HOW TO MAINTAIN A SUCCESSFUL COUNTERTERROR CAMPAIGN WHILE NEGOTIATING FOR PEACE

BY

COLONEL NIR SOLOMON
Israeli Defense Forces

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2010

Only a work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright. Based upon the nature of a particular student-author’s employment, a paper may not be a work of the United States Government and may, in fact, be protected by copyright.

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-03-2010</td>
<td>Strategy Research Project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
<th>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How to Maintain a Successful Counterterror Campaign While Negotiating For Peace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5b. GRANT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. AUTHOR(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Nir Solomon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Paul Cale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
<th>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army War College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122 Forbes Avenue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlisle, PA 17013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution A: Unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only a work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright. Based upon the nature of a particular student-author's employment, a paper may not be a work of the United States Government and may, in fact, be protected by copyright.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The State of Israel is fighting terrorism which has been trying to undermine the foundations of its sovereignty since its establishment in 1948. Over the years, Israel tried to make peace with its enemies while continuing to fight simultaneously for independence. The Israeli - Palestinian conflict is perhaps the most intensive struggle of all. In recent years, a dialogue process began between the parties. This dialogue was supposed to set the permanent situation between the parties. Since then, the first and second intifada broke out and negotiations between the parties continued while the I.D.F conducting its counter-terrorism campaign.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The purpose of this essay is to examine the role of the military and the strategy that is required to conduct a counter-terrorism campaign while negotiating peace. The essay will examine the historical processes, key events and milestones that have affected negotiations from a military perspective; it will specify the dilemmas facing military leaders; and analyze the special military – political relationship. All in order to examine their efficiency and offer an alternative strategy that supports and serves the Israeli national policy. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15. SUBJECT TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism, Nature of War, Israeli – Palestinian Conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
HOW TO MAINTAIN A SUCCESSFUL COUNTERTERROR CAMPAIGN WHILE NEGOTIATING FOR PEACE

by

Colonel Nir Solomon
Israeli Defense Forces

Colonel Paul Cale
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

Only a work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright. Based upon the nature of a particular student-author's employment, a paper may not be a work of the United States Government and may, in fact, be protected by copyright.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
The State of Israel is fighting terrorism which has been trying to undermine the foundations of its sovereignty since its establishment in 1948. Over the years, Israel tried to make peace with its enemies while continuing to fight simultaneously for independence. The Israeli - Palestinian conflict is perhaps the most intensive struggle of all. In recent years, a dialogue process began between the parties. This dialogue was supposed to set the permanent situation between the parties. Since then, the first and second intifada broke out and negotiations between the parties continued while the I.D.F conducting its counter-terrorism campaign.

The purpose of this essay is to examine the role of the military and the strategy that is required to conduct a counter-terrorism campaign while negotiating peace. The essay will examine the historical processes, key events and milestones that have affected negotiations from a military perspective; it will specify the dilemmas facing military leaders; and analyze the special military – political relationship. All in order to examine their efficiency and offer an alternative strategy that supports and serves the Israeli national policy.
HOW TO MAINTAIN A SUCCESSFUL COUNTERTEERROR CAMPAIGN WHILE NEGOTIATING FOR PEACE

The Israeli - Palestinian conflict, at the center of the Israeli national security discourse, has wide implications for Israel's security. Despite the fact that this is not a classic case of "hard power" that threatens the very existence of Israel, it is a sensitive and much debated political issue in Israel. Palestinian’s "soft power" and their ability to destabilize the regional stability dynamics is a matter of deep concern for Israel. The Palestinians have the potential to undermine the demographic balance of Israel and therefore to influence its national character. The proximity of the Palestinian populated areas to the Israeli population centers allows them to disrupt normal life in Israel by applying terror against the Israeli population. In addition, the Israeli - Palestinian conflict has a strong influence on the Arab and Muslim "streets" and on the relationship between Arab countries and the Muslim world to Western countries and Israel.

Throughout the years of conflict and dialogue with the Palestinians, the military has been situated in the center stage of action as a shield of the existence and sovereignty of the State of Israel and as the instrument of national power exercised by politics to promote national interests. As Clausewitz said, "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means". Hence, the interaction between military action and diplomacy has a critical impact on the military strategy and the campaign against Palestinian terrorism. The dynamic nature of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians - the threats and additional challenges that face the State of Israel and the level of worldwide involvement in conflict resolution (U.S., European Union, Arab countries, and others) - require the military to urgently examine the basic assumptions
of the campaign against terror with respect to the enemy it faces (Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Palestinian security forces, politicians or religious agitators, etc.) and the need to act in a reality where the ends, ways and means frequently change.

In considering the ways in which the military is used as an instrument of national power, to promote national interests, and with an objective to suggest a course of action to fight terrorism and maintaining Israel's security while negotiating peace with the Palestinians, we must examine the historical process. I shall do so not for the sake of acknowledging the facts and milestones in this struggle, but for the sake of examining the relationship between the political and military echelons and their impact on shaping the campaign against terror.

The Historical Process

By September 2009, nine years had passed since the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip². In considering the role filled by the military at every stage of the conflict, I will divide the duration of the conflict according to the major milestones in the struggle and the dialogue between the parties. The relationship and interaction between the political processes and military confrontation is also an interesting point for analysis due to the fact that the military campaign was directed in parallel to the managing of political negotiations and sometimes it was hard to distinguish which effort was in the lead and which effort was in support

From the Oslo Agreement to the Second Palestinian Uprising (Intifada “Al Aqsa”). On September 9, 1993, there was a breakthrough in the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. After two years of secret negotiations, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasser Arafat, sent a letter to the prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, which detailed a number of important statements, amongst them recognition by
the PLO to Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and a commitment to resolve the conflict peacefully. Following that letter, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians in peace talks. At the same time in Washington, the PLO and the State of Israel signed the Oslo Agreement with the Israeli - Palestinian Joint Declaration of Principles and a proposal for an interim agreement of self-government for the Palestinians.

The main idea, which stood at the base of the agreement, was the building of a terraced trust between the parties to maintain the security of Israel and to support the Palestinians’ right for self determination. Under the agreement, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) withdrew from most of the West Bank cities and passed the security responsibility to Palestinian Authority forces. This allowed the process of building trust between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority by limiting military activity in territories that were transferred to Palestinian security responsibility and coordinated operations between the IDF and the Palestinian security forces. The most complex challenge the IDF faced was the continuation of terrorist attacks by Palestinian rejectionist organizations that came from the territories controlled by the Palestinian Authority and the limitations of military operations in these areas due to the Oslo Agreements.

In September 1995, in Washington, the ‘Taba’ Agreement was signed ("Oslo II Agreement"), an interim agreement designed to expand Palestinian self-government and to transfer authority and responsibility in the West Bank and Gaza to a Palestinian Council that would be elected. In October 1998, after a marathon of negotiations mediated by U.S. President Bill Clinton and King Hussein of Jordan, Israel (under the
government of Benjamin Netanyahu) and the Palestinian Authority signed, in the White House, the ‘Wye’ Memorandum which was actually the permanent second pulse application in the interim agreements. During this agreement, Israel agreed to withdrawal, in stages, from 13 percent of the West Bank, in exchange for steps to be taken by Palestinians, such as increasing the fight against terrorism, increased security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and terrorists arrests.

The inability of the Palestinian Authority to control sovereignty over the territories transferred to their control, with continuation of IDF activities to attack terrorist organizations, led to the outbreak of the second intifada and to the stopping of the diplomatic process. On September 28, 2000, the Leader of the Opposition then, Ariel Sharon, visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, during the tense stalemate relations between Israelis and Palestinians following the failure of the Camp David summit. This visit led to the outbreak of serious and violent riots in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which led to a harsh Israeli response. Israeli security forces were instructed to stop the spread of riots and to stop a possible organized violent uprising. Accomplishing that mission was made possible at a heavy price in terms of human life, the destruction of Palestinian institutional infrastructure, and in the sense of belief by both parties that substantive dialogue toward the agreement would be hard to resume. The endstate was defined in a way that did not indicate the condition of the Palestinian Authority at the termination of hostilities, but only the military security aspect - and returning stability to the region.

More than once the Israeli political leadership mentioned the aspiration to return to the negotiating process absent a terrorist threat. The conflict results and its
intensiveness can be seen in statistical data that indicated the scope of attacks made by Palestinians, the number of victims of the attacks and victims of the Israeli response, and the rate of economic damage caused to the Palestinian economy³.

At the time of fighting, attempts of discussion continued between the parties, with U.S. mediation, and in October 2000, sponsored by U.S. President Bill Clinton, the Sharm el - Sheikh Summit was gathered in an effort to end the ‘Al-Aqsa intifada’ which erupted in the West Bank about three weeks earlier. A day later, President Clinton announced that an agreement was achieved on a ceasefire between the parties, the withdrawal of IDF forces, and the renewal of negotiations two weeks later. In fact, the agreement brought only a temporary lull in fighting. In January 2001, shortly before the end of the term of the government of Ehud Barak and the elections for prime minister, the parties met in Taba with an attempt to decide on a permanent agreement (on the basis of President Clinton’s proposals). After six days of marathon negotiations, the talks were suspended with an advertised joint statement but without an agreement.

From Operation “Defensive Shield” to the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip. The turning point in the counterterrorism campaign occurred following Operation “Defensive Shield”, which began in April 2002, in which the IDF returned to control the central cities in the West Bank. In this operation, the military and other agencies restored stability to the region (militarily, not politically), and it is recognized that the return of the operational and intelligence control in the area removed the threat⁴. The second intifada and Operation “Defensive Shield” situated the IDF against the need to confront the waves of murderous terrorists and forced IDF’s commanders to deeply examine the basic terms such as "decisive" and "victory". Between 2002 and 2005 the IDF, with the General
Security Service (‘Shabak’), managed to formulate an updated concept of counterterrorism and to reduce greatly its impact on the public civil agenda of the State of Israel\(^5\). This operation also set clear objectives in terms of "return of security control", "a mortal blow to terrorism" and "removing the threat of terrorism". Again, an endstate was not specified that indicated the long-term strategy of the State of Israel with respect to the position and situation of the Palestinian Authority and the status of Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

The prolonged Palestinian violence and the failure of attempts to restrain them, or to reach a ceasefire and resume negotiations, along with the political situation created by both sides, brought to Israeli public awareness the principle of "unilateral security separation" based on two key assumptions\(^6\). The first was, in the near future, it would be impossible to resume negotiations with the Palestinians and reach agreements with them. The second assumption was that there is no way to defeat the Palestinians by military means and impose a solution on them, or to motivate them to end violence and reconcile with the status quo. The security separation was the initiative of the Ministry Of Defense who understood that the most serious problem posed by Palestinian violence was the terrorist attacks on the Israeli side of the ‘Green Borderline’ (Israel's 1967 frontiers), especially suicide bombings. Its aim was to provide a security solution to the problem by limiting the ability of Palestinians to cross into Israeli territory, while avoiding any political issues. The main idea was to not make any changes in the distribution of regional control and the responsibility of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, but to place obstacles at different levels of difficulty and border guards along the ‘Green Borderline’ that would prevent passage of Palestinians into
Israel's territory, except for a limited number who would receive approvals and pass through organized passageways.

The security fence, established for the purpose of separation between the West Bank and Israel, which was established following a government decision, in April 2002, also was assessed as helping to reduce the volume of terrorist attacks. The number of shooting events, throwing of grenades, and suicide attacks decreased significantly. The complexity of the unilateral separation plan is the political aspects. The separation firmly fixed the boundaries of the fence route without negotiation and implementation of separation in the West Bank. This strengthened protection of Jewish communities and separation along the roads, but may perpetuate the Israeli occupation and the expected question of responses in the international and regional systems.

However, the violence did not fade but only changed its face. Suicide bombings, the most extravagant expression of the struggle against Israel, is a source of constant tension between Israel and the Palestinians and as the center of terror activities against Israel. Additionally, since 2005, the mortar firing and Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip to West Negev and the continued terrorist attacks against military and civilian targets in the West Bank have become routine.

After a long period of stagnation in the political process, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon presented in December 2003, the unilateral disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip. Full details of the plan were presented in April 2004, when Sharon announced his intent to carry out the separation and the disengagement plan in the Gaza Strip. This will include the evacuation of all Jewish settlements from Gaza and several settlements in Northern Samaria. The program was designed to occur without negotiations with the
Palestinians. In early August 2005, the State of Israel began implementing the unilateral disengagement plan. Evacuation of the settlements and their residents took about a week, including the evacuation of about 9,400 civilians, and included army camps. The unilateral disengagement process from Gaza was aimed to achieve three operational objectives: (a) to reduce the friction between the Jewish residents of the Gaza Strip and Arab residents; (b) to comply to the continuous pressure on the Government of Israel to carry out a political process in parallel to the military activities to cease Palestinian violence; and, (c) to create a situation where the Palestinian Authority would have to regulate the internal regime in Gaza. The plan was executed by the IDF with the cooperation of the Israeli police.

This unilateral disengagement set a significant security challenge to the IDF of protection against rockets fired from Gaza. Indeed, stability around the Gaza Strip only lasted a brief period during 2005 and 2006, when 1,400 mortar bombs and rockets were fired towards Israel's territory and cities. In January 2006, elections were held by the Palestinian Authority and in contrast to Israeli predictions, the Hamas movement defeated the Fatah movement. Following the election, a unity government was established in the Palestinian Authority.

Hamas Takeover of the Gaza Strip until Today. During its first year, the Hamas government and Palestinian president tried to reach an agreement related to the government of the National Palestinian Authority. Internal power struggles led to a renewal of violent confrontations between Fatah and Hamas culminated in June 2007 when Hamas opened an offensive with an aim to destroy the overall military power of Fatah and to take over the Gaza Strip. Hamas achieved complete control of the Gaza
Strip, and the presence of Fatah as a functioning movement was almost completely wiped out. As a response, Fatah began to arrest Hamas activists in Judea and Samaria. The Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas declared a state of emergency, dissolved the national unity government, and appointed a government closely associated to the Fatah headed by Salam Fayyad⁸.

Following the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, the U.S. government started to initiate an international peace conference to promote negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The main idea was to weaken Hamas and at the same time strengthen Abu Mazen. In November 2007, the Annapolis Conference opened in the U.S. At the end of the conference an Israeli – Palestinian statement was advertized acknowledging that negotiations between the parties, would continue after the conference and that a permanent agreement, ending the conflict between the nations, would be achieved by the end of 2008⁹. Both sides also agreed that the solution to the conflict should include the establishment of a Palestinian state. Within this reason, actions were taken to clarify to the Palestinian people that the line Fatah represents - two states for two nations - is the right solution, and following that, the Palestinian public will support once again the Fatah, which is the preferred partner for negotiations and agreement. In parallel to the discussion after the Annapolis Conference, the Israel strategy was to encourage the separation between Gaza and the West Bank and strengthen the control of Fatah in the West Bank while punishing the Hamas rule in Gaza with an aim to weaken it. In that, Israel hoped to turn the Judea and Samaria areas in to a success story, to encourage the expansion of economic activity and to increase the standard of living since many sanctions were removed. International aid and tax money, that Israel holds, were partly
channeled and Israel removed many barriers and eased Palestinian traffic throughout the West Bank.

However, the Gaza Strip continued to withstand the Israeli and international sanctions and the pressure on Gaza increased. This action did not weaken Hamas in a way that changed the consciousness of the Palestinian public and in fact, after the Hamas takeover of Gaza Strip, the firing of mortars and rockets into Israel became more frequent. These actions forced the State of Israel to start a large-scale military operation (Operation "Cast Lead") in the Gaza Strip which occurred during advanced negotiations with the Palestinians. Following that operation, the talks ceased between the parties - and in fact were not renewed until today.

Military-Political Relations

The famous dictum of Clausewitz was that war is nothing but a continuation of politics by other means, establishes statesmanship on top of command, and the subordination of the military to the political echelon. We can say that in the tactical level, the relationship and discourse between the various levels of command in the military allow the senior leadership to clarify to the lower level the aims and purposes, and to the lower level to clarify the capabilities to realize the goals and intentions. In this manner of dialogue, the plan will develop and will be carried out. When it comes to the relationship between the military and political echelons, it is likely that there is a significant gap in recognizing military practice by the political echelon.

In general, in these relations, we can define the political echelon as an initiator and leader. The political echelon guides the military which brings forward recommendations of force deployment to promote national interests. In fact, at this time, a process of dialogue is created between the parties where at the end the military
formulates recommendations of action and the political echelon approves the alternative and provides instruction for its implementation. The process of discussion between echelons is very crucial to the military because the political guidance is often vague in a structured manner. This ambiguity is the result of government reluctance to reveal its goals due to foreign relations considerations or internal political considerations. This means that the military is responsible to replace this ambiguity, in content or plan, and fill the space that the political echelon leaves.

During a state of war, the discourse between echelons is characterized by upgrading the military's influence in determining national security policy and strategy. The government sets the national security policies, but in time of war, must respect the professional autonomy of the military. An extreme example of this situation can be seen in the U.S. military influence in determining national security policy at the end of World War II. The military was the dominant factor in determining national security policy and the military in Germany and Japan enjoyed the autonomy compared to the civil / political echelon. In order to balance the situation, the American Congress responded by a change of legislation with an aim to return the control to the hands of the civilians. Among the changes formulated by the US Congress was the establishment of the National Security Council as a tool by the President to restrain the military.

Wars and confrontations are common in modern times and involve many considerations of national security policy and the military has its own ideas about how to resolve conflict. It is also clear to the military that war will not be determined only on the battlefield and for this reason the military tries to be involved in shaping strategic decisions that will help the nation win. In the war on terror, additional branches of
government are involved and in Israel’s case, it is the General Security Service (GSS) that are trained to prevent terrorist attacks within the borders of the State of Israel and is a body subordinate to the office of the prime minister. In this way, an equation of the two security bodies was created, which often compete amongst each other and both work in the political process of determining security policy. Later, I will analyze an appropriate alternative military – political relationship in a reality of fighting terrorism. But before then, it would be correct to characterize the changing nature of warfare with an emphasis on the last round of Israeli confrontation with Palestinian terror.

**Palestinian Terrorism as a Model for the Changing Nature of Warfare**

A debate on the question of the nature of war ensures longevity for those involved. There is a very broad spectrum of opinions as to the question of whether the nature of wars or warfare changed in the 21st century and whether the change is really in the nature of war or just in the definition of opponents and weapons. To support the goal of the work, I will not go into these fundamental questions but will mention the new challenges facing the State of Israel in the war against Palestinian terror.

Since World War II, and in the context of the State of Israel since the Yom Kippur War, the nature of war has been gradually changing – from comprehensive conventional wars between states to low intense conflicts between states and nonstate actors. This statement does not mean that traditional war has ended but rather states that the phenomenon of other conflicts has expanded.

The first challenge is the understanding of the variables in the asymmetric hybrid war that occurs in a saturated area of civilian population. While in traditional war, the question concerning the military commander was where the enemy was located, indeed in an asymmetrical war the disturbing question is who is the enemy? In this war, the
enemy does not wear a uniform and necessarily interacts within populated areas. The enemy can actually be a citizen and a terrorist as he wishes. The enemy can appear as a politician, an extreme religious leader and inciter or even as a policeman. The enemy can go by all organization components and adapt himself according to the course of action we have chosen to fight against him. The important factor here is the political dimension not the tactical / operational dimension.

If we examine the conflict with the Palestinians, we can see that the characteristics of the enemy changed in accordance with the political situation, to a point it was difficult to understand who the enemy actually was. In certain periods, the Palestinian security forces were allies and operated in full cooperation with IDF, in other instances they stood by and did not prevent certain terrorist acts, and in certain periods they became the enemy turning their weapon against IDF soldiers.

The second challenge is the regulation of relations between the military and the political echelons. In traditional wars, dialog is simple. The political echelon orders the military to win the war and after achieving victory or truce, the political process will begin. Even if victory is not simple, its definition is clear. In these wars, there is an authorized system by the state to manage the termination of the conflict. On the other hand, when the enemy is an organization, the delineation of the problem covers up the boundaries of time, place and possible achievements in the struggle. In these limited conflicts, it is hard to define political objectives and to translate them into military missions. As a result, a different kind of dialogue between the military and political echelon is required, not just hierarchical dialogue where the political echelon directs and the military executes.
The third challenge is the need for both process and organizational changes in security organizations built in a way that matches the reality of traditional wars. A number of examples from recent years could explain the need for these changes. The United States reached this conclusion after the attacks of September 11, 2001, regarding the division of areas between the civil authorities (the CIA and FBI) and military intelligence. The conclusion was the need for reorganization, and in order to do so a civilian inspector coordinator was appointed to all intelligence arms that report to the President. Even in the State of Israel, important changes were made in this field and the most prominent was the change made in the military and the GSS in an attempt to improve coping with suicide terrorism out of the West Bank and Gaza during the second intifada and in the years following Operation “Defensive Shield”. In order to act effectively against terrorism it is required "to close the operational circle" connecting the intelligence capabilities of the GSS to the operational capability of military forces on the ground. The vulnerability time of the targets is shorter in these cases than traditional wars and hence, complex coordination between the organizations is required. Despite this organizational problem, which in fact only the Prime Minister can formally connect between the two organizations (the GSS and the military), the entities managed to create efficient work processes.

The fourth challenge is the technological challenge and its nature in matching ability and means developed for a traditional war to an asymmetric-limited war. Therefore, this requires technology matching in the war against terror organizations. The adjustment is not only technical but also conceptual.
The fifth challenge is the proper use of the media. One of the important dimensions in all types of wars is international and public legitimacy. This dimension has a direct effect on freedom of action, the time in which you can operate and a variety of means that can be used. The legitimacy is influenced by the image of reality that is created in the media and not necessarily from reality itself.

The sixth challenge is the gap remaining between the levels of expectation to the ability to fulfill them. In asymmetrical wars, a large gap exists between the expectations of public opinion, politicians and press to the security forces' ability to realize them. The gap is expressed in terms of duration of war. What is the required time for a large, strong and progressive army as the IDF to defeat hundreds or thousands of terrorists? For the number of casualties on both sides (with an emphasis on the innocent) - after all asymmetric wars are usually defined as “wars of choice” and therefore the cost of human lives is accordingly high. Also the ability to achieve total victory (by definition of traditional war) - the public and politicians are willing to pay a price in every war and under the conditions that at the end we will achieve a clear and absolute victory. This definition of victory is complicated mainly when there is an asymmetric definition between the disputed parties. Usually the State will define victory as a decision whereas the terror organization will define it as survival.

**Variables Affecting the Level of Terrorism**

After we have clarified the challenges facing the State of Israel in the nature of the current conflict, I will try to clarify the variables that affect the level of terrorism. Most terrorist organizations are based on three main components: (a.) ideological, religious leadership; (b.) political, state leadership; (c.) terrorist military arm (often defined as an
army and sometimes operational terrorist arms). Each component has a different role and the synchronization between these components is the power of the organization.

According to an analysis conducted in Israel by the GSS following a wave of terror in early 2000, a high correlation was identified between three key variables\textsuperscript{15}. The first is Palestinian public opinion, second is a policy of terror attacks by the Hamas organization, and third, a thwarting policy of the Palestinian Authority. The analysis showed an opposite correlation between Palestinian public support in the political process and a decrease in terrorist attacks. That is, as long as support in the political process increases, the number of suicide bombings decreases. One of the reasons is probably the second variable, which is the Hamas organization that led the terrorist activity against Israel, but is also attentive to public opinion. Hamas is perceived only as a terrorist organization but in fact, it is beyond that. Hamas is an ideological organization where the central pillar is built on education infrastructure, welfare and preaching.

For years, Israel looked at Hamas through the narrow prism of a terrorist organization, but its dependence on the public made the organization to subordinate terrorist attacks on public opinion. As long as the Palestinian public believed that its national aspirations would be fulfilled through the political process, it did not give legitimacy to terrorism. The third variable is, as stated, the Palestinian Authority's position in relation to terrorism. Palestinian security forces also are attentive to public opinion and act accordingly to thwart terrorism. As to public opinion, the belief of security services is that as long as the war against terrorism and Hamas members will lead them to an independent state, they will continue the same route, but once they lose confidence in the process, fighting against terrorism will cease.
Indeed, in the summer of 2000, following the failure of talks at the Camp David II summit, a process occurred whose nature was the loss of confidence in the political process among the Palestinian public. The Palestinian public no longer believed that the political process would fulfill the expectations of independence, would end the occupation and generally improve. The change in public opinion quickly translated to terrorist organization activities and ended the activities of Palestinian security forces against terrorism. However, in 2007, after the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank understood that Hamas threatened their status; out of survival necessity, they began to fight Hamas while promoting the negotiations with the State of Israel.

The Efforts Required for Effective Counterterrorism

After clarifying the complex relationship between the military and political echelons and clarifying the nature of the current fighting of the State of Israel against Palestinian terrorism, I will try to place the required model to effectively fight terrorism.

Military-Political Relations. Clausewitz stated, in his book *On War* that the essence of victory is in creating a better political reality. If we accept this statement, indeed the common purpose of the political and military leadership is to build a model that will allow the achievement of victory, in other words to reach a diplomatic endstate. Therefore, it is required to match the echelon relations model to the type of war we are faced with and supposed to deal with.

As I described the changes in the nature of war in terms of intensity, for the sake of simplicity, I will now define a rough classification of types of warfare. The first type is a high intensity conflict, or in other words, the conventional war that characterized Israel's wars in the past (in fact, until the Yom Kippur War in 1973) in which weapons
used were airplanes, tanks and ships and the desired endstate was usually the
destruction of the enemy's army. The second type of warfare, that accompanies the
State of Israel and the rest of the world in recent decades, is a low intensity conflict, or
in other words, asymmetric warfare. Since terrorism is the subject of this project, we will
extend the concepts related to the time dimension and to the concept of victory. Unlike
conventional war, which is perceived as a short and existential threat, terrorism is an
ongoing threat that is not considered existential; its influence permeates and crumbles
over time. The defined goal of terrorists is to survive, not to surrender. Most of the
definitions on the asymmetric nature of this warfare refer to weapons but not to
asymmetry between the concept of the decision against not surrendering and from the
meanings derived from it17.

Regarding the issue of relations between the military and political echelons, we
can indicate three possible models. The first model is Clausewitz model of a diplomat
dictating political objectives and using military tools at their disposal. This hierarchical
model has two modes of operations, war or peace, and has a very clear hierarchy
where the political echelon defines missions or political objectives to the military
echelon18. The second model suggested by Raymond Aron19, in his book On War and
Peace, he sees the diplomat as holding in one hand diplomacy and in the other the
military option, and uses it simultaneously or ranked in both arms to achieve political
goals. This is a parallel and dynamic model where interaction between political
guidance, diplomacy and military ability exists. This model seems most appropriate for
conventional warfare.
The third model is a model suggested by Gen. (ret.) Dov Tamari where the military and political echelons go through a joint learning process, something less hierarchical. The parties sit together and focus on the content created in the ongoing discussion. In this situation, the military cannot complain that the political echelon did not dictate a policy. In this model, especially when discussing the fight against terrorism, where the limits of force activations are clear, there is no place for dictating. The role of the political echelon is not to dictate, but to shape, whereas the role of the military is to enter the vacuum created in the goal to create discourse. It seems that in the reality that the State of Israel is situated, and the restriction on the political leadership to dictate goals by political and state constraints, this model of ongoing discussions between echelons shall be acquired. As stated, in this model the political echelon sets its goals at any point in time, largely from understanding the limits of the power and the conflict.

Redefine “Decisive” and “Victory”. Israel failed at the outset in an attempt to deal with fighting terrorism while using conventional warfare. The victory concept becomes irrelevant against an enemy whose goal is not to surrender and the deterrence concept does not exist against a society’s vision that has nothing to lose. The terrorist organizations Israel faces are organized and operate in a hybrid manner which makes it difficult to declare victory on the battlefield. The hybridism concept (see Figure 1) is reflected in the organization structure such as Hamas and Hezbollah, in which four parallel working mechanisms exist that allow movement and transfer from one to the other or the neglect of one mechanism for prosperity of the others.

The four mechanisms are: (a.) Ideological leadership - usually a religious fanatical extremist who leads the religious ideas that drive the organization. This
leadership operates charity institutes through which the movement draws the population closer to its ideas (winning the hearts and minds). The charities are responsible for the movement’s educational institutions, welfare institutions and fund-raising activities to support the idea of the movement (civil and military); (b.) Political leadership – divided into external leadership and internal leadership. The political arm of “external Hamas” is responsible for the relationship with Hamas and Islamic states and terror organizations and on the strengthening of the military arm. The head of the political arm of “internal Hamas” is responsible for the foreign affairs of the organization and for competing over the local authority throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip; (c.) Terrorist cells - responsible for the realization of armed resistance against Israel, its citizens and its security forces. Usually organized based on geographic spaces of central control and operate according to the guidelines of the military arm and not as per the political leadership (although there is a dialogue partner among them). Its members undergo training abroad and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and are supported by foreign leadership that provides most of the weapons and methods with the assistance of countries such as Iran and Syria; (d.) Military arm - based on the police force and operational power organized in a framework like an army. Such power was established in Gaza after the Hamas takeover of government institutions and similar attempts were made to establish a similar force in the West Bank but those attempts were thwarted by Israeli security forces and security forces of the Palestinian Authority;
So the question asked is how to act against this type of a system? How is it possible to decide and what is defined as victory?

The overall response to this complex problem should be based on a number of principles:

1. Instead of using the term deterrence, that is not relevant in the face of this type of threat, we must act to achieve attrition (see Figure 2). Attrition means continuous pressure on the opponent in all areas and possible means for a period of time while focusing on the armed groups and much less on the general population, because it cannot pressure and deter the radicals in the midst. It is best that the pressure should be free of all negotiations, except for temporary tactical purposes. The advantage of attrition is that it does not allow, or at least slows the learning process of the opponent, diminishes its power and increases the loss. The disadvantage of attrition is that it is not easily achieved and sometimes the one exhausting may be exhausted. A good example is the declared war against Hamas with an emphasis on the West Bank region. This battle included; attrition of Hamas, on all components, including direct damage of
terrorist activists; damage of economic institutions while detaining expert money changers of funds transferred to the organization; closing of charities and transferring them to the Palestinian Authority; technological prevention of transfer of knowledge and terrorists of foreign leadership to the organization in the West Bank, all this was brought together by combining the various intelligence sources

![Figure 2. The Idea of Attrition](image)

2. Maintaining legitimacy - Maintaining legitimacy for actions against terrorist organizations is an essential component in the ability to cope, especially during negotiations between rival parties. What has changed in recent years is not only the nature of military conflicts but also the very existence of violent conflicts that cause the killing of human beings. In order to succeed in war, legitimacy must be maintained for strategy (the actual act of going to war) and tactics (the method of conduct and operated means). The first alone is not enough. In contrast, these limitations are similar (though not identical) on the enemy as well, even if the enemy is a non-political organization (having provided a clear affinity to an organization like Hamas and Hezbollah unlike the Al Qaeda organization). The restraints forced by these
organizations imposed upon themselves in recent years shows how a combination of military force with other means - political, economic and public - is the right thing\textsuperscript{20}.

3. The designed battles, not only operational programs – the reality facing the army in the political process conducted for peace arrangements with the Palestinians in parallel to the ongoing war on terrorism, along with a dynamic and complex political process in which governments change, on average, every two years. The constant pressure from the international system has different interests and diverse conflict solutions, the amount of agreements these governments sign requires the army to abandon the current planning process of the defined threat which operational plans are prepared against. The system design approach allows the required flexibility for dynamic discourse between planners and designers. The campaign design methodology will apply continuous strategic thinking to the problem which requires frequent reframing as required by the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians\textsuperscript{21}.

The complexity of the conflict regarding the numerous actors involved (Palestinian – Fatah & Hamas, military, settlers, international community, etc.); the dynamics of the negotiations; external influences and many other variables and the critical desired endstate for the State of Israel, are all emphasizing the importance of the design approach.

The Campaign against Hamas – A Case Study

In 2006, the IDF Central Command initiated a campaign against Hamas. The campaign was initiated due to the understanding that the Hamas movement was not only a terrorist organization trying to achieve its goals through terrorist acts committed by its military wing; but that the organization operated as a hybrid system (as indicated before), and that actual damage to the movement would be possible through attacking
its political institutions, financial and sermonizing system, and charity institutions that
directly support the terrorist activities of the movement. The campaign required an
interagency effort in order to understand the way in which the organization operated and
a plan to create sufficient targets against Hamas.

The planning approach performed by the Central Command, consisted of
analyzing the operational environment, defining operational objectives and eventually
identifying numerous targets which were submitted to the six regional brigades in the
West Bank. This approach created a reality in which, within a short period, many
infrastructures of the Hamas organization were damaged, including operational activists
arrests, detention of money changers, shutting down charitable institutions and
businesses and confiscation of equipment that was used to support the organization’s
activities.

After less than a year, the government ordered a halt to the campaign due to the
pressures of the Palestinian Authority (led by the Fatah movement) and the international
community due to second and third order effects of the operation. These implications of
the damage that was caused to the Palestinian economy, the population which was
supported by these institutions and damaging the Palestinian Authority, which was
perceived as collaborators with Israel against the Palestinian people, were not taken
into account while planning the campaign and not properly analyzed during the overall
assessment performed during the operational planning. In fact, the Palestinian public
that was hurt as a result of this operation found themselves standing alongside the
Hamas movement and against the Palestinian Authority.
Using the design approach could have allowed the Central Command to frame the operational environment and try to answer the questions as to the tendency and the "alternative future environments that those opposing us may desire, so we can consider this in developing an operational approach that will not only meet our endstate, but preclude the undesirable aspects of the opposing endstate". In this case, using the design approach could have enabled the Central Command to understand the consequences expected from the possible course of action against the organization and its implications on the population and the Palestinian Authority and not just the consequences related to the operational environment and the organization's ability to carry out terrorist acts. In addition, the design approach will allow reframing of the problem, "which focus heavily on progress towards a selected end state and uses assessment as a tool to inform a response and reactions to current condition." In other words, even during the operation, if the basic conditions changed in the operational environment (such as population response, the Palestinian Authority and international pressure), the design approach would allow the Central Command, by reframing the problems, to change the operational approach and still accomplish the endstate of the campaign without having the political echelon intervene and stopping the operation. The advantages of the design approach in a complex and ambiguous environment like the current conflict with the Palestinians will enable the IDF to carry out its tasks and meet its objectives more effectively while supporting strategic goals of the State of Israel.

Conclusion

The campaign that the State of Israel is conducting against terrorism, especially the Palestinian terrorism in the West Bank and Gaza, and the operational environment
in which it is carried out, is the most complex and ambiguous that could be described. This complexity forces the military to operate under sets of limitations and constraints that set a significant challenge. On the tactical level, the military and the other intelligence agencies managed to cope with waves of terror, subdue it and dispel it from the public agenda of the citizens of Israel. However, on the national strategic level, an effective pressure against terrorism will be possible by understanding the current changing nature of warfare (hybrid environment), the urban and high population density environment in which it occurred and its implication in the international arena; by forcing a new model in the relationship between the military and government echelons, different and more open dialogue and flow of information between both sides; by understanding the concept of victory in the asymmetric and low intensity conflict which will probably influence the strategic objective of the campaign; and by acquiring the design methodology which will offer a more flexible and adjustable approach for the dynamic environment, unlike the current planning process.

Endnotes


3 “Terrorism against Israel in 2006: data characteristics and trends”, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center Intelligence Heritage Center

4 Ron Tira, “Movement of the Tectonic plates - a review of the peace process assumptions”, Strategic Update, Vol 12, Issue 1, May 2009

5 Gabriel Siboni, “From the Second Intifada through the second Lebanon war and operation ‘Cast Lead’; attach one campaign”, Military Strategy, Volume 1, Issue 1, even in 2009, p. 26

Omri Tov, “Economic implications of the disengagement plan”

Brom, Shlomo, “Hamas takeover of Gaza”, INSS Volume No. 21, June 17, 2007


Brom, Shlomo, “Policy options for Israel after the Hamas takeover of Gaza” targeting strategic, Issue 7, June 19, 2007

Moshe Ya'alon, “Discourse between the civilian to the military”, civilian military Relations, Memorandum 82, February 2006, p. 16

Yehuda Ben Meir, “the echelon Considerations of military conflicts”


Giora Eiland, “Changing nature of wars”, Strategic Update, Volume 10, Issue 1, June 2007, p. 12-14

Ami Ayalon, “War on terror: the need for new mil – pol model”, Civilian – military relations in Israel in time of military confrontation, Memorandum 82, February 2006, p. 63

Ibid, p.66


Giora Eiland, “Changing nature of wars”, Strategic Update, Volume 10, Issue 1, June 2007, p. 18

U.S. Department of the Army, USAWC, Campaign Planning Handbook” (Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, AY10) p. 33

Ibid p. 35.

Ibid p. 32.