

MAINTAINING THE PROFESSIONALISM OF THE U.S. ARMY OFFICER CORPS

BY

COLONEL C. THOMAS CLIMER
United States Army

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USAWC CLASS OF 2010

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 12-03-2010		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Maintaining the Professionalism of the U.S. Army Officer Corps				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel C. Thomas Climer				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Colonel William G. Braun Strategic Studies Institute				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT In order to maintain status as a profession, any group of people practicing a specific line of work must ensure they continue to meet the requirements associated with the definition of a profession. In recent years, the U.S. Army has instituted policies and practices that cause some to worry about the detrimental effect they will have on the professionalism of the U.S. Army Officer Corps. There are three policies in particular that cause concern. These policies are the decisions to outsource Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) instruction, Intermediate Level Education (ILE) curriculum development and instruction, and doctrine writing. This paper will address the definition of a profession and discuss how officership fits within the model of a profession. It will examine trends and issues in the U.S. Army that led to the decision to outsource ROTC instruction, ILE instruction and doctrine writing and examine why each of the decisions potentially undermines the profession. Lastly, it will discuss possible outcomes if the leadership of the U.S. Army fails to reverse these decisions and postulate a solution. The decisions to outsource ROTC Instruction, ILE instruction and doctrine writing place the Army on a path toward loss of control over its other professional jurisdictions.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Officer Professionalism, Contracting, Outsourcing, ROTC, ILE, Doctrine Writing					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON William G. Braun III
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) (717) 245-4125

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Colonel C. Thomas Climer
United States Army

Colonel William G. Braun
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel C. Thomas Climer
TITLE: Maintaining the Professionalism of the U.S. Army Officer Corps
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 12 March 2010 WORD COUNT: 6,875 PAGES: 34
KEY TERMS: Officer Professionalism, Contracting, Outsourcing, ROTC, ILE, Doctrine Writing
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

In order to maintain status as a profession, any group of people practicing a specific line of work must ensure they continue to meet the requirements associated with the definition of a profession. In recent years, the U.S. Army has instituted policies and practices that cause some to worry about the detrimental effect they will have on the professionalism of the U.S. Army Officer Corps. There are three policies in particular that cause concern. These policies are the decisions to outsource Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) instruction, Intermediate Level Education (ILE) curriculum development and instruction, and doctrine writing. This paper will address the definition of a profession and discuss how officership fits within the model of a profession. It will examine trends and issues in the U.S. Army that led to the decision to outsource ROTC instruction, ILE instruction and doctrine writing and examine why each of the decisions potentially undermines the profession. Lastly, it will discuss possible outcomes if the leadership of the U.S. Army fails to reverse these decisions and postulate a solution. The decisions to outsource ROTC Instruction, ILE instruction and doctrine writing place the Army on a path toward loss of control over its other professional jurisdictions.

MAINTAINING THE PROFESSIONALISM OF THE U.S. ARMY OFFICER CORPS

In recent years, the U.S. Army has instituted policies and practices that cause some to worry about the detrimental effect they will have on the professionalism of the U.S. Army Officer Corps. There are three policies in particular that cause concern. These policies are the decisions to outsource Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) instruction, Intermediate Level Education (ILE) curriculum development and instruction, and doctrine writing.¹ Those voicing concern over these issues argue that such policies go against the very grain of professionalism and therefore undermine the status of the officer profession.

In order to maintain status as a profession, any group of people practicing a specific line of work must ensure they continue to meet the requirements associated with the definition of a profession. Over the years, many professions have developed and others have disappeared. Some professions subordinated others and some professions either gained or lost influence in a particular field. Psychiatry emerged as a new profession in the 19th Century and now is challenged by both psychologists and social workers for dominance in the field of mental health.² Homeopathic medicine has all but disappeared in competition with the disciplines of allopathic and osteopathic medicine.³ According to sociologist Andrew Abbott, professions exist in a system of professions and as such continue to vie for legitimacy and work in various fields.⁴ In the field of death; doctors, clergy, lawyers and counselors all vie for control of various aspects of human response and reaction.⁵ Therefore, the senior leaders within the profession of U.S. Army Officer need to remain cognizant of issues that either strengthen or weaken the claim to professional status for the officer corps. If the

leadership does not actively seek to secure our professional status, we run the risk of deprofessionalization and perhaps a loss of authority to practice our military expertise.

This paper will address the definition of a profession and discuss how officership fits within the model of a profession. It will examine trends and issues in the U.S. Army that led to the decision to outsource ROTC instruction, ILE instruction and doctrine writing and examine why each of the decisions potentially undermines the profession. Lastly, it will discuss possible outcomes if the leadership of the U.S. Army fails to reverse these decisions and postulate a solution.

What is a Profession?

Several factors distinguish a profession from other occupations. Relevant here are the definitions as espoused by Samuel Huntington and Andrew Abbott. Both studied professions from the sociological standpoint.

Samuel Huntington's definition of a profession centers on the factors of expertise, responsibility and corporateness.⁶ Huntington maintains that the "professional man is an expert with specialized skill and knowledge in a significant field of human endeavor."⁷ He then asserts that the professional is responsible to perform his specialized service for society when needed.⁸ Lastly, members of the profession must associate themselves as a member of a collective who share that same social responsibility. In other words they maintain a shared sense of being members of the same group.⁹ Another key aspect of his definition includes the requirement for a broad liberal education as the foundation for the specialized knowledge of the profession which is taught by the profession itself¹⁰. Other relevant concepts to his definition include a "higher calling" to the service, the necessity of rotating personnel between operational

and academic positions within the profession and the requirement that pay not be the primary motivation for participation in the profession.¹¹

According to Andrew Abbott, a profession is a group of people practicing the same occupation who acquire and apply esoteric or abstract knowledge to solve problems.¹² The most important facet of the abstract knowledge is its ability to allow practitioners to make new diagnoses, develop and implement treatments and create new methods of inference to apply the knowledge to new problems.¹³ Like Huntington, Abbott states that the problems that professions attempt to solve are human or social ones that are “amenable to expert service.”¹⁴ To be considered a profession, the field of endeavor must also have an academic knowledge system with the ability to instruct its own members.¹⁵

Abbott’s definition also states that a profession must establish a jurisdiction or area where it will practice this expertise and a client whom it supports.¹⁶ A profession can claim jurisdiction over the application of a particular abstract knowledge, the responsibility for self-discipline, “control of professional training,...and of licensing its professionals, to mention only a few.”¹⁷ The jurisdiction can be recognized legally or by public deference.¹⁸ Most professions seek to establish absolute control over a jurisdiction, but that is not usually possible.¹⁹ Sometimes jurisdiction is shared, split by the type of client, or split by the specific nature of the work with another profession.²⁰ A profession can also subordinate itself to another profession or maintain a simple advisory role within a body of work.²¹ Finally, jurisdiction over the work can truly be shared by multiple professions with no division of labor at all.²²

Lastly, as noted in the introduction, Abbott declares that all professions exist within a system of professions.²³ He asserts that only professions with the expert knowledge base and ability to use abstraction with that knowledge are able to redefine their work and defend it from being dominated by other professions. In essence, all professions by nature must fight to retain their jurisdictions and most continue to look for new work through expansion of their current jurisdictions. So, professions are always in conflict with other professions.

The Army as a Profession and the Army Officer as a Professional

We can now examine how an officer in the United States Army can be deemed a professional on the basis of both Huntington's and Abbott's work. Huntington himself in his seminal work *The Soldier and the State* was the first to proclaim that the military officer is indeed a professional. In the opening of his book, he states: "The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer is a professional man."²⁴ Huntington lays out how military officers meet the requirements of expertise, responsibility and corporateness in order to attain status as professionals.

Huntington notes that a military force exists in order to fight and win armed conflicts.²⁵ This purpose is consistent with the U.S. Army's current mission statement which is noted below.

The Army's mission is to fight and win our Nation's wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in support of combatant commanders. We do this by:

- Executing Title 10 and Title 32 United States Code directives, to include organizing, equipping, and training forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land.

- Accomplishing missions assigned by the President, Secretary of Defense and combatant commanders, and Transforming for the future.²⁶

Within the military as a profession, Huntington adopts Harold Lasswell's description of the central expertise of the professional officers as being the "management of violence."²⁷ This skill is an extremely complex and intellectual one requiring years of study to master and is a skill that must be continually updated as warfare evolves and changes.²⁸ The Army officer's professional duties or expertise are to: (1) organize, train and equip the force, (2) plan the Army's activities and (3) direct its operations in and out of combat.²⁹ Huntington thereby defines the officer's expertise as the preparation of a military force to accomplish its purpose, to win conflicts. This definition by Huntington meets the criteria for professionalism by demonstrating a clearly defined area of expertise that is outside the scope of the layman and that warfare is indeed a significant area of human endeavor.

To further develop the concept of the officer as professional, Huntington notes other relevant traits that officers share with other professions. He states that officers do not act primarily for reasons of monetary reward, but rather out of a sense of loyalty and obligation to the state.³⁰ The officer's responsibility to the state is to provide expert military advice and to maintain a trained and ready force.³¹ He notes that officers also share a sense of corporateness based on the customs and traditions, associations, schools and sense of loyal service to the Nation which all serve to bind the officer corps together.³²

Members of the U.S. Army Officer Corps possess a sense of belonging to a special and unique group. Like the medical profession, the Army possesses some necessary bureaucracy in order to allow it to function. However, as doctors are to the

medical profession, officers are the professionals within the military profession.³³ The right to belong to and practice as an officer is limited to a select group and an Army officer's commission is his authority to practice the profession just as a medical license permits the doctor to practice his profession.³⁴ DA civilians hired under US Code Title 10 to provide instruction at military institutions are also serving professionals in that their license to practice is the authority granted them by the Secretary of the Army to study, develop and teach the Army's expert knowledge.³⁵ Army officers and Title 10 DA Civilian professors and instructors are the Army's professionals. Both have broad undergraduate training requirements, specialized knowledge instructional requirements, are subject to control and discipline by the profession, and direct the Army profession's accomplishment of its mission.

Several authors have published updated interpretations of the Army profession based on the writings of Andrew Abbott that analyze how the military profession meets the criteria of his model. Dr. Don Snider has published an anthology of these interpretations in a work entitled *The Future of the Army Profession*. Some of these articles look at the work military officers do and describe how it fits into the model of developing and applying abstract knowledge to solve new military problems. Others address the jurisdictions that the Army maintains authority over, by consent of its client, the United States of America and its citizens. Many of these articles also address how the Army profession is in competition with other professions and occupations for control of various jurisdictions.

The US Army's own doctrine states that one of the fundamental aspects of any profession is the development and instruction of an expert base of knowledge and the

development of the professionals who will practice and apply that knowledge.³⁶ Richard Lacquement further develops the special expertise that Army officers possess as one that is responsible for “the development, operation, and leadership of a human organization--a profession--whose primary expertise is the application of coercive force on behalf of the American people; for the Army officer, such development, operation and leadership occurs incidentally to sustaining America’s dominance in land warfare.³⁷ In other words, the Army’s primary professional function is to conduct dominant land warfare in order to win the Nation’s wars. Within the scope of this function are the six jurisdictions of the Army as noted by Don Snider. The six Army jurisdictions are: (1) Major Combat Operations, (2) Stability Operations, (3) Strategic Deterrence, (4) Homeland Security, (5) Develop Expert Knowledge, and (6) Develop Army Professionals with Expertise.³⁸ The first four are external jurisdictions and the last two are internal jurisdictions within the Army Profession.³⁹ Now that the Department of Homeland Security exists, the true jurisdiction for the military now lies in Homeland Defense rather than Homeland Security, though the boundaries between the two are not absolutely delineated.⁴⁰ The officer, as the professional within that organization, exercises “leadership of Army soldiers in the organized application of coercive force” as his primary area of professional expertise to enable the Army to successfully maintain and execute its jurisdictions.⁴¹ The Title 10 professor at the US Army War College or ILE is focused on the development of the Army’s expert knowledge and developing Army professionals with expertise.

Lacquement further maps out four broad categories of expertise required by the Army that make it unique. These four categories are the Military Technical, Human

Development, Moral-Ethical and Political-Cultural.⁴² The Military-Technical category centers on the ability of officers to master the ability to apply violence in order to attain policy objectives.⁴³ Human Development refers to the ability of the Army to develop expert knowledge and imbue it in the members of the profession through professional development, academic instruction and training.⁴⁴ Within the Moral-Ethical category officers must develop and maintain a thorough understanding of the ethical application of force, the necessity of maintaining high morals within the officer corps in order to maintain a profession that is fully trusted by its client, and a full grasp of the ethical dimensions of civil-military relations.⁴⁵ Lastly, the Political-Cultural category refers to the requirement for Army officers to be experts in the critical task of “advising society on the use of the profession’s expertise”, and the need to understand cultural impacts of military operations in other countries.⁴⁶

Richard Lacquement notes that in keeping with Abbott’s theory, the Army is indeed in competition with other professions for control of these jurisdictions. He explains that the other military services, government agencies, and many private firms are all in competition with the Army for work relating to the Nation’s defense.⁴⁷ The Army must always be cognizant that other professions are seeking to obtain jurisdiction over work within the Army’s current portfolio.

Arguably, the US Army is a profession and the professionals within that organization are the officers. The officer corps is where the esoteric expert knowledge resides that is learned over a career in order to apply it to solving the ever changing problems of land warfare. Like doctors in the medical corps, Army officers make a diagnosis of the military situation, apply one’s expert knowledge and prescribe

treatment in the form of strategic, operational and/or tactical solutions depending on where one is in his or her career development. Clearly—the Army is also in competition with the other US Armed Services (notably the Marine Corps) for jurisdiction in this domain. Likewise—other government agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and the ever expanding world of private military contractors also vie for some of the jurisdictions the Army claims as its own (protecting America from attack and training our military or foreign militaries).⁴⁸ The next section will highlight some of the contracting changes that have eroded the Army's claim to some of its current jurisdictions.

External Pressures on the Army Profession

The end of the Cold War created pressure on the Department of Defense's (DOD) budget. After years of large defense budgets, the Congress and the American people wanted a "peace dividend" in light of what seemed to be a peaceful new future.⁴⁹ DOD looked at many areas to save money while still seeking to maintain a capable military. Manpower is one of the most increasingly expensive components of the defense budget. As of 2007, the annual cost of 10,000 active duty soldiers was \$1.2B a year and growing due to salaries and increasingly costly benefits.⁵⁰ The military would seek to reduce its active duty force level from 2.1 million at the end of the Cold War to a planned level of 1.36 million by 2005.⁵¹ This process began in 1989 and was interrupted briefly by Desert Storm in 1991. For the US Army, its active duty military declined from a force containing eighteen Divisions to one that contained only ten. Ironically, just as the Army began to downsize, it became busier than ever.⁵² Operations in Panama, Kuwait, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and many domestic operations all served to significantly increase the OPTEMPO while budgets and personnel manning were being

reduced. Yet despite an increasingly smaller force and budget, the Army still needed to continue to do more with less. New sourcing strategies were needed to meet these demands and the Army turned to contracting to meet many of its needs.

The U.S. Army has a long history of using contracting to meet demands that it could not fulfill with uniformed personnel. Up until World War II, most of the outsourcing was done to meet materiel and other logistical needs.⁵³ During World War II and after, the Army did privatize some training functions such as some portions of pilot training and even some portions of enlisted training.⁵⁴ During the Vietnam War, the Army further extended its contracting to include some training for Vietnamese soldiers and officers.⁵⁵ This trend was formalized in policy with OMB Circular A-76 published in 1983 which directed that government “rely on commercial entities to provide those services that are not inherently governmental....”⁵⁶ In other words, government agencies should look to the private sector to provide any services that were not core functions.

This trend towards privatization continued even during and after the Reagan era military build-up as the military continued to have more work than it had soldiers to do the work.⁵⁷ As the mission load continued to rise in the 1990s, increasing fiscal and personnel pressures caused the Army to look beyond the traditional materiel and logistical functions for areas where contracting could assist in meeting demands.

Assumed Risk and Outsourcing Decisions

The U.S. Army commissioned a study by the RAND Corporation to look into the possibility of outsourcing ROTC instruction. In 1997 the Army began a two year test program where Military Professional Resources International (MPRI), a private military contracting firm staffed and operated by many retired officers, filled some of the ROTC instructor billets.⁵⁸ The focus of the study was on assessing alternative solutions to the

use of active-duty Soldiers and to determine projected savings in both manpower and cost.⁵⁹ Despite some noted potential risks that the program might reduce the effectiveness and efficiency of ROTC instruction and a clear potential for increased cost, the program was implemented. As of 2002, some ROTC instructor positions at over 200 universities and colleges were staffed with contracted instructors.⁶⁰

In line with this trend, the Army also began to outsource other areas involved in the development and teaching of its core expert knowledge. Some instructors and curriculum developers at the Army's ILE course are now being filled by contracted staff.^{61 62} Doctrine writers and analysts within Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) are increasingly being filled through privatization.⁶³ The U.S. Army's decision to outsource the Reserve Officer Training Corps, and other levels of military education, and development of expert knowledge undermines and erodes the Army's asserted status as a professional institution.⁶⁴

These decisions were all made in light of the pressures that increasing workload and decreasing budgets are placing on the Army profession. Hiring contracted personnel was an expedient solution for meeting the manning needs of the Army during a period of continued mission growth to ensure that combat units were manned at optimum strength while also continuing to execute the vital training and knowledge development function.⁶⁵ However, it seems that under the pressure to meet personnel requirements, the Army did not devote sufficient thought to the professional implications of the decisions to contract out core tasks.

Outsourcing ROTC Instruction. The instruction of the Army's future officers during their pre-commissioning phase is a critical time for the development of these new

professionals. This is the seed corn from which our future senior military leaders will develop. The Army profession does not bring in senior leaders laterally from outside of the organization; they must be developed from its own junior leaders. Seventy-five percent of Army officers are commissioned through ROTC programs.⁶⁶ The ROTC program is designed to make professional military officers out of civilian students at civilian educational institutions.⁶⁷ Teaching future officers the basic fundamentals of the profession in ROTC is the first opportunity the Army has to expose them to the military as a profession and not just a job.

As former CSA GEN Peter Schoomaker noted, “Our core competencies remain: to train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders...”⁶⁸ In this sense, GEN Schoomaker was restating Snider’s argument that one of the internal jurisdictions of the Army is the training of future professionals. By any definition, a core competency is something absolutely vital to the success of an organization.^{69 70} In line with the definitions of a profession, the Army is responsible for educating its own professional members and certifying them for entry-level practice in the profession. We must also imbue in them a passion for a lifetime of learning about the expert knowledge of land warfare required by Army officers. As such, the decision to outsource the function of ROTC instruction to a body outside the Army profession can be considered one that contributes to the deprofessionalization of the Army.

Hiring private contractors to execute this function can indeed free up officers to serve in other billets. However, it can also have some unintended consequences that undermine the mission of the ROTC program to produce junior professionals. The contracting firms that have been used so far hire only retired military personnel with

some restrictive qualifications.⁷¹ Some of the requirements for these retired officers are that they must wear a uniform, be able to pass the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) and be retired for less than two years.⁷² While these are a few tangible qualifications, there are other intangible qualities that may be missing or less prevalent in a retired population.⁷³ Some of these intangibles include commitment, professional ethic, and a sense of selfless service.⁷⁴

Instructors are the role models and mentors for the developing professionals in the ROTC programs.⁷⁵ There is concern that retired officers no longer have the right to practice their profession. They surrendered their “license” to practice when they retired and gave up their commission.⁷⁶ Without their commission, one might question a retiree’s commitment to the ideals of selfless service and the willingness to accept the unlimited liability it represents.⁷⁷ In no other field are the professionals expected to willingly lay down their lives if necessary. The retiree is no longer subject to the ultimate sacrifice. To the aspiring officer, these mentors and instructors may represent the ideals of a market based service that is seeking to make a profit while simply performing a job and producing a product.⁷⁸

Additionally, the rapid pace of technological and doctrinal change in our modern military can undermine the development of expert knowledge in the ROTC cadets. In the past, ROTC programs would usually have one Lieutenant Colonel, one Major and two Captains in addition to some NCOs on their staff.⁷⁹ If the programs were staffed this way today, they would have officers with recent service (and likely combat experience) at levels closer to the entry positions the cadets are about to assume. Retired officers teaching may be retired only two years, but these are usually officers more senior in

grade. Missing is the vital relevant instruction from the tactical level Captains, recent graduates of commissioning programs themselves. These Captains would be able to maintain a focus on developing the necessary entry level professional skills and knowledge required of the new generation of leaders as they study their chosen profession for the first time. The older retired officers are products of an era when the Army was arguably more bureaucratic and less professional.⁸⁰

So far, no one has discovered any measurable decline in quality of instruction due to the outsourcing of ROTC instruction. However, we must remain watchful. The contract has already been transferred from MPRI to COMTek which has been described as being notably less professional.⁸¹ Costs and profit margins are the driving forces for contractors. Who can deny that the potential to hire less qualified instructors for less money is not possible?

Of further concern is that the contract to outsource instructors has given the hiring discretion to the contractor.⁸² Not only does this leave the contractor significant room to hire less qualified personnel to reduce costs, but it also removes the Army and the Congress from their previous role as overseers of the hiring and staffing process.⁸³ One of the Army's greatest areas of weakness is oversight of contractors which further removes the necessary control over the profession.⁸⁴ In numerous other contracting ventures, the Department of Defense experienced problems with "performance, reliability, accountability and discipline."⁸⁵ The Army simply does not have enough personnel to oversee the management of the numerous contracts and it does not have a good history of adequately defining the requirements for any said contract.⁸⁶ Contracting out ROTC instruction is then just one more area of risk we have accepted in

the oversight area. We will largely rely on the contractor to do the right thing and remain focused on hiring instructors who can produce qualified and competent young professional officers without any authoritative control over the program.

There have been no complaints to date about the quality of either company's service in providing qualified instructors.⁸⁷ However, there are some hidden risks inherent in such a program. The results of accepting these risks may not be seen for many years until the new generation of officers attain senior leadership levels or they choose to separate from the Army. At this point it will be too late to address.

Currently, the Army is experiencing an increased level of separation among its officers in the grade of Captain. According to Army officials, the top reason young officers leave the Army are long and frequent combat tours.⁸⁸ In an era of persistent conflict, lengthy and frequent deployments will likely continue to be the norm. The loss of the ROTC billets for our younger officers can only contribute to the pattern of frequent combat rotations. These assignments were opportunities for officers to "take a knee" and do some reflection on the nature of their profession while also passing on their expert knowledge to the next generation. Today, many Captains simply resign their commissions when faced with no choice but to deploy again and endure additional family and personal hardship.

Outsourcing Intermediate-Level Education. The risks to the profession here are similar to those associated with outsourcing ROTC instruction. However, at this level, officers are Majors and midway through their careers. Prior to ILE, when Command and General Staff College (CGSC) was the field grade portion of the Officer Education System (OES), many of the instructors were themselves Majors. Because only 50% of a

year group was selected to attend CGSC, these were considered the most competitive officers. Instructors were often selected from the other 50% of each year group.⁸⁹ There was an old saying that at CGSC, the “top half of the Army was being taught by the bottom half.” Advocates of the new heavily civilian staff at CGSC point to the great number of retired officers on the staff who were former battalion and brigade commanders or who held high staff positions within the Army. They note that the experience base of these officers is much greater than the old CGSC instructors who were either Majors or Lieutenant Colonels.⁹⁰

However, this program is the key professional development program for our mid-level professional officers. Outsourcing instruction at ILE still is subject to the same risks as outsourcing ROTC. While the instructors may well be more experienced, they may also suffer from a lack of recent experience in current operations, a lack of true professional dedication as they are now loyal to their contract employer rather than the Army. Outsourcing ILE instruction to a contractor also assumes the same increased risks to the professionalism of Army officers due to the inability of the Army to provide adequate oversight of the contract.

Outsourcing Doctrine Writing. As noted earlier, one of the key functions within any profession is the requirement to develop and maintain the profession’s body of knowledge.⁹¹ As demands for military personnel have increased, the Army also turned to contracts to supplement the doctrine writing staff within TRADOC.⁹² This violates one of the most fundamental principles of any profession because the Army outsourced a portion of a key jurisdiction—developing the Army’s expert knowledge. The Army’s doctrine is the codified and collected abstract knowledge contained within Field

Manuals, Pamphlets, Training Circulars and other publications.⁹³ This is the Army's particular expert knowledge that covers its work within the jurisdictions it controls. This body of knowledge is also used as a base for the development of joint operations manuals and serves as the foundation for the role that the Army plays within the Joint Environment. It is this base of knowledge that must be continually updated and assessed as the nature of war evolves and as the requirements of the Army's client change. If the Army continues to contract out the deep thinking about the nature of war and how to wage successful land campaigns, then the Army cedes some of its authority within this critical internal jurisdiction. As author James Carafano noted in a recent book, there is great danger in "outsourcing imagination to others" when reflecting on how future wars will be fought.⁹⁴ As Andrew Abbott pointed out, one aspect of a true profession is the fact that there will be some professionals who do not focus on being practitioners, but rather focus on building the abstract knowledge that the practitioners can use.⁹⁵ The importance of those who choose to focus on the intellectual aspect of the profession over the operational is vital to preserving the internal jurisdictions of developing the expert knowledge and training the Army professionals.⁹⁶ However, this does not imply that the Army professionals who focus in this area over do not have any operational experience. Additionally, even those who choose to focus in the development and maintenance of the internal jurisdictions of the Army still retain authority to teach or research based on commission or Title 10. These research or theorist professionals are absolutely vital to the health of any profession.

Risks to Professional Jurisdiction

These decisions to outsource areas of the Army's internal professional jurisdictions must be rectified. If the Army continues to allow contractors to develop the

Army expert knowledge and to develop Army professionals, it risks the very nature of its professionalism. The decisions to outsource ROTC Instruction, ILE instruction and doctrine writing place the Army on a path toward loss of control over its other professional jurisdictions. These decisions also continue to erode the Army's own values through the practice of poor stewardship and the Army will continue to miss the opportunity to link generations of leaders.

Likewise, if the Army surrenders its jurisdiction in the development of expert knowledge and the education of its professional officers, what authority will we have to maintain its jurisdiction in the other areas awarded by society? If the Army no longer develops the expert knowledge nor prepares and educates its own professionals, one could argue that its authority in the other jurisdictions is greatly weakened.⁹⁷

Jurisdictions are in competition. Congress has directed reviews of the services roles and missions in the past. As available discretionary money in the United States Budget continues to disappear, there is increasing demand to eliminate duplicative functions throughout the military.⁹⁸ If the Army allows its jurisdiction in the development of expert knowledge to erode, it could make it more difficult to maintain its jurisdiction over land warfare or its other external jurisdictions such as major combat operations or stability operations. If the Army does not train its own professionals and does not develop its own expert knowledge, the link to the external operational jurisdictions can be undermined.

Professional jurisdictions can be lost if the profession does not meet the needs of its client.⁹⁹ An example of a jurisdiction the military in general lost is that of providing strategic advice. Prior to the Cold War, strategic advice to governments was in the

realm of military leaders.¹⁰⁰ The advent of nuclear weapons made conventional military operations less relevant to government officials and defense policy makers.¹⁰¹

Significantly, there was a rise of civilian defense strategists in the 1950s who came to disdain the strategic thinking capabilities of military leaders.¹⁰² This disdain was born out during the events of the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 when President Kennedy himself wondered about the extremely poor advice he was being given by his military leaders and this further cemented the loss of the “monopoly over strategic advice” by the US military.¹⁰³

Likewise, Army senior leaders have been losing their shared jurisdiction over defense policy advice during the last decade. America has been in the longest ground war since Vietnam during the past eight years. In that eight year period, no Army general served in the senior uniformed positions of the Armed Forces of the United States. Instead, the political leaders have selected Air Force, Marine, and Navy flag officers to serve as both the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This selection of flag officers from the other services was made despite being engaged in significant land wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and with troops deployed worldwide in support of the Global War on Terror. In these fights, the US Army provided the preponderance of forces. Nonetheless, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld signaled his dissatisfaction with the intellectual abilities of Army senior leaders when he selected Gen Jones, a Marine, to serve as SACEUR—a post that until then had always been held by an Army general.¹⁰⁴ Until recently, the CENTCOM Commander also had not been a US Army general despite the two major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Stewardship of Capital

The efforts to outsource ROTC instruction have also violated one of the other fundamentals of professionalism, good stewardship. GEN Norton Schwartz in a speech on stewardship commented that “Everything that chips away at any part of military credibility, chips away at the whole.”¹⁰⁵ In their haste to save money, not enough analysis was done on the financial and human capital costs of contracting out the ROTC programs.¹⁰⁶ In terms of cost, the contracting program has turned out to be more expensive than if active duty military personnel were retained in the positions.¹⁰⁷ We now pay contractors to hire people who have the experience we already paid for once when we trained them in the Army.¹⁰⁸ The outsourcing did free up officers to serve in warfighting billets and enabled the Army to remain within personnel limits.¹⁰⁹ However, it has also had an adverse effect on officer retention past retirement eligibility and on broadening and developmental opportunities during their careers.

Lieutenant Colonels can simply retire at 20 years service so that they can be hired to teach ROTC. Why continue to serve past 20 when you can get paid at a rate equivalent to a GS-12 or 13 as an ROTC contracted instructor and draw your retirement? The transition to retired Lieutenant Colonel and ROTC instructor represents about a 35% pay raise after loss of active duty allowances.

Outsourcing also hinders the development of the Army’s human capital which is another key aspect of professional organizations.¹¹⁰ Many senior leaders complain that they are not getting enough strategic leaders inside the Army.¹¹¹ A chance to teach ROTC at a civilian academic institution represents an opportunity to earn a Masters degree from a respected university. Too often, Army senior leaders today only have a Masters degree from its own military schools (CGSC and the War College).¹¹² The

opportunity for young Officers to serve as an Assistant Professor of Military Science (APMS) at institutions with ROTC programs is fast disappearing. Officers used to have the opportunity to obtain an advance degree from institutions with ROTC programs such as Indiana University, Notre Dame or Georgia Tech while serving as an APMS. The end state will be a narrowed officer intellectual base with diminished strategic and critical thinking abilities. This effect can be seen in the Defense policy makers' lack of confidence in the Army senior leader's intellectual abilities to provide sound advice on strategy and policy. This can be seen in the continuing paucity of Army senior leaders at the higher level command and policy making levels.¹¹³

Generational Linkage Opportunity

A final loss in the development of a professional officer corps is the loss in the ability of junior and mid-grade Army officers to observe, analyze and understand the next generation of officers. As Dr. Leonard Wong discussed in a lecture at the War College, there are three distinct generations of officers in today's Army.¹¹⁴ At the senior level reside the "boomers." At the mid-grade level, Lieutenant Colonel and Major, exist the "Gen-Xers". At the junior grade level are the "millennials."¹¹⁵ Without active duty company and field grade officers instructing ROTC, the Army loses the possibility of the first interface between new and existing generations. This is a critical time for the generations to assess each other's motivations, driving forces, strengths, and relationship to authority. Professionals must train and grow each successive generation of leaders.¹¹⁶ If the Army loses contact with that next generation, and cedes control of it to an outside agency, then it will no longer be able to see the differences in the next generation. This will only exacerbate the challenges of developing the professionalism of the next generation and may even cause inadvertent alienation. The Army must

continue to adapt to changing cultural situations of its population and continue to develop a sense of professional service. Otherwise, cynicism will breed in young Army officers and they will leave this profession.¹¹⁷ The Army must gain and maintain contact with the next generation.

Summary

Dr. Snider correctly states that "...the education and development of the members of the Army profession are its core" function¹¹⁸ If the Army does not reverse the decision to outsource ROTC and ILE instruction; it risks grave consequences for this profession. The entry level and mid-grade officers may come to see the Army as a job rather than a profession, a way to make money instead of a call to service. If they see profit as the primary motivation of their first instructors and mentors along the way, they may lose sight of the true foundation of their professional calling—to serve. If they lose the opportunity to have a varied career with a chance for intellectual development and broadening at a civilian institution or within the knowledge base of the Army, they may be less likely to aspire to a lifetime of service. The loss of the ROTC and ILE instructor positions will also serve to further reduce the intellectual depth of our officer corps by reducing access to graduate programs outside the Army and contribute to the further reduction if senior leaders with well developed strategic thinking skills. By contracting out the development of Army doctrine, the special expert knowledge of the Army is ceded to another competitor for its jurisdiction—private military companies. Under the pretense of better stewardship, the Army will actually spend more money contracting out the instruction and lose more human capital through officer attrition. Lastly, the Army will lose the ability to see and understand the next generation. Without this insight, the risk of alienating the next generation and the rise in attrition problems increases.

One possible solution is to work with Congress to expand the officer Corps to allow for sufficient officers to both fill fighting units and to adequately staff Cadet Command and TRADOC with officers and/or Title X employees. These professionals will then maintain the Army's internal jurisdictions and thereby secure the link to the external jurisdictions. It is vital to the Army profession that it maintains jurisdiction over the development and maintenance of the Army's expert knowledge and the manner in which this knowledge is imparted to professional Army officers.¹¹⁹ The Army is a dual natured organization with both professional and bureaucratic elements. It is essential that the Army provide adequate focus on maintaining the primacy of the professional nature of its work over the bureaucratic aspects.¹²⁰

To paraphrase Clausewitz, the simplest of things are often difficult to implement and there are likely many other possible solutions. With current officer shortages at the company and field grade levels, it will be difficult to fill ROTC, ILE and other TRADOC positions and keep combat units up to strength. However, if the Army is to inspire officers to a career of service, this task must be done. It may require slowly phasing in the return of active duty officers into these billets as force levels rise and requirements for combat deployments lessen. It might even require a new and/or novel solution to ensure Army professionals remain in control of these vital internal jurisdictions.

The Australian Secretary of Defence, Allan Hawke, gave an address in 2001 at a Royal United Services Institute conference in Australia. In the conclusion of his remarks, he stated that "Australia needs the best Defence we can get. This means fostering and supporting the profession of arms as a profession – not just another job."¹²¹ This sentiment should most certainly apply to the US Army as well. If the Army does not

keep the impact on professionalism as a consideration in its decision making, it may continue to make short-sighted decisions that have unintended consequences for the long term health and vitality of the Army profession. There are many competitors in the defense market and they would all like to increase their work at the Army's expense. It is the duty of the Army's senior leaders to ensure our Army remains a professional force, relevant and ready to conduct the mission we have been given. The Nation cannot accept any risk that the Army's officers will not be up to the task of successfully leading our Army in land warfare.

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