Since the Air Force announced the development of an expeditionary concept to govern the way it organizes, trains, equips, deploys, and sustains forces, a debate has raged over the services’ commitment to fundamental change. Unfortunately, a key element of the debate is absent. What the discussion is missing is a list of definitions describing the characteristics and traits of “expeditionary” military organizations. This research project is an effort to discern those criteria and to then apply them systematically to the Air Force’s Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) concept. My intent is to reach an answer to the question posed in this paper’s title: Is the Air Force really expeditionary?

To develop these criteria, I will examine historical uses of the term expeditionary, scholarly writings on the subject, current military doctrine, and the historical lessons of past expeditionary units. While my research for this topic included a review of the American Expeditionary Force deployments in World War I, as well as US Army Air Corps and Mexican Expeditionary Air Force deployments in World War II, I have limited the scope of my enclosed discussion to USAF units that employed expeditionary concepts in a manner similar to the current EAF construct. My secondary purpose in reviewing these selected deployments is to educate readers on the rich history of USAF expeditionary operations. I have also enclosed a fairly detailed explanation of the process used to create the new EAF concept to illustrate the effort, motivation, and diligence senior leaders devoted to this very important, yet challenging, task of transitioning the service from a Cold War force to a 21st Century expeditionary force.
The Expeditionary Aerospace Force: Is the Air Force Really Expeditionary?
This analysis does not include U.S. Army doctrine governing expeditionary operations. Although the Army does have several mature concepts addressing force projection (FM 100-5) and force deployment -- including Contingency Force Packages (FM 100-17) and Prepositioned Afloat Operations (FM 100-17-1), I focused my analysis on the Marine Corps and the Navy because of the maturity of their expeditionary concepts and the similarities between the Air Force and the naval services’ cyclic approach to expeditionary operations.

A final point must be made before proceeding. In developing the list of criteria for this analysis, I do not presume to have discovered every measure of expeditionary organizations. What this list represents, at a minimum, is an unbiased attempt to apply concrete measures to numerous facets of a complex concept. Some sources of these definitions may emphasize criteria uniquely applicable to specific service missions to the detriment of sister service missions, such as the United States Marine Corps’ position that an expeditionary force must have a forcible-entry capability. While this may or may not be the case, to arbitrarily exclude specific expeditionary defining measures because of my personal or a service bias would undermine the objectivity of this analysis and create an incomplete picture. Moreover, it would not serve the best interests of the Air Force to measure the EAF concept against criteria diluted by the subjective elimination of the toughest standards supplied by sister services or independent writers. If the concept can measure up to the most difficult tests of what other services believe constitutes expeditionary traits, then the Air Force should feel confident it is on the right track.

I sincerely appreciate the assistance of my advisors to this project, Dr. Donald F. Bittner and Lieutenant Colonel John R. Atkins. Their patience and guidance were invaluable to the successful completion of this project. I also want to extend my thanks to Major Tom Geary, USAF, HQ ACC/CCX, and Major Tom Eannarino, USAF, HQ USAF/XOPE, each of whom
assisted me significantly in researching the material available on this developing concept.

Finally, I must thank my family for their support and patience; without them, this story would not have been told.
Executive Summary

Title: The Expeditionary Aerospace Force: Is the Air Force Really Expeditionary?

Author: Major Alan R. Metzler, United States Air Force

Thesis: The Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept represents a substantive change in the Air Force’s approach to post-Cold War operations but fails to fully satisfy the criteria found in professional writings, doctrine, and military history describing the traits of expeditionary units.

Discussion: In 1998, the Air Force introduced a new concept for organizing, training, equipping, and deploying for overseas operations. Describing this change fundamentally as a change from a garrison to an expeditionary force, the new vision was called the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF). Under this concept, the Air Force declared it would provide rapidly responsive, tailored-to-need aerospace force capability, prepared and ready to conduct military operations across the spectrum of conflict. To effect this change, the Air Force compiled pools of force structure in ten groupings called Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). These AEFs represent aerospace capability in pre-determined, scheduled sets of forces (approximately 150 combat aircraft and 10,000-15,000 personnel). From these groupings, task organized force packages would deploy, comprised of a cross section of weapon systems and people, providing forces for theater commanders’ requirements short of major theater war.

This new approach has been criticized by sources in and out of the Air Force. These criticisms range from disagreements over terminology to allegations of posturing for scarce defense dollars to larger questions regarding the Air Force’s expeditionary strategy. Senior Air Force leaders have defended the propriety of this new focus, citing the obsolescence of previous methods of providing forces and managing operational tempo.

This debate raises legitimate questions of how much the Air Force is really changing. The challenge the Air Force faces in answering these questions stems from its lack of a well-developed and widely understood concept of expeditionary operations. Service doctrine governing expeditionary concepts is scarce and, although it has a rich expeditionary tradition, this history is not widely known. Absent clearly defined doctrine and absent criteria to assess the service’s success in implementing an expeditionary philosophy, the debate over motives and methods will continue, and the transition to an expeditionary construct will prove challenging.

Conclusions/Recommendations: The Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept represents a substantive change in the way the service organizes, trains, equips, and deploys forces. The Air Force’s new approach meets or exceeds virtually all of the most stringent criteria used to describe expeditionary units and concepts. However, the concept fails in one critical area: training. Under the new plan, the Air Force will continue to rely on existing training programs to prepare units and personnel for expeditionary operations. These systems do not fully integrate operational, logistics, and combat support unit training in a systematic way prior to employment in an operational theater. Nor has the service fully implemented an Air Force-wide program to instill an expeditionary mindset in all of its members. Until the Air Force captures its expeditionary philosophy and history in a single doctrinal source and fundamentally changes its approach to expeditionary training, Air Force people will find it difficult to embrace this new concept and the service will fall short in its effort to institutionalize an expeditionary philosophy.
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The ability to project expeditionary military power is an essential component of our national security strategy…our Marines must be apprised that the principle reason for making this change [to “Expeditionary” designations for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces] is to affect how Marines think of and refer to themselves. Our Corps is an expeditionary intervention force with the ability to move rapidly, on short notice, to wherever needed to accomplish what is required…. I want every Marine or Sailor that serves with us to keep in mind this is our reason for being and that the return to expeditionary designations for our task units is intended to reinforce this sense of purpose.

General Al Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps
February 3, 1988

EAF is a journey, and we have many more steps to take along this path as we transform the Air Force from a forward-based, Cold War force to an expeditionary force able to respond to crises around the globe. …EAF is not just one event. It is a completely different way of looking at how we do our business. It is also a fundamental change in the way we operate…We are moving into the EAF for two reasons. First, to make sure that the nation has the trained aerospace forces it needs. Second, to make sure that our people have relief from operations tempo… in a turbulent world.

This is really what EAF is about.

F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force
November 5, 1999
Chapter 1

The Expeditionary Aerospace Force:
A New Concept for the United States Air Force

On the 4th of August 1998, Acting Secretary of the Air Force F. Whitten Peters and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan unveiled to the Pentagon press corps a major Air Force restructuring initiative designed to transition the service from a garrison-based, Cold War remnant to an Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) capable of projecting power rapidly to global hot spots and on-going contingency operations. Following a successful preview of the concept with Secretary of Defense William Cohen only two weeks prior, Secretary Peters began the press conference by describing the challenges the Air Force faced in the decade of the 1990s. The principal one he discussed was the task to support a national security strategy of engagement with a threat-based force, designed for a containment mission, and postulated to fight in-place from large forward-based installations. Secretary Peters went on to describe how the increasing employment challenges placed on the Air Force after the Persian Gulf War and the ensuing reduction of active forces in the post-Cold War years had resulted in an “ad hoc” selection process for unit deployments and an inconsistent approach to the command and control of those units. Finally, he frankly explained how the Air Force had experimented in the mid-1990s with moving large, integrated fighter and bomber forces -- Air Expeditionary Forces -- into foreign theaters as a means of providing the geographic Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) with engagement and combat forces.

The purpose of their briefing, he said, was to announce the “next logical step in organizing and training the Air Force to respond to contingencies.” Secretary Peters explained the key

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1 General Ryan briefed Secretary Cohen on July 16, 1998.
features of the plan, the benefits the geographic CINCs could expect from this proposal, the personnel tempo relief airmen could expect from the plan’s predictable and stable employment schedule, and the anticipated retention gains the service could realize from an improved quality of life. He enthusiastically painted a picture of an organization eager to adapt to the evolving global security environment and one fully cognizant of its responsibilities to provide a responsive and flexible total force capability.\(^2\)

Secretary Peters then deferred to the Chief of Staff to explain the details of the Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept. In his remarks, General Ryan also described the concept as a fundamental change from a garrison to an expeditionary force. The EAF vision, he said, was intended to support our national security strategy while allowing the Air Force to respond across the spectrum of conflict and take advantage of the inherent flexibility of aerospace platforms.

Pointing out that the Air Force was already engaged in numerous expeditionary missions around the globe, General Ryan described the essence of the concept:

\[
\text{This Expeditionary Aerospace Force…leverages the Air Force strengths. That is, we are capable of a rapid response with trained and ready forces that are capable, lean, agile, and structured so that they fit very rapidly into a …command and control structure that makes them effective.}^3
\]

Several months after this press conference, the vision described by Secretary Peters and General Ryan began to take shape. After months of staff planning, Air Force leaders assembled in Colorado Springs at one of the service’s senior leadership conferences, CORONA Fall ’98, to consider several organizational options to implement the EAF vision.\(^4\)


\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) The Air Force’s principal leaders attend these tri-annual conferences to review major initiatives and consider service-wide policy changes. They are named CORONA South, Top, and Fall.
force structure alternatives, they reached consensus on the best approach, setting the Air Force on a course for dramatic change.

The approved *Expeditionary Aerospace Force* concept created an organizational approach cutting across the Air Force’s current vertical organizational structure. This new means of organizing and employing Air Force forces created what the service calls geographically separated, but operationally linked *virtual organizations*. In reality, these *virtual organizations* are merely groupings of force structure from which the Air Force will task organize deployable forces. In the EAF construct, these force structure groupings are called Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). When the service organizes and deploys forces from these AEF groupings, they deploy as Aerospace Expeditionary Task Forces, Air Expeditionary Wings, Air Expeditionary Groups, or as Air Expeditionary Squadrons.

Officially implemented in January of this year, the EAF concept assigns a broad range of aerospace capabilities to 10 distinct AEFs. Most of the Air Force’s combat and combat support force structure is apportioned among these 10 groupings. Each AEF employs a 15-month cycle governing training, workup for deployment, and employment. Ideally, the construct will limit AEF units and assigned personnel to 90 days of deployment vulnerability every 15 months. The Air Force operates two AEFs at a time to support the continuous requirements of the theater CINCs. The Air Force asserts this construct, with over 300 aircraft and tens of thousands of personnel in each AEF pair, enables them to present customized forces, tailored to the unique

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5 This phrase “Air Expeditionary Force” and the acronym “AEF” represent a *fundamental change* in terminology use. From October 1995 to August 1996, the Air Force used “AEF” to refer to four Air Force deployments to Southwest Asia and Guam. This usage ended in 1997 when the Air Force began to name these deploying units Air Expeditionary Wings. Under the new EAF concept, “AEF” refers to packages of force structure available for deployment. Despite the shift to “Expeditionary” naming conventions for deploying units in 1997 and the adoption of the new AEF definition, the term “AEF” continues to be widely misapplied to deploying forces instead of *available forces*. This issue will be addressed further in Chapter 5.
needs of each warfighting CINC, with the ability to support a variety of wide-ranging combat
and non-combat operations.

But before the ink was dry on the new concept, critics emerged finding fault with it. These
criticisms have run the gamut, from mere disagreements over terminology to larger questions
regarding the overall AEF strategy. Some allege the Air Force’s new vision was merely an
attempt to jump on the expeditionary bandwagon to posture itself as the ‘force of choice’ for our
nation in a time of crisis. To these critics, the Air Force’s move to an expeditionary concept was
nothing more than a veiled attempt to increase the services’ bargaining position in the politically
charged battle for scarce defense dollars. Others have argued the concept does not represent a
fundamental change in the way the Air Force does business -- that it really is a scheduling
exercise designed to quick fix tempo problems in operational units. Another group carried this
argument one step further; they point to the failure to include apportionments of strategic
mobility forces (airlift and refuelers) or low density/high demands assets (U-2, RC-135,
AWACS, JSTARS, et. al.) in the 10 standing AEFs, arguing the concept isn’t a fundamental shift
for large segments of the services’ enabling forces. Still others find fault with the use of the term
“expeditionary,” asserting that to be truly expeditionary and to gain an appreciation for what it
means to be expeditionary the Air Force must do more than change the name of its deployed
units.6 Finally, at least one critic faults the narrowness of the AEF strategy, arguing it is “heavily
weighted to responding to conventional state-to-state aggression” versus what he deems “equally
important” humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.7

6 The author encountered each of these arguments during discussions on the EAF concept at
Marine Command and Staff College and while assigned to Air Combat Command in 1998/99.
Future?” Air War College Maxwell Paper No.19 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University,
September, 1999), 2 and 19.
To clarify the intent of the Air Force in pursuing an expeditionary course, General Ryan responded vigorously to one of these early criticisms. Writing in the *Air Force Times* only weeks after his initial press conference announcing the EAF concept, he answered an August 1998 column in the same paper that characterized the EAF concept as a "quick fix" and said EAF details hadn't been communicated to the troops. The Chief of Staff explained the Air Force had been wrestling with various ways to respond to increasing contingency operations since the Gulf War. Regarding the specifics of the EAF concept, General Ryan pointed out a small group of planners had been working for eight months to develop a construct to meet three underlying requirements:

- Providing U.S. military commanders the right force at the right place at the right time, whether the mission involves humanitarian relief or combat.
- Reducing deployment tempo by building more stability and predictability into the way we schedule our people to respond to contingencies.
- Taking full advantage of the vital contributions of the total force -- active duty, civilians, Reservists, and Air National Guardsmen.

While he acknowledged the final details had yet to be worked out, General Ryan asserted the product the Air Force’s planners had developed -- the EAF concept and the associated AEFs -- achieved each of these goals.  

With a product satisfying these broad goals, the Air Force now finds itself in the unique situation of having achieved what it sought yet still facing criticism for the concept. This raises several legitimate questions of how much the Air Force is really changing. Is the Air Force jumping on the expeditionary bandwagon in an attempt to corral political support in Washington? Is this new concept something more substantive than a deployment schedule? Is the Air Force merely throwing an expeditionary tag on units without changing anything but their

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name? And, if so, what is the true meaning of the Air Force’s expeditionary vision? Finally, what is the appropriate scope of an expeditionary unit? Should it focus on the high end of the combat spectrum or should it train for the most likely mission instead of the most dangerous? The Air Force needs to address these questions as it makes the transition to an expeditionary force.

The challenge the Air Force faces in providing answers is this: The service lacks a well-developed and commonly understood expeditionary concept of operations. Unlike the Marine Corps and the Navy, whose 225-year histories have led to mature expeditionary concepts, the Air Force has little doctrine governing its expeditionary organization, training, sustainment, and employment. Absent a clearly defined expeditionary doctrine and absent objective criteria to measure the service’s success in implementing the new concept, the debate over motives and success will continue. The transition to an expeditionary construct will thus prove challenging and problematic. This research project is an effort to increase the understanding of the EAF concept for Air Force members and to provide the objective criteria needed to answer the rhetorical questions posed in the narrative above. The primary focus of this study is to closely analyze the Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept in an attempt to answer this fundamental question: Is the Air Force really expeditionary?

This paper will show the Air Force is indeed changing in a substantive way. It will demonstrate the Air Force can satisfy the most stringent tests offered to describe the characteristics of expeditionary units and will further show that, despite its focus on Cold War missions and high intensity conflict, the service has a rich history it can build upon to communicate its expeditionary doctrine and employment concepts. The work the Air Force undertook in the decade of the 1990s to discover its roots and build a contemporary
expeditionary construct will ultimately pay dividends as the service is called upon to quickly
defend our nation’s interests around the globe.

However, while Air Force leaders tout the new construct as the next logical step in how the
service organizes and trains for contingencies, one inherent weakness exists: The lack of focus
on training, one of the core purposes according to Secretary Peters for implementing this
concept. While the Expeditionary Aerospace Force construct is effective in distributing combat
power to equally structured force packages, the concept, built with a force structure and force
management focus, does not support integrated team training. Training service members to
understand the expectations an expeditionary mindset imposes will be difficult. To do so, the
Air Force must clearly define what it believes “expeditionary” means and then formally
institutionalize those definitions in its daily operations, formal and continuation training,
professional military education, and its doctrine. Training geographically separated units to
operate as an integrated, seamless fighting organizations will be even more difficult, particularly
if the service continues to use existing training systems and training approaches. The Air Force
should make a firm commitment to integrated training of AEF deploying units and more deeply
institutionalizing the expeditionary mindset. Failure to do so may in fact lead some Air Force
members to conclude the EAF concept is merely a schedule for operational units versus a
fundamental methodology for operating an expeditionary force.
Chapter 2

Defining “Expeditionary”

To analyze the merits of the EAF concept and reach a conclusion on whether the Air Force has changed in a substantive way, it is important to consider some of the different ways the term is defined. How one characterizes this expression, as it relates to military operations, will drive conclusions regarding the Air Force’s new expeditionary concept.

Derived from the word expedition, meaning “a journey of some length or difficulty for a definite purpose,” the use of the term expeditionary to describe military operations has been part of the military lexicon for centuries. Webster’s confirms this relationship by defining the word ‘expeditionary’ with reference to its martial character: “Of, relating to, or being an expedition, especially a military one.” The Department of Defense Dictionary, a publication designed to ensure uniformity in the application and use of terms and definitions, uses similar terminology:

- Expedition: A military operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.
- Expeditionary Force: An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.

References to Webster’s and the DoD dictionary, however, offer little to evaluate the nature and traits of an expeditionary force. A more useful approach is an examination of the armed force’s use of the term. Each service brings a unique perspective to the discussion. How each one views expeditionary operations is important because it governs the training, organization, equipping, and culture of the respective military forces. But the search for objective definitions

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10 Ibid.
using this methodology quickly leads to circular arguments wherein a proponent of one criterion finds justification for his/her approach by citing the very characteristics needing definition. A perspective offered by one senior Marine Corps officer illustrates the challenge of this approach.

Responding to a request to discuss the expeditionary culture of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Jack Klimp, the Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, stated: “Expeditionary is a combination of force structure, people, equipment, doctrine, and concepts. Above all, it is the culture, the mindset of being expeditionary.” Lieutenant General Klimp also addressed the crux of the challenge when he said, “Expeditionary is how you define expeditionary. As the other services take on more expeditionary capabilities, what is expeditionary and what is being defined as expeditionary will change.”

This imprecise and ambiguous definition of expeditionary is what has lead to some of the criticisms of the Air Force EAF concept. A search for objective criteria must be the first step in the process. To identify these criteria, three sources will be employed: Historical uses of the term “expeditionary,” writings on the subject, and current military doctrine. Combined, these sources offer a wealth of definitions to analyze the EAF concept.

An excellent source outlining early uses of expeditionary terminology is Brigadier General (ret) Edwin H. Simmons’ 1988 article in Fortitudine explaining the Marine Corps’ return to “expeditionary” versus “amphibious” naming conventions for their operating forces. Brigadier General Simmons states that one of the earliest documented uses of the term expeditionary was in Captain George Smith’s Universal Military Dictionary. Writing in 1779, Capt Smith, Inspector of the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, said “There is no part of war so interesting to an insulary soldier as an expedition; nor can there be any part more worthy of

12 Lieutenant General Jack W. Klimp, USMC, Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, interview by author, January 4, 2000.
attention.” Simmons further notes that by the early 19th Century, the term “expeditionary troops” was used widely in the British Army. Simmons cites two other sources that included prominent use of the term. The first is Colonel H.L. Scott’s 1864 *Military Dictionary*. Scott, the Inspector General of the U.S. Army during the Civil War, defined an expedition as “an enterprise undertaken either by sea or by land against an enemy, the fortunate termination of which principally depends on the rapidity and unexpected nature of its movements.” The second was Winston Churchill’s 1898 work, *The Story of the Malakand Field Force*. In this book, as in other contemporary works, Simmons notes the British freely used the term “field force” interchangeably with the term “expeditionary force.”13 These early ideas give us some insight into how expeditions and expeditionary forces were viewed: Important operations with forces employed far from home with victory dependent on proper application of speed and surprise.

Former Commandant of the Marine Corps General Carl E. Mundy Jr. offered a more contemporary discussion on the nature and characteristics of what the term expeditionary means in his article “Expeditionary Forces: A Defining Concept for the Future.” Writing in the April 1992 issue of *Seapower*, his piece was intended as a primer to jumpstart a reassessment of the Navy’s mission focus and to offer the naval services a collective means of defining their roles in the future. Characterizing the post-Cold War security situation as an environment of “rapid change” and “uncertainty in the course of future events and…potential threats,” Mundy outlined a world view requiring the US military to remain engaged with greater flexibility in the employment of smaller military forces and with less reliance upon forward basing or host-nation support. Based on these assumptions, he suggested the naval service – the Marines and the

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Navy – reassess the focus of their main effort and transition from a blue-water, sea control service to one focused on upon littoral warfare and on influencing events ashore through the application of sea-based military power.14

General Mundy argues every military organization must have a role and an understanding of why it exists and the unique contribution it makes to the national defense. He then suggests the naval services adopt the concept of an “expeditionary naval service” as a vision for their future and as a means of defining how to organize, train, and equip Department of the Navy forces. With these purposes and assumptions clearly stated, the former Commandant then defines what he believes the term expeditionary means:

Expeditionary means service overseas—at sea, or in the field. It also reflects an inherent state of mind: to be constantly prepared for immediate deployment overseas for service in an austere environment with limited supporting infrastructure. Naval forces…fall into three categories: those that are forward-deployed, those that have just returned to home bases from deployment, and those that are getting ready to deploy. This cycle of expeditionary service is an integral part of naval operations that make us unique among the U.S. military services.15

Before discussing the merits of this definition and its requirements, it is important to note that General Mundy also described his view of the two organizations comprising naval expeditionary forces and the types of operations expeditionary duty entails. He says the two elements of naval expeditionary forces are the expeditionary fleets, the 6th and 7th Fleets, and the expeditionary Marine forces organized into Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. He suggests these two forces together provide the nation a “unique capability within our nation’s joint family of capabilities

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15 Ibid., 44.
for projecting influence in peacetime through forward presence operations and projecting power…in response to crisis.”

Taken in its entirety, General Mundy’s position appears to suggest a unique expeditionary role for America’s naval service. While his comments on uniqueness are debatable, his approach describes the underlying components of what he feels make an organization expeditionary. Based on the propositions offered above, the following list of characteristics can be added to the lexicon of expeditionary traits:

- Service overseas, at sea or on land.
- A mindset reflecting constant preparation for deployment overseas.
- Service in an austere environment with limited support and/or infrastructure.
- Forces engaged in a cyclic process of deployment, sustainment training, and deployment preparation.

But General Mundy’s comments reflect a much larger organizational ethos. Clearly, the United States Marine Corps believes it is the vanguard of America’s military forces. This philosophy is pervasive in Marine Corps literature and history. Lieutenant General Victor Krulak, USMC (Ret), perfectly illustrates this view in his book *First to Fight*:

Voltaire, in a disclaimer of atheism, declared, “If there were not a God it would be necessary to invent one.” Similarly, some modern-day military philosopher might be inspired to say that if the United States did not have a Marine Corps it would be necessary, in our national interest, to create one. But…to try to duplicate today’s Marine Corps would be as hopeless as commanding a sculptor to create another David.

Similarly, the United States Marine Corps views itself as the most expeditionary of the four services. With only a modicum of equivocation, Marine Corps doctrine states, “While all the Services include units capable of expeditionary operations, the entire operating forces of the

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16 Ibid.
Marine Corps are specifically organized, equipped, and trained for expeditionary service.”¹⁸

Using this deeply held belief as a vision to guide its force planning, operational concepts, acquisition strategy, training and education, and doctrine, the Marine Corps has produced a substantive construct that communicates the expeditionary nature of individual Marines and Marine units. This self-prescribed description of the Marine Corps as the “nation’s expeditionary force-in-readiness” serves as a central theme the Corps uses to articulate the distinct nature of Marine capabilities and their contributions to our nation’s defense.¹⁹

While service contributions to the national military strategy differ because of differences in mission, force structure, equipment, and training, the Marines Corps’ approach to being “expeditionary” is a useful prism to observe and evaluate the Air Force’s new concept. To gain a deeper appreciation of the Marine Corps’ expeditionary concept and how it can help the Air Force gain an understanding of the traits of an expeditionary force, it would be useful to look at the Marine Corps’ use of the term throughout its history.

**Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces**

Use of the term expeditionary began to appear in the Marine Corps’ vocabulary in the early 20th Century. While there have been several instances where various U.S. forces adopted the expeditionary title, the Marine Corps has been the most consistent user of the term to describe its operating forces. In 1922, the Marine Corps adopted the term for its Advanced Base Forces. The Advanced Base Forces were created in 1900 after successful operations in Cuba, the Philippines, and China; its mission was to serve as the Navy’s ground defense force to hold

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¹⁹ For a thorough treatment of this topic, see Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1, *Warfighting*, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, June 20, 1997), 53-68.
temporary forward operating bases.\textsuperscript{20} Starting in 1922, the Advanced Base Force would be known as the East Coast Expeditionary Force. Several years later, the Marine Corps established a West Coast Expeditionary Force as well. Although they could operate separately, these permanently organized units were the Marine Corps’ ground forces designated for overseas service with the fleet. Although they were not permanent component parts of the fleet, these two units, designed to provide a mobile force to accompany the fleet for operations ashore, were the predecessors of the Fleet Marine Force established in 1933. Since then, the Fleet Marine Force has been an operational element of the fleet. From this came today’s Marine Expeditionary Forces.\textsuperscript{21} Although the name and force structure has changed frequently over the years, their mission has remained relatively constant for the past 75 years. This consistent approach has produced a well-developed body of knowledge and fully refined expeditionary concepts. These concepts are now documented in Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 3, \textit{Expeditionary Operations (MCDP 3)}.

\textbf{Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 3, Expeditionary Operations}

MCDP 3 is one of the best sources available describing the characteristics of expeditionary operations. In this doctrinal publication, the United States Marine Corps lays out its view of the future challenges the United States will face in the world’s littorals, the nature of expeditionary operations, a listing of the Marine Corps’ expeditionary organizations, and a description of the service’s expeditionary concepts. For purposes of defining the term expeditionary, few documents can match the comprehensiveness of this document. Moreover, the definitions

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\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 30.
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included in MCDP 3 are useful as a comparative evaluative tool to assess the Air Force’s new concept.

After defining expeditionary operations using the Joint Publication 1-02 definition, the MCDP 3 produces a well-developed list of expeditionary characteristics and provides valuable objective criteria for this analysis. The following list of characteristics captures many of the expeditionary criteria gleaned from the Marine Corps’ expeditionary doctrine:

- The defining characteristic of expeditionary operations is projection of force into a foreign setting.

- By definition, an expedition involves the deployment of military forces to the scene of a crisis or conflict and their requisite support some significant distance from their home bases. These forces may already have been forward deployed, … or they may be required to deploy from their home bases in response to a developing situation.

- Expeditionary operations involve the establishment of forward bases, land or sea, from which military power can be brought to bear on the situation.

- An expeditionary operation requires the temporary creation of a support apparatus to sustain the operation to its conclusion. Logistics, the movement and maintenance of forces, is a central consideration in the conduct of expeditionary operations.

- Not all power projection constitutes expeditionary operations; operations that do not involve actual deployment of forces are not expeditionary.

- Power projection does not imply expeditionary operations are by definition offensive.

- An expeditionary force need not be primarily a ground combat organization…an expeditionary force may consist of aviation units operating out of an expeditionary airfield, supported by only a small security force.

- Expeditionary forces vary significantly in size and composition.

- Expeditionary operations may also vary greatly in scope, ranging from full-scale combat to non-combat missions.
• The term “expeditionary” implies a temporary duration with the intention to withdraw from foreign soil after accomplishing a specified mission.

• The term “expeditionary” implies austere conditions and support. This does not mean that an expeditionary force is necessarily small or lightly equipped, but that it is no larger or heavier than necessary to accomplish the mission. Supplies, equipment, and infrastructure are limited to operational necessities; amenities are strictly minimized.

• Expeditionary operations require a special mindset—a constant preparation for immediate deployment overseas into austere operating environments, bringing everything necessary to accomplish the mission.  

Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 3 is useful in more ways than just defining what the Marine Corps believes are the component parts and traits of expeditionary operations. MCDP 3 also explains the reasons to conduct expeditionary operations. Although it acknowledges there may be situations where our enemies could be deterred from an act or compelled to change their behavior by long-range bombing and mass firepower, the Corps asserts there are many policy objectives or military missions that can be accomplished only by establishing a potent military force on foreign soil. According to MCDP 3, expeditionary operations will thus be required for a variety of reasons. These include:

• To assure policy objectives pursued by other means have been secured; for example, to ensure compliance with established diplomatic solutions such as the adherence to a cease-fire or an agreement to hold free elections.

• To seize or control airports, ports, resource areas, or political centers to ensure their safe use, to deny their use to an enemy or disruptive element, or to facilitate future actions such as introduction of follow-on forces.

• To control urban or other restrictive terrain.

• To establish a close, physical, and highly visible presence to demonstrate political resolve, deter aggressive action, or compel desired behavior.

• To establish and maintain order in an area beset by chaos and disorder.

• To protect or rescue U.S. citizens or other civilians.
• To separate warring groups from each other or from populations at large, especially when enemy or disruptive elements are embedded.
• To provide physical relief and assistance in the event of disaster.  

This doctrinal publication also identifies several critical enabling actions that contribute to the expeditionary capabilities of a military force. The first offered is speed of deployment. But as the Marine Corps’ doctrine makes clear, fast deployment of sustainable forces is the most critical factor. The next enabler for an expeditionary force is entry to a theater or forward operating base. Entry may be permissive, tactical, or forced. But because a permissive environment may turn hostile relatively quickly, “a forcible-entry capability is a permanent requirement for successful expeditionary operations.” Other critical actions cited for expeditionary operations are the capability to introduce follow-on forces; establishing logistics, support, and disaster response capabilities; and securing key terrain for decisive actions.

According to MCDP 3, the final and most important element in the Marine Corps’ conduct of expeditionary operations is the individual and collective Marine Corps state of mind. Simply stated, the Marine Corps believes “expeditionary is, before anything else, a mindset.” Under this philosophy, the Corps’ doctrine says:

[A]ll Marines…think of themselves as part of a fundamentally expeditionary organization designed and intended to project military force overseas. This expeditionary mindset is epitomized by the phrase “bags packed” – that is, ready and willing to deploy on a moment’s notice, any time, to any place, to perform any mission. All operating forces, rather than just selected ready units, must maintain themselves in a high state of deployability and general readiness.

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23 Ibid., 37-38.
24 Ibid., 41.
25 Ibid., 44.
26 Ibid.
This philosophical approach includes several sub-elements as well. The Marine Corps believes the expeditionary mindset implies:

- An expectation and a willingness to endure hardship and austere conditions.
- The versatility and adaptability to respond effectively to a broad variety of circumstances without a great deal of preparation time.
- A global perspective oriented to responding to a diverse range of threats around the globe rather than to a specific threat in a specific part of the world.
- The mindset is a matter of training and institutional culture commanders must impart within their units.27

While these standards initially appear rather difficult to achieve, they have one major attraction: The Marine Corps’ recruits, trains, equips, and organizes to them. Lieutenant General Klimp made a point of reinforcing this philosophy when he said:

Expeditionary, in the terms that we understand it, takes on more than [power projection]. It takes on the idea that you are forward deployed and even if you are not forward deployed, you’re ready to go at any time. When you hit the ground, you are ready to execute the mission and when you are presented with a mission you may not have all of the things you need to get the mission done, but you get it done. . . . It is a mindset that all Marines are brought up with, educated with, and trained with, and it starts all the way back when we recruit them.28

Hence, the Marine Corps’ “every Marine is a rifleman” concept is reinforced by doctrine, recruiting, and training. There is also an additional concept contributing to the Marine Corps’ ability to field expeditionary units: The Team Integrity initiative of the Commandant’s “Unit Cohesion” program. This initiative takes new recruits in common specialties and links them up through basic training, follow-on career field training, and then assigns them to the same operational units. The goal of program is for these new Marines to remain with their assigned

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27 Ibid.
units for the duration of their initial enlistments. General C.C. Krulak, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, outlined his overall intent in the following message directed to all Marines:

Marines must possess and feel the absolute trust, subordination of self, the intuitive understanding of the collective actions of the unit, and the importance of teamwork. ... *Team Integrity* will provide a medium for carrying teams of Marines from the Crucible through the Military Occupation Specialty producing schools and to the Fleet Marine Force with their Marine ethos intact. By forming teams early, keeping the teams together, and assigning the teams to a unit, we will enhance unit cohesion. This added cohesion will result in increased fighting power, provide positive peer pressure, and reinforce our corps values as honor becomes dominant over self-interest. These teams will train together, garrison together, deploy together, and fight together.29

The Marine Corps is also adding a vertical element into this program. This vertical element will include the junior officers and noncommissioned officers for whom these young troops will work on arrival. The goal is to build unit cohesion among supervisors and subordinates in specific operational units.30 This integrated approach will not only contribute to continuity in supervision, it enables the Corps to keep people in units together for longer periods of time, building the trust and confidence teams need to execute the fight when required.

**Naval Expeditionary Warfare**

The United States Navy’s descriptions of its expeditionary nature add further fidelity to the growing list of definitions enclosed in this paper. These concepts are useful to identify objective expeditionary criteria as well.

“Forward presence” is the primary doctrinal concept governing the Navy’s expeditionary contribution to our nation’s security. The forward presence doctrine describes three contributions of seapower, contributions the Navy uses to define themselves as an expeditionary

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29 Commandant of the Marine Corps, Message to ALMAR. Subject: “Unit Cohesion--Commandant’s Intent.” 231300Z Dec 96.
service. Forward presence enables US forces to: gain access and influence in forward operating areas, provide first-on-scene forces, and facilitate projection of naval and Marine military power.

The United States Navy defines naval expeditionary warfare as:

[T]he use of forward deployed naval forces to influence events overseas. The purpose of these forward deployed naval forces is to preserve peace by deterring would-be aggressors, by reassuring friendly powers, by containing those conflicts that do erupt, and, when it becomes necessary, by creating the conditions that allow the use of decisive military force.31

The principles of “Forward Presence” are imbedded in the Navy’s draft publication Naval Doctrine Publication 3, *Naval Operations*. NDP 3 provides a broad view of naval operations. It not only describes how naval forces are organized and how the National Command Authority employs them, it also provides a perspective of Navy expeditionary operations:

The essence of being expeditionary is having the ability to conduct sustained operations at a distance from the continental United States. Expeditionary operations require a self-contained force with diverse combat capabilities, prepared to face a multitude of challenges. [This] force must be able to secure the battlespace quickly--in all dimensions--and project power as a coordinated whole.32

Although these definitions are attractive because of their broad focus and clarity, the Navy’s application of its expeditionary vision has a distinctly organizational aspect. The forward presence and combat capability of naval forces consists of more than just United States Navy ships, aircraft, and personnel. By virtue of the inextricable bonds the naval service imposes, the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps view expeditionary warfare through different lenses of the same glasses. Navy doctrine is, in essence, naval doctrine, encompassing the capabilities and operational concepts of Navy and Marine forces. The link between the services is the Director of Naval Expeditionary Warfare; this is the senior Marine Corps officer

on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (N85). Charged by law (Public Law 102-484, 23 October 1992), with supervising amphibious lift, mine warfare, naval surface fire support, and other tasks essential to supporting expeditionary warfare, this officer cements the link between the services. As a result, naval expeditionary warfare is viewed in terms of organization and equipment as much as it is governed by operational concepts and doctrine.

**Task-Organized Expeditionary Focus**

One of the key principles governing the organization of naval forces for expeditionary operations is task organization. According to NDP 3, the Navy uses task-based organization to achieve a balance of capabilities as an aggregate of many units for specific tactical employment. The objective, this doctrinal publication notes, is to employ a variety of forces--surface, subsurface, ground, air, and special warfare--in ways that exploit the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of each. This objective forms the core of the Navy’s expeditionary philosophy:

> Task-organized naval forces are distinctly suited to conduct expeditionary warfare… By forward deploying and sustaining balanced formations of ships, aircraft, and forces, we provide the combatant commander with needed capabilities, readily available for specific operational and tactical employment.34

These task-organized forces can be any combination of ships formed for a specific purpose. Four primary organizational groupings comprise the elements the Navy and Marine Corps deploy forward for expeditionary operations: The carrier battle group, the amphibious ready group with its embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, and Maritime Prepositioning Ships. Each provides unique but complementary capabilities, demonstrating a distinctly organizational approach to conducting expeditionary operations.

33 Ibid., note 31.
**Carrier Battle Group (CVBG)**

The principal element of the Navy’s power projection and forward presence capability is the carrier battle group. The air wing provides the carrier battle group’s primary offensive combat power. In addition to airborne firepower, the battle group’s accompanying surface vessels and submarines provide land attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, naval guns, electronic-warfare capability, mines, and torpedoes. The CVBG also includes naval special warfare forces and logistics support ships. In peacetime, the CVBG performs forward presence operations and responds as tasked to international crises.\(^{35}\)

**Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/Marine Expeditionary Unit**

The amphibious ready group is a task force built around amphibious assault ships capable of supporting Marine amphibious operations ashore in a hostile environment. While providing a distinctly littoral focus, they function as an independent, forward-deployed component of a naval expeditionary force. The ARG includes amphibious assault ships with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit, a naval special warfare detachment, and a beach group detachment. Designed to specifically support the Marine Corps, the ARG embarks, transports, lands in the objective area, and sustains Marine Expeditionary Units and naval special-warfare detachments ashore, eventually reembarking those elements when their operations are complete. In peacetime, the ARG also performs forward presence operations and responds to international crises.\(^{36}\)

**Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF)**

Touted as the nation’s expeditionary force in readiness, the MAGTF is a task-organized Marine force consisting of four complementary elements: Command Element, Air Component, Ground Component, and Combat Service Support Component. Each task force is a flexible, task

\(^{35}\) Ibid.  
\(^{36}\) Ibid.
organization capable of organizing and training personnel for employment across the spectrum of military operations. When deployed for operations, the MAGTF can take several different forms and sizes: Marine Expeditionary Forces (45,000), Marine Expeditionary Brigades (17,000), Marine Expeditionary Units (2,000), and Special Purpose MAGTFs (mission-based task organization). These forces have the flexibility to remain sea-based during deployments, as in the case of an embarked MEU, or they can conduct shore-based operations, as was the case with I MEF during Operation Desert Storm. Employing a combined arms focus, they maintain the nation’s ‘forcible entry from the sea’ capability as well as a capability to reembark and reassume the role of a naval force to pursue additional missions.

Maritime Prepositioning Forces

The Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) is the fourth organizational pillar of the naval services’ expeditionary capability. The MPF is a key element in the MAGTF operational concept, delivering the capability to deploy the full combat power of a 45,000-man Marine Expeditionary Force. MPF ships operated by the Navy’s Military Sealift Command are designed specifically to carry heavy equipment and cargo for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. The critical operational concept making these forces expeditionary is the forward basing and tailoring of MPF shiploads to specifically support airlifted Marine forces. Although the concept of operations requires a secure air and seaport of embarkation, the MPF’s responsiveness to theaters around the globe -- an MPF squadron of four to five ships can be in an any operational theater in 7-14 days sailing time -- and its ability to support a 17,000 man Marine Expeditionary Brigade for up to 30 days demonstrates the maturity of the Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary doctrine.

Integrated Training...Key Expeditionary Enabler

A key element in the Navy and Marine Corps’ task-organized approach to expeditionary operations is their belief in the value of integrated training and preparation for deployment. According to NDP 3, a Carrier Battle Group and an Amphibious Ready Group will generally work up for deployment as a single operational entity so they can respond to contingencies as an integrated task force. Although elements of these forces may deploy or operate as semi-autonomous task groups, units, or individual elements -- depending on the combatant commander’s mission, theater, and campaign objectives -- the integration training is designed to ensure the disparate elements are prepared to fight as a single force. An example of this training philosophy in practice can be found in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet’s combined Surface Force Training Manual. The objective of this manual is to “provide a comprehensive training program that integrates a sequence of individual, team, and unit training evolutions…to ensure that deploying units are fully ready to perform all designated missions.”

The training concept employed by the Commanders-in-Chief, Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, is called the Tactical Training Strategy (TTS). TTS is a three-phased approach to ensure integrated and ready forces are provided to unified commanders. The three phases are called Basic, Intermediate, and Advanced. Type commanders -- platform-oriented commanders (e.g., surface ships, aircraft, and submarines) -- conduct primary mission area tactical training in the Basic Phase of the training sequence while numbered fleet commanders conduct multi-ship and battle group training in the Intermediate and Advanced Phases of the cycle.

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38 COMNAVSURLANT/PACINST 3502.2D, Surface Force Training Manual, Department of the Navy, (Norfolk/San Diego, Commanders, Naval Surface Face Atlantic and Pacific: June 18, 1998), 1-1-1.
39
The Basic Phase, designed to ensure an individual ship is substantially ready in terms of individual and team skills, concludes with a Final Evaluation Period. The Final Evaluation Period is a rigorous and stressful three to four day assessment of a crew’s ability to conduct multiple simultaneous combat missions and support functions and to survive complex casualty control situations. The Intermediate Superior in Command (ISIC), with the assistance of the Afloat Training Group, evaluates a ship’s performance during this exercise. The type commanders use the ISIC’s findings to certify mission area readiness to proceed to the next training phase.40

It is during the latter two phases of the TTS cycle where the Navy’s integrated training approach -- comprised of numerous multi-ship training exercises, coordinated underway battle group operations, training evolutions, and fleet exercises -- best exemplifies how naval forces meet the mandates of NDP 3’s task-organized approach to expeditionary operations. Using a detailed matrix of exercises, events, and specialty training requirements by type command in the Intermediate and Advance Phases, the fleet commanders develop warfare skills and coordination among the numerous deployed units. The culminating training event is the Fleet Exercise, which evaluates the warfare skills of all deploying units, including embarked Marine Corps forces. This phased approach ensures the Battle Group and/or Amphibious Ready Group are fully ready to deploy as integrated warfighting teams in support of Unified Commanders-in-Chief.

Given the Navy’s operational concept of “Forward Presence” and given its structured approach to task organizing and training deploying forces, one can deduce the following criteria to describe expeditionary operations from the Navy’s perspective:

- Acquisition of infrastructure/equipment to support expeditionary concepts (e.g., shipping assets).

40 Ibid., 2-3-1 to 2-3-7.
• Mission-based task organizing of forces for deployment/employment.
• Mature employment concepts for integrated Navy and Marine Corps forces, including forward positioning of assets, basing arrangements to support employment, and integrated deployment concepts (e.g., MPF shipping).
• Integrated training and certification of readiness for task-organized deploying forces.

**Air Force Expeditionary Doctrine**

One final doctrinal source can help us identify criteria useful for evaluating the Air Force’s new focus on expeditionary concepts. This source comes from the Air Force itself. In this document, the Air Force produces organizational and employment concepts implicitly and explicitly defining the services’ view of expeditionary operations. As the previous statement indicates, however, the Air Force leaves it to the reader to draw some of the appropriate conclusions. A brief discussion of this is warranted.

In contrast to the Marine Corp’s approach to defining expeditionary concepts and, to a lesser extent the Navy, Air Force Doctrine Document 2, *Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power*, was written with a focus on how the Air Force organizes and employs aerospace power throughout the spectrum of conflict at the operational level. What the document *does not describe* is the expeditionary nature of the Air Force.

The lead author of the publication, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Poynor, Chief of the Aerospace Power Division at the Air Force Doctrine Center, alluded to this issue when he commented for *Air Force News* on its release: "This publication…outlines how to set up, plan and execute air expeditionary forces. The ideas in AFDD 2 represent the recommended best way to organize for expeditionary operations." According to Poynor, one of the reasons AFDD 2 is important to the Air Force is that before now "we've been expeditionary in nature, but not in organization.”

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While it is clear the Air Force has been expeditionary in nature the past decade, its failure to discuss this topic is the document’s basic weakness. Again, Poynor pointed out the disconnect between the service’s expeditionary concepts and the Air Force’s operational doctrine:

[T]he EAF framework and AFDD 2 – have been evolving together, with many of the same sources of ideas…However, the EAF concept is a policy decision, and guides things like how to schedule units for vulnerability for deployment. AFDD 2 talks about organization and command relationships, which [are] different issue[s]. In short, it's two sides of the same coin.43

This drawback notwithstanding, AFDD 2 is an excellent source of information on the variety of operations aerospace power supports, from peacetime engagement and crisis response, to deterrence and contingency operations, to combat operations. AFDD 2 also is exceptional in describing to internal, as well as external audiences, how the Air Force presents forces to warfighting commanders. Each of these topics are very useful for the purposes this analysis.

The other Air Force core doctrine publication, AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*,44 also fails to address the expeditionary nature of the service. This publication is focused on foundational concepts: Aerospace power in war, the tenets of aerospace power, Air Force core competencies, and aerospace power functions. It includes a short chapter on organizing Air Force forces and describes the service’s expeditionary organizations, but again, this discussion is purely focused on how to organize and present forces for expeditionary operations, not the employment concepts or the expected traits of expeditionary airmen or expeditionary units. The Air Force supplement to the DoD dictionary does not add to the discussion either. For example, it does not explain the fundamental difference between the *Expeditionary Aerospace Force* concept and an Air Expeditionary Force. Understanding the difference between these two ideas,

Print News, October 6, 1998), n. pag.
43 Ibid.
at a minimum, is critical to understanding the direction the Air Force is taking with the EAF concept. These ideas should be captured in the Air Force’s formal doctrine.

But where doctrine fails, Air Force history does not. Just as the Marine Corps experience has driven the development of a body of knowledge and expeditionary concepts, so does Air Force history. The difference is that the Air Force has not codified those experiences into doctrinal principles. To garner a clear understanding of how the Air Force approaches expeditionary operations, it’s important to look at the history of these operations and the unique way Air Forces tackle the challenge of projecting forces overseas to execute military operations.
Chapter 3

Air Force Expeditionary History

While Air Force leaders have spent great time and effort to emphasize the service is transitioning from a garrison to an expeditionary force in the post-Cold War era, the reality is throughout its history -- even during the Cold War -- the service always was an expeditionary force. Although much of its force structure, equipment, basing, and strategy for 40 years focused on fighting the Soviet threat, the Air Force remained capable of and did mount numerous expeditionary operations. However, in contrast to the Marine Corps’ relatively constant expeditionary focus over the past 75 years, it was not the governing mission or vision guiding the Air Force’s organization, training, equipping, and mindset. As a result, the Air Force finds it lacks the Marine Corps’ well-developed body of knowledge, culture, and fully refined expeditionary concepts. To discern the service’s approach to expeditionary missions, it is necessary to review several of these operations throughout its existence.\textsuperscript{45} The evolutionary history of expeditionary units and the lessons these forces learned over time contribute added criteria applicable to an analysis of the Air Force’s new expeditionary concept.

Before proceeding to a review of the lessons that can be derived from these expeditionary operations, the previous paragraph suggests a potential prima facie answer to the query posed by this research paper: Is the Air Force really expeditionary? The simple answer might be: ‘yes, it always have been.’ One senior Air Force officer suggested just such an approach, pointing out that for much of the service’s history air power was employed in an expeditionary manner.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{45} This review will be limited in scope as outlined in the preface. Research for this paper included an examination of Army Air Service expeditionary-type operations in World War I and World War II in addition to those conducted after the formation of the separate United States Air Force in 1947.

\textsuperscript{46} Brigadier General(s) Buck Rogers, USAF, Director, Chief of Staff’s Action Group,
Whether it was to support operations in Mexico fighting Poncho Villa, supporting General Pershing’s American Expeditionary Forces in Europe during World War I, or deploying forces to North Africa, Great Britain, and the Pacific to defeat the Axis Powers in World War II, air forces deployed from the United States to support military operations abroad. He continued this line of reasoning by suggesting that the Air Force was expeditionary in Korea and in Vietnam as well. It was only during the Cold War, he argues, did its focus on expeditionary operations diminish as the service prepared to fight from forward garrisons with established forces and infrastructure. While this overall assessment may prove correct, it would be premature at this point to conclude the Air Force is in fact an expeditionary force simply by application of the “we always have been” test. Proof must come in the form of data and analysis. The following discussion then, is intended to satisfy the two purposes outlined above: To identify criteria to apply to the Air Force’s current expeditionary concept and to demonstrate, through historical examples, the Air Force’s expeditionary qualities.

The language used in the 1990s to describe changes occurring within the military establishment implies when the Cold War started, expeditionary deployments ceased. In reality, the rigidness of our national security strategy in the 1950s pointed to the need to make adjustments that would enable our nation to employ conventional versus strategic/nuclear military forces. Throughout the Cold War, the Air Force demonstrated its ability to task organize forces for overseas missions of limited duration. While these forces took many forms, generally speaking, they represented the application of expeditionary principles to the unique security challenges the United States faced during the Cold War era.


47 Ibid.
Composite Air Strike Force (1955 – 1973)

The clearest example of an application of today’s expeditionary concepts to Cold War challenges was Tactical Air Command’s creation of the Composite Air Strike Force in 1955. Strikingly similar in its concepts of organization and employment to the current EAF construct, Tactical Air Command (TAC) saw the need following the Korean War to develop an employment concept that maintained forces at a constant, high state of readiness and provided a capability for “quick reaction to the threat of limited and general war.” Once deployed, these forces needed to be self-sustaining, capable of moving into undeveloped theaters and able to initiate immediate action without advanced preparation of mature logistics systems. To meet these operational requirements, Tactical Air Command created the Composite Air Strike Force (CASF). TAC described the CASF concept of operations as follows:

The CASF is a small, tactical air force composed of a command element, fighter, reconnaissance, tankers, troops carrier aircraft, and communications support units. The primary characteristic and determining quality of the force is fast reaction. [Emphasis in original] The CASF must be able to intervene swiftly against any aggressor in hours or the concept of deploying a strike force from the United States would lose its validity.

The CASF was developed as a result of the vigorous leadership of General Otto “Opie” Weyland, Commander of Tactical Air Command, from 1954 to 1959. Battling for “tactical operations in a USAF dominated by the Strategic Air Command (SAC),” he envisioned a rapid reaction force, capable of deploying to “areas of imminent or actual hostilities, keeping…SAC and theater forces free to counter the Soviet nuclear weapons threat.” To facilitate the fast employment of the CASF, TAC created a unique task force and command structure. Again, the

49 Ibid., 15.
striking similarity between the CASF and the concept the Air Force built for today’s AEF forces is evident. Just as today’s EAF concept consists of ten AEFs made up of tailorable forces for employment across the spectrum of conflict, the CASF consisted of three task forces tailored for employment in Cold War hot spots. The “packages,” as TAC called them, varied in size and composition. The first package had a limited combat capability and was designed as a “show-the-flag” force. The second was the “basic combat element.” TAC designed this as the initial element of a “small war force” and kept the units assigned to this ‘Strike Force’ on a progressive 24-hour alert system with initial elements available to deploy within four hours. The third and final package was an augmentation force for use in “expanded operations.” With this tailorable structure and through use of its alert system, TAC projected they could have the complete force in place ready for operations in the Middle East in 48 hours and in the Far East in 72 hours.51

Operational from 1955 to 1973, 19th Air Force served as the command element for forces assigned to CASF’s three task forces, planning the deployment and the employment of ‘Strike Force’ units.52 The employment system TAC used then was not unlike the system the Air Force will use in the new Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept: Grouping geographically-separated units into Air Expeditionary Wings and then providing them to a COMAFFOR for employment. Under the CASF concept, units from TAC’s two Numbered Air Forces, 9th and 12th, would organize into the packages described above and would then be released to 19th Air Force control


52 Nineteenth Air Force inherited its numerical designation from an illustrious World War II unit, the XIX Tactical Air Command that teamed with General Patton’s Third U.S. Army in Europe from August 1, 1944 to VE-Day on May 9 1945. Certainly, General Weyland’s World War II experience had something to do with this designation: he commanded the XIX Tactical Air Command, directing the fighter attack for Operation Overlord before joining up with Patton.
when a CASF was deployed. In another parallel to the current EAF construct, if the ‘Strike Force’ deployed to a theater with an existing command structure for the deployed force to fall in on – as in USAFE or PACAF – then the 19th Air Force command structure would chop direction of those forces to the appropriate overseas command while 19th Air Force remained available for other missions. Finally, just as the lead Wing Commander in the current EAF construct does not have direct command over most of the units assigned to his package, the commander of 19th Air Force did not have assigned forces; he gained command only when the task force units were assigned for overseas deployments.

One of the key enablers of the CASF concept of operations was Tactical Air Command’s acquisition and equipment strategy. In the early 1950s, TAC began to develop an air refueling capability for fighter aircraft. Once developed and fielded, this capability made rapid response possible and allowed CASF units to “maintain themselves economically on their home bases until the need to deploy arose.” The CASF concept inspired other developments as well, including tactical airlift, worldwide command and control, joint service operations, and mobile logistics. This focus on acquisition and equipment as an enabler of operational concepts is a vital lesson. It demonstrates a willingness on the part of a service to equip forces based on the demands of future missions rather than a “last war” focus, typically a constraint on operational capability. To their credit, today’s Air Force senior leaders have not limited their focus in this way and have advocated acquisition strategies to support the EAF concept.

Another piece of the CASF system demonstrating the expeditionary capability of the Air Force during this era was the use of dedicated logistics structures. The CASF was designed to conduct sustained operations for approximately 30 days with minimum logistics support (excluding food, fuel, and ammunition). To do this, TAC designed “flyaway kits” containing spares and equipment vital to combat operations.\textsuperscript{56} This not only enabled sustained overseas operations, but also made units self-deployable, thus increasing their flexibility and responsiveness.

The final element of the CASF structure demonstrating the expeditionary nature of this force was the “mindset” piece. The Commander of 19\textsuperscript{th} Air Force demanded that each of his members be ready for instant departure from the United States; he even went so far as to jump qualify up to one third of the staff so it could participate in airborne operations if necessary. The units’ stringent alert system guaranteed their rapid reaction capability. Under this structured system, command post controllers closely tracked local travel of airmen in alert status, enabling them to contact key personnel within two minutes. According to historical documents, alerts were a way of life in 19\textsuperscript{th} Air Force. A brief example illustrates this: During one New Year’s Eve party, the alert call demanded the pilots to change from civilian clothes to flight suits at the Officer’s Club. Familiar with this culture of readiness and dedication to the mission, one pilot observed “the wives carried on alone.”\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Composite Air Strike Force Concept of Operations}, (Langley AFB, VA: Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, October 1961), 17.

\textsuperscript{57} Major Ben H. Scarpero, USAF, \textit{The Suitcase Air Force}, (Goldsboro, NC: Office of Information, Headquarters, 19\textsuperscript{th} Air Force, Undated.), 8.
The operational history of this unique organization bears out these traits. Nineteenth Air Force maintained four-month rotational deployments of fighter squadrons to Spain, Italy, and Turkey to reinforce forward deployed units in the event of general war. They “showed the flag,” as their concept of operations stipulated, in every continent (except Antarctica) and in dozens of countries around the globe. When tensions increased in important regions around the world, it deployed units to demonstrate American resolve -- such as Lebanon and Taiwan in 1958 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

In many ways, the CASF concept was a prototype of the Air Force’s future expeditionary concepts. Many of the employment concepts that governed the 18-year existence of this force are found in today’s EAF concept. With similar relationships between the leadership elements and earmarked forces, and with parallel approaches to the organization, training, and employment concepts for ‘Strike Force’ units, one cannot help but conclude the Air Force’s expeditionary history has found its way into the expeditionary vision the service’s senior leaders have articulated for the Air Force’s future. Charles D. Bright, in his book *Historical Dictionary of the U.S. Air Force* carries this argument one step further. He asserts that despite the disbanding of 19th AF in 1973 to save money, the Air Force’s interest in providing rapid deployment continued: “While the CASF disappeared, the mission remained and took the guise of support to a series of joint, unified and specified commands.” Believing in an unbroken link between the CASF and modern employment practices, Bright concludes that as late as 1992 TAC operated and trained “under the CASF concept.”

While the CASF’s tailorable, flexible employment system closely resembles the construct of today’s *Expeditionary Aerospace Force* concept, 19th Air Force’s graduated employment

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concept, consisting of three inter-connected forces, even more closely resembles the Marine Corps' concept of employment for its Marine Expeditionary Forces. Other similarities exist as well: The CASF and MEF concepts each incorporate mission-based task organization, both systems view their forces as engagement tools, each employs logistics concepts that are linked to force packages and sustainment goals, they each demonstrate a commitment to acquiring the right equipment to enable expeditionary operations, and finally, each system firmly endorses imposition of a system to reinforce the expeditionary mindset. That said, if the Marine Corps earns the expeditionary title with respect to its concepts of organizing, training, sustaining and employing its forces, then an expeditionary label might also be due to the Composite Air Strike Force as well. Other examples of Cold War expeditionary operations help establish the continuity of the Air Force’s commitment to these expeditionary concepts.

Operation Freedom Train/Linebacker, 1972

On March 30, 1972, General Vo Nguyen Giap launched the North Vietnamese Army on its Easter offensive, attacking South Vietnam with 125,000 troops with supporting tanks and artillery. Attacking during the United States “Vietnamization” of the war effort, the primary response to the attack was borne by South Vietnamese air and ground forces. USAF aircraft supported the defenders with the approximately 300 aircraft that remained in the theater. But when the combined efforts of the Republic of Vietnam and in-country US forces could not stop the NVA offensive, President Nixon ordered a significant increase of American air power without a reinsertion of ground forces. On April 6, 1972, the United States launched its retaliatory air campaign, Operation Freedom Train. The strategy was to bomb the offensive to a standstill and interdict the lines of communication the North Vietnamese needed to sustain the operation.
When the initial strikes failed to stop the NVA advance, President Nixon expanded the air interdiction operation to all of North Vietnam. On the 10th of May 1972, American air forces then launched Operation Linebacker. Constant Guard was the CONUS-based aircraft deployment supporting the President’s aerial-focused strategy. Four separate deployments supported these operations, known as Constant Guard I-IV. From mid-April to June 1972, the Air Force deployed more than 270 aircraft to the region, the equivalent of 15 squadrons, including 119 bombers. The Air Force also deployed 110 KC-135 tankers to support the operation. Ultimately, this use of airpower to disrupt lines of communication and destroy NVA forces was successful.\footnote{Bernard C. Nalty, \textit{Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force. Volume 1.}, (Washington D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 317-324.} This ability to rapidly project massive firepower through deployments overseas is a capability the Air Force maintained throughout the Cold War.

\textbf{Force Projection in the 1970s and 1980s}

The Air Force also supported several other limited war operations throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The Air Force committed significant reinforcements to NATO for the defense of Western Europe and exercised this capability frequently in Crested Cap exercises and during the Army’s REFORGER exercises. The Air Force deployed forces to Saudi Arabia in 1979 as a show of force in response to the fall of the Shah of Iran. It also conducted military operations in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. While these Cold War-era operations demonstrate a varying degree of commitment to expeditionary concepts, these commitments of US forces show the Air Force does in fact have a history of projecting power overseas to support our national interests. But what they also reveal is a slow erosion of the Air Force’s understanding of the necessary elements required for vigorous and regimented expeditionary operations. The Cold War focus
on strategic forces, intermediate range nuclear weapons, arms control, and static garrison
operations, all of which were designed to engage an identifiable and monolithic threat, resulted
in a strategic overshadowing and a gradual shift away from the concepts embraced by Tactical
Air Command, 19th Air Force, and Composite Air Strike Force units.

The perception of the world as a bipolar fight between democracy and communism resulted in
a benign neglect of expeditionary capabilities. This benign neglect became more acute as the
decades passed. When the decade of the 1980s came to an end, the Air Force was firmly
entrenched in the force structure of the Cold War, operating a large fleet of nuclear capable
bombers, all of the United States’ Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), and literally dozens
of major forward operating bases. Although Tactical Air Command continued to employ forces
in expeditionary-type operations, the Air Force as a whole had prepared for operations at the
high end of the conflict spectrum with insufficient attention devoted to developing structures or
organizational concepts to engage in a multipolar world of undefined threats. The implosion of
the Soviet Union, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and a revised national security strategy that
employed military forces as an engagement tool forced the Air Force to adjust its sight picture to
a new set of circumstances. These new conditions would require the Air Force to rethink its
approach to expeditionary operations.
Throughout most of the 1990s, the Air Force faced a continuing reduction of its active duty strength, the closure of most of its forward operating bases in Europe and the Pacific, and a continuing requirement to provide forces to Central Command to enforce No-Fly-Zones imposed by the United Nations following the Persian Gulf War. The constraints of a smaller force and the demands of increased operational tempo forced the service to readdress its approach to expeditionary operations.

Major vision and structural changes were made in the early 1990s as a result of these demands. The Air Force announced a new doctrine of *Global Reach, Global Power* in 1990 and made several organizational changes to reflect a shift from a Cold War posture to one focused on rapid world-wide engagement. Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command and Military Airlift Command were dissolved. All fighter, bomber, and air-breathing ISR forces were transferred to a newly formed Air Combat Command; airlift and tanker forces were transferred to the redesignated Air Mobility Command. SAC’s management of the ICBM force came to an end also with the reassignment of these forces to Air Force Space Command. The Air Force streamlined its command structure as well. It reduced the number of major commands -- an echelon of command one level below the Air Staff -- from 13 to 8 and eliminated an entire command echelon of 19 air divisions. In addition to these historic organizational changes, the Air Force began to develop new operational concepts to deliver expeditionary airpower.

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60 Ibid., 568.
Composite Wings

From 1991-1994, the Air Force experimented with composite wing structures as a means of organizing forces for employment. General Merrill McPeak, then Air Force Chief of Staff, became interested in these configurations after the success of several provisional units during the Gulf War. According to Bernard Nalty, in his two-volume work *Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force*, the creation of composite wings “was not a new concept.” He points out that this organizational approach had been “implemented in the 1920s and 1930s and again during World War II by the Air Commandos.” Designed to provide operational commanders with the variety of aerospace power capabilities needed to conduct combat air operations, this approach represented the Air Force’s first modern attempt to recreate an expeditionary capability from dissimilar operational units and platforms.

Originally, two composite wings were formed to test this concept, one at Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina and another at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. Designed as rapid reaction, power projection units, both combined a variety of platforms—fighters, bombers, refuelers, and airlift assets—under a single command structure. Although some of these assets remained stationed at locations separate from their command elements, the concept called for their integration at a deployed location in the operational theater. A second type of composite wing was formed in 1994 at Pope AFB, North Carolina and at Moody AFB, Georgia. These “battlefield support” wings were comprised of F-16s, A/OA-10s, C-130s, and an Air Control Squadron to provide air surveillance/management and weapons control. These wings were designed primarily to perform Combat Air Support operations and were located near major

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61 Ibid., 548
62 Ibid.
63 The 4th Wing at Seymour Johnson originally consisted of only KC-10s and F-15Es, while the 366th Wing controlled a force of F-15C/E, F-16s, B-52s (later B-1s), and KC-135 tankers.
XVIII Airborne Corps warfighting units to facilitate integrated training. Combined, these composite wings gave the Air Force rapidly deployable units capable of supporting a variety of combat contingencies.\textsuperscript{64}

**Reinserting “Expeditionary” into the Air Force Vocabulary**

Although the Air Force had made noteworthy advances in transitioning to a force postured for engagement with the creation of composite wings, the events of October 1994 demonstrated the Air Force needed to fundamentally rethink its approach to force structure and force employment.

The precipitating event, according to Lieutenant Colonel Larry Thompson, was Saddam Hussein’s massing of combat troops along his southern border in late 1994, presenting a renewed threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The United States response to this threat was a rapid deployment of forces using self-deployable airpower and naval forces, and the rapid deployment of heavy ground forces using Maritime Prepositioning Forces for the Marine Corps and prepositioned material for US Army units. Called *Operation Vigilant Warrior*, the Air Force flew nearly 2,000 airlift sorties and moved 21,000 personnel and nearly 10,000 tons of cargo into the theater in just ten days, increasing the number of combat aircraft in theater three fold. While this demonstration of national resolve successfully deterred further advance of Iraqi forces, it convinced General John P. Jumper, then commander of USCENTAF and Ninth Air Force, the Air Force needed to increase its efficiency and its ability to rapidly respond worldwide. General Jumper “saw the increasing need for a rapidly deployable US airpower force” and asked, “how can we get back to responsive and reliable airpower that can deter and rapidly react? Fundamentally, how can we put the word ‘expeditionary’ back into our vocabulary?”\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{64} Nalty, *Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force*, 548.

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While General Jumper recognized the need to develop a rapidly deployable airpower force, he was also intimately aware of the need to continuously deploy a steady stream of Air Force and Navy aircraft to support the requirements imposed by *Operation Southern Watch*. In October 1995, when the Navy redeployed the *U.S.S Independence* from duty in Central Command to fulfill the service’s carrier rotation policy -- despite the gap in force structure this redeployment created -- General Jumper was forced to develop a package of air assets comparable to the capabilities found in a carrier battle group. According to Dr. Richard Davis, this thinking formed the basis of the modern AEF concept.66

The package 9th Air Force originally developed to cover this “carrier gap” consisted of 36 aircraft: 12 F-15Cs (air-to-air fighters), 12 F-16s (multi-role fighters), 6 F-16s for the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) mission, and 6 B-52s on alert in the continental United States. Although this tailored force package differed slightly from typical deployment modules for those individual weapons systems, the length of their deployment was expected to remain less than 60 days, the anticipated length of the carrier gap. Armed with this plan, General Jumper sought approval from the Commander of Air Combat Command, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and the Commander-in-Chief of United States Central Command. With their concurrence, a revolutionary new way to employ aerospace forces was borne. The first Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) of the 1990s deployed to Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain on October 28, 1995. Known as AEF I, the force of 576 personnel spent 51 days in theater and flew 673 sorties.67

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67 Ibid., 22.
Over the next several years, the Air Force would deploy seven more Air Expeditionary Forces, primarily to Southwest Asia. Table 1 shows the task-organized AEFs the Air Force deployed during this period of their expeditionary development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITS</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>PAX</th>
<th>C-141 EQ</th>
<th>DATE</th>
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<tr>
<td>AEF I</td>
<td>347 WG 20 FW</td>
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<td>32</td>
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<td>88</td>
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<tr>
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<td>366 WG 12 x F-15C 6 x F-15E 12 x F-16 HTS 3 x B-1 4 x KC-135</td>
<td>Shaikh Isa, Bahrain</td>
<td>1271</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Mar-98</td>
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Table 1: AEF Deployments

In February of 1997, Air Combat Command proposed a new naming convention for these deployments, recommending they take the unit designator from the wing providing the leadership element of the deploying force. Hence, the Air Force shifted from “AEF X” nomenclature to “Air Expeditionary Wing” naming conventions for these units. This naming convention is currently in use today and is codified in Air Force Doctrine Document 2’s descriptions of how the service organizes for deployment.

While these deployments were on going, planners were working to standardize and refine the airlift, logistics support, and composition of each AEF deployment. Unfortunately, this was difficult because many of the AEF deployments were different in terms of force mix, location, and mission. AEF II was to a bare base location in Jordan; AEF IV was a bomber-only AEF.
deployment to Guam, each requiring vastly different infrastructure and combat support assets.
And although airlift requirements fell within a consistent range for most AEFs--32 to 46 C-141 equivalents--AEF II and AEF IV demonstrated the need to develop a more rigorous approach to expeditionary force deployment planning.

To reduce the ad hoc nature of each deployment, Air Combat Command planners decided to standardize the deployment packages by developing an “AEF Model” for the CENTCOM area of operations.  The templates they built considered force packages, phasing, and beddown locations as the principal planning variables to use for future AEF deployments. Based on this AEF template--a model that also included standard assumptions for munitions, vehicles, water, and fuel--the lead units then developed force phase lists, depending on the weapons system of the lead wing. The system was the Air Force’s best effort to date in developing refined expeditionary concepts. Planners were learning lessons from each deployment and by the eighth AEF deployment--the 366th Air Expeditionary Wing’s deployment to Shaikh Isa AB, Bahrain--repeat units were training, organizing, and deploying under the AEF paradigm. Inter-unit equipment sharing in theater, equipment prepositioning, deployment phasing, and force tailoring were leading to efficiencies in airlift and logistics as well. But this system still resembled an ad hoc approach to expeditionary operations. In particular, the units preparing for deployment were employing forces designed to support major theater war OPLANs, not to support employment in the small-scale contingencies called for in Southwest

<table>
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<th>Table 2: CENTCOM AEF Model, April 1998</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Air Superiority Fighters</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Strike Aircraft</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SEAD Fighters</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bombers</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tankers</strong></td>
</tr>
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68 General Richard E. Hawley, USAF, Commander, Air Combat Command, “AEF Deployment CONOPS,” Briefing to CORONA Top Conference, (Randolph AFB, TX, June 1998.)
Asia. Units were breaking apart Unit Type Code teams, equipment packages, and supply kits to meet the needs of these AEF deployments.

Because of the need to inject planning, training, and scheduling rigor to the process, soon this ad hoc system and the term *AEF*, as it was being used in the mid-1990s, would become obsolete. In their place, the service would introduce the next evolution of the Air Force’s expeditionary concept, the *Expeditionary Aerospace Force* concept. The idea to revive expeditionary concepts Air Force wide grew out of General Jumper’s advocacy and the success of the concept in Southwest Asia. With General Jumper’s move to the Air Staff in June of 1996 came the seeds of a truly fundamental rethinking of how the Air Force employs forces.
Chapter 5

Institutionalizing Expeditionary Concepts

The first evidence of a desire to create a broad institutional shift to expeditionary concepts was the Air Force’s commissioning of a 12-month Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) study in January 1997. Recognizing the valuable military options the Air Force could provide to the theater CINCs with AEFs, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff tasked the SAB to “…conduct an intense examination of Air Expeditionary Force operations and to recommend to the Air Force opportunities and options for enabling the Air Force to fulfill the training, deployment, sustainment and employment performance it requires to conduct air expeditionary operations.”69 After an extensive study of existing Air Force expeditionary concepts, the SAB concluded the Air Force could create an Air Expeditionary Force capable of responding “in less than half the time currently needed, with less than half the airlift, with less than one-third the people forward, to unprepared locations throughout the world.”70 It also found the Air Force was operating AEFs much less effectively than was feasible: “…an AEF can operate about an order-of-magnitude more effectively…with relatively small marginal cost to the current Air Force program and in the near future.”71 With these two findings forming the foundation of the report, the SAB then went on to make its most important statement about the future of the United States Air Force, one echoing the inherent U.S. Marine Corps expeditionary mindset:

Fielding the envisioned AEF will require that the Air Force adopt new operational concepts, new organizational structures, new approaches to training, and new equipment. But most importantly, the AEF is a different

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70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
culture and the Air Force will have to make the appropriate culture changes to be successful in this venture.\textsuperscript{72}

The SAB also made dozens of specific recommendations. These included operational changes, such as a modular deployment model for deploying units and rapid planning methods; culture changes such as education and training “from the classroom to the field” to inculcate the AEF philosophy in all Air Force members; and numerous other recommendations relating to research and development, experiments, and technology demonstrators to ensure acquisition, command and control, sustainment, and force protection concepts were incorporated into the new AEF.

Their report, while visionary and enthusiastic, was realistic about what the Air Force could and should do. Recognizing many of the organizational, planning, and training advances could be made rapidly at little cost, it recommended the Air Force undertake those improvements immediately. In 1998, the Air Force did exactly what the SAB suggested and quickly took action to build the next evolution of the service’s expeditionary force.

\textbf{Genesis and Growth of the EAF Concept}

In 1997 and 1998, two other efforts were underway to make improvements to the Air Force’s expeditionary concepts, one in the Pentagon under General Jumper’s staff in the Directorate of Air and Space Operations and another at Air Combat Command under the leadership of General Richard Hawley. These simultaneous endeavors produced the foundation and the framework for the expeditionary approach the Air Force would soon adopt.

In the Pentagon in early 1997, General Jumper was focused on reintroducing expeditionary warfighting to the United States Air Force. His staff was working on developing methods to organize, train, and equip warfighting forces capable of rapidly creating, projecting, and

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
employing combat airpower in an expeditionary manner. Patterned after the US Marine Corps I/II Marine Expeditionary Forces, General Jumper envisioned creating an East Coast and West Coast force capable of quickly projecting combat power into a foreign country and operating from host-nation sponsored contingency bases. In addition to using these forces in host-nation sponsored exercises and incorporating forward positioning of equipment into their concept of operations, he believed these forces could function as a CINC’s Flexible Deterrent Options able to project power as a show of force prior to OPLAN execution. 73 At the Air Force’s summer meeting of senior executives, CORONA Top '97, General Jumper successfully inserted the topic “Evolving to an Expeditionary Aerospace Force” into the “grab bag” of issues on the conference agenda. Although the topic wasn’t formally briefed, General Jumper’s evolutionary vision had now been inserted into the Air Force’s primary process for making decisions on major service-wide issues. 74 Despite this inauspicious start, the issue came to dominate ensuing CORONA Conferences. Throughout 1998, and later in 1999, the Air Force used the CORONA Conference decision-making process as the primary system for tasking, tracking, and deciding issues related to implementing this new expeditionary vision.

General Hawley, Commander of Air Combat Command from 1996 to 1999, was driving several improvements to Air Force deployment practices as well. 75 In addition to the efforts to build standardized AEF models described above, General Hawley was deeply concerned with building team integrity as well as injecting a measure of predictability into the process of selecting forces for deployment. To that end, he directed his staff to develop more rigorous

74 Ibid.
75 The author observed these efforts and participated in the development of EAF decision briefings while assigned to Headquarters, Air Combat Command from January 1997 to June 1999. Several observations made in this section are based, in part, on this direct involvement.
personnel and aircraft scheduling systems. Once in place, those systems would allow units to better manage their operational tempo burden and would enable Air Combat Command, as the force provider to United States Atlantic Command, to more efficiently source units for overseas deployments. In early 1998, ACC began to use these processes to great effect. Not only were improvements made in sourcing and predictability, General Hawley now had a better tool to capture personnel tempo data and to create efficiencies in the deployment process.

These two complementary efforts came together in the spring of 1998 when General Ryan asked General Hawley to review a concept he was considering for organizing the force. This new approach, developed cooperatively by Air Staff planners from the Directorate of Plans and the Directorate of Air and Space Operations, was the first conceptual effort that sought to institutionalize expeditionary concepts Air Force wide. The idea they presented was what is now known as the Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept. In June 1998, senior Air Force leaders approved this new approach in principle and made the decision to transition the idea from concept to reality. Because Air Combat Command had already made great strides in developing an effective scheduling system for deploying expeditionary units, General Ryan asked General Hawley to study the issue and suggest an option for organizing the “expeditionary” Air Force.

General Ryan did not constrain ACC to specific organizational models. However, his planning guidance asked them to ensure the concept they proposed consisted of 10 Air Expeditionary Forces76 and that they employ a 15-month rotational cycle with a deployment vulnerability period of 90 days. Implicit in his guidance was the need to blend General Jumper’s

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76 This use of the term Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) is intended to refer to aerospace capability in pre-determined, scheduled sets of forces, not deployable units. From these groupings of forces, task organized packages would deploy -- comprised of a cross section of weapon systems and people.
warfighting focus with General Hawley’s focus on creating predictability and teamwork in deployments.

General Hawley’s enthusiasm for the project was contagious. He made it clear to his staff they were doing important work that would set the course of the Air Force for the foreseeable future. His passionate direction to consider all possibilities and take advantage of his rank and position, if necessary, set the tone for the project. The following two items are the specific tasks General Hawley assigned to his staff:

- Define a process for identifying future Air Expeditionary Force composition, both mission and support (to include appropriate humanitarian assistance/disaster relief assets, force protection, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, medical, Civil Engineers, communication, contracting, and other support elements) and integrate these resources into the AEF structure.

- Using the ACC master Combat Air Forces scheduling process, identify a unit alignment plan for AEFs in FY00 to include both mission and combat/combat service support assets for FY00. Ensure the process can schedule available "on-call" forces that can react to "pop-up" NCA/CINC taskings without significant disruption to the FY00 Combat Air Force Consolidated Tasking Order.77

With these clear tasks, the Air Combat Command staff set to work to build the Air Force’s future expeditionary construct. In addition to the planning guidance referenced above, the staff was constrained in other ways as well. The principle drivers governing their development of potential AEF structures were the physical inventory of available forces by mission area, the ability to support the existing deployment requirements levied on the Air Force by the Unified Commands, and the requirement to withhold sufficient fighter and bomber platforms from the 10 AEFs to constitute a rapid reaction capability for crisis response. In developing their proposals, ACC planners took a comprehensive view of the entire Air Force operational force structure, compiling inventories of all active, guard, and reserve air mobility forces, combat air forces, ISR

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77 General Richard E. Hawley, “AEF Composition and Scheduling” Briefing to USAF CORONA Fall Conference, (United States Air Force Academy, CO: October 5, 1998.)
platforms, and search and rescue forces. The planners also were careful not to operate in a vacuum, closely consulting with the Air Staff and the other Major Commands on various AEF options.

The planning team pursued a four-pronged approach in building the AEF constructs. First, the team developed terminology to categorize forces assigned to an AEF. This consisted of the following three categories: *Deployed Forces* were those forward deployed for steady-state contingencies and other semi-permanent commitments. *On-call Forces* were those identified to maintain a deployment/execution posture between 24 to 96 hours with posture timing based on 24 hours of unambiguous strategic warning. The third category, *Available Forces*, referred to all remaining AEF forces that could be used to meet new requirements during the AEF’s deployment vulnerability window. Next, planners examined and assessed baseline AEF requirements, particularly with respect to the aerospace functions required for each AEF package. After developing and assessing several alternative alignments, ACC then assigned notional forces to specific AEFs in four different configurations—one served as the ‘baseline,’ while three others were considered alternative AEF constructs.

General Hawley met with the staff several times during this effort to review their progress and to issue amplifying instructions. His guidance focused the teams’ work and ultimately provided the assessment criteria the team would use in stage four of the process. According to these criteria, the AEF construct should:

- Include all aviation forces except those assigned to Korea.
- Link current low density/high demand (LD/HD) systems to the AEF structure -- in some manner.
- Keep the faith with the 45-day operations rotation policy (driven by pilot training currencies).
- Construct the deployment cycle to avoid repetitive holiday rotations.
• Maximize the linkage of combat support units to the construct (initially those considered were Red Horse, Combat Comm, and Air Transportable Hospitals).

• Avoid on-call tasking of Air National Guard (ANG)/Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) fighters; task them as scheduled deployers.

• Give AEFs comparable capability in five aerospace missions: Offensive/Defensive Counterair (OCA/DCA), a precision guided munitions (PGM) engagement capability, a Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) capability, a Close Air Support (CAS)/Anti-armor capability, and a Strategic Attack capability.

• Minimize mobility forces workload.78

The ‘baseline’ configuration generally met these criteria, but there were several deviations in this option that drove considerable discussion. The major features of the ‘baseline’ configuration included 90-day rotations for fighters versus the desired 45, an imbedded on-call crisis response force versus a stand alone capability, a requirement to operate flying squadrons from split locations if the on-call AEW was executed, a degraded SEAD capability in one AEF caused by insufficient active F-16CJ squadrons, the use of ANG/AFRC fighters for on-call CAS requirements in two AEFs (or use of a non-traditional system--the B-1B--to support the on-call requirement), and an inconsistent inter-deployment training cycle between vulnerability periods.

Recognizing the potential flaws in the above alignment, the team developed three alternative AEF alignments that addressed the ability to maintain a 45-day aircrew rotation cycle, avoid split operating locations, handle the SEAD mission, and optimize use of the ANG/AFRC. The three alternative AEF alignments each had unique characteristics as well. The first option consisted of ten AEFs with 45-day OCA/DCA rotations, an imbedded on-call force, but unbalanced PGM support. The second alternative included nine AEFs with 45-day OCA/DCA rotations, an imbedded on-call force, and again an unbalanced PGM support. The third option represented a more balanced approach than the ‘baseline’ configuration or the other two alternatives; it

78 Ibid.
consisted of nine AEFs with 45-day rotations and independent on-call force (called the 9+1 Offset). After developing an assessment matrix based on the original taskings and the additional guidance provided throughout the process, the staff had four complete options ready for wider consideration. The work was grueling and time consuming, but as General Hawley opined early in the process, it was definitely worthwhile. In October of 1998, two months after Secretary Peters and General Ryan’s EAF press conference announcing the new concept, senior leaders reviewed the first fully developed constructs proposing the Air Force’s new expeditionary structures.

Originally, General Ryan and the other senior Air Force leaders approved the fourth option, the 9+1 Offset option. This was selected because the independent on-call force (the “+1”) resolved the issues associated with the 45-day rotations policy and the split operating locations issue, and it used ANG and AFRC assets as deployers. But this approach still required a SEAD workaround and it only proposed a ten and a half month inter-deployment cycle, a potentially problematic issue to obtain consistent ANG and AFRC deployment support.

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79 Jeff Williams, Senior EAF Analyst, Air Combat Command “AEF Composition and Scheduling,” Background Paper to USAF CORONA Fall Conference, (United States Air Force Academy, CO: October 5, 1998.)
For these reasons, General Ryan subsequently asked ACC to reconstruct the 9+1 option and develop another AEF construct that included a consistent twelve-month inter-deployment cycle, two stand-alone crisis response Air Expeditionary Wings (to allow for a predictable, rotating alert capability), and ten AEFs. To make this shift from the 9+1 option, ACC planners transitioned F-16s previously dedicated to a CAS-only mission to one more accurately portraying them as multi-role aircraft and they placed A-10s in each AEF versus every other. This shuffling of platforms freed up enough force structure to build the tenth rotational AEF. The new option used a “stacked” versus an “offset” approach and included an on-call force module similar to the 9+1 variation.

The advantages of this revised approach, which proved to be the final AEF variation, were a reduction in the number of air bridge cycles required to deploy forces, a capability to cross-level forces between AEFs when one AEF is tasked beyond its internal capacity, and a consistent 12-month inter-deployment cycle.80

**AEF Humanitarian Operations Capability**

Before this final AEF variation was announced to the public, General Ryan expressed concern that the AEFs constructed were focused on conflict at the high end of the spectrum and unintentionally neglected the wide variety of non-combat, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief missions the Air Force was called upon to perform on a consistent basis. To rectify this shortcoming, in February 1999 General Ryan asked General Hawley and General Charles Robertson, Commander of Air Mobility Command, to develop a system to ensure the proposed AEFs included an ‘Operations Other Than War’ capability. Recognizing the Air Force already

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80 Colonel Steve Wright, EAF Implementation Team, Air Combat Command. “AEF Update.” Briefing to Combat Air Force Commander’s Conf. (Langley AFB, VA, November 17, 1998.)
had developed a system for the consistent presentation of expeditionary forces, the solution they developed focused on delivering leadership elements familiar with humanitarian instead of combat operations and task organized humanitarian assistance teams.

The commanders’ agreed to establish a “Lead Mobility Wing,” with one such wing assigned to each pair of AEFs. This unit would serve as the single point of contact to prepare CONUS AEF assets for deployments in support of humanitarian and disaster relief operations. The goal of the concept was to provide on-call mobility leadership to enable a rapid response to mobility-centric humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations. Although the initial response for humanitarian operations would come from Air Force Component Command theater-assigned forces, each AEF would retain the capability to deploy and establish operations where no theater capability existed.

The approved concept first called for the Commander of Air Force Forces to deploy a tailored assessment team to evaluate the operational requirements on behalf of the supported JFC. The assessment team would likely include functional representatives from AEF assigned units, such as Civil Engineering, Services, Medical, Communications, Contracting, Comptroller, Legal Affairs, Public Affairs, and Security Forces. Following this assessment, the force providers would then develop a force list for executing potential humanitarian operations. This would include a list of “qualified wing command elements and operations, support, logistics, and medical groups command elements to serve within humanitarian relief-focused operations.” At execution, the AEF-tasked units would deploy and fall under the operational control of the

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82 Ibid., A-VII-3.
83 Ibid., A-VII-2.
designated task force, wing, or group commander.

In March 1999, after Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command reached agreement on this issue, General Ryan publicly announced the selection of the ten lead wings for combat AEFs, the five lead wings for humanitarian AEFs, and the two lead wings for crisis response Air Expeditionary Wings. Table 4 shows the distribution of these lead wings across the Air Force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAF AEF LEAD WINGS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 AEF Lead Wings (Combat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 388 FW Hill AFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 7 BW Dyess AFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 3 WG Elmendorf AFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 48 FW RAF Lakenheath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 555 WG Davis-Monthan AFB</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 20 FW Shaw AFB</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 2 BW Barksdale AFB</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 28 BW Ellsworth AFB</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 27 FW Cannon AFB</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 1 FW Langley AFB</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5 AEF Lead Wings (HUMRO)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2 43 AW Pope AFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4 60 AMW Travis AFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/6 22 ARW McConnell AFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/8 319 ARW Grand Forks AFB</td>
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<tr>
<td>9/10 92 ARW Fairchild AFB</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>2 On-Call AEWs</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OC A 366th Wing Mt Home AFB</td>
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<tr>
<td>OC B 4th Fighter Wing Seymour Johnson AFB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: USAF AEF Lead Wings

The 10 combat AEFs consisted of approximately 150 combat aircraft -- air superiority, air-to-ground assets, precision attack, mobility, and bomber platforms -- and from 10,000 to 15,000 personnel. From these pools of force structure, equipment and people, the Air Force will task organize force packages for deployment. Table 5 is a graphic representation of the “stacked 10” AEF construct, the 15-month AEF life cycle, and the separate breakout of expeditionary base leadership as well as the rapid reaction Air Expeditionary Wings (AEWs) designed for crisis response. With this approved construct, the Air Force had an organizational structure and an employment life cycle to use as a framework to further refine its expeditionary concepts.
Implementation Challenges

It took almost a year to develop this EAF construct and thousands of hours of staff work. But this hard-earned success was only the beginning when compared with the challenges that lay ahead. Before the EAF vision could be translated to reality, Air Force leaders recognized there were a myriad of organizational, cultural, training, equipment, and employment challenges they needed to address to successfully implement the concept by January 2000.

One of the first issues raised by senior Air Force leaders was the need to transform the Air Force mindset and culture to an expeditionary mindset. One of the tools the Air Force developed to effect this transformation is a new Air Force manual called the Airman’s Manual. Modeled after the US Army’s Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks, this publication contains the basic expeditionary skills applicable to airmen worldwide. It begins by stating “Every Air Force

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member is an ‘expeditionary airman.’ That means you must be prepared to deploy anywhere in the world on short notice.”85 Containing the fundamental skills required to deploy, set up, fight, and survive, the manual is an excellent start to the culture change needed to inculcate an expeditionary mindset across the Air Force.

Senior leaders also realized that before the concept could be implemented, the Air Force had to make changes in the way manpower authorizations were distributed throughout the service. In March 1999, the Air Force announced changes in the service's force structure effecting the operating locations of people, aircraft, and organizations across the United States. While some of these changes were the result of mission changes, adjustments for efficiency, and congressional directives, many of the additions were also required to support implementation of the EAF concept. The most noticeable feature of these force structure adjustments was the addition of 5,820 new personnel authorizations to units experiencing high deployment personnel tempo rates. These authorizations were divided among numerous career fields, principally in combat support, to help relieve operational tempo concerns associated with the simultaneous demands of home station and deployment commitments.

Another significant manpower and resource challenge the Air Force faced early in EAF planning was the requirement to transform several dependent-flying squadrons to independent status. The problem stemmed from how the Air Force had structured itself to provide deployed maintenance support to flying squadrons. Because the Air Force did not anticipate deploying multiple squadrons from individual bases to more than one operating location, the Air Force could economize by requiring those units to obtain maintenance services from a single organization. These dependent flying units, under the new AEF construct, would now be subject

85 Ibid., 3.
to independent operations, requiring dedicated maintenance support versus shared. Hence, the
Air Force needed to make a costly resourcing decision early in the EAF implementation plan.
The cost to resource the 366th AEW at Mountain Home AFB for independent operations, one of
the two crisis response wings, was $18 million and 139 new personnel positions. For five other
flying units in Air Combat Command, the cost to transition them to fully independent status was
nearly $38 million and an additional 254 personnel. 86

As planning progressed in early 1999, other issues were rising to the senior levels that pointed
to the need to look much harder at the effects many current Air Force policies would have on the
EAF structure. Two of those identified early in the process were airmen assignment policies and
maintenance spare parts systems that gave priority to overseas units versus stateside units.
Those systems were the product of a Cold War mindset that assumed these forward units would
have the highest need because they would be the first to fight the Soviets in central Europe.

Under the EAF concept, the unit entering the 90-day deployment vulnerability window will
have the highest priority for people and parts regardless of their physical location. These two
extreme examples illustrate the challenges this new expeditionary paradigm presents. Just as the Air
Force will have to examine its personnel and supply priorities, this new approach will require the
Air Force to examine virtually every program, policy and regulation to ensure outdated Cold
War assumptions are replaced with expeditionary ones.

These organizational, cultural, training, equipment, and employment challenges are far from
being resolved, however. The process is continuous, with several measures currently under

86 Major Geoff Parkhurst, Logistics Planner, HQ Air Combat Command, “APOM Submission
for Mountain Home AFB” and “Resources Needed for Dependent Unit Conversion,” Approved
staff proposals. (Langley AFB, VA: March 11 and 17, 1999).
consideration to implement even more fundamental service-wide expeditionary concepts. Briefly, these efforts include: Restructuring Air Force deployable units into smaller deployable modules; broadening the services’ acquisition strategy to include asset deployability considerations and resourcing low density/high demand assets to levels consistent with the EAF 10/15/90 commitment; streamlining logistics through an aggressive investment in forward operating locations and equipment prepositioning; and establishing new organizations, such as the AEF Center, to facilitate preparation and readiness for AEF unit deployments. Collectively, these measures and the evident changes in the Air Force’s approach to expeditionary operations demonstrate the Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept is indeed a substantive transformation in the way the service organizes, trains, equips and deploys forces. The only question left unresolved is the question posed in the title of this study: Is the Air Force really expeditionary? The discussion proffered in the next chapter answers this question.
Applying Expeditionary Criteria to the EAF Concept

Having discerned “expeditionary” criteria from professional writers, service doctrine, and historical examples, the task of applying these criteria to the Air Force’s new expeditionary concept now arises. To complete the analysis in a systematic way, the criteria were subdivided into several general categories: Operational, Basing, Logistics, Organizational, Training, and Equipment. These categories, and the assignment of criteria to them, were made based on intuitive assessments of the substance and/or intended meaning of the given standard. After identifying the criteria, a commentary will follow assessing whether the Air Force Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept satisfies the trait described. Where possible, similar criteria offered by more than one source were consolidated with a single commentary addressing each; sources are indicated in parenthesis.

Operational Criteria

Operational criteria are those requirements offered in literature, doctrine, and the experience of units governing or describing employment of expeditionary forces. The first four criteria describe setting(s) for the conduct of “expeditionary” operations.

- Expeditionary Force: An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. (Joint Pub 1-02)
- The defining characteristic of expeditionary operations is the projection of force into a foreign setting. (MCDP 3)
- Not all power projection constitutes expeditionary operations. Operations that do not involve actual deployment of forces are not expeditionary operations. (MCDP 3)
- Expeditionary is service overseas, at sea or on land. (General Mundy)

The Air Force concept was structured in such a way to meet the global steady state and contingency operational requirements levied by the warfighting Commanders-in-Chief. The
current demands they impose will find Air Force Expeditionary Task Forces, Wings, Groups, and Squadrons deploying to support operations in Southwest Asia, Europe, and the Caribbean. The Air Force’s structuring of the EAF concept to meet these overseas deployment demands satisfies these tests.

- Forces maintained at a constant state of high readiness and a capability for quick reaction to the threat of limited and general war. (CASF)
- A global perspective oriented to responding to a diverse range of threats around the globe rather than to a specific threat in a specific part of the world. (MCDP 3)
- Ability to rapidly project massive firepower through deployments to execute operations or reinforce existing forces (Linebacker Deployments/NATO Crested Gap Operations)

In developing the EAF concept, Air Force leaders saw the need to provide a flexible crisis response capability to complement the paired AEFs. To do so, they created two similarly constructed on-call Air Expeditionary Wings consisting of platforms capable of air superiority, precision attack, suppression of enemy air defenses, long-range attack, intra-theater airlift and air refueling. Referred to as a “911” force with a “potent shooter and force projection capability,” this tailored-to-need mix of forces can support a wide range of operations from presence to deterrence to combat operations.\(^{87}\) With a capability to launch aircraft within 48 hours of a CJCS execution order (assuming a minimum of 24 hours between the alert and execute orders), the Air Force envisions these forces would be able to support theater operations as a “pre-cursor to OPLAN execution” or in a Flexible Deterrent Option.\(^{88}\) With a detailed concept of operations governing AEW deployment, employment, command and control, logistics, and supporting efforts, the Air Force has developed a system to ensure forces remain at a high state of readiness.

\(^{87}\) *Air Expeditionary Wing Concept of Operations* (Draft), HQ Air Combat Command, Directorate of Operations, (Langley AFB, VA: November 1999), 6.

\(^{88}\) Ibid.
across a spectrum of missions. It is important to note the Air Force also expects the residual forces in the “Deployment/On-Call” stage of the AEF life cycle to remain available for rapid generation and forward deployment as reinforcing units. Thus, the “capacity for quick reaction” will not be limited to just the crisis response AEWs, but will be an integral capability of all units in this phase of an AEF cycle. The EAF concept meets the three criteria offered above.

- Expeditionary operations may vary greatly in scope, ranging from full-scale combat to non-combat missions. (MCDP 3)
- Power projection does not imply that expeditionary operations are by definition offensive. (MCDP 3)

When the Air Force developed its EAF vision, Air Force leaders anticipated the use of Air Force people and equipment in operations across the full spectrum of conflict. The wide range of aerospace capabilities included in each AEF guarantees the Air Force’s ability to respond to large and small conflicts as required. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 5, the Air Force created the “Lead Mobility Wing” concept for each AEF pair to provide leadership functions for humanitarian missions, disaster response, and other non-combat requirements, and to institutionalize a process for delivering humanitarian capabilities with the EAF construct. This employment concept is consistent with established practices for providing forces to theater commanders and enables the Air Force to consistently present forces for full-scale combat to operations other than war. The EAF concept satisfies these two tests.

- The term expeditionary implies a temporary duration with the intention to withdraw from foreign soil after the accomplishment of the specified mission (MCDP 3)

Although the duration of a military mission is typically a political decision and not one left to military planners, the concept of an expeditionary operation as one of limited duration is
consistent with the Air Force’s concept.\textsuperscript{89} Air Force Doctrine Document 2, \textit{Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power}, addresses this concept clearly in its discussion of conflict termination, particularly with respect to the role aerospace forces can play in this vital stage of an operation.\textsuperscript{90} Just as CASF forces deployed to and redeployed from Lebanon and Taiwan in 1958 following resolution of the respective crisis, today’s AEF units also anticipate rapid response, threatening or employing military force, and then redeploying quickly. The Air Force demonstrated these capabilities most recently in \textit{Operation Allied Force} where AEF-type forces were employed in out-of-cycle rotations prior to the official implementation of the EAF concept. Although operations in Kosovo required the Air Force to surge beyond the services’ normal day-to-day deployment requirements -- to force levels exceeding the operational percentages of \textit{Operations Desert Shield} and \textit{Desert Storm}, and Vietnam \textsuperscript{91} -- the SECDEF authorized a rapid redeployment of forces within days of conflict termination.\textsuperscript{92} This quick redeployment of over 600 aircraft demonstrates the EAF concept is consistent with the criteria offered above.

- \textit{Theater access--entry to a theater or forward operating base is required for expeditionary operations.} Not all expeditionary operations involve forcible entry; entry may be permissive, tactical, or forced. But because a permissive environment may turn hostile relatively quickly, the Marine Corps asserts, “a forcible-entry capability is a permanent requirement for successful expeditionary operations.” (MCDP 3)

If one accepts the criteria offered earlier in this section, that operations not involving the actual deployment of forces are not expeditionary operations, then the requirement to gain entry

\textsuperscript{89} As of this writing, Air Force deployments in support of \textit{Operations Southern Watch} and \textit{Northern Watch} are considered temporary.
to a theater or access to forward operating bases becomes a critical test of the EAF concept, particularly when a “forcible-entry capability” is included in this requirement. First, it’s clear the Air Force has gained theater access and entry to expeditionary operating bases over the past decade and will continue to do so in the future. For Southwest Asia operations they include: Al Jabar, Ali Al Salem, and Camp Doha, Kuwait; Shaikh Isa, Bahrain; Doha, Qatar; Taif and Prince Sultan AB, Saudi Arabia; Seeb, Oman; and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, among others. More recently the Air Force employed forces from or gained use of European bases in Istres, France; Rota and Moron, Spain; Rimini, Brindisi, and Pisa, Italy; Tuzla, Bosnia; and Taszar, Hungary.

The second part of this criterion becomes more problematic. Forcible-entry according to USMC doctrine is “the ability to seize a lodgment in hostile territory via combat.” The two commonly referenced types of forcible-entry capabilities are seaborne or airborne. This would seem to exclude the Air Force from the list of services capable of executing this mission, creating a shortcoming in the Air Force’s expeditionary capability. However, the question becomes one of perspectives when all the elements of the “forcible-entry capability” are considered. Forcible-entry operations rarely focus on single service or single platform operations. Amphibious operations require, as a minimum, the cooperation of Navy and Marine Corps forces. The Army also has a rich amphibious history. Airborne operations, by definition, require Air Force involvement. And both operations require the support of air and space forces to set the conditions for successful introduction of forces, particularly with respect to an air superiority capability. Finally, it must be noted that aerospace forces, while not typically the

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94 Ibid., 40.
force of choice to “seize” a lodgment in a hostile territory, bring tremendous mobile firepower to a forcible-entry operation, facilitating landward and seaward maneuver, isolating the battlefield, and destroying critical enemy functions and/or facilities. The EAF concept, given these capabilities and this perspective of a forcible-entry operation, satisfies this criterion of expeditionary operations.

- Expeditionary forces engage in a cyclic process of deployment, sustainment training, and deployment preparation. (General Mundy)
- All operating forces, rather than just selected ready units, must maintain themselves in a high state of deployability and general readiness. (MCDP 3)

The Air Force has adopted a cyclic process to stabilize operational tempo for most of its deployable combat and combat support forces similar to the one suggested by General Mundy. The full cycle lasts 15 months and consists of several stages: deployment, stand down, normal sustainment training, and spin-up/deployment preparation. In the deployment stage, Air Expeditionary Task Forces, Wings, Groups, and Squadrons from the 10 AEFs will either deploy or be in an on-call status for 90 days. Once a deployment is complete, those returning units will stand down for about two weeks at their home base to recover. Then they will begin the process of building the forces back up again to prepare for deployment. During the spin-up/deployment preparation period, the assigned units begin deployment preparations, including fulfilling flight currencies, preparing to mobilize, and packaging essential gear. During this period, units also train on the theater-specific requirements of each CINC to ensure they are prepared for their prospective operational environment. Unlike the US Navy approach to cyclic deployments, all AEF units remain in combat ready status throughout the AEF life cycle because of the Air Force

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requirement to support CINC OPLAN taskings. The EAF concept meets these final employment criteria.

**Basing Criteria**

Basing criteria describe the relationship between the garrison locations of expeditionary forces and their expeditionary operating locations. The two criteria below suggest the requirements a force must meet with respect to basing to gain an “expeditionary” designation:

- **Expeditionary operations involve the establishment of forward bases, land or sea, from which military power can be brought to bear on the situation.** *(MCDP 3)*
- **By definition, an expedition thus involves the deployment of military forces and their requisite support to the scene of a crisis/conflict some significant distance from their home bases. These forces may already have been forward deployed, ... or they may be required to deploy from their home base in response to a developing situation.** *(MCDP 3)*

The discussion above regarding the Air Force’s use of forward operating bases in Southwest Asia and in Europe clearly supports the first basing criterion offered in this category. Many of these expeditionary bases have become quasi-permanent in nature. To stand up these bases, the Air Force took personnel and resources from other programmed activities and installations. It then reapplied these human and equipment resources to the expeditionary bases to ensure their continued operation. This improvised approach to expeditionary base funding was not the Air Force’s only effort, though. In the past two years, the service has made a $40 million dollar investment in Forward Operating Locations (FOL) for the Air Force’s bomber fleet.96 This process began in April 1998 when the Chief of Staff directed planners to optimize bomber FOLs to improve deployment response timing and to improve the preparedness of employment locations. The Air Force is prepositioning equipment, ammunition, and vehicles; improving and

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96 Lieutenant Colonel Lane Krat, USAF, HQ Air Combat Command, Directorate of Logistics, Interview by Author, November 10, 1999.
constructing maintenance and storage facilities; and is developing a bomber alert concept of operations to support expeditionary operations at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Andersen AFB in Guam, RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom, and at an undisclosed location in Southwest Asia. These forward bases significantly reduce deployment response times, offer a permanent location to demonstrate American resolve in a crisis, and they will assist in the initiation of a Flexible Deterrent Option or execution of a CINC OPLAN.

The second basing criterion suggests an expeditionary force must operate some distance away from its garrison location. The Air Force’s expeditionary philosophy and the new EAF schedule supports this standard. In its October 1999 EAF Fact Sheet, the Air Force EAF Implementation Office stated: “Being expeditionary means the Air Force conducts global aerospace operations with forces based primarily in the US that will deploy rapidly to begin operations on bed-down” [Emphasis in original]. This operational philosophy acknowledges the need to forward base units for expeditionary operations and simultaneously concedes that some of these “expeditionary” forces will be already forward deployed. The inclusion of European and Pacific-based units in AEFs 1-10 demonstrates the service’s understanding of this key expeditionary concept. For example, AEFs 5 and 7 include F-15 fighters from Kadena Air Base in Japan, F-16 multi-role fighters from Aviano Air Base in Italy, and F-16CJs for the SEAD mission from Misawa Air Base in Japan. Thus, regardless of the theater these AEFs must support, the Air Force will employ even forward-based forces far from their garrisons to support expeditionary operations. The EAF concept satisfies the basing criteria offered above.

Logistics Criteria

The criteria found in professional writings, service doctrine, and historical examples describing the characteristic of expeditionary logistics suggest the movement and sustainment of forces is a critical factor in conducting expeditionary operations. Logistics criteria include prepositioning, supply systems, sustainability, service in undeveloped locations, and an integrated approach to operations and logistics. The first two expeditionary criteria listed below demonstrate the centrality of logistics in expeditionary operations.

- **Logistics, the movement and maintenance of forces is a central consideration in the conduct of expeditionary operations.** (MCDP 3)
- **Expeditionary operations include mature employment concepts including forward positioning of assets, basing arrangements to support employment, and integrated logistics concepts** (NDP 3)

Logistics will play a major role in the success of the EAF concept. The Air Force is sensitive to logistics considerations, particularly strategic lift and aerial refueling concerns, due to limited assets and the consistent demands placed on them by theater commanders. Air Mobility Command (AMC) is the principal agency in the Air Force for planning and executing the movement of forces. AMC’s deployment planning for the EAF concept will make use of existing deliberate planning procedures, with particular emphasis placed on the need for theater CINC’s to define their steady state and time critical mission requirements. Once a requirement is defined, AMC builds an “air mobility concept” to facilitate execution. Two primary concepts govern AMC’s mobility mission: the Global Reach Laydown (GRL) and the Mobility Air Bridge. AMC tailors onload, offload, and en-route locations based on the needs of each AEF using these systems. Program Action Directive 99-01, *Expeditionary Aerospace Force Implementation*, describes both:

The GRL air mobility system is made up of detailed deployment force modules and overlay packages that can be tailored to meet any concept of operations….
GRL refers to both the assets of and strategy for ensuring effective employment of a robust global air mobility support system. The backbone of the GRL is the en route system, a worldwide network of personnel, material, equipment, and facilities providing command and control, logistics, maintenance, and aerial port services to air mobility forces. The system is flexible, capable of expanding or contracting according to operational requirements in peacetime, contingency, or war.  

The definition of the Mobility Air Bridge is just as thorough in describing its contribution to sustaining expeditionary deployments:

… The mobility air bridge encompasses all those components that are required to deploy, redeploy, and sustain combat forces. It includes GRL support, Tanker Task Force and Mobility Task Force stand-up, Coronet support, and establishing AMC stage locations at the onload, en route, and offload locations.

The Air Force further demonstrates its commitment to the movement of forces through its core competency of “Rapid Global Mobility.” According to the *Air Force Posture Statement 2000*, “Rapid Global Mobility is the ability to quickly position forces -- from our own forces to those of our sister services or coalition partners -- on or near any spot on the globe.” The Air Force asserts it can achieve this capability now and will do so in the future with procurement of the full complement of C-17s (135), development of the CV-22, aggressive C-130 and KC-135 modernization programs, and C-5 upgrade programs.

With respect to maintenance systems in an expeditionary Air Force, the bumper sticker over the past several years has been “light, lean, and lethal.” What this translates to in the logistics community is two-level maintenance, time-definite resupply versus just in-time delivery, in-transit visibility, a reduction in the amount of spares and equipment that moves forward, and a

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99 Ibid., A-VI-3.
101 Ibid.
wide variety of logistics improvements. Several logistics equipment acquisitions are designed to improve the deployability and sustainability of air forces expeditionary units, such as the Next Generation Munitions Trailer, the 60,000-pound capacity Tunner aircraft loader, and the Next Generation Small Loader. Each of these systems promises to deliver increased throughput, improving the rapidity of force embarkation and debarkation. The Air Force is also engaged in perfecting deployable support equipment such as food, tents, communications, power, and other basic expeditionary requirements, as well as the unique equipment required to run operations from austere airfields, such as radar approach control equipment, maintenance equipment, fire fighting equipment, and special purpose vehicles. Whether or not it achieves the promised rapidity in global mobility, with this substantial investment in mobility and logistics, the Air Force demonstrates compliance with these expeditionary criteria.

- An expeditionary operation requires temporary creation of a support apparatus to sustain the operation to its conclusion. (MCDP 3)
- Fast deployment of sustainable forces is the most critical factor. (MCDP 3)
- Actions critical to expeditionary operations are: the capability to enable introduction of follow-on forces; establishing logistics, support, and disaster response capabilities; and securing key terrain for decisive actions. (MCDP 3)
- Once deployed, these forces needed to be self-sustaining, capable of moving into undeveloped theaters and able to initiate immediate action without advanced preparation of mature logistics systems. (CASF)
- The CASF was designed to conduct sustained operations for approximately 30 days with minimum logistics support (excluding food, fuel, and ammunition). To do this, TAC designed “flyaway kits” that contained spares and equipment vital to combat operations. (CASF)

Several criteria offered in the literature describe expeditionary logistics in terms of sustainment capabilities. Operation Allied Force in the spring of 1999 demonstrates the Air Force’s ability to sustain its forces. First, the Air Force operated from over 21 expeditionary

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102 Ibid., 31 and 70.
operating locations supporting combat and non-combat operations in Kosovo, Serbia, and Albania. The logistics effort expanded to support operating forces at each of these locations, demonstrating the service’s ability to create sustainment systems, even at undeveloped or temporary locations. Another excellent example of the Air Force’s expeditionary logistics capability during the Kosovo operation was the transformation of the international airport in Tirana, Albania into a humanitarian relief center and a combat airfield for Task Force Hawk in less than twelve days. With little advance notice, Air Force units deployed to Tirana via C-130s to initiate *Operation Shining Hope*, a humanitarian operation designed to support the refugees fleeing from Kosovo. Along with several NATO countries and other US forces, the Air Force established a fully operational combat airfield, received US Army combat forces, constructed refugee camps, and continuously improved living conditions throughout the operation with sewage, water, electrical, road, and runway repairs. The logistics system flexed for flying operations as well. To compensate for a shortage of spare parts Air Force-wide, maintenance depots and contractors surged production and delivery to keep airplanes flying.

Finally, in a remarkably similar approach to the one employed by the CASF, the crisis response AEWs will deploy with pre-built Mobility Readiness Spares Packages designed to last 30 days to meet the wing’s initial combat capability requirements. These demonstrated capabilities -- fast deployment, use of undeveloped bases, establishment of temporary systems and facilities, and a supply system able to surge/expand to sustain combat and humanitarian forces -- meets the logistics criteria offered above.

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103 Ibid., 20.
104 Ibid., 50.
The term “expeditionary” implies austere conditions and support. This does not mean an expeditionary force is necessarily small or lightly equipped, but that it is no larger or heavier than necessary to accomplish the mission. Supplies, equipment, and infrastructure are limited to operational necessities; amenities are strictly minimized. (MCDP 3, General Mundy)

Many deployments of expeditionary forces will involve operations in austere conditions with limited equipment and only the absolute essentials to guarantee mission accomplishment.

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and Operation Shining Hope in Albania are several examples of these types of missions. However, austerity and limited infrastructure, equipment, and supplies are not necessary conditions for a deployment to be deemed “expeditionary.” Often, the Air Force has had the opportunity to operate from airfields in foreign nations with mature support infrastructure, such as operations from Italy, France, and Hungary during Operation Allied Force. While the different services have their respective views on what constitutes austerity, operational necessities, and amenities, it is fair to say the Air Force limits supplies, equipment, and infrastructure for temporary operations to the absolute necessities. Although it is clear the service does invest more earnestly in quality of life enhancements at deployed locations than is typical for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, these “amenities” do not come at the cost of mission accomplishment. Hence, the Air Force meets this final logistics criterion.

Organizational Criteria

Organizational criteria refer to those characteristics that govern the size, composition, and structure of an expeditionary organization. The four criteria below describe these requirements:

- Expeditionary forces vary significantly in size and composition. (MCDP 3)
- An expeditionary force need not be primarily a ground combat organization. An expeditionary force may consist of aviation units to operate and fly missions out of an expeditionary airfield, supported by only a small security force. (MCDP 3)
- Expeditionary forces use mission-based task organizing for employment. (NDP 3)
Expeditionary forces use a consistent presentation of forces, both in command relationships and organizational structure. (AFDD-2)

As described above in Chapter 5, the EAF concept establishes 10 comparably-resourced Air Expeditionary Forces from which the Air Force will task organize Air Expeditionary Task Forces, Wings, Groups, or Squadrons to meet the to meet global steady-state and contingency operational requirements of the theater Commanders-in-Chief. As CINC requirements change, the scheduling teams working in the Aerospace Expeditionary Forces Center (AEFC), will adjust the deploying task-organized team based on the theater or JTF commander’s mission requirements. This system allows the Air Force to consistently present its forces to the theater commanders while ensuring those forces scheduled to deploy are structured and equipped for the specific mission identified by the theater commander. Finally, with respect to the types of organizations or missions the AEF can perform, the Air Force Instruction governing AEF planning acknowledges AEF can provide capabilities “ranging from small scale contingencies to participation in an MTW” and that these capabilities could include “aircraft-oriented or non-aircraft oriented responses.” This ability to tailor AEF forces to achieve desired operational effects, while retaining a consistent organizational presentation, allows the Air Force to satisfy the four preceding organizational criteria.

Expeditionary forces possess a flexible and responsive command element. (CASF)

AEFs are not deployable units and do not have a command element. Under the EAF concept, the deployable units are formed from AEFs as Aerospace Expeditionary Task Forces, Wings,

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106 The AEFC, located at Langley AFB, VA, is a cross-functional, centralized management team responsible for AEF/AEW tasking, sourcing of forces, providing AEF/AEW continuity, identifying training requirements, guiding AEF/AEW planning, and monitoring readiness.

Groups, or Squadrons. These units deploy with tactical-level command elements and align to joint command structures under the command of the COMAFFOR. 

Air Force expeditionary units operate under the two central premises of command and control: “the principle of unity of command and the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution.” At the operational level, these principles allow commanders of air and space forces to retain a theater-wide focus and to effectively employ aerospace capabilities ensuring unity of effort and mutual support. In the EAF concept, the supported COMAFFOR provides the centralized control while the decentralized execution occurs at the wing, group, and squadron level. The flexibility to focus the airpower effort at the time and place of the commander’s choice, to redirect forces to ensure unity of effort, and to apportion sorties to various missions and geographic areas demonstrates the responsiveness of the AEF command apparatus.

Training Criteria

Expeditionary training criteria focus on a service’s ability to field a force capable of performing the mission in a deployed environment. But, the criteria focus on more than just the individual or collective abilities of units and teams; they also focus on the mindset of individuals regarding their expectations and attitudes toward expeditionary service. The following criteria, with the indicated sub-elements, reflects this assessment:

- The versatility and adaptability to respond effectively to a broad variety of circumstances without a great deal of preparation time. (MCDP 3)
- An expectation and a willingness to endure hardship and austere conditions. (MCDP 3)
- The mindset is a matter of training and institutional culture that commanders must impart within their units. (MCDP 3)

A mindset among service members that reflects a constant preparation for deployment overseas. (General Mundy)

Expeditionary operations require a special mindset—one that is constantly prepared for immediate deployment overseas into austere operating environments, bringing everything necessary to accomplish the mission. (MCDP 3)

Air Force senior leaders have remained concerned over expeditionary force training for some time. The Scientific Advisory Board study addressed this issue specifically, recommending the Air Force focus on issues relating to instilling a new Air Force culture consistent with the expeditionary criteria offered above. The board stated: “The Air Education and Training Command (AETC) should provide education and training from the classroom to the field that inculcates the AEF philosophy in all members of the Air Force.”

The Air Combat Command staff reached similar conclusions in the spring of the following year. At the CORONA Top '98 Conference, General Hawley recommended several measures to train the expeditionary Air Force: 1) Phased training for AEFs; 2) Training for an expeditionary mindset; 3) Developing an “Airman’s Manual” for AEF core tasks; 4) Leader training at Group and Wing Commander’s courses on the AEF concept and lessons learned; and 5) AEF training in officer and enlisted leadership PME courses. The Air Force has implemented many of these recommendations. The *Airman’s Manual*, discussed earlier in Chapter 5, was a direct result of these recommendations.

Another program that grew out of this renewed emphasis on expeditionary training was AETC’s “Warrior Week.” Implemented in October 1999 at Air Force Basic Recruit Training, Lackland AFB, Texas, the program, in effect, implemented the SAB board findings as well as

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111 General Richard E. Hawley, “Train the Force” Briefing to USAF CORONA Top Conference, (Randolph AFB, TX: June, 1998.)
General Hawley’s recommendation to train for an expeditionary mindset. According to Air Force Print News, approximately 850 to 1,000 recruits weekly experience Warrior Week in basic military training. The purpose of the program is to help facilitate a change in the Air Force’s professional culture, creating a more “warrior-oriented” airman and instilling an expeditionary orientation in the Air Force's enlisted corps. Using field training activities at two camps, the exercise exposes new airmen to a built-up deployed environment and an austere forward deployment site. During the week, new airmen receive training in mobility line processing, force protection, law of armed conflict, the code of conduct, forward front-line deployment, field communications, self-aid and buddy care, readiness and nuclear-biological-chemical training, and weapons familiarization. This program is an excellent start to satisfy the expeditionary criteria listed above. Unfortunately, this program is not duplicated at the base level Air Force-wide. To inculcate this “special mindset,” however, the stresses and demands of expeditionary service must become part of the real life experience of airmen when they enter the operational Air Force. To sustain the value of this program and, more importantly, to institutionalize an expeditionary mindset across the service, the Air Force should continue training and evaluating expeditionary tasks at the base level. Two grass roots programs are trying to do just that, the Contingency Leadership Airman Warrior Skills (CLAWS) Program at Minot AFB and the Base Expeditionary Skills Training (BEST) Program at Seymour Johnson AFB.

The CLAWS Program began in March 1997 as an initiative to train Minot AFB personnel in basic combat skills in preparation for a Phase 2 Conventional Operational Readiness Inspection. Recently, Minot officials broadened the course’s focus to “build upon the skills…troops develop

113 Ibid.
in ‘Warrior Week’ and to train Expeditionary Airmen.” The training emphasizes the “combat
team,” and is structured to maintain unit integrity and to parallel a unit’s wartime mobility
tasking. The program teaches chemical warfare, law of armed conflict, anti-terrorism, weapons
familiarization & unexploded ordnance procedures, and self-aid and buddy care procedures.  

The BEST Program at Seymour Johnson AFB is similar to the program implemented at Minot
AFB. Taught for the first time in March 2000, the course is designed to “train airmen on
common core tasks that are essential in a deployed environment” and to “ensure…airmen and
noncommissioned officers are prepared to operate in a field environment upon arrival at a
deployed location.” Based on key points of the Airman’s Manual, the course teaches
Seymour Johnson AFB personnel on construction of defensive fighting positions, hardening of
facilities, tent construction, self-aid and buddy care and selective arming.

While both programs are commendable steps to teach expeditionary skills, they merely
represent efforts to fill the expeditionary training gap the Air Force faces today. The problem
stems from a lack of reinforcing training across the Air Force. The “Warrior Week” program
starts airmen off in right direction, focused primarily on creating an expeditionary mindset. But
if frontline supervisors do not reinforce that mindset when those airmen enter the operational Air
Force, the desired attitude and the expeditionary philosophy will not take hold. Unfortunately,
too often the first thoughts expressed to new airman by their frontline supervisors when they
arrive at their permanent duty station sound something like this: ‘Forget everything they taught
you in basic training…I’ll tell you how things work in the real Air Force.’ The Air Force needs
to bridge this gap. It should expand use of the Airman’s Manual and implement base-level

114 “The 5th Bomb Wing Warrior Skills Training Program: CLAWS (Contingency Leadership
Airman Warrior Skills),” Fact Sheet, (Minot AFB, ND: January 26, 2000), 4.
115 Airman First Class Theresa Serrano, USAF, Staff Writer, “BEST Training,” Wright Times,
Volume 45 Number 11, (Seymour Johnson AFB, NC: March 17, 2000), 10.
training programs similar to those at Minot AFB and Seymour Johnson AFB; these are exceptional tools the Air Force could use to institutionalize an expeditionary mindset.

One final point is relevant before making an assessment of the Air Force’s compliance with these expeditionary criteria. The mindset of Air Force members who served during the Cold War has changed dramatically. The events of the past decade -- numerous deployments, years of engagement, and an increasing willingness on the part of our national command authority to use the military instrument of power -- have taught career personnel that the Air Force is indeed an expeditionary service. These members are an invaluable source to employ in the effort to develop a new expeditionary mindset. It could employ these career professionals for this purpose with a more formal institutionalization of expeditionary requirements. To do so, the Air Force must clearly define what it believes “expeditionary” means and then formally institutionalize those definitions in its daily operations, formal and continuation training, professional military education, and its doctrine. This could have the practical effect of reducing or eliminating the “real Air Force” syndrome described above and simultaneously serve as the framework to achieve the fundamental mindset change the service is seeking.

While the Air Force has made a commendable initial effort to institutionalize an expeditionary mindset, training programs and institutional controls aimed at inculcating and reinforcing an expeditionary mindset on all personnel are lacking. Hence, the Air Force only partially meets the expeditionary training criteria outlined above.

- Integrated training and certification of readiness for task-organized deploying forces. (NDP 3)
- Integrated, team approach to personnel policies and unit training. (Lieutenant General Klimp)

One of the original purposes of the “Spin-up/Deployment Preparation” phase of the AEF life cycle was to conduct integrated and theater-specific training for units preparing to enter the
deployment vulnerability period. To do this, the Air Force originally considered establishing an in-garrison exercise that would bring together the AEF lead wing command staff, aviation elements, and combat support elements. Called “Expeditionary Warrior” and hosted by the AEF lead wing, the proposed exercise would last four to five days, occur during the 60-day spin-up period, and would be tailored to the intended area of operations or the predicted hotspot for the on-call AEW. The plan anticipated that combat support command staffs from the AEF’s major constituent units would travel to the lead unit and perform in key positions in the Wing Operations Center, Survival Recovery Center, and Base Defense Operations Center, among others. The plan also included participation of an aviation package from the lead wing to support Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO) training objectives. The focus of the exercise, as originally conceived, concentrated on integrating combat support command echelons into the AEW operational staff, providing the AEW commander an opportunity to meet and work with the people supporting his mission.116 Air Force leaders incorporated this philosophy into the Air Force Posture Statement in 1999 to communicate the service’s commitment to this goal:

Training as a team during their spin-up cycle, AEFs will form fully integrated aerospace units that combine the capabilities of the Service’s weapons systems to create a powerful composite force. AEF deployment schedules will be published a year or more in advance allowing commanders to structure training programs to put these units at the peak of readiness as they enter their vulnerability period. A known commitment period will also permit AEFs to refine training and planning to match current world events, resulting in shorter response times and a tailored force that better meets the needs of US commanders in the field.117

Despite these statements regarding integrated team training, by August 1999 the commitment to integrated training in the manner described above appeared to be significantly diminished. In

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the EAF Implementation Program Action Directive, the annex describing the EAF concept of operations included only one brief statement referencing this exercise: “Expeditionary Warrior, an additional training exercise for ECS leadership, incorporating AOR-specific scenarios, will be developed and executed.”\textsuperscript{118} However, portions of the directive describing the AEF rotation cycle excluded any reference to integrated team training during the “Spin-up/Deployment Preparation” phase (Para 5.4).

By the time the Air Force Instruction governing AEF force planning was published in October 1999, the idea to deploy major AEF units to the location of the lead unit appeared to be virtually dead. The instruction now said: “Lead Wing Commanders [are] responsible for training within their own wings…[and are] not responsible for training other units assigned to their AEFs or certifying those units for deployment.”\textsuperscript{119} [Emphasis Added] The instruction did grant some authority to the AEF Center to arrange training for Air Expeditionary Force units. This grant, however, again demonstrated a limited commitment to integrated training: “[The AEF Center] works…to access major exercise opportunities that may maximize the integration of AEF/AEW training.”\textsuperscript{120} [Emphasis added] In November of 1999, Major Thomas Eannarino, an action officer in the EAF Implementation Office and co-author of the Air Force Instruction governing AEF planning, confirmed this assessment regarding integrated training, stating “the larger portions of combat support and service support will not train with AEF partners before deploying.”\textsuperscript{121} Mr. Jeff Williams, a Senior EAF Analyst at Air Combat Command (and one of

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 14. Emphasis added by the author.
\textsuperscript{121} Major Thomas Eannarino, USAF, HQ United States Air Force, EAF Implementation Team. Interview by Author, November 24, 1999.
the principal staffers who developed the AEF constructs), was just as clear on this topic, stating “there is no integrated training for Expeditionary Combat Support planned for AEFs 1-10.”

While AEFs 1-10 lack a focus on integrated training, the crisis response AEWs appear to be firmly committed to building team cohesion through integrated training. The AEW concept of operations directs the parent MAJCOMs to “schedule training and exercises so AEW units can train as a composite force” and the AEW lead wings are charged with coordinating a “unit-to-unit training plan.” In March 2000, the 4th AEW at Seymour Johnson AFB put this philosophy into practice when they conducted an Operational Readiness Exercise with members of the 820th Security Forces Group from Lackland AFB, Texas participating in the training.

However, this planned use of integrated training to build team cohesion for the AEWs is insufficient to support a finding that the EAF concept as a whole complies with the expeditionary criteria offered above. If the focus of AEF planning is truly committed to “integrating the AEWs/AEGs/AESs command, operations, and support elements into an integrated cohesive force,” as the Air Force instruction claims, then the Air Force must make a commitment to training deploying teams in a manner designed to improve unit relationships and cohesion. The EAF concept does not meet these expeditionary criteria.

**Equipment Criteria**

Equipment criteria are those characteristics that demonstrate a service’s commitment to expeditionary concepts through acquisition of systems appropriate to the expeditionary mission.

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The following two criteria were distilled from naval doctrine and the Composite Air Strike Force approach to systems acquisition:

- Acquisition of infrastructure/equipment to support expeditionary concepts (MCDP 3, NDP 3)
- Acquisition program should support operational concepts...equip forces based on the demands of future missions (CASF)

Several sources demonstrate the Air Force’s continued commitment to building and acquiring systems to support an expeditionary approach. One of the best sources linking the Air Force approach to acquisition and modernization is the Air Force Posture Statement 2000. Designed and written to convey the Air Force’s perspective on its role in our nation’s defense and how it intends to accomplish its mission, the document lays out the Air Force vision for equipment modernization program to support the EAF concept. By explicitly linking the Air Force’s modernization program -- a multi-decade program covering each of the service’s core competencies -- to its vision of transitioning to an expeditionary force, Air Force leaders have provided the necessary outlines of how they see the force changing in the next century.125

With the implementation of the EAF concept, Air Force leaders recognized several mission areas where this commitment could be applied immediately. One of these was highlighted in the EAF Program Action Directive: “Additional investments in LD/HD programs will be required to reach the EAF goal of no more than 90 days of contingency deployment every 15 months.” In the fall of 1999, senior Air Force leaders made a commitment to begin funding for people, parts, and equipment to get the LD/HD systems enough resources to approach the 10/15/90 tempo commitment.126 Two other mission areas gained immediate attention as well: SEAD and PGM

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capable aircraft. To increase the equity among AEFs in capabilities and force structure and to ultimately transition to 10 AEFs with imbedded crisis response capabilities, the service will purchase 30 new F-16s to build a 10th active duty SEAD squadron by 2006, and it will commit to an F-16 upgrade roadmap designed to completely outfit the aircraft with a precision guided munitions capability by 2009.127

The Air Force’s commitment to resource fighter squadrons for independent operations, establish forward operating locations for expeditionary forces and bomber forces, purchase aircraft support equipment to improve deployability, and to fund nearly 6,000 new personnel authorizations further demonstrate the service’s focus on resourcing the force to support the new operational concept. Similarly, future investments in miniaturized munitions technologies and communications reachback systems will ensure the Air Force remains light and lean when deploying. The EAF concept meets these equipment criteria.

Before making an overall judgment regarding the Air Force’s expeditionary concept and its congruence with the criteria presented above, it is important to note that the progress the Air Force made in the early 1990s in developing composite wings and later in developing and refining Air Expeditionary Force/Wing deployments substantially affected this analysis. Many of the logistics concepts, organizational concepts -- specifically the command and control structure -- and the basing concepts were products of this early development. The categories of expeditionary criteria most clearly impacted by the development of the new EAF concept are the operational criteria, equipment criteria, and the organizational criteria -- specifically those aspects addressing recent developments in employment concepts, force size, composition, and task-organization of AEF forces. As the Air Force continues to develop expeditionary models to

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127 Eannarino Interview, HQ USAF, November 24, 1999.


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replace those designed to support Cold War-era operations, the developments of the early 1990s will continue to function as a foundation upon which those advances will be made, just as the Composite Air Strike Force surely impacted many of the deployment concepts Tactical Air Command employed as late as 1992. This on-going evolution, where one approach functions as the starting point for the next major advancement, guarantees that the Air Force’s 10-year investment in expeditionary concepts will produce significant returns. Hence, while the preceding analysis demonstrates the Air Force’s new concept can meet most of the tests of an expeditionary force, it also demonstrates that the Air Force still has many improvements to make to fully achieve its expeditionary vision. The continued advancements mentioned in Chapter 5 will move the service toward this end. But until the Air Force firmly commits itself to developing an institutional mindset through a wide range of training and certification systems, the service will only partially achieve its stated goals. The final chapter will address how the Air Force can become a more expeditionary service.
Chapter 7

Moving Toward a More Expeditionary Air Force

With the implementation of the EAF concept, the Air Force has come full circle. Forty-five years ago, when the service was in its infancy, General “Opie” Weyland convinced the Air Force to develop a modularized capability to rapidly project conventional air forces in situations short of major theater war. To do this, the service fielded the Composite Air Strike Force. Now, in a similar effort to improve Air Force expeditionary warfighting and to institutionalize a system for providing forces short of full-scale conflict, the Air Force developed the Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept. With this effort, the Air Force has begun the process of casting off the institutional remnants of the Cold War. The ad hoc nature of deploying expeditionary forces that characterized the mid-1990s is gone as well. Both have been replaced with a flexible and responsive system to employ expeditionary aerospace forces.

Although it would be premature to declare the plan a complete success only four months through its first iteration, the Air Force appears headed in the right direction. The service’s commitment to developing a system designed to support expeditionary forces does not appear haphazard or motivated by budget posturing, as some critics would suggest. Nor does it appear the Air Force is loosely applying expeditionary terminology or limiting the concept to the implementation of a new schedule. Additionally, the service has begun an internal examination of how it organizes, trains, equips, deploys, and sustains expeditionary forces in attempt to discover Cold War assumptions and replace them with systems consistent with an expeditionary approach.

Critics will still argue a fundamental transformation has not occurred for air mobility and low density/high demand forces. Yet, while these systems are not apportioned nor physically
assigned to the 10 AEFs -- a pure inclusion not attainable because of inventory limits and consumer demand -- these forces have two force management tools in place to enable some measure of tempo control. Air Mobility Command uses mobility commitment lines to control and measure the workload of the tanker and airlift force, while the Air Force and the joint community together use the Global Military Force Policy (GMFP) to measure and control the demand for LD/HD assets. For LD/HD wings, tempo stability will best be achieved by ensuring those assets are tasked within the steady-state/surge limits prescribed in the GMFP. If the demand for these assets exceed the desired sustained employment rates, then senior Air Force leaders need to engage with theater CINCs to reduce those LD/HD requirements.

The *Expeditionary Aerospace Force* concept clearly is addressing operations from major theater war to humanitarian operations, answering criticisms regarding the scope of the postulated EAF strategy. In what amounts to a rebirth of Composite Air Strike Force organizational concepts and guiding principles, the Air Force has successfully postured itself to support conflict across the spectrum with tailorable forces designed to support theater CINCs while simultaneously creating a system to stabilize personnel tempo.

Finally, the *Expeditionary Aerospace Force* concept meets virtually all of the most stringent tests found in professional writings, service doctrine, and historical examples describing the characteristic of expeditionary units. The service has developed a thorough concept for organizing and employing expeditionary forces and has codified these concepts in Air Force Instruction 10-400, *Aerospace Expeditionary Force Planning*. The Air Force has developed a rapid response capability in the 4<sup>th</sup> and 366<sup>th</sup> Air Expeditionary Wings for crises that require immediate deployment of combat forces. Also, the Air Force has developed a detail concept for providing humanitarian and disaster response forces. The service has taken a comprehensive
view toward reducing the operational footprint of expeditionary forces, investing heavily in basing and logistics concepts to make the service more rapidly deployable without sacrificing mobility and sustainability, even for undeveloped theaters. Also, it has clearly made a commitment to continuing the investment in systems and equipment needed to build a more complete expeditionary force.

Despite these accomplishments, a critical test the concept fails is in the area of ‘expeditionary training.’ Over the past 18 months, senior Air Force leaders have compared the EAF construct to the approach the Navy and the Marine Corps employs with respect to expeditionary operations. However, the Marine Corps and Navy judge integrated team training as a core expeditionary enabler. Under the EAF concept, the Air Force will continue to rely on existing training programs. However, these programs do not fully integrate operations, logistics, and combat support units in a systematic way prior to employment in an operational theater. Absent this critical readiness step, geographically-separated AEF units will deploy to common locations under common command structures without first having an opportunity to develop the team and inter-unit cohesion the naval services’ deem so vital. This approach is inconsistent with an expeditionary philosophy and must be corrected in the near term, particularly since commanders of those integrated expeditionary units will not report readiness to deploy against common Designed Operational Capability mission statements. Until the Air Force implements a methodology to measure readiness of geographically-separated task organized units, the service should conduct integrated team training and develop a process to certify those teams prior to deployment.

The benefits of integrated training however are much more than readiness; the advantages in many respects are intangible. Co-located team training allows deploying AEF units to develop
team and unit cohesion prior to entry into an operational theater. Units that train together as
teams build understanding, learn each other’s expectations, and develop loyalty -- to the mission and to each other. Before the Air Force can completely implement the EAF concept, this shortfall must be corrected.

Nor has the service fully implemented an Air Force-wide program to instill an expeditionary mindset in all of its members. The introduction of “Warrior Week” in basic military training and publication of the *Airman’s Manual* are excellent first steps. But until the fundamentals of these programs are further institutionalized in base-level training, Professional Military Education, and even into promotion fitness exams, the service will find it difficult to engrain an expeditionary mindset in all of its members. Training geographically separated units to operate as an integrated and seamless fighting organizations will be difficult. But the ability to develop integrated expeditionary teams will be significantly enhanced if individuals are first trained to a demanding expeditionary mindset.

Finally, if the Air Force proposes to eradicate existing Cold War assumptions imbedded in operations, logistics and support programs and instead seeks to build a widely understood concept of expeditionary operations, the service must capture its expeditionary principles and history in a single doctrinal source, similar to the Marine Corps’ doctrinal publication on *Expeditionary Operations*. Currently, Air Force doctrine governing expeditionary concepts is scarce and, although the service has a rich expeditionary tradition, this history is not widely known. Once captured in doctrine, this history and expeditionary philosophy should serve as the basis for Air Force organization, training, equipping, deployment, and force sustainment. This doctrine should be taught in all officer and enlisted professional military education as well. Dr. Richard G. Davis’ publication, *Immediate Reach, Immediate Power: The Air Expeditionary*
In November 1999, Secretary Peters said “the EAF is a journey and we have many more steps to take along this path as we transform the Air Force from a forward-based, Cold War force to an expeditionary force able to respond to crises around the globe.” The Air Force has taken many steps to date to complete this transition. And, as Mr. Peters correctly states, there are many to go. To completely achieve the Air Force vision of a fully trained and ready Expeditionary Aerospace Force, service members must not only understand the expeditionary concepts the Air Force develops, they must firmly believe in and champion the expeditionary approach, internally and externally. This belief will only be developed through practical experience and participation in the system, a system that prepares them to fight and builds the cohesiveness and trust warfighting teams need to succeed in combat.

Appendix A

Glossary of Terms

**Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs):** The AEFs represent aerospace capability – counterair and counterland assets, intra-theater mobility, and strategic attack platforms -- in pre-determined, scheduled sets of forces (aircraft, equipment and personnel). From these, tailored-to-need force packages would deploy. AEFs include a cross section of Air Force weapon systems (150+ combat capability aircraft) and people (10,000-15,000) providing forces for theater commanders’ requirements short of major theater war.

**Air Expeditionary Forces Center (AEFC):** The AEFC is a cross-functional, centralized team responsible to facilitate AEF/AEW management tasks. These include: AEF/AEW tasking, providing AEF/AEW continuity, identifying training requirements, guiding AEF/AEW planning, and monitoring readiness.

**Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) Lead Wings:** HQ USAF designated wings which provides the leadership elements to effect the planning and coordination efforts of AEF combat coded units to determine operational, command and control, and support requirements to meet mission objectives. Force preparedness of AEFs is focused through these “lead wings” that also provide tactical level contingency operation leadership for some deployments where there is no pre-existing command structure. The lead wings also are intended to support the bulk of ECS large team taskings.

**CORONA Conferences:** The Air Force’s principal leaders (Secretariat level officials, 4-star generals, Center Commanders, and Air Staff Deputy Chiefs of Staff, among others) attend these tri-annual conferences to review major initiatives and to consider service-wide policy changes. The three conferences are named CORONA South, CORONA Top, and CORONA Fall.

**Crisis Response Aerospace Expeditionary Wings (AEWs):** On-call crisis response AEWs, scheduled back-to-back, to provide rapid force projection capability.

**Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF):** The Air Force vision to organize, train, equip, deploy and sustain itself in the dynamic 21st century global security environment. Under this concept, the Air Force will provide rapidly responsive, tailored-to-need aerospace force capability, prepared and ready to conduct military operations across the full spectrum of military operations.

**Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS):** Expeditionary combat support concepts assure AEFs are supported and operate with a small footprint and streamlined infrastructure requirements. It includes the processes the Air Force uses to create, sustain, and protect aerospace capabilities.

**Expeditionary Force:** An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.
**Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD):** Assets with limited force structure and unique performance capabilities stressed by continual high operational tempo because of CINC demands. These platforms include: C2ISR systems, CSAR and pararescue forces, CAS platforms (A/OA-10s), Combat Camera, and EC-130 COMPASS CALL and COMANDO SOLO systems.

**Mobility Lead Wings:** Five mobility “lead wings” paired to the AEFs provide expeditionary leadership and airlift expertise for response to the need to establish expeditionary locations.

**Steady State:** Continuing deployment requirements established by Unified Commanders-in-Chief.
## Appendix B

### Glossary of Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>AB</td>
<td>Air Base</td>
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<td>ACC</td>
<td>Air Combat Command</td>
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<td>AEF</td>
<td>Air Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>AEFC</td>
<td>Air Expeditionary Forces Center</td>
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<td>AEG</td>
<td>Air Expeditionary Group</td>
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<td>AES</td>
<td>Air Expeditionary Squadron</td>
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<td>AETC</td>
<td>Air Education and Training Command</td>
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<td>AEW</td>
<td>Air Expeditionary Wing</td>
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Primary Sources: Several documents were of considerable value to this research project. Foremost among them was the Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 3, *Expeditionary Operations*, due to its comprehensiveness in describing the Marine Corps’ approach to expeditionary concepts and the practical examples offered as illustrations. The Air Force official publications available on the EAF concept, specifically the Air Force Program Action Directive and Air Force Instruction 10-400, were particularly useful because they capture the overall framework of the concept and the intent of Air Force senior leaders. Finally, the original briefing and support materials from the Air Force CORONA conferences were invaluable to accurately record the complexity and the details of the process leading to the final and approved *Expeditionary Aerospace Force* construct. The Air Force Chief of Staff’s Action Group, HQ USAF/CCX, in the Pentagon, retains all CORONA conference briefings and background papers. The Commander’s Action Group, HQ ACC/CCX, Langley AFB, VA also retains those CORONA materials produced by Air Combat Command.


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