MODERN PIRACY AND REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN: THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

by

Michael G. King Jr.

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Thesis Advisor: Erik J. Dahl
Second Reader: Daniel J. Moran

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# Modern Piracy and Regional Security Cooperation in the Maritime Domain: The Middle East and Southeast Asia

**Author:** Michael G. King Jr.

**Abstract:**
This thesis examines the development of cooperative maritime security efforts in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Recent regional efforts to combat maritime security threats in the Gulf of Aden have drawn comparisons to similar efforts undertaken in the Malacca Straits. However, such comparisons fail to address the unique nature of security cooperation in the Persian Gulf, specifically the necessity of external security support for states in the region. This thesis argues that despite similarities shared by the two regions, the states of the Persian Gulf must deal with issues of prioritization, regional animosities, and external dependence before they can attempt to develop cooperative maritime security arrangements akin to those existing in Southeast Asia. Success will require a concerted effort by these states as well as the realization, by the United States, that it is undermining effective security cooperation in the region.

### Subject Terms
- Piracy
- Maritime Security
- Regional Security Cooperation
- Cooperative Security
- Middle East
- Southeast Asia
- Gulf of Aden
- Straits of Malacca
- Maritime Capacity

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the development of cooperative maritime security efforts in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Recent regional efforts to combat maritime security threats in the Gulf of Aden, and maritime piracy in particular, have drawn comparisons to similar efforts undertaken in the Malacca Straits. However, such comparisons fail to address the unique nature and history of security cooperation in the Persian Gulf, specifically the reliance of states in the region on external security support. Despite some similarities shared between the two regions, the states of the Persian Gulf must deal with issues of prioritization, regional animosities, and external dependence before they can attempt to develop cooperative maritime security arrangements akin to those existing in Southeast Asia. Success will require a concerted effort by states in the region and realization by the United States of its role in undermining effective security cooperation in the region.
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN+3</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Extended membership)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAKORKAMLA</td>
<td>Indonesian Maritime Security Coordination Board</td>
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<td>CGPCS</td>
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<td>CJTF HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force (Horn of Africa)</td>
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<td>CMPT</td>
<td>Combined Maritime Patrol Teams</td>
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<td>CTF-152</td>
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<td>EiS</td>
<td>Eye in the Sky Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>GOA</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
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<td>HOA</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Chamber of Commerce</td>
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<td>IEG</td>
<td>Intelligence Exchange Group</td>
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<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
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<td>IMB</td>
<td>International Maritime Bureau</td>
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<td>IRGCN</td>
<td>Islamic Republic Guard Corps Naval Forces</td>
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<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Islamic Republic of Iran Navy</td>
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<td>IRTC</td>
<td>Internationally Recognized Transit</td>
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<td>ISC</td>
<td>Information Sharing Center</td>
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<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Coordinating Council</td>
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<td>MALSINDO</td>
<td>Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols</td>
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<td>MMEA</td>
<td>Maritime Enforcement Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MSCHOA</td>
<td>Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa)</td>
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<td>MSP</td>
<td>Malacca Straits Patrols Malaysian</td>
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<td>MSP-IS</td>
<td>Malacca Straits Patrol Information System</td>
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<td>MSSP</td>
<td>Malacca Straits Sea Patrol</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSTF</td>
<td>Maritime Security Task Force</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NAVCENT</td>
<td>U.S. Naval Forces Central Command</td>
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<td>NM</td>
<td>nautical miles</td>
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<td>OPK</td>
<td>Ocean Peace-Keeping</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>Piracy Reporting Center</td>
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<td>PSF</td>
<td>Peninsula Shield Force</td>
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<td>ReCAAP</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia</td>
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<td>RMSI</td>
<td>Regional Maritime Security Initiative</td>
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<td>RNO</td>
<td>Royal Navy of Oman</td>
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<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<td>UIC</td>
<td>Union of Islamic Courts</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>dollars (U.S.)</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES

On June 29, 2009, eleven Middle Eastern Arab states met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to discuss the formation of an all-Arab maritime force to combat the continuing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. This discussion was in response to a growing concern by the Arab community regarding the risk piracy posed to trade and security in the region, especially its threat to oil and gas shipments.\(^1\) Discussion of the task force’s formation can be seen as the culmination of several months of coaxing by the international community. It followed repeated actions by the United Nations calling for greater coordination and cooperation between regional and international actors able to operate in the Gulf of Aden and West Indian Ocean.\(^2\)

The most recent of these actions took place in January 2009, when representatives from several Middle Eastern and East African states met in Djibouti to discuss possible regional cooperation in addressing maritime security problems, such as piracy.\(^3\) Observers of this International Maritime Organization (IMO)-led conference pointed to the event as a precursor to a regional security arrangement similar to that established to


combat piracy in the Malacca Straits. That agreement, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP), established procedures for coordination and information sharing between states in the region, and was widely credited with the reduction of piracy in the Straits of Malacca. Such comparisons between the relatively successful counter-piracy efforts of Southeast Asia and the fledgling arrangements of the Middle Eastern Arab states highlight the main questions of this thesis: Can Middle Eastern countries establish an effective and sustainable, cooperative arrangement to address maritime security problems in the region? Specifically, is the Southeast Asian model of maritime security cooperation applicable to similar efforts being discussed in the Middle East by some of the Persian Gulf states? If so, what lessons can strategic decision-makers and military leadership concerned with the region derive from the cooperative security efforts in the Southeast Asian maritime domain?

This thesis will argue that despite recent announcements regarding a dedicated Arab maritime task force to cooperatively address maritime security issues in the region, the Gulf states possess neither the capacity nor the willingness to do so effectively. Although comparisons between cooperative maritime security efforts in Southeast Asia provide a convenient and informative “model” for counter-piracy efforts in the Middle East, the Gulf states find themselves in a unique situation. Few states in the region possess sufficient maritime forces to operate outside their own territorial waters. More importantly, several key political factors prevent states in the region from developing effective cooperative security arrangements. The factors most affecting these efforts are related to prioritization of internal and eternal security, poor relations between regional neighbors, and overdependence on foreign security assistance.

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B. IMPORTANCE

Despite increased efforts by the UN, European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States, piracy off the Somali coast continues to be a significant issue. International response to the situation, in the form of increased naval presence, has failed to reduce piracy in the region. In fact, over the first three months of 2009 alone there were 61 reported attacks, over ten times that seen during the same period the year before (See Figure 1).⁶

![Maritime Violence off Somalia (1998-2009)](image)

Figure 1. Maritime Violence off Somalia (1998–2009)⁷

Additionally, the economic benefits of piracy continue to be a significant issue with ransom payments in 2008 estimated to have been somewhere between 18 to 30

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⁷ NOTE: Table 1 shows the number of actual or attempted piracy attacks in or around the Horn of Africa from 1998–2009. SOURCE: Figures were compiled from the ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report. UK: IMB, 1998 to 2009. Reports can be found at www.ice-ecs.org.
Besides the immediate cost of ransom payments, the maritime shipping industry faces potential increases in insurance premiums if they elect to continue transits of the region, and increased operating costs if forced to bypass the Suez Canal and GOA. Recent estimates from Lloyd’s of London, a major insurer of commercial vessels, show an increase in average insurance premiums from 500 USD in 2007 to 20,000 USD in 2008 for vessels operating in the GOA, an estimated cost of 400 million USD annually. Conversely, operators who wish to bypass the region altogether have one option, a long voyage of over 2,700 nautical miles around the Cape of Good Hope. This voyage, although safer, takes six more days than the Suez and GOA route and is projected to cost significantly more, close to 89 million USD annually (industry-wide) in added cost.

To be sure, piracy in the Gulf of Aden and along the east African coast affects stability in the region, threatens vital aid from reaching the people of Somalia, and presents serious challenges to the world maritime economy. These effects, though not usually affecting U.S. citizens or commercial entities directly, cause significant issues for maritime trade in the global market, which in turn, has repercussions for the U.S. economy and the economies of its Persian Gulf and African allies. Although it can be debated to exactly what extent piracy directly affects the economies of the Middle East, it is obvious that the phenomenon does have important political and social effects for these countries. With several vessels from Middle Eastern countries having been hijacked in

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8 According to IMB reporting, there were 111 reports of actual and attempted attacks against merchant shipping in the GOA and Indian Ocean in 2008, over two times the numbers from previous years (44 in 2007, 20 in 2006, 45 in 2005, 10 in 2004, and 21 in 2003). IMB, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period, 1 January – 31 December 2008,” ICC International Maritime Bureau (January 2009): 5. *These figures may be deceptive, however, industry representatives interviewed by the author agreed that prior to the recent increase in high-profile attacks, and subsequent notoriety of the piracy problem, reporting from shipping companies and shipmasters was notoriously unreliable. Discussions between the author and representatives of maritime industry, the IMO and IMB took place during the “Tackling Piracy at Sea” Conference in London, March 18–19, 2009. Financially, experts disagree on the exact amount of ransoms paid out to Somali pirates with some estimating total payments in the range of 18–30 million USD. Major news services and other media outlets tend to estimate based on average ransom paid and number of vessels held for the year. Roger Middleton, “Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding local wars,” Chatham House Briefing Paper, London (October 2008), 5.


the past few years, these countries undoubtedly experience some pressure to address the issue. These states have also been under continuous pressure by the UN and other international powers to contribute in a coordinated manner. Therefore, analysis of Middle Eastern capacity to conduct sustained and coordinated counter-piracy operations as a joint force, the effect such operations may have on developing broader cooperative, maritime security arrangements, and the applicability of previous experiences of establishing such arrangements, would provide policy-makers and operational commanders with essential data to support future efforts.

C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION

This thesis seeks to determine the feasibility of cooperative, maritime security arrangements in the Middle East similar to those currently existing in Southeast Asia. Favorable comparisons between the two, as discussed in the previous section, are often presented as models for similar efforts in the Middle East. Policy-makers and experts see such measures as important steps toward not only addressing the short-term issue of piracy and maritime crime, but also addressing possibilities of regional cooperative maritime security in the long-term. It is not clear whether these comparisons are accurate. This thesis will seek to identify the key characteristics that have allowed for successful cooperation in Southeast Asia, whether those characteristics exist in the Middle East, and what affect these have on cooperative security development in the region.

To facilitate this research, a historical analysis of each region was conducted to determine the key similarities and differences applicable to understanding cooperative

11 According to IMB statistics for 2008, five vessels registered in Middle Eastern Arab countries were hijacked or attacked in that year: Two from Yemen and one each from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. In the period of 2003 to 2008, 29 Arab-owned or registered vessels have been attacked (this number is worldwide with further analysis required to identify the actual number attacked as a result of Somali piracy). The most high profile of these cases was the M/V Sirius Star, a very large crude carrier (VLCC) that was hijacked by Somali pirates in November 2008 and later ransomed for a reported three million USD. The Sirius Star, owned by a UAE based company that is a subsidiary of the Saudi Arabian state oil company, Saudi Aramco, was carrying close to two million barrels of crude oil bound for the US. IMB, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period, 1 January – 31 December 2008,” ICC International Maritime Bureau (January 2009): 18–19; BBC, “Pirates capture Saudi oil tanker,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7733482.stm (accessed August 20, 2009); BBC, “Saudi tanker ‘freed off Somalia,’” BBC News, January 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7820311.stm (accessed August 20, 2009).
security development in each. This analysis seeks to identify the characteristics of each region to include the progression of counter-piracy efforts, the factors that influence cooperative efforts in each region, and the effect both have had on maritime security cooperation overall. It will focus on events observed during spikes in reported attacks in each region since 1998, specifically from 1998 to present in Southeast Asia and from 2001 to present off the Horn of Africa (HOA). This historical analysis will be used in conjunction with theoretical models of cooperative security to identify the key factors that contribute or hinder effective security cooperation in each region.

This thesis will be organized into six chapters. This introductory chapter explains the purpose and importance of this topic, including the methodology that will be utilized to conduct the comparison between efforts in both regions. Chapter II will provide a review of relevant literature on the topic, with the purpose of providing background on the discussion between experts and its bearing on this thesis. The third and fourth chapters will provide background on the development of counter-piracy in both regions respectively. They will provide an overview of the steps taken to address piracy over the last several years. Chapter V will provide an overview of maritime security and geopolitical issues within the Middle East to include a background on maritime capacity in the region and a summary of factors related to security cooperation between states in the region. The final chapter will compare the nature of security in both regions to determine the similarities and differences between the two, and the applicability of the Southeast Asian “model” to cooperative efforts in the Middle East. This will include recommendations for policy-makers and a discussion of possible topics of further research.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION

Piracy has garnered a significant amount of attention over the past few years. Most of this attention has come because of the dramatic increase in attacks off the Horn of Africa and the resulting increase in media exposure to the problem. The goal of this chapter is to provide background on the resulting literature, especially with regards to piracy’s effect on regional security cooperation. It will first outline discussions within academic and policy circles on how to best address maritime security issues like piracy. It will then detail the use of the Southeast Asian “model” as a case for comparison and emulation by some of the same circles. This will be followed by a discussion on some theories of cooperative security to include identification of key factors that hinder or aid development of regional cooperation. The final two sections will outline the application of some of these metrics by scholars and regional experts and how they affect security cooperation in both regions.

B. MODERN PIRACY AND COUNTER-PIRACY

Somali piracy has garnered a significant amount of attention over the past few years despite previously being ignored during the first few years of the 21st century. Until recently, discussion on the topic had been strictly limited to organizations specifically interested in maritime security issues, such as the U.S. Navy, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime Bureau (ICC IMB). Such groups obviously had a vested interest in the topic: U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) in understanding and countering a maritime problem in its area of operations, the IMO dedicated to developing and maintaining global maritime security, and the IMB seeking
to protect the interests of international trade and the maritime shipping industry. However, as pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean became more high profile, the international media and, in turn, the general public, became more aware of the issue and international pressure for intervention began to grow.

Scholars and security experts quickly agreed that Somali piracy was a unique phenomenon, that the combination of lawlessness and economic disadvantage inherent within and surrounding the collapsed state of Somalia provided an ideal environment for piracy to exist. To some, the logical way to eliminate Somali piracy was to provide sustained security, economic stability, and an opportunity to establish centralized control

12 Piracy has long been a maritime industry issue. Guidance from the International Maritime Organization from 2002 discusses the various measures a ship captain can take to prevent or reduce the likelihood of attacks. Additionally, industry organizations like the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) released guidance in 2009 for masters transiting through the area. “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships,” IMO Guidance Circular, International Maritime Organization, May 29, 2002; OCIMF, Piracy – The East Africa/Somalia Situation: Practical Measures to Avoid, Deter or Delay Piracy Attacks, Oil Companies International Marine Forum (Edinburgh: Witherby Seamanship International Ltd, 2009): 1–42.


of the country by a Somali government. However, while most agreed that the root causes of piracy should be addressed, they also agreed that the task of internally stabilizing Somalia was too difficult to handle presently. James Kraska and Brian Wilson, two U.S. naval officers who have written extensively on Somali piracy, stressed in early 2009 that “until the world can effectively craft and execute a long-term solution… the problem of piracy must be addressed from the sea to the shore rather than the other way around.” To Kraska and many other policy experts, counter-piracy efforts should be focused on bolstering military and law enforcement action designed to disrupt and disincentivize the act of piracy itself.

C. THE SEARCH FOR ANSWERS

Representatives from a wide range of organizations did agree that immediate action was required to stem the rise in pirate attacks off of Somalia regardless of the situation within the country. In a 2008 policy document, “Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan,” the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) called for “three distinct lines of action”: reduce the vulnerability of maritime shipping to piracy, interrupt and deter attacks within the auspices of international law, and ensure development of an internationally recognized framework for arrest and prosecution of pirates. Within these lines of action, the NSC plan called for cooperative arrangements to streamline counter-piracy operations and the establishment of a regionally based Counter


Piracy Coordination Center (CPCC) tasked to collect reporting, disseminate information to forces in the region, and provide a “common operating picture.”  

The next year the United Nations established the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) to “facilitate discussion and coordination of actions among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia.” Since inception, the CGPCS has primarily served as a forum for international cooperation; providing an opportunity for the international community to discuss increased naval coordination, promote preventative efforts within the maritime industry, facilitate legal solutions pertaining to captured pirates, and increasing maritime capacity in the region.

Following the first meeting of the CGPCS in January 2009, Stephanie Hanson, an analyst for the Council on Foreign Relations, highlighted four “mechanisms for combating piracy”: adoption of onboard deterrents or defensive countermeasures for shipping transiting the region, deployment of international and regional naval forces to deter and prevent attacks, creation of a Somali coast guard funded and trained by the international community, and establishment of regional counter-piracy patrols based on those in place in the Malacca Straits since 2006.

Hanson’s last point highlights a comparison that has become popular in recent literature on counter-piracy. During this time, authors began pointing to the success of cooperative security arrangements in Southeast Asia as a possible example for addressing the same issue off HOA. The most often referenced of these arrangements was the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against

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21 Hanson, “Combating Maritime Piracy,” 3.
22 In a 2009 commentary, Joshua Ho advocates that policy-makers developing counter-piracy policy for the HOA to “go local” and emulate the successes of Southeast Asian cooperative efforts. Joshua Ho, “Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Lessons from the Malacca Strait,” RSIS Commentaries, S, Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, January 22, 2009, 3.
ships in Asia (ReCAAP), an aptly named initiative introduced by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and established in 2006.\textsuperscript{23}

Regional experts and the international community alike have heralded ReCAAP as an example of effective security cooperation and coordination.\textsuperscript{24} Joshua Ho, a Singaporean scholar who has written extensively on ReCAAP and other maritime security issues in the region, has repeatedly lauded the efforts of the organization, although he freely admits that it does possess worrisome flaws.\textsuperscript{25} James Kraska and Brian Wilson often cite ReCAAP as the prime example for cooperative maritime security with regards to counter-piracy.\textsuperscript{26} The international community has also been especially quick to acclaim ReCAAP’s applicability to similar deliberations in the Middle East. In January 2009, for example, the International Maritime Organization acclaimed meetings held in Djibouti to discuss regional cooperation as the first step toward a similar cooperative agreement in the Middle East and East Africa.\textsuperscript{27}

To advocates of the cooperative regional approach, key aspects of ReCAAP were especially informative. First was the formal development of a regional arrangement and the normative expectations the agreement represented.\textsuperscript{28} Second was the need for formalized communication and information sharing in the form of regional coordination.

\textsuperscript{23} ReCAAP called for cooperative security patrols around the Malacca Straits and established a network of regional centers designed to provide information on attacks and partner actions to an Information Sharing Centre (ISC). Joshua Ho, “Combating piracy and armed robbery in Asia: The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC),” in \textit{Marine Policy} 33 (2009), 432.


\textsuperscript{25} Ho, “Combating piracy and armed robbery in Asia,” 433.


centers and official lines of communication. According to proponents, both characteristics are key to the success of the organization. By emulating the states of Southeast Asia, they argued, the states in the Middle East and Northeast Africa could take great strides toward curbing piracy and maritime crime in their waters.29

D. THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN “MODEL”  

Despite enthusiasm from some, others have argued that the example of ReCAAP might not be directly applicable to developing arrangements in the Middle East. Even supporters of the ReCAAP effort overall admitted that the agreement has had its flaws. Joshua Ho identifies three factors that limited the agreement’s success: lack of an operational role, a non-obligatory nature, and the absence of key states in the agreement. After providing a litany of the organization’s strengths, Ho accedes that the organization’s lack of an operational role limits the effectiveness of forces depending on the expected level of operational coordination. He continues by describing the agreement as a “paper tiger,” possessing no authority to require coordination or action from its members.30 Due to the loose terms of the agreement, members have no obligation to abide by it, a characteristic some supporters view as a strength of the organization.31 The final limiting factor is the absence of Indonesia and Malaysia in the agreement, the two countries whose waters comprise a majority of the Straits of Malacca. Their absence calls into question the legitimacy of an organization established solely to address piracy and


maritime crime in the Straits. As Cara Raymond adds in a 2009 article on piracy in the Malacca Straits, the absence of Indonesia and Malaysia “cannot help but cast doubt on its [ReCAAP’s] effectiveness.”

Less known, and arguably more informative, is the evolution of other efforts at maritime cooperation between the states in the region. Recent literature has begun to describe this evolutionary process, heralding a succession of cooperative agreements between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand as a more applicable example of maritime security cooperation. The first of these was MALSINDO (an acronym for the first three states involved: Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore). This trilateral agreement was established in 1999 and coordinated maritime patrols in the Malacca Straits, building on existing bilateral agreements between the three states. MALSINDO was followed by the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) and the Malacca Straits Sea Patrols (MSSP), efforts that built upon the successes of the initial agreement. The most recent of these agreements, the MSSP, was more effective than its predecessors, especially following its integration with a new information-sharing initiative, the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG), and joint maritime air patrols, the Eyes in the Sky Initiative (EiS), forming the Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) in 2006.

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32 Ho, “Combating piracy and armed robbery in Asia: The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC).” 433.


Joshua Ho highlighted the success of these efforts, attributing it to the willingness of participants to address issues of sovereignty while still increasing coordination between their forces. To both Ho and Huang, the key to its success was the limitation of naval patrols to their respective territorial water, thereby addressing fears of infringement on national sovereignty while still increasing coordination between patrolling forces.\(^\text{36}\) There are those who disagree, however, characterizing the Malacca Straits patrols as more “show” than providing “real utility.”\(^\text{37}\) Some claim that this coordination merely consisted of an “exchange of schedules” rather than a truly cooperative effort.\(^\text{38}\)

There are also those who view the establishment of these agreements as merely political maneuvering. J.N. Mak, a scholar of maritime security issues in the region, criticized MALSINDO in 2006, stating that the purpose of the agreement was not necessarily to curb maritime violence, but to “forestall possible foreign intervention in the Malacca Straits.”\(^\text{39}\)

Concerns regarding the level of success of regional security cooperation in Southeast Asia aside, comparisons between them and similar agreements developing in the Middle East seem valid. Therefore, an analysis of the factors that either limited or encouraged cooperation between states in Southeast Asia would be informative. Recent literature on the subject tends to agree that certain obstacles hindered cooperation in the region. The first deals with issues of maritime capacity: physical capability, training, and platforms, all the things that determine a state’s ability to carry out its security intentions. Most states in the region lack adequate vessels and personnel to patrol their waters. Indonesia and Malaysia have both dealt with inadequate capacity, admitting publicly that

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they lacked the forces necessary to adequately patrol their own waters. Carolin Liss and others attribute their inadequate maritime capacity to a general lack of resources following the financial crisis in the late 1990s and the states’ preoccupation with internal stability.

Considering this general lack of regional maritime capacity, related literature often stresses the need for continued international assistance to ensure success in the region including all measures of capacity building such as training, equipping, and surveillance and reconnaissance. Kraska and Wilson point to existing capacity-building programs in the region, particularly those of the United States and Japan, as lending significantly to the transformation of maritime forces in the region.

The second obstacle to regional security cooperation in Southeast Asia deals with the broader issue of political willingness. Political willingness, in this context, alludes to the internal and external political concerns that prevent or hinder a state’s decision to participate in a cooperative arrangement. Three specific political issues remain constant throughout all current literature and explain the hesitance of states in the region to cooperate, including: internal distractions, poor relations with neighbors, and “meddling” by external actors.

*Internal distractions.* States in the region have been focused on internal stability, especially following the financial crisis of the late 1990s. Economic depression and the resulting poverty and unemployment were beyond the control of most states in the region.

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40 Raymond, “Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Straits,” 36.


The financial crisis drained vital resources and weakened economies throughout the region. Political opposition within their borders further distracted the states, drawing resources from less urgent issues, such as maritime crime and border patrols. Most notably, until 2004, Indonesia was faced with armed opposition in the northeast portion of the country and, as a result, had little control over security in that area.\textsuperscript{44} Organized crime has become another distraction as transnational criminal groups have proliferated throughout the region, testing the mettle of law enforcement agencies region-wide.\textsuperscript{45} Faced with a wide range of internal distractions, states in the region were spread exceedingly thin, as evidenced by the dramatic rise in illegal fishing, smuggling, and piracy in the Straits.

\textit{Poor relations with neighbors.} Mistrust between states in the region has limited cooperation for several decades. Animosity between neighbors resulting in border disputes and frigid relations was particularly disruptive. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have all experienced conflicts between them. Issues of national sovereignty, territorial waters and maritime boundaries, in this case, are a matter of fact. States in the region were slow to address these issues, making them a significant hindrance to further cooperative efforts.\textsuperscript{46} Some critics question the success of the agreements themselves, highlighting the mainly political utility of ReCAAP. According to Liss and Vavro, participants merely acted out their part, scheduling joint patrols and establishing new initiatives that did little to curb maritime crime in the region. Recent coordinated efforts, such as joint patrols, were viewed as merely exercises in sharing schedules, but lacking observable coordination between the participants.\textsuperscript{47}

\textit{Meddling by external actors.} Relations with external actors have also adversely affected cooperation in the region. Efforts at assistance or coordination have often been

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} Carolin Liss, “The roots of piracy in Southeast Asia,” Austral Policy Forum 07–18A, Nautilus Institute, October 22, 2007, 7–8.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 6.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Vavro, “Piracy, Terrorism and the Balance of Power in the Malacca Strait,” 13–14; Mak, “Unilateralism and Regionalism,” 135.
\end{itemize}
perceived at attempts to “meddle” in Southeast Asian affairs. National sovereignty is a sensitive issue for all countries when dealing with extra-regional powers such as the United States, Japan, and China. U.S. and Japanese cooperative initiatives have been continuously met with suspicion by Indonesia and Malaysia especially.48 Although this issue has hindered cooperation in the past, some experts accede that states in the region have begun to trust offers of assistance if couched less strongly, offering some hope for the future.49

Despite the obstacles and limitations of cooperation in Southeast Asia, it is important to consider those factors that encouraged or facilitated cooperation. The first of these identified in the literature is the presence of a security threat sufficient to motivate cooperation between states in the region. Although slow in effecting change, the threats of maritime terrorism and maritime crime in the Malacca Straits ultimately provided states sufficient motivation to cooperate.50 John Bradford, in a 2005 article for the Naval War College Review, highlighted the realization by states in the region that maritime crime poses a direct because of the importance of maritime trade to their national security.51 In contrast, Victor Huang argues that despite the enthusiasm for countering maritime crime by states such as Singapore, the other states have yet to consider maritime crime “sufficiently compelling” to offset the political costs.52 Vivian Louis Forbes attributes the reduction of piracy in the region partly to national efforts, but largely to recognition by said states that maritime violence was a sufficient issue requiring


cooperation. Harry Harding, a noted Asian scholar and policy expert, disagrees, arguing that states in the region became increasingly aware of such “unconventional threats” following the Cold War, realizing that although they could address some issues alone, they would need to cooperate to deal with them all.

Another factor that has contributed to cooperation in Southeast Asia is the existence of a tradition of such activity, best illustrated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Formed in 1967, ASEAN’s goal was to develop regional strength by strengthening states in the region a goal described by Allan Collins as regional strength through strong states, not strong regional institutions. Collins describes this “holistic approach,” as one of mutual respect between members with resolution of disputes through peaceful means as the basis for progressive cooperation. ASEAN was designed as a cooperative organization focused on “nation building,” designed to stabilize the region economically, socially, and culturally. Many scholars consider it to be a success, pointing to the relative stability of the region.

Amitav Acharya, in two books on security in Southeast Asia, accedes that ASEAN can be regarded as “one of the most successful experiments in regionalism in the developing world” but downplays its role in maintaining regional security. According

55 Collins identifies national sovereignty as one of the key aspects of ASEAN’s “nation building” efforts. Since inception, the organization has sought to protect and ensure the national sovereignty of its members, both internally and externally to the organization. Allan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 129.
56 Ibid., 130–131.
59 Acharya, A New Regional Order in Southeast Asia, 3; Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (New York: Routledge, 2001), 29.
to Acharya, attempts at security cooperation in Southeast Asia were hindered by two familiar concerns: poor relations between member states and fear of external manipulation. In a similar work, Harry Harding further explains these concerns by highlighting the reluctance of Southeast Asian states to broaden regional security cooperation in the 1980s. According to Harding, many states were afraid that such arrangements would be dominated by a few states or would weaken their existing security capabilities or alliances.

Acknowledging the inability of the ASEAN states to cooperate on regional security issues, these same scholars still credit ASEAN with normalizing relations in the region. Acharya describes the organization as a vital part of the process of building a security community in which states “develop a reliable pattern of peaceful interaction, pursue shared interests, and strive for a common regional identity.” Collins echoes this observation, remarking that members of ASEAN appreciate that their individual security is tied to each other. He argues that ASEAN’s holistic approach at “nation building,” or maybe more appropriately, “nation strengthening,” has allowed increased cooperation across a wide range of issues.

E. THE MIDDLE EAST AND SECURITY COOPERATION

Despite the consensus for regional cooperation that has recently become popular, some critics question the ability of states in the Middle East to cooperate within such an arrangement. In June 2009, Matthew Hulbert, a security analyst for the Center for Strategic Studies, argued that “greater coordination of counter-piracy measures…will become all the more critical in [the] future” but he stressed that the actors involved “lack the political cohesion…to shift the strategic landscape.” Even more, James Russell, a

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scholar of Middle Eastern security issues, argues that states in the region have consistently “failed to see the value in cooperation as a tool to manage their security dilemmas,” with leaders often too distracted by their own issues, both internal and external, to realistically pursue cooperation. According to Jamal Al-Suwaidi, a noted Emirati scholar, despite the “lessons” provided by the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars, security in the Middle East remains “volatile” and “the search for a more stable arrangement unsettled.”

The inability of states in the region to embrace the cooperative “spirit” of the post-Cold War era has been written on extensively over the past few decades. Most of this literature revolved around several key issues that remain constant to the present: the reality of continuous conflict in the region, the limiting nature of cooperation on national interests, the perception of force in regional relationships, and the reliance of states on the United States for protection.

A culture of conflict. First, continuous conflict in the region perpetuates national and regional instability. The near constant presence of conflict between states in the region has an obvious effect on attempts at cooperation. Many of the states remain suspicious of their neighbors, with shared borders a consistent point of contention, even


between cordial neighbors, and fueling animosity throughout the region.\(^{69}\) Even without the existing animosity and suspicion between states in the region, the weakness of leadership within Middle Eastern regimes and the subsequent reliance on their militaries for internal control, make it difficult for them to even consider external cooperation.\(^{70}\) Internal stability remains a key concern of leaders within the region, perceptions that drive their reliance on internal and external security forces to maintain power. Regimes concerned with their own political survival, or with the perceived machinations of their neighbors, are naturally averse to arrangements that limit or dilute their power, politically or security-wise.

**Self-interests over regional security.** A second related issue, cooperation, and the reciprocity necessary for its success, is seen by many regimes as a limit on their ability to respond forcefully to ensure their own interests. Geoffrey Kemp attributes this tendency to the maintenance of “zero-sum” perceptions within the region.\(^{71}\) According to Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, security in the Middle East over the past several decades can be better characterized as a result of national efforts, despite the presence of cooperative arrangements such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).\(^{72}\) To Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, the GCC is a “hollow” organization, as illustrated by the inability of its members to prevent conflict between them and the choice made by most of its members

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^72^ Cordesman et al., *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War*, 1.
to pursue their “own path” with regards to security.\textsuperscript{73} Another regional organization, the Arab League, although designed to foster cooperation across a wide-range of issues and a mechanism for conflict resolution between the Arab states, has also failed on most counts.\textsuperscript{74}

\textit{Force as a tool.} Regional perceptions of deterrence and force are different from other regions.\textsuperscript{75} In the experience of most states in the region, the threat of or actual use of force is a rewarding and acceptable method of diplomacy. Military strength is considered an indicator of national strength and its use as a deterrent to aggression, naturally ensuring that force, versus cooperation, is the preferred tool of statecraft.\textsuperscript{76}

\textit{Reliance on external actors.} The Middle East continues to be a region of concern for the world’s powers. The importance of the region’s chief export, oil, to the global economy makes security in the region an international issue. As described above, relationships between states in the region have been the large cause of conflict in the region, leading many of the weaker states to seek assistance from the United States and other external actors.\textsuperscript{77} The United States has willingly assumed the role of “protector” to these states in return for bases in the region, which, according to Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, has had an unbalancing effect on regional security. The willingness of the U.S. to assume responsibility for regional security, they argue, has allowed states in the region to focus on internal issues while eschewing their external defense. With U.S. protection, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait have had no incentive to cooperate regionally since all external threats are readily handled by the United States.\textsuperscript{78}

All of these factors present a daunting obstacle to cooperation in the region. Geoffrey Kemp argues, however, that “strategic, political and economic changes in the global environment have caused major realignments” that are pressuring states in the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{73} Cordesman et al., \textit{Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War}, 11–14.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Maoz, “Regional Security in the Middle East,” 19–20.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Kemp, “Cooperative Security in the Middle East,” 391–393.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Toukan, “The Middle East Peace Process, Arms Control, and Regional Security,” 29.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Cordesman et al., \textit{Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War}, 4–5.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 14–18.
\end{itemize}
region to seek normalized relations with their neighbors. The war in 1991 (and one can logically include the war in 2003) poignantly highlighted the inadequacies of Middle Eastern countries in an increasingly globalized world.

In response to these obstacles, Kemp and other scholars advocate a broader approach toward increased security cooperation in the region. In 1994, Kemp provided some requirements for successful security cooperation in the region. First, states in the region must develop a shared desire to promote and improve relations between them. Second, they must work to reduce or eliminate security threats through compromise and diplomacy. Finally, he stresses the need for all of the states to “subscribe to the principle of “asymmetric reciprocity,” whereby participants reject the traditional “zero-sum” game. Bjorn Møller, a senior security researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies agrees, adding that states in the region must develop a sense of mutual interdependence that provides them a “stake in maintaining peace.” He further advocates a more comprehensive approach, along the lines of ASEAN, which might meet with greater success, including dialogue concerning “threat misperceptions” that regional states might have, in an effort to diminish such misperceptions.

F. COOPERATIVE SECURITY THEORY

The expressed importance of developing such relationships is not accidental, however. Cooperative security theorists have long discussed them and others as those necessary for effective attempts at cooperation between state actors. Literature on the broader topic of cooperative security identifies the first factor, development of a

80 Ibid., 393.
81 Michael Intriligator echoed this in 1995, arguing that states in the region should take the position that security cannot be gained at the expense of the others but “rather in conjunction with the security of…other states.” Michael D. Intriligator, “The Middle East Process, Arms Control, and Regional Security,” in Practical Peacemaking in the Middle East, Volume I: Arms Control and Regional Security, eds. Steven L. Spiegel et al. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995), 46–47.
normative base, as especially important to successful cooperation in a multilateral or regional environment. The noted political scientist and scholar, John Gerard Ruggie, argued in his 1993 book on multilateralism that cooperative arrangements depend on “certain principles of ordering relations” that “specify appropriate conduct for a class of actors.” More simply, participants in a cooperative endeavor must have a tradition of cooperation, rules (either spoken or unspoken) that govern the way they interact. 84 In a separate work on cooperative security from the same period, Antonia and Abram Chayes affirm the need for a “strong normative base” within such arrangements. They stress that the success of a cooperative system “depends on the ability to generate, adapt, and enforce a system of governing norms.” So not only are norms important to establish but they must be flexible and enforceable. 85

That leads to some important questions with direct application to this thesis, namely: what are norms and what characteristics does such a “normative base” possess? Again, John Ruggie’s book provides some useful insight on how actors within such an arrangement must act. In his introduction, Ruggie stresses that successful cooperation depends on “diffused reciprocity,” with “diffuse” meaning that an understanding exists between participants that the benefits of the arrangement will be evenly distributed over time. This is in contrast to more traditional agreements, such as those that existed prior to and during the Cold War, that narrowly define what benefits they will receive and when. 86 Accordingly, the participants within a cooperative arrangement must be willing to “renounce temporary advantages” while expecting recompense in the long term. 87

87 Ibid., 56.
Therefore, not only must participants establish a normalized framework for relations but they must also embrace the concept of diffuse reciprocity, or adopt a “win-win” mentality.88

Adopting such an attitude, then, entails a level of trust between participants that is difficult between modern states. According to Emily Landau in her 2006 book on cooperative security in the Middle East, theorists agree that even in the “post modern” era, cooperation is still predicated on the concerns of a “self-interested state.” Therefore, theorists understood that they must focus on the “factors that encourage self-interested actors to adopt cooperative behavior.” This implies that states must have an incentive to enter into such cooperative arrangements. Incentives that, Landau argues, are difficult to provide since states are naturally reluctant to enter into an arrangement they perceive would provide greater immediate benefits to other participants Thus, she argues, cooperative efforts that do not address this reluctance are naturally difficult to maintain and short-lived. 89

One way to mitigate such reluctance is to ensure that norms are enforced in some way, thereby assuring the participants that deviations from prescribed norms will be punished. According to Antonia and Abram Chayes, the states must have “confidence that the others…are abiding” by the same rules.90 Such expectations are difficult to realize, especially considering the nature of cooperative security theory, which insists on persuasion, versus aggression, as the means of dialogue and enforcement.91 Likewise, John Steinbruner argues that cooperative security systems, unlike previous security systems, which were characterized by active confrontation between military forces, entail

89 Landau, Arms Control in the Middle East, 12.
“active enforcement of collaborative rules,” relying on reassurance versus deterrence.\(^{92}\) In her 1994 book on cooperative security, Janne Nolan, further specifies cooperative security arrangements as being “designed to ensure that organized aggression cannot start” through persuasion and dialogue.\(^{93}\) Accordingly, cooperative security arrangements depend on more peaceful means of dialogue, persuasion and reassurance specifically, to prevent conflict. This does not mean that conflict is obsolete. On the contrary, John Ruggie stresses that participants should expect disputes within the “limits of agreed upon norms and established procedures.”\(^{94}\)

Literature on the topic is especially clear with regards to what characteristics are essential for successful cooperative efforts. Participants must establish, or have established, a tradition of cooperation amongst them. This implies that they have a history of favorable group interactions and have successfully mitigated or minimized conflict over time. They are able to trust the other participants or the system sufficiently to allow them to forgo gains in the short term. They must also share a relative level of group cohesion and shared perceptions of threat sufficient to assure cooperation. In this sense, they must possess a unifying characteristic or sufficient threat to motivate them to seek cooperation.

G. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Although not a perfect example of cooperative security, there is consensus that use of the Southeast Asia “model” provides a practical example of maritime security cooperation in a regional setting. Despite the shortcomings identified above, the Southeast Asian experience, namely the evolution of a cooperative tradition between states in the region, coincides closely with established theories of regional cooperative security. Establishing political willingness—specifically realizing the existence of a shared threat, identification of their own inability to address that threat, establishment of


trust between neighbors through confidence building, and the gradual formation of increasingly complex, cooperative arrangements—was necessary for states in the region to reach the present level of cooperation. It is useful, therefore, to utilize this “model” to better understand the feasibility of similar arrangements in the Middle East.
III. PIRACY AND MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION

Piracy has long been a problem in the Malacca Straits, one of the busiest maritime shipping lanes in the world. Piracy has long been considered a domestic nuisance best handled by local governments. During the late 1990s, however, a significant increase in reported criminal and pirate attacks in the Straits brought the issue to the attention of the international community. Regional actors faced increasing pressure by the international community to take action to curb piracy. Despite some early efforts to do so, regional states were often unable and unwilling to act. It was not until 2004, after it became obvious that efforts had been insufficient to counter the economic and political effects of maritime violence in the Straits, that these states began to take concerted action.

These attempts took the shape of coordinated agreements, some operational in nature and others focused strictly on information sharing and administrative coordination. It is the overall effort that is widely credited by many for the recent reduction of maritime violence in the Straits of Malacca. As detailed in the previous chapter, this success, whether perceived or real, has been extensively cited as a template for cooperative action against pirates in the Gulf of Aden and West Indian Ocean.

This chapter provides context for further comparison of maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. It will first provide background on the steps taken by regional and extra-regional actors to counter piracy and the effect these steps have had on curbing the problem. It will end by summarizing the effect these steps

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have had on maritime security cooperation in the region, overall. It will argue that repeated attempts at cooperation on regional maritime issues have followed an evolutionary trend, establishing a tradition of cooperation within the region. This tradition was facilitated by a mutual understanding of the threat piracy posed, the realization that unilateral action was insufficient to address it, and the rejection of dependence on external assistance.

B. UNILATERAL EFFORTS AT REGIONAL COUNTER-PIRACY

Despite the increased awareness of the piracy problem in the Malacca Straits, little action was taken, initially, to reverse the trend. Regional responses to international pressure were limited in nature with the primary countries, Indonesia and Malaysia in particular, hesitant to take concrete action to stem the rise in attacks. To this effect, these three countries’ attempts at unilateral action were ineffective, as reported attacks in the Straits dipped slightly in 2002 but remained high for two more years (See Figure 2).

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Figure 2. Maritime Violence in the Malacca Straits (1998–2008)

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97 Figure 2 shows the number of actual or attempted piracy attacks in or around the Malacca Strait, an area that includes the Malacca Strait, Singapore Strait, waters of Indonesia and Malaysia. SOURCE: Figures were compiled from the ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report. UK: IMB, 1998 to 2009. Reports can be found at www.icc-ccs.org.
This second dip, observed near the end of 2004, was more likely the culmination of two key developments. The first of these was the realization by some of the regional actors that actions up to that point had proved ineffectual, a realization that led to greater unilateral actions. The second development consisted of greater regional cooperation, which will be discussed in a subsequent section. The primary cause of the ineffectiveness of these national efforts was the lack of maritime capacity, including a general lack of vessels to patrol the Straits and sufficient capability to conduct counter-piracy operations. In 2003 and 2004, the three countries—Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia—began to earnestly build their maritime capacity and integrate their maritime forces toward a more streamlined, focused force. The next three sections will briefly discuss the unilateral actions taken by Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia to counter maritime violence in the Malacca Straits.

1. Singapore

Singapore’s waters are often considered the safest in the region, partly because it invested heavily in its maritime forces, but also because it has far less water to control. More recently, Singapore has streamlined maritime security operations and decision making through the Maritime Security Task Force (MSTF). The MSTF’s role is to coordinate the activities of the Singapore port authority, coast guard and navy. Singapore maritime forces, overall, are significantly smaller than its neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia. This should have little overall effect, however, considering the area it must control, approximately 200 square nautical miles (NM). As of June 2009, the Singapore Navy consisted of approximately 4,500 personnel, 5 maritime patrol aircraft, 13 surface combatants, and 35 patrol vessels. The Police Coast Guard reportedly consists of approximately 1,000 personnel and over 100 patrol vessels.

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Singapore has actively advocated increased cooperation among regional actors. It has led in several attempts to increase situational awareness and information sharing through the formation of modern tracking and coordination centers. In fact, the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre and ReCAAP’s Information Sharing Center (ISC) are both located in Singapore, signaling the state’s willingness to lead cooperative efforts in the region. In 2007, the Singapore Ministry of Defence, announced the establishment of a new joint command center, the Singapore Maritime Security Centre (SMSC), which would also house an Information Fusion Centre (IFC) and a Multinational Operations and Exercise Centre (MOEC). The goal of the SMSC, according to the Defence Minister, was to provide a “useful platform for nations to cooperate and respond more flexibly and effectively to a dynamic maritime security environment.”

![Figure 3. Total Maritime Inventory in Southeast Asia (2009)](chart.png)

Figure 3. Total Maritime Inventory in Southeast Asia (2009)

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102 NOTE: Figure 3 shows the approximate number of maritime surface vessels including navy, coast guard, or other maritime service branch inventories of the states being compared. SOURCE: Figures were compiled from Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments for each of the states.
2. **Malaysia**

Malaysia’s position in the region produces more significant challenges than those that Singapore faces. With over 2,500 NM of coastline, the sheer size of Malaysia’s territorial waters poses a significant challenge to its limited maritime forces. Up until 2004, Malaysia did not possess the necessary ships and aircraft to unilaterally patrol the Straits or deter attacks against shipping, despite a sustained effort to build its capacity since 2000. The establishment of a dedicated anti-piracy task force within the Royal Malaysian Marine Police in 2000, which included the acquisition of 24 new patrol craft, was inadequate in addressing the shortfall. Soon after, Malaysian officials lamented that the Navy did not have adequate vessels to patrol their extensive territorial waters, regardless of promised aid by Indonesia.\(^{103}\) Professionalism has also been a problem for Malaysian authorities, with accusations of corruption, including extortion and piracy, common.\(^{104}\)

By 2004, Malaysia began to take concerted action to address its operational shortcomings, establishing the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA). The MMEA brought together Malaysia’s five maritime agencies into one organization with the goal of streamlining maritime operations in its waters. Finally launched in 2005, the agency sought to increase capacity through the refurbishment of existing vessels and the purchase of new patrol craft and helicopters.\(^{105}\) As of 2009, the MMEA consisted of approximately 5,000 personnel and 60 patrol vessels dedicated to counter-maritime violence operations. The Malaysian Navy was significantly larger, reportedly consisting of 20,000 personnel and 50 surface combatants and patrol craft.\(^{106}\)

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Malaysia has made recent efforts to increase its maritime capabilities, gradually accepting foreign assistance and procurement. In 2007, with the assistance of the United States, Malaysia initiated upgrades to its coastal surveillance systems and related command centers, to be completed in 2009.\textsuperscript{107}

3. Indonesia

With an even longer coastline than Malaysia, over 29,000 NM, Indonesia has had difficulty in adequately patrolling its waters. Indonesia did make efforts in 2003 to modernize its maritime forces and emphasized the role of these forces in combating maritime violence. These measures included the formation of regional control centers, with special counter-piracy units, to serve command and control functions.\textsuperscript{108} Like Malaysia, Indonesia established a combined maritime agency responsible for coordination among its six maritime agencies. The Indonesian Maritime Security Coordination Board (BAKORKAMLA) was institutionalized in 2005, and among other roles, is responsible for the coordination of maritime security activities and operations in Indonesian waters.\textsuperscript{109}

Despite efforts to streamline and coordinate their maritime capabilities, the Indonesian Navy has been unable to adequately address its material deficiencies. Efforts to increase the size of their fleet through both internal and external sources have been unable to adequately bolster the capacity.\textsuperscript{110} High-ranking navy officials publicly acknowledged their deficiencies in 2009, stating that they required another 262 patrol ships to adequately patrol Indonesian waters. As of September 2009, the Indonesian Navy


\textsuperscript{110} Beginning in 2003, the Indonesian Navy attempted to increase domestic production of coastal patrol craft and acquisition of foreign built vessels. “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Indonesia,” Jane’s Information Group, last updated September 2009.
boasted approximately 57,000 personnel (16,000 of which were Marine forces), over 30
surface combatants, and nearly 50 patrol craft. Compounding this shortage, only 25
percent of their 115 vessels can be considered serviceable, placing additional doubt on
Indonesia’s maritime capacity.\textsuperscript{111} The Indonesian government has also been willing to
accept limited external assistance. It has worked closely with the United States, for
example, to build its maritime capacity, with the United States providing equipment for
five coastal surveillance radars in the Malacca Straits.\textsuperscript{112}

C. BILATERAL COOPERATION AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

Most prohibitive to initial counter-piracy efforts in the region was the
unwillingness of regional actors to actively participate in cooperative arrangements or
accept foreign assistance. Such opposition was based on sentiments of national
sovereignty characterized by two key attributes: mistrust of their neighbors and fear of
foreign meddling. Many of the primary actors, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand, were sensitive to any infringement on national sovereignty by their neighbors,
specifically control over their own territorial waters.

Early attempts at cooperation among the regional actors highlight the inherent
difficulty in building cooperative relationships. Following the colonial periods of the 19th
and 20th centuries, the Southeast Asian states struggled to define themselves. National
boundaries, whether ashore or at sea, were particularly vexing. At any given time, one or
another state has been in conflict with another over the delineation of shared borders.
Usually, this was precipitated by aspirations to control strategic islands or natural
resources, disputes that became national priorities and sources of continued tension.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{111} “Navy Needs 262 More Warships to Safeguard Indonesian Waters,” \textit{Antara News}, September 18,
2007; Carolin Liss, “The Challenges of Piracy in Southeast Asia and the Role of Australia.” Both works
cited by Raymond, “Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Straits,” 36.

\textsuperscript{112} Ian Storey, “Calming the Water in Maritime Southeast Asia,” \textit{Asia Pacific Bulletin} 29 (February
18, 2009).

\textsuperscript{113} In its official white paper from 2003, Indonesia Ministry of Defence devotes an entire section to
outstanding and resolved territorial disputes with its neighbors, highlighting the importance of the issue,
both politically and culturally. MINDEF Indonesia, \textit{Defending the Country Entering the 21st Century},
Indonesian Ministry of Defence, 2003, 23. Also of great use to understanding the territorial issues of the
region is Vivian Louis Forbes book, \textit{Conflict and Cooperation in Managing Maritime Space in Semi-
This environment of underlying mistrust created serious impediments to cooperation between neighbors. With regards to maritime violence in the Straits, Malaysia and Indonesia viewed piracy as a domestic problem and stressed the importance of sovereign control over their territory, regardless of the Malacca Straits designation as an international waterway. Not surprisingly, when the regional states did begin to establish cooperative frameworks, they stressed the primacy of national rights, expressly prohibiting incursion into another nation’s waters, even in pursuit of criminals. Mechanisms to prevent such incursions, even in cases where forces were in “hot pursuit” of suspected pirates or criminals, have been carefully maintained in almost every agreement of the past three decades.

Despite their tendency to resist cooperation early on, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were eventually able to take steps toward limited bilateral cooperation. Prior to the rise of maritime violence in the late 1990s, there had been efforts between the individual states to increase cooperation in the maritime environment. Malaysia and Indonesia had established formal agreements on maritime cooperation as early as 1980. Other bilateral agreements for coordinated patrols had existed between the three countries since 1992. In that year, Singapore and Indonesia signed a cooperative agreement that established a direct communication link between naval counterparts in each country. Later that year, both countries agreed to coordinated patrols in the Straits, an agreement highlighted by the understanding that these patrols would call for assistance when pursuit into the other’s territorial waters was likely. Likewise, Malaysia and Indonesia formed a joint Maritime Operation Planning team to coordinate patrols in the Straits of Malacca in 1992 and conducted joint maritime exercises on the border the following year. Later in 2003, Malaysia renewed a standing bilateral agreement with Thailand for coordinated maritime patrols in the northern Malacca Straits. The limited success of those endeavors is obvious considering the subsequent rise in maritime violence in the region,

but such agreements were invaluable in the long-term. In fact, any steps toward cooperation, even those limited in nature, can be seen as precursors to further cooperation since an integral part of any such arrangement is sustained confidence in the motives of the other partners.\textsuperscript{118}

D. THE ROLE OF EXTRA-REGIONAL ACTORS

Just as suspicion between the states of the region had characterized their regional relationships, their reaction to offers of assistance by those outside the region hindered the success of maritime security efforts in the region. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, extra-regional actors, such as the United States and Japan, were eager to provide increased assistance for counter-terrorism efforts. United States and Japanese apprehension over what were considered substantial maritime vulnerabilities in the region motivated them to make forceful attempts at increasing coordination and cooperation in the region. Initial offers of foreign assistance were especially galling to Indonesia and Malaysia. These attempts provoked fear and suspicion among the regional states that external powers were attempting to gain power in the region at their expense. As a result, such “heavy handedness” was often rebuffed.

1. Japan

Japan had limited success in gaining consensus for maritime security cooperation in the region. As an extended member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN+3), Japan repeatedly proposed coordinated maritime patrols in the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits. First in 1997, it proposed the formation of a maritime security force with contributions from all the member nations. The Ocean Peace-Keeping (OPK) force was envisioned as a framework for maritime cooperation but was never embraced by the other members, especially China, who saw the proposal as an attempt to

\textsuperscript{118} In 2005, John Bradford, a U.S. naval officer, argued the importance of these nascent agreements toward later cooperative agreements. For more, see his article “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia.”
reestablish Japanese dominance over the region. Similar efforts to establish a regional coast guard in 1999 were unsuccessful, and in the end, produced agreements of little consequence.\footnote{119}

Japan enjoyed greater success when it focused on bilateral cooperation, however. Since the Cold War, Japan has conducted bilateral training exercises with most of the states in Southeast Asia, and Japan’s most successful attempts at fostering regional cooperation, ReCAAP, managed to promote discussion and limited information sharing, but have yet to convince critics of its effectiveness.\footnote{120}

2.  The United States of America

U.S. efforts to promote cooperative security were met with similar suspicion and often rejected outright. Overtures by the U.S. Pacific Commander to establish a Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in the Pacific were flatly rejected by Indonesia and Malaysia, both refusing to participate in the cooperative endeavor. Proposed in 2004, RMSI was designed to be a mechanism for maritime security cooperation and streamline counterterrorism efforts in the region. Intended to be completely neutral and voluntary, the initiative was doomed from the start, as unfavorable press led to misconceptions about its intent. Malaysia and Indonesia condemned RMSI as an attempt by the United States to control the sea-lanes of the region, an assault on their sovereignty.\footnote{121} Since then, the U.S. has avoided attempts at multilateral cooperation in the region, instead focusing on strengthening existing bilateral relationships with the individual states. These relationships have primarily consisted of two interrelated efforts: capacity building and training. By focusing on these areas, the U.S. has managed to alleviate regional fears while contributing to the effectiveness of counter-piracy and counter-terrorism efforts in the region.


\footnote{120}{Ibid., 76–77.}

\footnote{121}{Victor Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?” \textit{Naval War College Review} 61:1 (Winter 2008), 93.}
3. Regional Responses to Refocused International Assistance

Extra-regional actors, like the United States and Japan, learned quickly from regional reactions to their initial attempts, initiatives that were perceived by the states as heavy-handed and intrusive. Subsequent measures proved more successful, primarily due to their less threatening, less imposing natures. In this respect, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia made great strides toward accepting limited assistance from the United States, Japan, and other regional powers. Of the three, Singapore exhibited the greatest willingness to build cooperative relationships with such states. Heavily dependent on uninterrupted trade through the Straits of Malacca, Singapore has the most to lose if shipping is disrupted or diverted. Considering its reliance on maritime trade, Singapore was willing to cooperate extensively with international actors, including the U.S., Japan, and China, and accepted assistance in strengthening its maritime forces through training and technical assistance. Prior to 2000, Singapore was active in partnerships with several regional and extra-regional actors, including the United States, Japan, China, and as a member of ASEAN.

Indonesia and Malaysia have shown an increasing willingness to cooperate with international actors, if only in a limited fashion. Indonesia and Malaysia have accepted assistance from the United States and Japan in strengthening their counter-piracy capacity, primarily through training and the purchase of patrol ships. Since the late 1990s, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have all conducted bilateral naval exercises with the U.S., Australian, and Japanese navies. China has also recently increased its efforts at strengthening security cooperation in the region. Also of note is Indian involvement in the region. Coordinated patrols and bilateral naval exercises between India and most of the regional states have become routine and highlight India’s interest in expanding security cooperation to the peripheries of its historical area of operations.


Although most of the above mentioned efforts have been bilateral and limited in nature, their success is evidenced by the increased willingness of the states in the region to accept aid and cooperate more extensively with extra-regional actors. Initial attempts at assistance were perceived as heavy-handed and often rejected outright. The previous examples highlight the experience of these extra-regional actors and the difficulties of attempting arrangements without considering the sensitivities of the regional actors. After considering these examples, it can easily be seen that properly couched attempts to foster cooperative arrangements, such as those that build on previous agreements and offer guarantees of respect to national sovereignty, tend to be more successful. Ironically, it is such early, insensitive attempts that were likely the catalysts for future multilateral action by regional actors, primarily because they forced the states in the region to seek courses of action that were more sensitive to each other’s suspicions and prevented “meddling” by those outside of the region.

E. MULTILATERAL MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION

By 2003, it was evident that the various unilateral and bilateral efforts to counter maritime violence in the region were insufficient for the task. From 2002 to 2004, reported attacks actually increased, with many attacks taking place inside territorial waters.\(^{124}\) Realization of this trend and sustained pressure from the international community led to several attempts at increased security cooperation in the maritime domain.

1. Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols (MALSINDO)

The first of these multilateral attempts, the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols, often referred to as MALSINDO, was designed to coordinate maritime efforts by deconflicting patrol schedules, streamlining information sharing, and facilitating cross-

border communication in the Straits. As a part of this agreement, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia agreed to establish coordinated maritime patrols in the Malacca Straits in 2004 in an effort to prevent and deter further attacks. Interestingly, MALSINDO was essentially an evolution of existing bilateral agreements between the three partners that expanded the scope of these original relationships. Thailand later joined the organization in 2005. Although viewed by some critics as merely a “sharing of schedules,” MALSINDO arguably served as a step toward greater cooperation in the region.

2. **ReCAAP and the Information Sharing Centre (ISC)**

Another multilateral effort undertaken shortly after MALSINDO was the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP). ReCAAP was a result of successive cooperative agreements including national, bilateral and multilateral efforts by and between the states of Southeast Asia to curb rampant piracy and maritime terrorism in the Straits. Finalized by most members of ASEAN in 2004, the Japanese-led agreement established a network of regional centers providing information on attacks and partner actions to an Information Sharing Centre (ISC) centrally located in Singapore.

Heralded as the first successful multilateral agreement on maritime security cooperation in the region, its original members included Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, India, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Myanmar, Norway, the

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127 See Ho’s “The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,” for a detailed account of the unsuccessful efforts undertaken by individual states to combat maritime crime and piracy in their own waters, subsequent attempts at bilateral cooperation, and ultimately multinational efforts that culminated in ReCAAP. Ho, “The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,” in *Asian Survey*, 46:4 (July/August 2006): 558-574.

Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. By the end of 2006, nine more
nations had joined ReCAAP. ReCAAP’s goals were to facilitate the sharing of
information among members, collate and analyze data on maritime violence in the region,
and support regional capacity-building efforts.\textsuperscript{129} Despite initial success at formalizing
regional maritime cooperation and increasing support for capacity building, three
inherent flaws limited its success:\textsuperscript{130}

a. \textit{Non-Operational}: The organization has no operational role and
primarily serves as a framework for information sharing, essentially limiting the
effectiveness of any effort since operational forces are required to physically deter and
prevent attacks.

b. \textit{Non-Binding and Non-Obligatory}: ReCAAP’s non-obligatory
nature, although vital to bringing regional actors together, makes it merely a “paper
tiger,” with no authority to require sharing of information or coordination.

c. \textit{Absence of Key States}: Indonesia and Malaysia are not part of
ReCAAP, limiting the scope and legitimacy of the organization. Their absence can be
directly attributed to concerns regarding the agreement’s effect on national sovereignty.

Ironically, these weaknesses can be considered to have been intentional,
constituting an attempt to gain the most participation by couching the terms of the
agreement in a non-threatening manner. Without operational commitments or other
binding obligations, ReCAAP allowed members to participate at individual levels of
comfort, in effect creating a framework for cooperation for cooperation’s sake. Despite
these shortcomings, it is worthwhile to point out that ReCAAP did establish procedures
for coordination and information sharing between states in the region through the use of
regional centers and the Information Sharing Centre (ISC).

\textsuperscript{129} ReCAAP, “Factsheet on the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP),” Singapore Ministry of Transportation, April 20, 2006,

\textsuperscript{130} Ho, “Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia: Boosting ReCAAP’s Role.”
3. Joint Coordinating Council – MALSINDO Revamped

Arguably, more recent multilateral efforts have been more effective, continuing the success of MALSINDO. The first of these was the Malacca Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP). MSSP essentially revised the original MALSINDO agreement and was designed to facilitate coordinated patrols in the Straits of Malacca. Made up of the three original member countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore (with Thailand joining in 2008), MSSP was aimed at reducing maritime violence and smuggling in the Straits. The key to the success of this agreement was the limitation of naval patrols to their respective territorial water, thereby addressing fears of infringement on national sovereignty while increasing coordination between patrolling forces.131

The second of these efforts was the Eye in the Sky (EiS) program. Started in 2005, EiS consisted of coordinated air patrols of the Malacca Straits by maritime patrol aircraft from Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, in order to provide increased situational awareness of the maritime domain. EiS aircraft were allowed limited overflight of each other’s territorial waters, an ability provided by embarked Combined Maritime Patrol Teams (CMPT) that were made up of representatives from each member state.132

These two programs were brought together, along with the newly formed Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG), under the Joint Coordinating Council (JCC) in 2006. The role of the JCC was to coordinate maritime and air patrols of the three member countries (and later a fourth with the joining of Thailand in 2008).133 The IEG consists of the intelligence agencies of the participating countries and is tasked to provide analytical support for MSSP and EIS missions. Sharing of this intelligence is accomplished through

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133 Donald Urquhart, “Malacca Strait air and sea patrols brought under one umbrella,” The Business Times (Singapore), April 22, 2006; Zakaria Abdul Wahab, “Thailand Joins In The Patrol Of Malacca Straits,” Bernama, September 18, 2008 (translated text provided by BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political, BBC Worldwide Monitoring, September 19, 2008.)
the use of the Malacca Straits Patrol Information System (MSP-IS) and standardized by formal Information Sharing Procedures signed in 2009.\textsuperscript{134}

As a successor to MALSINDO, the JCC and its various parts were designed to build upon existing bilateral agreements and bolster its predecessor’s initial multilateral success. By increasing operational coordination, primarily through ensuring interoperability and formalizing intelligence sharing, the JCC was arguably more successful than ReCAAP and constituted a significant step towards greater security cooperation in the region.

\textbf{F. CHAPTER SUMMARY}

Efforts to counter piracy and maritime violence in the Straits of Malacca have constituted a lengthy process. Initial efforts to counter the rising trend were hampered by two factors: insufficient maritime capacity and lack of political will. The first directly impacted the ability of individual states to address the increase adequately. Without properly trained personnel or adequate vessels and aircraft, the states that control the Straits were unable to effectively counter maritime violence in their own waters. Further hampered by the regional economic collapse of the late 1990s, these countries were unable to finance the necessary improvements and additions to their maritime forces.

More important to the success of counter-piracy efforts was the role of bilateral and multilateral arrangements that enhanced maritime cooperation in the region. Such cooperative efforts were hindered more by lack of political motivation than by capacity. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore were initially reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements because of pre-existing mistrust and suspicion. The feared effect of such agreements on their national sovereignty caused concern and prevented early attempts at cooperation to counter maritime threats. Of particular concern was the continued sanctity of territorial waters. Indonesia and Malaysia were particularly sensitive to incursions by foreign forces into their waters, even in the case of “hot pursuit.” As a result, successful agreements over the past 30 years delineated the bounds of “hot pursuit” with regards to counter-piracy. This did not mean that cooperation was impossible. Several bilateral

\textsuperscript{134} Ho, “Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Lessons from the Malacca Straits,” 3.
relationships existed between individual states and between these states and extra-regional actors during this period. These relationships were useful for building trust between the states and provided useful opportunities to increase maritime capacity.

By 2003, the states in the region realized that greater action would be required, prompting attempts at increasing multilateral coordination. Because of these efforts, maritime violence in the Straits was on the decline by 2005. Reported attacks in that year dropped by over 60 percent from the year before and by half again in both 2007 and 2008.\textsuperscript{135} This decline cannot be solely attributed to recent multilateral efforts, but more appropriately to an accumulation of effort at all levels: national, regional, and international.

\textbf{a. National}

At the national level, regional actors took increasing steps to streamline coordination within their own services. As seen previously, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia drastically restructured their maritime agencies to improve cross-communication and increase counter-piracy efforts. In addition they all dedicated resources to increase their capacity through training and the acquisition of new equipment.

\textbf{b. Regional}

At the regional level, both bilaterally and multilaterally, they improved existing relationships with their neighbors, and established new relationships meant to strengthen the coordinated maritime effort. They increased coordination at the regional level and instituted cooperative frameworks that were acceptable to each partner.

\textbf{c. International}

States in the region slowly increased cooperation with extra-regional actors, focusing on limited assistance rather than integration. To do so, they accepted assistance in the form of financial aid, and increased training opportunities and equipment procurement programs.

By considering these factors, the success of maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia can be seen as an evolutionary process progressing from one level to another, eventually leading to its present, multilateral form. By simultaneously addressing issues of capacity and political will at varying levels, states in the region were able to increase their maritime capabilities and build confidence in each other. Through trial and error, regional actors gradually gained confidence in the intentions of their neighbors and developed boundaries regarding their relationships with extra-regional actors. Likewise, regional political sensitivities and reduced capacity required regional and extra-regional actors to reconsider their efforts and decide upon new courses of action. Although some critics question the effectiveness of recent agreements due to their limited nature, some attributing it to the economic and social effects of the 2004 tsunami or the resolution of political conflict within the states themselves, there has been an obvious downward trend in attacks in the Straits of Malacca in the last few years. The success of these efforts, no matter how limited, does provide an opportunity to compare such measures to those being taken in the Gulf of Aden and West Indian Ocean, and determine the applicability of the Southeast Asian model to the situation off Somalia.
IV. COUNTER-PIRACY IN THE GULF OF ADEN AND WEST INDIAN OCEAN

A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION

Although piracy in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) and West Indian Ocean shares many of the key causal factors and characteristics of piracy in Southeast Asia, it is drastically different. Resulting efforts to address it have been equally disparate. This chapter will highlight the steps taken by the international community, regional states, and the various factions controlling Somalia to combat piracy’s dramatic rise. It will begin by focusing on the various efforts to combat Somali piracy by national, regional, and international interests. This analysis will examine the unilateral measures undertaken by the different factions presently controlling Somalia and the effectiveness of their efforts. It will include a description of the actions taken by Yemen, a country that has a crucial role to play in preventing maritime violence in the GOA.

A description of international measures, multilateral, bilateral and unilateral in nature, will then be provided to illustrate the breadth of the counter-piracy effort in the region. Following this, the chapter will analyze the trans-regional and regional cooperative agreements that developed in response to piracy. In conclusion, it will provide analysis of the effectiveness of all these measures by examining the results of each and their effects on maritime security cooperation in the region. It will argue that besides the almost total absence of maritime security capacity in the region, specifically in the GOA, states in the region lack the internal and external mechanisms to address the issue of piracy. Distracted by more pressing internal issues, the states that border the GOA have insufficient “political will” to consider addressing it.

B. UNILATERAL EFFORTS AT REGIONAL COUNTER-PIRACY

Despite increasing international attention given to piracy in the region, national measures to counter the problem have been minimal. This is due primarily to the inability of key states in the region to exert control over the areas they claim. These states also happen to be the poorest in the region, lacking a formal economy, as in the case of
Somalia, or possessing relatively weak economies, as in Somaliland and Yemen. Without adequate financial resources or political legitimacy, these states have been unable to take effective action against piracy. The primary result of their financial and political woes has been the inability of these states, most obviously in Somalia but still evident in Yemen, to maintain sufficient security capacity on land, let alone at sea. As a result of these political and security weaknesses, pirates have been able to consolidate power and even expand their operations with little fear of retribution. It has been only recently that concrete action has begun to emerge in the region, as political developments within Somalia have started to rearrange the security outlook. This section will examine the capacity of these states to take action and provide a background on the actions they have taken, whether successful or unsuccessful.

1. Somaliland

Somaliland declared its autonomy from greater Somalia in 1991, shortly after the fall of the Barre regime. It currently functions as a separate state but lacks recognition by the international community, and thus is still considered, politically, to be part of the recognized Somali republic. Despite this, Somaliland has fared relatively well and is considered by many observers to possess a relatively stable government and security situation, the latter evidenced by the lack of piracy in its waters. However, further contribution to regional maritime security by Somaliland would be extremely difficult since the country receives little international assistance and has been forced to tackle the piracy problem using its existing, limited maritime capability.\textsuperscript{136}

The Somaliland Coast Guard reportedly has three small patrol craft left from the former regime and approximately 150 personnel.\textsuperscript{137} As late as May 2009, the Somaliland Coast Guard was actively pursuing pirates operating near their waters and despite the absence of specific piracy laws in its legal code, had convicted pirates to prison time.


Following these arrests, a Somaliland spokesman publicly stated that Somaliland was “committed to fight against pirates and terrorists,” but admitted that the state lacked the capacity to do so effectively.138

2. Puntland

Puntland has functioned as a semi-autonomous state since 1998, separate from the Somali Republic and the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Although not as politically and socially stable as its Somaliland neighbor, the Puntland government has provided relative peace and stability to the area it controls. Unfortunately, its government is notoriously corrupt with high-ranking tribal and government leaders rumored to have benefited from piracy, indirectly if not directly.139 Although not backed by substantive evidence, these rumors seem to hold some truth. Throughout the dramatic rise in attacks from 2008 to 2009, pirate groups were operating extensively from Puntland, calling into question the effectiveness and honesty of Puntland authorities.

Puntland’s political system is heavily influenced by clan dynamics. With three major clans and various sub-clans continuously vying for dominance in the region, Puntland’s government finds itself far more concerned with maintaining the balance of power through financial support of the various factions than countering piracy with an established maritime force.140

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Considering this conflict of interests, it is not surprising that Puntland’s indigenous maritime capability is virtually nonexistent. Realizing this limitation, the government of Puntland made efforts in the late 1990s to outsource maritime security. Although not widely known, these efforts to privatize maritime security off the Puntland coast were significant as they illustrated the willingness of Puntland officials to invest money in countering maritime violence and illegal fishing. From 1999 to 2008, the Puntland government made repeated attempts to contract its maritime security out to private security firms.141 Whether due to legal concerns regarding Puntland’s authority to enter into such agreements or reported corruption by the contractors themselves, these efforts were unsuccessful. The failure of these attempts further highlight the problem of legitimacy the Puntland government faced and could be partly attributed to corruption within the government itself.

Due to its lack of maritime capacity most of Puntland’s counter-piracy efforts have come on the land. In early 2000, the Puntland government dedicated some of its meager security forces to track down and arrest pirates operating within Puntland. Raids on known pirate havens were widely reported in the local press and provided local leaders opportunities to highlight the increased effort of Puntland forces.142 Publicly, Puntland officials condemned piracy and pledge to combat it within their borders.

141 Although difficult to trace, Puntland government attempts at solving their maritime security problems utilizing private security firms have been unsuccessful. In 2000, the Puntland International Development Corporation was contracted by the government to lead counter-piracy efforts off the coast. The PIDC turned to an established international security company, Hart Security, to fulfill the contract. Hart Security reportedly provided training and procured equipment, including locally acquired arms and a vessel, for a Puntland maritime security force of 70 men. Hart Security ended this effort in 2002 citing legal concerns about Puntland’s authority to honor the original contract. From 2002 to 2005, the government contracted the Somali Canadian Coastguard (SOMCAN) to establish facilities in Puntland. This contract was called into question after three of its employees were convicted as pirates in Thailand. In 2005, a Saudi-based firm, Al-Habibi Marine Service, was unable to even establish operations in Puntland.

However, Puntland authorities also realize that they lack the capacity to do so effectively and insist that international assistance through training and capacity building is necessary.143

More recently, Puntland initiated cooperative relationships with international forces operating in the region. NATO officials interviewed in September 2009 announced that cooperative patrols with Puntland security forces had been established along the Puntland coast. These patrols consisted of NATO vessels and aircraft with embarked Puntland security representatives, who were shown suspected pirate camps. Subsequent patrols reportedly showed that many of these camps had disappeared.144 These initial efforts also included official meetings between NATO operational commanders and Puntland security officials.145

The president of Puntland also met with EU representatives, in September 2009, to discuss increasing cooperation against piracy and human smuggling between the two entities. The two parties also discussed international assistance projects to address the economic and social issues in Puntland.146

3. Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia

The TFG acts as the internationally recognized government of Somalia and is based in Mogadishu. Although considered by the UN, and therefore most of the

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144 NATO officials heralded these initial cooperative steps with the local government as critical to effectively countering Somali piracy at its source, on land. These statements were made by Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, NATO Maritime Component Command Northwood, Commodore Hans Helseth (Norwegian Navy), at the Maritime Piracy Summit held in Vienna, Virginia, on 22–23 September 2009.

145 NATO commander have met several times with Puntland authorities to share information and discuss further cooperation. See the NATO MCC Web site for further information and official press releases, “NATO works with Somali officials,” NATO Operation Ocean Shield Web site, August 14, 2009; “NATO meeting with Puntland Regional Administration,” NATO Operation Ocean Shield Web site, September 11, 2009; “NATO works with Puntland authorities,” NATO Operation Ocean Shield Web site, September 24, 2009, http://www.manw.nato.int/page_operation_ocean_shield.aspx#NATO_works_with_Somali_authorities (all accessed October 30, 2009).

international community, as the legitimate government of the country and subsequently the beneficiary of most international assistance, the TFG exerts little control over government and security in Somalia. The TFG has been in constant conflict with other factions within Somali political society since its inception in 2002. Military intervention by the Ethiopians in 2007 and the African Union in 2008, prevented collapse of the TFG by pushing back more dominant groups, primarily radical Islamist groups such as the Union of Islamic Courts and Al Shabaab. Without support from these regional actors, the TFG would likely have been completely pushed out of the region.

Like Puntland, TFG security forces consist primarily of militia-like organizations with little formal training or coherent structure. Initially, little action was taken by the TFG to combat piracy, mostly due to the inability of the government to adequately police the few areas it did control. As with Puntland, these shortcomings were initially addressed by seeking assistance from private security firms.\(^{147}\) Also like Puntland, these efforts were unsuccessful and highlight the difficulties inherent in bilateral relations between the government and private companies.

In response to international pressure, TFG officials announced the formation and training of a new Somali Navy in 2008, with assistance from the international community.\(^ {148}\) The new maritime force reportedly consists of 500 personnel but no patrol craft, implying that the focus of the force will be to combat piracy on land rather than at sea. The legitimacy of this initiative, as well as the nascent Puntland effort, was strengthened tremendously in September 2009 with the announcement by the TFG that Puntland would be the home of the new Somali Navy. Additionally, Puntland was given the authority to enter into agreements with international actors on behalf of the Somali

\(^{147}\) In 2005, an agreement between the TFG and an American company, Top Cat, which highlighted the goal of targeting pirate mother ships, was blocked by the U.S. State Department as a violation of the arms embargo on Somalia. More recently, in 2008, a French company, Secopex, was contracted to provide maritime security for Somalia. Fulfillment of this contract reportedly hinges upon international financial aid. Middleton, “Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding local wars,” 11.

government. Overall, the agreement was a significant step toward national reconciliation and provided a framework for successive attempts at cooperation.149

4. Yemen

Although likely not directly involved with piracy, Yemen has still played a crucial role in the development and continuance of Somali piracy. The two countries share thousands of years of history, often depending on each other economically and socially. Trade between Yemen and Somalia has a tremendous effect on the economic and social situation of the population on both sides. Traditional trading partners, both countries have benefited from the flow of goods and people across the GOA for thousands of years. Somalis depend on the export of livestock through Yemen to the rest of the Middle East for their livelihood, trade that survived the collapse of the formal government in 1991. Besides the flow of legitimate trade, the nature of illicit trade better illustrates the social and economic relationship between the two countries. Yemen serves as the transit route for laborers seeking to find work in the Middle East, illustrated by reports of human smuggling between the two countries every day. Thousands of illegal immigrants are estimated to attempt the GOA crossing every year with the help of human smugglers and the tacit approval of corrupt Yemeni officials. Trade in qat, a mildly narcotic but extremely addictive plant, popular throughout the region but primarily grown in East Africa, also serves to connect the two countries.

Yemen itself is considered by many of its neighbors and the international community to be a haven for extremists and rife with corruption. Saudi Arabia, a country with a long and spotted history with Yemen, began building a concrete barrier along its border with Yemen to prevent smuggling and incursions by extremists. Over the past several years, Saudi Arabia has blamed the government of Yemen for allowing extremists to use Yemen as a base for operations against the Saudi kingdom. In late 2009 in particular, Saudi military forces even conducted cross-border operations into northern

Yemen to prevent incursions into the kingdom, and initiated a naval blockade of the eastern Yemeni coast to prevent the flow of weapons to the extremists.\textsuperscript{150}

Relations with its neighbor across the GOA, Eritrea, are also strained. Yemen opposed Eritrean independence from Ethiopia and each country backed opposing factions in Somalia in the mid 2000s, with Eritrea backing the UIC and Yemen backing the TFG.\textsuperscript{151}

Although active along the coast, especially around the port city of Aden, Yemeni maritime forces have proven to be ineffectual in controlling their own waters. The overall material readiness, training, and capacity of these forces is considered to be minimal and there has been no observed growth in personnel or platforms in recent years, despite continued international support. Yemeni maritime forces consist of approximately 3,000 personnel, split between navy, marines, and coast guard. The Yemeni Coast Guard consists of approximately 1,000 men and 40 patrol boats (four of which are coastal patrol craft).\textsuperscript{152} The Yemeni Navy consists of approximately 1,700 sailors and 500 marines. Its fleet consists of a corvette, three aging, fast attack missile boats, and over 30 patrol craft, most of which are considered to be non-operational or in poor repair. The newest of these are 10 patrol boats acquired in 2003 from Australia. Additionally, there have been reports of the Yemeni government agreeing to purchase several Russian fast attack patrol boats in 2009, but these vessels have not yet been delivered.\textsuperscript{153}

Yemen has benefited greatly from international support. The United States, France, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Italy have all initiated bilateral programs


aimed at building capacity, both maritime and ashore, and increasing capability through training and coordination. The following section will outline some of these initiatives in greater detail.

Despite the assistance of the extra-regional actors, Yemeni forces have been unable to stem the flow of illicit trade and maritime violence in the Gulf of Aden. Human smuggling and the qat trade continue to be a problem. Piracy only serves to further highlight their inadequacies, as the number of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden rose exponentially in 2008. Not only did the number of attacks rise, but also most took place on the Yemeni side of the GOA, prompting further criticism from the international community. Whether as a response to the drastic rise or to increasing international pressure, the Yemeni government announced the formation of a 1,600-man, 16-vessel, counter-piracy task force in 2008, charged to “enhance the protection of ships and stop Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Bab Al Mandab Strait.”154 The effectiveness of this measure and the resulting forces it constitutes has yet to be determined.

C. BILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE GULF OF ADEN

Cooperation between the affected countries has been nonexistent, a development that can be explained by considering the state of government control in the region. As discussed above, Somalia, and to lesser extent, Yemen, lack strong governments and security forces to provide political and social order. The failed state of Somalia, unable to control its own territory, is equally unable to operate outside its boundaries in an effective manner, lacking the political and diplomatic wherewithal to cooperate with external actors, even their own neighbors. Only recently have some of the actors within Somalia begun to move toward measures that allow for bilateral relationships outside the country. The development of cooperative arrangements between NATO and the governments of Somalia, both Puntland and the TFG, began in 2009, after political compromises between the two groups provided political and diplomatic space for such action. This allowed for

coordinated patrols between international naval forces and Puntland security forces and led to the establishment of a Somali Navy based in Puntland.

Yemen has exhibited the capacity to work bilaterally but lacks the resources and will to capitalize on these opportunities. Bilaterally, Yemen has been the most active state in the region. Yemen retains a close, if reluctant, relationship with the United States, a country that has made the small Arab state a priority in its counter-terrorism effort. Since the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and the terrorist attacks in 2001, the U.S. has dedicated millions of dollars to improve the capability of Yemen security forces both on land and at sea. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard maintain close relations with their Yemeni counterparts, conducting joint training exercises and maritime patrols with Yemeni maritime forces in the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the U.S. task forces concerned primarily with security in the Horn of Africa, assisted Yemen in establishing a dedicated CT unit and helped strengthen security along the coast. Even through 2009, when the overall ineffectiveness of Yemeni counter-piracy efforts was most evident, U.S. officials maintained that Yemen continued to be a key actor in preventing pirate attacks in the GOA.

Other international actors have attempted to bolster Yemeni maritime capacity. Australia reportedly sold ten fast patrol boats to Yemen in 2003, vessels reportedly delivered to the navy in 2005. In 2005, Yemen and France signed a formal agreement to train and equip Yemeni forces dedicated to patrolling the Bab Al Mandab, the strategic waterway connecting the Red Sea and GOA, an agreement that included installation of a surface search radar system along the Yemeni coast. Similarly, in 2007, Yemen signed a contract with an Italian firm to install a series of “radar and electro-optical sensor

surveillance” sites and operations centers along the coast in an effort to enhance its ability to monitor maritime activity in its waters.\textsuperscript{158}

Other states in the region are better positioned to cooperate with regional and extra-regional actors, but often fail to do so whether it is because of a lack of resources and capacity or political willingness to confront an issue that does not directly threaten their interests. Bilateral measures in these cases have been limited to agreements based on legal issues or limited maritime capacity building and coordination. Despite the limited nature of these agreements, their contribution to the counter-piracy mission in the region is evidenced by greater coordination and increased training support. As previously mentioned, Kenya has signed Memorandums of Understanding with extra-regional actors conducting counter-piracy operations in the region. These MOUs have served to legitimize these efforts by providing a venue for legal proceedings against captured pirates. Other East African nations have begun to join in the effort. In 2009, the Seychelles signed separate cooperative agreements with the United States, France, and the European Union allowing for coordinated naval operations between the actors.\textsuperscript{159}

\section*{D. INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS AT REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY}

Although far more robust and ambitious than the actions of the individual states and interests in the region, the international response to Somali piracy has produced little quantifiable success. Despite the dedication of dozens of warships to the region in 2008-2009, reported attacks in the GOA and West Indian Ocean actually increased through the first six months of 2009 (See Table 2). Successes initially attributed to the increased naval presence were later more appropriately attributed to changes in weather off the coast, as high seas and winds during the stormy seasons prevent most small craft activity off the eastern coast of Somalia. Conversely, the GOA is relatively protected during these periods, allowing for continued pirate activity throughout the year.


These initial failures were understandable considering the extent of the problem they were facing. With over 1,700 nautical miles of Somali coastline and 25 million square miles of ocean to patrol, even hundreds of vessels would have difficulty preventing pirate attacks.\textsuperscript{160} In contrast, by early 2009, there were only a few dozen warships in the region, all facing the daunting task of being everywhere at once.

There have been some successes, however. Some attempts at bilateral cooperation between states in the region and the international task forces patrolling the seas were successful. Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) between the international actors and regional states regarding prosecution and imprisonment of captured pirates illustrate such successes. Such MOUs provide legitimacy to the counter-piracy efforts of the EU, NATO, and U.S.-led forces by allowing for captured pirates to be tried and punished for piracy according to international law. More recently, attempts at bilateral cooperation between NATO and the Puntland government facilitate information sharing and allow for greater coordination between counter-piracy forces at sea and on land.

The following section will delineate the international response to Somali piracy, identifying the success or failure of these measures and describing the effect of each on maritime security cooperation in the region.

1. **European Union Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR)**

The European Union authorized deployment of a dedicated, counter-piracy task force to the GOA in November 2008. The political agreement called for voluntary allocation of naval forces from EU member states to conduct military operations against “acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.”\textsuperscript{161} Designated “Operation Atalanta,” this task force deployed to the region by December 2008 and initially consisted of approximately six naval warships and support vessels. Besides its overall counter-piracy mission, the EU task force is specifically mandated to escort UN World

\textsuperscript{160} From trusted discussions, in 2009, between the author and EU and NATO officers directly involved with counter-piracy efforts in the GOA.

\textsuperscript{161} “Council launches operation against piracy off the coast of Somalia (EU NAVFOR Somalia),” Council of the European Union, Press Release 16968/08, December 8, 2008.
Food Programme (WFP) vessels transporting WFP shipments into Somalia. Operation Atalanta was originally mandated to continue for one year but was extended until December 2010 in June 2009.162

EU NAVFOR Somalia primarily operates in the GOA and maintains the Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC); a designated transit route patrolled by EU vessels and coordinated by the Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa), MSCHOA. MSCHOA coordinates maritime traffic through the region and facilitates operations with the other task forces in the region using the MSC HOA Web portal.163

2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO commenced its counter-piracy mission off Somalia, Operation Ocean Shield, in August 2009. NATO commanders consider Operation Ocean Shield to be a continuation of previous NATO counter-piracy efforts in the region. The official goals of the task force are to:164

- Deter, disrupt and protect against attacks
- Actively seek and prevent further pirate activity
- Support development of regional maritime capacity
- Coordinate NATO operations with other maritime forces conducting counter-piracy operations in the region

Operation Ocean Shield is usually comprised of five to six NATO warships operating in the GOA and West Indian Ocean. Like EU NAVFOR Somalia, NATO disseminates information and facilitates coordination with the shipping industry and other task forces through a dedicated web portal, the NATO Shipping Center (NSC). As mentioned previously, in 2009 NATO commenced bilateral liaisons with the Puntland government to coordinate counter-piracy operations.

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163 See the Maritime Security Center, www.mschoa.org, for more information.

164 See Operation Ocean Shield at the NATO Shipping Centre Web site, http://www.shipping.nato.int/CounterPir, for more information.
3. **U.S. Responses and Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151)**

The U.S. Navy has been active off Somalia since 2005, whether monitoring the location of hijacked vessels anchored off the Somali coast or actively tracking and interdicting pirate skiffs or mother ships operating in the West Indian Ocean. Initially, particularly from 2005 to 2007, U.S. Fifth Fleet only dedicated a few warships at a time to conduct counter-piracy operations in the region. This limited response can be attributed to the low-profile nature of piracy at the time and the limited availability of coalition warships available for dedicated counter-piracy operations.

The dramatic rise of attacks in 2008 combined with the high-profile nature of some of these prompted a shift in U.S. policy. As attacks in the GOA and Indian Ocean become more high profile, the international media, and in turn, the general public, became more aware of the issue and international pressure for intervention began to grow. Of special importance were several events that illustrated the expansion of the pirate’s range and targeting: the hijacking of Le Ponant, a French luxury yacht; the Faina, a vessel loaded with Russian tanks; the Sirius Star, a Saudi supertanker carrying oil to the U.S.; and the hijacking of the Maersk Alabama, a Danish cargo vessel with an American crew. Unlike previous events, these attacks received extensive media coverage worldwide and subsequently initiated public dialogue on the issue.

The U.S. shifted forces to the region as a result of the public outcry, initially drawing from its counter-narcotics task force, CTF-150, to counter piracy off Somalia. This multinational task force consisted of several warships from the U.S., international and regional partners such as Pakistan, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Australia. In August 2008, Fifth Fleet also established the Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) in the GOA in an effort to coordinate counter-piracy efforts. Unfortunately,

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piracy continued to rise through the end of 2008 into 2009, despite Fifth Fleet's increased efforts and the simultaneous arrival of the EU and NATO task forces. In response to this failure, in January 2009, U.S. Fifth Fleet established a dedicated counter-piracy task force, CTF-151, to allow for simultaneous counter-piracy and counter-narcotic efforts in the region.166

CTF-151 is nearly identical in structure and composition to CTF 150, consisting of several coalition warships and support vessels. The initial task force deployed in early 2009 was comprised of six warships, U.S., British, Dutch, and Turkish in nationality. Over 20 other nations promised to provide warships for the task force.167 Since its inception, CTF-151 has operated primarily off the eastern Somali coast. Despite the formation of this dedicated task force and its subsequent success at capturing some pirates, piracy off the coast still continues primarily because of the previously mentioned problem of having too few ships to patrol such a large area.

4. United Nation Contact Group on Piracy off Somalia (CGPCS)

The CGPCS was established in January 2009 as a result of UNSCR 1851, in an effort to “facilitate discussion and coordination of actions among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia.”168 Since inception, the CGPCS has primarily served as a forum for international cooperation; to provide an opportunity for the international community to discuss increased naval coordination, promote preventative efforts within the maritime industry, facilitate legal solutions pertaining to captured pirates and increase the maritime capacity in the region. As of September 2009, 45 nations had participated in the CGPCS.169


The CGPCS is basically a diplomatic mechanism to increase awareness on the issues surrounding piracy off Somalia and provides opportunities for the international community to address these issues at a state-to-state level. However, due to its status as merely a forum for discussion, it lacks the political authority and legitimacy to bring about tangible measures toward regional coordination.

5. Other International Actions

Other international actors began to take action in 2008. Individual states began to deploy naval forces to the region in answer to UN calls for action. The first of these was the deployment of a Russian warship in September 2008.170 This vessel was soon followed by ones from China, India, and Iran, all countries that had rarely made such gestures before.171 All of these deployments continued and grew in size through 2009. Deployment of these forces serves to highlight the international response to what was previously considered a regional issue, best handled by those directly affected by the phenomenon.

E. TRANSREGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION

By 2003, it was evident that the various unilateral and bilateral efforts to counter maritime violence in the region were insufficient for the task. From 2002 to 2004, reported attacks actually increased, with many attacks taking place inside territorial waters.172 Realization of this trend and sustained pressure from the international community led to attempts at increased security cooperation in the maritime domain. For example, regional actors from across the Middle East and Northeast Africa met in Djibouti to discuss piracy off Somalia, including how best to counter the phenomenon through coordination and cooperation.

170 Mike Eckel, “Russia sends ship to Somali coast to fight piracy,” USA Today, September 26, 2008.


In January 2009, eight East African states, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, the Maldives, the Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and one Middle Eastern state, Yemen, signed the Djibouti Code of Conduct, an agreement designed to improve coordination of counter-piracy efforts in the GOA and East Indian Ocean. Led by the UN under the auspices of the IMO, the Code of Conduct affirmed the signatories’ commitment toward increasing regional cooperation against piracy, actively interdicting suspected pirate vessels, ensuring legitimate legal action is taken against captured pirates, and that captured pirates and victims are treated fairly and with due diligence. In order to facilitate effective information sharing, the Code called for the establishment of three regional information centers in Yemen, Tanzania, and Kenya.

In response to the signing of the agreement, the IMO Secretary General applauded the efforts of the signatories, highlighting the agreement’s similarities to the ReCAAP agreement in Southeast Asia, considering it a “starting point for successful cooperation and coordination in the region.” In fact, the Djibouti Code was based primarily on the ReCAAP agreement, another IMO-led endeavor. Like ReCAAP, the Djibouti Code serves as a basis for cooperation, but provides little authority or obligations to comply with its tenets.

F. MULTI-LATERAL MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE REGION

Regional attempts at multi-lateral cooperation have been equally slow-moving and half-hearted. As will be further discussed in Chapter IV, regional security cooperation does not have an impressive track record, consistently lacking the force that other attempts at cooperation such as the economy and identity protection elicit.

In June 2009, several Middle Eastern Arab states met to discuss a proposed Arab counter-piracy task force. Representatives from Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

attended the meeting. Participants stressed their concerns regarding piracy in the region and its affects on maritime shipping. Saudi Arabia agreed to lead coordination efforts between the Arab participants and other international naval forces operating in the region.174

Later, in October 2009, naval representatives from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) along with other Arab countries on the Red Sea decided to form a joint naval task force “aimed at combating piracy and guaranteeing…safety…” in the Red Sea. A Saudi representative affirmed that the mission of the task force was to prevent the spread of piracy outside of the Gulf of Aden and coordinate more effectively with international naval forces operating in the region.175

These announcements were followed by little concrete action. As of November 2009 there had been no measurable movement toward a cooperative security framework between the Arab states in the region. It is possible, however, to compare these initial steps, those promised during the Djibouti Code of Conduct and Arab Task Force meetings, to those of the nascent ReCAAP and MALSINDO members in the early 2000s, where public statements and formal agreements were ultimately succeeded by concrete efforts toward maritime cooperation and coordination. However, it may be too soon to tell if the Arab task force will enjoy the level of success its Southeast Asian counterpart has attained.

G. CHAPTER SUMMARY

As described in this chapter, Somali piracy has garnered tremendous attention since 2008. The dramatic rise in pirate attacks and the pirates’ focus on larger, more valuable targets brought an old problem to the attention of the international community. As in other regions plagued by maritime violence and piracy, the waters surrounding Somalia provide ample opportunities for such attacks and lack strong national governments able to fully control the seas. These similarities provide observers with


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obvious corollaries when it comes to solutions for piracy, as well. The most obvious of these was discussed in the previous chapter: counter-piracy efforts in Southeast Asia.

The ineffectiveness of recent counter-piracy efforts in the GOA further enhanced the scrutiny of experts searching for an effective solution. International steps, including the deployment of dozens of naval warships from the international community, have proved largely ineffective, especially considering the continued rise in attacks following their arrival. EU, NATO, and U.S.-led task forces failed to reduce the number of attacks.

National unilateral efforts have also proved ineffectual, hampered even more by a lack of political cohesion and capacity than the Malacca Straits countries. Somalia is considered a failed state with existing ruling groups unable to prevent piracy. Puntland and the TFG both lack the political legitimacy and security capacity to effectively prevent maritime violence originating from the areas they control. Yemen rivals its neighbor’s lack of control, proving repeatedly that it is unable to prevent illicit traffic, let alone heavily armed pirates, off its shores.

Therefore, as in Southeast Asia, counter-piracy in the region is hampered by two key limitations: lack of political will and maritime security capacity. As has been illustrated by the cases of the various regions of Somalia and its neighbor, Yemen, lack of political will in their cases can better be understood as a lack of political effectiveness and highlighted by an inability to effectively control its territory ashore. Their maritime capacities are equally ineffective, further exacerbating their lack of control and making them unable to prevent pirates from using their waters to launch attacks. Considering their ineffectiveness, it is understandable that the international community would seek solutions that bypass or mitigate the weaknesses of these states.

While the general metrics described above make Somalia and its neighbors’ case similar to Southeast Asia, it is the development of regional cooperative frameworks that sets them apart. Regional cooperation in MENA, unlike Southeast Asia, has been almost nonexistent, with most efforts seen as token gestures rather than sincere attempts at cooperation. The most publicized of these is the Djibouti Code of Conduct agreement, signed by several states in the region, and considered to be the first step toward a regional
cooperative framework like ReCAAP. More recently, some of the Arab states agreed to form an Arab counter-piracy task force to protect their interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Both of these measures are laudable attempts at building confidence and consensus. However, they merely highlight their ineffectiveness by providing an opportunity to make half-hearted commitments that are not intended or able to be fulfilled due to a lack of political will and maritime capacity.

International efforts aimed at preventing attacks at sea have been equally ineffective, as can be seen by the continued rise in attacks through 2009. It can be argued that any successes at preventing or deterring attacks can best be attributed to maritime industry measures rather than naval warships patrolling the waters off Somalia. Granted their presence is a deterrent, but as they have shown before, Somali pirates can quickly adapt to new situations.

The most effective measures have been those taken by international forces to support and cooperate with the various interest groups within Somalia, specifically the semiautonomous government of Puntland and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and with Yemen. These measures, consisting of support for increased maritime capacity and greater cooperation between counter-piracy forces, address the concerns of some that international patrols alone cannot prevent piracy, that states in the region must take action to counter piracy. Somalia and Yemen, however, have an excuse for depending on external assistance. They lack the internal and external stability necessary to facilitate both unilateral and cooperative maritime security efforts, an excuse their Gulf neighbors do not have.
V. THE MIDDLE EAST AND MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION

A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION

This chapter will provide an overview of security issues within the Middle East and include a background on maritime capacity and a summary of factors related to security cooperation between states in the region. It will first outline the maritime capacity of the remaining states in the region. By focusing on the states of the Persian Gulf, specifically Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar, it will illustrate the relative capabilities and condition of their maritime forces. This will include discussion of their primary roles, numbers of platforms and personnel, material condition of their vessels, training and capability of their personnel, and the relative mission proficiency of their forces. The second section of this chapter will discuss the factors that affect cooperation in the region, such as internal stability, external friction, and foreign dependence. The final section will quickly examine how these factors have affected security cooperation in the region using the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as an example.

B. MARITIME CAPACITY IN THE GULF

Maritime capacity in the region can be best described by dividing the Gulf states into two distinct groups: regional powers and small regional actors. Those in the first group, Iran and Saudi Arabia, possess large populations and enjoy steady streams of income from petroleum and natural gas exports, allowing them to maintain much larger standing militaries than their smaller neighbors. Those in the second group are significantly smaller, enjoy varying levels of income from oil and gas, and depend more heavily on external protection. As can be expected, the regional powers are able to allocate more resources, financially and in terms of manpower, to building and maintaining their maritime forces (See Figure 4). Equally predictable is the inability of many of the smaller states to adequately man, equip, and train their own forces due to
financial constraints or relatively low populations. Some of the smaller states, such as UAE and Oman, have built modern maritime forces but lack sufficient manpower resources from which to draw personnel.

Figure 4. Total Maritime Inventory of the Gulf States (2009)\textsuperscript{176}

Issues of priority also affect maritime capacity in the region. As will be discussed in more depth in the subsequent section, external security has often been superseded by internal stability when regimes consider allocation of resources. This has been further exacerbated by the tendency of states in the region to rely on external security assistance and assurances for their external security needs. By allowing outside interests, primarily the United States in this case, to bear the burden of regional security, states in the region have been free to focus their attention and resources on building their internal security forces and bolstering internal mechanisms of control. The nature of maritime capacity in

\textsuperscript{176} NOTE: Figure 4 shows the approximate number of maritime surface vessels including navy, coast guard, or other maritime service branch inventories of the states being compared. SOURCE: Figures were compiled from Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments for each of the states as well as Anthony H Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan’s book, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars.
the Gulf, especially, is significantly affected by their choice to rely on external protection and focus on maintaining their internal power base. The following sections will provide further background on the capabilities and limitations of each state.

1. Regional Powers

a. Iran

Iran depends on its maritime forces to protect the vital interests of the state. For this reason, modernization of the Iranian Navy and its irregular “partner,” the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Naval Forces, has been a priority for the regime over the past few decades.177 This attention has allowed the service to enjoy an advantage over its counterparts in the region (See Figure 4). Its maritime capacity has increased significantly over the past few decades, both in capabilities and platforms. The Iranian Navy (IRIN) has 18,000 personnel (including approximately 2,600 marines and 2,600 in naval aviation), six large surface vessels (four frigates and two corvettes), almost 150 coastal patrol craft of varying sizes, 13 amphibious ships, and 26 logistic/supply ships. It also has passable maritime patrol capability with approximately 11 fixed wing patrol aircraft, including three aging P-3 Orion's, and over 27 rotary wing aircraft of various models.178 Unlike the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Naval Forces (IRGCN), which will be further described later, the IRIN serves as Iran’s “regular” naval force, under control of the civilian government, with the mission of protecting the Iranian coast, especially its ports and vital petroleum infrastructure.179

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Naval Forces (IRGCN) is a separate maritime force from the regular navy. The primary mission of IRGCN is defense of the Iranian coast and its waters. It controls coastal defense batteries all along the coast, especially in the Strait of Hormuz (SOH), the only sea-lane into the Gulf. It also has an

177 “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Iran,” Jane’s Information Group, last updated June 2009.
important irregular warfare function and trains to conduct guerrilla-type missions, such as covertly laying mines and attacking maritime traffic off the coast.\textsuperscript{180} As its name indicates, the IRGCN is closely associated with the theocratic leadership of the Iranian government, serving as protector of the “revolution” within Iran. The IRGCN consists of 20,000 personnel, including approximately 5,000 marines. It has an extensive surface fleet, fielding over 140 coastal patrol craft of varying size and capability.\textsuperscript{181} Other maritime forces can be drawn from Iranian border and security forces numbering between 40,000 and 60,000 personnel, with approximately 130 small patrol craft.\textsuperscript{182}

Operationally, Iranian maritime forces tend to remain within or near Iranian waters due to their limited expeditionary capabilities and the nature of their defensive mission. With the exception of submarine exercises conducted regularly in the deeper waters of the Gulf of Oman, Iranian maritime forces conduct regular deployments within the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman, staying relatively close to land for limited periods of time.\textsuperscript{183} Recent exceptions to this tendency can be seen in Iranian efforts to contribute to counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden (GOA). In May 2009, two Iranian naval vessels were dispatched to conduct anti-piracy patrols and escort Iranian merchant vessels in the GOA. These patrols have continued through early 2010 and have reportedly remained independent from other forces operating in the GOA.\textsuperscript{184}

\textbf{b. Saudi Arabia}

Saudi Arabia occupies a strategic position between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, which allows it unique control of the approaches to the region’s three vital waterways: the Suez Canal, the Bab-al-Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. Also, as the

\textsuperscript{180} Cordesman et al., \textit{Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars}, 359.
\textsuperscript{181} IISS, “Chapter Five: The Middle East and North Africa,” 252.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 253.
\textsuperscript{183} “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Iran,” 96.
predominant military force on the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia provides a counterpoint to the Islamic Republic of Iran, in effect shielding the smaller Gulf states from Iran’s influence and potential aggression.\textsuperscript{185} Its navy is the second largest in the region, behind Iran, with approximately 15,500 personnel and 44 surface vessels.\textsuperscript{186} Its surface fleet consists of 11 large surface combatants, approximately 65 coastal patrol craft, and five support vessels.\textsuperscript{187} The Saudi Navy has a substantial naval rotary wing force of approximately 44 attack and support helicopters but lacks a fixed wing maritime patrol force.\textsuperscript{188} The Saudi Navy’s primary roles are protection of the Saudi coast and maintenance of free navigation through the SOH, the latter role putting it into direct opposition with Iran.\textsuperscript{189}

The Saudi Navy has a relatively modernized force, having made great strides over the last decade in procuring new platforms and equipment. Its three newest surface combatants, \textit{Al-Riyadh} class frigates, are modified French \textit{Lafayette} warships, a sophisticated and effective design. However, these efforts at increasing its effectiveness have been hampered by poor training and readiness.\textsuperscript{190} Although considered “blue-water capable” by some, the Saudi navy has not shown a desire to utilize its forces in a “power projection” role. It does operate as a “two-sea force” with forces operating independently in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.\textsuperscript{191} The Saudi navy, specifically the Gulf “fleet,” has made “significant progress” recently, according to some experts, although these experts point to the Red Sea “fleet” as a “work in progress.”\textsuperscript{192}

Of note is the maritime contingent of the Saudi Border Guard, which functions under the Ministry of the Interior. The Border Guard is comprised of

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\item \textsuperscript{185} Cordesman et al., \textit{Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War}, 163–165.
\item \textsuperscript{186} “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Saudi Arabia,” \textit{Jane’s Information Group}, last updated December 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{187} “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Saudi Arabia.”
\item \textsuperscript{188} Cordesman et al., \textit{Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War}, 200–203.
\item \textsuperscript{189} “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Saudi Arabia.”
\item \textsuperscript{190} Cordesman et al., \textit{Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War}, 199–203.
\item \textsuperscript{191} “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Saudi Arabia.”
\item \textsuperscript{192} Cordesman et al., \textit{Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War}, 199.
\end{itemize}
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approximately 30,000 men, although it is difficult to determine how many function in a maritime role. Its fleet includes over 60 patrol craft of various sizes and capabilities. The Border Guard is tasked with protecting key infrastructure along the coast, including plants, ports, and oil facilities.193

2. Small Regional Actors

a. United Arab Emirates

Situated on the southeastern side of the Persian Gulf, the United Arab Emirates are naturally juxtaposed to Iran, both physically and politically. UAE has longstanding disputes with Iran over key islands in the Strait of Hormuz, which influence its relations with the country. It also has “close military ties” with the United States and Great Britain and offered assistance during the buildup to the Iraq war, despite the personal misgivings of UAE leadership.194

The UAE Navy is small but modernized and well trained. Presently designed for coastal defense, it consists of 2,400 personnel, two frigates, two corvettes, eight fast patrol craft, 26 small patrol craft, 28 amphibious landing craft, and no dedicated support vessels. Its aviation wing consists of 14 maritime attack and four maritime surveillance helicopters,195 providing it a substantial over-the-horizon capability most of its peers lack. The UAE Border and Coast Guard directorate is part of the UAE armed forces and consists of approximately 10,000 personnel, although not all of these are maritime related, and over 128 patrol craft of various sizes and capabilities. The role of the coast guard is to prevent smuggling and illegal immigration along the coast.196

Although historically a largely coastal force, the navy has begun to expand its role to include blue-water capability, envisioning its forces able to “conduct and sustain operations throughout the Gulf region, the Arabian Ocean, and as far as the Red

193 Cordesman et al., *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War*, 204.
194 Ibid., 284.
The navy has begun to modernize and expand its fleet accordingly by increasing acquisition through foreign procurement and domestic shipbuilding. This expansion has been hindered, however, by manpower shortages, a problem within the military as a whole. The resulting reliance on foreign expertise and manning reduces the overall effectiveness of an otherwise capable force, according to critics. As a whole, the UAE Navy is more formidable than those of the smaller Gulf countries but smaller than those of Iran and Saudi Arabia.

b. Bahrain

Bahrain is a small, yet strategically located country. It is situated on the western side of the Persian Gulf between some of the regions key offshore oilfields. Bahrain lacks the natural resources of its neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, depending on regional trade and finance to drive its economy. Because of this, the primary function of the Bahraini maritime forces, its navy and coast guard, is defense of the sea-lines of communication and protection of the country’s maritime boundaries against piracy, illegal smuggling, and illegal fishing.

The Royal Bahraini Navy is small compared to those of Saudi Arabia and Iran, but closely matches the forces of its regional peers (see Figure 4). As of June 2009, it consisted of approximately 1,000 sailors, three surface combatants (one frigate and two corvettes), eight fast patrol craft, five amphibious ships and one support vessel. Unlike

197 “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – United Arab Emirates;” Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 306.
199 Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 302, 306.
200 The Bahraini Coast Guard is small, with approximately 260 personnel and 22 patrol craft. Officially under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, the coast guard has a similar goal of preventing illegal activities within Bahraini waters and would become subordinate to the navy during wartime. “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Bahrain,” Jane’s Information Group, last updated June 2009, 38, 52–53.
201 Ibid., 52–53.
202 “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Bahrain,” 52.
its neighbors, the Bahraini fleet is in good material condition and considered “fully combat capable.”

Although small, it is efficient, relatively well trained and equipped, though dependent on foreign expertise to maintain its more modern systems. According to Jane’s Sentinel, the Bahraini Navy has made recent efforts to address this shortcoming by increasing the technical expertise of its personnel.

Operationally, the Bahraini Navy is no match for larger naval forces in the region; however, according to most experts, it should be able to defend Bahrain’s port until the arrival of foreign assistance. Understandably, it has not contributed to international maritime operations, such as recent counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, but has been part of cooperative patrols within the region. In 2008, for instance, a Bahraini admiral commanded Combined Task Force 152 (CTF-152); a U.S. Navy Central Command-initiated task force that coordinates cooperative exercises and patrols in the Persian Gulf. Due to its limited reach and capability, Bahrain depends heavily on foreign assistance for its security.

c. Kuwait

Surrounded by larger neighbors, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, Kuwait occupies a strategic location in the northern Gulf. It has a troubled history with its neighbors, most recently illustrated by the Gulf War invasion in 1991. Kuwait depends on its vast oil reserves, most of which are located on land, but a significant proportion located within Kuwaiti waters. The main role of the Kuwaiti Navy, therefore, is the protection of Kuwaiti interests at sea, to include protection of Kuwait’s major ports and

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203 Cordesman et al., *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War*, 77.
204 “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Bahrain,” 52.
205 Cordesman et al., *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War*, 77; “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Bahrain,” 52–53.
206 “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Bahrain,” 53.
208 Cordesman et al., *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War*, 77; “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Bahrain,” 52–53.
offshore oil facilities. It operates extensively with the U.S. and British forces and both states have used Kuwaiti ports to supply their forces in Iraq.209

Like its Bahraini counterpart, the Kuwaiti Navy is small, comprising only 2700 personnel, 500 of which are part of the Kuwaiti Coast Guard.210 Its fleet is small and less advanced, consisting of eight large patrol craft, three amphibious craft, and two support vessels.211 The material question of these vessels is questionable, as well. The Kuwaiti Navy suffered greatly during the Gulf War and has received very little support since.212 The Kuwaiti Navy serves primarily as a coastal defense force that augments the Kuwaiti Coast Guard with border and customs support. Kuwaiti maritime forces patrol extensively in their own waters and have even participated in coordinated patrols protecting Iraq’s oil transfer facilities, but they seldom operate outside of these areas. As a result, Kuwait has not contributed to international maritime operations, such as those being conducted in the Gulf of Aden, and would be unable to resist aggression from any of its larger neighbors.213 To do so, Kuwaiti forces would require extensive assistance from international partners, such as the United States and Great Britain.214

d. Oman

Its location on the eastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula provides Oman with the opportunity of strategic control of the southern approaches to the Persian Gulf. Its coastline extends over 1,000 nautical miles (NM) from the Strait of Hormuz, through the Gulf of Oman, and into the Gulf of Aden. Oman shares control of the Strait of

210 The Kuwaiti Coast Guard is also small, consisting of approximately 500 personnel and 35 patrol craft. It belongs to the Ministry of the Interior and is tasked with controlling the maritime borders of Kuwait. Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 102.
211 “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Kuwait.”
212 “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Kuwait.”; Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 101.
213 “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Kuwait.”; Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 103.
214 “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Kuwait.”
Hormuz with Iran, a position that naturally places them at odds with the Islamic Republic in most cases. Its long coast and strategic location have ensured that the Royal Navy of Oman (RNO) maintains a high priority.215

The RNO has approximately 4,200 personnel, two surface combatants, four large patrol craft, eight small patrol craft, six amphibious vessels, and four support vessels. Relatively well trained and equipped, the Omani navy’s role is protection of the Strait of Hormuz and coastal defense. Their main adversary in this respect is Iran. Due to the lack of mine and anti-submarine platforms, it is not expected to fare very well in direct conflict with Iran. As a result, the RNO depends heavily on U.S. and British assistance.216

e. Qatar

Strategically located in the center of the Persian Gulf, Qatar shares a border with Saudi Arabia and natural gas resources with Iran. The Qatari Navy is small and, like most of its counterparts, designed solely for coastal defense. It is comprised of 1,800 personnel, four patrol ships, three missile patrol boats and more than 20 small patrol craft.217 It depends heavily on security assistance from the United States and hosts a large U.S. headquarters on its soil.218

C. FACTORS AFFECTING GULF SECURITY COOPERATION

As discussed in Chapter I, efforts at cooperative security are heavily influenced by internal and external factors. Such efforts in the Middle East, and the Gulf region in particular, are characterized by four factors: preoccupation with internal stability, unresolved animosity between Arab states, Arab fears regarding Iran, and reliance on foreign security assistance. The following sections will provide background on each to more fully explain the environment in which recent cooperative efforts have begun.

215 Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 132.
216 Ibid., 133–134.
218 Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 153.
1. **Internal Stability Versus External Security**

States in the region are obsessed with control and their priorities reflect these concerns. All of the Gulf states depend on varying levels of political and social control to ensure their positions of power. Such control is especially important to states in the region because their power is based on their ability to keep the population satisfied. Although most of the states in question are nominally “democratic,” they depend on fundamentally autocratic methods of control. Legitimacy with their populations depends on their ability to balance public sentiment. Maintaining this balance has become increasingly difficult in the past few decades, primarily because of increasingly disruptive socio-economic and political trends. Dramatic population growth, stagnant economic markets in the region, and increased exposure to the rest of the world have created instability within the region and made control difficult.\(^{219}\)

The situation is further complicated by cultural sentiments. Although economic and social globalization have led many in the region to question the legitimacy of governments unable to provide a higher standard of living for its people, other factors hinder efforts to address these grievances. To many religious leaders, and thereby large segments of the population, liberalization is a corruptive force. Globalization, and the inherent liberalizing effects it entails, threatens the cultural and religious norms, producing a source of opposition to any associated measures. Religious and societal leaders, alike, perceive globalization as a corruption of traditional life, while political leaders understand that economic success requires modernization. Therefore, political leaders in the region must consider the political effects of liberalization and balance accordingly. Too much freedom may threaten their position of power, allowing opposition to grow in strength and influence. Too little freedom could increase dissent or further stagnate their economies.

Regimes in the region depend on two types of control, which will be briefly discussed here as the “carrot” and the “stick.” The “carrot” refers to measures designed to

make the population loyal to the regime. In the Middle East, and the Gulf states especially, regimes depend on incentives to maintain power. The Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, depend mostly on familial or tribal connections for legitimacy, and work diligently to satisfy their supporters and population through patronage or rents. Patronage, in this case, consists of supplying supporters with employment in positions of power within the government or military to ensure their support. Rent or the rentier system, implies using government revenue to provide its citizens with income, social benefits, or both. In the case of most of the Gulf countries, these systems ensure that those who could most directly threaten their control are beholden to the regime.

When these methods fail to ensure support or only partially do so, regimes must look to the “stick” to discourage or prevent dissent. The “stick” for most regimes is their internal security services. When dissent does occur, it is these forces that protect the regime. Accordingly, states in the region invest heavily in their internal security, reasoning that external security is worthless if they are no longer in power. When the “carrot” fails to entice or maintain loyalty, then the “stick” enforces it by stifling or de-incentivizing dissent.

In their preoccupation with internal stability, trying to balance support and dissent naturally draws financial and manpower resources away from external security. Additionally, it de-emphasizes the importance of cooperation. As regimes look inward, they tend to discount external assistance, perceiving such as a sign of weakness that could affect their internal stability. Recent drops in oil prices will only exacerbate decisions for states in the region, as similar drops affected spending in the previous century. Decreasing income from petroleum and natural gas will undoubtedly require states to decide between internal stability and external security.

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2. **The Issue of Neighbors**

As in most areas of the world, relations between neighboring states in the Gulf have been historically strained by suspicion and animosity. Longstanding border disputes between neighbors have been especially troubling in the Gulf, as most states have experienced conflict over the definition of shared boundaries, ownership of strategic islands, and the rights to natural resources.\(^{221}\)

_Saudi Arabia_ – The Saudi regime considers itself a regional power and has made significant efforts to exert influence over the region. It views itself as the natural balance to Iranian influence in the region and, therefore, often finds itself at odds with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Relations with its Arab neighbors in the Gulf have also been influenced by this view, as has been illustrated by its attempted dominance over most cooperative efforts in the region. Saudi Arabia has been especially dissatisfied with efforts by its smaller neighbors to seek external assistance as such efforts tend to erode Riyadh’s influence in the region.\(^{222}\) It has also been critical of efforts between some of these same neighbors to cooperate on energy issues. Discussions between Qatar, UAE and Oman, on establishing a combined natural gas infrastructure, are perceived by Saudi Arabia as a threat to its influence in the region. Plans for the sub-regional grid include a proposed pipeline that would allow the smaller states to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, thereby lessening the influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia on energy trade.\(^{223}\) These recent events have only exacerbated standing border disputes between Saudi Arabia and UAE.\(^{224}\) Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Yemen continue to face-off over the flow of terrorists, weapons, and drugs from Yemen to Saudi Arabia.\(^{225}\)

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\(^{222}\) Cordesman et al., *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War*, 312.


\(^{224}\) Cordesman et al., *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War*, 273.

\(^{225}\) Ibid., 244
**United Arab Emirates** – UAE has few standing issues with its Arab neighbors. A border dispute with Oman was apparently resolved in a 2003 agreement.\(^{226}\) Along with the disputes with Saudi Arabia mentioned above, UAE has continuing disputes with Qatar and Iran over islands in the Gulf.

**Bahrain** – Bahrain has relatively good relations with its Gulf neighbors. Its most recent dispute was with Qatar over Hawar Island, but this was settled in international court in 2001.\(^{227}\) Most concerning to Bahrain are its relations with Iran, which will be discussed in the next section.

**Kuwait** – Kuwait has recently begun to normalize relations with Iraq, but it is hard to imagine trust between the two following the Iraqi invasion in 1990. Kuwait has normal relations with Saudi Arabia, but the two countries still share a neutral zone established after World War II as a result of Saudi aspirations to invade the Kuwaiti kingdom. Oil and gas fields shared with Saudi Arabia and Iran provide additional sources of potential conflict.\(^{228}\)

**Oman** – Oman has no “pressing border disputes” but it does have a history with Saudi Arabia and UAE, as discussed in a previous section. Although relations with Yemen are currently good, the former state of South Yemen did provide support to insurgents within Oman during the 1960s and 70s.\(^{229}\)

**Qatar** – Besides the disputes mentioned above, relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia have recently soured. The Saudi regime is often critical of the Qatari news channel, Al Jazeera, which they claim purposefully portrays the Saudi regime unfavorable.\(^{230}\)


\(^{227}\) Cordesman et al., *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War*, 81–82.

\(^{228}\) Ibid., 87–88.

\(^{229}\) Ibid., 121, 513–515.

\(^{230}\) Ibid., 312.
Yemen – Has fought border wars with Oman and Saudi Arabia. Former South Yemen supported insurgents within Oman during the 1960s and 70s. Saudi Arabia still views Yemen as a security risk due to the flow of weapons, drugs, and extremists from Yemen into the Saudi kingdom. Civil unrest within Yemen in 2009 renewed this animosity and prompted Saudi Arabia to deploy land and naval forces to the border.

3. Iran and the Arabs

Iran is convinced it should be a power in the region and is working diligently to make it so. It particularly resents foreign intervention and the presence of foreign military forces in the Gulf, blaming them for helping perpetuate dependence on the West. The Gulf states, in turn, feel threatened by Iranian aspirations and depend on U.S. and British assistance to offset this threat. Iran’s neighbors are especially worried about continued Iranian military development and its support of Islamic extremists in the region. In addition, many of the Gulf countries feel threatened by Iran’s pursuit of nuclear power and the chance that Iran may transition that capability to nuclear weapons. Overall, most of the Gulf Arab countries consider Iran a “flashpoint” for conflict and a threat to stability in the region.

Iran and Saudi Arabia – Relations between two of the largest militaries in the region are relatively good considering the animosity that existed between them during the 1980s. However, like its smaller neighbors, Saudi Arabia is suspicious of Iranian motives in the region. Particularly disconcerting to Riyadh is Iran’s continued

231 Cordesman et al., *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War*, 513–515.


235 Cordesman et al., *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War*, 12.

236 Alshayji, “Mutual Realities, Perceptions and Impediments between the GCC States and Iran,” 229–230.

development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Consequently, Saudi Arabia’s military was developed as a direct counter to Iranian capabilities and its attempts at leadership tend to focus on Iran as the greatest threat to security in the region. Saudi Arabia’s leadership within the Gulf Cooperative Council, an organization established partly as a counter to Iranian economic and political aspirations in the Gulf, best illustrates this.

Most recently, the two states have traded accusations regarding unrest in Yemen. Iran has repeatedly accused Saudi Arabia of “state terrorism” for its forays into Yemeni territory. While Riyadh claims the Iranian regime supports Houthi rebels that have made the Saudi border with Yemen a hotly contested area, it is a claim the rebels and Iran deny.

Iran and UAE – Disputes over three islands in the southern Persian Gulf continue to sour relations between Iran and UAE. Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands are strategically located on the western entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, making them of strategic importance to anyone looking to control the vital waterway. Iran seized the islands in 1971, claiming them as part of Iran. Iran considers the matter closed, pointing to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreed upon by the two states in 1971. Conversely, UAE still tacitly disputes ownership, arguing that the Iranian interpretations of the MOU and their claims to the islands are faulty.

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238 Cordesman et al., *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War*, 269–270.
Iran and Bahrain – Although territorial claims on Bahrain made by the Islamic Republic appear to have faded with time, mistrust between the two still exists. The Bahraini regime claims that Iran has provided support to Shiite dissidents within Bahrain, a claim Iran denies. This is an understandably sensitive issue for the Sunni regime, considering that native Shiites comprise approximately 75–80 percent of the total indigenous population.244

Qatar and Oman – Iran’s relations with Qatar and Oman are markedly better than those with the rest of the Gulf states. Both Qatar and Oman have made efforts to improve relations between the GCC and the Islamic Republic, calling for its inclusion in regional security discussions.245 In addition, Qatar and Iran share offshore natural gas fields and Qatar’s relations with Iran are considered by some to be closer than with its GCC partners.246

4. The Role of External Assistance

Foreign assistance is a significant factor in the Gulf region. The United Kingdom and United States consider security in the region to be a significant part of their own national security. As a result, both states have dedicated substantial resources to maintaining stability there. These efforts were led by the British who had controlled key territory and exerted influence over most of the regimes in the region from the early 19th century until 1971.247 By that time, the United States had accumulated sufficient influence in the region to allow it to take Britain’s place. Since then, the United States has intervened in conflicts between Iran and Iraq during the war in the 1980s and 90s, between Iraq and Kuwait in 1991, and removed the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

244 Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 67, 82.
246 Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 155–156.
However, U.S. involvement in the region is best defined by relations with the more peaceful states in the region. Until 2003, the United States and Saudi Arabia enjoyed close military relations with U.S. military forces deployed within the country.\textsuperscript{248} Other Gulf Arab states host American military forces, as well, including Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar. Most of the Gulf Arab states depend on U.S. assurances of assistance for their security. This dependence arguably reduces the incentive for these states to pursue greater cooperation in the region.\textsuperscript{249}

\section*{D. \textbf{COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST}}

All of these factors have had a significant effect on cooperative relations in the Persian Gulf in particular. Tenuous internal control by apprehensive regimes and existing animosity between neighbors, combined with overdependence on foreign assistance produced an environment adverse to cooperation on almost every level. When cooperation has been attempted, it was these factors that determined the success of the endeavor.

The most enduring of such attempts has been the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Started in 1981, the GCC, although implicitly denying alignment against the rising powers of the region, Iran and Iraq, was originally designed to counter the increasing influence and threat of the two states.\textsuperscript{250} Heralded as a comprehensive effort at cooperation, the six GCC member states, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, UAE, and Qatar envisioned an organization able:

\begin{quote}
To effect coordination, integration and inter-connection between Member States in all fields in order to achieve unity between them.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
To deepen and strengthen relations, links and areas of cooperation now prevailing between their peoples in various fields.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
To formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following:
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{249}Cordesman et al., \textit{Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War}, 16–17.
\end{itemize}
- Economic and financial affairs
- Commerce, customs and communications
- Education and culture

The GCC charter makes no mention of military or security cooperation and official discussion of security cooperation within the GCC did not begin until 1982. During this meeting, the GCC states advocated a collective approach to security wherein “any attack on any Member State means an attack on all Member States.” Despite this initial success, the members were unable to agree on a framework for such cooperation mostly due to the fears of some members that such measures would lead to interference in the internal affairs of the member states. A comprehensive security strategy was adopted by the GCC members in 1987 but dealt mostly with trans-border issues such as crime, smuggling, airport security, immigration, and border defense.

Military cooperation within the GCC began shortly after the founding of the GCC. It was also during this time that formation of a Gulf security force was first considered. Formation of the GCC Rapid Deployment Force was approved in 1982 and joint exercises began shortly after. A few years later, in 1984, a standing force, the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), was established, and by 1985, the 7,000-man force was firmly established. The PSF proved to be notoriously ineffectual. PSF operations are inevitably plagued by interoperability and force cohesiveness issues. Manning has also been an issue. The PSF continuously maintained only a small standing force, depending on force contributions from GCC members during a crisis to fully field the force.

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253 Ibid.


Such operational issues are minor compared to the overall ineffectiveness of GCC military and security cooperation. The inability of the GCC to act in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 most poignantly illustrates this.\textsuperscript{256} Attempts at preventing the invasion proved ineffectual, as GCC representatives were largely excluded from negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait. The GCC states instead joined the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq, contributing forces to the overall effort but choosing to remain on the fringe, politically.\textsuperscript{257} Further attempts by the GCC, at resolving conflict in the region, have been almost equally disturbing. The International Court of Justice facilitated the resolution of a dispute between Bahrain and Qatar over Hawar Island in 2001 without the assistance of the GCC.\textsuperscript{258} Similarly, a border dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in 1992 was only resolved with help by the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak.\textsuperscript{259}

More recently, the GCC has been able to move forward on discussions concerning regional security cooperation. Along with the Arab counter-piracy task force proposed in mid 2009, the GCC began to discuss responses to other regional security threats. During a meeting held in December 2009, the GCC members agreed to establish a rapid reaction force to replace Peninsula Shield.\textsuperscript{260} However, these recent measures appear to be similar to previous attempts at security cooperation and draw equal skepticism on their potential effects.

Overall, the GCC has been hampered by most of the factors mentioned in the previous section. Regimes in the region are concerned with maintaining their tenuous hold on power, thereby assuring internal stability takes precedence over external security. Animosity and suspicion between GCC members has prevented extensive coordination within the organization. Such suspicion makes them unwilling to contribute forces to an

\textsuperscript{256} Kuffel, “The Gulf Cooperation Council’s Peninsular Shield Force,” 16.
\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., 210–213.
\textsuperscript{259} Ibid., 213–214.
\textsuperscript{260} Lauren Gelfand, “Regional threats fuel Gulf plan for rapid-reaction force,” \textit{Jane’s Defence Weekly} (December 17, 2009); \textit{Jane’s}, “GCC signs monetary and military agreements,” \textit{Jane’s Intelligence Weekly} (December 17, 2009).
organization that could potentially be used against them.\textsuperscript{261} Finally, they are unable to justify allocating resources to any endeavor while they are receiving assurances from the United States and other foreign powers interested in the region.

E. \hspace{1em} \textbf{CHAPTER SUMMARY}

As expected, the two regional powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran, possess the largest and most capable maritime forces in the Gulf. However, the smaller states possess maritime forces that are smaller yet equally effective in accomplishing their stated missions. As in other regions, each state must balance its resources with its desired capabilities and, expectedly, varying results can be seen. Beyond issues of interoperability and capabilities, however, maritime capacity in the region serves to better highlight the political factors that affect cooperation in this area.

Although the relative lack of maritime capacity in the Persian Gulf is concerning, when compared to Southeast Asia, it is the underlying political factors that more dramatically affect cooperation in the Gulf area. Regimes in the region are overly concerned with maintaining control over their population and depend on their internal security forces to do so. By focusing their attention and resources on maintaining internal stability, they are ignoring potential external threats. Cooperation is further hindered by the presence of conflict between states in the region. The Gulf Arab states that comprise the GCC are naturally suspicious of Iran. The smaller Gulf states are almost equally suspicious of the aspirations of Saudi Arabia and retain historical animosity between them.

Where the two regions differ is in their reactions to foreign intervention. Southeast Asian states, particularly those in the Straits of Malacca, have soundly rejected foreign assistance beyond financial aid and training support. The Gulf states, in contrast, have embraced foreign support. Although often unofficial in nature, relationships between the states in the region and foreign actors, such as the United States and Great Britain, include basing foreign troops on their soil. Despite assuring regional security,

\textsuperscript{261} Ramazani, \textit{The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis}, 35–38.
their presence and the assurances that the United States and other foreign powers have given, provide further excuses for the Gulf states to neglect both their own capabilities and concerted efforts at security cooperation.
VI. CONCLUSION

A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION

This chapter will compare and contrast the nature of maritime security and security cooperation in the two regions in question, providing an answer to the question posed in the introductory chapter. Specifically, is the Southeast Asian model of maritime security cooperation applicable to similar efforts being discussed in the Middle East by some of the Persian Gulf states? If so, what lessons can strategic decision-makers and military leadership concerned with the region derive from the cooperative security efforts in the Southeast Asian maritime domain?

In the introduction to this thesis, it was postulated that maritime capacity and political willingness are the most important factors affecting security cooperation between regional states. The lack of the former, and a conciliatory approach with regards to the latter, naturally lead to more effective cooperative efforts. Therefore, recent cooperative efforts in Southeast Asia were presented as a “model” of regional maritime security cooperation that could be applied to similar efforts in the Persian Gulf. Of specific interest were cooperative counter-piracy efforts in the Straits of Malacca and their applicability to similar efforts in the Gulf of Aden (GOA).

This final chapter will argue that the Southeast Asian “model” of maritime security cooperation, although informative for similar cooperative efforts in the Middle East, merely highlights the inadequacies facing the Gulf states as they develop such relationships. Southeast Asia and the states of the Persian Gulf share similar characteristics related to maritime capacity and political willingness, however, there are key differences between the two regions that have already and may continue to hinder comparable success in the Gulf. The main argument of this thesis is that political willingness is the primary hindrance to cooperative security success in the region. The cumulative effect of prioritization of resources, regional animosity, and dependence on foreign security assistance has prevented and will continue to prevent efforts at security cooperation in the seas of the region. In this regard, the Southeast Asian model is not
directly applicable to the Middle East and Persian Gulf, but serves to inform observers of the absence of key factors present during the development of cooperative maritime security in the Straits of Malacca.

This chapter consists of four sections. The first section will discuss the importance of maritime capacity to operational success and overall cooperation in the two regions. In this section, the overall state of maritime capacity in each region will be compared to explain how maritime capacity has affected each region and its attempts at cooperation. The second section will compare the level of political willingness for cooperation in each region. In this section, similarities and differences between factors related to the propensity of states, in each region, to seek the aid of its regional neighbors will be compared. The goal of this comparison is to identify key factors that have influenced cooperation in Southeast Asia that are applicable to similar efforts in the Middle East. The third section will summarize the comparison and provide an answer to the questions posed by this thesis. The chapter concludes with recommendations to encourage and facilitate more effective maritime security cooperation in the Middle East and between the states of the Persian Gulf in particular, and with recommendations for further research.

B. DOES MARITIME CAPACITY INFLUENCE COOPERATION?

In the introduction to this thesis, it was postulated that maritime capacity is a determining factor in a state’s decision to cooperate in a regional setting. The decision to cooperate by states in Southeast Asia was given as an example of states realizing they lacked the capacity required to successfully address issues in the maritime domain. Many of the individual states in the region complain that they have too few ships to patrol their own waters and, in turn, are unable to prevent piracy and maritime crime even within their own waters. Similarly, in the opinion of some policy and security experts, the Middle East has similar capacity issues that need to be addressed and, once resolved, should lead to greater cooperation between these states.

Maritime capacity has been an issue for the states of both regions since they became independent and established their own governments. In Southeast Asia, maritime
capacity has been most affected by financial issues. The rise of piracy coincided with the Southeast Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s and the resulting economic instability significantly reduced financial resources available to apply to maritime forces. This adversely affected maritime capacity through the mid-2000s, when most states in the region began to dedicate resources to bolster their maritime capacity. This shift can be directly attributed to domestic and international pressure to address the rise of piracy in the Straits of Malacca, as discussed in Chapter III. Most responded by increasing acquisition of new vessels through domestic and foreign sources, improving training for their forces, and expanding cooperation between neighboring states.

Conversely, maritime capacity in the Middle Eastern Gulf states has been most affected by issues of priority. Granted, a few of the Gulf states deal with financial constraints, but most possess ready sources of income from their oil and natural gas resources. With the exception of Bahrain and Yemen, states in the region are in a far better financial state than their Southeast Asian counterparts in terms of available financial resources. Therefore, the issue of maritime capacity in the region focuses more on the priority maritime forces receive rather than on their lack of funding. States in the region are overly concerned with internal stability. Accordingly, regimes in these states depend heavily upon internal security forces to maintain control and external security forces often serve to augment these forces.262 Another factor that aids in the decision of regimes to focus on internal stability versus external security is the protection of external actors, such as the United States. The smaller states depend on foreign security assistance and assurances. With the United States and others assuring regional security, these states are free to focus their resources on assuring internal stability.

Maritime forces in both regions are primarily designed for coastal defense. Few of the states have “blue water” navies, possessing vessels capable of operating far from land for extended periods.\textsuperscript{263} Even states that have large surface vessels rarely use them in that role. All of the states have taken steps to address their inventory shortfalls. Procurement from foreign sources has increased, often with aid from external actors, while some states have worked to increase their inventory through domestic production.\textsuperscript{264}

Training and its resulting proficiency remain an issue in both regions. Although better trained than in the past, most Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern maritime forces still lack the requisite skill sets to effectively address maritime violence and piracy. In addition, few of the examined states possess the ability to operate outside of their own territorial waters.\textsuperscript{265} Although lack of power projection capability is not pressing in the close waters of the Straits of Malacca, it should concern states in the Middle East, considering recent discussions between the Gulf states concerning an Arab counter-piracy task force operating in the GOA. This lack of capability has been partially addressed in both regions through increases in domestic training, external assistance, and increased participation in bilateral maritime exercises with neighbors and external actors. However, only Iran and Saudi Arabia can be considered “blue water” capable and the UAE and Oman the only other states to be actively pursuing the capability.\textsuperscript{266}

Reorganization efforts have had a significant impact on capacity in Southeast Asia particularly. Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia have all restructured their maritime forces to improve cross-service capability and focus their efforts on maritime violence and piracy in the region. These steps can be seen to have dramatically improved the maritime capability of most states in the region.

\textsuperscript{263} See Cordesman et al., \textit{Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War}, for more information on the “blue water” aspirations of the Gulf states.

\textsuperscript{264} See “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments” on each state for more information on the development of their respective maritime forces.

\textsuperscript{265} See Cordesman et al., \textit{Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War}, for more information on the “blue water” capabilities of the Gulf states.

\textsuperscript{266} “Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – United Arab Emirates,” \textit{Jane’s Information Group}, last updated June 2009; Cordesman et al., 306.
Maritime security cooperation has also been a major contributor to force effectiveness in Southeast Asia. Unlike their counterparts in the Middle East, the Southeast Asian states have progressively looked to their neighbors to increase their overall effectiveness. The Malacca Straits Sea Patrol (MSSP) and ReCAAP have contributed significantly to overall maritime security in the region by streamlining information-sharing functions, deconflicting regional maritime operations, and combining maritime resources. The Malacca Straits Sea Patrols and its predecessors have allowed greater coordination between members, allowing for more effective utilization of their forces. Although not operationally significant, the ASEAN-led ReCAAP agreement has focused attention on maritime security in the region as a whole. It has provided a framework for communication and cooperation that has become a norm in the region, increasing coordination at the operational and tactical level. Overall, the combination of more vessels, improved capability, and increased coordination has allowed states in the Straits of Malacca to more effectively patrol their own waters, thus decreasing maritime crime in the region.

This relationship does not exist in the Middle East. The most significant cooperative organization in the region, the Gulf Cooperation Council, is notoriously inept at military and security cooperation, owing largely to existing suspicion between members and the lack of a unifying threat. Bilateral relationships exist between states in the region but lack the extent of coordination and communication of Southeast Asian efforts. Recent discussions between the GCC states indicate that greater cooperation in the maritime domain is desired, however, most states in the region would be physically unable to contribute forces to a maritime force operating out of range of their own waters.

Cooperation with external actors is one area where both regions differ. Although states in both regions actively cooperate and exercise with foreign navies, the nature of these relationships are decidedly different in each. In Southeast Asia, foreign intervention in security matters has long been viewed with suspicion, and relations with external actors were noticeably distant. For example, most navies in the region conduct regular exercises with the United States and accept training and financial assistance from other external actors. However, most attempts to closely cooperate or coordinate operations
between them have been viewed with suspicion and often flatly refused. Conversely, in the Persian Gulf, most of the states rely heavily on foreign assistance and aid to ensure their external security. Most of the smaller states there have de facto security arrangements with the United States and Great Britain, even basing foreign forces on their own soil.\(^{267}\) This dependence has adverse affects on overall capacity, as states that do not have to worry about their external security are free to focus their resources and attention on other issues.

Overall, the relative disparity of maritime capacity would indicate that the Gulf states should be eager to initiate cooperative maritime security arrangements. Only Iran and Saudi Arabia compare closely to the Southeast Asian states, as can be seen in Figure 5.

![Maritime Capacity in the Persian Gulf and Straits of Malacca, 2009](image)  

**Figure 5.** Comparison of the Persian Gulf and Straits of Malacca (2009)\(^{268}\)

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\(^{267}\) Cordesman et al., *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War*, 14–18.

\(^{268}\) NOTE: Figure 5 shows a comparison of the approximate number of maritime surface vessels including navy, coast guard, or other maritime service branch inventories of the states being compared. SOURCE: Figures were compiled from *Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments* for each of the states as well as Anthony H Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan’s book, *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars.*
In fact, most of the states in the Gulf have maritime forces that are significantly smaller than those of the least capable of the Southeast Asian states. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand were more willing to cooperate on maritime security, yet they have larger maritime forces than their Gulf counterparts. Despite their shortcomings, Gulf Arab states have been unable or unwilling to organize a meaningful cooperative effort. Even the growing maritime force of Iran and the increasing potential instability of the Iranian regime have done little to encourage cooperation between them. This would seem to indicate that insufficient maritime capacity in the region may not provide sufficient motivation for cooperation, unlike Southeast Asia where maritime sufficient capacity is an accepted factor leading to cooperation. Therefore, there must be other factors that have prevented cooperation from becoming a priority for states in the region.

C. POLITICAL WILL AND REGIONAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY

Considering the relatively low importance of insufficient maritime capacity to states in the Persian Gulf, it is logical to conclude that some other factor must be hindering cooperation in the region. Therefore, willingness to seek greater cooperation on security matters in a region must depend more heavily on issues that are more political in nature. As discussed in the introductory chapters, development of regional security cooperation relies on the willingness of states to seek assistance from the whole rather than on their own. These factors include internal stability, intra-regional relations, and the influence of external actors.

On the surface, Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf region are strikingly similar with regards to most of these factors. Regimes in both regions rely heavily on their internal security forces, and in some instances their external security forces, to maintain internal stability and ensure that they retain power. Likewise, most of the states in both regions face internal pressure from the social, economic and political effects of globalization and the destabilizing influence of violent and nonviolent religious extremism. These internal pressures draw attention away from external security, as a state

269 Cordesman et al., Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War, 1.
that worries about losing power is naturally reluctant to expand its external commitments or shift financial and manpower resources.

Likewise, both regions have a history of conflict between neighbors. Although not always violent in nature, states in both regions often view their neighbors with suspicion. Standing border disputes are commonplace and agreed-upon borders guarded jealously, making operations along them extremely sensitive. Therefore, it is easy to understand the hesitancy of states in both areas to coordinate across borders, even in instances of “hot pursuit.” Although relations between most of the states in both regions have cooled significantly in the past few decades, cooperation is still heavily influenced by instinctual protectiveness. In Southeast Asia, the evolution of cooperation has transitioned through a logical sequence of bilateral then multilateral maritime cooperation, as illustrated by the MSSP and ReCAAP. The Gulf states are similar in that most have existing bilateral and multilateral relationships between them, but differ in the level of observable cooperation on matters of maritime security. The closest example they have is the GCC military force, Peninsula Shield (PSF), but cooperation and coordination within the PSF appears tacit at best.

More concerning to the potential development of cooperation in the Persian Gulf has been the role of external actors. External influence has ramifications on any regional effort at cooperation and the Gulf region provides a poignant example of this. Unlike the Southeast Asia states, the Gulf states are heavily dependent on foreign assistance and security assurances. U.S. protection is especially important to the smaller states, which fear the influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia, within the region, over cooperation. U.S. influence in the region is obvious, with U.S. forces still active in Iraq and occupying bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar, U.S. naval forces patrolling the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Aden, and military advisors and trainers providing less intrusive military assistance to Saudi, Yemeni, and Omani forces. Only Iran rejects U.S. intervention in the region and refuses to discuss regional security cooperation with U.S. forces remaining in the region. Dependence on the United States and other external actors reduces the incentive for states in the region to cooperate between them. If they can depend on the
United States to protect them externally, why should they be concerned with developing the capabilities of their own forces or fostering regional cooperation?

D. CONCLUSION

Recent discussions between the GCC countries, regarding increased cooperation on regional maritime security issues, should elicit discussion within the academic and U.S. policy circles. Literature on the subject of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden and West Indian Ocean has focused on the applicability of the Southeast Asian “model” of counter-piracy to the region. Beyond the operational and tactical aspects of this model, experts and policy makers should be concerned with the lessons inherent in the development of this model. To simply “cut and paste” the steps taken by the states in Southeast Asia, and attempt to apply them to similar efforts in the Middle East, is not sufficient. Such comparisons do, however, provide an opportunity to compare the progression of events that led to success in Southeast Asia. Discussion on how these events and the geo-political factors inherent in them led to the level of cooperation in the region is worthwhile and was the overall goal of this thesis.

In many ways, the geopolitical environment in both regions is largely the same. Both regions have histories of internal instability, where regimes must seek balance between what maintains the loyalty of the population and assures continued control over the mechanisms of power in the state. Both regions possess histories of intra-regional conflict: violent and nonviolent conflict between neighbors, illustrated by border disputes, military invasions, or support of political oppositions within another state. Where the two diverge is in relation to external influences. Although states in both regions inherently eschew foreign intervention as a whole, geopolitical realities have caused more vulnerable states to seek the aid of external powers. Unlike in Southeast Asia, where the states reject foreign assistance and meddling beyond traditional financial assistance, training, and bilateral exercises, the Gulf states have sought the protection of the United States and others.

In some ways, this protection has taken on the characteristics of dependence. Where the Southeast Asian states looked to each other for mutual protection, the Gulf
states have sought continued assurances of regional security externally, creating an environment where regional cooperation is perceived as unnecessary. This dependence has not only affected efforts at cooperation, it has affected the development of their armed forces, allowing states in the region to focus on other issues at the cost of reducing their overall military capability and stalling efforts at increasing interoperability in their established “joint” forces, such as the PSF.

Overall, the Southeast Asian “model” of maritime security cooperation is informative for recent Gulf state discussions, but lacks the applicability most experts attribute to it. It mainly provides a counterpoint for comparison between the two in that the gradual development of a cooperative tradition as seen in Southeast Asia is unlikely in the Persian Gulf. The Southeast Asian states gradually developed a cooperative tradition free from external intervention. The success of maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia can be seen as an evolutionary process progressing from one level to another, eventually leading to its present, multilateral form. By simultaneously addressing issues of capacity and political will at varying levels, states in the region were able to increase their maritime capabilities and build confidence in each other. Through trial and error, regional actors gradually gained confidence in the intentions of their neighbors and developed boundaries regarding their relationships with extra-regional actors. Likewise, regional political sensitivities and reduced capacity required regional and extra-regional actors to reconsider their efforts and decide upon new courses of action.

In contrast, cooperative efforts in the Persian Gulf have been adversely affected by the choice of Gulf states to rely on external intervention and discount the need for cooperative security. After more than two decades, the GCC remains a “hollow shell” of what it could be with regards to security cooperation. Its joint military and security endeavors have proven ineffectual despite several opportunities to exert influence. With the exception of Iran, who has initiated unilateral counter-piracy operations, Gulf Arab maritime forces are virtually absent from counter-piracy efforts in the GOA. The

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270 Cordesman et al., *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War*, 11–14.
European Union, North American Treaty Organization, and the United States lead those efforts, highlighting the propensity of the Gulf states to depend on external protection. Regardless of the lack of urgency the piracy issue is to them, the Gulf states have once again allowed their external security to be “outsourced.” That is why recent announcements by the Gulf Arab states, that they were considering contributing to maritime security in the GOA, were viewed derisively by this author and provided the impetus for this thesis.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

The hypothesis espoused in the previous section suggests that continued foreign influence is detrimental to long-term security in the region. It leads one to consider that only the withdrawal of foreign forces would lead states in the region to truly understand the incentives of regional security cooperation by removing the primary point of contention and source of dependence. Logically, this would further suggest that if the United States wishes to encourage greater maritime security cooperation and coordination in the Gulf, it should significantly reduce its presence or completely withdraw from the region.

Obviously such steps would be foolhardy in terms of their geopolitical effect. Protection of U.S. strategic interests necessitates U.S. involvement in the region. The global economy depends on Middle Eastern oil and gas. The threat of Islamic extremism continues to be a particular concern of the United States. Unstable states in the region could provide havens for extremist groups to train and operate, a lesson learned from Afghanistan. A stable Middle East, therefore, is a cornerstone of U.S. policy, and stability in the region is presently the purview of the United States.

Accordingly, the United States expends a significant amount of effort to ensure stability in the region. It has fought two recent wars, dedicates valuable military assets to protect the region, and provides substantial aid to states in the region. An abrupt cessation of these efforts could create a vacuum that could be quickly filled by groups hostile to the United States and increase the potential for conflict in the region. Therefore, continued U.S. assistance is required to maintain regional stability. However, the United States
should begin to reduce the “exposure” that current policies have on the phenomenon of dependence in the region. The following steps are recommended to begin to reduce dependence on the United States:

**Make capacity building “joint” and “enabling”** — Tailor capacity building initiatives to encourage joint capability and interoperability. Such changes should stress the need for shared systems, procedures, and multilateral coordination. Additionally, capacity building should focus on enabling regional forces to adequately address their own external threats versus acquiring the newest, “shiniest” systems.271

**“Enable” regional cooperation** — The United states must gradually foster regional cooperation by seeking to strengthen existing bilateral relationships between states in the region. This includes encouraging bilateral military exercises, assisting in the establishment of regional coordination centers designed to facilitate information sharing and coordination, and ensuring the existence of robust military liaison programs between the states. Due to regional sensitivities pertaining to U.S. intervention, such efforts must be handled through unofficial channels and include minimal U.S. presence. Eventually, states in the region must be encouraged to strengthen military ties by improving the interoperability of their combined forces, streamlining information-sharing practices, and increasing coordination between all forces in the region.

**Reduce the U.S. “footprint” in the region** — Eventually, the U.S. military presence in the region should be reduced. By enabling forces in the region to adequately address their own external threats and gradually strengthening bilateral and multilateral relationships, the United States can reduce its presence in the region while assuring relative stability. Reduced U.S. presence would effectively neutralize Iranian complaints of foreign meddling and could help normalize relations with the Islamic Republic.

Ideally, by developing the maritime capacity of each state in the region toward increased interoperability and enabling the development of cooperative tradition, the United States should be able to slowly distance itself from intervening in regional security affairs. Gradually deemphasizing the importance of U.S. intervention to those

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271 Cordesman et al., *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of asymmetric War*, 14.
states that depend on such assistance should lessen the overall impact of such a withdrawal. Additionally, a reduction of foreign presence in the region should have a de-escalatory effect on Iranian rhetoric and allow for greater dialogue between the Gulf states and their northern neighbor.

F. IMPETUS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Obviously, the scope of this thesis was ambitious; it was designed to highlight the obvious similarities and differences between cooperation in each region. More in-depth analysis of the effect of political factors on cooperation in the Gulf would be extremely useful to policy experts and decision makers. The greater understanding of the role of maritime capacity as motivation toward greater cooperation within a region and then as a facilitator for greater cooperation as the arrangement progresses would be especially beneficial. Additionally, further analysis of the role of the United States and other foreign actors on cooperative efforts in the region would be warranted, including discussions of the effect the absence of foreign assistance would have on the geopolitical situation.
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