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Military Roles and Missions
Past Revisions and Future Prospects

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with John H. “Scot” Crerar
Preface

On 29 January 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates issued the *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report*, the first report from a process mandated by Congress that is to be repeated in the off years between Quadrennial Defense Reviews.

The first review fell short of Congressional expectations. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton issued a statement that said report showed “the Department still has a lot of work ahead to reform its organization, budgets, and processes” to execute its post-9/11 mission set. The first Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, and the framework for analysis it produced, therefore set the stage for more to follow, in the wake of the Quadrennial Defense Review due to Congress in February 2010.

This paper was prepared for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Transformation and Resources under the task order “Roles and Missions.” The task order objective was to foster better understanding of the history and implications of roles-and-missions legislation and Executive Branch responses, from the National Security Act of 1947 through the most recent legislation alluded to above.

This paper should not be construed as representing the official position of either the Department of Defense or the sponsor. Its intent is to stimulate discussion by providing, in advance of the next Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, some ways to think about the process and the results Congress expects it to produce.

Colleagues at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) who provided advice and encouragement during the course of this study include Joel Resnick, Karl Lowe, and Phil Major. Scot Crerar dug into his own files and interviewed colleagues from his distinguished career in Army Special Forces to produce the insider’s account of the creation of the United States Special Operations Command that is included as an Appendix to this report.

Special thanks to reviewers Mike Leonard of IDA, who shared the insights he gained as Executive Director of the Commission on Roles and Missions in 1994–95; and to John W. McGillvray, United States Navy (Retired), who ran the roles and missions desk in the Joint Staff’s Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) during General Colin Powell’s review of roles and missions in 1992–93 and subsequently throughout the life of the Commission on Roles and Missions.

And finally, thanks go to Editor Carolyn Leonard, whose advice made the paper easier to write and whose deft touch with a blue pencil made it easier to read.
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Executive Summary

Introduction
“Roles and missions” describe what the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps do. It is more accurate to speak of the functions assigned to them, but “roles and missions” took hold during debates that led to the National Security Act of 1947 and the term has been used ever since to encapsulate arguments about duplication of effort and which Service has the “right” to acquire and operate various platforms and weapons.

This paper posits that arguments about military roles and missions are a manifestation of the conflict between the President in his role as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the Congress empowered by the Constitution to raise and support Armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. It traces the history of roles-and-missions disputes, focusing on the tension and interaction between the Legislative and Executive Branches. It then draws on lessons from the past in an effort to understand why intended reforms have produced little more than mere “tinkering on the margins.” Finally, it offers a brief assessment of the first review conducted under the new legislation, and concludes by suggesting one way the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) might make better use of functions, by relating them to capabilities, in order to close gaps and reduce unwarranted redundancies.

A Short History of Roles and Missions
Before World War II, Service functions were derived from Presidential powers. The War Department and Navy Department were independent, Cabinet-level entities, each overseen by its own standing Committees in Congress. When both Services acquired aircraft, the two Secretaries provided written guidelines to delineate the functions of each. They cited “to provide for the common defense” (from the Preamble to the Constitution) as the basis for maintaining the Army and Navy, and the President’s role as Commander in Chief as the basis for their actions. While the functions agreed between the two Secretaries were deemed “authoritative,” they carefully noted that the President had the power to make exceptions. The powers of Congress were not mentioned.

During World War II, “War Powers” granted by Congress enabled unity of command in Washington, and in the field. The “First War Powers Act,” enacted soon after Pearl Harbor, empowered the President to adjust Executive Branch organizations in matters related to the war. President Franklin D. Roosevelt joined Prime Minister Winston Churchill in establishing the Combined Chiefs of
Staff as the supreme military body for the Anglo-American war effort. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were formed to provide the US contribution. The JCS reported to the President. To provide unity of command in the field, a single commander in each major theater exercised command over all assigned units, regardless of Service. Theater commanders were responsible to the JCS, who designated one of their members as executive agent for each unified command. A provision of the First War Powers Act said the authorities it granted would terminate six months after the end of the war, a fact that gave urgency to post-war organization.

After the war, the President and Congress both claimed —and both exercised—the power to assign functions.

Debate over post-war unification spanned several years and multiple hearings before various Congressional committees until, in February 1947, President Harry S. Truman was able to submit draft legislation that had the concurrence of the JCS and the Service Secretaries. As agreed by all, Truman informed Congress of his intent to issue an Executive Order that would delineate Service functions. However, the Marines, fearing Army intentions, urged Congress to make the Corps’ continued existence “a matter for determination by the Congress and not one to be resolved by departmental legerdemain....” Congress agreed, with the result that what some today call roles, but Congress itself called combatant functions, were included in the National Security Act of 1947.

President Truman did issue an Executive Order prescribing Service functions, but differences between it and the functions assigned by Congress led to disagreements. When the JCS were unable to agree on a solution, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal met with them in Florida to force a compromise. Truman rescinded the Executive Order and directed Forrestal to issue in its place the “Functions paper” agreed at Key West. The paper defined both primary and collateral functions of the Services. An accompanying JCS memorandum explained that the JCS member whose Service had primary responsibility for a function would be the Joint Chiefs’ agent to present to them the requirements for that function. Functions were therefore linked to requirements. The JCS guidance cited as an example the construction of a large aircraft carrier, saying that while the Navy might be unable to establish a requirement for the carrier solely on the basis of its naval function, the contribution it could make to the Air Force’s primary function of strategic air warfare might warrant construction.

Cancellation of a Navy carrier prompted the “Revolt of the Admirals” and caused Congress to restrict the Executive Branch’s ability to assign functions.

Driven by budget considerations, a new Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson, cancelled the “supercarrier” USS UNITED STATES, leaving intact the Air Force’s B-36 intercontinental bomber program. Despite much drama (the Secretary of the Navy resigned and the Chief of Naval Operations was fired), the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) found the Secre-
tary’s decision to withhold funds “entirely within the law.” But the HASC expressed deep concern about infringements on “the constitutional responsibility of the Congress to provide and maintain a Navy and to raise and support an Army.”

When in 1949 Congress amended the National Security Act to create the Department of Defense (DoD), it added a provision stating that the combatant functions previously assigned to the Services by Congress could not be transferred, reassigned, abolished, or consolidated. The restriction remains in effect today, and the “combatant functions” assigned to the Services by Congress in 1947 remain the law of the land, except that the term combatant has since detached itself from the Services.

Through the decades, the “combatant” role shifted from the Services to the unified and specified commands.

The National Security Act of 1947 made it the duty of the JCS “to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security.” The JCS agreed at Key West to continue the practice of designating one of their members as executive agent for each unified command.

In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower directed the SecDef to designate a Military Department, rather than a member of the JCS, as the executive agent for a unified command. By 1958, however, he found this channel “not usable in war” and directed the Secretary to cease using executive agents for unified commands. He asked Congress to repeal statutory authorities that vested responsibility for military operations in any official other than the SecDef, and Congress repealed provisions that gave operational authority to Service Chiefs. Congress also deleted the word combatant from the description of Service functions it had assigned in 1947, and specified that the President would establish unified or specified combatant commands for the performance of military missions.

The Key West “Functions paper” became a DoD Directive that remains in effect today.

President Eisenhower informed Congress in 1953 that the SecDef would be issuing a revision to the Key West Agreement, to make the executive agent for each unified command a civilian Service Secretary rather than a uniformed member of the JCS. The revision took the form of DoD Directive (DoDD) 5100.1, now titled Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components. Though reissued in 2002 and marked “Current as of November 21, 2003,” the directive has not been revised since 1987.

Goldwater-Nichols preserved the limits on Executive Branch freedom, but did mandate periodic reviews of roles and missions.

A 1985 Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) staff study found the absence of a comprehensive and objective review of Service roles and missions to be a significant problem,
caused by statutory restrictions on changes to the functions of each Service and the desire of the Services to avoid rehashing controversial issues. The report proposed authorizing the Secretary, with the President’s approval, to alter the assignment of Service roles and missions. As ultimately enacted, however, Goldwater-Nichols left intact Title 10 Section 125, which says that any function, power, or duty assigned to the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps by specified sections of Title 10 may be transferred, reassigned, or consolidated only if the President determines it necessary during hostilities or imminent threat, and only until the hostilities or threat have ended.

Goldwater-Nichols did attempt to compel greater attention to the functions that were not assigned by Congress, establishing a triennial “Report on the Assignment of Roles and Missions” as a function of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

Despite mounting Congressional pressure, two CJCS reviews produced only one approved change in assignment of functions—and it was promptly ignored.

The first such report was signed by Admiral William J. Crowe just before he retired, and left on the desk for his successor, General Colin L. Powell. Admiral Crowe recommended numerous changes to the functions in DoDD 5100.1, but none were ever incorporated.

In July 1992, as the due date for the next triennial report approached, Senator Sam Nunn made a speech calling for a “thorough overhaul” of roles and missions and raising several issues of costly duplication among the Services. Following Nunn’s speech, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 required the next roles and missions report, previously provided only to the SecDef, to be submitted to Congress, along with the Secretary’s comments. The same bill listed specific areas to be addressed, including cooperation between the Army and the Marine Corps and the respective roles and missions of long-range bombers, carrier-based aviation, and long-range theater attack aircraft.

These Congressional actions heightened expectations for General Powell’s report, which, strictly by calendar, fell due the day after the 1992 election. Candidate Bill Clinton increased interest even more in an August 1992 speech in which he suggested that realignment of the military’s roles and missions could lead to substantial savings, and promised if he became President to convene a meeting similar to Key West “to hammer out a new understanding about...military roles and missions in the 1990’s and beyond.”

Only one of General Powell’s recommendations required a formal change to assigned functions; namely, that close air support (CAS) be assigned as a primary function for all Services. Secretary Les Aspin approved, and informed Congress that he had so directed. General Powell proposed the necessary revision to DoDD 5100.1, but the change was never incorporated, and the Army never embraced the Secretary’s decision, as evidenced by current joint doctrine that says, The Army does not consider its attack helicopters a CAS system.
Still seeking a result that two CJCS reviews had failed to deliver, Congress created the Commission on Roles and Missions.

HASC Chairman Ron Dellums pronounced General Powell’s report mere “tinkering at the margins of organization,” and a future chairman of the committee, Congressman Ike Skelton, declared that “For many in Congress, there is too much of the same status quo in the final report….As a result, I fear that the Services may have missed a chance to direct their own fate.”

Congress in the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 found that the triennial review of roles and missions had not produced the comprehensive review envisioned, and established the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) to “review the efficacy and appropriateness for the post-Cold War of the current allocations among the Armed Forces of roles, missions, and functions.”

The CORM rejected the Key West approach, and called for capabilities to take precedence over functions.

In forwarding the Commission’s report to Congress in May 1995, CORM Chairman (and soon-to-be Deputy Secretary of Defense) John P. White stated that, “The traditional approach to roles and missions—attempting to allocate them among the Services in the context of the Key West Agreement of 1948—is no longer appropriate. That approach leads to institutional quarrels…and unsatisfactory compromises. More importantly, it does not lead to achieving the Department’s goals.”

The CORM found that each Service tried to deliver to the combatant commands what the Service viewed as the best possible set of specific capabilities—without taking into account the similar capabilities provided by the other Services. The CORM therefore recommended that capabilities and requirements be reviewed in the aggregate, thus starting DoD on the path toward “capabilities-based planning.”

In keeping with CORM advice, the Department’s emphasis shifted to capabilities.

First, the CJCS published Joint Vision 2010 to provide a common direction for use by the Services “in developing their unique capabilities within a joint framework of doctrine and programs.” The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) conducted in 1997 then sought to ensure “a force capable of carrying out today’s missions with acceptable strategic risk, while allowing us to stabilize our investment program in order to achieve the future joint force capabilities described in Joint Vision 2010.”

The next QDR in 2001 explicitly adopted a capabilities-based model, and in 2003, CJCS Instruction 3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) seemed to complete the shift away from functions as an organizing principle:
JCID S will provide...an enhanced methodology utilizing joint concepts that will identify and describe existing and future shortcomings [and] **identify the most effective approach or combination of approaches** to resolve these shortcomings [from among] **capability proposals developed throughout the department** [using] an operationally based assessment of all potential DOTMLPF* approaches to solving (or mitigating) one or more of the capability gaps (needs) previously identified.

Boldface was added to this passage to emphasize that under JCIDS, capabilities are no longer the exclusive province of a Service based on the assignment of functions: when a capability need is identified, all DoD components are free to propose a solution. Subsequent versions no longer include the bold statement, but the May 2007 version says “JCIDS implements a broader review of capability proposals developed throughout the Department of Defense,” which still implies that who develops a capability is based on rigorous analysis of competing proposals vice the *a priori* assignment of a function.

**After the CORM, periodic reviews by the CJCS dwindled to nothing.**

The Joint Staff’s comments on the CORM report and its work on the 1997 QDR were deemed to “count” in lieu of the triennial review, and the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 repealed the requirement. For the next report, the CJCS was to submit to Congress a separate “assessment of functions (or roles and missions),” to be based on the findings in the 2001 QDR report, which had already been issued. Whether this assessment was ever delivered is not a matter of public record; in any event, it produced no discernable change.

After 2001, the statutory requirement was for the CJCS to review roles and missions as part of his independent review of the QDR. The result was a four-sentence paragraph in the “Chairman’s Assessment of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review” that said the review had “examined the challenges of the 21st century and the responsibilities of our Armed Forces in meeting them, and found roles and missions to be fundamentally sound.” The following year, a frustrated Congress reinstated the requirement, this time in the form of a Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM).

**The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QMR) is the latest attempt by Congress to bring about the “overhaul” of roles and missions.**

The Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 mandated a roles and missions review every four years. The first one was conducted in 2008.

**Lessons from the Past**

Enough has transpired in the 62 years since the National Security Act of 1947 became law to permit some learnable lessons to be identified, including the following:

* DOTMLPF = doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities.
“Unnecessary Duplication” has been the target since at least 1986, but decades of debate have produced only “tinkering at the margins.”

Starting with Goldwater-Nichols, Congress has repeatedly called for roles-and-missions reform. The consistently stated goal has been to eliminate unnecessary duplication. The consistently cited source of such duplication has been the Key West Agreement, and the consistently touted example has been “four air forces.” Because Key West was an agreement among the JCS, presided over by the SecDef, the duplication represented by “four air forces” is seen as an Executive Branch creation. But Key West came about only after the National Security Act of 1947 had specified that the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps would each include “such aviation forces as may be organic therein,” in passages that Congress two years later said could not be altered except temporarily during hostilities. Thus a fundamental degree of duplication among the Services is present by Act of Congress, and efforts to weed out “unnecessary” duplication have been constrained to, and criticized for, mere “tinkering at the margins.”

Tinkering at the margins is painful and is seen as unproductive, as evidenced by the fact that DoDD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, has gone unrevised for more than two decades. In truth, few pay any attention to functions and it is hard to argue that anyone should.

Functions are hard to keep current and harder still to enforce.

The functions agreed to at Key West, codified in DoDD 5100.1, and modified only reluctantly in years since, are far from a complete list of what the Services do. Other functions, powers, duties, responsibilities, missions, and tasks have been assigned to the Military Departments and Services by executive agency arrangements and in other directives. The Army, for example, lists 129 “Executive Agent Responsibilities Assigned to the Secretary of the Army.” Still other functions have been assumed by the Services and de facto “assigned” when enabling programs were included in Defense authorization and appropriations bills: the Marine Corps’ Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force is an example. Some functions assigned to the Services are neglected or under-resourced, such as the rotary-wing CAS function assigned to the Army on General Powell’s recommendation, and nuclear aspects of the “strategic air and missile warfare” function assigned to the Air Force.

DoDD 5100.1 lists the “command functions” assigned to commanders of combatant commands by Goldwater-Nichols, but does not reflect the functions of “functional combatant commands,” which are listed instead in the Unified Command Plan. Responsibilities are also assigned—to Services, Agencies, and combatant commands—in DoD Directives.
Functions are not capabilities: they don’t satisfy needs.
The “Functions” framework that has purported to guide the determination of requirements since DoD’s creation has not done the job. The consequences of its failure include orphan missions such as cyber and chemical-biological-radiological defense; capability gaps embodied in the phrase, “high demand/low density”; omissions such as a specified nuclear role for the Air Force; a confused chain of command as documented in The Guts to Try, Blackhawk Down, and Not a Good Day to Die; and an overall slowness to adapt, as evidenced by repeated but largely unanswered calls for a “whole of government” approach to threats that straddle the seams between military, law enforcement, intelligence, and economic responsibilities.

There can be winners and losers, but not big losers.
When a Service feels its very existence is threatened, as did the Marines in 1947 and the Navy in 1949, one can expect that Service to spare no effort in rallying Congressional and public support. It is hard to envision resolution of a roles and missions issue where one Service “loses” and the others are perceived as having won.

Public debate is part of the process.
President Truman tried to suppress dissent during the struggle over unification and paid a price, in the media and in Congress.

President Eisenhower lamented duplications, inefficiencies, and publicized disputes, and said that in Washington such rivalries usually found expression in the Services’ Congressional and press activities. He directed the SecDef to move Service legislative liaison and public affairs personnel and activities into the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and urged Congress to pass enabling legislation. Congress rebuffed the request, instead placing in the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 a provision that the Military Departments were to be “separately organized” and reaffirming the right of the Service Secretaries to present recommendations to Congress—in effect ensuring that the Services would always be able to present views contrary to those of the President and the SecDef.

Timing matters.
In decades of roles and missions actions and reactions, timing has been a frequent factor, particularly with respect to which political party controls the White House and the Congress. When HASC Chairman Ron Dellums chided a Joint Staff briefer about issues General Powell’s report did not address, he was reminded that the report was based on the National Military Strategy developed during the preceding administration. Congress then established the CORM to take another look, but by the time the CORM issued its report, the Democratic 103rd Congress had been supplanted by a Republican majority in both Houses.
Roles and missions reform was not in the House Republicans’ “Contract With America” and attention turned elsewhere.

The newest requirement calls for a roles and missions review every four years. Starting in 2011, it will be part of an alternating cycle, with the QDR conducted during the first year of each new administration and the QRM two years later.

**Congressional committee structure may influence outcomes.**

Passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 resulted in the merger of previously separate Military Affairs and Naval Affairs into a single Committee on Armed Services in each chamber. How much that influenced the bill finally passed is a matter of conjecture, but it is reasonable to wonder, for example, whether greater efficiency might result if the multiple committees that provided oversight of the separate agencies merged to form the Department of Homeland Security were restructured.

**Real change can result when the Legislative and Executive Branches work together.**

The drafting and passage of Goldwater-Nichols required adherents in both branches to have a precise understanding of, and respect for, the Constitutional line between the powers of the Presidency and the Congress. *Victory on the Potomac: the Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* by James R. Locher, III is a case study in how those overlapping powers are perceived and can be applied to effect change. The Nunn-Cohen Amendment, which mandated establishment of a combatant command for special operations, similarly took years of efforts by military and civilian, Legislative and Executive Branch forces.

**Results of the First Quadrennial Review**

In establishing the requirement for a Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, Congress made clear the expected outcomes include the identification of unnecessary duplication and gaps in capability and a plan for resolving them. The first such review was conducted in 2008 and the report, issued on 29 January 2009, declared it was “the first review conducted with the intention of establishing a framework for performing roles and missions analysis on a recurring basis every four years.”

The report identifies six *Core Mission Areas* corresponding to the six approved Joint Operating Concepts that establish context for force development planning and resourcing activities, and nine *Core Competencies* corresponding to the nine Joint Capability Areas established following the 2006 QDR. *Functions* are “the appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, office, or organization as defined in the National Security Act of 1947, including responsibilities of the Armed Forces as amended.” According to the report, strategy documents like the National Defense Strategy, Core Mission Areas, and Core
Competencies generate demand for capabilities, and the assignment of Functions in turn generates the supply.

The framework suggests that better balance could be achieved by aligning the supply of capabilities (represented by the functions assigned in DoDD 5100.1) with the demands (represented by the Joint Operating Concepts and Joint Capability Areas) to identify gaps and redundancies. In fact, mapping functions to Joint Capability Areas would be an interim step at best, because history shows that assignment of a function does not assure the availability of the requisite capability.

The first QRM is a start, but how well the framework of Core Mission Areas and Core Competencies succeeds in fixing responsibility for providing capabilities, identifying gaps and duplication, and devising a plan for addressing them must await the next QRM in 2011, which will be based on the QDR just getting underway.

A Way Forward

In a hearing before the HASC on 20 June 2007, former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre testified on “Roles, Missions, and Requirements of the Department of Defense.” Included in his prepared testimony were observations about Pentagon supply and demand:

We need to organize the Department’s decision-making procedures so that they bring both the advocates of supply and demand to the table equally before the Secretary. I believe that too often the Washington councils are populated just by the “supply” side of the equation. The Chairman and Vice Chairman have to carry the full burden of representing operational demand, and I don’t think that they have all the horsepower that is needed for this task.

One way to meet Dr. Hamre’s goal of bringing the advocates of supply and demand to the table equally before the Secretary would be to have the Services assess their programs against the full set of functions assigned to them, and identify the capabilities available to perform each function. A comprehensive, up-to-date list of those “functions” (by any definition of that term) would give the Services a better and more transparent basis for identifying internal capability gaps and overlaps and would give the SecDef a better way to view and make decisions regarding supply versus demand.
1 Introduction

“Roles and missions” is shorthand for what the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps do. It is more accurate to speak of “functions” assigned to them, but “roles and missions” caught on during debates that led to the National Security Act of 1947, and the term has been used ever since to encapsulate arguments about duplication of effort and about which Service has the “right” to acquire and operate certain platforms and weapons.

At their core, roles-and-missions disputes are a struggle for primacy. They take place—

- within the Services, most typically in arguments over budget priorities, as between bomber advocates and the “fighter mafia” in the Air Force, surface warfare and aviation adherents in the Navy, and “light” and “heavy” factions in the Army.

- between the Services, over responsibilities—whether the Air Force or Navy should be charged with delivering nuclear weapons, for example, or whether the Army or Air Force should have the final say on “requirements” for defending ground forces from enemy air attack.

- between the Department of Defense (DoD) and other agencies, such as when deciding which department should lead “soft power” stability and reconstruction efforts.

At another level, however, arguments about military roles and missions are part of the checks and balances written into the Constitution of the United States. Like the War Powers Act of 1973, enacted over Presidential veto to constrain future Chief Executives from committing US forces to combat without the approval of Congress, roles and missions are a manifestation of the conflict between the President in his role as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the Congress—empowered by the Constitution to declare war, raise and support Armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directed the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the roles and missions, core competencies, and capabilities of DoD. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Forces Transformation and Resources was assigned the lead for the 2008 review within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and requested that the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) help develop an understand of the history and implications of roles-and-missions legislation and Executive Branch responses, from the National Security Act of 1947 through the most recent legislation.

This paper traces the history of roles-and-missions disputes, focusing on the tension and interaction between the Legislative and Executive Branches. It draws on lessons from the past 62 years in an effort to understand why intended reforms have produced little more than what one Congressional committee chairman dismissed as mere “tinkering on the margins.” Finally, it offers a brief assessment of the first review under the new legislation, and concludes by suggesting a way the SecDef might make better use of historically assigned functions, by relating them to capabilities to close gaps and reduce unwarranted redundancies.
2 A Short History of Roles and Missions

Before World War II, Service functions were derived from Presidential powers.

For a century-and-a-half, the War Department (established 1789) and Navy Department (1798) were independent, Cabinet-level entities. The War Department was overseen by standing Committees on Military Affairs and the Navy by standing Committees on Naval Affairs—the Senate’s two committees having been established in 1816 and the House’s in 1822.

In the field, Army and Navy elements found ways to operate together, as in the Vicksburg campaign conducted by Major General Ulysses S. Grant and Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter during the Civil War. But the “jointness” they achieved was local; there was no top-down delineation of responsibilities.

Only when both Services acquired aircraft did the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy find it necessary to spell out their respective responsibilities in a document called Joint Action of the Army and Navy, first published in 1927. Its stated purpose was “to distinguish between the functions of the Army and Navy in such a manner as to establish an authoritative and adequate basis for development, planning, procurement, and training of each service; and for their guidance in joint operations.”

The Preamble to the Constitution—“to insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, and promote the general welfare”—was cited as the basis for maintaining the Army and Navy, and the President’s role as Commander in Chief was cited as the basis for their actions. While the functions prescribed by the two Secretaries were deemed “authoritative,” they carefully noted that the “President has the power to make exceptions.” The powers of the Congress were not mentioned.

Joint Action of the Army and Navy declared that:

The Army and the Navy together constitute the Nation’s military power.... Conjointly and in cooperation, [their common mission is] to defend the territory of the United States...[and] to protect and promote the interests and policies of the United States in peace and in war.
To accomplish the above mission, the Army performs functions that nor-
mally pertain to land operations; the Navy performs functions that nor-
mally pertain to sea operations. The air forces of the Army are an integral
part of the land forces. The air forces of the Navy are an integral part of
the sea forces....

Under this policy:

(1) The air component of the Army conducts air operations over the land
and such air operations over the sea as are incident to the accomplish-
ment of Army functions.

(2) The air component of the Navy conducts air operations over the sea
and such air operations over the land as are incident to the accomplish-
ment of Navy functions.²

As clear as this policy might have sounded, it left room for friction, particularly
at the coastline where land and sea meet. The drive for an independent air force
owed much of its momentum to the sinking of a captured German battleship by
land-based bombers under the command of Army Brigadier General Billy Mitchell
in 1921, and the Army Air Corps thereafter claimed responsibility for coastal de-
fense up to 300 miles out to sea. In 1931, the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of
Naval Operations agreed that Navy air would conduct missions directly connected
with fleet movements and that land-based Army air would defend the home coasts;
however, the next Chief of Naval Operations withdrew from the agreement. In
1933, Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur assigned the aerial coast de-
fense mission to the Army Air Corps, while in 1934 the Joint Board stated that the
fleet maintained primary responsibility for coastal defense. During joint exercises
in 1937, Army Air Corps long-range bombers located and simulated bombing a
Navy battleship at sea, and in 1938, Army bombers successfully intercepted an Italian
ocean liner 600 miles at sea in the North Atlantic. Both feats were leaked to the
media, and the wrath of Navy officials prompted the War Department to limit Army
air operations to a distance of 100 miles from the coastline.³

Perhaps anticipating disputes like the one over coastal defense, and with the
intent of achieving the most effective cooperation, the Secretary of War and the
Secretary of the Navy in Joint Action of the Army and Navy prescribed governing
principles as follows:

(1) Neither Service will attempt to restrict in any way the means and
weapons used by the other Service in carrying out its functions.
(2) Neither Service will restrict in any way the area of operations of the other Service in carrying out its functions.

(3) Each Service will lend the utmost assistance possible to the other Service in carrying out its functions.⁴

Aware that these arrangements could lead to duplication in aircraft development programs, the two Secretaries jointly directed the following:

Projects of the Army and Navy relating to their respective air components shall, in peace time, with a view to insuring the minimum of overlap and duplication, be considered by the Aeronautical Board prior to being used as a basis for action.⁵

*Joint Action of the Army and Navy* remained in effect through World War II, but by 1945, many of its provisions had been overtaken by events.⁶

**During World War II, “War Powers” granted by Congress enabled unity of command in Washington, and in the field.**

Eleven days after Pearl Harbor, Congress passed the First War Powers Act, 1941. Title I, “Coordination of Executive Bureaus in the Interest of the More Efficient Concentration of the Government,” empowered the President to adjust the organization of the Executive Branch in matters related to the conduct of the war.⁷ A committee formed in May 1944 to study postwar organization for national defense found that:

At the outset of the war the Army and Navy were far apart in their thinking and planning....Because each knew so little about the capabilities and limitations of the other, adequate mutual understanding which is so essential to unity of effort was lacking to an alarming degree. Moreover, the War and Navy Departments were organized along cumbersome and inefficient lines which hindered rather than facilitated cooperation. It became evident immediately that radical reorganization, both in Washington and in the field was necessary. Fortunately, the broad war powers granted the President by Congress permitted immediate action. The Joint Chiefs of Staff came into being as an agency to direct the broader phases of the conduct of the war. The War and Navy Departments were substantially reorganized by Executive Orders. The principle of unity of command in the field was adopted and supreme commanders were appointed in the combat area; but this did not produce complete integration of effort within theaters of operations.⁸

Wartime unity was driven from the top. President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill established the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the
supreme military body for strategic direction of the Anglo-American war effort. The British Chiefs of Staff Committee represented the United Kingdom, and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were formed to provide the US contribution. The first members of the JCS were the "opposite numbers" to the British Service Chiefs and included not only the Chief of Staff of the Army and Chief of Naval Operations, but also the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, who, although not the head of a Service, was added to provide an American counterpart to the British Chief of the Air Staff, who represented the independent Royal Air Force.* The JCS reported to the President rather than to the Secretaries of War and the Navy.

To provide unity of command in the field, a single commander in each major theater exercised command over all assigned units, regardless of their Service. The theater commanders were responsible to the JCS, who designated one of their members as executive agent for each unified command. General Dwight D. Eisenhower in Europe got his orders from General George C. Marshall and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz in the Pacific got his from Admiral Ernest J. King.† With the President performing as an active commander-in-chief, advised by the JCS on matters of strategy and operations, and issuing orders to field commanders through the JCS, the civilian Secretaries of War and the Navy were not part of the operational chain of command, but remained responsible for administrative and logistical support.

These arrangements were enabled by the First War Powers Act but not formally enacted in law. A provision of the enabling legislation said the authorities it granted would terminate six months after the end of the war, a fact that made post-war organization especially urgent to the Army Air Forces, lest they automatically revert to their ante bellum state.‡

**After the war, the President and Congress both claimed—and both exercised—the power to assign functions.**

As early as 1943, ideas for unification began to rise from War Department staff officers dissatisfied with the ad hoc nature of the JCS. By spring 1944, a House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy was holding hearings at which War Department officials argued for, and Department of the Navy representatives argued against, a "Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces.” The Select Committee

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† Lieutenant General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, became Commanding General of the US Army Air Forces in March 1942.

‡ Lieutenant General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, became Commanding General of the US Army Air Forces in March 1942.
concluded in its 15 June 1944 report that it was too soon “to write the pattern of any consolidation, if indeed such consolidation is ultimately decided to be a wise course of action.” Instead, the Select Committee urged a careful study of this problem.\footnote{\textsuperscript{12}}

While the House Select Committee was holding hearings, the JCS formed a “Special Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee on Reorganization of National Defense,” headed by retired Admiral James O. Richardson, to study alternative organizations, including a one-, two-, or three-department structure. The Special Committee’s report took note of underlying tensions between the Legislative and Executive Branches:

The problem of overall reorganization of the armed forces has been of concern for many years. Since World War I, numerous bills which would either merge the War and Navy Departments or create a separate Air Force have been introduced in Congress and considered by Congressional committees. During that time no less than twenty-six Departmental reorganization studies have been made. Not one of these bills or studies has produced comprehensive results.

The Congress is again actively concerned with this problem and looks to the military profession for definite proposals. Unless an acceptable solution is developed by the Armed Services, Congress may take the initiative and adopt its own. Bills for reorganization were introduced into the present Congress before it had been in session for one month.\footnote{\textsuperscript{13}}

The Special Committee’s report was issued in April 1945, the day before President Roosevelt died. It recommended a single Department of the Armed Forces, with a Commander of Armed Forces reporting to the Secretary of Armed Forces, but wearing another hat as Chief of Staff to the President. The Committee’s chairman, Admiral Richardson, filed a minority report, non-concurring in the Committee’s recommendations. Among the reasons given for his dissent was the following:

I believe it unwise to give power proposed herein [i.e., in the Committee’s majority report] to one Secretary and one Commander of the Armed Forces. Aside from the difficulty of finding men capable of discharging those vast duties acceptably, there is real danger that one component will be seriously affected by the decisions of one man to the detriment of the effectiveness of the Armed Forces as a whole.

Admiral Richardson went on to make clear which component he thought was in danger:

I am not convinced that an Air Force should be set up on a basis coordinate with the Army and Navy. Proponents of this idea assert that this is
necessary for full development of air power. Naval air power has developed within the Navy. I fear that the creation of an Air Force on a basis coordinate with the Army and Navy would inevitably draw the Naval Aeronautical Organization out of the fabric of the Navy into which it is now intimately woven. Such disintegration of the Navy would be prejudicial to the effectiveness of the Armed Forces as a whole.

The admiral concluded his minority report by proposing that, instead of reorganizing the Armed Forces, "the present Joint Chiefs of Staff organization be continued after the war by statute" and "the reorganizational gains of the War and Navy Departments made possible by Executive Order and administrative action be continued after the war by statute."

Admiral Richardson thus gave expression to two fundamental Constitutional issues regarding Service roles and missions. First was the fear that if one man—the Secretary of the Armed Forces or the Commander of Armed Forces—were empowered to make decisions regarding roles and missions, he might favor one component over another, threatening the existence of the one not favored. Second, the way to guard against such an eventuality was for Congress to prescribe the organization of the armed forces by statute.*

As parties inside the Executive Branch staked out their positions, Congress maintained its interest in post-war organization. In May 1945, the Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee suggested to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that alternatives to the proposed one-department structure be examined. Forrestal asked Ferdinand Eberstadt, a former Chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board, to head the study. The Eberstadt Report ultimately recommended retaining independent Service departments, including a new Air Department, each to be headed by a civilian secretary with cabinet rank. To coordinate foreign and military policy, Eberstadt recommended creating a National Security Council. He also recommended formal statutory establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a Joint Staff to support them. Forrestal forwarded the Eberstadt Report to Congress in October

* Decades after Congress took Admiral Richardson’s advice and prescribed the organization of the armed forces by statute, fear that one component might be favored lingers. Dr. Mackubin Owens, Professor of Strategy and Force Planning at the US Naval War College, has written on the dangers of "strategic monism"—which he describes as the belief that the United States should invest in a single, strategically decisive capability, citing the "air power can do it all" argument as an example. Mackubin Thomas Owens, Jr., "Goldwater-Nichols: A Ten-Year Retrospective," Marine Corps Gazette (December 1996): 48; see also Owens’ "Judging Rumsfeld," National Review Online, 5 January 2005, 7:15 a.m.
1945, two days after the JCS had forwarded the report of the Special Committee on Reorganization to the President, without offering a JCS “position” but with each Chief instead sending his views to the President separately.15

Hearings in late 1945 before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs highlighted the differences over unification. War Department officials testified in favor of a single department with three Services (Army, Navy, and Air Force). Department of the Navy representatives opposed the single department, calling instead for three departments, each with a civilian secretary of cabinet rank, as Eberstadt had proposed.

While those at the top debated the fate of entire departments, subordinate layers were more concerned with the fate of their communities. Advocates of an independent air force called for naval aviation to be incorporated into the new Service. At the same time, high-ranking Army officers strongly opposed retaining Fleet Marine Forces, advocating instead a much smaller Marine Corps with no major land combat responsibilities. General Eisenhower, by then Chief of Staff of the Army, submitted a paper to the JCS warning that, “Once Marine Corps units attain such a size as to require the combining of arms to accomplish their missions, they are assuming and duplicating the mission of the Army and we have in effect two land armies.” General Eisenhower went on to recommend that—

- The Marine Corps be maintained solely as an adjunct of the fleet and participate “only in minor shore combat operations in which the Navy alone is interested.”
- It be recognized that “the land aspects of amphibious operations” would be undertaken by the Army; consequently, “the Marine forces will not be expanded in time of war.”
- It be agreed that the Navy would not develop a land Army or a so-called amphibious Army. Marine units should be limited in size to “the equivalent of the regiment” and the total size of the Corps “therefore be limited to some 50,000 or 60,000 men.”16

On 13 May 1946, the Senate Military Affairs Committee voted 13 to 2 in favor of a bill that called for a single department. The Senate Naval Affairs Committee held concurrent hearings, during which supporters of the Department of the Navy’s position testified against the bill. One witness was General Alexander Vandegrift, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, who called on Congress to protect the Marines from the predations of the Army:

In placing its case in your hands, the Marine Corps remembers that it was this same Congress which, in 1789, called it into a long and useful service to the Nation. The Marine Corps feels that the question of its continued existence is likewise a matter for determination by the Congress and not one to be resolved by departmental legerdemain or a quasi-legislative process enforced by the War Department.

The Marine Corps, then, believes it has earned this right—to have its future decided by the legislative body which created it—nothing more. Sentiment is not a valid consideration in determining questions of national security. We have pride in ourselves and in our past but we do not rest our case on any presumed ground of gratitude owing us from the Nation. The bended knee is not a tradition of our corps. If the Marine as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after 170 years of service, he must go. But I think you will agree with me that he has earned the right to depart with dignity and honor, not by subjugation to the status of uselessness and servility planned for him by the War Department.  

On 15 May 1946, a letter signed jointly by the Chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Naval Affairs informed Navy Secretary Forrestal that the bill the Military Affairs Committee passed was unlikely to be passed by Congress. They cited a number of reasons, including the following:

It permits the executive branch of the Government, without prior reference to or approval by the Congress, either to abolish the Marine Corps outright or to divest it of most of its vital functions.

It permits, without prior reference to Congress, the executive branch of the Government to transfer vital naval aviation functions to the Army Air Corps.

Obviously in search of a unification formula acceptable to both the Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Committees of Congress, just two days before President Harry S. Truman had directed the Secretaries of War and the Navy to develop a mutually agreeable plan for the post-war organization of the armed forces. Evidently aware of that directive, the letter to Forrestal from the chairmen of the two Naval Affairs committees went on to warn that:

Any compromise which results from a conference by the War and Navy Departments which does not embody most of the views of those Members of Congress who have made a study of the importance of sea-air power in
our national defense structure, and which in general does not conform with the views expressed in this letter would not, in our opinion, be in the best interests of the United States.18

On 31 May 1946, Secretary of War Robert Patterson and Forrestal informed the President that they had reached agreement on all but four sticking points. On 15 June 1946, President Truman responded, providing his position on the four points as follows:

1. **SINGLE MILITARY DEPARTMENT.** There should be one Department of National Defense. It would be under the control of a civilian who would be a member of the cabinet. Each of the services would be headed by a civilian with the title of “Secretary.” These secretaries would be charged with the internal administration within their own services. They would not be members of the cabinet....

2. **THREE COORDINATE SERVICES.** There should be three coordinate services—the Army, Navy and Air Force....

3. **AVIATION.** The Air Force shall have the responsibility for the development, procurement, maintenance and operation of the military air resources of the United States with the following exceptions, in which responsibility must be vested in the Navy:

   (1) Ship, carrier, and water-based aircraft essential to Naval operations, and aircraft of the United States Marine Corps.

   (2) Land-type aircraft necessary for essential internal administration and for air transport over routes of sole interest to Naval forces and where the requirements cannot be met by normal air transport facilities.

   (3) Land-type aircraft necessary for the training of personnel for the aforementioned purposes.

   Land-based planes for Naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping can and should be manned by Air Force personnel. If the three services are to work as a team there must be close cooperation with interchange of personnel and special training for specific duties.

   Within its proper sphere of operation, Naval Aviation must not be restricted but must be given every opportunity to develop its maximum usefulness.

4. **UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.** There should be maintained as a constituent part of the Naval service a balanced Fleet Marine Force including its supporting air component to perform the following functions:
(1) Service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of Advanced Naval Bases or for the conduct of such limited land operations as are essential to the prosecution of a Naval campaign.

(2) To continue the development of those aspects of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique [sic], and equipment employed by the landing forces.

(3) To provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy.

(4) To provide security detachments for protection of Naval property at naval stations and bases.¹⁹

President Truman declared these four points, upon which the War Department and Navy Department had been unable to agree, to be “herewith decided” and sent them, along with the points the two departments had agreed on, to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Military and Naval Affairs with the hope that “the Congress will pass legislation as soon as possible effecting a unification based on these twelve principles.”²⁰

In January 1947, Patterson and Forrestal informed President Truman that they had come to agreement on a unification plan both departments could support. In a document that both signed, they recommended that the armed forces be organized under a single Secretary of National Defense so as to place the Army, the Navy (to include the Marine Corps and Naval Aviation), and the Air Force, each with a military chief, under the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, respectively. In addition, the two Secretaries informed the President that, “We are agreed that the proper method of setting forth the functions (so-called roles and missions) of the armed forces is by the issuance of an Executive Order concurrently with your approval of the appropriate legislation.”²¹

In late February 1947, President Truman submitted draft legislation that reflected the agreement reached by the Secretaries of War and the Navy and that had the concurrence of the JCS. In transmitting the bill to Congress, President Truman expressed his intent to issue an Executive Order that would delineate Service functions.

While these actions were taking place within the Executive Branch, the Legislative Branch, for reasons having nothing to do with defense reunification but rather in an effort to streamline its own activities, had passed the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. The Act merged into a single committee in each house the previously
separate Committee on Military Affairs and Committee on Naval Affairs. In the Senate, the Administration’s draft unification bill was referred to the newly formed Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). It breezed through the committee and the Senate floor vote without controversy. Hoping to obtain equally easy agreement by avoiding the newly formed House Armed Services Committee (HASC), which it saw as much more pro-Navy, the administration arranged to have the bill referred to the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. The chairman of that committee, Congressman Clare Hoffman (R-MI), numbered among his acquaintances a Marine lieutenant colonel who was close to the Commandant, and soon two Marine officers were advisors to the Congressman. In hearings before this committee, General Eisenhower’s previously undisclosed JCS paper expressing Army hostility to the Marine Corps was made public and tipped the scales in favor of the Marine Corps’ position. Hoffman proposed amendments to formally assign functions to the Services. Though opposed by War and Navy Department officials, the amendments were adopted, and were accepted by the Administration lest it get no unification bill at all.

As a result of Hoffman's amendments, what some call roles, but Congress itself later described as combatant functions, were included in the following numbered sections of Public Law 80-253—better remembered as the National Security Act of 1947:

§205(e). In general the United States Army, within the Department of the Army, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.

§206(b). In general the United States Navy, within the Department of the Navy, shall include naval combat and services forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea.

§206(c). The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.
§208(f). In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations.\textsuperscript{24}

The National Security Act of 1947 created the independent United States Air Force that had been the dream of War Department aviators from the time of Brigadier General Billy Mitchell and even before. But in specifying that the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps would each include combat and service forces “and such aviation forces as may be organic therein,” Congress sowed the seeds for decades of debate. In the words of Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, who commanded Eighth Air Force earlier in the war and in April 1945 became Deputy Commander of the Army Air Forces and Chief of the Air Staff, the National Security Act of 1947 “legitimized four military air forces.”\textsuperscript{25}

Tacked on the end of each Service’s statutory reason for being was an additional sentence that said the Army, Navy, and Air Force would be “responsible for the preparation of [land, naval, and air] forces [respectively] necessary for the effective prosecution of war.” Thus the National Security Act of 1947 assigned to the Services both a \textit{warfighter} role (prompt and sustained combat) and a \textit{force provider} role (preparation of forces for war). Tension between these roles would not be completely resolved until 1986; even today, while there is consensus that “roles are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services were established in law,” there is no agreement as to which parts of the above passages describe the Services’ \textit{roles} and which describe their \textit{functions}.

In a 1993 report to Congress on the roles, missions, and functions of the armed forces, General Colin Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) defined the Services’ roles as follows:

- Army: organize, train, and equip forces for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land
- Navy: organize, train, and equip forces for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on and from the sea
- Air Force: organize, train, and equip forces for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations
- Marine Corps: organize, train, and equip forces for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases, and the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign
In simple terms, then, the primary function of the Services...is to provide forces—each organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role—to be employed by the commander of a combatant command in the accomplishment of a mission.26

If providing forces to perform a role is a function, then the role as articulated by General Powell would appear to be prompt and sustained combat, service with the fleet, etc.

Two years later, the Congressionally-mandated Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) saw it just the opposite, with “force provider” as the role and “prompt and sustained combat” as the function:

Simply stated, the role of the Services...is to provide capabilities (forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform specific functions) to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission.27

Congress, on the other hand, continues to avoid using the term role (except when calling for reviews of roles and missions), and describes the “broad and enduring purpose” of the institutions it creates as simply a function. In 1986, when it directed the establishment of a unified combatant command for special operations forces, Congress said, “The principal function of the command is to prepare special operations forces to carry out assigned missions.”28 (See Appendix C for a more detailed discussion of terminology.)

The Executive Branch, too, assigned functions. As he had notified Congress he intended to do when he forwarded the draft legislation, on the same day he signed the National Security Act of 1947 into law, President Truman issued an Executive Order prescribing “the assignment of primary functions and responsibilities to the three armed services” (the Marine Corps was then considered a component of the Navy rather than a Service).29 Differences between the Executive Order and the functions written into the Act itself, plus budgetary pressures on favored Service programs, led almost immediately to disagreement, primarily over the respective functions of the Air Force and naval aviation.

The Congressional Aviation Policy Board, chaired by Senator Owen Brewster (R-ME), blamed the impasse between the Air Force and Navy on shortfalls in strategic planning. The Air Force believed it had been given exclusive responsibility for the strategic air mission while the Navy believed the law permitted it to “develop any type of weapon and base its plans and requirements on the utilization of any
weapon.” The conflict between the law and the Executive Order prompted the Aviation Policy Board to call for “immediate clarification,” either by amending the National Security Act or by revising the Executive Order.\footnote{30}

When the JCS were unable to agree on how to revise the Executive Order, James Forrestal, promoted from Secretary of the Navy to become the nation’s first Secretary of Defense, met in March 1948 at Key West, Florida with the Chiefs of the Army, Air Force, and Navy to force a compromise. The result was called the “Functions paper” at the time, but is better known today as the “Key West Agreement of 1948.” The paper defined the common functions of the armed forces; the functions of the JCS; and both primary and collateral functions to the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force. The agreement explained “collateral functions” as follows:

The forces developed and trained to perform the primary functions \cite{31} of a Service shall be employed to support and supplement the other Services in carrying out their primary functions, where and whenever such participation will result in increased effectiveness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff member of the Service having primary responsibility for a function shall be the agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present to that body the requirements for and plans for the employment of all forces to carry out that function. He shall also be responsible for presenting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final decision any disagreement within the field which has not been resolved. This shall not be construed to prevent any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from presenting unilaterally any issue of disagreement with another Service.\footnote{31}

\footnote{NOTE: The term \textit{requirements} is highlighted above, and in passages that follow, because the issue of who determines requirements is fundamental to \textit{roles and missions}.}

As a guide intended for military planners, the JCS developed a Memorandum for the Record that amplified and explained provisions of the Functions paper. They were unable to come to full agreement, and the paper was referred to Secretary Forrestal, who amended and approved it as follows:

\begin{flushleft}
26 March 1948
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\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD}
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
Subject: Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
\end{flushleft}

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. This memorandum based on notes taken during the conferences conducted by the Secretary of Defense with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Key
\end{itemize}
West, Florida on 12, 13, 14 March 1948, and at Washington, D.C. on 20 March 1948, is provided for the guidance of all concerned.

2. There was general agreement that the Functions paper should not be an operational or command document, but should serve mainly as guidance for the Planners. The conferees agreed that, in time of war, the delineation of functions would not be governed by such a document, but by the means available at the time, and by the urgency of the situation. They considered, however, that the Functions paper should be of value to the Planners in the determination of force requirements and in the preparation of budgetary estimates which are based on strategic plans.

3. It was agreed that the paper should be written within the framework of the National Security Act. The Secretary of Defense stated that he planned to recommend to the President that Executive Order No 9877 on “Functions of the Armed Forces” be rescinded. If that recommendation is approved the Secretary of Defense will promulgate the Functions paper to the Services with the understanding that it be changed from time to time if conditions warrant.

4. Marine Corps. In the discussions relating to the Marine Corps it was made clear that there should be no attempt to abolish the Corps, or to restrict it unduly in the discharge of its functions. There was agreement, however, that in order to prevent unnecessary duplication its size should not be such as to involve the creation of a second land army. The following language was adopted as a note to the Planners:

For present planning purposes only, the ultimate number of divisions is four.

In considering Section V, A, paragraph 11 d it was the understanding that the Marine Corps would not, unless authorized by the JCS, train and equip parachute and glider units, but would in general limit the training and equipping “for airborne operations” to the transportation of Marine Forces by air. It was also the understanding that the creation of Marine Field unit headquarters, higher than a Corps headquarters, was not contemplated.

5. Primary and Collateral Functions. After considerable discussion the following memorandum was drafted by the conferees, and, except for paragraph f, was agreed to on 13 March. Paragraph f was drafted after return to Washington.

a. Primary functions will be assigned.

b. Collateral as well as primary functions will be assigned. It is recognized that the assignment of collateral functions may establish further
justification for stated force requirements, but such assignment shall not be used as the basis for establishing additional force requirements. (Minute directed to the attention of the Planners: In connection with the discussion of this paragraph, and in particular the language, “but such assignment shall not be used as the basis for establishing additional force requirements” the sense is as follows: That no service is precluded from advancing any and all arguments before the JCS in favor of a project which that service believes necessary, but it is understood that the foundation of the arguments cannot rest on collateral or putative assignments. It is also the sense that the decision, having been arrived at by the JCS, that decision will be supported before the Budget or the Congress by all hands. It is agreed that, unless the project is approved by the JCS, collateral assignment arguments cannot be used in any other quarters.)

c. The JCS member of the service having primary responsibility for a function shall be the agent of the JCS to present to that body the requirements for and plans for the employment of all forces to carry out the function. He shall also be responsible for presenting to the JCS for final decision any disagreement within the field of his primary responsibility which has not been resolved. This shall not be construed to prevent any member of the JCS from presenting unilaterally any issue of disagreement with another Service.

d. The JCS approval of force requirements will be on the basis of over-all security requirements. It is not intended that the Service with primary responsibility will dictate force requirements to another service through the medium of its interest in the use of forces used on a collateral basis. (Minute directed to attention of the Planners: With particular reference to paragraphs B and C of this paper, it is not intended that the service with primary responsibility shall undertake to use its interpretation of collateral functions of another service to deny weapons and equipment to that Service.)

e. The Navy will conduct air operations as necessary for the accomplishment of objectives in a naval campaign. They will be prepared to participate in the over-all air effort as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Minute directed to the attention of the planners: This paragraph will not be interpreted to prohibit the Navy from attacking any targets inland or otherwise, necessary for the accomplishment of its mission.)

f. Nothing in the foregoing shall, in itself, be construed as placing arbitrary restrictions on those material development programs and projects of an individual Service which are considered essential by that Service, in order properly to discharge the responsibility assigned in Section II, part B,
paragraph 5, of “FUNCTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.”* It is intended that an individual Service is to be permitted to carry through the development stage any material improvement program or new weapons development program considered by that Service to be essential in the interest of increased effectiveness of its weapons, material, or equipment. The ultimate application and utilization of the product of such a development program shall, of course, be subject to the examination and recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the basis of its contribution to the over-all war effort. The statements contained in this paragraph must be qualified by this fact: Nothing contained in this Memorandum for the Record, and nothing contained in the Functions paper itself, is intended in any way to modify or affect the authority or duties of the Research and Development Board, as defined in the National Security Act of 1947 and in the Board’s directive of 18 December 1947.

g. The Navy’s requirements for equipment and forces to accomplish its mission will not be the basis for development of a strategic air force.

6. Strategic Air Warfare. Although strategic air warfare is assigned to the Air Force as a primary function, it was agreed that the Navy should not be denied the air necessary to accomplish its mission. The Chief of Naval Operations stated at the outset, that the Navy has no intention of developing a separate strategic air force. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force stated that the Air Force had no desire to deprive the Navy of its carriers.

In considering the statement “To be prepared to participate in the overall air effort as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff”, which appears in Section V B 4 [as a collateral function of the Navy], it was stressed that the capabilities of naval aviation should be utilized to the maximum, including a specific provision that the Navy would not be prohibited from attacking targets, inland or otherwise, to accomplish its mission. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force stated that he visualized situations where it might be advisable to have naval aircraft operate from land bases.

One illustration that was brought out in connection with requirements for the execution of collateral functions was the construction of a large carrier. In discussing this example it was assumed that the Navy might not be able to establish a requirement for the carrier solely on the basis of its naval function. A consideration of its purely naval function, plus the

* The cited paragraph made it a common function of the armed forces “To conduct research, to develop tactics, technique [sic] and organization, and to develop and procure weapons, equipment, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of the functions hereinafter assigned, each Service coordinating with the others in all matters of joint concern.”
contribution which it could make to strategic air warfare, might be enough to warrant its construction.

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 5 c, above, would be responsible for presenting to the JCS that portion of the **requirement** pertaining to its strategic air warfare function. If in the presentation a disagreement arose it would be the JCS who would make the decision. If they could not agree the Secretary of Defense would decide.\(^\text{32}\)

As called for in the above Memorandum for the Record, President Truman rescinded Executive Order 9877 and directed Forrestal to issue in its place the Functions paper agreed to at Key West.

While the Functions paper and the accompanying Memorandum for the Record appeared to clear up the Navy’s responsibilities for strategic air warfare, one issue not explicitly addressed concerned atomic operations. To resolve it, Secretary Forrestal met again with the JCS at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The Newport Conference resulted in a supplement to the Functions paper, clarifying the term “Primary Function” as follows, so that the Air Force could not deny Navy access to atomic weapons or exclude the Navy from planning for strategic air operations:

Subject to control by higher authority, each service, in the fields of its primary missions, must have exclusive responsibility for planning and programming and the necessary authority. In the execution of any mission of the armed services, all available resources must be used to the maximum overall effectiveness. For this reason, the exclusive responsibility and authority in a given field do not imply preclusive participation. In providing for our armed forces, including the preparation of the annual budget and the preparation of mobilization plans, it is essential to avoid duplication and the wastage of resources therefrom. For this reason the service having the primary function must determine the **requirements**, but in determining those **requirements** must take into account the contributions which may be made by forces from other services.\(^\text{33}\)

**Cancellation of a Navy carrier prompted the “Revolt of the Admirals” and caused Congress to restrict the Executive Branch’s ability to assign functions.**

In April 1949, eight months after atomic weapons functions were ostensibly resolved at Newport, and in spite of the understanding reached at Key West that the Navy could contribute to strategic air warfare and thereby justify construction of a
“large carrier,” to reduce the defense budget a new Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson, abruptly cancelled the Navy “supercarrier” USS United States, but left intact the Air Force’s B-36 intercontinental bomber program. The Secretary of the Navy resigned in protest, and within weeks an anonymous document was delivered to key members of Congress alleging flaws in the B-36 and improper conduct by Secretary Johnson. Hearings before the HASC captured national attention, but the supercarrier stayed cancelled, the B-36 was built, and the charges against Johnson were found baseless. In the aftermath, the Chief of Naval Operations was fired. Despite all the headlines and drama, the Key West Agreement, as supplemented by the Newport Conference, was unchanged.34

That is not to say, however, that Congress took no notice of the cancellation of the Navy’s carrier and what it implied. After extensive hearings, the HASC found the SecDef’s decision to withhold funds to be “entirely within the law” but expressed deep concern about the Executive Branch’s infringements on “the constitutional responsibility of the Congress to provide and maintain a Navy and to raise and support an Army.”35

In March 1949, shortly before the B-36 decision that sparked the Revolt of the Admirals, President Truman had requested that Congress amend the structure established by the National Security Act of 1947 to convert the National Military Establishment into an Executive Department of the Government and provide the Secretary of Defense with appropriate responsibility and authority. The President did not request any changes to the previously-cited sections of the Act of 1947 that had specified Service “roles and missions.” In fact, his message to Congress explicitly stated that he was not recommending “any change to the statutory assignment of combatant functions to the Army, Navy, and Air Force.”36

Congress amended the Act in August 1949, establishing the Department of Defense and strengthening the role of the SecDef as the President had requested. In the same amendment, however, despite the President’s disclaimer of any intent to alter the Service functions assigned by Congress, the Legislative Branch made sure the Executive Branch wouldn’t someday try. Section 202(c)(1) was added to the National Security Act of 1947 to state that:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act [i.e., of 1947], the combatant functions assigned to the military services by sections 205(e), 206(b),
206(c), and 208(f) hereof shall not be transferred, reassigned, abolished, or consolidated.\textsuperscript{37}

Both President Truman and Congress thus characterized the responsibilities assigned to the Services by the Act of 1947 as \textit{combatant} functions, emphasizing their warfighting role. As will be seen next, that term detached itself from the Services over the next four decades, and came instead to describe the warfighting role of the unified \textit{combatant commands}.

\textbf{Through the decades, the \textquote{\textit{combatant}} role shifted from the Services to the unified and specified commands.}

The National Security Act of 1947 formally established the JCS and made it their duty “to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security.” And Key West continued the World War II executive agency practice, directing the JCS “to designate, as necessary, one of their members as their executive agent for... a unified command.”\textsuperscript{38}

To strengthen civilian control, President Eisenhower in 1953 directed the Secretary of Defense to amend the Key West Agreement to provide that the Secretary, after consulting with the JCS, would designate a \textit{Military Department}, rather than a \textit{member of the JCS}, to serve as the executive agent for a unified command. Under this arrangement, the President informed Congress, the “channel of responsibility and authority” to a commander of a unified command would unmistakably run from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the designated civilian Secretary of a Military Department.\textsuperscript{39}

By 1958, however, President Eisenhower found even this streamlined channel of responsibility “cumbersome and unreliable in time of peace and not usable in war.” He directed the SecDef to discontinue using executive agents for unified commands and asked Congress to repeal any statutory authority that vested responsibility for military operations in any official other than the SecDef, citing as examples “statutory provisions which prescribe that the Air Force Chief of Staff shall command major units of the Air Force and that the Chief of Naval Operations shall command naval operating forces.”\textsuperscript{40}

Congress granted the President’s request, repealing the provisions that gave responsibility for military operations to Service Chiefs, deleting the word “combatant” from the description of Service functions, and specifying that the President,
with advice and assistance of the JCS and acting through the Secretary of Defense, would “establish unified or specified combatant commands for the performance of military missions” (emphasis added).* The DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 established that the commanders of combatant commands would be responsible to the President and SecDef for such military missions as might be assigned to them, that Military Departments would assign forces to the combatant commands as directed by the SecDef, and that forces thus assigned would be under the full operational command of the combatant commander.41

The DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 also set in motion a shift in power between the Services, who organize, train, and equip forces, and the combatant commanders who employ them.

To establish “force requirements,” the JCS in 1950 had directed the Joint Staff to prepare a strategic plan for a conflict commencing on 1 July 1954. The result was approved in December 1950, but as the Korean War heated up, the JCS asked the staff whether the plan should be revised or completely rewritten. Under the executive agency arrangements in effect at the time (a member of the JCS was the executive agent for each of the unified and specified commands), the plan represented each Service’s view of force requirements. Air Force planners envisioned a short war in which nuclear exchanges would prove decisive, fought essentially by forces in being, with strategic air power dominating the force structure.† Army, Navy, and Marine Corps planners, skeptical of quick victory, projected a massive buildup lasting many months, much like World War II. Disputes over “force table” projections and mobilization planning were finessed in 1955, when the JCS agreed that force levels attained after six months of mobilization would be maintained and supported for the duration of hostilities. Thus the Air Force could claim that a war would be fought mainly by forces in being, while the other Services could envision at least beginning the build-up for a long conventional conflict.

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* Many have questioned use of “combatant command” to describe the newly formed US Africa Command, asserting that it has a militaristic flavor contrary to the Command’s purpose. Whether “combatant command” is the politically correct term is open to question; but it is certainly the legally correct term.

† A “force in being” is defined in the current DoD Dictionary as a force “that avoids decisive action, but, because of its strength and location, causes or necessitates counter-concentrations and so reduces the number of opposing units available for operations elsewhere.” Simply by being, such a force exerts a deterrent influence, because an enemy has no choice but to take its existence into account.
Over the years, the Services continued to disagree on the forces required to execute the strategic plan. Often the force tables included in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) reflected “splits”—recommendations on which the JCS were unable to come to consensus. Even when differing views on requirements could be reconciled, the strategic plans the JCS produced were of limited value. As noted in the Joint Staff’s history of joint strategic planning:

...merely producing a JSOP did not make that document influential. Constantly...its force-level recommendations fell between two fires. Those that the Services proposed cost more than the administration was willing to fund; those that the Secretary or the Chairman favored frequently proved too low to meet the Services’ requirements.42

Following passage of the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 and discontinuation of the executive agency arrangement for unified commands, the JCS took the first step toward giving combatant commanders a voice in articulating requirements—albeit a limited one. On 1 May 1959, the JCS directed the component commanders of the unified commands to submit advice on requirements to their appropriate Services. Such comments as the combatant commanders chose to submit to the JCS “should be made only after consultation with their component commanders.”43 Thus the Services continued to dominate the force planning process.*

In January 1960, the JCS completed JSOP-63. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Thomas D. White, approved the plan, but with the proviso that it be sent to the SecDef along with his view that the plan did not adequately take into account the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958, particularly with respect to enhancing the role of unified and specified commanders in producing the JSOP, which he described as “the definition of an over-all national military posture toward which Service programs should be directed in order to assure a coordinated, balanced and effective military instrument in support of national policy.” Army Chief of Staff General Lyman L. Lemnitzer added comments of his own, arguing against a greater role for the combatant commanders because, he said, a plan that projected four years into

* The Service forces assigned to combatant commands are grouped under a Service headquarters to form a Service component command, consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command. What the JCS told the commanders of the unified combatant commands in 1959 was, in effect, "You may tell us what your needs are, but only after checking with your subordinates."
the future would be meaningless in terms of providing unified and specified commanders with guidance for the employment of their forces.\textsuperscript{44}

The chain-of-command provisions established by the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 remained the basis for unified operations for almost 30 years. In 1985, the previously cited SASC staff study examined recent military operations—including the capture of the \textit{USS Pueblo}, the failed Iran hostage rescue, and Grenada—and found confusion in the chain of command caused by unclear statutes about the role of the Secretary of Defense, an ambiguous directive relating to the role of the JCS, and the \textit{de facto} influence that individual Service Chiefs retained over the operational commands.

The SASC staff study argued that “the concept of unified command, as formulated in the immediate post-war period and as articulated by President Eisenhower in 1958, had not been implemented.”\textsuperscript{45} A year later, the Goldwater-Nichols Act amended Title 10, United States Code to establish that, “Unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of command to a unified or specified combatant command runs (1) from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and (2) from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command.”\textsuperscript{46}

\textit{The Key West “Functions paper” became a DoD Directive that remains in effect today.}

In his 1953 message informing Congress that the executive agents for unified commands would henceforth be civilian Service Secretaries rather than uniformed members of the JCS, President Eisenhower said the SecDef would be issuing a revision to the Key West Agreement. Promulgated 16 March 1954, the revision took the form of DoD Directive (DoDD) 5100.1, \textit{Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff}. Since retitled \textit{Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components}, the current directive is dated 2002.

Reluctance to reopen the agreements reached at Key West has been a steady feature of the DoD landscape. The 1985 SASC staff study counted ten “clarifications” of the Key West Agreement between 1948 and 1985. One (the Newport Conference) addressed the dispute between the Navy and Air Force over atomic weapons; two were between the Navy and Air Force over sea control operations; one on the military uses of space involved all four Services; and six involved differences between the Army and Air Force over aviation support for land combat.\textsuperscript{47}
Disputes over air support to land combat forces appear to have stemmed from the fact the National Security Act of 1947 established that the Army would include land combat and services forces “and such aviation as may be organic therein” but never established what kinds of aviation could be organic.* The two most contentious issues were the arming of any aircraft by the Army, and the operation by the Army of fixed-wing transport aircraft. A series of agreements between the two Services’ chiefs of staff and Service Secretaries, with the SecDef stepping in on occasion, placed limitations on the empty weight of aircraft the Army could operate, limited their operating area by specifying maximum distances forward and rear of the front line, and forbade the Army from providing close air support (CAS). These issues came to a head in Vietnam, where the Army employed armed helicopters in large numbers and operated a short-field cargo aircraft, the Caribou, which the Air Force saw as an encroachment on an Air Force primary function. Both issues were resolved by an agreement reached between the two Service Secretaries in 1966, without the involvement of the SecDef: the Army surrendered its fleet of 160 Caribous to the Air Force, in exchange for which the Air Force withdrew its objections to the Army’s use of helicopters to provide organic intra-theater movement of forces, fire support, and aerial resupply of forces on the ground.48

The online version of DoDD 5100.1 is marked “Certified Current as of November 21, 2003” but it was last revised in 1987 to reflect Goldwater-Nichols and does not reflect events since, including the establishment at Congressional direction of a unified combatant command for special operations mandated by Congress in the Nunn-Cohen Amendment.49 Also, at the direction of Congress, extensive CJCS reviews of roles and missions have produced recommendations to change DoDD 5100.1, none of which were ever incorporated. The current version of the directive still ties requirements to primary functions:

The forces developed and trained to perform the primary functions set forth hereafter shall be employed to support and supplement the other Military Service forces in carrying out their primary functions, where and whenever such participation shall result in increased effectiveness and

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* Organic is a military term of art, defined in the current DoD Dictionary of Military and Related Terms as “Assigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization. Organic parts of a unit are those listed in its table of organization for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the administrative organizations of the operating forces for the Navy.” In other words, the National Security Act of 1947 both recognized and authorized the continued existence of aviation elements owned and operated by each of the Services.
shall contribute to the accomplishment of the overall military objectives. As for collateral functions, while the assignment of such functions may establish further justification for stated force requirements, such assignment shall not be used as the sole basis for establishing additional force requirements.50

The key distinction is that a Service may not use an assigned collateral function as the sole basis for establishing requirements. This distinction has rarely (if ever) been an explicit consideration in the requirements process, the acquisition process, or the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process—which together identify requirements, develop programs to satisfy them, and provide the funds necessary to pay for the programs. If this stricture on establishing requirements had been enforced, innovative capabilities such as that represented by the Marine Corps’ Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) might not exist. No chemical or biological functions, primary or collateral, are assigned in DoDD 5100.1. When the CBIRF was established, the Secretary of the Army was (and still is) the designated executive agent for DoD’s Chemical-Biological Defense Program, with responsibilities that include coordinating and integrating research, development, test and evaluation, and acquisition requirements of the military departments.51 A recent DoD Directive assigns to the Secretaries of all Military Departments the responsibility to “Organize, train, equip, and otherwise prepare their respective forces to combat WMD [weapons of mass destruction], means of delivery, and related materials.”52 This wording is consistent with what the Key West Agreement called a “Common Function of the Armed Forces,” and what DoDD 5100.1 calls a “Common Function of the Military Departments.” But it has not yet been codified as such in DODD 5100.1.

Goldwater-Nichols preserved the limits on Executive Branch freedom, but did mandate periodic reviews of roles and missions.

The previously cited 1985 SASC staff study that preceded Goldwater-Nichols found the absence of a comprehensive and objective review of Service roles and missions to be a significant problem with two causes: (1) statutory restrictions on changes to the combatant functions of each Service, which served to inhibit central management; and (2) the desire of the Services to avoid reconsideration of controversial issues.53 To correct this problem, the report presented three options:

(1) require the submission by the President to the Congress of a one-time report on Service roles and missions.
(2) require the CJCS to submit an annual report to the SecDef on Service roles and missions.

(3) authorize the SecDef, with the approval of the President, to alter the assignment of Service roles and missions.\(^5^4\)

The first two options addressed the second cause—the desire of not just the Services, but of the whole Executive Branch, to avoid roles-and-missions battles. The third might be construed as an acknowledgement that Congress had tied the SecDef’s hands, first assigning overlapping functions to the four Services, and later making those functions subject to transfer, reassignment, or consolidation only by the President, only during time of hostilities or imminent threat.

Congress chose not to loosen those bonds. As amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (and subsequent legislation through 3 January 2007) and currently codified in Title 10 Section 125, the National Security Act of 1947 now reads as follows:

§125. Functions, powers, and duties: transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition

(a)...The Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate action (including the transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition of any function, power, or duty) to provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration and operation, and to eliminate duplication, in the Department of Defense. However, except as provided by subsections (b) and (c), a function, power, or duty vested in the Department of Defense, or an officer, official, or agency thereof, by law may not be substantially transferred, reassigned, consolidated, or abolished. [Emphasis added.]

(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if the President determines it to be necessary because of hostilities or an imminent threat of hostilities, any function, power, or duty vested by law in the Department of Defense, or an officer, official, or agency thereof, including one assigned to the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps by section 3062(b), 5062, 5063, or 8062(c) of this title, may be transferred, reassigned, or consolidated. The transfer, reassignment, or consolidation remains in effect until the President determines that hostilities have terminated or that there is no longer an imminent threat of hostilities, as the case may be. [Emphasis added.]

(c) Notwithstanding subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense may assign or reassign the development and operational use of new weapons or weapons systems to one or more of the military departments or one or more of the armed forces.\(^5^5\)
The off-limits sections of the National Security Act of 1947—or originally Sections 205(e), 206(b), 206(c), and 208(f)—are codified in Title 10 by the section numbers cited above in Section 125. As amended through 3 January 2007, they now read as follows:

§3062. Policy; composition; organized peace establishment

(b) In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.56

§5062. United States Navy: composition; functions

(a) The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

(b) The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers. For purposes of this subsection, an operational aircraft carrier includes an aircraft carrier that is temporarily unavailable for worldwide deployment due to routine or scheduled maintenance or repair.

(c) All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation consists of combat and service and training forces, and includes land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.

(d) The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique [sic], organization, and equipment of naval combat and service elements. Matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.57
§5063. United States Marine Corps: composition; functions

(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.

(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique [sic], and equipment used by landing forces.

(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.58

§8062. Policy; composition; aircraft authorization

(c) In general, the Air Force includes aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. It is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.59

The force structure provisions written into the law (i.e., not less than three Marine divisions and air wings, and not less than 11 Navy operational aircraft carriers) were added at different times for different purposes. In June 1952, after continued Army efforts to limit the size of the Fleet Marine Force, and after anti-Marine Corps statements made by President Truman became public, Congress added language to specify the composition and authorized strength of the Marine Corps.60 The language setting a minimum carrier strength for the Navy was added much later when the Navy wanted to retire the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY and, to keep that from happening and thus preserve Mayport as home port for a carrier, Florida’s congressional delegation
wrote a minimum force of 12 Navy carriers into the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.\textsuperscript{61} Though these provisions do not bear directly on Service roles and missions (or functions), they nevertheless demonstrate how Congress can limit the discretion of the Executive Branch (although the \textit{Kennedy} was retired despite the law, and the statutory minimum number of Navy carriers was subsequently reduced to the current 11 by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007).

Goldwater-Nichols did attempt to compel greater Executive Branch attention to the functions that were \textit{not} assigned by Congress, by establishing a triennial “Report on the Assignment of Roles and Missions” as a statutory function of the CJCS:

(1) Not less often than once every three years, or upon the request of the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a report containing such recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the armed forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces. In preparing such report, the Chairman shall consider (among other matters) the following:

(A) Changes in the nature of the threats faced by the United States.
(B) Unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces.
(C) Changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare.\textsuperscript{62}

\textit{Despite mounting Congressional pressure, two CJCS reviews produced only one approved change in assignment of functions—and it was promptly ignored.}

The first such report was signed by Admiral William J. Crowe in 1989 just before he retired, and left on the desk for his successor, General Colin L. Powell, to review. Admiral Crowe’s report recommended that DoDD 5100.1 be changed to:

(1) require the CJCS to report on roles and functions of the armed forces once during each two-year appointment (vice every three years as required by Goldwater-Nichols);

(2) provide more clarity and precision in the allocation of Service functions;

(3) assign CAS as a primary function of all four Services; and

(4) reflect proposed changes in the assignment of Service functions for space combat, combat support, and combat service support (specifically, to assign the Air Force primary responsibility for space functions; the
Army primary responsibility for space functions that directly contribute to land operations; and the Navy primary responsibility for space functions that contribute directly to maritime operations).  

Before forwarding Admiral Crowe’s report to the Secretary of Defense, General Powell sent it to the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force for comment. A memorandum jointly signed by the two Chiefs reaffirmed their belief that CAS should be assigned exclusively to the Air Force. General Powell subsequently recommended that the Secretary not change DoDD 5100.1 to assign CAS as a function to be performed by the Army. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney responded three months later, noting that a Congressionally-directed CAS study was then underway and that other recommendations in the Crowe report were also under study. Following decisions on those issues, he said, the Director of Administration and Management would review DoDD 5100.1 and staff proposed changes. Ultimately, no changes were made as a result of Admiral Crowe’s report. (Appendix D provides the text of DoDD 5100.1, with the changes proposed by Admiral Crowe almost 20 years ago shown in line-in/line-out format.)

In forwarding Admiral Crowe’s report to Secretary Cheney, General Powell expressed his belief that the report “should be viewed as the first iteration in a process that will remove ‘Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces’ from the status of icon and place it in a context as a working document of the Department of Defense.” Congress, however, did not share General Powell’s belief.

In July 1992, as the due date for the next triennial report approached, SASC Chairman Senator Sam Nunn made a speech on the Senate floor calling for a “thorough overhaul” of roles and missions. He raised several issues of costly duplication among the Services, including the tens of billions of dollars spent every year operating tactical airlift squadrons in each of the four Services; land-based versus sea-based power projection; duplicative multi-role fighter capability; duplication between the Marine Corps and Navy; and duplication in theater air defenses, space operations, helicopter forces and training, intelligence functions, aerial refueling, electronic surveillance, and the Services’ medical, chaplain, and legal components. After summarizing each issue, Senator Nunn repeated the mantra, “The fundamental question is not what is best for the individual Services. The question is what is best for America?” He concluded by noting that in the coming weeks, the SASC would be marking up the defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1993, and said
his intention was to stimulate and facilitate General Powell’s and the Department’s efforts in the difficult task of overhauling roles and missions. Failing to deal with these issues, he observed, meant US military capability would be diminished by needless duplication and inefficiencies.\textsuperscript{67}

Following Senator Nunn’s speech, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 required the next CJCS report, previously provided only to the SecDef, to be submitted to Congress, along with the SecDef’s comments. The same bill identified specific areas to be addressed in General Powell’s review, including cooperation between the Army and the Marine Corps; a comprehensive analysis of the respective roles and missions of long-range bombers, carrier-based aviation, and long-range theater attack aircraft; the future of the Defense Nuclear Agency; and duplication of effort and separate overhead costs of Service and joint intelligence and threat analysis centers. Other Congressionally mandated studies, not tasked directly to the CJCS but that lent themselves to incorporation in Powell’s roles and missions review, included tactical aircraft modernization programs, a study of operational support airlift aircraft and administrative transport aircraft, consolidating war and staff colleges, and a comprehensive study of the military medical care system.\textsuperscript{68}

These Congressional actions heightened expectations for General Powell’s report, which, strictly by calendar, fell due one day after the 1992 Presidential election. Candidate Bill Clinton increased the taxpaying public’s interest in roles and missions. As reported in the \textit{New York Times}, Mr. Clinton endorsed Senator Nunn’s critique in a speech in Los Angeles on 13 August 1992, suggesting that a realignment of the military’s roles and missions could lead to substantial savings:

“I agree with Senator Sam Nunn that it is time to take a fresh look at the basic organization of our armed forces,” Mr. Clinton said. “We have four separate air forces—one each for the Marines, Army, Navy and Air Force. Both the Army and Marines have light infantry divisions. The Navy and Air Force have separately developed, but similar fighter aircraft and tactical missiles.”

Mr. Clinton added, “While respecting each service’s unique capabilities, we can reduce redundancies, save billions of dollars and get better teamwork.”

Mr. Nunn complained in his speech that the Key West accord failed to prevent duplication of military missions. In his August speech, Mr. Clinton also said that he thought the Key West agreement failed, promising to revisit the issues if he became President.
"As President I will order the Pentagon to convene a similar meeting to hammer out a new understanding about consolidating and coordinating military roles and missions in the 1990's and beyond," Mr. Clinton said. 69

General Powell released his report in February 1993 after giving the new SecDef, Les Aspin, time to review it. His premier recommendation was to assign US-based general purpose forces to a joint command, its mission to train and deploy US-based forces as a joint team. "Unification of the Armed Forces, which began in 1947," he wrote, "would at last be complete." 70 The recommendation was approved, and US-based general purpose forces from all Services were assigned to US Atlantic Command—then known as LANTCOM, but its acronym was changed to USACOM to signify its change of mission. Today, those forces and that mission are assigned to that same command, only today the command is designated the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). (How and why it received that designation are discussed in Appendix G.)

Under the heading of "America's Air Power," General Powell addressed the subject of tactical aviation first raised by Senator Nunn and echoed by then-Candidate Clinton. He recounted the development of aviation as a military instrument from World War I through the Cold War, and observed how—

The Services adapted aviation technology to their quite different war-fighting domains, and in the process gave their fighting units the lethality, mobility, and sustainability necessary for the evolving nature of the modern battlefield. Today the fact that all have airplanes and helicopters causes some to argue that America has "Four Air Forces," implying we have three more than we need. In fact, America has only one air force, the United States Air Force whose role is prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The other Services have aviation arms essential to their specific roles and functions but which also work jointly to project America's air power.

With its global reach and global power, the Air Force brings speed, range, and lethality to any planning equation. Our Navy and Marine Corps air bring power from the sea, providing ready, visible, lethal, sustainable, and responsive presence worldwide, unconstrained by the politics of access ashore. The aviation elements of Army and Marine Corps forces are an integral part of the unmatched mobility and lethality that figured so prominently in the success of our ground operations during Operation Desert Storm and that characterize America’s modern ground maneuver
forces. America’s air power makes the prospect of conflict a sobering consideration for any who would consider opposing us.

So while some argue that we have four air forces, in reality each is different, playing a unique but complementary role. Together, the aviation elements of the four Services constitute “America’s Air Power.” It is a potent combination, proven over and over in combat. It has been developed over the years through the cooperation and the far-ranging vision of the Department of Defense, the Services, and the Congress of the United States. By creating the US Air Force, codifying Marine Corps Tactical Air in law, and supporting carrier aviation and Army helicopter programs, Congress bestowed on America’s fighting men and women a force that has paid for itself repeatedly. Any American who has ever faced an armed enemy is grateful for the robust capability we possess.\(^7^1\)

Citing the Air Force’s role as “prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations” and crediting Congress with having codified Marine Corps tactical air in law was a subtle way of reminding Senator Nunn and others that it was Congress, not the Executive Branch, that made it a matter of law for (1) the Army to include land combat and service forces and organic aviation and water transport; (2) the Navy to include naval combat and services forces and organic aviation; (3) the Marine Corps to include land combat and service forces and organic aviation; and (4) the Air Force to include aviation forces both combat and service.

General Powell was less subtle when addressing the issue of redundancy between the Army and Marine Corps:

Both the Army and Marine Corps forces possess the ability to respond to crises involving land combat. As outlined in Title 10 and amplified in DoD Directives, the Army’s primary responsibility is “to organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land—specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas.” The Marine Corps’ primary responsibility is to be organized, trained, and equipped “to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”\(^7^2\)

The quotation marks in the above passage are as published in the Powell report, which cites no source. Though not verbatim, the language is based upon Title 10 sections 3062(b) and 5063(a), respectively—the provisions added to the
National Security Act of 1947 at the Marine Corps’ urging, despite President Truman’s wishes. They are among the functions vested in DoD by law that Title 10 section 125 says may not be substantially transferred, reassigned, consolidated, or abolished; except by the President during time of hostilities or imminent threat of hostilities.

The between-the-lines message from General Powell to Congress might be characterized as, “You created this mess, and you haven’t empowered me to fix it, so I am making the best of it.”

The challenge of getting all parties to agree to a fundamental change in roles and missions is illustrated in the issue of Army–Marine Corps cooperation. Appendix E is a study of what Congress expected from General Powell on this subject, his response, the reaction of both Congress and Secretary Aspin to his recommendations, and the outcome as seen during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Only one of General Powell’s recommendations required a formal change to assigned functions: that CAS be assigned as a primary function for all Services (the same recommendation Admiral Crowe had made). Secretary Aspin approved and informed Congress that he had so directed. To implement the decision, General Powell submitted a proposed revision to DoDD 5100.1. Deputy Secretary William Perry responded that administrative action would be held pending resolution of other issues rising from General Powell’s report and work then underway in the Bottom-Up Review.

Secretary Aspin informed the Services of his decisions in a memorandum separate from the letter he sent to Congress. Included was his decision that:

Close air support will become a primary function for all Services, with each Service specializing in different aspects of the close air support mission. Service force structures for this function will be examined in the bottom-up review. CJCS will ensure that Army and Marine Corps attack helicopters are fully integrated in close air support planning. CJCS will develop standardized joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. This will ensure that all Service elements can provide safe, effective close air support to other Service elements as circumstances warrant.

Despite this SecDef guidance, the Army never embraced the CAS mission for its attack helicopters, most likely out of fear that “fully integrating them in close air support planning” as decreed by Secretary Aspin would lead to their being included in
the Air Tasking Order prepared by the Joint Force Air Component Commander and thus removed from Army control. The Army instead referred to “support by fire,” described in Army doctrine published four years after Secretary Aspin’s decision as—

...a mission given to attack helicopters, directing them to establish a base of fire or an overwatch position. It can be used to engage a target while ground or air maneuver assets move to or bypass the same target area. It may range from suppression to destruction of the target; however, the primary mission is to fix the target so another force may maneuver.76

The result of the Army’s keeping CAS at arm’s length became apparent in Afghanistan during Operation ANACONDA, when procedures had to be developed literally on the fly, while troops on the ground were in contact. In an undated set of briefing slides widely circulated by email circa June 2002, under the heading of Air-Ground Integration, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) reported the following lessons:

- Unable to hover, AH64s [Apache attack helicopters] are using running fire—requires new level of coordination with ground troops.
- Ground commanders and aviators have developed a TTP [tactics, techniques, and procedures] called Close Combat Attack in which AH-64 attack helicopters provide directed fires in support of the ground commander.77

A few months later, CALL issued an Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Initial Impressions Report that bluntly declared, “Army Attack Aviation needs to suck it up and get in bed with the Marine Corps, find out how they do it and become an expert in the rotary wing CAS environment (that’s what the Marines call it).”78

Major General Franklin L. Hagenbeck, who commanded Coalition forces during ANACONDA, later said, “The most effective close air support asset we had was the Apache, hands down.”79 Even so, the Army continues to resist, as evidenced in this paragraph from Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support:

**Army aviation units** are organic to corps, divisions, and regiments and perform missions as part of a combined arms team. Army helicopter units normally receive mission type orders and execute as an integral unit/maneuver element. Special situations may arise where attack helicopters are employed in smaller units. The Army does not consider its attack helicopters a CAS system, although they can conduct attacks employing CAS JTTP [joint TTP] when operating in support of other
forces. The preferred employment method is as an integral unit, operating under the control of a maneuver commander executing mission-type orders.\(^{30}\) [Boldface in the original; italics added.]

Still seeking a result that two CJCS reviews had failed to deliver, Congress created the Commission on Roles and Missions.

When General Powell’s report was briefed to the HASC, committee chairman Congressman Ron Dellums (D-CA), pronounced it mere “tinkering at the margins of organization.” A future chairman of the committee, Congressman Ike Skelton (D-MO), declared that “For many in Congress, there is too much of the same status quo in the final report.... As a result, I fear that the Services may have missed a chance to direct their own fate.”\(^{81}\) Subsequently, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Congress found that:

The existing process of a triennial review of roles and missions by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pursuant to provisions of law enacted by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has not produced the comprehensive review envisioned by Congress.\(^{82}\)

Accordingly, Congress established the CORM to “(1) review the efficacy and appropriateness for the post-Cold War of the current allocations among the Armed Forces of roles, missions, and functions; (2) evaluate and report on alternative allocations...; and (3) make recommendations for changes.”\(^{83}\)

The CORM rejected the Key West approach, and called for capabilities to take precedence over functions.

In forwarding the Commission’s report to Congress in May 1995, CORM Chairman (and soon-to-be Deputy Secretary of Defense) John P. White stated that:

The traditional approach to roles and missions—attempting to allocate them among the Services in the context of the Key West Agreement of 1948—is no longer appropriate. That approach leads to institutional quarrels...and unsatisfactory compromises. More importantly, it does not lead to achieving the Department’s goals.\(^{84}\)

Instead of the traditional “who gets to do what” view of roles and missions, the CORM found the question should be “who needs what?” The Commission’s report made no recommendations regarding the assignment of functions, but instead focused on capabilities, declaring that emphasis should be on the needs of the
combatant commanders and whether the full set of DoD capabilities includes everything they need to fulfill their missions. In discussing the “needs of the combatant commanders,” the CORM avoided the term requirements, which Key West had said were determined by the Services based on the assignment of primary functions.

In rejecting the traditional approach, the CORM called on the Services (and, not incidentally, on the Congress that created the CORM) to “set aside outdated arguments.” The CORM listed these outdated arguments as Two Land Armies, Close Air Support, and Four Air Forces.

But the CORM did find a pressing need for a central vision to harmonize the Services’ views of joint warfighting, drive joint requirements, and guide the Services regarding the capabilities they should supply to unified military operations. In the absence of a unifying concept for joint warfighting, the CORM stated, each Service was fully engaged in trying to deliver to the combatant commands what the Service viewed as the best possible set of specific capabilities—without taking into account the similar capabilities provided by the other Services. The CORM therefore recommended that capabilities and requirements be reviewed in the aggregate: “Only by approaching capabilities in the aggregate, from the combatant commanders’ perspective rather than the Services’, can the ‘who needs what’ question be answered.”

The CORM thus started the Department on the path toward what has since come to be called “capabilities-based planning.”

**In keeping with the CORM’s advice, the Department’s emphasis shifted to capabilities.**

First, the CJCS published *Joint Vision 2010* to provide a common direction for the Services to use “in developing their unique capabilities within a joint framework of doctrine and programs as they prepare to meet an uncertain and challenging future.” The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) conducted in 1997 then sought to strike a balance between the present and future, to ensure “a force capable of carrying out today’s missions with acceptable strategic risk, while allowing us to stabilize our investment program in order to achieve the future joint force capabilities described in *Joint Vision 2010.*”

39
The next QDR in 2001 explicitly adopted a “capabilities-based model” but presented it as a shift from the “threat-based” model that had dominated past thinking rather than as a shift away from the traditional “who does what?” approach to determining requirements. Described as a model that focuses more on how an adversary might fight than who the adversary might be and where a war might occur, the 2001 QDR report said the capabilities-based approach “requires identifying capabilities that US military forces will need to deter and defeat adversaries who rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives.”

The Transformation Planning Guidance, published in April 2003, called for reforming the requirements system to better identify and assess specific options for mitigating future risks. Soon thereafter, CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), seemed to complete the shift away from functions as the DoD organizing principle of the Department of Defense:

Upon implementation, JCIDS will provide...an enhanced methodology utilizing joint concepts that will identify and describe existing and future shortcomings [and] identify the most effective approach or combination of approaches to resolve these shortcomings [from among] capability proposals developed throughout the department [using] an operationally based assessment of all potential DOTMLPF* approaches to solving (or mitigating) one or more of the capability gaps (needs) previously identified.

Boldface has been added to this passage to emphasize that under JCIDS, capabilities are no longer the exclusive province of a Service based on the assignment of functions: when a capability need is identified, all DoD components are free to submit proposed solutions.

JCIDS is now in its fourth (soon to be fifth) iteration. Subsequent versions no longer contain the bold statement above, but the current (May 2007) version still says that “JCIDS implements a broader review of capability proposals developed throughout the Department of Defense, focusing on the contributions made to the realization of the [family of joint concepts].” This seems still to imply that “who gets to do what” is based on rigorous analysis of how well competing proposals fill a given gap rather than on the a priori assignment of a function.

* DOTMLPF = doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
After the CORM, periodic reviews by the CJCS dwindled to nothing.

Legislation that established the CORM required the SecDef, after consulting with the CJCS, to comment on the Commission’s report. General John M. Shalikashvili proposed to Secretary Perry that the Department’s comments on the CORM report count as having met the requirement for the next triennial roles and missions review, and Secretary Perry concurred. The same logic presumably allowed the Department’s QDR and its response to the National Defense Panel—both mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997—to “count” in lieu of the next triennial review of roles and missions.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 repealed the requirement for a triennial report, in its place requiring the CJCS to include an assessment of roles and missions as part of his independent assessment of the QDR. For the 2001 QDR, the CJCS was to submit to Congress (rather than through the SecDef) a separate assessment of functions (or roles and missions) of the Armed Forces, to be based on the findings in the 2001 QDR, which had previously been issued by Secretary Rumsfeld on 30 September 2001.

To conduct this one-time assessment, the Joint Staff engaged a team of knowledgeable contractors. According to members of that contractor team, they began by focusing on the 2001 QDR to identify issues that implied potential changes in the functions, roles, and missions of the Armed Forces in light of the 11 September 2001 attacks—especially issues associated with the unnecessary duplication of effort, issues involving emerging technologies with potential to improve joint capabilities, and issues affecting the three CJCS-established priorities: winning the global war on terrorism, improving joint warfighting capabilities, and transforming joint forces to ensure their readiness to face future challenges. What the contractor team first proposed as a “Key West-type” assessment of 20 issues was quickly pronounced “too ambitious” by the Joint Staff, and the task was scaled back. One participant remembers the guidance they were given as follows:

The contents of this document will not be contentious; invalidate our assertion that the QDR already satisfied the requirement; open old wounds; nor provide validation for Congress to reinstitute a triennially-required document which both SecDef & CJCS had decided was redundant and absolutely unnecessary.
Whether the assessment was ever forwarded to Congress is not a matter of public record. An inquiry to the HASC staff prompted a reply that said it appeared the 2001 CJCS roles-and-missions assessment had never arrived. What is a matter of record is that nothing changed.

Following the one-time, post-2001 QDR assessment, the requirement became for the CJCS to conduct a roles and missions review as part of his independent review of the QDR. The result was a single paragraph in the Chairman’s Assessment of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review included in the report issued by Secretary Rumsfeld in February 2006. Under the heading, “Assessment of Roles and Missions,” General Peter Pace wrote as follows:

The Department continues to refine and improve the way capabilities are developed, fielded, and integrated, in order to execute the full range of missions the Armed Forces may be called on to perform. The 2006 QDR stresses an integrated approach with interagency and international partners. This review examined the challenges of the 21st century and the responsibilities of our Armed Forces in meeting them, and found roles and missions to be fundamentally sound. I concur with this assessment.

The following year, a frustrated Congress reinstated the requirement, this time in the form of a Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM).

The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review is the latest attempt by Congress to bring about the “overhaul” of roles and missions.

Two sections of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 drove the roles and missions review conducted in 2008. Section 941 directed the CJCS to submit to the SecDef an assessment of roles and missions of the armed forces, conducted so as to—

(A) organize the significant missions of the armed forces into core mission areas that cover broad areas of military activity;

(B) ensure that core mission areas are defined and functions are assigned so as to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces; and

(C) provide recommendations with regard to issues to be addressed by the SecDef.

After considering the CJCS recommendations, the SecDef was to identify:

(1) the core mission areas of the armed forces;
(2) the core competencies and capabilities associated with the performance or support of a core mission area;

(3) the elements of DoD that are responsible for providing the core competencies and capabilities required to effectively perform the core missions;

(4) any gaps in the ability of DoD to provide core competencies and capabilities required to effectively perform the core missions;

(5) any unnecessary duplication of core competencies and capabilities; and

(6) a plan for addressing any gaps or unnecessary duplication identified.99

Closely related was Section 942, which changed the mission of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to add helping the CJCS identify, assess, and approve joint military requirements and identify the core mission area associated with each one. In addition, the JROC is to “conduct periodic reviews of joint military requirements within a core mission area.”100

In case the legislation’s language masked the true intent of these changes, Representative Ike Skelton, now Chairman of the HASC, made Congressional expectations clear in his opening statement at a hearing on roles and missions held 20 June 2007:

We require that the Secretary of Defense review the roles and missions of the Department every four years in the down time between quadrennial defense reviews. We recommend that the Secretary determine the core competencies that each of the military services and defense agencies currently offer in fulfilling these missions; ensure that they develop the core competencies that are currently lacking; and jettison capabilities that are not related to core competencies.101 (Emphasis added.)
3 Lessons from the Past

Enough has transpired in the 62 years since the National Security Act of 1947 became law to permit some lessons to be identified (this is not to claim the lessons have been “learned”). This chapter discusses those among the more important.

“Unnecessary duplication” has been the target since at least 1986, but decades of debate have produced only “tinkering at the margins.”

Starting with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress has repeatedly called for roles-and-missions reform—a triennial review by the CJCS, the CORM, an assessment by the CJCS as part each QDR, and now a quadrennial review in the down years between QDRs. The consistently stated primary goal has been to identify (and presumably eliminate) unnecessary duplication. The consistently cited source of such unnecessary duplication has been the Key West Agreement, and the consistently touted examples have been “four air forces” and “two land armies.” Even Senator Nunn, in his July 1992 speech on roles and missions, made an explicit connection between Key West and wasteful duplication:

The problem, of course, with the Key West Agreement is that it largely failed to avoid the tremendous redundancy and duplication among the military services. As former Senator Barry Goldwater frequently said, we are the only military in the world with four air forces.  

Because Key West was an agreement among the JCS, presided over by the first SecDef, the duplication represented by “four air forces” is seen as an Executive Branch creation. But as seen in this paper, the Key West Agreement came about only after the National Security Act of 1947 had specified that the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps would each include “such aviation forces as may be organic therein,” in passages that Congress two years later said could not be altered except temporarily. Thus, a fundamental degree of duplication among the Services is “necessary” by Act of Congress, and efforts by the Executive Branch to weed out “unnecessary” duplication have ever since been constrained to, and criticized for, “tinkering at the margins.”
Tinkering at the margins is painful and is seen as unproductive by the Department of Defense, as evidenced by the fact that DoDD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, has gone unrevised for more than two decades. Admiral Crowe proposed extensive changes in 1989, which were never approved, and General Powell proposed one in 1993 (regarding rotary-wing CAS) that was never written into the directive despite SecDef approval.

In truth, few pay any attention to DoDD 5100.1, the current manifestation of the Key West Agreement, and it is difficult to argue that anyone should.

There is scant evidence that the distinction between a primary function and a collateral function has ever been a significant factor in planning, programming, and budgeting decisions. The few times that Key West issues have been raised, it was usually by one Service trying to block another from encroaching on its functions—when the Air Force objected to the Army’s possession of the Caribou cargo aircraft, and to the Army’s placing weapons on its helicopters, for example.

Many important functions—nuclear strike, for example—are left out of the directive, and other important functions—such as countermine warfare or equipping and training foreign military forces—are assigned but often neglected in favor of other functions the Services perceive as having higher priority.

Many functions, duties, and responsibilities of DoD components are left out of 5100.1 altogether, including the functional responsibilities of functional combatant commanders (listed instead in the Unified Command Plan, UCP), the executive agency responsibilities of Service Secretaries, and the responsibilities assigned to both combatant commands and Services in DoD Directives and CJCS Instructions.

If the document where assigned functions (i.e., “roles and missions”) are recorded is not kept current, is not adhered to, and is honored only in the breach, it is fair to ask why Congress keeps coming back to roles and missions, asking the Executive Branch to identify unnecessarily duplicative efforts in the defense program. A plausible answer is to provide a basis for cutting the defense budget (which helps explain why DoD and its major components are such reluctant participants in the process).

But if duplicative Service programs in the defense budget were patently obvious, the CJCS would have already advised the SecDef, and the SecDef would have already cut them. If Congress itself knew which parts of the defense budget were truly duplicative (and unnecessarily so), Congress would simply cut them, and reduce the
DoD budget accordingly. Having DoD update the list of assigned functions—or produce a list of core missions and core competencies—won't make it any easier for the Executive or Legislative Branch to recognize and eliminate unnecessary duplication.

**Functions are hard to keep current and harder still to enforce.**

The functions agreed to at Key West, codified in DoDD 5100.1, and modified reluctantly in the years since, are far from a complete listing of what the Services do. Other “functions, powers, and duties” (as the National Security Act of 1947 defined “functions”) and “responsibilities, missions and tasks” (as the Key West Functions paper defined the word) have been assigned to the Military Departments and Services by executive agency arrangements and in the “Responsibilities” section of DoD directives. The Army, for example, lists 129 separate “Executive Agent Responsibilities Assigned to the Secretary of the Army” in a Department of the Army Memorandum by that title. The document is 12 years old and includes responsibilities that clearly are no longer in effect, such as “DoD Support to the 1996 Olympic Games.” But it also contains many that continue to require significant resources and attention, such as the Army’s statutory responsibility to operate and maintain Arlington National Cemetery and the Secretary of the Army’s designation as executive agent for the Chemical Biological Defense Program.103

Still other functions have been assumed by the Services and *de facto* “assigned” when enabling programs were included in the President’s Budget and included in Defense authorization and appropriations bills, despite the absence of a primary function to justify the “requirement.” Again the Marine Corps’ CBIRF comes to mind, as do Air Force efforts, thus far not completely realized, to establish a “Cyber Command.”104

DoDD 5100.1 incorporated the “command functions” assigned to the commanders of combatant commands by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but has not been updated since. Missing are the Congressionally-assigned functions and “special operations activities” of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), a unified combatant command with “Service-like” responsibilities. Also missing are the functional responsibilities of three additional “functional combatant commands” established by the President (US Transportation Command; US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM); and JFCOM). Functions assigned to these commands are typically listed only in the UCP, or, between UCP revisions, in SecDef memoranda. An example of the latter was the *Designation of Responsibilities for Combating Weapons of*
Mass Destruction (WMD) to Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM). The memorandum was signed by Secretary Rumsfeld on 6 January 2005, too late to make it into the UCP that President George W. Bush approved on 1 March 2005. Its provisions were subsequently incorporated in UCP 2006, signed by the President 5 May 2006. More recently, Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-034—DoD Counterthreat Finance (CTF) Policy established DoD policy for countering financing of threat activities by illicit trafficking networks and designated Commander, USSOCOM as the DoD lead agent. The DTM, signed by the Deputy SecDef on 2 December 2008, was effective immediately and was to be converted to a new DoD Directive within 180 days. A provision said the next review of the UCP “should consider Counterthreat Finance as a UCP-specified mission responsibility” under Commander, USSOCOM. Responsibilities may also be assigned to the commanders of combatant commands in DoD Directives. A recent example is DoDD 3000.7, Irregular Warfare (IW), issued 1 December 2008. In addition to general responsibilities assigned to the commanders of all combatant commands, the directive assigns specific responsibilities to the commanders of two functional commands, USSOCOM and JFCOM.

As previously noted, some functions assigned to the Services are neglected or under-resourced, such as the rotary-wing CAS function assigned to the Army by Secretary Aspin in 1993. The Army is not alone in this regard. Despite the fact that one of the Navy’s primary functions assigned in the Key West Agreement was “To be responsible for...the protection of shipping, and for mine laying, including the air aspects thereof, and controlled mine field operations,” Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen in 1998 felt it necessary to demand that the Navy “fence” mine countermeasures to ensure that funds meant to maintain readiness of current mine warfare forces were not siphoned off for other purposes.

More recently, the heavy demand for advisory teams to help train and equip security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan has caught DoD short, despite that, as agreed at Key West and still specified in DoDD 5100.1, “assist in training and equipping the military forces of foreign nations” is a common function of the armed forces.

Given the centrality of “atomic operations” to the Newport Agreement and the subsequent Revolt of the Admirals, the Air Force’s well-documented trouble with nuclear weapons in recent years seems especially ironic. The Navy, too, has been accused of neglecting its responsibilities with respect to nuclear weapons.
Established by Secretary Gates in June 2008, the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management found in its review of the DoD nuclear mission that:

...over the past 15 years the military services have shed nuclear assets—or attempted to do so—in order to use the resources elsewhere. The Services perfected the art of starving a capability when they wished to shed the associated mission—and then recommending that the mission be abandoned on grounds that it has become inadequately resourced or the capability was no longer reliable. The case of the Tactical Land Attack Missile-Nuclear (TLAM-N) illustrates this point. Policy documents and a memo by the Secretary of Defense directed that the Navy should maintain the system until a follow-on program is developed. However, as viewed by the Navy, USSTRATCOM, and the Joint Staff, there is no specific military capability or gap the TLAM-N would satisfy. To date, no follow-on program of record has been established and no funding has been programmed or long-term sustainment of this system.109

What the Task Force refers to above as a mission, many (including the author of this paper) would instead call a function, but by any name the Task Force’s meaning is clear. Yet surprisingly, despite the centrality of the “atomic” function to the Newport Agreement, and the importance of that issue in the Revolt of the Admirals. DoDD 5100.1 assigns to the Air Force as a primary function to “organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic air and missile warfare,” but it does not equate strategic to mean nuclear. In fact, the only nuclear function explicitly assigned in DoDD 5100.1 is “To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic nuclear warfare to support strategic deterrence,” a primary function of “the Navy and/or the Marine Corps.”110

As these examples indicate, the assignment of a function does not, in and of itself, assure that the nation will have the capabilities it needs for a particular contingency.

**Functions are not capabilities: they don’t satisfy needs.**

The “Functions” framework that has purported to guide the generation of “requirements” (and the development of capabilities) since DoD’s creation has not done the job. The consequences of its failure include orphan missions such as cyber and chemical-biological-radiological defense; capability gaps such as those embodied in the phrase, "high demand/low density"; omissions such as a specified nuclear role for the Air Force; a confused chain of command such as documented
in *The Guts to Try, Blackhawk Down, and Not a Good Day to Die*;\(^{111}\) and an overall **slowness to adapt**, as evidenced by repeated but largely unanswered calls for a “whole of government” approach to threats that straddle the seams between military, law enforcement, intelligence, and economic responsibilities.

**There can be winners and losers, but not big losers.**

When an issue arises—whether between the Executive and Legislative Branches, between the Services, or between the centralized “joint world” and the Services—the natural instinct is to cast the outcome in terms of winners and losers. The assignment of roles and missions, functions, activities, core competencies or whatever other name they might go by is essentially a political process in which compromise is a constant, and the pattern seems to be that nobody should win too big or lose too bad.

When President Truman announced his intent to assign functions to the Services via an Executive Order, the Marines saw themselves as the big loser and rallied Congress to intervene. When the supercarrier USS *America* was cancelled, the Admirals revolted, but Congress saw itself as the loser (even more so than the Navy), and amended the law to ensure that no future administration could alter the functions Congress itself had assigned to the Services.

Disputes between Services are generally resolved with each side getting something it wants and giving something up in return. The prime example occurred during Vietnam, when the Army gave up its organic fixed-wing resupply aircraft, the Caribou, to the Air Force, in exchange for the Air Force agreeing to let the Army put weapons on its helicopters: each side was able to claim at least partial victory.

Issues affecting the balance of power between the Services and the “joint world” (consisting of OSD, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and the Defense Agencies) have increasingly been decided in favor of centralization at the expense of the Services. Such outcomes as Goldwater-Nichols and the creation of USSOCOM may have been possible only because the Services all lost equally—no one Service was singled out and thus felt the need to go all out in rallying Congressional and public support. Even so, the Services learned from the USSOCOM experience that it’s better to give up a little than to give up a lot: designation of USACOM as the DoD Executive Agent for Joint Experimentation was less costly to the Services than a Congressionally mandated Joint Forces Command with its own major force program, MFP 12, would have been.
When one Service feels its very existence is threatened, that Service can be expected to spare no effort in rallying Congressional and public support. It is difficult to envision resolution of a roles and missions issue where one Service “loses” and the others either win or break even.

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates recognizes the need to ensure that no one Service perceives itself as bearing a disproportionate burden. During presentations he made at each of the Service war colleges to explain the decisions he’d made on the Fiscal Year 2010 budget submission, he expressed it this way:

I wanted, in particular, for the Service Chiefs to see what we were doing in the other Services. There’s always the risk that...each of the Services feels like...they are the ones being singled out. And I wanted them to see that...the pain was being shared, and to see the grimaces on the faces of their colleagues.112

Public debate is part of the process.

One way the Executive Branch can get in trouble over roles and missions is by trying to suppress dissension. President Truman tried during the struggle over unification and paid a price:

On 9 April, the Thomas subcommittee introduced its bill, S. 2044. Navy Department representatives began to oppose it publicly as well as privately.... Truman was incensed by the Navy opposition....[He] opened fire at his 11 April press conference. Ill temper prompted imprecision as he said that he had not authorized Navy officers to speak against unification; he had authorized them “to express their honest opinions.” When the Commander in Chief sets out a policy, it “should be supported by the...War Department and the Navy Department. That doesn’t mean that the individuals are muzzled on their honest opinion.” The official leaders would have to “get into line” or he might have to “alter the situation.”113

President Truman’s ”gagging” of the Navy over S. 2044—a policy that continued throughout the controversy—evidently derived first from his own convictions regarding unification and then from his equally strong views of the President as Commander in Chief....

The President’s denunciation of Navy transgressions in the spring of 1946 brought him unfavorable press comment even from newspapers that had previously supported his stand on unification. As one article put it, what normally constituted free speech for professional officers was “to prevail for all but the Navy.”114
As another chronicler of the unification battles put it,

An attempt to curb freedom of expression within the executive branch is very readily interpreted as an attack on Congress’ authority to seek information for the purpose of legislating. [Congressman Carl] Vinson was probably not speaking only for the opponents of unification when he [said] he did not see "how the President can keep the Army and Navy from talking.... If Congressional committees call admirals and others before them for questioning, they have a duty to Congress to give the information the committees seek."^{115}

President Truman’s successor shared his desire to curtail Service lobbying. In the same Message to Congress that requested clarification of the chain of command, and that led to the DoD Reorganization Act of 1958, President Eisenhower had this to say:

I know well, from years of military life, the constant concern of service leaders for the adequacy of their respective programs, each of which is intended to strengthen the Nation’s defense. I understand quite as well the necessity for those leaders to present honestly and forcefully to their superiors their views regarding the place of their programs in the overall national effort. But service responsibilities and activities must always be only the branches, not the central trunk of the national security tree. The present organization fails to apply this truth.

While at times human failure and misdirected zeal have been responsible for duplications, inefficiencies, and publicized disputes, the truth is that most of the service rivalries that have troubled us in recent years have been made inevitable by the laws that govern our defense organization.

Parenthetically, I may observe that these rivalries, so common in the National Capital, are almost unknown in the field. Here in Washington they usually find expression in the services’ Congressional and press activities which become particularly conspicuous in struggles over new weapons, funds, and publicity. It is just such rivalries, I am convinced, that America wants stopped....

Earlier I mentioned that a principal outlet for service rivalries is the public affairs and legislative liaison activity within each of the military departments. For many years I have attached the greatest importance to providing prompt and accurate information to Members of the Congress. I have the same viewpoint in respect to furnishing information to the press and the public. But surely everyone will agree that personnel charged with such duties should not seek to advance the interest of a particular service at the
expense of another, nor should they advance a service cause at the expense of over-all national and defense requirements. Of this I am sure: We do not want defense dollars spent in publicity and influence campaigns in which each service claims superiority over the others and strives for increased appropriations or other Congressional favors.

I have directed the Secretary of Defense to review the numbers as well as the activities of personnel of the various military departments who engage in legislative liaison and public affairs activities in the Washington area. I have requested that he act, without impeding the flow of information to the Congress and the public, to strengthen Defense Department supervision over these activities and to move such of the personnel and activities as necessary into the Office of the Secretary of Defense....

At my direction the Secretary of Defense will shortly transmit to Congress draft legislation to carry out those items I have discussed which require legislative actions. I urge the Congress to consider them promptly and to cooperate fully in making these essential improvements in our Defense Establishment.\textsuperscript{116}

The DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 gave the President most of what he had asked for, including, as noted earlier, the repeal of statutory authorities that had previously vested responsibility for military operations in officials other than the Secretary of Defense. However, the Act included a provision that the Military Departments were to be “separately organized,” and it reaffirmed the right of the Secretaries of the Military Departments to present recommendations to Congress—in effect ensuring that the Services would always be able to present views contrary to those of the Administration.\textsuperscript{117}

The importance to Congress of unconstrained testimony is reflected in the questions given to nominees requiring Senate confirmation in advance of their confirmation hearings:

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?\textsuperscript{118}

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Timing matters.

In decades of roles and missions actions and reactions, timing has been a frequent factor, particularly with respect to which political party controls the White House and the Congress.

The Democratic majorities of the House and Senate were unable to agree on a unification bill submitted by a Democratic White House in 1945 and 1946. The Republican majority that took over both Houses in January 1947 passed the National Security Act of 1947, which had first been proposed and was then signed into law by a Democratic President.

By the time of the Revolt of the Admirals, both Houses of Congress were back in Democratic control, which may explain why Congress chose not to rebuke the Truman Administration for cancelling the Navy’s supercarrier, but instead wrote into law that the functions assigned to the Services by Congress could not be changed.

When Republican President Eisenhower submitted his Reorganization Plan 6 in 1953, taking executive agency for combatant commands away from uniformed members of the JCS and assigning it instead to the civilian Secretaries of the Military Departments, it was to a Republican Congress, and he got what he wanted. When he asked Congress in 1958 to repeal statutory authority that vested responsibility for military operations in any official other than the SecDef, the Democratic Congress did as he asked. But the Democratic Congress ignored his request to remove public affairs and legislative liaison activities from the Services and place them under the control of the SecDef, and instead reaffirmed the right of Service Secretaries to present recommendations directly to Congress.

Two milestone pieces of roles-and-missions legislation enacted in 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Nunn-Cohen Amendment that mandated USSOCOM, were the product of a Democratic House and a Republican Senate. Both were signed into law by a Republican President.

Public Law 99-433, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, was dated 1 October 1986. The law required a report on roles and missions once every three years from the CJCS. The first report was signed by Admiral Crowe on 28 September 1989, and forwarded by General Powell to Secretary Cheney on 2 November 1989. Had General Powell adhered strictly to the “not less
than once every three years” requirement of Goldwater-Nichols, the next report would have been due the day after the Presidential election of 1992.

General Powell waited until February 1993 to submit his report, giving the new SecDef time to review it. The issue of that report’s timing was captured in an exchange between HASC Chairman Ron Dellums (D-CA) and Army Lieutenant General Edwin S. Leland, Jr., the Joint Staff’s Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), during a hearing five weeks into the Clinton Administration:

Mr. DELLUMS: General Leland, the report that you briefed us on this morning is made up of a series of evaluations of specific proposals for changes in the military organizations, and they depart, and I would admit arguably at the margins, from our current ways of doing things. But you also made it clear in your earlier remarks this morning that our current military organization, the command structure and the assignment of roles, functions and missions evolved to meet the needs of World War II on the one hand and the cold war on the other hand.

What if instead of examining, again arguably, marginal changes from past organization you look from the bottom up at operational capabilities we need for tomorrow’s world and at how they need to be developed, managed, and coordinated? Wouldn’t that give us a better goalpost or yardstick that we could use to see how well we are doing in achieving improvements in effectiveness and efficiency rather than to approach it in the way you ably approached it this morning?

General LELAND: Sir, I would respectfully indicate to you that at least in our opinion the recommendations are not marginal, but in fact very substantive. We tried hard to be careful about the consideration of operational capabilities. That is why I continue to stress the strategy and the fact that the criteria talked about, not capabilities, but talked about needed capabilities. In other words, we need to be sure we have the capability to do the things to operate in the world as we see it unfolding.

Mr. DELLUMS: I appreciate that. But it seems to me that if we started from a bottom-up approach then we would have seen, for example, in this presentation some recommendations with respect to proliferation of nuclear weapons, which we have learned on numerous occasions is an extraordinarily important issue. But there is no recommendation in this area at all.

We would have also, it seems to me, seen recommendations in roles, missions, functions with respect to an increasing multi-national peacekeeping function. There was a brief allusion to that when you talked about the
combining of a central command dealing with the United States, but again there was no recommendation there. You could go on....

General LELAND: [That] is what the strategy discusses. It discusses multinational forces. It discusses nuclear proliferation, and so the whole basis was to be sure that we had the force structure with the roles, missions and functions in a way that could execute the strategy....I would emphasize...that the strategy is our existing military strategy...done during the previous administration. This [roles-and-missions] study was done during the previous administration. We are now members of the Clinton administration, and if there are some strategy changes relative, for example, to participation with the UN, then clearly that is part of the ongoing process...where we continuously evaluate the subject.\textsuperscript{119}

The HASC Chairman let stand his appraisal of the previous administration’s study as mere tinkering at the margins, and the Democratic Congress soon thereafter established the CORM to take another look. But by the time the CORM met its Congressionally mandated reporting date in May 1995, the Democratic 103rd Congress had been supplanted by a Republican majority in both Houses, and roles-and-missions reform was not among the items in House Republicans’ “Contract With America.”

The CORM issued its report on schedule, and its Chairman, Dr. John White, became Deputy SecDef. In that position, he was able to see many CORM recommendations implemented, but Congressional interest was lacking. President Clinton quietly abandoned the pledge he had made as a candidate to convene a Key West-like conference “to hammer out a new understanding about...military roles and missions in the 1990s and beyond.”

In his 1989 report, Admiral Crowe recommended changing the reporting requirement from every three years to every two. He did so not because the triennial requirement would run into a change of administrations, but because within the three-year guideline of Goldwater-Nichols,

[A] sitting Chairman possibly would not submit a report if he were to serve only a single appointment of two years. Since the purpose of the law was to establish a regular review of Service roles and missions, each Chairman should be required to submit this report in the latter months of his appointment, and again at the same timeframe in each succeeding appointment....To ensure continuity, every Chairman should report to the Secretary of Defense on the status of roles and missions of the Armed Forces once during each appointment.\textsuperscript{120}
Neither this nor any of Admiral Crowe’s other recommendations led to any changes, but in any event, the review done by his successor was the last one done under the original Goldwater-Nichols requirement. The Joint Staff’s response to the CORM in 1995 and participation in QDR 97 “counted” in lieu of subsequent reviews; the report due to Congress in conjunction with QDR 01 never made it into the public eye; and the CJCS assessment of roles and missions that was submitted as part of his overall assessment of the QDR conducted in 2005 amounted to a single paragraph that found roles and missions “fundamentally sound.”

The newest requirement from Congress calls for a roles and missions review every four years, “in the down time between quadrennial defense reviews,” according to HASC Chairman Ike Skelton. Starting in 2011, it will be part of an alternating cycle, with the QDR to be conducted during the first year of each new administration and the QRM two years later. However, the law required the first such Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review to be conducted in 2008, the last year of a two-term administration.

**Congressional committee structure may influence outcomes.**

It is difficult to build a convincing case based on a sample size of one, but the difference between 1945–46 and 1947 cannot be dismissed out of hand.

The existence of separate Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Committees in both the House and Senate, each the advocate of a particular point of view, made agreement on a unification bill all but impossible in 1945 and 1946. Passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 resulted in these committees merging into a single Committee on Armed Services in each chamber; how much that influenced the ultimate outcome is only a matter of conjecture, but it seems intuitive that the broader the perspective of a committee, the more likely it is to come to consensus. It is reasonable to wonder whether the Congressional committee structure that used to provide oversight of the 22 separate agencies amalgamated to form the Department of Homeland Security might be restructured for greater efficiency, and efforts to reform the overall structure of the “National Security System” within the Executive Branch must also take into account the current structure of Congressional committees.
Real change can result when the Legislative and Executive Branches work together.

The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 had enormous consequences for the way the Armed Forces of the United States fight. According to Senator Sam Nunn:

The National Archives ranked the Goldwater-Nichols Act as the SASC’s most important achievement during its first fifty years. The act addressed a huge problem—the inability of the military services to operate effectively together as a joint team—and solved it. By establishing a clear chain of command and focusing operational responsibility in the warfighting commanders, Goldwater-Nichols made possible the remarkable military successes of the 1990s.122

The drafting and passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act required its authors and adherents to have a precise understanding of, and respect for, the Constitutional line between the powers of the Presidency and the Congress, and anyone wishing to understand how those overlapping powers are perceived and applied can do no better than to study Goldwater-Nichols. Fortunately, a definitive in-depth case study already exists: Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon by James R. Locher, III. Mr. Locher led the team that wrote the 1985 SASC staff study cited repeatedly in this paper, led drafting of the Goldwater-Nichols Act itself, and today is the Executive Director of the Project on National Security Reform, a project which aims to do for the national security system as a whole what Goldwater-Nichols did for DoD.

Another Act of Congress, which followed closely on the heels of Goldwater-Nichols, took the unprecedented (and so far unrepeatable) step of mandating, in law, the establishment of a unified combatant command for special operations, today’s USSOCOM. Commonly called the Nunn-Cohen Amendment, it too merits study by anyone wishing to understand how to motivate change. Appendix F is The Road to USSOCOM, written by John H. “Scot” Crerar based on his having been a special operator during the period described and his extensive interviews with key participants. While not as exhaustive as Victory on the Potomac, Mr. Crerar’s study of USSOCOM’s origins provides insight into the confluence of forces—military and civilian, Legislative and Executive—necessary to fundamentally alter the assignment of roles and missions.
Complementing *The Road to USSOCOM* is Appendix G, *Joint Forces Command: The Road Not Taken*. It describes how the Department of Defense headed off legislation that would have created a Joint Forces Command similar to USSOCOM, with its own budgetary authority that could have come only from reducing Service budgets. Rather than accede to another Congressionally-mandated combatant command, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen assigned executive agency responsibilities to an existing command, USACOM, which was later redesignated to give it the same name Congress had proposed, JFCOM. Through mutual give-and-take, the Legislative Branch got the result it wanted, and the Executive Branch avoided the result it did not want.
4 Results of the First Quadrennial Review

In establishing the QRM, Congress made clear the expected outcomes include identifying gaps in capability, identifying unnecessary duplication, and developing a departmental plan for resolving gaps and eliminating duplication. The first such review was conducted in 2008; the report was released to the public on 29 January 2009. The news release said that while DoD had completed similar reviews in the past, “this was the first review conducted with the intention of establishing a framework for performing roles and missions analysis on a recurring basis every four years.”

The report depicts this framework as shown below:

Accompanying text says this diagram illustrates how “Core Mission Areas and Core Competencies provide guidance to the Services and US Special Operations Command on...
the appropriate mix and scope of roles and functions to meet priorities of the *National Defense Strategy* and *National Military Strategy*.”

Core Mission Areas are defined as those for which DoD is either uniquely responsible, provides the preponderance of US Government capabilities, or is the US Government lead. The six Core Mission Areas correspond to the six approved Joint Operating Concepts that establish context for the Department’s force development planning and resourcing activities.125

Core Competencies in this framework are defined as functionally-organized capabilities associated with the performance of, or support for, a Core Mission Area. DoD’s Core Competencies correspond to the nine Joint Capability Areas established following the 2006 QDR.126

Functions are defined in the QRM Report as “the appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, office, or organization as defined in the National Security Act of 1947, including responsibilities of the Armed Forces as amended....Specific Functions of the Services and US Special Operations Command are captured in Department of Defense Directives.”127

Functions are shown in the right-hand side of the graphic, and the Directive cited there is the familiar DoDD 5100.1. Arrows to the left of the Functions box show how the strategy documents, Core Mission Areas, and Core Competencies generate strategy-based *demand* for capabilities, and how the assignment of Functions in turn generates the *supply*.

The question of supply versus demand was raised by former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre when he testified on “Roles, Missions, and Requirements of the Department of Defense” in a hearing before the HASC on 20 June 2007. Included in his prepared testimony was the following observation:

> In essence, Goldwater-Nichols created a new and healthy balance of “supply” and “demand” for military capabilities. The Military Departments—the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force—are now “supply” operations—providing the personnel, equipment, training program and facilities required to undertake military missions. The “demand” function is now concentrated in the combatant commanders. The Joint Staff and the Chairman/Vice Chairman integrate the operational needs of the combatant commanders and advise the Secretary of Defense concerning those operations.128

The fundamental question behind the QRM is whether the capabilities supplied by the Services fall short of, meet, or exceed the demands of the combatant commanders.
The first QRM did not answer this fundamental question, or even try. The report says teams of military and civilian leaders from across DoD worked together to develop a framework that “defines and links the Department’s Core Mission Areas with its Core Competencies and Functions of the Armed Forces.” But this linking has not been completed because the first QRM did not produce an updated list of the Functions assigned to the Armed Forces. The report says a major aspect of the assessment was a thorough review of DoDD 5100.1, but in one place it says the directive “was modified to ensure functions are identified and assigned to appropriate organizations” and five pages later it says the Department “is revising” it. The second statement appears the truer of the two, because the DoDD 5100.1 in effect today is still the version that Admiral Crowe recommended revising in 1989, now dated 2002 but unchanged since 1987. Absent a revised or updated set of Functions, and their linkage to Core Competencies (and thus to Joint Capability Areas), DoD is not yet in a position to demonstrate it has met HASC Chairman Skelton’s challenge to jettison capabilities that are not related to core competencies.

The legislative requirement was for the SecDef to identify (1) the core mission areas of the armed forces; (2) the core competencies and capabilities associated with the performance or support of a core mission area; (3) the elements of DoD responsible for providing the core competencies and capabilities required to effectively perform the core missions; (4) any gaps in the DoD’s ability to provide core competencies and capabilities; (5) any unnecessary duplication of core competencies and capabilities; and (6) a plan for addressing gaps or duplication.

The first QRM satisfies only the first two items. As suggested by the framework, items (3) through (6) could be met by aligning the supply of capabilities, represented by Functions, with the demands, represented by the Joint Operating Concepts and Joint Capability Areas, to identify gaps and redundancies. The important work of fixing responsibility for providing needed capabilities; identifying gaps and unnecessary duplication; and devising a plan to address gaps or duplication must await the next QRM, which will be conducted in 2011, based on the QDR just getting underway.
5 A Way Forward

Completing the revision of DoDD 5100.1 is the essential next step toward linking strategy-based demand for capabilities to the available supply. Once the functions assigned to the Services have been updated, agreed, approved and published, a more difficult (but crucial) step will be to inventory the capabilities those functions represent.

One of the lessons from history is that the assignment of a function does not produce a capability; it merely confers on a Service the responsibility to produce one. Capabilities are produced by combining platforms, sensors and weapons with trained operators in organizations with skilled leaders and appropriate doctrine, policy, etc. (usually abbreviated DOTMLPF). For any assigned function, a Service theoretically should be able to list the capabilities it has on hand. Those lists of capabilities, combined and aligned under Joint Capability Areas, would then represent the available supply of DoD capabilities, which could then be weighed against the cumulative demands of the combatant commanders to truly assess the balance between supply and demand.

In the previously cited HASC hearing on “Roles, Missions, and Requirements of the Department of Defense,” former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre addressed the need to bring supply and demand into better balance:

The Goldwater-Nichols Act created an effective “supply-demand” relationship in the Department. Today, however, DoD’s requirements and resource allocation processes are dominated by the “suppliers” of military capability—most notably the military services.

The Military Departments have a vital role to play in national security: they organize, train, and equip military forces. Their success in this role is unparalleled in the world, and we must continue to strengthen their unique capabilities to man, train, and equip the force. But the Military Services do not conduct combat operations—the Combatant commanders do.

Since Goldwater-Nichols, military missions have been the distinct operational province of the unified combatant commands. Joint commanders are charged with effectively employing military force, typically in a multi-service and multi-national environment, in order to secure US national
interests. Combatant commands write all war plans, oversee all peacetime military activities, and conduct all military operations.

We need to organize the Department's decision-making procedures so that they bring both the advocates of supply and demand to the table equally before the Secretary. I believe that too often the Washington councils are populated just by the “supply” side of the equation. The Chairman and Vice Chairman have to carry the full burden of representing operational demand, and I don’t think that they have all the horsepower that is needed for this task.

We can’t ask each Combatant Commander to spend all his time in Washington attending meetings. He needs to be in the field fighting wars. But we do need the voice of the operator in these councils.131

The individual charged by Congress with being the “voice of the operator” is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who may be the only DoD Component to have a role assigned by law and explicitly identified as a role in Title 10. By law, his role includes serving “as the spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands, especially on the operational requirements of their commands.”132

The CJCS recently issued a new CJCS Instruction to revise the Joint Strategic Planning System, “the primary formal means the Chairman uses to meet his statutory responsibilities.”133 A key feature is the comprehensive joint assessment, or CJA, a deliberate assessment process built around a survey that requests comprehensive assessments from Service Chiefs and combatant commanders.134

The 2008 survey asked Service chiefs and combatant commanders to assess their ability to meet Title 10 and UCP responsibilities and to support the National Military Strategy within their area of responsibility (AOR) or functional area.

The survey defined AOR as “the geographic area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations,” and functional area as “the areas of responsibility assigned to functional combatant commands, and the roles of the Services or the broad and enduring purposes for which they organize, train, equip, and provide forces,” (emphasis added).135

A mismatch is immediately apparent: Combatant commanders report their ability to meet the detailed geographic and functional responsibilities specified in the UCP, while Service Chiefs report against the “broad and enduring purposes” spelled out in Title 10—not the more detailed functions assigned to them in DoDD 5100.1 and in executive agency arrangements, SecDef memoranda, and other directives.
The CJA survey said the integrated priority list (IPL) remains the principal mechanism by which combatant commanders communicate their views to the CJCS and the SecDef on the adequacy of the defense program—the IPL is thus the means by which the “voice of the operator” is heard in Washington. Collectively, the IPLs of the combatant commanders constitute the demand side of the DoD roles and missions framework.

To assist combatant commanders and their staffs in the preparation of IPL submissions, the CJS survey provided the following guidance:

(1) Provide the ten highest priority capability gaps.

(2) Focus on mission analysis and risk assessment to identify and prioritize capability gaps using the Unified Command Plan, Guidance for the Development of the Force, Guidance for Employment of the Force and/or Security Cooperation Guidance as a baseline.

(3) In describing capability gaps, select “Proficiency,” “Sufficiency,” or “Both” and cite the strategic guidance document (GEF, JSCP, UCP, GDF, etc.) that assigns the specific mission whose execution is at risk because of the capability shortfall. If possible, reference document title, page and paragraph.\(^{136}\)

To identify gaps (differences between the capabilities they need to execute assigned missions and those apportioned to them for planning), combatant commanders are directed to focus on mission analysis and risk assessment. To justify a gap, they are to cite the page and paragraph of the guidance document that assigned the mission in the first place. The Services are not held to the same standard on the supply side.

One way to get supply and demand represented more equally before the Secretary would be to have the Services describe their capabilities in terms not only of the broad roles of Title 10, but also the detailed list of functions they’ve been assigned—identifying, just as combatant commands do, gaps in “Proficiency” (no capability exists at all to perform an assigned function) and gaps in “Sufficiency” (capability exists but not enough to meet cumulative demand).

A comprehensive, up-to-date list of the functions assigned to each Service (by any definition of that term) would provide the Services a better and more transparent basis for inventorying their capabilities and identifying internal gaps and overlaps. The clearer picture of the supply side that would result would give the Secretary of Defense a better way to view and make decisions regarding supply versus demand. A way forward, then, would be to:
1. Revise DoDD 5100.1 to document all the responsibilities that have been assigned to the Services (and other DoD components as well) by any name (functions, powers, duties, responsibilities, missions, tasks, etc.);

2. Incorporate the results in the QRM framework; that is, attribute each assigned function to a corresponding Core Competency/Joint Capability Area;

3. Require the Services (and other capability providers) to inventory and report the capabilities they possess (or are developing) to fulfill each assigned function, identifying gaps and overlaps; and

4. Consider supply versus demand across the Department to identify capability gaps ("Proficiency," "Sufficiency," or "Both") and areas where on-hand supply meets or exceeds anticipated demand, thus informing investment decisions.
End Notes


4 Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 208.

5 Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 211.


15 Cole et al., Documents, 3–6; Raines, The Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 40–42.


President Truman to Robert P. Patterson and James Forrestal, 15 June 1946, reproduced in Documents on Establishment and Organization, 26–28.

President Truman to the Chairman of the House and Senate Committees on Military and Naval Affairs, 15 June 1946, reproduced in Documents on Establishment and Organization, 29–31.

Robert P. Patterson and James Forrestal to President Truman, 16 January 1947, reproduced in Cole et al., Documents, 31–32.


Sections 205(e), 206(b), 206(c), and 208(f), respectively, of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253—80th Congress), reproduced in Cole et al., Documents, 41–45. Public Law 416 (82nd Congress) amended Section 206(c) to specify that the Marine Corps shall “be so organized to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings.” Public Law 109-163, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, amended Section 206(b) to specify that “the naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less than 12 operational aircraft carriers” and Public Law 109-364, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, changed the minimum number or operational carriers to 11. These provisions are currently codified in Title 10 and Section 5063(a) and 5062(b), respectively.


Title 10, Section 167(a), <www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_00000167----000-.html> accessed 29 Dec 2008.

Executive Order 9877, 26 July 1947, reproduced in Cole et al., Documents, 267.


US Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff files, Record Group 218, CCS 370 (8-19-45), Section 17, National Archives, Washington, Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 May 1948, reproduced in Cole et al., Documents, 276–85.

Memorandum for the Record, subject: Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 March 1948, reprinted in Cole et al., Documents, 286–89.


Public Law 216, 81st Congress, 10 August 1949, in Cole et al., Documents, 84–89.

Cole et al., Documents, 45, 279.

President Truman’s Message, 30 April 1953, in Cole et al., Documents, 152.


Poole, The Evolution of the Joint Strategic Planning System, 4


Title 10, Section 162(b), <www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_00000162---000-.html> accessed 27 Mar 2008.

Senate, Defense Organization, 440.

For a complete analysis of these issues from the Army’s perspective, see Dr. Ian Horwood, Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006); for an Air Force perspective, see Trest, Air Force Roles and Missions, 147–49, 193–212. The Army’s surrender of the Caribou has implications in the current Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, because intra‐theater airlift and specifically the Joint Cargo Aircraft is an issue under review.


Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5160.05E, Roles and Responsibilities Associated with the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, 9 October 2008.

Senate, Defense Organization, 447.


Title 10, Section 125. <www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_00000125----000-.html> accessed 3 Dec 2008.


Title 10, Section 5062. <www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sup_01_10_10_C_20_L_30_507.html> accessed 3 Dec 2008.

Title 10, Section 5063. <www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_00005063----000-.html> accessed 3 Dec 2008.
Title 10, Section 8062. <www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_00008062----000-.html> accessed 3 Dec 2008.


Powell, CM-44-89.


White et al., *Directions for Defense*, i.


Account provided by members of the contractor team that worked on the 2002 roles and missions assessment.

Mark Lewis, email to author, 4 June 2008.


Department of the Army Memorandum 10-1.


See for example, the Air Force Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures, 8 February 2008; the Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons, February 2008 (revised April 2008); the Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase I: The Air Force’s Nuclear Mission, September 2008; and the Air Force Nuclear Task Force report, Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise, 24 October 2008 (sometimes referred to as the Air Force “Nuclear Roadmap”). None of these high-level studies appears to have checked DoDD 5100.1 to see what nuclear function, if any, had been assigned to the US Air Force—commentary, perhaps, on the low esteem in which the directive that assigns functions is held.


DoDD 5100.1, paragraph 6.6.3.2.3. for the primary function of “strategic air and missile warfare” assigned to the Air Force; paragraph 6.6.2.6. for the primary function of “strategic nuclear warfare to support nuclear deterrence” assigned to “the Navy and/or the Marine Corps,” accessed 4 Jan 2009 at <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510001p.pdf>.


House Armed Services Committee, HASC No. 103-17, 156–57.

Crowe, Report on Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces.

Ike Skelton, Opening Statement.

Sam Nunn in the Foreword to James R. Locher, III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 2002).
Appendix A: Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACOM (United States) Atlantic Command (also USACOM)
AFJI Armed Forces Journal International
AOR area of responsibility
ASD(SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
CA civil affairs
CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAS close air support
CBIRF Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (Marine Corps)
CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command
CFLCC combined force land component command/commander
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CINC commander in chief
CJA comprehensive joint assessment
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CORM Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
CSA Chief of Staff of the Army
DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (Army)
DoD Department of Defense
DoDD Department of Defense Directive
DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities
DSP Directorate of Special Planning
DTM directive-type memorandum
FORSOM Forces Command (US Army)
GDF Guidance for Development of the Force
GEF Guidance for Employment of the Force
HASC House Armed Services Committee
HIMARS high-mobility artillery rocket system
IDA Institute for Defense Analyses
IPL integrated priority list
J-3 Directorate for Operations (Joint Staff)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J-5</td>
<td>Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (Joint Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCIDS</td>
<td>Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFCC</td>
<td>(United States) Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>(United States) Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFKCENMA</td>
<td>John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JROCA</td>
<td>Joint Requirements Oversight Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOA</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOC</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Objectives Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOSE</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Support Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANTCOM</td>
<td>(United States) Atlantic Command (later USACOM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Military Airlift Command (US Air Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFP</td>
<td>major force program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLRS</td>
<td>multiple launch rocket system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Defense Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA&amp;E</td>
<td>program analysis and evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDASD/ISA</td>
<td>Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPBE</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (process)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pub</td>
<td>publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRM</td>
<td>Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QSR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Strategy Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDCOM</td>
<td>(United States) Readiness Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASC</td>
<td>Senate Armed Services Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAL</td>
<td>sea-air-land team (US Navy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>special forces (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>special operations (Air Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOAP</td>
<td>Special Operations Advisory Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOPAG</td>
<td>Special Operations Policy Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORG</td>
<td>Special Operations Review Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Tactical Air Command (US Air Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACOM</td>
<td>United States Atlantic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFC</td>
<td>warfighting challenge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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White, John P., Antonia M. Chayes, Admiral Leon A. Edney, USN (Ret), Major General John L. Matthews, ANG (Ret), Robert J. Murray, Franklin D. Raines, General Robert W. RisCassi,


Appendix C: What’s a Role and How Will I Know One When I See It?

Introduction

*Roles and missions* is a codephrase that has taken on different meanings over time. Historically, the term that has mattered is *functions*, because functions are what Congress ascribed to the Services in the National Security Act of 1947 and also what the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) agreed to at Key West in 1948. The Legislative and Executive Branches assigned different meanings to the word—the Act of 1947 saying it meant “functions, powers, and duties”; the glossary in the Key West Agreement saying it meant “responsibilities, missions and tasks.”

Without specifying whether what they were assigning was a role, a mission, or a set of functions, the House of Representatives, at the urging of Marine Corps officials, wrote the following sections into the National Security Act of 1947:

205(e). In general the United States Army, within the Department of the Army, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.

206(b). In general the United States Navy, within the Department of the Navy, shall include naval combat and services forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea.

206(c). The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

208(f). In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and
equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations.²

A 1949 amendment added the following provision to the National Security Act of 1947:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the combatant functions assigned to the military services by sections 205(e), 206(b), 206(c), and 208(f) hereof shall not be transferred, reassigned, abolished or consolidated.³

Later, at the request of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the term combatant was dropped from this passage, and Congress applied it instead to unified and specified commands, making them combatant commands.⁴

The term roles did not appear in Title 10 until 1986, when the Goldwater-Nichols Act required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to provide the Secretary a report containing “recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (or roles and missions)” every three years. One of the first things the CJCS had to do to satisfy this requirement was define what the words had come to mean.

Admiral William J. Crowe explained how the terms had changed since Key West in the following words:

Changes to the military command structure wrought by the Defense Reorganization Acts of 1958 and 1986 have rendered the term “Service Roles and Missions” an inaccurate description of the division of Defense responsibilities. In the Defense reorganization, the Military Departments (Services) have kept their legal “Roles” as delineated in Title 10, United States Code, to organize, train, and equip forces, but have ceded their operational “Missions” to the combatant commanders, who will employ those forces to execute assigned tasks.

Because the meanings had changed, Admiral Crowe had to give the terms new meanings, and did so as follows:

- **Roles**—The broad and enduring purposes for which a Service was established by Congress in law.
- **Missions**—Those tasks assigned to a Unified or Specified command by the President or the Secretary of Defense.
- **Functions**—Those principal responsibilities assigned to a Service through Executive action which permit it to successfully fulfill its legally established role.
• **Primary functions**—Those principal responsibilities assigned to a Service within its role for which it may allocate fiscal resources and generate force structure. More than one Service can be assigned a primary function for each mode of warfare.

• **Collateral functions**—Those responsibilities assigned to a Service to support another Service or Defense Agency’s primary function...a Service may not generate force structure based solely on a collateral function...more than one Service can be assigned a collateral function.

Admiral Crowe found that the “roles” of the Armed Forces as crafted in law were fundamentally sound, but that the “functions” of the Armed Forces as written in Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5100.1 needed to be revised and updated. He reported included numerous recommended changes. None were made, however, and the 1987 version of DoDD 5100.1 was still in effect when General Colin L. Powell issued the next report mandated by Goldwater-Nichols in February 1993. (Appendix D is an extract of the 1987 version, with the changes recommended by Admiral Crowe in line-in/line-out format.)


General Powell defined roles in essentially the same terms Admiral Crowe had used, but added US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)—the only combatant command established in law (the others are established by the President). General Powell also described the relationships among the terms:

In broadest terms, the role of the Services is to organize, train, and equip forces, the Army for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land; the Navy for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on and from the sea; the Air Force for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations; and the Marine Corps for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases, and the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign; and Special Operations Command for special operations activities or missions.

In simple terms, then, the primary function of the Services, and USSOCOM, is to provide forces—each organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role—to be employed by the commander of a combatant command in the accomplishment of a mission.

---

* First published in 1954 as Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to codify the Key West Agreement, DoDD 5100.1 is today titled Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.
General Powell’s definitions were incorporated in Joint Publication (Pub) 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, as follows:

The terms “roles, missions, and functions” are often used interchangeably, but the distinctions between them are important. “Roles” are the broad and enduring *purposes* for which the Services and United States Special Operations Command were established by Congress in law. “Missions” are the *tasks* assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders. “Functions” are specific *responsibilities* assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to enable the Services and USSOCOM to fulfill their legally established roles. Simply stated, the primary function of the Services and USSOCOM is to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role—to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission.8 (Boldface in the original.)

Dissatisfied with General Powell’s report, Congress mandated the establishment of a Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) to “(1) review the efficacy and appropriateness for the post-Cold War of the current allocations among the Armed Forces of roles, missions, and functions; (2) evaluate and report on alternative allocations...; and (3) make recommendations for changes.”9

**The Commission on Roles and Missions (1995)**

The CORM revisited the accepted definitions, changed the relationships among the terms and added a new one: *capabilities*. According to the report:

- *Roles* are the broad and enduring purposes specified by Congress in law for the Services and selected Department of Defense (DoD) components.
- *Missions* are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders.
- *Functions* are specific responsibilities assigned by Congress, by the President, or by the Secretary of Defense to enable DoD components to fulfill the purposes for which they were established.
- *Capability* is the ability of a properly organized, trained, and equipped force to accomplish a particular mission or function.

Simply stated, the *role* of the Services (and the US Special Operations Command), is to provide *capabilities* (forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform specific *functions*) to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a *mission*.10 (Italics in the original.)
The terms as then-used in Joint Pub 0-2 and as used in the CORM report are compared below. The CORM recommended making the role of the Services and USSOCOM that which had previously been their function; namely, providing forces to the combatant commands. Rather than calling the Services “force providers,” the CORM recommended they be designated as providers of capabilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table C-1. Comparison of Joint Pub 0-2 and CORM definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 0-2 (Feb 95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The primary function of the Services and USSOCOM is to provide forces—organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role—to be employed by the combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legislation that established the CORM directed the Secretary of Defense to consult with the CJCS, and then comment on the Commission’s report. Then-CJCS General John Shalikashvili concurred in the Commission’s definitions of roles, missions, functions, and capabilities, and the above statement describing the relationships among them. However, the terms were not mentioned in the Secretary’s comments to Congress and were never incorporated in joint doctrine. When it was revised in 2001, Joint Pub 0-2 used the same language as the 1995 edition to describe roles, missions, and functions, and still did not address capabilities.

Joint Pub 0-2 was superseded in May 2007 by Joint Pub 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, which eliminates missions and still does not address capabilities. Current doctrine reads:

The terms “roles and functions” often are used interchangeably, but the distinctions among them are important.

a. “Roles” are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and USSOCOM were established in law.

b. “Functions” [are] the appropriate assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, office, or organization. As defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the term “function” includes functions, powers, and duties (Title 50, USC, Section 410[a]).

Joint Pub 1 does address roles, declaring unequivocally in the Executive Summary that “The Services role is to organize, train, equip, and provide forces.”
Current doctrine therefore echoes Admiral Crowe, who said the Services’ legal role was to “organize, train, and equip forces” but that their operational missions had been ceded to the combatant commanders.

General Powell, on the other hand, said the primary function of the Services was to provide forces, each organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role—the Army role being prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land; the Navy role being prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on and from the sea; the Air Force role being prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations; and the Marine Corps role being service with the fleet and the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

The CORM said the role of the Services was to provide capabilities, which it further defined as forces organized trained, and equipped to perform specific functions.

All sources cited above agree that roles are the Services’ broad and enduring purposes as specified by Congress in law. Unfortunately, Congress never used the word role in the National Security Act of 1947. Congress does say that any function assigned to the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps by section 3062(b), 5062, 5063, or 8062(c) of Title 10, may be transferred, reassigned, or consolidated only by the President, only because of hostilities or imminent threat of hostilities, and only until the hostilities terminate or the imminent threat disappears. These sections were numbered 205(e), 206(b), 206(c), and 208(f) in the National Security Act of 1947; they were renumbered when codified in Title 10, and as amended through 3 January 2007 now read as follows (readers are invited to decide for themselves which parts are roles and which are functions):

§ 3062(b) In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

§ 5062(a) The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as
otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

(b) The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers. For purposes of this subsection, an operational aircraft carrier includes an aircraft carrier that is temporarily unavailable for worldwide deployment due to routine or scheduled maintenance or repair.

(c) All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation consists of combat and service and training forces, and includes land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.

(d) The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization, and equipment of naval combat and service elements. Matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.¹⁸

§5063(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.

(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces.

(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.¹⁹
8062(c) In general, the Air Force includes aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. It is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.\textsuperscript{20}

As if Roles, Missions, and Functions Weren’t Enough: Activities

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 directed establishment of a unified combatant command for special operations and said the principal \textit{function} of the command would be to prepare special operations forces to carry out assigned \textit{missions}. The law did not list what those missions might be, but did specify “special operations activities” as including the following:

1. Direct action
2. Strategic reconnaissance
3. Unconventional warfare
4. Foreign internal defense
5. Civil affairs
6. Psychological operations
7. Counterterrorism
8. Humanitarian assistance
9. Theater search and rescue
10. Such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense\textsuperscript{21}

While these “activities” bear a strong resemblance to functions, they are not recognized as such and have never been incorporated in DoDD 5100.1. Admiral Crowe’s 1989 report on roles and missions recognized the existence of USSOCOM and his proposed changes to the directive (see Appendix D) included as the command’s primary function “to organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of special, psychological operations, and civil affairs,” but did not address the special operations activities established by statute. In any event, Admiral Crowe’s proposed changes were never incorporated DoDD 5100.1, which was reissued in 2002 but has not been revised since 1987.
One result of the failure to codify the assignment of functions to USSOCOM is confusion over Foreign Internal Defense, which is delineated as a special operations activity in Title 10 and thus assumed by some to be the sole province of USSOCOM and not a function that must be attended to by the Services. This assumption overlooks the "common function of the Military Departments" agreed at Key West (and still in DoDD 5100.1) "to assist in training and equipping the military forces of foreign nations."

As long as "special operations activities" are not the same as functions, they are not subject to the limitations of Section 125 of Title 10, which says that "a function, power, or duty vested in the Department of Defense, or an officer, official, or agency thereof, by law may not be substantially transferred, reassigned, consolidated, or abolished." USSOCOM commanders have used this loophole to their advantage. In May 2003, for example, the command announced that what had previously been called its "principal missions" would henceforth be known as "core tasks," and by 2007, the list of core tasks had further evolved, as shown in Table C-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Operations Activities Title 10, Section 167(j)</th>
<th>USSOCOM Core Tasks 202013Z May 03 and Joint Pub 5-03, 17 Dec 03</th>
<th>USSOCOM Core Tasks USSOCOM Posture Statement 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct action</td>
<td>Direct action</td>
<td>Synchronize DoD Global War on Terror efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic reconnaissance</td>
<td>Special reconnaissance</td>
<td>Direct action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconventional warfare</td>
<td>Unconventional warfare</td>
<td>Special reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign internal defense</td>
<td>Foreign internal defense</td>
<td>Unconventional warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil affairs</td>
<td>Civil affairs operations</td>
<td>Foreign internal defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
<td>Civil affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological operations</td>
<td>Psychological operations</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>Information operations</td>
<td>Information and psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater search and rescue</td>
<td>Counterproliferation of WMD [weapons of mass destruction]</td>
<td>Counterproliferation of WMD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others as specified by the President or Secretary of Defense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Today, USSOCOM is one of four "functional combatant commands" whose assigned functions are not addressed at all in DoDD 5100.1, but instead are spelled out (in detail similar to that found in 5100.1) in the Unified Command Plan (UCP). UCP 2006 said the unique responsibilities assigned to USSOCOM were "in addition to the functions specified in section 167 of Title 10"; the recently-approved UCP 2008 contains similar language. Whether the "functions specified in section 167" means the "special operations activities" listed in section 167(j) is not specified.
And Now: Core Competencies

The newest term to enter the roles-and-missions lexicon—*core competencies*—was first used in the CORM’s report. The CORM defined the term itself, and the core competencies of each Service, as follows:

Core competencies are the set of specific capabilities or activities fundamental to a Service or agency role. They define the Service’s or agency’s essential contributions to the overall effectiveness of DoD and its unified commands.

As viewed by the Commission, Service core competencies include the following: *for the Air Force*, air superiority, global strike/deep attack, and air mobility; *for the Army*, mobile armored warfare, airborne operations, and light infantry operations; *for the Navy*, carrier-based air and amphibious power projection, sea-based air and missile defense, and anti-submarine warfare; *for the Marine Corps*, amphibious operations, over-the-beach forced entry operations, and maritime pre-positioning; and *for the Coast Guard*, humanitarian operations, maritime defense, safety, law enforcement, and environmental protection.

Among the core competencies of joint organizations are planning and conducting joint and combined military operations.22 (Italics in original.)

The lists of “core competencies” promulgated by the CORM were intended to describe what each Service did rather than prescribe what it should do or constrain what it might do in the future. They were not meant to be authoritative in the way functions are supposed to be authoritative. The Services were free to modify them and did so; the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, for example, redefined Air Force core competencies in 2003.23 Today the “Air Force Link” website cites three core competencies,24 which make possible six “distinctive capabilities” as shown in Table C-3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Superiority</td>
<td>Developing Airmen</td>
<td>Air and Space Superiority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Strike/Deep Attack</td>
<td>Technology-to-Warfighting</td>
<td>Global Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Mobility</td>
<td>Integrating Operations</td>
<td>Rapid Global Mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Precision Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Information Superiority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agile Combat Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that what once were seen as *core competencies* are now labeled *capabilities* demonstrates the imprecision of the terms, but at the same time illustrates the strong
connection between them. The latest review of roles and missions ordered by Congress seeks to make the connection even stronger.

**The New Quadrennial Assessment of Roles and Missions... Core Competencies and Capabilities**

Section 941 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct every four years a comprehensive assessment “of the roles and missions of the armed forces and the core competencies and capabilities of the Department of Defense to support such roles and missions.”

The quadrennial process is to begin with an independent military assessment by the CJCS “of the roles and missions of the armed forces and the assignment of functions to the armed forces, together with any recommendations for changes in assignment that the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum efficiency and effectiveness of the armed forces.” The assessment is to be conducted so as to—

1. organize the significant missions of the armed forces into core mission areas that cover broad areas of military activity;
2. ensure that core mission areas are defined and functions are assigned so as to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces; and
3. provide the Chairman’s recommendations with regard to issues to be addressed by the Secretary of Defense under subsection (c).

Based on the Chairman’s assessment, the Secretary of Defense is to identify and report to Congress—

1. the core mission areas of the armed forces;
2. the core competencies and capabilities that are associated with the performance or support of a core mission area;
3. the elements of the Department of Defense that are responsible for providing the core competencies and capabilities required to effectively perform the core missions;
4. any gaps in the ability of the elements of the Department to provide core competencies and capabilities required to effectively perform the core missions;
5. any unnecessary duplication of core competencies and capabilities between defense components; and
6. a plan for addressing any gaps or unnecessary duplication identified.
Closely related is a change to the mission of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). This mission now includes helping the CJCS identify, assess, and approve joint military requirements; and identify the core mission area associated with each one. In addition, the JROC is to “conduct periodic reviews of joint military requirements within a core mission area.”

In case the legislation’s legal language masks the true intent of these changes, Representative Ike Skelton, now Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, made congressional expectations crystal clear in his opening statement at a hearing on roles and missions held 20 June 2007:

We recommend that the Secretary determine the core competencies that each of the military services and defense agencies currently offer in fulfilling these missions; ensure that they develop the core competencies that are currently lacking; and jettison capabilities that are not related to core competencies. (Emphasis added.)

Whether core missions, core competencies, and capabilities prove to be better than functions as a framework for “roles and missions” remains to be seen.

End Notes

1 Public Law 253, National Security Act of 1947, Section 308(a), 80th Congress, in Cole, et al., Documents, 50; Section VII, Glossary of Terms and Definitions, Functions of the Armed Forces and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 21 April 1948, in Cole, et al., Documents, 284.

2 Sections 205(e), 206(b), 206(c), and 208(f), respectively, of the National Security Act of 1947, in Cole, et al., Documents, 41–45. Public Law 416 (82nd Congress) amended Section 206(c) to specify that the Marine Corps shall “be so organized to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings.” Public Law 109-163, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, amended Section 206(b) to specify that “the naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less than 12 operational aircraft carriers” and Public Law 109-364, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, changed the minimum number or operational carriers to 11. These provisions are currently codified in Title 10 and Section 5063(a) and 5062(b), respectively.


5 CJCS Memorandum CM-2243-89.

6 These descriptions of what the Services and USSOCOM do are consistent with language in Title 10, Sections 3062, 5062, 5063, 8062, and 167; however, nothing in Title 10 has ever explicitly identified these as “roles.”

7 CJCS Memorandum CM-1584-93, I-2, I-3.


12 CJCS Memorandum CM-8885-95, Comments on the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces Report Directions for Defense, 24 July 1995, 3-1. (Boldface in the original).


15 Joint Pub 1, xiii

16 Title 10, Section 125, <www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_0000125-000-.html> accessed 3 Dec 2008.


18 Title 10, Section 5062, <www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sup_01_10_10_C_20_1_30_507.html> accessed 3 Dec 2008 at.

19 Title 10, Section 5063, <www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_0005063-000-.html> accessed 3 Dec 2008.

20 Title 10, Section 8062, <www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_0008062-000-.html> accessed 3 Dec 2008 at.

21 Codified in Title 10, Section 167(j), <www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/usc_sec_10_0000167-000-.html> accessed 3 Dec 2008.

22 Directions for Defense, 2-20.


27 Skelton, Opening Statement.
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Appendix D:
Extract from DoDD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components
25 September 1987, Showing Changes Recommended by Admiral Crowe *
Deletions are in line-out (strikethrough) format; additions are in line-in (underlined) format.

D. Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The JCS, consisting of the Chairman; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and supported by the Joint Staff, constitute the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense.

1. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall be responsible for the following principal functions:

   a. Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the preparation of annual policy guidance for the heads of the Department of Defense [DoD] components for the preparation and review of program recommendations and budget proposals.

   b. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the preparation of policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans

   c. Assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces, including the direction of operations conducted by the Commanders of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

   d. Prepare strategic plans, including plans which conform with resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective

   e. Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and recommend the assignment of logistics and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

* These changes were never made. Though the current version of DoDD 5100.1 is dated 2002, it was only reissued, not revised. The functions assigned in this 1987 version remain in effect in 2009.
f. Prepare military strategy and assessments of the associated risks. These will include the following:

(1) A military strategy to support national objectives within policy and resource-level guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. Such strategy shall include broad military options prepared by the Chairman with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

(2) Net assessments to determine the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared to those of possible adversaries.

g. Provide for the preparation and review of contingency plans that conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense.

h. Prepare joint logistic and mobility plans to support those contingency plans and recommend the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces in accordance with those logistic and mobility plans.

i. Advise the Secretary of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans, and assess the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans.

j. After consultation with the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, establish and maintain a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

k. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of the requirements, especially operational requirements, identified by the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

l. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments and other components of the Department of Defense conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

m. If deemed necessary, submit to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget proposals within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense, to achieve greater conformance with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities for the requirements of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.
n. In accordance with guidance of the Secretary of Defense, recommend budget proposals for activities of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command, as appropriate. Activities for which funding may be requested include:

(1) Joint Exercises
(2) Force Training
(3) Contingencies
(4) Selected Operations

o. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which the major programs and policies of the Armed Forces in the area of manpower conform with strategic plans.

p. Assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs.

q. Develop and establish doctrine for all aspects of the joint employment of the Armed Forces.

r. Formulate policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the Armed Forces.

s. Provide for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

t. Submit to the Secretary of Defense, not less than once every 3 years in each 2-year appointment, a report containing such recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (roles and missions) to the Armed Forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

u. Prescribe the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman, JCS, subject to approval of the Secretary of Defense.

v. Exercise exclusive direction of the Joint Staff.

w. Subject to the direction of the President, attend and participate in meetings of the National Security Council.

x. Advise and assist the President and the Secretary of Defense on establishing Unified and Specified Combatant Commands to perform military missions and on prescribing the force structure of those commands.

y. Periodically, not less than every 2 years, review the missions, responsibilities (including geographic boundaries), and force structure of each Unified and Specified Combatant Command; and recommend to the President through the Secretary of Defense, any changes to missions, responsibilities, and force structure, as may be necessary.
z. Transmit communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, as directed by the President.

aa. Perform duties, as assigned by the President or the Secretary of Defense, to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function.

bb. Oversee the activities of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

c. Advise the Secretary of Defense on whether a Commander of a Unified and Specified Combatant Command has sufficient authority, direction, and control over the commands and forces assigned to the command to exercise effective command of those commands and forces.

d. Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on measures to provide for the administration and support of forces assigned to each Unified and Specified Combatant Command.

ee. Advise the Secretary of Defense on whether aspects of the administration and support necessary for the accomplishment of missions should be assigned to the Commander of a Unified or Specified Combatant Command.

ff. Serve as the spokesman for Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, especially on the operational requirements of their commands.

g. Provide overall supervision of those Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities for which the Chairman, JCS, has been designated by the Secretary of Defense to oversee. Perform such other functions with respect to the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities as assigned by the Secretary of Defense.

hh. Periodically, not less than every 2 years, report to the Secretary of Defense on the responsiveness and readiness of designated combat-support agencies.

ii. Provide for the participation of combat-support agencies in joint training exercises, assess their performance, and take steps to provide for changes to improve their performance.

jj. Develop, in consultation with the director of each combat-support agency, and maintain a uniform readiness reporting system for combat-support agencies.

kk. Advise and assist the Secretary of Defense on the periodic review and revision of the curriculum of each professional military education school to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters.

ll. Review the reports of selection boards that consider for promotion officers serving, or having served, in joint duty assignments in accordance with guidelines furnished by the Secretary of Defense and return the reports with deter-
minations and comments to the Secretary of the appropriate Military Department.

mm. Advise the Secretary of Defense on the establishment of career guidelines for officers with the joint specialty.

nn. Submit to the Secretary of Defense an evaluation of the joint duty performance of officers recommended for an initial appointment to the grade of lieutenant general or vice admiral, or initial appointment as general or admiral.

oo. Promulgate Joint Chiefs of Staff publications (JCS Pubs) to provide military guidance for joint activities of the Armed Forces.

pp. Review the plans and programs of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands to determine their adequacy and feasibility for the performance of assigned missions.

qq. Provide military guidance for use by the Military Departments, the Military Services, and the Defense Agencies in the preparation of their respective detailed plans.

rr. Participate, as directed, in the preparation of combined plans for military action in conjunction with the Armed Forces of other nations.

ss. Determine the headquarters support, such as facilities, personnel, and communications, required by the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, and recommend the assignment to the Military Departments of the responsibilities for providing such support.

tt. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration, general strategic guidance for the development of industrial and manpower mobilization programs.

uu. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense military guidance for use in the development of military aid programs and other actions relating to foreign military forces.

vv. Formulate policies for the joint training of the Armed Forces.

ww. Assess joint military requirements for command, control, and communications; recommend improvements; and provide guidance on aspects that relate to the conduct of joint operations.

xx. Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for information and consideration in connection with the preparation of budgets, statements of military requirements based upon U.S. strategic war plans. These statements of requirements shall include tasks, priority of tasks, force requirements, and general strategic guidance for developing military installations and bases, and for equipping and maintaining military forces.
yy. In carrying out his functions, duties, and responsibilities, the Chairman, JCS, shall, as he considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

zz. Perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may prescribe.

2. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as specified below:
   
a. A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or in addition to, the advice or opinion presented by the Chairman. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present that advice or opinion to the President, Secretary of Defense, or National Security Council at the same time that he presents his own advice. The Chairman shall also, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to any matter.

b. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers, shall provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense requests such advice.

3. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

E. Functions of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commanders

1. Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the authority, direction, and control of the Commander of a Unified or Specified Combatant Command with respect to the commands and forces assigned to that command include the command functions of:
   
a. Giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry our missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics;

b. Prescribing the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command;
c. Organizing commands and forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;

d. Employing forces within that command as he considers necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command;

e. Assigning command functions to subordinate commanders;

f. Coordinating and approving those aspects of administration, support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command; and

g. Exercising the authority with respect to selecting subordinate commanders, selecting combatant command staff, suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial, as provided in 10 U.S.C. [Title 10, United States Code].

2. If a commander of a combatant command at any time considers his authority, direction, or control with respect to any of the commands or forces assigned to the command to be insufficient to command effectively, the commander shall promptly inform the Secretary of Defense.

3. Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of the Defense, Commanders of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands exercise authority over subordinate commanders as follows:

   a. Commanders of commands and forces assigned to a Unified or Specified Combatant Command are under the authority, direction, and control of, and are responsible to, the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command on all matters for which the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command has been assigned authority under paragraph E.1. above;

   b. The commander of a command or force referred to in subparagraph E.3.a., above, shall communicate with other elements of the Department of Defense on any matter for which the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command has been assigned authority under subsection E.1., above, in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command;

   c. Other elements of the Department of Defense shall communicate, with the Commander of a command or force referred to in E.3.a. on any matter for which the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command has been assigned authority under subsection E.1., above, in accordance with procedures, if any, established by the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command; and
d. If directed by the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command, the commander of a command or force referred to in subparagraph E.3.a. shall advise the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command of all communications to and from other elements of the Department of Defense on any matter for which the Commander of the Unified or Specified Combatant Command has not been assigned authority under subsection E.1.

F. Function of the Military Departments

1. The chain of command for purposes other than the operational direction of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the commanders of Military Service forces.

2. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for, and have the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of their respective Departments, including the following:
   a. Recruiting
   b. Organizing
   c. Supplying
   d. Equipping (including research and development)
   e. Training
   f. Servicing
   g. Mobilizing
   h. Demobilizing
   i. Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel)
   j. Maintaining
   k. The construction, outfitting, and repairs of military equipment
   l. The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities; the acquisition, management and disposal; and the management of real property of natural resources.

3. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the following activities of their respective Departments:
   a. The functioning and efficiency of their Departments;
b. The formulation of policies and programs that are fully consistent with national security objectives and policies established by the President and the Secretary of Defense;

c. The effective and timely implementation of policy, program, and budget decisions and instructions of the President or Secretary of Defense relating to the functions of each Military Department;

d. Carrying out of the functions of the Military Departments so as to fulfill (to the maximum extent practicable) the current and future operational requirements of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands;

e. Effective cooperation and coordination between the Military Departments and agencies of the Department of Defense to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and to eliminate duplication;

f. The presentation and justification of the positions of their respective departments on the plans, programs, and policies of the Department of Defense;

g. The effective supervision and control of Military Department intelligence activities; and

h. Such other activities as may be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.

4. Common Functions of the Military Departments. The functions of the Military Departments, under their respective Secretaries, are as follows:

   a. To prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower, equipment, and supplies for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war and planning for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war.

   b. To maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized, trained, and equipped for employment in emergency.

   c. To provide adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence and counterintelligence for the Military Department and other agencies as directed by competent authority.

   d. To recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

   e. To prepare and submit budgets for their respective departments; justify before the Congress budget requests as approved by the President; and administer the funds made available for maintaining, equipping, and training the forces of their respective departments, including those assigned to Unified and Specified Combatant Commands. The budget submissions to the Secretary of Defense by the Military Departments shall be prepared on the basis, among
other things, of the recommendations of CINCs [commanders-in-chief] and of Service component commanders of forces assigned to Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

f. To conduct research; develop tactics, techniques, and organization; and develop and procure weapons, equipment, and supplies essential to the fulfillment of the functions assigned in this Directive.

g. To develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations, including lines of communication, and to provide administrative and logistics support for all forces and bases, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

h. To provide, as directed, such forces, military missions, and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national interests of the United States.

i. To assist in training and equipping the military forces of foreign nations.

j. To provide, as directed, administrative and logistic support to the headquarters of Unified and Specified Combatant Commands, to include direct support of the development and acquisition of the command and control systems of such headquarters.

k. To assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective functions, including the provisions of personnel, intelligence, training, facilities, equipment, supplies, and services.

l. To prepare and submit, in coordination with other Military Departments, mobilization information to the JCS.

5. Common Service Functions. The Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and Marine Corps, under their respective Secretaries, are responsible for the following functions:

a. Determining Service force requirements and making recommendations concerning force requirements to support national security objectives and strategy and to meet the operational requirements of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands.

b. Planning for the use of the intrinsic capabilities of resources of the other Services that may be made available.

c. Recommending to the JCS the assignment and deployment of forces to Unified and Specified Combatant Commands established by the President through the Secretary of Defense.

d. Administering Service forces.
e. Providing logistic support for Service forces, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

f. Developing doctrines, procedures, tactics, and techniques employed by Service forces.

g. Conducting operational testing and evaluation.

h. Providing for training for joint operations and joint exercises in support of Unified and Specified Combatant Command operational requirements, including the following:

(1) Development of Service training, doctrines, procedures, tactics, techniques, and methods of organization in accordance with policies and procedures established in Service publications.

(2) Development and preparation of Service publications to support the conduct of joint training.

(3) Determination of Service requirements to enhance the effectiveness of joint training.

(4) Support of that joint training directed by the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands and conduct of such additional joint training as is mutually agreed upon by the Services concerned.

i. Operating organic land vehicles, aircraft, and ships or craft.

j. Consulting and coordinating with the other Services on all matters of joint concern.

k. Participating with the other Services in the development of the doctrines, procedures, tactics, techniques, training, publications, and equipment for such joint operations as are the primary responsibility of one of the Services.

6. **Specific Service Functions.** The forces developed and trained to perform the primary functions set forth hereafter shall be **assigned to and employed to support and supplement** the other Military Service forces in carrying out their primary functions, where and whenever such participation shall result in increased effectiveness and shall **by the unified and specified commanders as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. These forces also shall be prepared to perform collateral functions set forth hereafter whenever such participation contributes to the accomplishment of the overall military objectives of the unified or specified commander. As for collateral functions, while the assignment of such functions may establish further justification for stated force requirements, such assignment** **However, these**
collateral functions shall not be used by the Services as the sole basis for establishing additional force requirements.

a. Functions of the Department of the Army

(1) Organization and Responsibility of the Army. The Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and any organic aviation and organic water transport assigned forces. The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the to effectively prosecuteion of war and military operations short of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, The Army is also responsible for the expansion of the its peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war wartime force requirements.

(2) The Primary Functions of the Army, are:

(a) To organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land -- specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas. This includes, but is not limited to:

1. land-based air and space defense of land areas and forces.
2. space operations in support of land forces.
3. organic air operations in support of land forces.
4. electronic warfare operations in support of land forces.
5. close air support for land forces.
6. airborne/air mobile operations.
7. intelligence operations in support of land forces.
8. minelaying and countermobility-related operations.
9. operation of land lines of communication.
10. logistics over the shore and terminal operations.

(b) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including the provision of forces as required for the strategic defense of the United States, in accordance with joint doctrines. To provide forces for the land defense and land-based air and space defense of the continental United States.

(c) To organize, equip, and provide Army forces, in coordination with the other Military Services, for joint amphibious, airborne, and space operations and to provide for the training of such forces, in accordance with joint doctrines. Specifically, the Army shall: To provide
forces for the land defense and land-based air and space defense of forward bases.

1 Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Army for amphibious operations and not provided for elsewhere.

2 Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army and Marine Corps forces in airborne operations. The Army shall have primary responsibility for developing those airborne doctrines, procedures, and equipment that are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.

3 Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army forces in the conduct of space operations

(d) To participate in organizing, training, equipping, and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations.

(e) To provide equipment, forces, procedures, and doctrine necessary for the effective prosecution of electronic warfare operations and, as directed, support of other forces. To develop those doctrines, procedures, and equipment that are common to global airborne operations.

(f) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of psychological operations.

(g) To provide forces for the occupation of territories abroad, including initial to include the establishment of temporary military governments, pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.

(h) To develop doctrines and procedures, in coordination with the other Military Services, for organizing, equipping, training, and employing forces operating on land, except that the development of doctrines and procedures for organizing, equipping, training, and employing Marine Corps units for amphibious operations shall be a function of the Marine Corps coordinating, as required, with the other Military Services.

(i) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces, as directed, to operate land lines of communication.

(j) To conduct the following activities:

1 Functions relating to the management and operation of the Panama Canal, as assigned by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense.

(g) To manage and operate the Panama Canal.
2. The authorized civil works program, including projects for improvement of navigation, flood control, beach erosion control, and other water resource developments in the United States, its territories, and its possessions.

(h) To perform civil works programs, including projects to improve navigation, flood control, beach erosion control, and other water resource developments in the United States, its territories, and its possessions.

3. Certain other civil activities prescribed by law.

(i) To perform certain other civil activities prescribed by law.

(j) To participate in the development of joint doctrine.

(k) To maintain the capability to rapidly generate forces trained to conduct amphibious operations.

(3) Collateral Functions of the Army: A collateral function of the Army is to train forces to interdict enemy sea, space and air power and communications through operations on or from land.

(4) Army responsibilities in support of space operations include the following:

(a) To organize, training, equipping, and provide Army land forces to support maritime and space operations. This includes, but is not limited to:

1. land-based air defense for maritime operations.
2. land-based interdiction in support of maritime operations.
3. airborne/airmobile operations in support of maritime operations.
4. land-based support for space operations.
5. air support for maritime operations.

(b) Developing, in coordination with the other Military Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by Army forces for use in space operations.

(c) Conducting individual and unit training of Army space operations forces.

(d) Participating with other Services in joint space operations, training, and exercises as mutually agreed to by the Services concerned, or as directed by competent authority.

(e) Providing forces for space support operations for the Department of Defense when directed.

(5) Other responsibilities of the Army. With respect to close air support of ground forces, the Army has specific responsibility for the following:
(a) Providing, in accordance with inter-Service agreements, communications, personnel, and equipment employed by Army forces.

(b) Conducting individual and unit training of Army forces.

(c) Developing equipment, tactics, and techniques employed by Army forces.

b. Functions of the Department of the Navy

(1) **Organization and Responsibility of the Navy.** The Navy, within the Department of the Navy, includes, in general, naval combat, combat support, and combat service support, and organic aviation forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Navy is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary to effectively prosecute war and military operations short of war. The Navy is also responsible for the expansion of its peacetime components to meet wartime force requirements. The Marine Corps, within the Department of Navy, includes not less than three combat divisions and three air wings and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Coast Guard, when operating as a Service within the Department of the Navy, includes naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein.

(a) The Navy and the Marine Corps, under the Secretary of the Navy, are responsible for the preparation of Navy and Marine Corps forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of war, except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with the integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy and the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

(b) During peacetime, the Department of Transportation is responsible for maintaining the United States Coast Guard in a state of readiness so that it may function as a specialized Service in the Navy in time of war or when the President directs. The Coast Guard may also perform its military functions in times of limited war or defense contingency, in support of Naval Component Commanders, without transfer to the Department of the Navy.

(2) **Primary Functions of the Navy and/or Marine Corps are:**

(a) To organize, train, equip and provide Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and land-based naval air components -- specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces, to project power ashore, and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to control vi-
tal sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communication, to establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such land, air, and space operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. This includes but is not limited to:

1. Land and sea-based air operations in support of naval forces.
2. Space operations in support of naval forces.
3. Reconnaissance/sea surveillance in support of naval forces.
4. Electronic warfare operations in support of naval forces.
5. Intelligence operations in support of naval forces.
6. Operation of sea lines of communication.
7. Aerial refueling operations in support of naval forces.
8. Anti-submarine warfare operations.
9. Anti-air warfare operations.
10. Anti-surface warfare operations.
11. Minelaying and controlled minefield operations.
12. Protection of shipping operations.
13. Close air support for naval operations.

(b) To provide force for the maritime defense and sea-based air and space defense of the continental United States.

(b) To maintain the Marine Corps, which shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct. However, these additional duties must not detract from, or interfere with, the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. These functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land army.

(c) Further, the Marine Corps shall:

1. Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, the doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations. The Marine Corps shall have primary responsibility for the development of those landing force doctrines, tactics, techniques, and
equipment that are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.

2. Train and equip, as required, forces for airborne operations, in coordination with the other Military Services, and in accordance with joint doctrines.

3. Develop, in coordination with the other Military Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment of interest to the Marine Corps for airborne operations and not provided for by the Army, that has primary responsibility for the development of airborne doctrines, procedures, and techniques, which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.

(ec) To organize, train, and equip, in coordination with the other Military Services, and to provide naval forces, including naval close air support and space forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious operations, and to be responsible for the amphibious training of all forces assigned to joint amphibious operations in accordance with joint doctrines.

(d) To participate in organizing, training, and equipping naval forces for the conduct of special operations.

(e) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment of naval forces for amphibious operations and the doctrines and procedures for joint amphibious operations.

(ef) To organize, train, and equip, and provide naval forces for the conduct of strategic nuclear warfare to support strategic deterrence.

(gf) To furnish adequate, timely, reliable intelligence support for the Coast Guard.

(h) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, protection of shipping, aerial refueling and minelaying, including the air and space aspects thereof, and controlled minefield operations.

(i) To provide the afloat forces for strategic sealift.

(j) To provide air support essential for naval operations.

(k) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including the provision of forces as required for the strategic defense of the United States, in accordance with joint doctrines.

(l) To provide equipment, forces, procedures, and doctrine necessary for the effective prosecution of electronic warfare operations and, as directed, support of other forces.

(m) To furnish aerial photography, as necessary, for Navy and Marine Corps operations.
(n) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Navy and Marine Corps forces in the conduct of space operations.

(o) To provide sea-based launch and space support for the Department of Defense when directed.

(p) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces, as directed, to operate sea lines of communication.

(q) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations.

(r) To organize, train, equip, and provide Navy and Marine Corps forces for the support and conduct of psychological operations.

(s g) To coordinate with the Department of Transportation for the peacetime maintenance of the Coast Guard. During war, the Coast Guard will function as a Military Service. The specific wartime functions of the Coast Guard are as follows:

(h) To organize, train, and equip forces for the sea transport of the Armed Forces.

(i) To provide sea-based support for space operations.

(j) To participate in the development of joint doctrine.

1. To provide an integrated port security and coastal defense force, in coordination with the other Military Services, for the United States.

2. To provide specialized Coast Guard units, including designated ships and aircraft, for overseas deployment required by naval component commanders.

3. To organize and equip, in coordination with the other Military Services, and provide forces for maritime search and rescue, icebreaking, and servicing of maritime aids to navigation.

(3) The collateral functions of the Navy and the Marine Corps include the following:

(a) To interdict enemy land power, air power, space power, and communications through operations at sea. To organize, train, equip and provide naval forces to support land and space operations. This includes, but is not limited to:

1. naval/naval air/naval space support for land operations.
2. naval/naval air/naval space support for space operations.
3. aerial imagery for cartographic purposes.
4. the establishment of temporary military governments.
5 logistic support for Coast Guard Forces to include procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance.

(b) To conduct close air and naval support for land operations.

(c) To furnish aerial imagery for cartographic purposes.

(d) To be prepared to participate in the overall air and space effort, as directed.

(e) To establish military government, as directed, pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.

(4) Navy and Marine Corps responsibilities in support of space operations include:

(a) Organizing, training, equipping, and providing Navy and Marine Corps forces to support space operations.

(b) Developing, in coordination with the other Military Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by Navy and Marine Corps forces for use in space operations.

(c) Conduct individual and unit training of Navy and Marine Corps space operations forces.

(d) Participating with the other Services in joint space operations, training, and exercises, as mutually agreed to by the Services concerned or as directed by competent authority.

(5) Other responsibilities of the Navy and the Marine Corps include:

(a) Providing, when directed, logistic support of Coast Guard forces, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance.

(b) Providing air and land transport essential for naval operations and not otherwise provided for.

(c) Providing and operating sea transport for the Armed Forces other than that which is organic to the individual Services.

(d) Developing, in coordination with the other Services, doctrine and procedures for close air support for naval forces and for joint forces in amphibious operations.

(4) Organization and Responsibility of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, includes expeditionary land combat, combat support, combat service support, and aviation forces. The Marine Corps is responsible for the preparation of combined arms forces necessary to effectively prosecute war and military operations short of war. The Marine Corps is also responsible for the expansion of its peacetime operations to meet wartime force requirements.

(5) Primary Functions of the Marine Corps:
(a) To organize, train, equip and provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms for prompt and sustained operations with the fleet—specifically, expeditionary forces for the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases, and the conduct of land operations essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. This includes, but is not limited to:

1. amphibious operations.
2. naval expeditionary operations.
3. airborne operations in support of naval forces.
4. electronic warfare operations in support of naval forces.
5. aerial refueling operations in support of naval forces.
6. intelligence operations in support of naval forces.
7. land and sea-based air operations in support of naval forces.
8. land-based defense of advanced naval bases.
9. aerial photography/reconnaissance in support of naval forces.

(b) To develop those doctrines, procedures, and equipment for all land forces that are common to amphibious operations.

(c) To provide detachments for service on armed vessels of the Navy and for the protection of naval stations and bases.

(d) To participate in the development of joint doctrine.

(6) Collateral Functions of the Marine Corps:

(a) To organize, train, equip and provide combined arms forces to support land and space operations. This includes, but is not limited to:

1. airborne/airmobile forces in support of land operations.
2. air operations in support of land forces.
3. land and air defense of the continental United States.
4. special operations.
5. forces for the occupation of territories abroad, to include the establishment of temporary military governments.
6. anti-submarine warfare operations in support of naval forces.
7. mine laying and controlled minefield operations.
8. protection of shipping operations.

(7) Organization and Responsibility of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard, when operating as a Service within the Department of the Navy, includes naval combat, combat support, combat service support, and organic aviation forces. During peacetime, the Department of Transportation is responsible for maintaining the Coast Guard ready to function as a specialized Service in the Navy in time of war or when the President directs. The Coast Guard may also perform its military
functions in operations short of war without transfer to the Department of the Navy.

(5) Primary Wartime Functions of the Coast Guard:

(a) To organize, train, equip, and provide integrated port security and coastal defense forces for the United States.

(b) To organize, train, equip, and provide specialized Coast Guard units for overseas deployment under naval component commanders.

(c) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for maritime search and rescue, icebreaking, and servicing maritime aids to navigation.

c. Functions of the Department of the Air Force

(1) Organization and Responsibility of the Air Force. The Air Force, within the Department of the Air Force, includes aviation forces, both combat and space combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, not otherwise assigned. The Air Force is responsible for the preparation of the air and space forces necessary for the prosecution of war and military operations short of war, except as otherwise assigned and, according to integrated joint mobilization plans, The Air Force is also responsible for the expansion of its peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war wartime force requirements.

(2) The Primary Functions of the Air Force include:

(a) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained offensive and defensive combat operations in the air and in space -- specifically, forces to defend the United States against air and space attack in accordance with doctrines established by the JCS, to gain and maintain general air and space supremacy, to defeat enemy air and space forces, to attack enemy surface targets, conduct space operations, to control vital air and space areas, and to establish local air and space superiority, except as otherwise assigned herein. This includes, but is not limited to:

1 air and space defense of land areas and forces.
2 air logistics support operations for land forces.
3 airlift and air resupply for airborne operations.
4 electronic warfare operations in support of air forces.
5 aerial reconnaissance in support of air and land forces.
6 operation of air lines of communication.
7 air interdiction in support of land forces.
8 air and space defense of forward air bases.
9 intelligence operations in support of air forces.
10 air refueling operations in support of air forces.
11 close air support for land forces.

(b) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and missile defense and space control operations, including the provision of forces as required for the strategic the air and space-based defense of the continental United States, in accordance with joint doctrines including threat warning and attack assessment.

(c) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic air and missile warfare. To participate in organizing, training, and equipping forces for the conduct of special operations.

(d) To organize, equip, and provide forces for joint amphibious, space, and airborne operations, in coordination with the other Military Services, and to provide for their training in accordance with joint doctrines the conduct of strategic nuclear warfare and strategic conventional aerial bombardment.

(e) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for close air support and air logistic support to the Army and other forces, as directed, including airlift, air support, resupply of airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical air reconnaissance, and air interdiction of enemy land forces and communications.

(f) To organize, train, equip and provide forces for the air transport for of the Armed Forces, except as otherwise assigned.

(g) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment for air defense from land areas, including the United States.

(hf) To organize, train, and equip, and provide forces to furnish aerial imagery for use by the Army and other agencies as directed, including aerial imagery for cartographic purposes and in support of the Army.

(i) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Air Force for amphibious operations and not provided for elsewhere.

(j) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Air Force forces in airborne operations.

(kg) To provide land-based launch and space support, including common user satellite control operations for the Department of Defense, except as otherwise assigned.

(l) To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Air Force forces in the conduct of space operations.

(mh) To organize, train, and equip, and provide land-based tanker forces for the to conduct in-flight refueling support of strategic forces operations.
and operational deployments of the aircraft of the Armed Forces and Air Force tactical operations, except as otherwise assigned.

(i) To participate in the development of joint doctrine.

(n) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces, as directed to operate air lines of communications.

(o) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of special operations.

(p) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and conduct of psychological operations.

(q) To provide equipment, forces, procedures, and doctrine necessary for the effective prosecution of electronic warfare operations and, as directed, support of other forces.

(3) Collateral Functions of the Air Force include the following:

(a) Surface sea surveillance and anti-surface ship warfare through air operations. To organize, train, equip and provide air and space forces to support maritime and land operations. This includes, but is not limited to:
   1 air support of amphibious operations.
   2 interdiction and aerial minelaying operations.
   3 sea surveillance.
   4 air/space operations against enemy warships/surface commerce.
   5 air/space operations to defend sea lines of communication.
   6 air refueling in support of naval operations.
   7 close air support for land forces in naval operations.

(b) Antisubmarine warfare and antiair warfare operations to protect sea lines of communications.

(c) Aerial minelaying operations.

(d) Air-to-air refueling in support of naval campaigns.

(4) Air Force responsibilities in support of space operations include:

(a) Organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces to support space operations.

(b) Developing, in coordination with the other Military Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by Air Force forces for use in space operations.

(c) Conducting individual and unit training of Air Force space operations forces.
(d) Participating with the other Services in joint space operations, training, and exercises as mutually agreed to by the other Services concerned, or as directed by competent authority.

(5) Other responsibilities of the Air Force include:

(a) With respect to amphibious operations, the Air Force shall develop, in coordination with the other Services, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Air Force and not provided for by the Navy and Marine Corps.

(b) With respect to airborne operations, the Air Force has specific responsibility to:

1. Provide Air Force forces for the air movement of troops, supplies, and equipment in joint airborne operations, including parachute and aircraft landings.

2. Develop tactics and techniques employed by Air Force forces in the air movement of troops, supplies, and equipment.

(c) With respect to close air support of ground forces, the Air Force has specific responsibility for developing, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines and procedures, except as provided for in Navy responsibilities for amphibious operations and in responsibilities for the Marine Corps.

c. Functions of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)

(1) Organization and Responsibility. USSOCOM, while a unified command within the Department of Defense, has been assigned several functions in law which are the same as those assigned to Service Departments. It includes all CONUS [continental United States]-based and some forward deployed Special Operations forces (SOF), Psychological Operations forces, and Civil Affairs forces. SOF include: Special Forces, Rangers, SEALs [sea-air-land teams], Special Boat Units, Special Operations Aviation units, and Air Force Special Operations units. USSOCOM is responsible for the preparation of forces necessary to effectively conduct special operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs.

(2) Primary Functions:

(a) To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of special, psychological operations, and civil affairs. This includes, but is not limited to:

(b) To coordinate the development of joint doctrine and procedures for the employment of the Armed Forces in special operations.

(c) To develop those doctrines, procedures, and equipment that are common to all special operations.

(Note: Once the development of USSOCOM has been achieved fully as required by law, we will need to evaluate the results and determine whether further changes to law or these functions are necessary to maintain US special operations capabilities.)
Appendix E: 
Legislative and Executive Views on Army and Marine Corps Roles and Missions

The challenge of coming to agreement within and between the Legislative and Executive Branches of government is illustrated through the issue of Army-Marine Corps cooperation as it developed and played out from 1992 onward.

Legislative Expectations
In his 2 July 1992 floor speech, “The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Services’ Roles and Missions,” Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Senator Sam Nunn defined the issue this way:

During Operation DESERT STORM, the Army provided tank battalions and rocket artillery support to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has only 4 tank battalions, and two of these battalions have only 8 tanks each. By contrast, the Army has over 35 tank battalions, each with 54 tanks. The Marine Corps would also like to buy 42 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers, even though the Army has over 500 and provided MLRS support during DESERT STORM.

Obviously the Marine Corps would like to have its own tank and MLRS battalions. But we must ask the following key questions. Can the Army provide armor and artillery support for the Marine Corps? Can Army tank and MLRS battalions train and deploy with Marine Corps expeditionary forces, freeing the Marine Corps to invest in unique capabilities that they can provide for other Services?

The fundamental question is not what is best for the Marine Corps or the Army. The question is what is best for America?¹

Section 903 of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 subsequently expressed the “Sense of Congress on Cooperation Between the Army and the Marine Corps” as follows:

(a) FINDINGS.—With respect to the roles and missions of the Army and Marine Corps, the Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Army and the Marine Corps both provide military capabilities that are necessary for carrying out the national military strategy of the United States.

(2) Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the complementary nature of those capabilities and the substantial degree to which the Army and the Marine Corps can effectively coordinate their activities and cooperate with each other.

(3) The availability of future Federal budget resources for the Army and the Marine Corps is likely to be significantly more limited than the Federal budget resources currently available for the Army and the Marine Corps.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Army and the Marine Corps should intensify efforts—

(1) to eliminate unnecessary duplication; and

(2) to improve interservice coordination and to specialize in specific functional areas.

(c) EXAMINATION BY CJCS [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff].—

(1) The Congress encourages the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine whether—

(A) the Army should provide the Marine Corps with armor and heavy fire support needed for mid-intensity and high-intensity combat; or

(B) the Marine Corps should be equipped with the armor, heavy artillery, and other weapons and sustainability needed to engage in mid-intensity and high-intensity combat independent of the other military services.

(2) In conducting the examination, the Chairman should consider the following actions:

(A) Designating Army artillery battalions equipped with the Multiple Launch Rocket System to support Marine amphibious forces afloat.

(B) Designating Army tank battalions to support Marine amphibious forces afloat.

(C) Equipping maritime prepositioning ships with Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers and M1 tanks to be manned by Army units in support of Marine forces.

(D) Transferring management of all prepositioning shipping on behalf of all the Armed Forces to the Marine Corps.
(E) Transferring Army shipping and lighterage to the Navy.

(3) In the consideration of the actions referred to in paragraph (2), the Chairman should evaluate the logistics, training, and operational implications of each action.

(4) If the Chairman recommends that the Marine Corps be equipped with the armor, heavy artillery, other weapons, and sustainability necessary for engaging in mid-intensity and high-intensity combat independent of the other services, the Chairman should determine, as part of the examination under this paragraph, the following:

(A) What additional procurement requirements and costs are necessary to equip the Marine Corps to meet the demands of mid-intensity and high-intensity combat.

(B) The adequacy of current prepositioning programs, mine warfare capability, naval fire support, and night fighting capability to meet the demands of mid-intensity and high-intensity combat.

(d) ROLES AND MISSIONS AUTHORITY OF THE CHAIRMAN.—The Chairman should consider the findings and sense of Congress set forth in subsections (a) and (b), and the matters set forth in subsection (c), including the options for streamlining the roles and missions of the Army and the Marine Corps, in the performance of the Chairman’s responsibilities under section 153(b) of title 10, United States Code.²

The Executive Branch Response: Chairman Powell

General Colin Powell’s February 1993 “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States” devoted two-and-a-half pages to the similarities and differences between Army and Marine combat functions and capabilities:

CONTINGENCY AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

The capability to respond to regional crises is one of the key demands of our National Military Strategy. US forces must be prepared for differences in terrain, climate, and the nature of the threat, as well as for different levels of support from host nations and other allies.

Both the Army and Marine Corps forces possess the ability to respond to crises involving land combat. As outlined in Title 10 and amplified in DoD Directives, the Army’s primary responsibility is “to organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land—specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land
areas.” The Marine Corps’ primary responsibility is to be organized, trained, and equipped “to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”*

The similarity of Army and Marine Corps capabilities provides alternatives to the President and the Secretary of Defense during a crisis. However, it leads to the question of why two Services have similar responsibilities for certain land operations. The answer lies in the unique, yet complementary capabilities of these two Services’ capabilities [sic] that span both deployment and employment characteristics.

The role of Army forces is to defeat enemy land forces and occupy territory. Army contingency forces are organized and equipped for a full range of crises that require prompt and sustained land operations or presence. They include the following:

- **Airborne forces** capable of responding to a crisis within hours to show US resolve and stabilize the situation.
- **Light infantry forces** specifically designed for rapid air deployment to provide sustained force in various types of terrain where maneuver and mobility are restricted.
- **Air assault forces** structured to hit hard and fast, using lift helicopters for rapid mobility over any terrain and attack helicopters to defeat even heavily armored targets.
- **Armored and mechanized infantry forces** capable of defeating the full range of enemy capabilities, including other heavy armored forces. Because their heavier equipment must be deployed by sealift, these forces take longer to deploy in response to a crisis.

In some situations, Army contingency forces can serve as the enabling force for additional contingency or expeditionary forces by establishing a secure lodgment and then transitioning to a sustained land operation. A recent exam-

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* Quotation marks are in the original Powell report, but no source is cited. The language is based upon sections 205(e) and 206(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, but is not verbatim. These passages, currently codified in Title 10 sections 3062(b) and 5063(a), respectively, were added to the National Security Act of 1947 at the Marine Corps’ urging, despite the fact that the President had indicated his intention to prescribe Service roles and missions by Executive Order, as agreed by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. They are among the functions vested in the Department of Defense by law that Title 10 section 125 says may not be substantially transferred, reassigned, consolidated, or abolished; except during time of hostilities or imminent threat of hostilities when the President may transfer, reassign, or consolidate (but not abolish) them until the hostilities are terminated or there is no longer an imminent threat.
ple of the Army in an enabling role occurred in DESERT SHIELD, when elements of the 82nd Airborne Division were inserted in the first days to secure lodgments at the ports of Dammam and Al Jubail in Saudi Arabia. These lodgments were then handed off to other Army and Marine Corps elements to develop into major basis of operation.

Marine Corps expeditionary forces are organized and equipped for a full range of crises that require operations from the sea. Marine forces are capable of seizing and defending lodgments in the littoral areas, enabling the introduction of follow-on forces. They can deploy in two ways:

- As Marine expeditionary forces, they can use Navy amphibious shipping for crises requiring forcible entry by amphibious assault, conduct “show of force” operations coupled with the threat of US intervention, and conduct operations without sustained logistical support or host nation infrastructure.

- As Maritime Prepositioning Forces, which are Marine forces that have equipment and supplies staged aboard forward deployed Maritime Prepositioning Ships, they can be airlifted to a crisis area, link up with their equipment, and perform a variety of missions.

With the focus on regional crises and the increased uncertainties of the post-Cold War era, a mix of forces with distinct but complementary capabilities is essential. Situations will often demand that the two Services operate together. An example is the initial establishment of a lodgment area by the Marines, followed by a build-up of Army forces, or vice versa. Once Army forces expand the lodgment and begin sustained land operations, Marine forces can become the CINC’s [commander-in-chief’s—i.e., the combatant commander’s] strategic reserve, threaten the enemy with an amphibious assault from another direction, or continue to fight on land—as they did during DESERT STORM.

There are several advantages in having similar, complementary capabilities among the two Services. It allows the combatant commander to tailor a military response to any contingency, regardless of geographic location. At the national command level, it adds to the options available to senior decision-makers in a crisis, especially one that occurs unexpectedly.

In 1990, during Operation SHARP EDGE, Marines operating from Navy amphibious ships helped evacuate US citizens during a major upheaval in Liberia. The situation in Liberia steadily deteriorated over a period of days, permitting a [sic] Amphibious Ready Group to arrive on the scene and remain offshore for several months while continuing to monitor and evaluate events. Had the crisis erupted more quickly, Army airborne forces might have been more appropriate. Another example...was the Somalian crisis. In January 1991, an amphibious force quickly
shifted to assist in the evacuation of US embassy and other personnel. Again, had the situation required more rapid action, Army forces could have been used.

The comprehensive review that produced the Base Force in response to a changing world yielded significant reductions in our contingency and expeditionary forces. Accordingly, a number of Army heavy and light divisions and Marine Corps personnel were removed from the force structure. But our capabilities-based strategy demands the unique and complementary capabilities provided by the Army and Marine Corps. In fact, with its emphasis on rapid response to regional crises, the National Military Strategy puts a premium on these forces. Review of requirements is a continuous process, however, and may in the future produce additional areas of personnel and cost savings in contingency and expeditionary forces, to include the possibility of further reductions in the Army’s light infantry forces.

General Powell concluded his discussion of contingency and expeditionary forces with the recommendation that, “The capabilities of the contingency and expeditionary forces in the Army and Marine Corps provide decision makers with valuable alternatives and should be retained. The possibility of further decreases in the Army’s light infantry will be studied as force structure is reduced.” He then turned to a topic raised by Senator Nunn and the subject of the Sense of Congress in the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993.

**Tanks and MLRS for the Marine Corps**

The Army and Marine Corps both employ tanks and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) as integral parts of their doctrine for tactical operations. Both Services currently have tanks in their force structures, but only the Army currently has MLRS—a system which saw its first combat service in DESERT STORM. The Marines have programmed to buy MLRS beginning in 1994.

The Marine Corps is structured to integrate armor and artillery units into its maneuver elements. Both are inextricably linked with the Marine infantryman. This connection is reflected in the Marines Corps’ [sic] credo that “every Marine is a rifleman first.” Armor and artillery are not separate units that simply support the infantry when necessary.

**Tanks.** In the Base Force, the Army has tanks in eight Active component heavy (armored and mechanized infantry) divisions and in two armored cavalry regiments and two separate brigades. In the Reserve components, the Army has tanks in five heavy divisions, two cadre divisions, three separate heavy brigades, six round-out and round-up brigades, and one armored cavalry regiment.
The Marine Corps Base Force armor structure consists of three tank battalions—two active and one reserve—to support the capability to employ two Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) forward and outfit three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons. This small tank force permits the Marine Corps to fulfill its role in the National Military Strategy. The Army conducts tank skills training for both the Services.

**MLRS.** Eight active Army heavy divisions each have one MLRS battery with nine launchers. Additional MLRS are located in corps artillery battalions. Marine Corps MLRS capability is programmed around a total of 42 launchers. MLRS systems are identical for both Services, and individual training for both would be combined at Army schools.

The Marines will rely on MLRS to provide general support field artillery to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). In 1989, the Marine Corps selected MLRS to augment its general support artillery capability. In making that decision, the artillery force structure was realigned. Subsequent force planning decisions required additional artillery reductions. The Marine Corps gave up all self-propelled general support cannon artillery and retained the requirement for an MLRS battalion—a decision based, in part, on the promise of projected savings in personnel and maintenance. The Marine Corps has argued that MLRS is essential to offset its 45% reduction in cannon artillery, the loss of self-propelled capability, and reductions in tactical aviation traditionally depended on to make up for shortfalls in artillery.

Acknowledging that armor and MLRS are necessary capabilities for enabling forces operating from the sea, the question of whether the Army can provide these capabilities to the Marine Corps was studied. Certainly, the Army possesses the tanks, MLRS launchers, and requisite crews to perform the mission. But the tougher question is whether separating tanks and MLRS from the MAGTF would have an unacceptable impact on the Marines’ ability to fight as a cohesive team, and whether having to provide part of its structure to support the Marine Corps would leave the Army short of its warfighting requirements.

A range of alternatives was examined, from having the Army provide all tank and MLRS support to the Marine Corps to maintaining the current program. It was concluded that severing armor from the organic structure of the Marines would markedly reduce unit cohesion and warfighting capability and achieve negligible cost savings. The Marine Corps unique role as an enabling force from the sea demands a force structure with enough armor to conduct its amphibious mission. Also examined was the related issue of how many tank battalions the Marine Corps should retain. There was consensus that the Marine Corps must retain enough tank battalions to support amphibious operations and outfit three Marine Prepositioning Squadrons.
A different conclusion was reached on MLRS. In keeping with the adage that "the artillery is never in reserve," there are advantages in assigning the Army responsibility for all MLRS support. Because MLRS units are normally positioned in the rear and typically fire across maneuver unit boundaries, the impact on Marine unit cohesiveness for warfighting would not be as severe as losing armor. Adopting this course of action would result in significant savings—preliminary estimates indicate on the order of $300 million of a six year period.

But eliminating the Marine Corps’ organic general support artillery is a major step that warrants an in-dept cost and effectiveness analysis before being implemented. This study must also examine the impact on the Army if it is required to provide MLRS for the Marines, and whether tactical air and naval gunfire can provide sufficient fire support for Marines fighting ashore.

General Powell concluded the discussion with a recommendation that the

Marine Corps will retain enough tank battalions to support amphibious operations and to outfit three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons. The Army will provide any additional tank support required. There appears to be advantages [sic] in having the Army provide MLRS support for Marine Corps operations, however, an in-depth cost and operational effectiveness analysis is required before implementing this recommendation.³

**Congressional Reaction**

On 24 February 1993, Army Lieutenant General Edwin S. Leland, Jr., the Joint Staff Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), appeared before the House Armed Services Committee to present General Powell’s report on roles and missions. During his presentation, he addressed the Army and Marine Corps issue as follows:

There is a perception that somehow there is a lot of unnecessary redundancy between the Army and the Marine Corps, and so we spent a lot of effort on this one. The first thing we did is we went in and we looked at all the various capabilities, and what we found is that they are quite different. The Marine Corps, as an example—if they happen to be nearby, and if what you are going to deal with is near the water—have a lot of advantages. They can get there quickly, they bring a lot with them, so there is a lot of support with them, and you can get them out quickly.

The operation in Liberia, I think, is an excellent example. When I was the Chief of Staff of European Command, which was the assignment I had before I came to the Joint Staff some 2 years ago, you may remember we used the Marines to evacuate the embassy in Liberia. Again, an excellent use of that force. But in that example, if we would have had to get there quicker it was the Army that
was going to have to do it. The Marines were in the Mediterranean. It took several days to get them down off the coast of Liberia. So it was Army airborne, Army air assault, if you had to get there quick.

Then, obviously, not everything is close to the water, and clearly the marines are not equipped for extended operations on land with long lines of communications, and they are not equipped for mounted armored or mechanized-type warfare. So, as you went through the capabilities, there was clearly a requirement in the Army for airborne, air assault, light infantry, and the armored formations, and we clearly need the things that the marines can do. So the capabilities—we need them all.

How much you need is a whole different subject. we went through that as part of this strategy drill that I mentioned to you when the strategy was published last January—the process actually began a year and a half before that—and took our best cut at what we think is the right size force for the United States, and that is the base force. But obviously, the world is continuing to change, and there are ongoing assessments, and so how much is a legitimate issue. But we feel strongly that we need to be sure that, as we size the force, we make sure we retain all the capabilities. We need some of all of that stuff.

A related issue is tanks, and...multiple-launch rocket systems, which are rocket artillery. We looked at tanks. The question was, should there be tanks in the Marine Corps? The answer was, in our judgment, yes, but not very many. They need just enough to do amphibious operations and to be able to have the tanks in their maritime prepositioning ships.

This is an interesting discussion about how you come to that conclusion, because what they do, the complexity of the kinds of operations the marines do is such that if you had Army crews on those tanks, they would have to spend so much time with the Marine Corps they might as well be marines, because it would be just very expensive sending them back and forth all the time. So there was no benefit to making them Army and, in fact, it not only didn’t save money, it would probably cost money. If you need tanks beyond those minimum number, then they are clearly provided by the Army as we did during Desert Storm.

Multiple-launch rocket system was a different answer. The Army has them, the marines don’t. The marines want to buy them. Our recommendation is that they don’t. We think that support can be provided by the Army. It will save $300 million or $400 million.
Following General Leland's presentation, he was questioned by members of the House Armed Services Committee. Congressman Paul McHale (D-PA)* questioned him on the subject of tanks for the Marine Corps. The transcript of their exchange follows:

Mr. McHALE. General, like the other members of the committee, I want to commend you on your testimony and what I thought was a very thought full and well-balanced report. Having said that, let me take a bite out of your hide, if I may.

I was greatly concerned by the Chairman’s proposal to decrease the tank capabilities of the Marine Corps, and I listened very carefully to your testimony on that point, jotted down a few comments that you made. First of all, the thrust of your testimony was that the Marine Corps should keep a limited number of tanks. You went on to say that the Marine Corps needs tanks but not very many. Finally, and for me most disturbingly, you said that the Marines Corps should have just enough tanks to do amphibious operations.

In that context, which I find to be disturbing, how can the Marine Corps execute land warfare missions in a non-amphibious environment without support from tanks and combined arms task forces? For example, how could the Marine Corps execute a deliberate minefield breach without tank support?

General LELAND. Let me talk numbers with you a little bit. No one is—the recommendation is not to decrease the number of tanks in the Marine Corps; the recommendation is not to increase them. What it basically says is what they have now is correct. They have tank battalions in the two divisions in the United States. As I remember, there are 44 tanks in each of those battalions. They have three tank battalions that are positioned in the maritime prepositioning ships. So the recommendation says that is fine. It just says that that is enough.

Mr. McHALE. I may have misunderstood something. I thought that your chart in your testimony called for two Active Duty tank battalions, which is less than what the Marine Corps has today on Active Duty.

General LELAND. It is the current structure. It is the two, plus what it has in the—the tanks that are in the maritime prepositioning fleets. So basically, they have two Active, one Reserve. There is no tank battalion on Okinawa.

Mr. McHALE. So you would preserve two Active Duty tank battalions.

General LELAND. Right.

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* Mr. McHale served as an active duty Marine Corps infantry officer in the 1970s, then, as a Marine Corps Reservist, volunteered and served as an infantry officer in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. He was elected to the House in 1992, and served in the George W. Bush administration as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs.
Mr. MCHALE. If I can get back to, I think, the broader thrust of your statement, which is really the part that concern me [sic], you said the Marine Corps should have just enough tanks for amphibious operations. If I may, let me point out that 2 years ago today, this very morning, marines conducted a non-amphibious land warfare mission with integrated tanks in a combined arms task force. Did you really mean to say that the Marine Corps should only have enough tanks for amphibious operations, thereby precluding the kind of mission that we executed 2 years ago, or do you really envision a broader tank role beyond the scope of the amphibious ops for the Marine Corps?

General LELAND. The key issue there is where you draw the line between the Army and the marines. The Army is the service that is principally designed for mounted land combat, so the major armored formations that we have in the Defense Department are in the Army. So the point is whether the Marines have the tanks that they need to have in order to do those things as they project themselves ashore. Sometimes that is going over the beach in an amphibious operation. Sometimes that is the initial operations after they get ashore. But, if they get into an environment where they need more armor than that, in the same way that we took a brigade of the 2d Armored Division and provided it to the Marine Corps in Desert Storm, we think that is the appropriate thing to do in the future.

Mr. MCHALE. I think that it is critically important that we focus on that because that is a fundamental change in the structure of the Marine Corps. Two years ago the Marine Corps executed a land warfare mission that was non-amphibious with tanks that were integral to the Marine Corps. If I understand your testimony correctly, you are saying that in the future, pursuant to the Chairman's proposal, the Marine Corps would not in-house have the capability of repeating the mission that they so successfully executed just 2 years ago.

General LELAND. No. That is not right.

Mr. MCHALE. Where would the tanks come from?

General LELAND. They would come from the maritime prepositioning ships which is where they came from in Desert Storm. Or, as you know, in this case the actual tanks came from the Army because we changed models.

Mr. MCHALE. Yes.

General LELAND. So we changed to the M-1 tank. But the tank crews were the Marines—are the same tank crews that we envision into the future.

Mr. MCHALE. OK. General, I understand what you are saying. I would urge you to reconsider the broad-brush statement that you made earlier, and that is,
that the Marine Corps should only have sufficient tanks for amphibious operations. Because what you are saying to me now is, for instance, by relying on MPS [maritime pre-positioning ship] tanks the Marine Corps should have the capability for tank operations that go beyond the scope of amphibious operations, because 2 years ago that was not an amphibious operation.

General Leland. Correct.

Mr. McHale. That was a deliberate minefield breach having nothing to do with amphibious ops, and the tanks were there because the Marine Corps had them. It would concern me greatly if that philosophy of stripping the Marine Corps went to the extent of only equipping the Marine Corps for amphibious operations. That is a very limited role, much more severely restricted than what we applied on the battlefield 2 years ago.

General Leland. I obviously didn’t do that adequately, but when I said amphibious operations and “to man the maritime prepositioning ships,” that was my shorthand way of dealing with what you are concerned about.

Mr. McHale. There is a really big difference there in terms of the tank capability of the Marine Corps.  

The Secretary’s Decision
Following Senator Nunn’s speech, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 required the next CJCS report—previously submitted only to the Secretary—to be forwarded to Congress, along with the Secretary’s comments. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin wrote Senator Nunn on 29 March 1993, forwarding General Powell’s report and declaring it “a constructive first step in assessing the roles, missions, and functions of the military Services for the post-Cold War era.” Attached to the letter was a list of the Secretary’s decisions in response to the Chairman's recommendations, including the following:

Marine Corps armor. The Secretary of the Army, assisted by the Secretary of the Navy, will establish joint procedures to provide additional armor support to the Marine Corps when required. The Marine Corps will retain sufficient tank assets to support amphibious operations and outfit maritime pre-positioning squadrons.

Marine Corps general support artillery. CJCS and the Secretary of the Navy will report on long-term Marine Corps general support artillery requirements. Analysis will include in-depth cost and operational effectiveness assessment of purchasing rocket launched artillery for the Marine Corps. Consideration will also be given to having the Army provide all rocket launched artillery support to the Marine Corps.
Outcome

As of November 2008, the Marine Corps has a Reserve tank battalion of six companies and two active battalions of five companies each. The Marine Corps did not buy any MLRS, but did receive MLRS support from the Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.*

*On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* is the Army’s official study of major combat operations in Iraq through 1 May 2003. Included is the Combined Forces Land Component Command order of battle as of 1 May 2003, which notes the Army’s 3rd Battalion (MLRS), 27th Field Artillery was attached to the 11th Marine Regiment under the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (Reinforced). Along with the MLRS support, the Army also provided the Marines with Firefinder artillery-locating radars, a Patriot-equipped air defense artillery brigade, a military police battalion, chemical smoke capabilities, and maintenance and transportation assets.8

*On Point* goes on to note that:

By law, the Department of the Army is not a warfighting organization. Instead, the Army provides trained and ready forces to combatant commanders. The Army also provides forces to other services that enable economies across the Department of Defense. For example, the Army provides special forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs units to marines or elsewhere as required by the combatant commander. Similarly, theater air and missile defense units extend land-based air and missile defense wherever the combatant commander requires it. The same is true for certain kinds of support, including processing and securing enemy prisoners of war. The Army also provides port-opening, terminal management, and logistics over the shore services and thus is a major contributor to JLOTS [joint logistics over the shore] operations. Finally, the Army provides certain common user commodities to all of the services. For example, the Army is responsible for providing fuel and bulk water to all forces ashore.

The Army did all this and more in OIF [Operation IRAQI FREEDOM]. It provided both mandated support and support that it volunteered to provide. More than 40,000 soldiers either supported the joint team or were assigned directly in support of other services. Some 6,200 soldiers served in or supported the Coalition Force Special Operations Component Commander. More than 2,700 soldiers served with I MEF [1st Marine Expeditionary Force], doing everything

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* And since IRAQI FREEDOM, the Marines have acquired the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), which offers the firepower of an MLRS on a wheeled chassis. The first HIMARS-equipped Marine battalion deployed to Iraq in July 2007, <www.army-technology.com/projects/himars> accessed 26 Nov 2009.
from chemical reconnaissance to manning rocket artillery units. The Army and Marine Corps also collaborated to solve serious logistics problems. The Marine hose and reel system, the Army pipeline, and "bag farms" provided the means to assure adequate fuel reached Army and Marine ground units. Similarly, the Marine Corps provided air and naval gunfire liaison teams to the Army to assist the Army in requesting and employing Naval and Marine air.

This campaign not only illustrated the power of US armed forces, but also showed how much more powerful the parts are when integrated rather than merely deconflicted. The campaign also suggests that the missions of the Army and Marine Corps may be converging. These two services should find more ways to collaborate and train with each other. They may also find ways to achieve interdependence that could result in efficiencies that make them more effective as well. In some ways, this might prove painful for the Army. For example, to provide marines and the joint team the ability to sustain joint land campaigns and to do so quickly may force reallocation of force structure to provide active units to theater support and CS [combat support] operations in lieu of Reserve Component units that are not able to respond as quickly. That structure is not extant in the current force.⁹

Recent Developments

The Army is not alone in worrying that its missions and those of the Marine Corps are converging, but where they are converging appears to be a function of what's going on at the time and which Service's claim to a particular role feels threatened. As the Army sought to make itself lighter and more rapidly deployable in the late 1990s, it was the Marines who circled their wagons.

“U.S. Services Battle for Lead in Expeditionary Missions” was the headline in the 30 November–6 December 1998 issue of Defense News. Paul Van Riper, a retired Marine lieutenant general and former commander of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, noted that, “As overseas bases are cut and forces come back to the United States, the only forces that will be relevant are those that can move quickly overseas.” The article cited the Air Force’s creation of Air Expeditionary Forces and the Army’s experiments with smaller units called Strike Forces, described as equipped similarly to current Marine Corps units and designed to possess a quick-reaction capability for immediate response to future crises, then went on to describe the Marines’ response:

The Marine Corps, however, is already responding to what service leaders see as assaults on their traditional missions by the Air Force and Army. Top Ma-
rine commanders warn that the United States cannot afford any duplication in
missions, especially as weaponry becomes more expensive.

“There’s expeditionary and there’s expeditionary,” Gen. Charles Krulak, Marine
Corps commandant, said in an Oct. 27 interview.

The new initiatives by the Air Force and Army leave the Navy and Marine
Corps feeling their traditional turf is being encroached upon, naval experts
said. Therefore, Navy and Marine Leaders are redoubling their own efforts to
prove the value of what they do.

As often happens in a roles-and-missions dispute, Marine Corps champions tried not
only to prove the value of Marine Corps capabilities; they also disparaged the Army’s.

"Only One Corps Needed" said an editorial in the Marine Corps Times:
The Army’s latest creation is something called a “Strike Force,” the headquar-
ters of which will be fashioned around the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment’s
headquarters at Fort Polk, La. It will be designed to accept a variety of units at
short notice.

That description sounds a lot like a Marine air-ground task force, but there’s
one big difference: The Strike Force can’t strike, and it really isn’t a force.

Unlike the Corps’ task forces, the Strike Force isn’t designed to force itself into
a combat zone. Instead, it will only be capable of conducting peacekeeping and
disaster-relief missions, such as the Bosnia mission it already has. And its es-
timated 5,000 troops would come from a variety of Army units, depending on
the mission, also similar to the way the Army already does business.

So why bother?

It’s just one more wasted Army effort to find relevance in the post-Cold War
world.

A year later, the Marine Corps Association’s magazine took up the issue in its March
2000 editorial, titled “Watching the Army.”

One of Gen Eric K. Shinseki’s first acts upon becoming the Army’s chief of staff
last June was to announce his intent to introduce significant changes to Army
structure, equipment, and capabilities. The key features of his plan are not
new. They were foreshadowed in the Army’s Louisiana Maneuvers Task Force
and in the Strike Force concept that Gen Shinseki’s predecessor defined during
his last year in office. Indeed, the roots of the plan—and the Army’s efforts to
achieve dominance in the mission of rapid deployment—can be traced back
two decades to the efforts of Gen E.C. Meyer, who also sought to lighten the
Army divisions, reduce their strategic lift requirements, and acquire a greater share of the rapid deployment function. Gen Shinseki’s version of the plan, although still a work in progress, envisions the same sort of lighter units—5,000-man brigades built around lighter tanks and smaller, more deployable wheeled vehicles—redesigned to function as Marine units do across a broad span of the conflict spectrum. The Army goal is to deploy a combat-ready brigade in 4 days without dependency on prepositioned equipment stocks, a division in 5 days, and five divisions in 30 days.

Concern about the intent and wisdom of the Army’s plan increased as details about it emerged. Army Secretary Louis Caldera explained the plan this way:

We are committed to making the Army the force of choice for the nation, no matter what the mission is, no matter where in the world....We concede no mission to anyone from initial entry to high intensity....If our soldiers are going to be there for the long run, they ought to be there on day one....Only one Service closes with and destroys the enemy...

In subsequent remarks to the media, Gen Shinseki seemed inclined to temper this by emphasizing his congenial relationship with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, but official Army spokesmen stressed that “the secretary of the Army and chief of staff of the Army are in complete agreement as to the roles and missions of the Army and their relationship to the Marine Corps.” Such remarks make it difficult to believe that this is not an effort to change unilaterally and without public debate what has long been seen as a sensible division of functions.12

Today, Marine Corps opinion leaders are worried less about the Army’s encroaching on the Marines’ traditional role than they are about the Marine’s own loss of the competencies necessary to perform it, and the risk to Marine Corps programs.

In April 2008, retired Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor told his fellow Marines to “Listen Up...We Belong at Sea, Ready for Trouble.” He noted that “Marines have been almost indistinguishable from the Army for the past five years of the Iraq War,” but said, the Corps was “born to serve on the Seven Seas and that’s where its future will again reside.” By reconfirming its nautical character as a lean, no-frills 911 force, ready for anything, he said, the Marine Corps will be in a strong position in any roles-and-missions debate.13

A month later, Major General Thomas Benes, the Chief of Naval Operations’ director of expeditionary warfare, said of the Marine Corps, “We’re not a second land army. We can always be used to complement the [Army’s] mission on the ground, and we don’t shy
away from a fight….But our real traditional role of being a naval force is what we want to get back to.”

Most recently, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has publicly called for Marines to be withdrawn from Iraq and deployed instead to Afghanistan, implicitly differentiating the Marine Corps from the Army based on Marines’ warfighting prowess:

“We are a fighting machine,” Gen. James Conway tells CBS News, and the fight is now in Afghanistan.

On a whirlwind holiday visit to remote bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, Gen. Conway assessed the situation on the ground. He makes no secret of the fact he believes U.S. Marines would be better suited to the challenges in Afghanistan.

Their role in Iraq, he says, has been reduced to “nation building.” In Anbar province, once the most dangerous province in Iraq, the violence has fallen to such low levels, Marines are working with the government on civil services.

“That’s not what we do,” Conway told Marines in Afghanistan. “Where there’s a fight, that’s where the Marine Corps is needed.”

And while the Commandant seeks to distance the Marines from “nation building,” debates rage over whether the Army should emphasize counter-insurgency or “full-spectrum” operations in its force development efforts and whether to create a standing “Advisory Corps” to replace the ad hoc efforts that have been used to equip, train, advise and mentor security forces (army and police) in Iraq and Afghanistan.

At stake for both Services are billions of dollars in acquisition programs—the Army for its Future Combat System, the Marine Corps for the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, the amphibious Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

End Notes

3 Colin L. Powell, Chairman’s Memorandum CM-44-89, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 February 1993), III-35–III-39.
5 *Hearing*, HASC No. 103-17, 189–92.
7 QDR Integration Group, PA&E, PR, HQMC, email to author, 24 November 2008.
8 COL Gregory Fontenot, USA (Ret); LTC E. J. Degen and LTC David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 448–54.
16 See for example, the Point-Counterpoint articles by John A. Nagl, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In,” and Gian P. Gentile, “Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 52 (1st Quarter 2009): 20–26, 27–33, respectively.
Appendix F: The Road to USSOCOM

by

John H. "Scot" Crerar

Overview

This paper outlines approximately seven years of special operations history at the national government level, culminating in the establishment of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). These seven years occurred almost entirely within one presidential administration, which provided stability in civilian leadership. During those seven years, special operations forces (SOF) progressed from being fragmented, threatened, minor Service elements to being better equipped, better funded, centrally commanded organizations, more capable of successfully executing assigned tasks. That today these forces are at the forefront of operations around the world, including the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan is largely the result of this period.

In terms of organizational evolution, this major change was achieved by means too irregular and multifaceted to be termed a process. It is possibly best described by the term effort. Some would characterize it as an organizational insurgency with a goal not to overthrow legitimate authority as in a political insurgency, but to adjust its application. This line of reasoning is not pursued in this paper; however, those who wish to should have little difficulty identifying the overt operators, underground, auxiliary, and dedicated leadership. The insurgency appearance of this effort was enhanced by the need of the advocates of change to operate and communicate securely to protect the active duty participants from professional retribution.

In the early years of this process, the national government organizations involved—both the advocates of change and of the status quo—were all within the Department of Defense (DoD). They were the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), three of the Armed Services (Army, Navy and Air Force), and a subordinate office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), that of the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (PDASD/ISA). Initially, the goal was simply to improve the conditions and capabil-
ities of special operations forces. At the time, SOF advocates probably would have been satisfied with a cessation of threatened reductions in SOF; improved Service support in equipment, funding, and manning; plus provisions to sustain such support. These conditions were largely achieved by the midpoint of the effort. By then, however, for reasons that will become evident, the goal had become more ambitious.

By its culmination, the effort became primarily a legislative activity of the Congress. It then involved the above DoD participants plus, at least in intent, the National Security Council (NSC).

The press played strong educational and influence roles. The primary goal evolved into providing SOF with centralized direction for inter-Service coordination and national level advocacy. The participants’ agreed-upon secondary goals were a national-level agency to oversee SOF, a special operations representative on the NSC, and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. The resulting legislation would vary somewhat from these goals, but would encompass their essence. As ultimately enacted, the legislation did affect the organization of DoD’s civil as well as military elements. These changes were specified in legislation despite the fact that Congress, possibly to avoid unintended consequences, historically eschews directing specific actions, preferring to merely establish the “Sense of the Congress” and leave the details of implementation to the subject organization.

If, as one close participant says, this was a struggle over resources and authority, it was largely a successive rather than a concurrent struggle. The Services, mostly unwillingly, made extensive changes to correct resources faults that were brought to light. Their rejection of change was demonstrated by repeated stalling and obstruction plus a history of “solving” a highlighted SOF problem by allocating resources to fix it and, later, before they could be applied, diverting them to other projects. The reformers then sought more radical solutions, which, because they were beyond the Services’ reach, were irreversible. While gradually acceding to material changes, the Services and JCS were unable, structurally or culturally, to accept the later-posited authority changes. The press would portray this, and Congress would perceive it, as unreformable resistance to sorely needed change.

Numerous active duty Army, Navy, and Air Force officers played important roles in the effort but, because of periodic military reassignments, they frequently changed, with as many as three or four people occupying a specific position during the seven years. Ci-
villians, retired military personnel (particularly special operations personnel working in government), and government civilians without significant prior military connections initiated or sustained most of the principal activities and provided the critical continuity.

The Beginning

Although there are references in this paper to earlier events, 1980 is a valid if somewhat arbitrary starting point. That year essentially marks the nadir of US special operations capability. A tragic failure early that year, Operation EAGLE CLAW—the failed attempt to rescue hostages held by Islamic militants at the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran—provided worldwide visibility of the sorry state of US special operations. This date also precedes any of the eventually effective revitalization efforts. (The term revitalization—a gem of political communications—is variously attributed to Lynn Rylander and Noel Koch. It is as difficult to oppose revitalization as it is the overused reform.) Although it is impossible to isolate and quantify its specific effects, a background environment in the 1980s that included repeated high visibility terrorist events, a long irregular war in Afghanistan, and two long-term insurgencies in Central America influenced many to consider it desirable to revitalize the United States’ capabilities for low-intensity conflict and special operations.

As the 1980s began, the assortment of organizations now formally titled special operations forces, or SOF, were disparate and separate. Even the terms special operations forces and special operations community, which were handy conversational collectives, were neither precise nor descriptive of a defined group. Speakers had to first define and delimit the subject they were addressing. Organizations later labeled SOF were highly fragmented and under great pressure; they had no inter-Service organizational connections except small staff sections in the Joint Staff and the headquarters of regional combatant commands. The latter employed limited and outdated operational doctrine for the command and control of joint operations. These small staff sections, ostensibly regional command cadres, varied widely in size, duties, and subordination. Nor were special operations units united within their respective Services. For instance, of the Army’s three Special Forces (SF) groups, two were US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) assets and one was assigned to US European Command. A ground tactical combat unit, XVIII Airborne Corps, controlled both the Army special operations school (Institute of Military Assistance) and the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (JFKCENMA)—the headquarters that controlled most of the Army’s SF, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Civil Affairs (CA) units. The two Ranger battalions were effectively adjuncts of the infantry
divisions on whose bases they were located. Similarly the Navy’s Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) units were Pacific and Atlantic Fleet assets, essentially divided between east and west coast commands with the entry qualification course, Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL, being their principal common experience. Fleet support was the SEALs’ first priority. Supporting the unified combatant commands was a distant and highly conditional secondary mission, valued mostly for the major annual exercises it engendered.

None of these organizations enjoyed a highly respected or secure position in its parent Service. Following the Vietnam War, the Navy had considered putting the SEALs in the Reserves. In 1978, the Army initiated action to eliminate one of the three understrength active-duty SF groups. The Air Force had, as recently as 1976, intended to put the special operations aviation squadrons in the Air Force Reserve. Failing this, the Air Force later moved the entire special operations wing from Tactical Air Command (TAC) to the Military Airlift Command (MAC). Here, the MAC leadership with manifest goodwill but limited success struggled to integrate Air Force special operators’ mission-oriented “anyway, anyplace, any time” culture with MAC’s “on-time airline” culture. Although TAC instigated the transfer as a stratagem to avoid the cost of SOF aircraft, most Air Force special operators perceived it as a deliberate downgrading of their status from combat to support.

Equipment in most special operations units, from small arms to watercraft and aircraft, was at best from the Vietnam era; much was even older. The Army Special Forces, for instance, had Korean War cold weather equipment and team radios of late World War II vintage. This museum-quality collection included vacuum tube base-station radios the Army long since had declared “unsupportable.” Annual allocations in various DoD budgets were supposed to fix some of these equipment problems, but each year the funds went uncommitted and were soon diverted to pay other DoD bills. Similarly, year after year, the Air Force ignored a Congressional directive and appropriation to buy new MC-130H Combat Talon aircraft.

While the Navy had created the SEAL officer specialty (1130) in 1969, this merely legitimized officers’ serving full careers as SEALs and relieved them from having to remain current in the Navy surface warfare field. It therefore supported a more professional SEAL officer corps, but did not provide their organizations with the institutional support enjoyed by the Navy’s older unrestricted line designators—surface, subsurface and air. Many highly qualified Air Force pilots of MC-130 Combat Talons, AC-130 gunships, and SOF’s only long-range helicopters believed they had to leave special operations for more mundane assignments if they hoped to get promoted. The exceptions
were the “True Believers” who hazarded promotions to continue flying SOF missions. The Army’s branches, which managed officers’ assignments and careers, generally tolerated one SF assignment as long as it did not preclude the officer from “getting his ticket punched” in one of the “branch qualifying” jobs in each grade that were considered critical to a career. Officers were regularly warned that a second SF tour would be career damaging. Again, there was a core of dedicated officers who believed in the mission and sought repeated tours in SF despite the career hazards.¹²

In 1980, the recent past did not contain any unmarred successes by the US Armed Forces in small scale operations, whether conducted as special or conventional operations. While the 1970 Son Tay Raid (Operation IVORY COAST) was well executed, it had been six months in preparation and missed its goal of recovering US prisoners of war by weeks. The SS Mayaguez incident on 12 May 1975 was a bloody, cobbled-together inter-Service fiasco. On 24 April 1980, the United States launched a special operation, Operation EAGLE CLAW (often referred to as “Desert One”), to recover American embassy personnel held in Teheran. The effort ended disastrously at an en route airfield with the loss of eight lives, a C-130, and six helicopters. This event garnered worldwide media attention and validated the conviction of special operators that ad hoc collections of personnel and equipment could not execute professionally demanding operations. The JCS commissioned a Special Operations Review Group (SORG) to investigate the causes of this failure. It became more widely known as the Holloway Commission after its chairman, Admiral James L. Holloway, a former Chief of Naval Operations. The SORG was composed of senior general and flag officers, most of whom had special operations experience. Notable among these was the vice chairman, Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, US Army (Retired), one of a handful of general officers with extensive special operations experience.¹³ The ensuing SORG/Holloway Report recommended creating a Special Operations Advisory Panel¹⁴ and a standing task force to conduct future special operations.¹⁵ The report commented adversely on the operation’s command and control, operations security, and lack of interoperability among Service elements. Many experienced special operators, including some of EAGLE CLAW’s participants, believed the report failed to identify the much more significant basic weaknesses in Service support to US special operations units and operations. The EAGLE CLAW failure was a national embarrassment, drawing invidious comparison to the successes of recent foreign special operations such as the Israeli Entebbe operation (July 1976), the German Mogadishu operation (October 1977), and, less than a week after EAGLE CLAW, the British Special Air
Service takedown of terrorists in the Iranian embassy in London. Few critics of that time acknowledged the massive differences in operational environments and conditions between these operations and EAGLE CLAW.

The continuing embarrassment affected the special operations community. The special operators knew they were competent, that they had good people, that they were well trained, and that they possessed the dedication and ability to accomplish their doctrinal missions. They resented the national embarrassment. They also resented having to struggle and risk lives and careers with inadequate national support in order to provide what they saw as a small but crucial national capability. Although there were vast differences in opinion as to what specifically was needed, there was a general consensus among its practitioners that special operations “needed fixing.”

The JCS and Services exhibited little interest in SOF, which constituted only about one percent of the Armed Forces and operated on one-tenth of one percent of the DoD budget. The small-unit-oriented SOF skills were perceived as barely relevant in what was perceived as the one important potential war—that with the Soviet Union. In the post-Vietnam era, Defense dollars were tight and low priority forces like SOF would have to tough it out. Even when money was forthcoming, as in a Congressional initiative that directed and funded an Air Force purchase of MC-130H Combat Talon II aircraft, Service obstruction and delay stretched into years.

In a notable but brief exception to broad Service disinterest, General E. C. “Shy” Meyer, successively Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) and then Chief of Staff of the Army from the late 1970s until mid-1983, fostered selected revitalization efforts. He strongly supported the creation of Special Forces Operational Detachment-D (“Delta”), backing the unit with his authority and protecting it from opposition. He encouraged efforts to remove the personnel disadvantages of SF service by approving SF specialties and returned more than 1,100 recently-cut positions to SF, PSYOP, and CA units. He approved the establishment of 1st Special Operations Command, which removed the Army special operations troop headquarters and school from XVIII Airborne Corps control and had them report to FORSCOM and the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, respectively. And, finally, General Meyer advocated the creation of a Strategic Services Command, similar to the World War II Office of Strategic Services, to provide joint command over special operations organizations. The Navy and Air Force opposed the idea and it died when General Meyer retired; his successor did not continue his interest in or support of SOF.
Internal Struggle

In 1981, Noel Koch became the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the newly elected Reagan Administration.

He had a long-term interest in guerrilla warfare and its usually inherent tactic, terrorism. Convinced that terrorism was expanding and the nation’s capability to address it was critical, he requested and was given responsibility for it. By internal reorganization, he established a Directorate of Special Planning (DSP) to address counterterrorism, and made himself its director. A condition he requested in the assignment of the counterterrorism portfolio permitted him to bypass some supervisory levels in OSD and go directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on Special Planning matters. Other personnel in the office included a civilian deputy director; one field grade officer each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative. The Service officers were selected after interviews and were typically qualified in special operations, intelligence operations, or both.

Lynn Rylander was Koch’s Deputy Director for Special Planning. In early 1981, almost as soon as he started his new job, Rylander was contacted by Ted Lunger, a Congressional staffer and a special operations advocate and activist. This was the beginning of a partnership that would endure the length of the effort, and a friendship that would endure until Rylander’s death in 1990. It was also one of the first “outside” links to what would become the informal special operations support mechanism within the Pentagon.16

In late summer or early fall of 1981, Army Colonel George McGovern, a recent commander of the 5th Special Forces Group, was assigned to PDASD/ISA as Koch’s military assistant. In the following months, McGovern apprise Koch of the baleful condition of the forces on which US counterterrorism plans and their execution depended. McGovern was widely known in the special operations community and was well respected and trusted. As word circulated among special operators that there was a new office intent on “fixing SOF,” his own contacts and those of DSP members quickly expanded into an informal network that included most of the special operations-qualified personnel assigned to the Pentagon. They styled themselves “the SOF Liberation Front.” This net provided information that was otherwise difficult to acquire, and insured that Koch’s office was quickly informed of special operations-related actions in JCS and the Services.17 Colonel McGovern died unexpectedly in October 1982, and Noel Koch, who had become McGovern’s friend as well as his boss, decided he would continue McGovern’s struggle. Rylander, although without special operations experience, had become a member of McGovern’s group and
therefore widely known by the Pentagon SOF community. Following McGovern’s death he became “communications central” of the effort. Army, Navy, and Air Force special operators in Pentagon assignments routed timely information to Rylander. Koch's initial efforts were directed at persuading JCS, the Services, and other DoD entities with special operations responsibilities to recognize the desirability of rebuilding SOF. He encountered disinterest and increasing bureaucratic opposition. The latter was exemplified by an inability to get appointments, unanswered calls, long delayed correspondence, obfuscation, and dishonesty. Typical of the last was the programming of money to meet an identified SOF need, then, too late to preclude the diversion or readdress the problem, reprogramming the funds for other Service needs. Repetitions of such practices not only wasted time and effort but destroyed the degree of trust necessary for cooperative progress.

As a counter to anticipated claims by the Services that Koch and the DSP lacked special operations knowledge, operational expertise and depth, Koch created the Secretary of Defense Special Operations Policy Advisory Group (SOPAG). At Koch’s request, Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger presided at the group’s first meeting. The SOPAG consisted of retired, highly respected senior officials and general officers. A number had special operations credentials; others were noteworthy for exceptional career accomplishments in different areas.18 Their seniority and reputations made them difficult to ignore. While it might have been possible to dismiss Koch and his relatively junior (but largely SOF-qualified) staff as lightweights, the experience and knowledge represented in the SOPAG was, as intended, intimidating. Beyond merely buttressing the qualifications of the revitalization “team,” the SOPAG in subsequent deliberations supported the validity of specific positions, proposals, and programs, contributing to their credibility and acceptance.19

In 1982, the Navy produced a Naval Special Warfare Master Plan that laid out goals and objectives for building and supporting the Navy SOF units. This was briefed to Koch, who recognized in it a means of prying specific plans for SOF improvement out of the Services or forcing them to admit there were no such plans. The author of the Navy master plan, then-Commander (now Rear Admiral, Retired) George Worthington and Lynn Rylander drafted a memorandum directing that SOF be adequately resourced and that any monies budgeted for SOF be diverted only with the knowledge of the PDASD/ISA and the approval of the Secretary of Defense. The memo also directed the Services to develop and submit master plans indicating how they were going to remedy SOF shortfalls. After the Services failed to meet a number of deadlines for providing their comments, concurrence or non-concurrence on the draft memorandum, Koch conferred with Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Thayer and requested that he sign the memorandum. On 3 October 1983, Thayer sent the memorandum to the Services with a due date for their master plans of 1 March 1984. Because some of the requirements in this memorandum were subjectively stated—such as “adequately resourced”—it was not difficult for the Services to evade them. The master plan requirement, however, was specific, and the Services reacted to it. The Army produced a master plan that would have a major impact on resources allocated to SOF, particularly aviation. As stated above, the Navy already had its master plan, which was the basis for its subsequent Program Objective Memorandum input. Specifically, it supported doubling the SEAL contingent and establishing a Naval Special Warfare training facility. The Air Force’s master plan touted as improvements the very programs it had resisted and dodged, but that had been imposed on it: new MC-130Hs and new modifications for the EC-130Hs and the AC-130Hs. The Thayer memorandum had a bonus effect of encouraging special operations officers serving in the Pentagon because it was tangible evidence that their chosen field had high-level support. Because many of them backed SOF revitalization in opposition to their parent Services’ desires—because they believed it a national requirement—such validation was important.

Shortly after the memorandum was sent to the Services, two things happened that would have a considerable impact on the future of special operations. On 23 October 1983, the US Marine barracks in Beirut was attacked with the loss of 241 Marines, Sailors, and Soldiers. Two days later, Operation URGENT FURY was launched in Grenada. Both events resulted in extensive criticism of the Services for what were perceived as avoidable failures. These ranged from the general, such as “unreadiness,” to the specific: the stumbling employment of SOF and the inability of elements of the various Services in close geographic proximity to communicate. Congress took notice and both the major legislation that later became the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act and the Nunn-Cohen Amendment, which more narrowly addressed SOF matters, justified their exceptionally directive wording partly on failures evident in these events.

Efforts to improve SOF organization and visibility appeared to have been successful when the JCS established the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA) on 1 January 1984. It was an initiative of the Special Operations Division in the Joint Staff’s Directorate for Operations (J-3) and, when considered by the JCS, was the “middle option” between maintaining the status quo and creating a joint special operations command. Initially, only the Navy, Marines, and the regional combatant commanders supported the JSOA, but the Chairman of the JCS, Army General John W. Vessey, Jr., engendered the Army and Air Force’s
grudging support for its establishment. This appearance of significant organizational change unfortunately proved to be largely without substance. Lowering the originally proposed grade of its director to major general, subordinating it to the J-3, and limiting its access to top JCS leaders obviated JSOA’s expected capabilities. Some came to view JSOA as just another coordination point ("chop") required for special operations actions. Some who were less kindly inclined saw it as a JCS subterfuge intended merely to placate the special operations community and its growing number of Congressional supporters. Lacking any substantive authority, JSOA of necessity concentrated on policy. It did provide, for the first time, a central organization at the national level for all SOF. When JSOA failed to meet even their minimal desires, some Congressional advocates became convinced that a solution would not be forthcoming from DoD but would have to be directed by Congress.

**Going Through Other Doors**

Largely as a result of the influence of his close friend and constituent, Lieutenant General Sam Wilson, Representative W. C. “Dan” Daniel (D-VA), had become a strong advocate of improving SOF. He arranged to have the subject come under the purview of the Readiness Subcommittee (which he headed) of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC). He formed a SOF Panel, chaired by Representative Earl Hutto (D-FL). By calling witnesses, the panel was able to gather facts and, more importantly, maintain attention on SOF issues. Daniel also used his not insignificant influence to inform and engage other House members. One of the pioneer advocates of revitalizing SOF was the previously mentioned Ted Lunger, a former SF officer, who initially was on the HASC staff. Lunger’s outspoken SOF advocacy generated both support and opposition. When Representative Les Aspin (D-WI) became HASC chairman in 1985, he told Lunger to “find another job.” Lunger soon went to work on the staff of Representative Daniel, already a SOF proponent.22 Another SOF advocate was Vaughn Forrest, Legislative Director for Congressman Bill McCollum (R-FL). Forrest had extensive contacts in both Houses of Congress that he used to “spread the SOF gospel” among staffers and key principals including Senators Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Warren B. Rudman (R-NH), William S. Cohen (R-ME), and Malcolm Wallop (R-WY). Chris Kolesnik, a staffer for Senator Grassley, helped educate and influence Chris Mellon of Senator Cohen’s staff and Jim Locher of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) staff. As early as April 1984, in one of the first evidences of Senate interest, Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) spoke up for SOF improvements and entered into the Congressional Record a particularly damning speech by Noel Koch on the lack of progress in SOF revitalization.
From 1968 until 1992, Ben Schemmer was the owner and editor of the influential *Armed Forces Journal International (AFJI)*. His publication had a wide readership among military and civilian members of DoD and the Congress. Schemmer, a former Army officer, apparently became interested in special operations when he researched and wrote the first and most substantial account of the Son Tay Raid. He became a dedicated partisan in the effort to revitalize SOF. For more than a year—February 1985–April 1986—there were articles and letters on the subject in every *AFJI* edition, 45 in all. Some of the most significant were an interview with Noel Koch in March 1985; six articles attributed to Representative Daniel in May, August, and October 1985; and a January 1986 article by Senator Cohen titled, *A Defense Special Operations Agency: Fix for a SOF Capability That is Most Assuredly Broken*. The Daniel articles included the radical proposal that the Services’ special operations units be consolidated and established as a “Sixth Service.” This provocative proposal generated contentious commentary, adding to the subject’s public visibility. The article by Senator Cohen, a senior member of the SASC, was indicative of growing Senate interest. Sporadic articles in news magazines and on television reinforced the *AFJI* articles. Paul Hovin, a stringer for various publications and a supporter of the SOF effort, orchestrated many of these. The educational effort included an informational movie on SOF produced by Don Bellisario and narrated by Tom Selleck. It was shown widely on Capitol Hill and other venues where assistance was sought.

Around September 1985, Ted Lunger, looking for further support of SOF revitalization, contacted Chris Mellon. Senator Cohen was intent on more widespread improvement of the Armed Forces, particularly in their organization and ability to operate joint-ly vice merely cooperatively. The problems of the Grenada operation were frequently cited as a result of the lack of such “jointness.” Mellon apparently perceived the SOF revitalization effort as a more specific part of the larger goal. In the ensuing months, the SOF revitalization effort would increasingly move parallel to the intended broader reforms that emerged in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Although not included as part of Goldwater-Nichols, the SOF revitalization provisions were part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987.

During the long struggle to revitalize special operations capabilities, the steps needed to accomplish this end gradually evolved. The Service SOF master plans, coupled with their desire to preclude legislation (which they feared would reduce their control of assets and organizational authority), resulted in some reductions in the earlier problems of equipment, support, and funding. By the mid-1980s there had been considerable structur-
al improvement within each Service and modest expansion in the Army and Navy special operations organizations. Other than the marginally effective JSOA, however, there had been no progress on creating a national-level organization that could provide SOF with inter-Service coordination, proponency, advocacy, and central command.

Jim Locher had directed the writing of a SASC study, *Defense Reorganization: The Need for Change*, which provided the analytical underpinnings for Goldwater-Nichols. While references to SOF problems in this study were austere, they did get recognized. Senator Cohen and Chris Mellon found the study strongly supported the Senator’s defense reform goals. Locher was soon engaged in developing the Senate bill that became the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. This legislation addressed SOF problems only in passing, but did indicate the direction the Senate intended. Because of his knowledge of the subject, hard work, and writing skills, Locher was “borrowed” from the SASC staff to help Mellon write the SOF bill (S. 2453), the Senate basis for the Nunn-Cohen amendment. Because of the demands of the legislative schedule, SASC Chairman Senator Barry M. Goldwater (R-AZ) soon pulled Locher back to work on the broader legislation.

In mid-May 1986 there was a program review meeting attended by Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft, general officers representing the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, David Chu from Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), and Noel Koch. One of the subjects and soon the center of contention was Initiative 17, an Army-Air Force helicopter issue with serious implications for special operations. The meeting became contentious when, in terms later described as “abrupt,” Koch challenged the truthfulness of some of the claims presented and the honesty, or at least wisdom, of anyone accepting them. Such head-on conflict made Secretary Weinberger uncomfortable.

Soon thereafter a senior official made a proposal to the Secretary to rein in Koch’s wide ranging efforts by removing SOF responsibilities from the Office of the PDASD/ISA and dispersing them to Richard Armitage, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and Don Latham, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. Secretary Weinberger concurred and as a result, on 30 May 1986, Koch submitted his resignation. Although requested by Secretary Weinberger to withdraw his resignation, Koch demurred, but did remain in office for about three months until a successor was appointed. Koch’s successor, Larry Ropka, was a retired Air Force colonel with special operations experience. He did not have, however, Koch’s communications skills, political and media connections, or willingness,
if he deemed it necessary, to do battle outside of the Pentagon's halls. Ropka soon made it clear to the PDASD/ISA and DSP staffs that he would abide by the new rules mandated by Secretary Weinberger and would not rock the boat as Koch had done.

Noel Koch was a critical central figure in the first five years of the revitalization effort; his departure at an earlier time almost certainly would have been fatal, but at this juncture it was of lesser consequence. The communications and informational foundations had been well laid and, most significantly, the center of action had moved to the Congress.

During the preparation of their respective bills, the positions espoused by Senator Cohen and Representative Daniel in their AFJI articles shifted. While Senator Cohen moved away from his published advocacy of a Defense Special Operations Agency, and towards a military command for special operations, Representative Daniel moved from his Sixth Service position to advocating a National Special Operations Agency.

On 15 May 1986, Senator Cohen introduced a SOF reform bill, cosponsored by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA). A SASC hearing on the Nunn-Cohen bill was held on 5 August. An initial intent to frame it as a less directive “Sense of the Congress” evaporated after the strong testimony (some classified) of retired Major General Richard A. Scholtes, US Army (Retired), the recent commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). The rewritten bill (S. 2638), unlike most Defense-related legislation, was detailed and specific. It was also unprecedented because it specified the creation of a joint command, specified an extensive list of “special operations activities,” and designated the forces that were to be assigned to this command.

Representative Daniel had submitted a SOF reform bill (HR 5109) to the House on 26 June 1986. The wording of its initial draft, by Lunger and Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Tim Davidson of the DSP, largely survived. It was handily passed.

A conference to resolve the differences between the House and Senate bills was faced with differences that were major and appeared irreconcilable. The conference lasted over a month and required repeated, often daily, redrafting of the agreed text by Jim Locher. At Representative Daniel's request, General Wilson served as a consultant, lending his extensive knowledge of governmental organization and operations and keeping the group focused on the principal objectives. During the process, frequent off-site discussions and coordination meetings were held at a site provided by Mr. Earl Lockwood of Betac Corporation. Attendees varied but usually included Lynn Rylander, Army General Robert C. Kingston, Admiral James Holloway, General Wilson, and a select
group of SOF advocates, some of whom were recently retired special operators. Discussions included analysis of the various posited concepts: Sixth Service, agency, and joint military command. An agency reporting to the National Command Authority (a since-abandoned term that referred to the President and Secretary of Defense) was preferred by those who saw such an organization as smaller and less rigid in form and function than a military command and more easily capable of coordinating with other non-military government organizations such as the Department of State and CIA. Preparations for adopting the “agency” option had included drafting of an organizational structure and a set of director’s authorities patterned after the classified National Security Agency charter. A few individuals, usually including Ben Schemmer of AFJI and one or two Congressional staff members, were individually briefed after these meetings.

Representative Daniel eventually but regretfully accepted Senator Cohen’s proposed military command vice the agency he had advocated. He insisted that the commander of the new SOF command have unprecedented fiscal authority that would permit him to make decisions and commit funds for special operations requirements without requiring specific JCS or Service authorization. With this authority, the new command would have a characteristic usually enjoyed by an agency or by a separate Armed Service but never before given to a joint commander. This was accepted and included in the bill. The final bill also specified the creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and interjected itself into the Executive Branch by proposing a SOF representative on the NSC. Like all compromises, the final form did not satisfy everyone. Some of those involved believed, or at least hoped, that the military command was an interim step, leading eventually to an agency. Justifiably, Ted Lunger, one of the first advocates of SOF vitalization and still a member of Representative Daniel’s staff, participated in the lengthy conference.

PL 99-661, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, incorporating the Nunn-Cohen Amendment as Section 1311, became law on 14 November 1986.

Implementation was neither simple nor rapid. The JCS suggested a lower rank for the new organization’s commander. This brief effort ended when Congress indicated it intended the commander to be a four-star general or flag officer equivalent to the other combatant commanders. Another early question was where the command should be located. Advocates largely supported a location in the National Capital Region, such as Fort Belvoir, Fort Meade, or Bolling Air Force Base. The strongest supporting rationale for such a site was the geographic limits on intelligence distribution then in effect. The JCS pressed
for MacDill Air Force Base, near Tampa, Florida, based largely on the economies inherent in putting the new command in the existing facilities occupied by United States Readiness Command (REDCOM). REDCOM’s operational functions and responsibilities had been earlier reduced: those remaining could be distributed to other commands. After extensive and strong contention, the latter course was selected and the REDCOM commander, Army General James J. Lindsay, was appointed the first commander of USSOCOM.

DoD continued to reject the concept of the commander having his own “purse” and found numerous ways to resist and delay it. These varied from asserting that USSOCOM did not have the talent necessary to prepare programs and procurement documentation to claiming the DoD computer system could not accommodate the additional funding category, Major Force Program (MFP) 11. Congress made its intent clear and legal authorities supported it. Further, to solidify the USSOCOM commander’s fiscal authorities, in December 1987, Congress passed additional legislation (PL 100-180) giving him “head of agency” authority.

Other questions concerned which forces were to be assigned to the joint command.28 US Army PSYOP and CA units supported both SOF and, with the bulk of their assets, general purpose forces. Advocates such as Senator Thurman and the politically powerful Civil Affairs Association made strong and repetitive arguments against placing these organizations under USSOCOM. The most important area of disagreement on forces, however, concerned the naval operational units: the SEALs, Special Boat Units, and Swimmer (later SEAL) Delivery Units. The Navy desired that these remain fleet assets, not under USSOCOM, a joint command. In October 1987, almost a year after the legislation passed, Secretary Weinberger directed that Army PSYOP and CA units and all naval special operations forces be assigned to USSOCOM.29

**Summation**

Looking at the relative sizes and influence of the contending groups, it is reasonable to ask, “Why did the SOF revitalization effort succeed?” The most basic reason is that from the beginning, the Services, by basing their opposition on priorities for relatively minor funds, were defending a poor and eventually untenable position. Specifically, excepting aircraft, the sums involved were a miniscule part of the Defense budget. This position contended with a demonstrable need for SOF capabilities in the then-world environment of expanding terrorism and insurgency. The deteriorated condition of US SOF from systemic and long-term neglect was visible and the details were readily determinable. This
allowed those who were trying to rebuild a national capability to be perceived as on the side of the angels, to their considerable advantage.

The initial JCS and Services' successes in killing numerous reform efforts by administrative delay and obstruction (slow rolling in bureaucratic parlance) later redounded to their disadvantage. These successes destroyed any trust that later Service-induced SOF improvements were both genuine and lasting. Had such trust existed, it is probable that revitalization would have been less extensive and stayed within DoD. More critically, the frustrations generated by these status quo “successes” pushed the reformers toward a venue where they believed they had a better chance of engendering what they saw as necessary change, the US Congress.

An equally germane question is, “Why was Congress so specific in its SOF legislation?” The major factors at play were a recent history of the Services (particularly the Air Force) ignoring more general Sense of the Congress directives, a threat environment perceived as expanding, and the testimony of SOF experts, particularly that of Major General Scholtes. The extended and extensive information effort that supported SOF revitalization in *AFJI*, news magazines, and other media highlighted Service shortcomings and evasions, informed legislators on the subject, and urged correction. There was no effective reply to this information offensive.

A number of disparate organizations proved essential to SOF’s revitalization. First in time and visibility was the Office of the PDASD/ISA, which provided a base, central coordination, a rally point, and determined advocacy. Its Directorate of Special Planning fought the interminable war of ideas, concepts, counterarguments, and white papers. Active and retired SOF veterans in the Pentagon—the SOF Liberation Front—provided Service-specific SOF expertise, intelligence, and communications. The final element was the Congress that had the authority and, eventually, the will to direct otherwise unwanted change. Individual contributors numbered in the dozens. The most prominent were Noel Koch, Lieutenant General Sam Wilson, Representative Daniel, and *AFJI* editor Ben Schemmer.

The engagement of these organizations and the contributions of the many participants were to a great degree facilitated and in many cases engendered by the untiring efforts of Ted Lunger and Lynn Rylander. While others, particularly the active duty military officers, made their contributions during relatively limited periods, Lunger and Rylander remained an influential and effective team throughout the long effort to revitalize SOF. Although other organizations and many senior individuals would be required for final suc-
cess, Lunger and Rylander remained the enduring DoD-Congress connection and exer-
cised influence disproportionate to their job titles. Together they constituted the vital link.

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Sources
This account is based overwhelmingly on the statements of individual, primary source, participants. To avoid absorbing secondary interpretations, reference to documentary sources was avoided to the extent possible. They were principally employed to create a chronology but also to confirm details provided by the participants such as dates, abbreviations, and specific titles of legislation.

Documents
10 USC 167 Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations

Individual Sources
More than two decades after the events described in this appendix, a number of the major participants remain concerned about their impact on the reputations and continuing government careers of their co-participants. In a very few instances they asked that some details and names not be included without the subject’s permission. These re-
quests have been respected.

The individuals listed below were all participants in the effort to revitalize SOF. Collectively they provided invaluable help in the writing of this account. This help was in the form of statements, comments, explanations, corrections, and in a few cases, merely con-
firmation of the correctness of draft text. Their help was delivered by email, telephone, and face-to-face conversation. They are listed alphabetically with no effort to indicate the
extent and criticality of their contributions. The positions and, where appropriate, military grades, listed are those they held during the most important period of their participation.

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relevant Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bahnsen, Peter</td>
<td>▪ Director of Special Operations Technology, ASD/C3I</td>
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<td>▪ Retired Special Forces Officer</td>
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<td>Colvin, Greg, Lt Col, USAF</td>
<td>▪ Member Air Staff, Special Operations pilot</td>
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<td>Davidson, Tim, Lt Col, USAF</td>
<td>▪ Assigned to Directorate of Special Planning</td>
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<td>Drake, Lyle, Major, USA</td>
<td>▪ Staff officer in SO office of Army DCSOPS</td>
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<td>▪ Special Forces NCO and officer</td>
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<td>Gembara, Andrew, LTC, USA</td>
<td>▪ Assigned to PDASD/ISA</td>
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<td>▪ Special Operations Intelligence officer</td>
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<td>German, A. Lincoln, COL, USA</td>
<td>▪ Assigned to J3 SOD. Special Forces officer</td>
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<td>Guest, James, COL-MG, USA</td>
<td>▪ Commander, 5th Special Forces Group</td>
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<td>▪ Commander, USAJFKSWCS</td>
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<td>▪ Commander, 1st Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>▪ Commander, Special Forces Command</td>
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<td>Koch, Noel</td>
<td>▪ Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and Director of Special Planning</td>
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<td>Lockwood, Earl</td>
<td>▪ President and CEO, Betac Corporation</td>
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<td>Lyon, Ted, Capt., USN</td>
<td>▪ Commander JSOSE, SEAL officer</td>
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<td>▪ Deputy Director of Special Planning</td>
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<td>Olson, Norman, Capt., USN</td>
<td>▪ Former JSOC Chief of Staff, SEAL officer</td>
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<td>▪ LANTCOM UW staff officer</td>
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<td>Meyer, E. C. ‘Shy’, GEN, USA</td>
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<td>▪ Member JSOSE, SEAL officer</td>
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<td>Wilson, Samuel V., LTG, USA (Ret)</td>
<td>▪ Vice-Chairman, Special Operations Review Group, (Holloway Commission)</td>
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<td>▪ Chairman, Special Operations Advisory Panel</td>
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<td>▪ Chairman, Special Operations Policy Advisory Group</td>
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<td>▪ Consultant, SASC/HASC legislative conference</td>
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<td>▪ See endnote 13 below for further information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Worthington, George, Cmdr-RADM, USN</td>
<td>▪ Navy staff officer and SEAL commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zacharias, Jon, Col. USAF</td>
<td>▪ Deputy Commander Joint UW Task Force Europe</td>
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<td>▪ Commander JSOSE</td>
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End Notes

1 The chronology of major events described in this appendix is largely based on *Unconventional Warfare*, by Susan Marquis, Brookings, Washington, 1997. The event dates of the Marquis book have been augmented and in some instances modified by the generous inputs of surviving participants and, in a few places, the author’s observations.

2 The US Marine Corps is absent from this listing primarily because it initially was an effort to restore special operations forces and the USMC had no in-being special operations forces. The extent of Marine involvement was the work of Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Rich Higgins of the Secretary of Defense staff, who guided SOF papers to the attention of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. (On his subsequent assignment, Higgins was assassinated by terrorists in Beirut.)

3 Slightly less admirably, use of *revitalization* somewhat obscured the fact that in the later stages, the goal was not restoration but enhancement.

4 Included in these is the Joint Special Operations Support Element (JSOSE), a skeletal 45-man task force established in 1977 and administered by US Readiness Command (REDCOM). It successively augmented each of the regional combatant commands during their annual field training exercises so that these commands could reasonably exercise command of assigned SOF. It was a “better than nothing” solution to long-standing, well-identified and documented shortfalls in theater organizational structures and personnel. While JSOSE was manned with excellent, highly qualified, hard working personnel, it was only a single theater field training exercise capability, totally inadequate to meet the wartime requirements of multiple theaters. It was disestablished in 1984 when the authorizations for special operations personnel were withdrawn to fill other requirements. Although JSOSE undoubtedly influenced the size and organization of later authorized theater special operations commands, its greatest contribution was probably in validating the need for such organizations.

5 The largest, European Command’s Special Operations Task Force Europe had twelve people authorized. Atlantic Command’s J-58 had eight; Pacific Command’s J-33 had five.

6 Although there were many interservice friendships, usually formed during joint training, the special operations units did not have even a common vocabulary. For instance, in Army usage “special operations” was a subset of “unconventional warfare.” In the Air Force the reverse was true. The Navy, sidestepping an earlier Navy use of the term “special operations,” employed “special warfare” for both activities.

7 The original planned reduction was a Ranger battalion but it was unaccountably changed to a Special Forces group during the travel absence of the responsible action officer. The SF group was eventually retained, largely by the efforts of Major General Jack V. Mackmull, commander of the Army special operations center at Fort Bragg, US Army John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance (JFKCENMA). This rescue, however, was accomplished by drastically cutting personnel spaces from all three SF groups, greatly reducing their self-support, command and operational capabilities.

8 The Air Force special operators appealed to then-Brigadier General Robert Kingston, US Army, who, as the only general officer among the US special operations organizations, had an unofficial but respected joint leadership status. Kingston threatened to raise the subject with Department of the Army as a failure of inter-Service support and the Air Force backed off.

9 Army administrative decisions exacerbated the problems. Chief among these were low priorities in both the Department of the Army Master Priority List and the Officer Distribution Plan.

10 Army Chief of Staff General Bernard W. Rogers, recognizing the SF communications problem, in 1977 had directed that funds be allocated to address it. Nine years later as the US and NATO commander in Europe, he was surprised to be told that problem had not been solved. This practice was repeated in 1982 when funds that Army Chief of Staff General E. C. Meyer had directed be used to fix SF communications were again diverted.
Rear Admiral Cathal "Irish" Flynn encapsulated SEAL feelings on this change in a speech to the National Defense Industrial Association SO/LIC Division, “There was bad news and good news. The bad news was that we weren’t going to get promoted. The good news was that we didn’t give a damn; we were doing what we wanted to do.”

In a supportive but separate effort, unrelated to the Nunn-Cohen amendment, Special Forces personnel specialties were approved on 15 September 1982. They served as a basis for the establishment of an SF officer branch in September 1987.

General Wilson had been a Marauder (5307 Composite Unit [P]) reconnaissance platoon leader in Burma in World War II, Director of Instruction at the Army Special Warfare School, a Special Forces group commander, an Assistant Director at the CIA, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. During the long effort to revitalize SOF, General Wilson would be continuously involved. He would fill numerous roles including chairman of important governmental groups, special mission unit evaluator, advisor and coordinator of disparate advocacy groups, consultant and expert witness before Congressional committees. Less definable but possibly of even greater importance would be the influence of his expertise, his wide ranging contacts and friendships, and the high regard in which he was held both within and outside the special operations community.

Despite the premium quality of its membership and the repeated efforts of Noel Koch to realize its capabilities, the Special Operations Advisory Panel did not achieve its potential. It was little used, meeting rarely.

The task force requirement was recommended by General E. C. “Shy” Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army. It was realized in the December 1980 establishment of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). After initial organization under Army direction, the commander of JSOC was directed to report directly to the JCS Chairman. Although this subordination would appear to be in violation of legislation prohibiting JCS from commanding forces, it remained in effect and apparently unchallenged until the establishment of USSOCOM.

The members jocularly referred to themselves as the “SOF Liberation Front” or the “SOF Mafia.” An Air Staff general officer reportedly referred to them as “pejorative staff officers.” Their flippant self references did not belie the fact that they were hazardous their careers to support what they perceived as a vital national capability. Use of public telephones and off-site meetings became necessary “force protection” steps. Because some participants are still in government service, a few primary participants will to this day not discuss specific events and names. Full details will have to wait on their evaluation that no harm will be done, and on the release of government documents.

Within ISA, Peter Bahnsen, a retired SF officer, tracked all of the appropriations, allocations and diversions of funds for SOF. He pulled together the numerous Service special operations funding items buried under titles such as “Schools” and “Tactical Units” as a single management funding line. This gave SOF a legal basis and protected them from the previously common Service diversions. This effort also provided the first transparency to the paucity of Service funding and the first opportunity for Congressional viewing. Later, this information would be potent ammunition in the discussion of the need for adequate, assured SOF funding.

The special operations-experienced included Army General Kingston and Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn; Air Force Major Generals Leroy J. Manor and Richard V. Secord; CIA Director William E. Colby; and Lieutenant General Sam Wilson. “Non-special operations” notables included former Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, former JCS Chairman Admiral William J. Crowe, former Chief of Staff of the Army General E.C. “Shy” Meyer, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James, L. Holloway, and Lieutenant Generals Richard G. Stilwell (Army) and James H. Ahmann (Air Force).

The SOPAG would have a continuing if changed existence after the passage of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment. It met a number of times under the chairmanship of LTG Wilson as an advisory group to the ASD SO/LIC.
Throughout the revitalization effort, the Air Force was much more resistant to SOF materiel requirements than the Army or the Navy. This is attributed to both the vastly greater cost of aircraft than any of the other Services’ SOF equipment and a resentment of the intrusion of the propeller-driven transport units into combat roles regarded as properly the realm of the Air Force fighters and bombers.

Of seven executed special operations, two were successful, two marginally successful and three incurred deaths with no compensating benefit. The media tale of the use of a commercial telephone credit card by a SEAL officer to contact nearby forces via a headquarters in the United States proved apocryphal but it generated interest and eventual investigation of the limitations in interservice communications.

Rep. Daniel’s office was a limited haven. Aspin continued his pursuit, pressing Daniel to fire Lunger. Daniel did not.

The Daniel articles were written by Lynn Rylander and Ted Lunger, as allegedly were some of the refuting replies.

Not all the AFJI articles were written or signed by government notables. A pseudonymous Stephan O. Foster, a retired Air Force special operations officer, contributed at least five articles that exposed Air Force delays and subterfuges concerning SOF support, much to that Service’s intense ire.

While the allocated funds were increased, the recently created special mission units (Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta and SEAL Team 6 and their expanding support elements), which enjoyed top priorities and had expanding wants, absorbed a disproportionate share of the funds. In some instances this left other SOF units worse off than they were before, with deleterious effects on all aspects of training and readiness.

Initiative 17 was one of 33 initiatives developed by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force that were intended to resolve areas of contention or overlap. Many were noncontroversial. Initiative 17, however, proposed transferring the mission of long-range rotary-wing support of SOF from the Air Force to the Army. The Army had no long range refuelable helicopters. As it would take years for the Army to procure new aircraft, train crews, and develop the requisite skills and expertise, implementation of this initiative meant drastically reducing the then current capabilities of United States SOF. It would be a matter of strong contention between SOF advocates and the Services for years before being settled in favor of retaining, and eventually expanding, existing capabilities.

The fact that the USSOCOM staff included a sizeable number of Marine officers, in fact more than the number of Army Special Forces officers, while there were no US Marine Corps special operations forces, may appear an anomaly. Two distinct factors were involved. The first was the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which made joint service a requirement for promotion to general or flag rank. Suddenly the Naval Services, which had long disdained joint assignments, were in pursuit of any available joint positions. The new joint command, USSOCOM, was an opportunity not to be missed. In regards to "Marine SOF," the Marine Corps has a long tradition of a unitary self perception. While it experimented with parachute marines and raider units, even in wartime it always returned to a single “Marine” identity, eschewing unit specialization. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld directed creation of a Marine SOF in 2002. Assigned Marine personnel are to return to ‘real Marine” units after five to six years.

Sadly, the alternatives concerning where the SEALs should be assigned—to USSOCOM or the Fleets—engendered strong personal feelings within the small, heretofore close knit SEAL officer corps. Some felt that the joint route was the only way the potential of Naval Special Warfare would be realized. Others felt strong ties to the Fleets that had kept them in existence and “paid their bills.” This disagreement disrupted many friendships and irritation endured long after the question had become moot.
Appendix G
Joint Forces Command: The Road Not Taken

Tracing one recommendation made by the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) provides insight into how the Legislative and Executive Branches wield the powers granted to them by the Constitution.

Under the heading of improving planning and direction for the defense program, the members of the commission stated that:

We recognize that, when Administrations change, defense planning is subject to a turbulence exceeded only by that resulting from significant shifts in the international security environment. Accordingly, we recommend a comprehensive strategy and force review at the start of each new Administration—a Quadrennial Strategy Review (QSR). This review should be an interagency activity directed by the National Security Council (NSC). OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the Joint Staff should lead the DoD [Department of Defense] effort. The QSR would incorporate the [combatant commanders’] appraisals of projected strengths and weaknesses, as well as their judgments on future forces and capabilities under consideration.¹

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General John M. Shalikashvili reported to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) that the CORM’s QSR recommendation required further study because (1) many of its features were already satisfied by existing processes, (2) there were impediments to unifying national and military strategies in a single process, and (3) there were political and practical limitations to setting and sustaining major defense resource levels and priorities in a four-year-centered process.² SecDef William J. Perry in turn provided his findings on the CORM’s recommendations to the Defense oversight committees. He cited the Clinton Administration’s Bottom-Up Review of defense strategy, force structure, key modernization programs, and support activities as having clearly demonstrated the value of a quadrennial strategy review at the outset of an administration, but said DoD believed the details of such a review should be left to each new Administration.³

Congress apparently liked at least part of the CORM’s proposal. It mandated a quadrennial defense (not strategy) review by whatever Administration took office
following the 1996 election. Congress made the “Force Structure Review Act of 1996” a part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, as follows:

- Congress makes the following findings:
  - The assessment by the Bush Administration (known as the “Base Force” assessment) and the assessment by the Clinton Administration (known as the “Bottom-Up Review”) were intended to reassess the force structure of the Armed Forces in light of the changing realities of the post-Cold War world.
  - Both assessments served an important purpose in focusing attention on the need to reevaluate the military posture of the United States, but the pace of global change necessitates a new, comprehensive assessment of the defense strategy of the United States and the force structure of the Armed Forces required to meet the threats to the United States in the twenty-first century.
  - In response to the recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense endorsed the concept of conducting a quadrennial review of the defense program at the beginning of each newly elected Presidential administration, and the Department intends to complete the first such review in 1997.
  - In order to ensure that the force structure of the Armed Forces is adequate to meet the challenges to the national security interests of the United States in the twenty-first century, to assist the Secretary of Defense in conducting the review referred to [above], and to assess the appropriate force structure of the Armed Forces through the year 2010 and beyond (if practicable), it is important to provide for the conduct of an independent, nonpartisan review of the force structure that is more comprehensive than prior assessments of the force structure, extends beyond the quadrennial defense review, and explores innovative and forward-thinking ways of meeting such challenges.

- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall complete in 1997 a review…intended to satisfy the requirements for a Quadrennial Defense Review as identified in the recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions.

- The Secretary of Defense shall establish a nonpartisan, independent panel to be known as the National Defense Panel.

  - The Panel shall submit to the Secretary an independent assessment of a variety of possible force structures…through the year 2010 and beyond, including the force structure identified in the [QDR] report….
– Not later than December 1, 1997, the Panel shall submit to the Secretary a report setting forth the...findings and recommendations of the Panel...including any recommendations for legislation that the Panel considers appropriate.

– Not later than December 15, 1997, the Secretary shall, after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, submit to [Congress] a copy of the report, together with the Secretary’s comments.⁴

The National Defense Panel (NDP) issued its report, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*, in December 1997. The Panel was not charged to examine roles and missions, and made no recommendations concerning the assignment of Service functions, but did recommend significant changes to the unified command structure, including the creation of a “Joint Forces Command, which would be the common force provider of combat-ready forces to all other commands for joint and combined operations.” The NDP report went on to say that:

This command would be responsible for developing and validating joint doctrine for the approval of the Joint Chiefs; conducting joint experimentation; directing joint battle laboratories; and overseeing other joint innovation and experimentation efforts described elsewhere in this Report.⁵

SecDef William S. Cohen provided his comments on the NDP’s report to Congress on 15 December 1997. In letters to the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House authorizing committees, he wrote the following:

I welcome the Panel’s emphasis on joint experimentation and am particularly interested in those recommendations that focus on infusing greater “jointness” into our ongoing efforts. Accordingly, I will explore its suggestion to create a joint battle lab for experimentation and joint exercises, to establish a joint national training center, a joint urban warfare center, and a joint concept development center, and to integrate existing service battle labs and facilities where appropriate....

The NDP recommended maintaining the current number of combatant commands but suggested that the Department make adjustments in the responsibilities of many and changes in the missions, and hence names, of some. As the means by which the missions, responsibilities, and force structure of the combatant commands are assigned, the UCP [unified command plan] is a cornerstone of the [combatant commanders’] ability to meet the defense strategy’s fundamental challenge. It is therefore imperative that we thoroughly review and modify the UCP as we transform our forces for the future. It is also essential that we modify the UCP only after deliberate analysis. Changes in responsibilities should come at a rate that can be implemented by
the [combatant commanders] without an undue increase in risk in the transitional areas of responsibility.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently completed a biennial review of the UCP as required by Title 10 and Section 905 of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, which directed a review of the impact of the QDR on the UCP. This review was an extensive effort that involved the Joint Staff, [combatant commanders], and Services. Several proposals similar to the Panel's recommendations were reviewed in this cycle. Some, including ...further clarification of ACOM's mission, were recommended for inclusion this year (UCP 97). Since the Panel's full range of UCP recommendations merit thorough analysis, I will ask the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include them for consideration in the UCP review cycle that begins in January 1998 and would look to act on any particularly promising ideas expeditiously.

Secretary Cohen's promise to refer the NDP's recommendations to a review cycle that would not prompt any action for at least two more years did not sit well with some members of Congress.

Representative Mac Thornberry (R-TX) introduced H.R. 3845, the Joint Forces Command Act of 1998, which would have directed the President to establish a unified combatant command for joint forces, the principal functions of which would be (1) to integrate elements of the different armed forces into joint forces and prepare them to be provided to the commanders of other combatant commands to carry out assigned missions ...; and (2) to design, develop, and carry out a process of joint experimentation to assist in determining the future capabilities, organization, and operational concepts of the joint military force. The bill included a long list of functions related to experimentation for which the commander of the joint forces command would be given responsibility and authority.

Most significantly, the bill would have established a new major force program (MFP) category for joint experimentation, patterned after MFP 11, the funding category that was established to enable the commander of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to execute the responsibilities assigned to him by the Nunn-Cohen Amendment for developing and acquiring special operations-peculiar equipment, and for

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* ACOM was the short version of USACOM, the acronym for United States Atlantic Command. It was previously known as LANTCOM, but renamed USACOM when US-based forces were assigned to it in response to General Powell's 1993 recommendation. The command was redesignated US Joint Forces Command in 1999—arguably in response to the NDP's recommendation.
acquiring special operations-peculiar material, supplies, and services. The new major force program category for joint experimentation activities was to be administered by the commander of the joint forces command, who, according to the draft legislation, would have planning, programming, budgeting, and execution authority and would include in his budget requests funding for the following:

(A) Research and development of equipment required by the joint force in the conduct of joint experimentation.

(B) Procurement of material, supplies, and services required for the conduct of joint experimentation.

(C) Operations and maintenance expenditures associated with the conduct of joint experimentation activities.

(D) Operation of joint battle laboratories and joint concept development centers.  

In the zero-sum game of the Defense budget, funding for the new MFP category could come only from other, existing categories, meaning the Services. Whether the Services were even aware of the Bill’s provisions before it was referred to committee on 12 May 1998 is not certain, but one day before, on 11 May 1998, Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), introduced a Bill with a different approach, which was ultimately the one taken.

S. 2060 was a Bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999 for military activities of the Department of Defense. Title XII addressed Joint Warfighting Experimentation, and included the Sense of Congress that “Congress supports the initiative of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to designate a commander of a combatant command to have the mission for joint warfighting experimentation....”

The Bill said it was further the Sense of Congress that the commander designated to have that mission should be provided resources adequate for the joint warfighting experimentation process; and should have authority over use of the resources for the planning, preparation, conduct, and assessment of joint warfighting experimentation. Finally, it was the Sense of Congress that, for joint warfighting experimentation to be effective, the commander designated to have the mission should have the authority and responsibility for, among other things:

Coordinating with each of the Armed Forces and the Defense Agencies regarding the development of the equipment (including surrogate or real tech-
nologies, platforms, and systems) necessary for the conduct of joint experimenta-
tion, or, if necessary, developing such equipment directly.

Coordinating with each of the Armed Forces and the Defense Agencies re-
garding the acquisition of the materiel, supplies, services, and surrogate or
real technology resources necessary for the conduct of joint experimentation,
or, if necessary, acquiring such items and services directly.\(^8\)

There’s a big difference between *coordinating* with the Services and Agencies for
research, development, and acquisition of materiel, and *having authority* over a
separate major force program. Speculation at the time among those with a stake in
experimentation was that the Thornberry Bill had scared DoD, and particularly the
Services, into action; and that the CJCS and Commander in Chief, USACOM visited
friendly offices on Capitol Hill to offer a less drastic approach, which the SASC accept-
ed.\(^9\) The committee report that accompanied S. 2062 seems to support the specula-
tion that a deal was cut to ward off the more drastic House Bill:

The committee believes the Department of Defense should move quickly
toward a process of joint experimentation as recommended by the National
Defense Panel. The committee acknowledges the progress the Department
has made by developing a charter assigning the responsibility and authority
for that process to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. The
committee directs the CINC [commander in chief], USACOM, or other combat-
ant commander subsequently responsible for joint experimentation, to re-
port to the congressional defense committees annually on joint experimenta-
tion conducted in the previous year. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are also directed to comment on each report
prior to the submission to the Congress. The committee will carefully review
the initial and subsequent annual reports on joint warfighting experimenta-
tion to assess the adequacy of the scope and pace of transformation activity.
Should that scope and pace be deemed inadequate, the committee will con-
sider legislation to establish a unified combatant commander with the mis-
ion, forces, budget, responsibilities and authority to conduct joint experi-
mentation.\(^10\)

Whatever the exact sequence of events, and whether or not the threat of another
unified combatant command with its own budget authority caused DoD to wave aside
Secretary Cohen’s statements to Congress on the need for deliberate analysis to
precede modification of the UCP, the fact that ACOM’s mission had just been further
clarified in UCP 97, and the need to consider the rate at which changes in combatant
commander responsibilities could be implemented, DoD announced on 21 May 1998
that USACOM was designated executive agent for joint warfighting experimentation

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\(^8\)\(^9\)\(^10\)

For a while it looked as though a Joint Forces Command might be the next stop on the road that had already led to USSOCOM, but DoD leadership’s quick action averted another congressionally mandated combatant command with its own major force program and budget authority.

**End Notes**


9. Author’s recollection. At the time, I was in a newly formed group at the Institute for Defense Analyses charged with developing advanced concepts for experimentation, and followed developments closely, albeit from a distance.


11. Author’s recollection. At the time, I was in a newly formed group at the Institute for Defense Analyses charged with developing advanced concepts for experimentation, and followed developments closely, albeit from a distance.
# Military Roles and Missions: Past Revisions and Future Prospects

**Abstract**

Arguments about military roles and missions are a manifestation of the conflict between the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the Congress empowered by the Constitution to raise and support Armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces. This paper traces the history of roles-and-missions disputes, focusing on the tension and interaction between the Legislative and Executive branches. It then draws on lessons from the past in an effort to understand why intended reforms have produced little more than mere “tinkering on the margins.” Finally, it offers a brief assessment of the first review conducted under new legislation, and concludes by suggesting one way the Secretary of Defense might better use functions, by relating them to capabilities, in order to close gaps and reduce unwarranted redundancies.

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**Subject Terms**
- Armed Services Committee
- Bush Administration
- capabilities
- Clinton Administration
- Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
- comprehensive joint assessment
- Congressional Aviation Policy Board
- Core Competencies
- Core Mission Areas
- CORM
- DoD Reorganization Act of 1958
- DoDD 5100.1
- Eisenhower Administration
- “First War Powers Act, 1941”
- functions
- Goldwater-Nichols Act
- history of roles and missions
- JCIDS
- Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Joint Requirements Oversight Council
- Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
- JROC
- Key West Agreement of 1948
- Military Affairs Committee
- missions
- National Defense Authorization Act
- National Security Act of 1947
- Naval Affairs Committee
- needs
- Nunn-Cohen Amendment
- Quadrennial Defense Review
- Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review
- Revolt of the Admirals
- roles
- Roosevelt Administration
- Special Operations Command
- Truman Administration
- US military services
- USS JOHN F. KENNEDY
- USS UNITED STATES
- War Powers Act of 1973