>44</sup> Since Muslims are unable or unwilling to adapt Islam to Western ideals, and because of the supremacy of the multicultural ideal in Europe, the West is becoming increasingly compliant to accommodate the religious and political norms of Muslim immigrants.<sup>45</sup>

There is little debate that European's respect cultural differences, normally embodied in the term multiculturalism. Multiculturalism as defined by *Dictionary.com* is: "the preservation of different cultures or cultural identities within a unified society, as a

state or nation.”<sup>46</sup> This would mean that in theory, all cultures are equally worthy of respect and indeed, the West has historically demonstrated an openness for other cultures dating back to the Greeks. Bruce Thornton describes this Western respect for other cultures when he states that “in Herodotus’ *History*, the entire second book is devoted to Egypt, whose civilization is presented in an admiring light. Western culture has profited from this curiosity and openness to other cultures, whose ideas Westerners have cheerfully borrowed or stolen.”<sup>47</sup> Taken to its extreme, multiculturalism holds that all cultures are of equal value and no part of another culture can be rejected. A criticism of European elites is that they take the extreme interpretation of multiculturalism, labeling as prejudice any effort on the part of Westerners to defend their values by questioning non-European cultures.<sup>48</sup>

In Eurabia, Europeans are willingly – or unwittingly – becoming *dhimmi*. This idea manifests itself in a number of areas, with culture and core principles being the most revealing. The cultural aspect of Eurabia is characterized by the supposed cultural debt owed by Europe to Islamic civilization. Islamic doctrine requires the acknowledgement of the superiority of Islamic culture by the *dhimmi* and European ministers have gladly obliged in their public statements of the Islamic origin or contribution to Western civilization arts and science.<sup>49</sup>

Speaking at the Ismaili Center in London on October 8, 1998, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook stressed the “debt our culture owes to Islam” and he added “Islam laid the intellectual foundations for large portions of Western civilization.”<sup>50</sup> This demonstrates the expected attitude of a *dhimmi*. While attempting to acknowledge the contributions of Islam and Arabic culture to European culture, it over attributes to Islamic

culture the knowledge inherited from Greece, Rome as well as other civilizations including the Judeo-Christian, Armenian, Persian, and Hindu; civilizations that Muslims conquered and colonized and upon which they built their own contributions.<sup>51</sup> In the words of Bruce Thornton, “We see here one of the roots of the current EU problems of its Muslim immigrants, who are allowed or even encouraged to reject assimilation partly because of this acceptance of Europe’s cultural inferiority and historical guilt.”<sup>52</sup>

The assault on Western values and the European *dhimmi* status is clearly summarized by Bruce Thornton:

Such groveling appeasement of assaults on the core values of Western civilization fits the profile of the *dhimmi* as documented by Bat Ye’or. To many Muslims, the Europeans’ capitulation to threats and violence bespeaks the spiritual poverty of a people for whom the highest good is physical comfort and pleasure, and nothing exists that is worth fighting and dying for. The indifference of Europe to violence against Christians and Jews in Middle Eastern countries—such as the jihadist murder in 2001 of seventeen Christians in Pakistan, or the desecration of Christian churches—while Europeans fret over and apologize for the most trivial “insults” to Islam, also confirms the decadence of the West and the superiority of Islam. What else are they to think, when a huge mosque is being built in Rome, while not a single church or synagogue exists in Saudi Arabia?<sup>53</sup>

The threat to U.S. strategic partnerships with European states does not stem from the danger of Europe suddenly waking up one day and being majority Muslim and switching sides and aligning against the “Great Satan”. The threat is more subtle, one that is slowly emerging from a change in interests due to the transformation of Europe to Eurabia.

### U.S. Strategic Implications

Nations do not exist in isolation. For as long as there have been gatherings of people – whether tribes, city-states or Westphalian nation states, those polities have interacted with each other; the manner of that interaction being largely driven by their

national interests. The United States Army War College teaches its students that the starting point for developing policy is a consideration of the national interests that are at stake. It is from these interests that leaders find the foundation and direction to formulate national policy.<sup>54</sup> Commenting on the enduring nature and importance of interests in international affairs, Army War College professor, Alan Stolberg has written “The concept of interest is not new to the 21st century international system. It has always been a fundamental consideration of every actor in the system.”<sup>55</sup>

The interests that national leaders craft policy upon are ultimately informed by the values that a nation’s people hold important; especially when the public feels that those values are important enough to commit national resources – either measured in national treasure or ultimately in blood. Certainly within the United States, values play a role in determining national interests. Joseph Nye, the former Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and Distinguished Service Professor has said of values and national interests that “The American people clearly think that their interests include certain values and their promotion abroad--such as opposition to ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.”<sup>56</sup>

The same link between values and interest holds true in Europe. Javier Solana, the European Union’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy speaking of European Union (EU) interests has stated:

...values matter as much as interests. A foreign policy which is not informed by our values is neither possible nor acceptable. This very much applies to the European Union. Values are at the core of our ...collective identity. We promote them because of who we are. But also because it is in our interest to do so.<sup>57</sup>

The examination of the impact of Eurabia on the U.S. - European strategic relationship is fitting considering Bat Ye’or’s basic argument supporting the premise for

Eurabia – how it came to be – is at its core largely geo-strategic. The United States has enjoyed a long history of strong partnerships and alliance with the nations of Europe; the cooperation founded principally on shared Western values. The strength of this bond created an enduring transatlantic relationship that has withstood overwhelming challenges, including two World Wars and the Cold War. While the ties between the United States and Europe remain strong some policymakers and academics are beginning to debate the value and purpose of the transatlantic relationship.<sup>58</sup> In the context of Oriana Fallaci's warning that European's are giving up on their principles and values, the debate can be framed by the emergence of Eurabia.

The United States and Europe's shared interests span the spectrum of geopolitical interests and not all of those interests will be affected. For example, the economic ties across the Atlantic are strong and continue to grow and are likely to be unaffected. The United States and the EU share the largest trade and investment relationship in the world, with annual trade, including goods, services and foreign direct investment exceeding \$2 trillion. The amount of two way direct investment alone exceeds \$1.5 trillion.<sup>59</sup> In the near to mid-term, security and broader Middle East issues will be the most affected; specifically, terrorism and the conflict with radical Islam; the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict; and the greater geostrategic positioning of countries in an increasingly multi-polar world.

Since September 11, 2001, there has been strong counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Europe; where there is disagreement between the allies concerning terrorism it is most likely the perception of the threat and the tactics that should be used to respond to the threat.<sup>60</sup> Critics of the European's approach question

whether or not they share the same level of concern as the United States towards Islamic terrorism.<sup>61</sup>

European governments did not officially recognize Islamic terrorism as terrorism until 2003; instead they attributed Islamists actions as an understandable response to Israeli actions toward Palestinians.<sup>62</sup> Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas were not labeled as terrorist organizations by EU until September 2003. Even after members of the European Union finally agreed to blacklist Hamas on September 6, 2003, France and Germany still refused to recognize Hamas as a terrorist entity.<sup>63</sup> The concern with many Americans on the importance of sharing the same perception of the threat is that they believe if you don't correctly identify your enemy, then you can't defeat it. The European reluctance toward identifying Islamic terrorism as such demonstrates the effect of Eurabia.

There is reluctance in Europe to link the terms Islam and terrorism. It is not uncommon to hear public officials in Europe state that the words Islam and terrorist are two words that do not go together. The European reluctance to tie Jihadi terrorism and Islam together not only demonstrates a differing perception of the threat, it also shows the inroads that Eurabian and *dhimmi* thinking have made into the European psyche. Dissuading Europeans from linking terrorism with the radical ideals of the Islamists is a victory for the Islamists and the Eurabians.<sup>64</sup>

Even more revealing of the Eurabian effect is the impact of the March 2004 Madrid bombings. If the intended effect of *dhimmitude* is to cause the *dhimmi* to conduct himself in the manner demanded by his Muslim master, the response of Spain to the Madrid bombings illustrates the effect. Reacting to the murder of one hundred ninety-

one Spaniards, eleven and a half million people, nearly a third of the population took to the streets in mass demonstrations. In typical Eurabian fashion, rather than blame Islamist ideology for the attacks, the demonstrators targeted and blamed Spanish president José María Aznar, who supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq.<sup>65</sup> Three days after the bombings, the Spanish electorate voted into office José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the Socialist candidate who ran on a promise to move Spain away from the United States and to remove troops from Iraq. This was the professed objective of the Islamists. An al-Qaeda document made public after the bombings speculated correctly that Spain “cannot suffer more than two to three strikes before pulling out [from Iraq] under pressure from its own people.”<sup>66</sup> Thornton notes that “the same Spanish people who had fought for seven centuries to drive the imperialist Muslims from Spain had ... justified their status as *dhimmi*...”<sup>67</sup>

Another important area where the emergence of Eurabia has had (and will continue to have) strategic implication for the United States is in the broader Middle East. For many years, the Middle East has been a cause for tension between the United States and Europe with the allies often at odds and not seeing eye-to-eye on all the issues.<sup>68</sup> But the presence and centrality of the Soviet threat in Europe during the Cold War created solidarity between the allies where differences over peripheral issues were easily resolved. The end of the Cold War and the loss of the Soviet threat have allowed other regional issues, such as those in the Middle East, to top the transatlantic agenda.<sup>69</sup> Recognizing the importance of the Middle East and the challenge America was having in dealing with the wide range of issues while also fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, President Bush reached out to Europeans to help shoulder the burden.



The United States is unlikely to receive the same level of broad support in the Middle East from Eurabia, as it enjoyed from Europe during the first Gulf War – especially as it relates to Israel. No other Middle East issue is more affected by the emergence of Eurabia than that of the Arab – Israeli conflict. It is stated policy of the United States to ensure the security and sovereignty of the State of Israel. A detailed analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is relevant to note that as a direct consequence of the establishment of Eurabian institutions and thought in Europe, Europeans have increasingly taken pro-Arab positions in the conflict with Israel.

Illustrative of this, Europe has taken the Arab position of primacy of resolving the Palestinian-Israeli issue before considering other issues in the Middle East. Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa stated that "If you talk about a Greater Middle East then it cannot be confined to the development of societies but also must cover bringing about stability in the whole region and that stability cannot come about without the correct treatment -- balanced, just and honest -- of the Palestinian issue."<sup>70</sup>

Contradicting the U.S. view that the two processes can proceed independently, Javier Solana supported the Arab League position when he stated "The peace process always has to be at the center of whatever initiative is in the field...any idea about reform of nations would have to be in parallel with putting a priority on the resolution of the peace process, otherwise it will be very difficult to have success."<sup>71</sup> As Bat Ye'or states, "The Euro-Arab linkage of Arab/Islamic reforms to Israel's stand is spurious and only demonstrates, once more, Europe's subservience to Arab policy."<sup>72</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the foundation of Eurabia was borne out of a two part French policy to counter U.S. power and influence. The first part of the policy was to

create joint Euro-Arab partnerships and institutions; the second part was to create a more unified Europe. The desire to balance the power of the United States and to create a multi-polar world exists today among many European politicians and elites. The invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the German / French opposition to the war was partially indicative of this. The objective of Jacques Chirac of France and Gerhard Schroeder of Germany was to challenge the United States as a way for Europe to bring about a new multi-polar world.<sup>73</sup> Much as Charles de Gaulle believed, many in the French ruling elite still are of the mindset that the main problem in international affairs is the United States and that only a French-led, EU superstate can provide a counterbalance.<sup>74</sup>

De Gaulle's superstate was to have been realized through a European Constitution; however, it was twice rejected in public referenda held in France and the Netherlands. What could not be obtained by public support was obtained by treaty – the Lisbon Treaty - also known as the Reform Treaty. The treaty was signed by the European Union member states on December 13, 2007 and came into force on December 1, 2009. The treaty provides the essential components needed for an EU superstate to become a global power and challenge American leadership on the world stage.<sup>75</sup>

In her analysis of the Lisbon Treaty, Sally McNamara noted that the treaty contains a consolidation of foreign and defense policy that is necessary for the EU to become the world's first "supranational superstate" that can challenge the United States.<sup>76</sup> As an integrated Europe with a common defense policy, the result of the treaty will do huge damage to American interests in Europe because it affects the ability of the United States to engage its European partners bi-laterally. The United States

relies on its ability to engage with nations on a bi-lateral basis in order to establish cooperative intelligence sharing and counterterrorism efforts. If the French policy objective was to counter-balance the United States by creating a Europe with a single voice, the Lisbon Treaty brings that realization closer to fruition.

If the United States' strategic partnerships with its traditional European partners are challenged as a result of the emergence of Eurabia and the European superstate, what alternatives does the United States have? To whom should they turn? There are a number of options. The United States can forge new relationships with emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia, India and China, the so called BRIC countries. They can cultivate existing relationships with countries less impacted by Eurabia; for example with newer members of the EU from Eastern Europe. Bat Ye'or noted this possibility during an interview with *FrontPage* magazine when she stated that "Britain, Italy and to some extent the East European countries are less marked by the subservience syndrome of *dhimmitude*...."<sup>77</sup> Or they can work within the new paradigm – capitalizing on the opportunities presented when common values and interests with other countries exist.

In its report to Congress on the possible options for U.S. policy in a changing Europe, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) considered similar options. They offered 5 options for Congress to consider. The options ranged from de-emphasizing Europe to forging a new transatlantic relationship.<sup>78</sup> The first option offered in the CRS report states that the U.S. might turn to China, Russia and Brazil. In as much as the U.S. shares common values and interests that may be plausible. However, what is more probable is the idea expressed in the concluding thoughts of the CRS report – that a mix of two or more of the options is likely.

The CRS report examines the various options against three areas that drive the friction between the United States and Europe: leadership issues; structural drivers; and interests and values. The CRS approach does not identify the emergence of Eurabia as the underlying cause, but components of the Eurabian idea thread throughout the reports criteria - especially within the structural drivers and the interests and values criteria. The leadership examination focuses primarily on charges against the Bush administration of unilateralism and a lack of interest in Europe – while acknowledging that similar complaints were often levied against other U.S. Presidents and Congresses including President Bill Clinton. The report also notes that European leaders are not without blame; German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac are highlighted for their opposition to the Iraq war, espousing multi-polarity and their desire to constrain U.S. power.<sup>79</sup> Their positions are very reflective of de Gaulle's policy mentioned earlier.

The second two criteria correlate quite well with the Eurabian examination. The structural drivers section discusses the maturation of the EU, addition of new member states, and the need for new mechanisms to address foreign policy and defense issues. Written prior to the EU passing and implementing the Lisbon Treaty, the report specifically addresses assertions by treaty advocates that the treaty will allow the EU to speak with one voice on foreign and security policy issues. As one of the two legs of the French policy that gave rise to Eurabia – that of unifying Europe – the treaty brings this policy objective closer to realization.

The final criteria discussed is diverging interests and values. This is particularly interesting since it is at the heart of the concern with Europe transforming to Eurabia.

The CRS report author notes that the United States and its European allies remain committed to the shared values of democracy, individual liberty, and free market economies and that is on the policy level that differences are introduced in the relationship depending on specific national interest.<sup>80</sup> However, as a result of Eurabia, Islamists, Muslim activists and European multiculturalists will likely challenge and put pressure on Europeans to accept Islamic values that will threaten to supplant the shared values between the United States and Europe.

The Islamization of Europe's Western values due to Eurabia do not necessarily spell the end of all cooperation between the United States and Europe. In international relations there are no absolutes. Clearly, the United States maintains strong relations and partnerships with many Muslim countries; Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey and Pakistan come immediately to mind. The degree to which the United States finds supportive partners with Muslim countries varies and like many things in international politics, depends on the issue. In the context of the discussion earlier – combating Islamic radicalism, issues concerning the Middle East and geostrategic positioning – the United States has had mixed results.

Over the past few years, the United States has had good partnerships with some of its Muslim allies - especially in the area of combating terrorism and Islamic radicalism. Faced with their own threat from Islamic radicals, countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are working closely with the United States to combat terrorists. In its “2008 Country Reports on Terrorism”, the U.S. State Department gives positive assessments of Pakistani and Saudi efforts, highlighting the cooperation of Pakistani security services with the United States and other nations to fight terrorism and the continuing efforts of

the Saudis to build its counterterrorism capacity and other efforts of government institutions to counter extremist ideology.<sup>81</sup>

On the broader issues facing the Middle East, the results are more mixed. The United States has several initiatives designed to facilitate political, economic and education reform and development in the Middle East, including the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA). On the security front, the United States maintains security guarantees with many regional states.<sup>82</sup>

Concerning Arab-Israeli peace, however, there is much less agreement and support for United States' positions. Many of the United States' Muslim allies hold skeptical views (at least publicly) of America's role as an honest broker, and with some notable exceptions, most Arab nations take an anti-Israeli / pro-Palestinian position with some refusing to recognize Israel or unwilling to establish diplomatic relations.

On the issue of geopolitical positioning the United States finds itself in a better circumstance with its Muslim partners than it does with its Eurabian partners. Considering that the relationship the United States has with its Muslim partners tend to be more regionally focused than global, Eurabia is better positioned to challenge the United States globally. Faced with the need to counter regional threats to stability, such as those posed by Iran and al-Qaeda, the United States is able to develop and maintain strong cooperation and mutually supporting positions with its regional partners. Additionally, while there are a number of institutions that promote regional cooperation (e.g. the Gulf Cooperation Council), there is no similar initiative to create an EU type superstate in the Middle East. This allows the United States to deal with Middle East

and other Muslim nations on a bi-lateral basis, improving its chances to broker deals supportive of America's policy objectives.

### Conclusion

Countries enter into partnerships for a variety of reasons – generally they are based on common values and shared interests based on those values. In international relations, there are no absolutes and countries will enter into partnerships with countries with which it does not share values. The alliance between the Western Allies with the Soviet Union during World War II is a perfect example. Clearly, the allies did not share common values, but they were able to set their differences aside to face a common enemy. However, absent an overriding and compelling reason otherwise, nations will almost invariably seek out others with common interests and shared values.

All societies change over time and Europe is no exception. Europe has a decreasing native population and an increasing Muslim population with Islamic values. Their Muslim populations are becoming more audacious in pressing for inclusion of their values and customs into the fabric of their adopted homelands. This is beginning to challenge long held Western values and traditions with seemingly little willingness of the European's to resist the assault, especially in the environment of increasing European secularism and an extremely entrenched form of rigid-multiculturalism. Combined with a newly unified European superstate, with long held political desires to balance U.S. power and influence, the United States is no longer dealing with a Europe it has long understood. The Europe that is emerging is better defined as "Eurabia".

United States' policy makers and strategic planners have to consider that in Eurabia, key partners once considered reliable allies on many issues may no longer be willing to take the American side or position. The United States will have to accept a

relationship with Europe that is more reflective of the one it has with its Middle Eastern and other Muslim allies or – more likely, they will have to forge new partnerships.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Oriana Fallaci, “Prophet of Decline: An Interview with Oriana Fallaci,” interview by Tunku Varadarajan, *The Wall Street Journal*, June 23, 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Bat Ye’or, *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses).

<sup>3</sup> Fallaci, “Prophet of Decline”.

<sup>4</sup> Bat Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 39.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, 10.

<sup>6</sup> See Bat Ye’or’s *Eurabia*; “*Dhimmitude* is the condition of “subjection with protection” of non-Muslims in their own countries, obtained by the cession of their land to the Muslim ruler. Subjection, because the infidels submit to the Islamic law which expropriates them, and protection because this same law protects them from jihad and guarantees limited rights under a system of discriminations that they must accept, or face forced conversion, slavery, or death. *Dhimmitude* is the direct outcome of jihad”, 34.

<sup>7</sup> Bat Ye’or, *Eurabia*, 9-12.

<sup>8</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (New York: Random House Publishing), 46.

<sup>9</sup> Leslie S. Lebl, “Radical Islam in Europe”, *Orbis* 54, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 51.

<sup>10</sup> University of Southern California, Center for Muslim-Jewish Engagement, Translations of the Qur’an, Surah 9. University of Southern California, <http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/quran/009.qmt.html> (accessed February 6, 2010).

<sup>11</sup> Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam*, 46.

<sup>12</sup> Mustafa Abul-Yazeed, interview with Al-Jazeera Television, June 22, 2009, <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/06/2009622111533470.html> (accessed January 17th, 2010).

<sup>13</sup> Bruce Bawer, *While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying The West From Within*, (New York: Broadway Books), 26.

<sup>14</sup> Bruce Thornton, *Decline and Fall: Europe’s Slow-Motion Suicide* (New York: Encounter Books), 95.

<sup>15</sup> Lebl, “Radical Islam in Europe,” 50.



<sup>16</sup> Muqtedar Khan, quoted in Fjordman, "What Does Muslim Immigration Cost Europe?" *Global Politician*, May 10, 2007, <http://www.globalpolitician.com/22773-euroimmigration> (accessed on February 6, 2010).

<sup>17</sup> Martin Walker, "The World's Numbers", *The Wilson Quarterly* (Spring 2009): 24-31.

<sup>18</sup> Timothy M. Savage, "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing," *The Washington Quarterly*, 27 no. 3 (Summer 2004): 26; notable states that do not permit questions on religion in censuses and other official questionnaires include: Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain.

<sup>19</sup> The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, *An Uncertain Road: Muslims and the Future of Europe* (Washington D.C.: The Pew Research Center, 2005), 3.

<sup>20</sup> Savage, "Europe and Islam," 27.

<sup>21</sup> Houssain Kettani, "2010 World Muslim Population," Polytechnic University of Puerto Rico (San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 2010), <http://www.pupr.edu/hkettani/papers/HICAH2010.pdf> (accessed January 15, 2010).

<sup>22</sup> The Pew Forum, *An Uncertain Road*, 3; Savage, "Europe and Islam," 28.

<sup>23</sup> Kettani, "2010 World Muslim Population."

<sup>24</sup> Lebl, "Radical Islam in Europe," 49.

<sup>25</sup> The Pew Forum, *An Uncertain Road*, 7.

<sup>26</sup> Heraclitus, *The Brainy Quote Homepage*, <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/h/heraclitus.html> (accessed January 19, 2010).

<sup>27</sup> Philip Jenkins, "Demographics, Religion, and the Future of Europe," *Orbis (Philadelphia, Pa.)* 50, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 519.

<sup>28</sup> Nancy Isenson, ed. "Merkel urges US, Europe to "Tear Down Today's Walls," *Deutsche Welle*, November, 11, 2009, <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4853847,00.html> (accessed on January 19, 2010).

<sup>29</sup> In 1991 Pakistan enacted the Enforcement of *Shari'a* Act (Act of 1991) that implemented *shari'a* law in Pakistan. In 2006, the "Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, was passed: "... to provide relief and protection to women against misuse and abuse of law and to prevent their exploitation," <http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1991/actXof1991.html> (accessed 6 February 2010).

<sup>30</sup> Thornton, *Decline and Fall*, 96.

<sup>31</sup> Lauren Vriens, "Islam: Governing Under Shari'a," *Council on Foreign Relations*, March 23, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8034/> (accessed February 7, 2010).

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> Olivier Guitta, "Shari'a's Inroads in Europe – Italian Court: 'Beaten Up for 'Her Own Good'", *Hudson New York*, March 5, 2009, <http://www.hudsonny.org/2009/03/Shari'as-inroads-in-europe-italian-court-beaten-up-for-her-own-good.php> (accessed January 10, 2010).

<sup>34</sup> Abul Taher, "Revealed: UK's First Official Shari'a Courts," *The Sunday Times*, September, 14, 2008, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article4749183.ece> (accessed February 7, 2010).

<sup>35</sup> As an example, Pakistan, Article 9(2) of the Pakistani Enforcement of *Shari'a* Act 1991 states "The publication and promotion of programs against or in derogation to the *Shari'ah*, including obscene material shall be forbidden." Enforcement of *Shari'ah* Act. 1991, Act X of 1991, An Act for the Enforcement of *Shari'ah*, Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part 1, June 18, 1991, <http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1991/actXof1991.html> (accessed 6 February 2010).

<sup>36</sup> Thornton, *Decline and Fall*, 112.

<sup>37</sup> Rainer Brunner, "Forms of Muslim Self-Perception in European Islam," *Sonderdrucke aus der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg*, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/20960517/Forms-of-Muslim-Self-Perception-in-European-Islam> (accessed January 15, 2010), 76.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, 75.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*, 78.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 81.

<sup>42</sup> The Pew Forum, *An Uncertain Road*, 6.

<sup>43</sup> Savage, "Europe and Islam," 43.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>45</sup> Bat Ye'or, *The Euro-Arab Axis*, 10-11.

<sup>46</sup> Dictionary.com Homepage, <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/multiculturalism> (accessed 12 February, 2010).

<sup>47</sup> Bruce Thornton, *Decline and Fall*, 96.

<sup>48</sup> Melanie Phillips, "Liberalism v Islamism", *Presentation at Neo Conference*, Stockholm, Sweden (May 11, 2007), 2, quoted in Lebl, "Radical Islam in Europe", 48.

<sup>49</sup> Bat Ye'or, *The Euro-Arab Axis*, 172-173.

<sup>50</sup> Robin Cook, "A New Dialogue with Islam," *Q News, The Muslim Magazine*, (October 1998), 297 quoted in Bat Ye'or, *The Euro-Arab Axis*, 172.

<sup>51</sup> Bat Ye'or, *The Euro-Arab Axis*, 172-173.

<sup>52</sup> Thornton, *Decline and Fall*, 93.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 113.

<sup>54</sup> Alan G. Stolberg, "Crafting National Interests in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," in *U.S. Army War College guide to National Security Issues, Vol.2: National Security Policy and Strategy*, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 2008), 5.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>56</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Redefining the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999): 22-35, (accessed January 17, 2010).

<sup>57</sup> Javier Solano, "National Interests and European Foreign Policy," Speech to the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Conference on "National Interests and European Foreign Policy," Berlin, October 7, 2008, [http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article\\_8202\\_en.htm](http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_8202_en.htm) (accessed February 10, 2010).

<sup>58</sup> Congressional Research Service (CRS), *The United States and Europe: Possible Options for U.S. Policy* (RL32577) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, March 8, 2005), 2.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> Bat Ye'or, *Eurabia*, 25.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 203.

<sup>64</sup> Bat Ye'or differentiates the ordinary European citizen from Eurabians. Eurabians are the political and policy leaders directly or indirectly involved in the institutions responsible for the transformation of Europe into Eurabia. She says "Eurabians are the agents and enforcers of this all-encompassing new Eurabian policy and culture." She goes on to say "The tension between Europeans and Eurabians arises from fundamental and uncompromising differences over political, societal, and cultural values, as well as core religious identities." Bat Ye'or, *Eurabia*, 12.

<sup>65</sup> Thornton, *Decline and Fall*, 105.

<sup>66</sup> Bawer, *While Europe Slept*, 162.

<sup>67</sup> Thornton, *Decline and Fall*, 106.

<sup>68</sup> Charles A. Kupchan, "Europe and America in the Middle East," *Current History*, 106, 698 (March 2007), 137.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> Reuters, "Solana: Mideast Peace Vital for Arab Reforms," *Haaretz*, March 3, 2004, <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/objects/pages/PrintArticle.jhtml?itemNo=400824> (accessed February 11, 2010).

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Bat Ye'or, "Eurabia," interview by Jamie Glazov, *FrontPageMagazine*, September 21, 2004, <http://frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=11429> (accessed January 17, 2010).

<sup>73</sup> Kupchan, "Europe and America in the Middle East," 138.

<sup>74</sup> Soeren Kern, "Why France Wants to Rejoin NATO," *The Brussels Journal: The Voice of Conservatism in Europe*, April 4, 2008, <http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/3208> (accessed 10 February, 2010).

<sup>75</sup> Sally McNamara, "The Lisbon Treaty Negative Implications for United States Foreign Policy," *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly* (January 1, 2010): 6266, in Proquest, (accessed February 13, 2010).

<sup>76</sup> Sally McNamara, "The Lisbon Treaty Negative Implications for United States Foreign Policy," *Hampton Roads International Security Quarterly* (January 1, 2010): 6266.

<sup>77</sup> Bat Ye'or, *FrontPageMagazine* interview.

<sup>78</sup> The options in the CRS report are summarized as: 1. De-emphasizing Europe, which is essentially an end to the political and strategic transatlantic alliance as it exists today, although the vast trade and investment relationship would remain intact; 2. Maintain the Status Quo where the United States would continue to muddle through with the European allies; 3. Coalitions of the Willing; 4. A Division of Labor which focuses mostly on the military/security dimensions of the transatlantic relationship; and 5. A New Bargain, where a new strategic bargain for the transatlantic relationship is forged.; CRS, "The United States and Europe: Possible Options for U.S. Policy", 12–18.

<sup>79</sup> CRS, *The United States and Europe*, 12–18.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>81</sup> United States State Department, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008* (Washington, DC: U.S. State Department, April 2009), <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf> (accessed 14 February, 2010), 151,135.

<sup>82</sup> James A. Russell, "Regional Threats and Security Strategy: The Troubling Case of Today's Middle East," *Strategic Studies Institute*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, November 2007), <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB814.pdf> (accessed February 14, 2010), 13; some of the regional states with which the United States maintains security guarantees include: Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Saudi Arabia.

