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*Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)*

Prepared by ANSI Z39-18
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Recruiting the Strategic Corporal in the 21st Century (through year 2010)

Author: Major R.D. Coleman, Jr., United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The Marine Corps must continually adapt to inevitable domestic changes in order to successfully recruit. Is it possible Marine Corps success, since June 1995, will inadvertently breed complacency and overshadow significant political, social, economic and demographic challenges adversely shaping the recruiting environment at the dawn of the 21st century? Is the Marine Corps prepared to overcome these significant domestic challenges in order to recruit the virtuous man or woman its future depends upon?

Background: Based upon the maneuver warfare philosophy, Marine Corps command and control doctrine, and military operations other-than-war, the success of the Marine Corps’ mission in the 21st century will depend upon the decisions of small unit leaders who are non-commissioned officers. These decisions will have strategic consequences, hence the term, “Strategic Corporal.” According to General Krulak, the roles and missions of the “Strategic Corporal” are envisioned to grow analogous to that of a second lieutenant 30 years ago. Recruiting an ample number of mature men/women of good judgment and strong character equal to their immense level of responsibility will be the Marine Corps’ challenge in the 21st century.

Prior to the inception of the all-volunteer force (AVF), the Marine Corps failed to acknowledge significant political, cultural and social forces adversely shaping the recruiting environment. This neglect, and the failure to establish a strategic plan to successfully recruit, nearly led to the Marine Corps’ demise in the early 1970s. The Marine Corps rebounded from the crisis of the 1970s through the determined leadership of Generals Chapman, Wilson and Barrow. By revolutionizing the manner in which it recruited, while remaining true to its ethos, the Marine Corps incrementally transformed itself from the brink of extinction, to the virtuous fighting force of Operations Desert Storm and Restore Hope.

Since June, 1995, the Marine Corps has successfully recruited due to the noble leadership of General Mundy and the bold vision of General Krulak; however, based upon the premise of “Ne Cras!” (not like yesterday), it is imperative the Marine Corps closely examine the political, social, economic, and demographic challenges adversely shaping the recruiting environment of the 21st century. It is vital Marines understand the history of their oscillating institutional commitment to recruiting and the delicate ecosystem which must be continuously monitored in order for the Marine Corps to maintain quality end strength.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the Marine Corps establish a strategic plan through 2010, based upon the 10 proposals provided throughout this paper, to successfully recruit the “Strategic Corporal” of the 21st century.
PREFACE

Having recently completed a tour as Commanding Officer of Recruiting Station, Cincinnati, OH., I felt compelled to offer recommendations as to how the Marine Corps may prepare for the recruiting mission of tomorrow. In May of 1998, I had an opportunity to hear General Charles Krulak describe his vision of the “Strategic Corporal.” That enlightened me to better understand, in an historical context, the true significance Marine ethos has played upon the recruiting success of our past. Better understanding General Krulak's vision of the "Strategic Corporal" also led me to question if the Marine Corps was prepared to overcome significant domestic challenges of the 21st century in order to find that quality Marine who is the future of the Corps.

Major Greg Balzer of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command was instrumental in the genesis of this paper. Greg is, without question, an unsung hero of the Marine Corps as are the countless others assigned to recruiting duty who overcome adversity and rejection, day in and out, in the quest to recruit America’s finest. This paper is dedicated to that Marine recruiter.

During my first interview with LtGen Klimp for this paper, the Commandant happened to call. Upon learning about this paper, General Krulak requested that I immediately schedule an appointment with him… yet another example of just how much recruiting duty means to the Corps’ number one recruiter. Both LtGen Klimp and General Krulak have been instrumental in the Marine recruiting success enjoyed since June 1995. In interviewing both, it became clear that others shared my concern about
complacency overshadowing the domestic challenges adversely shaping the recruiting environment of the 21st century. Based upon those interviews, this paper blossomed. Other brutally candid interviews with distinguished Marines such as General Mundy, who rebuilt the Marine Corps from within, one recruit at a time, made me realize two key points: 1) the significance of virtue as the primary characteristic we seek in the people we recruit, and 2) that a generation of officers (who understand the importance of recruiting duty, who suffered through the horrible days of our Corps during the 1970s), are about to retire. From these interviews, the significance of this paper became clear! To all I am deeply grateful.

If not for the candor, flexibility and guidance of LtCol Hemleben, this paper would not have been possible. Having served a distinguished career with recruiting experience within an Officer Selection Office, as an executive officer of a recruiting station, and as a manpower analyst at Headquarters Marine Corps, he patiently understood my passion and “took me onboard.” Major Jeff Sharrock, an unselfish leader who spent five straight years on recruiting duty, provided sage insight and counsel. Despite not having been officially assigned as a mentor for this paper, my faculty advisor, LtCol Moriarty, provided invaluable encouragement, and support. I owe a great deal to this Marine Officer! If not for "Mort," this paper never would have been written, nor would it have reached the level it finally did. I wish to thank my other mentor, Dr. Jim Robbins, who taught me a great deal throughout this academic year because of his thirst for knowledge and the blessing of a great attitude. Lastly, I wish to recognize the endearing support of a great lady, my wife Maureen, whose strength and perseverance inspires me daily.

Ne Cras!
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States Marine Corps established a clearly defined philosophy and doctrine regarding how it should fight, and how Marines should lead in a decentralized battle-space characterized by friction and chaos. Today, the maneuver-warfare philosophy, the Marine Corps’ command and control doctrine, and the inherent nature of military operations other-than-war (MOOTW), make it clear that the success of Marine Corps' missions in the 21st century will be determined by small-unit leaders. Their choices and actions will have strategic consequences; hence the term “Strategic Corporal.” In the January, 1999 edition of *Marine Corps Gazette*, General Charles C. Krulak, 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, wrote,

> In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will potentially influence not only the immediate tactical situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well...¹

The National Security Agency projects that three critical factors will revolutionize the manner in which we fight by 2010: 1) the world-wide migration to digital wireless technologies (cellular, satellite, global positioning systems, and fixed wireless local area networks); 2) high speed networking of local and wide area networks; and 3) fiber connectivity of wired and wireless infrastructures.² Marines of the 21st century will be challenged to master the technology of the information age, from microchips to precision guided weapons, and to make life and death decisions in an urban environment while the “global village” records his or her

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every move. Adversaries will also attempt to exploit technology in a relentless asymmetrical dual of connectivity, networking and collaboration. Will the stress of combat cause a Marine to shoot an adolescent who has stolen his sunglasses? Will the world learn of a Marine rape case, witness another My Lai, or experience another Black-Hawk Down incident? Or will the world revere the Marines, as exemplars of honor, courage and commitment in the execution of their mission?

The Genesis of the Strategic Corporal

During his years as Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and as Commanding General, Marine Forces, Pacific, General Krulak studied the emerging threat throughout the world. This was the genesis of the “Strategic Corporal” concept.3 These studies revealed demographic explosions propelling geopolitical forces within the urban areas of the continental coastal regions or "littorals" of the world. For example, more than 70 percent of the world’s population live within 200 miles of a coastline. Eighty percent of the world’s capitals are located within 300 miles of a coast.4 In summary, General Krulak’s broad examination revealed the probability of “global disorder, pervasive crisis, and the constant threat of chaos” in an ever-troubling age of national aggression, transnational threats, and terrorism spurred by ethnic conflict.5

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Marine Corps found itself engaged in humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations at an average rate three times greater than that of the Cold-War era. These missions, defined as military operations other than war or MOOTW, had become recognized as the “three-block war.” The MOOTW mission was not just a “fanciful metaphor” describing a future concept, but a 20th-century reality exemplified by a multitude of operations performed an average of once every five weeks since 1990, in countries

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3 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.C. Krulak, 31st CMC, of 1 April 1999
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such as Liberia, Albania, Haiti, and Somalia.

The significant leadership challenge entrusted to every Marine performing MOOTW was also recognized. Studies revealed the Marine Corps engaging in the highest peace-time operational tempo in its history by a force comprised of an officer to enlisted ratio approximating one to nine (for every one officer, nine enlisted Marines). This ratio, approximately double that of other services (USAF 1:4, USA 1:5, USN 1:4), illustrates the enormous amount of responsibility entrusted to the typical Marine non-commissioned officer relative to sister service (pay-grade) equivalents.6

The Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, identifies the personal qualities all service members must possess at all levels of peace operations. It emphasizes the individual character traits required of each service member, most notably the capacity for good judgment and independent action in MOOTW.7 Intrigued by the poise and confidence young Marine NCOs displayed while performing "three-block war" missions in Mogadishu, Thomas Ricks, in his book, Making The Corps, felt compelled to inquire how the Corps "made Marines" capable of performing so decisively in MOOTW:

In these operations, the kid whom we couldn’t trust to run the copier is the squad or platoon leader addressing questions that could alter national policy: Do I shoot at this threatening mob in Mogadishu? Do I fire first when a Haitian police officer levels his automatic weapon in my direction? If I am in a limited peacekeeping role, do I stop a rape when it occurs fifty yards in front of my position? And he is doing it under the glare of real-time global television broadcasts.8

General Krulak emphasizes that for the Marine Corps, the “Strategic Corporal” is

*Any Marine.* It is the realization that *any* Marine can take an action at a tactical level, and that action may well have strategic implications. The greatest example I can give you is what happened yesterday [1 April 99, in Kosovo] when three Army non-commissioned officers got captured. They got themselves into a position where they became a strategic issue. They’re at the tactical level driving

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7 Joint Pub, 3-07.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, part I
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down a road, caught in one portion of the "three-block war," didn’t recognize it, didn’t take the action they needed to, and now they’ve become a strategic issue. The Marine that we are building will not get himself into that position.9

Power Down.

The Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) concept requires a “Strategic Corporal” whose duties and responsibilities will exceed those traditionally entrusted to Marine non-commissioned officers (NCOs). General Krulak envisions the role of the “Strategic Corporal” as that of a commissioned officer 30 years ago. Small unit leaders will be empowered as never seen before by the "Transformation" process which includes the "crucible," "cohesion," and "sustainment." This intangible empowerment along with technology, the Marine Corps command and control doctrine, and the maneuver warfare philosophy will yield a force multiplier in the Marine Corps of tomorrow. Marine NCOs will be expected to comprehend the commander’s intent, understand the responsibility to overcome the friction of combat, and exploit enemy critical vulnerabilities in order to effectively attack enemy centers of gravity.

Decisions made at the tactical level by our 21st Century NCOs will be transmitted instantaneously throughout the operational and strategic levels of the theater. The networking of individual Marines and MAGTF elements will significantly increase situational awareness and operational efficiency. These network-centric relationships may compete with traditional hierarchical relationships, dramatically changing command organizational structures.10 According to General Krulak, the Marine Corps' success will hinge upon the “Strategic Corporal.” The challenge now is recruiting young men and women who will be equal to the task.

Challenges of the 21st Century

The responsibility for victory in the 21st century conflict will ultimately rest with NCOs operating in the chaotic environment of a dispersed battle-space. It is unclear the extent to which the Marine of tomorrow will be required to master a new set of skills; however, his or her

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9 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.C. Krulak, 31st CMC, of 1 April 1999
10 “Point Men For A Revolution Shift,” Washington Post, 6 March 1999: A1
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leadership potential will be determined and measured by a “moral compass.” Each Marine must possess the high moral courage, mental toughness, and physical stamina to withstand the demands of seemingly endless humanitarian operations, while simultaneously coping with the rigors of battling a ruthless asymmetric foe in a nonlinear battle-space. The essential keystone in building the “Strategic Corporal” is recruiting men and women of requisite virtue. Herein lies the challenge: to recruit young men and women of maturity, good judgment and sound moral character. Our ability to successfully recruit the virtuous “Strategic Corporal” will determine the future of the Marine Corps, and test the continuing viability of the Marine Corps within the paradigm of the all-volunteer force (AVF).

The Origin of the All Volunteer Force (AVF)

Preparation for the AVF began in 1969 when President Richard Nixon appointed a commission, chaired by Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, to determine the feasibility of ending the draft. The move away from conscription was based upon several factors, including growing political opposition to the Vietnam War, changing social attitudes regarding military service, the inequity of draft exemptions, and the larger pool of potential enlistees in the 1970s. According to manpower analyst Roger T. Kelley, “the Gates Commission provided immediate and sufficient justification for ending conscription” despite the 20% drop in youth population projected for the 1980s.11

The draft had failed to establish a fighting force representative of the democracy at large. Questions regarding the legitimacy of the Tonkin incident, the My Lai massacre, and continual promises of victory that never materialized, degraded the military’s credibility among society. Wrongly blaming Vietnam policy on the warrior, the country lost faith, trust and confidence in the military as an institution. For example, judges offered criminals the proposition, “Jail or the

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Marine Corps.” In essence, society generally viewed those people serving in the military as having little or no virtue.

July 1, 1973 marked the end of American involvement in Vietnam and the end of military conscription. Opposition to ending the draft within the United States military was powerful and widespread. There were warnings that U.S. national security would be weakened by a force comprised largely of the poor, the disenfranchised, and social misfits not inclined to fight, or fight well.12 Despite ample warning and time to prepare, the United States Marine Corps failed to acknowledge the changing political and social environment, marked by anti-war sentiment, rampant drug-use and a growing contempt for the military among American youth. The failure to recognize these domestic challenges to the recruiting effort created a manpower crisis of epic proportions (involving recruiting and recruit training improprieties), nearly bringing about the demise of the Marine Corps. In 1976, Congress initiated a proposition that the Army assume responsibilities for training all Marine recruits, a plan, which if implemented, would have deprived the Marine Corps of its most sacred prerogative, the ability to “make Marines”- to instill within each recruit the unique spirit and character of being a Marine.13

The Marine Corps recruiting effort eventually overcame the domestic crisis of the 1970s under the determined leadership of Generals Louis H. Wilson and Robert H. Barrow, and the collective effort of thousands of recruiters. By revolutionizing the manner in which the Marines recruited, and refocusing upon Marine ethos, these and other leaders saved the Corps. Despite an oscillating commitment to recruiting throughout the AVF, the Marine Corps eventually transformed itself from the tragedy of Private McLure (a retarded recruit fraudulently enlisted and beaten to death at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, Ca. in 1976), to the more virtuous fighting force of Operations Desert Storm and Restore Hope (Somalia).

In recent years, through General Mundy’s noble leadership, and the bold vision of General

12 The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade (Retrospect and Prospect) “The All-Volunteer Force Decision, History, and Prospects” by Martin Anderson, p 11
13 Maj Coleman Interview with LtGen J. W. Klimp, D C/S, M&RA, of 30 March 1999
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Krulak, the Marine Corps has achieved a level of excellence, despite a highly competitive recruiting environment. The success enjoyed since June 1995 warrants scrutiny, particularly in light of sister-service struggles. Numerous questions present themselves. What is the “take away?” What are the true reasons for success? Is it possible success may inadvertently breed complacency and overshadow significant political, social, economic and demographic changes occurring throughout the United States at the dawn of the 21st century? With the turnover of our 31st Commandant, will the Marine Corps maintain an institutional commitment to recruiting, or diverge from its present focus to concentrate on other priorities as it did during the late 1980s and early 1990s? Will the Marine Corps be able to overcome domestic challenges and recruit the virtuous men and women to whom its future is inextricably dependent?

For the Marine Corps to flourish, it must continually adapt to the changing environment while preserving its ethos. Based upon the premise, Ne Cras "not like yesterday," it is vital that the Marine Corps examine the domestic challenges adversely shaping the recruiting environment of the 21st century and establish a strategic plan to successfully recruit mature men and women of good judgment and sound moral character. This paper examines the following issues: 1) causes of past recruiting shortfalls, 2) factors contributing to current success; 3) domestic challenges confronting the Marine Corps; and 4) a revolutionary approach to recruiting the “Strategic Corporal” of the 21st Century.
CHAPTER 2

THE EVOLUTION OF MARINE RECRUITING

Since the end of the draft in 1973, the Marine Corps recruiting effort has experienced major phases shaped by external forces beyond the Marine Corps’ direct control. These forces include changes in labor markets, cultural trends, fluctuating DOD resources available for recruiting and retention, and changing attitudes of American youth. Furthermore, military accessions have been affected by economic, demographic, and political variables such as: shifts in military pay and allowances, unemployment rates, educational benefits, changing mental, moral, and physical enlistment standards, and the eligible enlistment population of males ages 17-21. The principal factors affecting recruiting that have been within the Marine Corps’ control include: setting recruiting standards; recruiting programs and benefits; recruiter manning levels; competent and efficient training, policy and procedures; and advertising the Marine ethos, the basic values peculiar to the Corps, with America.

In, *First To Fight*, LtGen Victor Krulak aptly describes the unique spirit and character which defines the Marine Corps and the significance of Marine leaders who preserved the mystique of the Corps with the American people:

> The Corps is in a sense like a primitive tribe where each generation has its medicine men--keepers of the tribal mythology, protectors of the tribal customs, and guardians of the tribal standards. Without them the tribe would wither, suffering from poverty of the soul.

While all thirty-one commandants are thought of as “the medicine men,” responsible for

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15 *The All-Volunteer Force After A Decade*, “Supply and Quality of First Term Enlistees Under the AVF,” by Gary Nelson, p 37
manning, training and equipping the Marine Corps, several were instrumental in transforming the quality of the Marine Corps through recruiting.

**General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. 1968-1972, “We Didn’t Promise You a Rose Garden”**

According to General Charles Krulak, when selecting a Commandant, “The Corps always seems to find the right guy for the right time. Although, in retrospect I’m sorry my dad was not [selected] Commandant, when I think back to Lynn Chapman, he was the right man for the right time.” General Krulak describes 1968 as a “bad, bad time for the Corps! At least 90 percent of a given battalion was on drugs. We had Marines murdered in their tents over racial incidents.”

During the early 1970s, the Marines hit bottom. They had suffered numerous casualties in the Vietnam War. Strained race relations within the Corps marred *esprit de corps* with more than 1,000 violent racial incidents logged in 1970. Drug abuse was rampant. The Marine Corps had not drafted anyone since 1970, and by the time the draft ended officially in 1973, it discovered many “volunteers” were simply running from problems such as escaping jail.

General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr. was renowned for emphasizing traditional Marine Corps standards of discipline, appearance, leadership, honor, individual worth and professionalism. He chose not to fall in step with other services which, to varying degrees, sought to attract sufficient numbers of volunteers by relaxing grooming and military standards and by widely advertising that they were in tune with the new youth culture. As relayed by General Krulak, “General Chapman said, ‘We didn’t promise you a rose garden and we are going to hold firm.’... that was the first time, I think, the Marine Corps went back to their roots and their ethos of, ‘we are a breed apart.’ The idea was to appeal to what we used to appeal to in World

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17 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.C. Krulak, 31st CMC, of 1 April 1999
18 Ibid.
19 *Making The Corps*, by Thomas Ricks, p 22
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War II, etc.”

The Corps in Crisis (1973-1976)

The first phase of the AVF, 1973-1976, took place during a period of relative cooperation (détente) between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was characterized by entry-level pay adjusted 61% upward in the last years of conscription, the deep recession of 1975, and an increasing population of age-qualified youths. Recruiting resources dedicated to making the recruiting effort successful included continuing the GI Bill. Despite the favorable conditions, the enlistment and retention of quality enlisted Marines became a major challenge in the first years of the AVF, due largely to the anti-military sentiment prevailing throughout society, as well as poor planning and ineffective recruiting procedures.

According to Col Michael D. Becker, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Marine Corps Recruiting Command, “One can think of 1973-1979 as being our Kasserine Pass. We were untested. We suffered an operational failure... an intelligence failure. We failed to recognize the implied tasks of successfully recruiting ‘an all volunteer force.’” As the Marine Corps approached the AVF, dramatic social and political changes were ignored largely due to a patriotic paradigm among senior leaders of the Corps who were second lieutenants during World War II and Korea. General Krulak emphasized how,

They [the senior leadership] believed the lettering on the banner and drank their own bath-water... we were preparing for an all volunteer force, [ala. World War II]... we were going to screen the birds [out of] this long line of people waiting [to join]... we didn’t realize until we almost got to the start line that it is not an ‘all volunteer force’ but an ‘all recruited force’ and that there weren’t going to be a lot of people lining up.

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22 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.C. Krulak, 31st CMC, of 1 April 1999
23 The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade, "Sustaining the All-Volunteer Force,” by Maxwell Thurman, p 268
24 Maj Coleman Interview with Col M. Becker, A C/S, MCRC, of 2 April 1999
25 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.C. Krulak, 31st CMC, of 1 April 1999
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As explained to Congress by Assistant Commandant General Sam Jaskilka, 1976-1980, “We were simply unprepared. There were two fundamental errors in our thinking. First of all, we thought everybody wanted to be a Marine. Second, we thought we could make a Marine out of anybody.”

With inception of the AVF, Marine Corps end strength quickly drew down, dangerously approaching the 200K level mandated by Congress. Regardless of quality, pressure was put on the newly-created all-volunteer recruiting force to ship recruits to Marine Corps Recruit Depots (MCRD). This perpetuated the social image of a Marine Corps that had come to consist of people with little or no virtue. During this period, then Major C. E. Mundy, as the Commanding Officer of an Instructor and Inspector Staff for a reserve unit in Miami, Fla., was responsible for recruiting reservists. “Word came out [from District], ‘if it walks and talks, test and ship it. Quality control is not yours to judge’... so we shipped a lot of trash into the Marine Corps.” It was a mistake that nearly cost the Marine Corps its very existence.

General Mundy related that as a battalion commander in 1973, “the brigs were so full, [you] had to have special authority of the commanding general to put a guy in the brig, and when he went in, one had to come out.” In 1975, the Marine Corps experienced 18,369 desertions. Fewer than 50 percent of those recruited were high school graduates and fewer than 25 percent tested within the upper mental categories of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). Forty percent of all recruits had used drugs within the previous 30 days, 48 percent within the last year. “Many ill-adjusted, antisocial young men ended up in our ranks,” BGen Trainor observed in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1978.

During this period, Major General Barrow was ordered to MCRD Parris Island where he quickly assessed the dismal plight of recruiting shortfalls. According to General Mundy,

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26 Maj Coleman Interview with Lt.Gen J. W. Klimp, D C/S, M&RA, of 30 March 1999
27 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.E. Mundy, 30th CMC, of 6 April 1999
28 Ibid.
29 Maj Coleman Interview with LtGen J. W. Klimp, D C/S, M&RA, of 30 March 1999
30 Making The Corps, Thomas Ricks, p 22
MajGen Barrow almost came to a contest with the then Commandant, General Cushman. He tried to get General Cushman to come down and make him walk the ranks of fat bodies and illiterates, thugs and thieves. Ironically, most of our honormen... were off the streets of New York and they knew how to run. They came to Parris Island as natural leaders and they became the honormen. They then went into the Fleet Marine Force and shot and stabbed people... we were dealing with a very bad Corps.31

As explained by LtGen Klimp, Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the culmination of poor recruiting strategy overwhelmed inexperienced drill instructors who believed it to be their responsibility, to “make a Marine out of anyone,” through brute force if necessary. In 1976, Private Lynn McClure, a retarded recruit fraudulently enlisted by a recruiter from San Antonio, was killed by fellow recruits with pugil sticks in an unauthorized training event. McClure had been assigned to the motivation platoon, designed to reprimand him for refusing to train. In another incident in 1976, Private Hiscock was shot in the hand by his drill instructor in an attempt to scare him. The deaths of several recruits along with recruiting improprieties in 1975-1976 prompted a Senate Armed Services Committee investigation into Marine recruiting and recruit training. Some in Congress insisted that Marines receive their initial recruit training from the Army. The Marine Corps was in jeopardy of losing direct control of its right to make Marines which meant eroding the service's culture and ethos-- it meant the demise of the Marine Corps.32

**General Louis H. Wilson, Jr., 1975-1979, “Just Me and My Driver”**

In 1975, General Louis H. Wilson, Jr. became the 26th Commandant. He immediately made recruiting quality Marines his top priority. He concurred with the stance taken by General Chapman emphasizing the tough challenges of becoming a Marine. In contrast to the Army slogan, “Today’s Army Wants to Join You,” and the Navy’s “Sailors Have More Fun,” the

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31 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.E. Mundy, 30th CMC, of 6 April 1999  
32 Maj Coleman Interview with LtGen J. W. Klimp, D C/S, M&RA, of 30 March 1999
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Corps’ theme of, “The Marines are Looking for a Few Good Men,” reflected the attitude of General Wilson that the Marines were looking for men and women of quality in the all-volunteer environment.\footnote{Where Does the Corps Go From Here?, Brookings Institute, 1976, p 58} In addition, he emphasized the need to negate the effect of the poor recruiting strategy by expeditiously discharging Marines who failed to meet standards. According to General Krulak, “with the expeditionary discharge program, we really cleaned house.”\footnote{Maj Coleman Interview with General C.C. Krulak, 31st CMC, of 1 April 1999} In 1976, General Wilson testified to Congress, “If I have to go down to just me and my driver to establish quality, that will be the size of the Marine Corps.”\footnote{Ibid.}

General Wilson then brought MajGen Barrow from the Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) Parris Island to be the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA). Together, General Wilson and General Barrow consolidated recruiting and recruit training under regional headquarters at Marine Corps Recruit Depots (MCRD) Parris Island, South Carolina and San Diego, California, each commanded by major generals.\footnote{Ibid.} Now that the Marine Corps had defined a strategy to honor its ethos by stiffening standards, the next step was to establish procedures, training, and marketing support to recruit people of quality.

Rebuilding the Corps: The Advent of Systematic Recruiting

General Wilson is known for having “built Marine recruiting.” He designated BGen A.P. McMillan as Director of Personnel Procurement in May 1977. As affectionately relayed by General Krulak, BGen McMillan was,

\ldots an obnoxious, loud, profane gentleman … who didn’t give a ---- about anybody. McMillan used to reign terror in headquarters...reported only to the Commandant and had great loyalty and affection of both Generals Wilson and Barrow... the guy was unbelievably powerful...What ‘Mac’ brought to the table was this unbelievable single-minded focus to making recruiting [procedurally] systematic in nature so that you can recruit any time any place... He had absolutely zero tolerance for not making mission... I can remember the firing of

\footnote{Where Does the Corps Go From Here?, Brookings Institute, 1976, p 58}
\footnote{Maj Coleman Interview with General C.C. Krulak, 31st CMC, of 1 April 1999}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
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recruiters and COs after three to four months of failure ...nobody wanted to go on recruiting duty. Those that were successful completing [the mission] did well-got promoted. You saw the impact of Wilson and Barrow as District CO’s got promoted to Brigadier General in this pressure cooker trying to clean the Marine Corps up.37

Under General Wilson, essential standards for measuring quality included the high school diploma, which demonstrated perseverance, and initial test scores, which demonstrated aptitude and trainability. Despite the Marine Corps’ dismal beginning with the AVF, General Wilson raised recruiting standards based upon these criteria. While BGen McMillan established a procedural system emphasizing a means to recruit quality, it did not have an immediate impact. According to General Mundy, during the Wilson era the Marine Corps “still didn’t have a quality force out there. We went through 4-5 years of instant shipping despite low quality... Systematic recruiting was not instantaneously embraced by recruiters.”38 All of the measures initiated by General Wilson, then MajGen Barrow, and BGen McMillan took four-five years before true improvements in recruit quality were realized. One of the reasons it took so long to affect change is encapsulated by the phrase, “you are what you recruit” and “you recruit what you are.” It took several years for the higher quality recruits to return as higher quality recruiters.


During 1980-1983, after the dismal FY 1977-1979 period, there was nowhere to go but up. All four services met authorized end strength from 1981-1983 while increasing the size of the active forces by nearly 75,000, or almost 4 percent.39 This was influenced by the unemployment rate of the second deep recession during the AVF period (1982-83). Heightened tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States, and the consequent increase in military

37 Ibid.
38 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.E. Mundy, 30th CMC, of 6 April 1999
39 The All-Volunteer Force a Decade Later (Retrospect and Prospect), “Military Manpower Training Achievements and Challenges for the 1980s,” by Lawrence J. Korb, p 6
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spending, led to pay increases of 11 percent in 1981 and 14 percent in 1982 which brought comparability with entry-level civilian pay. Yet most significant, the reason for Marine Corps recruiting success was the sustained leadership emphasis by General Robert H. Barrow. General Mundy describes General Barrow as being perhaps the single most important Marine, first as Deputy Chief of Staff of M&RA, and later as Commandant, in turning the Marine Corps around.

If anybody put the Marine Corps on the road to returning to the standards of Marines as we know them today, it was Robert H Barrow-- no question in my mind... General Barrow was ‘The Manpower Commandant,’ if anyone.

An important facet of General Barrow’s leadership style was to “empower the recruiter.” This empowerment built trust and fostered the belief that every Marine at the tactical level was an important part of the strategic picture, thus each Marine had a stake in whom he recruited. This empowerment philosophy was explained by General Mundy who headed Marine Recruiting under General Barrow:

He said, ‘You’re the head recruiter-- you walk into this office anytime you need to see me. There is no staff between you and me’-- a very important thing for future commandants to remember. General Barrow never made a field trip where he did not ride in a recruiting vehicle. His style was that he’d ride up front so the young major could tell him what was going on...I’d be sitting in my office, cooling down after an afternoon run, straps on my pack loosened a little because the boss was out of town. The phone would ring and it would be General Barrow at RS Cincinnati and he’d say, "The RS CO has two cases pending for this, I ‘d like to hear back from you this afternoon as to what we are going to do about that."

General Barrow continually emphasized recruiting and recruit training standards. It is estimated that by 1980, roughly 37 percent of all Marines were using illegal drugs at least occasionally. By establishing policies emphasizing leadership, discipline, and firm standards,

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40 *The All-Volunteer Force After a Decade*, “Sustaining The All-Volunteer Force,” by Maxwell R. Thurman, p 271
41 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.E. Mundy, of 6 April 1999
42 Ibid.
43 *Making The Corps*, Thomas Ricks, p 22
as well as mandatory urinalysis testing, General Barrow eventually created a virtually drug-free Marine Corps by 1983.  

According to General Mundy, “he was the man who knew recruiting was the Corps’ lifeblood, so he made it a premier job.” Under General Barrow, the quality-recruiting emphasis initiated by Wilson finally yielded significant gains. For the first time since the inception of the AVF, the percentage of high school graduates within the Marine Corps exceeded the percentage of high school diplomas among the youth population. The percentage of recruits with high school diplomas rose from 68 percent in 1980 to 92 percent in 1982. ASVAB test scores of recruits improved from 69 percent within upper I-IIIA mental categories to 91 percent. These indicators were critical milestones in establishing the conviction that the Marine Corps was finally recruiting true to its standards—young men and women of quality.

Both Generals Wilson and Barrow are credited for rebuilding the Marine Corps from within by driving an institutional commitment to recruiting quality people, maintaining firm discipline, and remaining faithful to Marine ethos. Achieving quality recruiting results took eight years of uncompromising commitment. While it may be accurately said no Commandant is disinterested in recruiting, in the following eight years other priorities obscured the institutional commitment to molding the Corps at the recruit level.


According to General Krulak, “there were two Commandants very interested in making it [recruiting] work… we went from there, in my opinion, to a period where MR [Marine Recruiting] lost what I would call power… General [P.X] Kelly was interested in recruiting but nothing like the commitment of Wilson and Barrow. His focus was on programming the Marine
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Corps for the 1990s.” He also was obligated to attend to more immediate matters, such as the U.S. intervention in Lebanon, and the tragedy in Beirut. General Kelley visited a badly wounded Marine in a hospital after the Beirut massacre who, upon recognizing the 28th Commandant wrote on a piece of paper, “Semper Fi!” Upon this moving demonstration of esprit de corps, General Kelley is known to have removed his stars and presented them to the Marine and asked, “Where do we find such men?” From 1983-1987, the Marines maintained recruiting standards despite relative pay reductions, and actually increased quality despite a declining youth population and rising employment.48


As with General Kelley, General A. M. Gray did not emphasize recruiting. His Warfighting focus was doctrinal in nature, related to training and education. His lack of attention to the delicate balance of the "recruiting ecosystem” later eroded the recruiting momentum generated by Generals Wilson and Barrow. According to General Mundy, who at that time headed up Plans, Policies and Operations, (PPO) of the Marine Corps, “decision makers at headquarters didn’t look at or listen to recruiting closely.” The recruiting force was cut by roughly 200 production recruiters, along with a 10 percent reduction in facilities and resources, partly due to the expected force draw-down. The HQMC recruiter screening team, responsible for selecting the best Marines for recruiting duty, was disbanded. The scrutiny of command assignments for majors to be recruiting station commanding officers slackened. “We learned quickly that the recruiting effort suffered... then began the roller coaster end strength reduction. During Gray’s fourth year we were projected to go from 200,000 to 159,000.”

47 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.C. Krulak of 1 April 1999
48 Marching Toward the 21st Century, “Change in the AVF: Reflections in Youth Attitudes,” by David Segal and Jerald Bachman, p 151
49 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.E. Mundy, 30th CMC, of 30 March 1999
50 Maj Coleman Interview with Col M. Becker, A C/S, MCRC, of 2 April 1999
51 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.E. Mundy, 30th CMC, of 6 April 1999
During this phase, Cold War tensions subsided, military age-eligible pools declined, entry-level civilian wages rose and unemployment was low. The immediate impact of these “adverse” forces was not readily felt upon recruiting, due to a surge in propensity to enlist following the Gulf War. However, the long-term effect of “other priorities” under Generals Kelley and Gray, coupled by unprecedented decline in "youth attitudes" (interests in the military), undermined the recruiting momentum which eventually resulted in the Marine Corps’ failure to meet an increased monthly net new contract mission for 18 months. It would take the Marine Corps several years under the determined leadership of General Mundy to get the recruiting effort back on track.

General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., 1991-1995 -- Virtue and the Springboard of Success

General Carl E. Mundy successfully defended the roles and mission of the Marine Corps to Congress, ensuring that the Corps was downsized properly. He was originally ordered to take the Marine Corps down to 154,000, yet was able to reverse that decision and keep the Marine Corps at an authorized strength of 179,000. General Mundy maintained the high recruiting standards. Due in part to decisions made under General Gray, and because of its effort to "thin out" the career force, the Marine Corps failed to accomplish an increased net new contract mission from January 1994 through June 1995. In addition, the external impact of forces beyond the Marine Corps’ control, such as the impact of the DOD force structure reduction upon (declining) youth attitudes toward enlisting, adversely affected Marine recruiting.

After Desert Storm, public sentiment toward the military took an unexpected downturn. Many people had overdosed on information about the American armed forces. The defense draw-down carried a message that the military was no longer as important as it had been, was no longer hiring, and that those joining faced uncertainty. The propensity to enlist among high

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52 Ibid., p 151
53 The Marine Corps increased its annual accession goals of its “first-term force” after the Gulf War in order to reduce the corpus of the “career force” which had grown too large, thereby thwarting promotion rates. Source: LtGen Klimp Interview
quality males 16-21 years old dropped significantly, roughly 10 percent for Whites, 10 percent for Hispanics, and 33 percent for African Americans.⁵⁴

Successful recruiting, like marketing of any kind, requires an adequate level of resources; however, neither DOD, nor Marine Corps policy officials anticipated this drop. In 1994, the potential supply of youths 16-21 exceeded the pre-draw-down level of 1989; however, substantial cuts had been made in recruiting resources as part of the military draw-down. For example, Congress mandated ceilings for the numbers of service recruiters, which along with the decline in propensity, constrained the Marine Corps' ability to accomplish the mission. Perhaps the best testimony to the nonlinear relationship of factors among the delicate recruiting ecosystem is explained by manpower analysts Mark Eitelberg and Stephen Mehay in, *Marching Toward the 21st Century*, “Here lies the weakness in our ways, for unexpected occurrences in science, politics, economics, and social relations-- maybe but a single event-- are capable of nullifying our most seemingly prophetic assumptions.”⁵⁵

Since General Wilson, the Marine Corps learned how recruiting problems can not be corrected quickly and that recruiting solutions require an institutional commitment throughout the Corps. As the 30th Commandant, General Mundy implemented several recruiting initiatives, which solidified a recruiting foundation for the success later realized under General Krulak.

**Emphasis of Marine Virtues -- Honor, Courage and Commitment**

General Mundy emphasized the character development of the individual Marine as the bedrock for developing the Marine Corps. Given social trends, he recognized the need to reinforce the precious virtues of each Marine. General Mundy defined these as “core values-- honor, courage and commitment.” Under General Mundy, drill instructors initiated core values


training with recruits as a means of reinforcing the Corps’ enduring ethos.

**Establishment of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command**

General Mundy deeply understood the importance of recruiting. In 1994, he established the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC), led by a major general with brigadier generals as subordinate commanders of each of the two recruiting regions. This enhanced the command and control aspect of the recruiting mission, provided unity of command and facilitated unity of effort. It formalized Barrow’s recruiter empowerment by institutionalizing a direct organizational relationship to the Commandant.\(^\text{56}\)

Under General Mundy, then MajGen Krulak was empowered as both Marine Manpower (MM) and Marine Recruiting (MR) while heading up the Force Structure Planning Group. This provided invaluable cohesion to the recruit staffing process, particularly at MCRC. Based upon the premise that “you recruit what you are,” General Krulak, like the “medicine men” before him, recognized that if the Marine Corps wanted the best from society, it must put the very best Marines out in society to recruit them. According to General Krulak, “I saw everyone that went out on recruiting duty...we were able to infuse stud muffins into the recruiting command.”\(^\text{57}\) For example, MajGen Jack W. Klimp was assigned to command the MCRC, then BGen. Jerry Humble was assigned to the Eastern Recruiting Region (ERR), and then BGen Gary L. Parks was assigned to the Western Recruiting Region (WRR). Each of these general officers had extensive recruiting experience as recruiting station commanding officers. They brought invaluable expertise and a sense of urgency within the MCRC at the outset of General Krulak’s tenure as Commandant of the Marine Corps.

**Establishment of Recruiting Incentives**

General Mundy empowered the Marines responsible for the Corps' toughest mission with

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\(^{56}\) Maj Coleman Interview with General C.E. Mundy, 30\(^{\text{th}}\) CMC, of 6 April 1999  
\(^{57}\) Maj Coleman Interview with General C.C. Krulak, 31\(^{\text{st}}\) CMC, of 1 April 1999
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the requisite resources and authority. Then, in recognition of the extreme sacrifices and achievements made on behalf of thousands of Marine recruiters and staff personnel, he created a recruiting ribbon. The purpose of the ribbon was to instill throughout the Marine Corps the singular importance of the recruiting mission by recognizing those who completed successful tours of recruiting duty. This met with considerable objections from many Marines, including General Mundy's Sergeant Major. Despite these objections, General Mundy was adamant that every Marine understand the importance of the duty which the recruiting ribbon symbolized. In addition, General Mundy ensured that every promotion board was thoroughly briefed regarding the challenges of recruiting duty and its importance to the Corps. Each board was instructed to give special consideration to the demanding nature of recruiting duty when evaluating one’s potential service to the Corps and to temper the impact of Marines ranked and evaluated strictly upon the net accessions per recruiter.58

Vision 21

During 1994, General Mundy met with a select group of general officers and announced, “somewhere in this room is the next Commandant.” For a period of five months, he convened symposiums to examine forces shaping the 21st century and the Marine Corps’ future role within it. These observations were crucial to his development of Marine Corps’ guiding policy and thesis, “…From the Sea.” Vision 21 was influential in shaping the doctrinal focus of littoral warfare and revealing the need for the "Strategic Corporal" later articulated by General Krulak. It also indirectly reinforced the singular importance of recruiting quality people in order to meet the mission of the 21st century while defining the characteristics of Generation X.

General Mundy’s effort was to create a sense of ownership and cohesion among the Corps’ senior leadership, building a firm foundation for the next Commandant from which to “march smartly.” Through the Vision 21 study group, General Krulak staffed his Commandant’s

58 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.E. Mundy, 30th CMC, of 6 April 1999
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Planning Guidance before its official release. According to General Mundy,

I valued continuity. Vision 21 was an attempt to build cohesion among contenders of the throne. I wanted the next Commandant to have a game plan and the support of his principal lieutenants. In that regard, Vision 21 was intended to be a foundation, or a ‘springboard’ for the 31st Commandant.59

59 Ibid.
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CHAPTER 3

SUSTAINING THE MARCH (THE SECOND RECRUITING REVOLUTION)


By July 1, 1995, General Charles C. Krulak was uniquely positioned to be the Marine Corps' 31st Commandant. As the son of LtGen Victor Krulak, General Krulak was blessed with a trusted advisor who fully understood the unique spirit and character of the Marine Corps, its history and tradition. According to the Commandant, his father was instrumental in instilling "the ethos that’s in my blood...this understanding of who we are and what we are."60 One early piece of advice from his father was “if you’re going to initiate change, do it within the first year, then reinforce it throughout the remainder of the tour.”61 With that in mind, General Krulak assembled a special study group consisting of roughly 12 officers (majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels) who worked through 23 drafts of what became the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, the most important responsibility of which was to “Make Marines and Win Battles.”

General Krulak understood that making Marines was predicated upon three key factors: committing quality Marines to the recruiting task (and to recruit training), focusing upon the Marine ethos, and recruiting people of unwavering maturity, judgment, and strength of character. The “Transformation” process was to reinforce one’s sense of honor, courage, and commitment through the “Crucible,” “cohesion” and “sustainment.”

Generals Wilson and Barrow are credited with transforming the core quality of their service by raising recruiting standards amidst a large pool of 17-21 year olds. Generals Gray, Kelley, and Mundy maintained recruiting standards despite a declining number of age-qualified youths and a declining propensity to enlist. Immediately upon assuming command as Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Krulak raised recruiting standards, despite the failure

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60 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.C. Krulak, 31st CMC, of 1 April 1999
61 Ibid.
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of the previous 18 months, declining propensity, and the concern expressed by some that “it was too much, too fast.” According to General Krulak, “We went way above. Instead of 90 percent high school grads we said 95 percent from 30 June 1995-1 July 1995. The reason ... was to send a very powerful signal... that we were going after the elite of the elite, and it paid off.”

The Reason for Recruiting Success

From 1 January 1994 through June 30, 1995, the Marine Corps did not accomplish the monthly net new contract mission. Since General Krulak raised standards, the Marine Corps has consistently excelled in every facet of the recruiting mission for 47 consecutive months. This has been accomplished despite the lowest national unemployment rate in 29 years, declining propensity, and the recruiting failure of sister services. The success observed by General Krulak is a stark contrast to his observations during the 1970s. FY 1998 data reveals that 95.9 percent of all recruits were high school graduates, as compared to 50 percent in 1975. Sixty-six percent tested within upper mental groups on the ASVAB in 1998, as compared to 25 percent in 1975. In 1998, only 3.6 percent had used drugs within the previous 30 days and only 7.8 percent within the previous year, as compared to 40 percent and 48 percent respectively in 1975. Throughout 1998, the Marine Corps had 1,231 deserters, compared to 18,369 in 1975.

In contrast to the Marines, other services are lowering recruiting standards, yet struggling to accomplish their recruiting mission. For example, at the outset of FY 99, the Army and Navy reduced the goal of recruits requiring a high school diploma from 95 to 90 percent. As of February 1999, the Army and Air Force missed year-to-date assigned ship missions by 3,941 and 1,046 respectively, while the Army, Air Force, and Navy all failed to accomplish assigned contracting missions by 23,000, 1,000, and 383 respectively.

62 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.C. Krulak, 31st CMC, of 1 April 1999
63 Maj Coleman Interview with MGen G. Parks, CG, MCRC, of 5 April 1999
64 Maj Coleman Interview with LtGen J. W. Klimp, D C/S M&RA, of 30 March 1999
65 Maj Coleman Interview with Maj M. Witzell, MCRC, of 2 April 1999
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General Krulak believes the main reason for the MCRC’s success is “because our guys work so hard!” This is true to a point. One need not go any further than the nearest recruiting sub-station to verify the Marine ethos of “making mission.” The working hours displayed by each service highlight the different work ethic; however, the reason the Marines work so hard is because they believe in the Marine Corps and understand the strategic importance of their monthly mission. An equally valid reason for the sustained success is because of the high caliber people personally assigned by the Commandant to recruiting duty.

**The Top-Down Institutional Commitment**

What may not be readily apparent from the outside is the significant top-down institutional commitment to recruiting and the positive influence it has upon the morale of the recruiting force. That commitment begins with the Commandant, who attempts to call several recruiting sub-stations every day, simply to motivate his recruiters. As he describes the recruiting force, that commitment extends through the M&RA, the MCRC headquarters, each region, district, recruiting station, and substation. General Krulak explained that any general officer who travels within the continental United States must visit a recruiter and reinforce that institutional commitment to “making Marines.”

This institutional commitment is further reflected in the 105 percent manning level of the recruiting force, which allows for new joins, rotation of personnel, and schooling. Because of this, the recruiting force is better able to maximize the true numbers of recruiters on production at 100 percent. It is also influential in the slating process of Marines assigned to recruiting duty. Each district commanding officer (a colonel), and recruiting station (RS) commanding officer, (a major), is screened by a formal board and approved by the Commandant. Sergeants Major are carefully assigned to each RS, and recruiter screening teams from Headquarters, Marine Corps interview every potential candidate for assignment as a recruiter. The institutional commit-

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66 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.C. Krulak, 31st CMC, of 1 April 1999
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ment is also reflected in the robust resources for facilities and advertising. Despite an austere budget climate, funding for advertising steadily increased to almost double what it was before 1995.67

**Taking a Stand (The Moral Compass of Marine Virtue)**

Throughout General Krulak’s tenure, the Marine Corps has continually reinforced its service identity with the American people by taking clearly defined stands regarding gender integrated training, marital fidelity, sexual harassment, and hazing. General Krulak has etched a “moral compass” in the souls of his Marines and, by so doing, has indelibly reinforced the eternal Marine ethos in the minds of the American people. This clearly defined “service identity” has distinguished the Marine Corps among all services. One father who brought his son to meet with a Marine recruiter explained he was opposed to his son entering the service:

> But when he persisted, I knew there was only one service I wanted him to be part of and that was the Marines. The reason I felt this way is because you people stand for something. I don’t always agree with the stance taken, but at least you clearly stand for principles and I respect that.68

While such a stand may make other service chiefs uncomfortable for not being “politically correct,” it has only reinforced a bold vision of the type of man and woman the Corps wants to recruit for tomorrow. While experience has taught the Corps that it cannot make a Marine out of just anyone, the Marine Corps understands that in order to “transform” a recruit's virtue, it must first recruit those of requisite character. General Krulak's position on contentious issues which threaten the Marine ethos has enticed Generation X to measure up the challenge. General Krulak’s call resonates in the minds of the general public and in the hearts of his Marines.

67 Maj Coleman Interview with Major Kuhn, MCRC Advertising, 6 April 1999
68 Ibid., as relayed by General Krulak
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Quality Advertising

An effective advertising campaign, orchestrated by the J. Walter Thompson (JWT) ad agency, has been a key component of the recruiting effort since World War II (when it advertised on a pro bono basis for the Marine Corps). With the inception of the AVF, the Marines became a formal account, which today is staffed by roughly 22 dedicated people comprising 126 years of experience.69 The Corps’ quality advertising supports recruiting the “Strategic Corporal” by shaping the attitudes of American youth, by creating an image consistent with Marine ethos, and obtaining timely information regarding market trends so that branch plans to marketing strategy may be developed.

The JWT/Marine Corps partnership has been instrumental in shaping a “brand image” since the early 1970s. This plan took a strategic turn during the early 1980s (with BGen Mundy as Director of Personnel Procurement) by emphasizing the "intangible" benefits of Marine Corps service through noteworthy advertising campaigns such as “Sword” and “Knight.” The effectiveness of “brand imaging” has been routinely enhanced through vigilant market analysis of focus groups and youth attitude tracking studies. For example, during the 1980s, the Marines were discovered to have had a “tough, but dumb” image. This perception was changed by the “Chess” campaign, which emphasized the “power of the mind as a weapon” along with raising the recruiting standards for the percentage of recruits required to have high school diplomas.70

Throughout these evolving campaigns, JWT has remained true to the Marine ethos by portraying the tough challenge of becoming a Marine along with the pride of belonging to an elite organization. The Marine officer with sword is the focus of an effective communication strategy emphasizing the concepts, "tough, smart, and elite” to the target market. Throughout, the mamaluke sword and dress blues have become Marine “icons.” The “Transformation” ad campaign, which General Mundy selected as Commandant, and “Rite of Passage” effectively appeal to Generation X which studies ascertained wanted to be challenged, measured against a

69 Maj Coleman Interview with Maj Kuhn, MCRC Advertising, 6 April 1999
70 Ibid.
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standard, held accountable, belong to something better than themselves, and become leaders as well.71

The New Millennials (Echo Boomers/Generation Y)

While too early to draw any significant conclusions, initial observations of the cultural characteristics of the generation after X, also referred to as “millennials” and the “echo boomers,” are that there is a marked difference between them and Generation X. The “millennials” are characterized as being unlike the “latch kids” of Generation X having been raised with more parental supervision in the home. They are inclined to conform to social controls. For example, they are more likely to have worn school uniforms, wear helmets while skateboarding, bike riding, etc.72 JWT and the Marine Corps are closely studying the emerging characteristics of this market, ensuring the marketing strategy and "sales" training reflect the most current and effective technique to “tap” this "target market."

Quality Training

Another cornerstone of the Marine recruiting foundation consists of quality sales training of the recruiting force, provided by Achieve Global Inc. This company, formally part of Xerox Corporation, has provided sales training since the late 1970s. With the advent of systematic recruiting, BGen McMillan recognized the need to acquire the services of the very best sales trainers in business in order to teach Marines the skills necessary to compete in the marketplace of the AVF. Like the JWT partnership, Achieve Global has expertly taken the Marine ethos and translated it into sophisticated sales strategy geared to the current characteristics of the market. It provides the cadre of Marine trainers and command groups throughout the MCRC professional selling skills training with Marine “mentoring” in mind. The Marine recruiter’s “sales strategy” is markedly different from that of other Services. Marine recruiting is largely a mentoring

71 Maj Coleman Interview with LtGen J. Klimp, D C/S, M&RA, of 30 March 1999
72 Maj Coleman Interview with MGen G.Parks, CG MCRC, of 5 April 1999
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process. Each Marine, in effect, sells him or herself, by committing themselves to each man or woman they recruit. The Marine recruiter is responsible for “the future Marine” from initial contact until he or she returns to home on leave as a United States Marine. The process Marines are trained to use remains true to the Marine ethos by the emphasizing intangible features/benefits of being a Marine instead of the tangible benefits other services sell (e.g. college money, signing bonuses, specific job training). Recruiters undergo a 7-week school located at MCRD San Diego, California. Career recruiters receive an additional 5-week mid-level refresher course along with district-sponsored reinforcement training. Each district and recruiting station emphasizes systematic recruiting procedures, noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) courses, and all-hands monthly training. Each echelon of the recruiting command is taught to coach recruiters. Recruiting involves everyone from a commanding officer of a recruiting station, to the private just home from recruit training, to the "poolee" (one who has enlisted but not yet shipped to recruit training), “telling the Marine Corps story.”

The Transformation

Is it possible for the Marine Corps to “make” Marines of virtue, who in turn will make ethically sound decisions? Can virtue be taught, and if so, to what degree? Recognizing one's moral compass as the cornerstone of a Marine's character, and ultimately, the bedrock of the Marine Corps’ foundation, General Krulak enhanced recruit training by increasing the mental, physical, and moral development of recruits. Embracing the core values training initiated by General Mundy, he extended recruit training one week to provide drill instructors ample time to teach Core Values in a mentoring role. This bold initiative was undertaken despite other services' moves to ease the demands of respective recruit training by shortening its length. General Krulak went on to implement a grueling 54-hour test of leadership and teamwork -- “The Crucible” -- to reinforce Marine virtues such as honor, courage, and commitment taught throughout the preceding 12 1/2 weeks of recruit training. The Crucible acts as a “rite of
passage” in the “Transformation” from civilian to “citizen-warrior.” The drill instructor facilitates this metamorphosis through leadership-by-example, as a respected mentor, not a feared demagogue.\footnote{Maj Coleman Interview with Col M. Becker, A C/S, MCRC, of 2 April 1999}

In the early 1970s, the Marine Corps learned it can not “make a Marine out of anybody.” It is not possible to transform someone who does not already possess a requisite level of virtue. The “Transformation” process simply takes young men and women with the right “metal” and forges the “steel” of moral character. It takes one’s learned value system, and if consistent with Marine ethos, reinforces those values into Marine core values of honor, courage, and commitment. It teaches virtue to those individuals seeking it. The bottom line is that an individual must already possess a moral compass in order for the Marine Corps to “Transform” them; the recruiter’s duty, along with the drill instructor’s, is to set a true azimuth.

In their quest, Marine recruiters typically encounter “prospects” among one of four groups: 1) those with strong moral and family values intact, 2) those “undamaged” by society that are “empty vessels” (lacking direction), 3) those “slightly damaged” by society with minor legal, moral problems requiring a waiver in order to enlist, and 4) those that are “evil and unsalvageable” that the waiver process screens out.\footnote{Maj Coleman Interview with LtGen J.W. Klimp, D/CS of M&RA, of 30 March 1999} The Marine Corps’ moral scrutiny, or enlistment standards are greater than other services.\footnote{Center for Naval Analysis, “Enlistment Waivers, Educational Background and Attrition From the Marine Corps Male Accessions,” of 8 January 99} This is one reason the Marine Corps submits more moral and drug waivers than any other service. Each person recruited is done so based upon a “whole person concept.” A 1998 Center for Naval Analysis report concluded almost half of male accessions had some kind of drug use, while roughly 45 percent had no drug or moral waivers. The results of this study concluded that, based upon first-term success rates of those requiring waivers, the “waiver process seems to be working well in identifying those who appear to have good prospects for becoming Marines.”\footnote{Ibid.}
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Virtue is difficult to measure objectively. The first contact a Marine recruiter has with a prospect is the critical stage for measuring and developing the values of the young man or woman. At the screening stage of the enlistment process, the recruiter first introduces the prospect to the Marine standards. The applicant must understand the cardinal law of telling the truth and trusting Marine leadership to do the right thing in considering him or her for enlistment based upon their character, not just aptitude or diploma. Applicants must prove their worth based upon their honesty.

Prospects disclosing a transgression for which there is no other evidence require moral waivers referred to as “self admittals.” Given the nature of the offense, these individuals are largely recognized for their integrity, not penalized because of it, and receive an opportunity to become a Marine. Those people who, for example, attempt to hide police records or drug use should not be considered for enlistment; however, given the pressure of “making mission,” sometimes they unfortunately are. With these people comes the perception of a double standard. Some enter the Marine Corps thinking “it’s legal as long as you don’t get caught.”

The Marine Corps now sends a clear signal to recruiters and prospects regarding how it values integrity in the enlistment process: “We can handle the truth -- just don’t do it again or you’re out.” Today, the MCRC does this to a large degree by allowing waivers for experimental drug use, then conducting a urinalysis before shipping people to recruit training. Those testing positively for drugs are automatically discharged and no longer eligible to enlist. While this creates enormous drain on the recruiting effort, it identifies those who either were not properly introduced to Marine core values by their recruiter, and weeds out those who lack a requisite level of integrity all together. Assessing the innate honesty of the prospect is a very important aspect of recruiting the mature man or woman of good judgment and strong character whom the Marine Corps seeks. The Marine Corps emphasizes this throughout the waiver process.

A classic example of evaluating one’s honesty in the recruiting process occurred during April of 1998 in Littleton Colo. Several weeks before Ed Harris went on a horrific killing spree
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at Columbine High School, he visited a Marine recruiter. During his initial interview, Harris lied about a psychiatric condition which he had been prescribed medication for.\textsuperscript{77} In a follow up interview conducted by the recruiter with his parents, the truth was disclosed. Despite the pressure to "make mission" and the recruiter's potential to pursue a waiver on Harris' behalf, the recruiter rejected him because he lacked a requisite level of honesty.

This incident illustrates the importance of assigning the best Marines to recruiting duty. Again, the adage of "you recruit what you are" comes to mind. Honest Marines recruit people of integrity. This incident also serves as a classic example of the "Strategic Corporal" whose decision at the tactical level had a profound strategic consequence. Had this Marine recruiter fraudulently enlisted Harris, it would have immediately tarnished the Marine Corps' reputation in the "Information Age." Instead, millions of Americans became better acquainted with Marine core values.

With a positive introduction to Marine standards the "poolee" learns to trust and revere Marine leadership comes inspiration, initiative, and the self discipline to build upon one’s experience at recruit training. With core-values mentoring and the “crucible,” one reinforces a moral foundation upon which the “Strategic Corporal” may stand. Based upon this, “cohesion,” and the "sustainment" of the "Transformation" following a Marine's arrival in the Operating Forces, the "Strategic Corporal" may develop the self-confidence and experience necessary to execute “mission orders” involving life or death situations in MOOTW. Most of the time, these decisions will be made based on intuition derived from Marine core values training and the azimuth of one's moral compass.

\textsuperscript{77} Dale Russakoff, “In Littleton, Neighbors Ponder What Went Wrong,”\textsuperscript{77}n Washington Post, 2 May 1999 A01
Looking to the Future

The notion that the Marine Corps needed to fill a void left by society at large and reinforce an innate level of character among men and women of good judgment was not new. However, the realization of just how underutilized the talented Marines of Generation X are occurred to General Krulak relatively late in his career:

Desert Storm was a real eye opener for me that we as a Corps had probably not invested enough faith in the capabilities of this Generation X Marine... and we are still not challenging them enough. In Hunter Warrior, we took Marines and gave them five separate military occupational skills [MOS] from lance corporal to gunnery sergeant. We took the MOS manual, took 4 months to teach them [the skills of the MOS manual] and they were capable across all five skills up to gunnery sergeant.78

General Krulak emphasizes the doctrinal differences between how the Marine Corps is attempting to exploit the critical capability -- the mind and character -- of the individual Marine, in contrast to other services' emphasis on technological crutches. The Marine Corps’ intent is to empower small unit leaders to make the right decisions. Furthermore, other services seek to retain hierarchical organizational structures in which decisions are made at the top of the pyramid, while the Marine Corps anticipates its organizational structure “flattening out.” As explained by General Krulak,

The whole idea of "equip the man" and not "man the equipment" is to equip the “Strategic Corporal” across the spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, equipment and support (DOTES). You give them (the Marines) all of that and you’ll be successful.79

With the instantaneous exchange of information, the strategic, operational, and tactical spheres of warfare will be compressed, dramatically revolutionizing combat power projection in

78 Major Coleman Interview with General C.C. Krulak, 31st CMC, of 1 April 1999
79 Ibid
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terms of time and space. The “Strategic Corporal,” with precision guided weaponry and network centricity, will be entrusted with authority and responsibility to exercise tremendous combat power. The character, maturity, intellect, and mental toughness of the Strategic Corporal will determine “whether to shoot or not shoot.”

Ne Cras!

The Marine Corps recruiting philosophy in the AVF was shaped by General Chapman. The commitment to recruiting quality people was directly forged by “medicine men” such as Generals Chapman, Wilson, Barrow, Mundy and Krulak. These leaders emphasized recruiting as an institutional priority by assigning the best people to it, based upon the notion that “we recruit what we are.” MajGen Gary Parks, Commanding General of the MCRC, astutely noted,

The progress accomplished by the Marine Corps was evolutionary, shaped by experience…the poor start (of the early 1970s) helped shape the senior leadership of today’s Corps. My priorities are to institutionalize that success…and not ever take it for granted…you’ve got to keep your eye on the ball…recruiting is a very delicate ecosystem which must be closely monitored. We are successful because of the quality of Marines assigned to this duty. If we lose sight of that, we are in trouble.

Since the inception of the AVF, the “institutional commitment” to recruiting duty has oscillated. This was evident at the outset of the AVF and again during the early 1990s. In Col Warren Parker’s (M&RA) estimate, “I’m not convinced we [the Marine Corps] are as committed [to recruiting] as we like to think we are.” He explained how throughout the history of the AVF, the Marine Corps has inadvertently developed a reactive approach to recruiting. Conversely, the greatest threat to recruiting success has become our own success (complacency). Today, “success has bred an expectation of future success to the point where current production is declining and unless attended to regularly may easily collapse.”

80 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.C. Krulak, 31st CMC, of 1 April 1999
81 Maj Coleman Interview with MajGen G. Parks, CG MCRC, of 5 April 1999
82 Maj Coleman Interview with Colonel Warren Parker, A C/S M&RA, of 26 April 1998
83 Maj Coleman Interview with Col W. Parker, A C/S M&RA of 26 April 1999
point by explaining many systemic trends of potential problems are easily ignored in the
euphoria of “having made mission.” A “bow-wave” of these problematic trends becomes
deeply engrained within the recruiting process to the point that, once failure is finally realized, it
is very difficult and costly to correct the root cause of failure.\textsuperscript{84}

The assumption that the Marine Corps will continue successfully to recruit simply because
it has done so the last 47 months may be analogous to the Roman Commander Varus, who
initially defeated the German barbarians in the farthest reaches of the Roman Empire. The next
year, 9 AD, General Varus again found himself at war with the Germans. This time, however,
they had adapted to Roman tactics. In the Battle of Teutoberger Forest, they lured the Roman
Legion into the woods, restricted its space to maneuver, and destroyed it. Upon his bitter defeat,
Varus was reported to have said, “\textit{Ne cras! Ne cras!} ("Not like yesterday!"). The lesson is the
enemy will continually adapt, and one must constantly strive to improve, or one is doomed to
defeat.

The recruiting environment is changing. As a result of the shrinking cohort of age
qualified people to enlist, competition among services has steadily increased. The recruiting
accessions goal for fiscal year (FY) 95 through FY 98 increased by 18 percent throughout DOD.
This has resulted in a squeeze to obtain more recruits, despite the declining propensity to enlist,
and beginning in 1998, a decline in the supply of youth population.\textsuperscript{85} Through February 1999,
the Army increased the number of recruiters 11 percent, from 5,400 to 6,040. The Navy plans to
increase the number of recruiting substations from 1,369 to 1,700 by end of FY 1999 and to
increase up to 1,775 by FY 2000.\textsuperscript{86}

The Marine Corps may need to recruit to a higher ethical/intellectual standard in order to
find more mature Marines capable of handling the responsibilities entrusted to commissioned
officers 30 years ago. In addition, the Marine Corps may increase its end strength requirement

\textsuperscript{84} Maj Coleman Interview with LtGen Klimp, D C/S M&RA, of 4 June 1999
\textsuperscript{85} Military Recruitment Outlook, pgs1-2
\textsuperscript{86} Maj Coleman Interview with Maj M. Whitzel, MCRC, of 6April 1999
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roughly 5,000 by 2010, based upon the results of the FY99 Force Structure Planning Group study. Significant domestic challenges may constrain the Marine Corps’ ability to successfully accomplish this ambitious recruiting mission. Given the ever-increasing demand for mature men and women of strong character, coupled with the significant political, demographic, social and economic forces adversely shaping the recruiting market, it would be prudent for the Marine Corps to strategically plan its mission for the 21st century based upon the following factors.

Challenges for Tomorrow--The Market Landscape in the 21st Century

Defining America's hegemonic role has been difficult given the world’s chaotic political environment and goals of the U.S. engagement strategy. Paradoxically, the American military will continue to be challenged by domestic political and social forces, which question its very purpose. General Mundy summarized the present civil-military relationship during a convocation address at the Marine Corps Command & Staff College, when he said, “Don’t be alarmed by a society that, in light of a robust economy and lack of an immediate military threat, doesn’t understand you or perhaps see a need for you.”

Demographic trends profoundly affect the size and composition of age-qualified men and women from which the military recruits. This, coupled with trends in educational attainment and test scores in the youth labor markets, have a direct bearing upon the ability to recruit. The following demographic, social and political trends highlight the scope of domestic challenges adversely shaping the recruiting market of the 21st century.

American Demographics

The youth population is getting smaller. The population as a whole is also getting older. This will equate to greater competition for the recruiting effort. According to projected demographic profiles, “the 21st century will be based on a labor scarcity ... because of demography

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87 General Mundy Address at Marine Corps Command & Staff College Convocation, August 98

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and technology, human capital will be the scarce valuable commodity of the future, and skilled labor will command enormous wages.  

Between 1995 and 2020, the over-65 population will increase by 60 percent, the 45-64 population 34 percent, the 18-44 by 4 percent. The median age will rise from 33 in 1994 to 37.6 by 2015. The "average soldier will be over age 30, married with children or a single parent (the oldest in military service since the Civil War)." The 18-25 age group is projected to decrease from 12.1 percent of the population as of 1990 to 10.7 percent by year 2015. The 26-45 age group (the career core) is also expected to decrease from 32.1 percent in 1990 to 24.9 percent in 2015.

In light of these demographic trends, the Clinton Administration recently announced it will invest $28 million to train high school graduates as computer programmers. This White House initiative "is driven by the economic implications of a manpower shortage in the nation’s largest and fastest growing industry." The long-term impact of these demographic changes upon the recruiting market means an ever-increasing competition with civilian labor market to recruit young men and women. As the baby boomers retire in unprecedented numbers, the available jobs for Generation X and the so-called Millenials will increase correspondingly.

The greatest challenge to Marine recruiting is the declining growth rate of age-eligible young people. Based upon U.S. census estimates, the overall male population growth rate of 15-29 year olds is expected to decrease from year 2001 to 2010. Within the declining growth rate of young people, the proportion of minorities is increasing. The increasing proportion of minorities within the country may warrant a representative composition within the recruiting force. Of all

http://www.hudson.org/American_Outlook/articles_sm98/london.htm p 1/7
89 Ibid. p 1/7
90 Marching Toward the 21st Century, “Domestic Trends to the Year 2015: Forecast from the Army 21 Study,” by David Osborne, pgs 3, 4
91 Ibid., p3
92 Marching Toward the 21st Century, “Domestic Trends to the Year 2015: Forecast from the Army 21 Study,” by David Osborne, pgs 2-3
93 "The Workforce, Education, and the Nation’s Future,” by Herbert London;
http://www.hudson.org/American_Outlook/articles_sm98/london.htm, p 4/7
94 Ibid., p 2/7
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ethnic groups, Hispanics will have the greatest proportionate growth from 16 million (2001) to 20 million (2010). Hispanics will have the youngest median age of any group. It will increase from 27 to 27.7 years of age (2001-2010). African Americans will have the second greatest growth rate, from 7 million (2001) to 18.9 million (2010). They will also have the second youngest median age which is expected to increase from 30.1 to 30.7 years of age (2001-2010). Whites will have the smallest proportionate growth of any group from 96.7 million (2001) to 99.3 million (2010). The white median age will be the oldest of any group which is scheduled to increase from 38 to 41 years of age (2001 to 2010). Based upon these demographic trends and the adage, "you are what you recruit, and you recruit what you are," it is imperative that the Marine recruiting effort reflect a proportional representation of the population from which it is recruiting.

Expanding Role of Women

Since the inception of the AVF, there has been a dramatic increase in the proportion of women in the military from roughly 43,000 (1.5 percent) in 1972 to 226,000 (11 percent) in 1991. The proportion of women in the services continues to increase, standing at almost 14 percent today. As a result of DOD initiatives, women now compete equally with men for some 260,000 additional military positions previously reserved for men. Ninety-four percent of all job fields in the Marine Corps are now available to women. For example, in 1997, the Marine Corps pinned wings on its first female combat pilot.

Women are expected to constitute 63 percent of new entrants to the work force. Three out of every five new female entrants will be of ethnic or racial minority. Female Hispanics are projected to constitute 30 percent of these new workers, African-American women 18 percent,

95 http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/nsrh/nprh0610.txt
96 Marching Toward the 21st Century, "Recruitment and Society After the Cold War," by Charles Moskos, p 143, p 151
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Asians and other minorities, 12 percent. According to defense officials, white women display the least interest of any female ethnic group in joining the military. Of the 200,000 women in the military overall, enlisted minority women outnumber white women 61 percent to 39 percent of enlistment. Forty-three percent of white women fail to complete their first term. With the declining number of male youths, it may be necessary for the Marine Corp to either more thoroughly concentrate upon the male mission, or consider opening up additional positions to women. It may be prudent for the Marine Corps to reinstate screening standards across the MCRC for all women. For example, they must have a diploma, be within the mental group I-IIIA, and may not have a traumatic history that required psychological counseling.

Sunbelt Migration

The population movement within the United States may require a realignment of recruiting personnel. The Western United States is expected to have the fastest growth rate, followed by the Southeast and Southwest. The Midwest will continue to lose population. According to MajGen Parks, the MCRC is undergoing an extensive structure analysis in order to properly align recruiting personnel based upon demographic changes. Today, ERR is responsible for all recruiting east of the Mississippi River while WRR has the same size headquarters, yet is responsible for all recruiting west of the Mississippi River.

Ethnic and Racial Diversity Within the Military

Trends in the ethnic and racial diversity of the youth population have important implications for military recruitment. The United States is becoming a more ethnically diverse nation with an ethnic minority accounting for 37.2 percent of the population. The share of

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99 Marine Corps Edition of Navy Times, dtd March 29, 1999 “Military Dropout Disparity is a Puzzle,” by Anrea Stone (of USA Today)
100 Ibid.
101 Maj Coleman Interview with MajGen G. Parks, CG, MCRC, of 5 April 1999.
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African American and Hispanic men ages 16-18 increased from 19 percent in 1973 to roughly 25 percent in 1991. Most of the increase was with Hispanic men, which nearly doubled in the share of its population from 6 percent in 1973 to 11 percent in 1991. The African American proportion of the youth market grew from 13 to 15 percent during the same timeframe. By 2015, Hispanic Americans are expected to be the dominant minority group, totaling 44.4 million, followed by African Americans with 41.9 million and Asian Americans at 13.3 million. In his essay, “The Minority Majority,” analyst Brad Edmonson notes that, “In less than one life span, Americans who belong to racial and ethnic minority groups will outnumber whites...a demographic shift that will transform politics and business over the next 50 years.”

The complex race relations among Americans warrants an assertive strategic plan to recruit a diversified segment of the democracy at large, with an equal representation of role models within the officer ranks. Today, Hispanics make up about 7 percent of active US military forces, yet comprise 11 percent of the population. Hispanics have the highest propensity to join although that significantly decreased from 44 percent in 1995 to 37 percent in 1997. Only 56 percent of the Hispanic labor force has a high school diploma. While DOD enlistment of other racial groups remained flat, Hispanic enlistment rose 12 percent last year due to the pentagon’s multimillion-dollar advertising campaign in the Hispanic media. During FY 1998, 50 percent of all male privates enlisting in the Marine Corps were Hispanic.

During the 25 years of the AVF, African American accessions within the military have been two to three times greater than the representation of African Americans among the general population. Within the Marine Corps, as of the end of FY 1998, 16 percent of male enlisted

\textsuperscript{102} Marching Toward the 21st Century, "Trends in Youth Labor Market," by J. Klerman, and L. Kardy, p. 46
\textsuperscript{103} Marching Toward the 21st Century, “Domestic Trends to the Year 2015,” by D. Osborne, p 2
\textsuperscript{104} “The Minority Majority in 2001,” by Brad Edmonson, p ½
\textsuperscript{105} “Education Key To Hispanic Participation in Military,” by Isaac H Cubillos, Latino Beat, p1/3
\textsuperscript{106} Marines Almanac, Special Edition, January 1999, p 28
\textsuperscript{107} Marching Toward the 21st Century, "Changes in the All-Volunteer Force-Youth Attitudes"
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and 6.8 percent of male officers are African American. Today, estimates are that 13 percent of the age-qualified population is African American.108

Desert Storm unleashed an almost immediate response from critics worried that the nation’s socially unbalanced armed forces would soon be involved in bloody and sustained conflict. African-American leaders such as Jesse Jackson, and Martin Luther King III urged African-Americans not to participate in the Gulf War, while African-American congressional leadership was noticeably opposed as well.109

The influence of African-American leadership not to fight in the Gulf War, along with racial tension evident as a result of the Rodney King beating, appears to have affected the propensity of African Americans to serve in the military and may be worth further examination. For example, the number of African American accessions decreased from 120,000 in 1989 to 66,000 in 1991.110 African Americans maintained a higher propensity to enlist than whites throughout most of the 25 years of the AVF, yet African-American propensity to enlist dropped from 53 percent in 1989 to 37 percent, in 1992.111 If nothing else, the Gulf War provided a better understanding of armed forces racial composition and how (minority) public support relates to the perception of a fighting force proportionately representative of the country at large.

Educational Trends

The Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS) shows “most young men and women see post-secondary education as the key to prosperity and job security. The percent of youth going to college is increasing.”112 According to a recent CNA report, there is an ever-increasing

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109 Marching Toward the 21st Century, "Recruitment and Society After the Cold War," by Charles Moskos, p. 143
111 Ibid.
112 Personnel Readiness Factors By Race and Gender”
    http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr98/apdx_g.htm p 4/6
potential to recruit within the community colleges. In 1995/1996 over 540,000 students graduated with AA degrees from over 1,400 schools. In FY 1996 and 1997, the Marine Corps only recruited 248 from community colleges, however, 80 percent were in the upper I-IIIA category. MajGen Parks acknowledged the community college market appears to be a “great target of opportunity” which he intends to explore. The General intends to pursue it with the support of Reserve Special Staff Officers and special educational workshops tailored specifically to community college markets as a means of jump starting a program that grew dormant some time ago.

The pool of available recruits is graduating from high school at higher rates, however, according to US Department of Education studies, concerns rest primarily with high school graduation rates of African Americans and Hispanics, which has averaged 20 percent lower than whites since the inception of the AVF. While this trend has narrowed by 5 percent in the past decade, the pattern suggests that throughout the next 25 years, as the proportion of minorities within the population increases, the Marine Corps must aggressively recruit to successfully meet educational standards.

Test Score Trends

While military weapon systems could be made user friendly, acquisition trends have been moving in the opposite direction. The armed forces are fielding increasingly complex weapon systems that are less reliable and harder to maintain. Assuming this procurement trend continues, the need for bright, technologically literate personnel will grow commensurate with the sophistication of the systems fielded. Over 40 years of research has shown that an individual’s level of aptitude strongly relates to his or her training success and job performance.

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113 Maj Coleman Interview with Maj Witzell, MCRC, of 6 April 1999 Source: Center For Naval Analysis Information Paper 1000/RP dtd 31 Mar 98
114 Maj Coleman Interview with MajGen G. Parks, CG MCRC, of 5 April 1999
115 Marching Toward the 21st Century, "Trends and Future Directions in Youth Labor Markets: Implications for Army Recruiting" by Jacob Klerman and Lynn Karoly, pgs 46-7
116 Ibid., "Technology and Army Manpower," by Martin Binkin, p 170
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The armed forces have made cognitive aptitude an important determinant of who gets into particular fields; however, based upon Army studies, “[t]he military’s pool of potential recruits appears to be in the midst of a test-score decline, and may not be well prepared to perform cognitive tasks required by the high-tech armed forces of the present or future.”

The Widening Gap Between Society and the Military

The active-duty military will have shrunk from roughly 2.6 million in the 1970s to 1.3 million at the dawn of the 21st century. In Making the Corps, Thomas Ricks points out that “[t]he gap between the military and society is exacerbated by the public’s new ignorance of military affairs.” For two centuries, the military played an important role in shaping the United States as “a country born of war,” but today’s military role is uncertain. Ricks' concern is that this lack of familiarity could undermine popular support for the military:

For the first time in our history, we are--if the Cold War is indeed considered a kind of war--maintaining a large military establishment during peacetime. What’s more, it is all-volunteer, and has been for two decades. It is no longer broadly representative of society, especially the elites. Even during the Vietnam War, two-thirds of the members of Congress had some military experience. Today about two-thirds have none.

Demographic Impact Upon Social Trends

Long-term social trends and their impact on recruitment may be difficult to discern clearly given the nature of American culture, its capricious ambivalence toward the military during times of peace and its reactionary dependence in times of crisis. However, one may safely state that near-term trends will challenge the military’s ability to recruit in the 21st century. The Washington Post recently reported notable changes of youth attitudes toward military service in

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117 Marching Toward the 21st Century, “Test Score Trends and the Recruit Quality Queue,” by Linda Kageff and Janice Laurence, p 92
118 Ibid., “Recruitment and Society After the Cold War,” by Carlos Moskos, p 139
119 Ricks, Making the Corps, p 23
120 Ibid., pgs 23-4
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the post-cold war era, “Youth today generally view the military as less attractive than before the Cold War... they (do) not wish to serve as peacekeepers in foreign countries...[and] they objected to being put in jeopardy to fight someone else’s battles.” With propensity to enlist declining, the question arises, if the military downsizes below a certain level, will it become socially irrelevant? In the book *Marching Toward the 21st Century*, Congressional researcher and manpower analyst Robert Goldich states,

Militaries that claim only a fraction of their countries’ resources often experience relatively greater difficulty in attracting and retaining personnel. The institution, being numerically and proportionally insignificant, loses its cachet as a place... to turn to for a career. This has happened in Canada, the Low countries, Australia, and New Zealand and may be about to happen in the countries of Western Europe...122

According to Youth Attitude Tracking Studies (YATS), veterans will always have a powerful influence upon attitudes and perceptions of potential recruits; however, the cadre of veterans available is dwindling. The vast cohort of WWII and Korean War era veterans is slowly drawing down, and the proportion of citizens who have never served steadily increases. A recent *Washington Post* article by Thomas Lippman asserts,

… that socially and politically, the nation feels the absence of the draft… In almost 26 years an entire generation of men has come of age without facing the prospect that the military would order them out of their homes and schools and into uniform...They have been spared the choices that their fathers and grandfathers faced.123

Mr. Lippman points out that since the end of the draft there has been a steady decline of interest in the military among young people. In 1973, 32 percent of young people expressed an interest in joining the military whereas by 1993 that figure dropped to 12 percent. In short, the lives of youth today are not affected by the military and increasingly, neither are the lives of their parents. According to Deputy Defense Secretary John J. Hamre,

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The average American knows very little about the military anymore, and even more troubling, the average middle and upper middle class home doesn’t tend to look on the military as a career they want their kids to follow. It’s harder for us to recruit, because normally we’re counting on a supportive context of parents or family, and we don’t have that.\textsuperscript{124}

\textbf{Declining Propensity Trends}

Since 1975, the DOD has tracked the propensity of young people to enlist in the military based upon YATS of a nationally representative sample of 10,000. Now that force draw-down levels have been met, YATS results indicate that “both men’s and women’s propensity remain substantially below pre draw-down levels and below the levels needed to meet increased accession requirements.”\textsuperscript{125} The 1998 YATS also shows that overall, young men’s propensity for military service dropped roughly one percent per year over the last three, to roughly 25 percent for 16-21 year old men. The propensity of Hispanic men dropped significantly from 44 percent in 1995 to 37 percent in 1997. African American men’s propensity dropped from 54 percent in 1989, to 32 percent in 1994. White men’s propensity dropped from 26 percent in 1989 to 22 percent in 1994. Neither African American nor White men’s propensity has changed significantly since 1994. The propensity of women 16-21 years of age declined from 14 to 12 percent in 1996-1997.\textsuperscript{126} These propensity trends indicate that the individual recruiter will be tasked to work harder (to prospect more) in the future in order to successfully recruit.

\textbf{The Marine Corps Critical Vulnerability}

In \textit{First To Fight}, LtGen Victor H. (Brute) Krulak writes, “the United States does not need a Marine Corps. However, for good reasons which completely transcend cold logic, the United States \textit{wants} a Marine Corps.”\textsuperscript{127} He goes on to explain, “we [the Marine Corps] exist

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\item \textsuperscript{124} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{125} http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr98/apdx_g.html
\item \textsuperscript{126} http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr98/apdx-g.html
\item \textsuperscript{127} LtGen V.H. Krulak, \textit{First To Fight}, p xx
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
today--flourish today… because of what the grassroots of our country believes we are and
believes we can do." Since the inception of the AVF, a major concern has been the
"misrepresentation" of the democracy at large among Americans serving in the military. The
percentage of minorities serving within the enlisted ranks has far exceeded the percentage of
minorities within the population; however, there has been a disproportionately low representation
of minorities within the officer corps of each service. The low representation of minorities
among Marine officers may become a political vulnerability in the 21st century given
demographic trends, likely racial conflict within America, and the growing unfamiliarity the
typical citizen has with the military in general. With the declining propensity to enlist among
Americans and the widening gap among society and the military in general, will the America of
2010 want a Marine Corps she perceives as being “racially disjointed?” How might such a
perception affect America’s support for the Marine Corps? Some sociologists predict a “violent
revolution” within the United States during the 21st century leading one to ponder whether the
ethnic hatred rampant in places like Bosnia and Kosovo could ever erupt on American soil.
Future operations, like the special purpose MAGTF sent into the L.A. riots of 1991, may engulf
the Marine Corps in its most difficult peace enforcement mission imaginable; one challenging
the very fiber of the Corps, and testing the strength of each Marine’s character.

128 Ibid., p xix
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CHAPTER 5

REVOLUTIONIZING MARINE RECRUITING IN THE 21st CENTURY

(10 PROPOSALS)

The impact of tumultuous demographic changes affecting this nation and the Marine Corps' role within an ever-shrinking world warrants close examination. Recruiting tomorrow’s Marine will be unlike yesterday. First, political, social, economic and demographic forces will profoundly affect the size, propensity and composition of the recruiting market. Second, the amount of competition among other services will increase. Third, Marine end-strength requirements are likely to increase by approximately 5,000 Marines before 2010.129 Lastly, meeting the high-quality demands for the “Strategic Corporal,” mandates an ever-increasing vigil to recruit mature young men and women of good judgment and strong character. Recruiting the “Strategic Corporal” requires perhaps another recruiting revolution of innovation. This paper proposes 10 methods to revolutionize Marine Corps recruiting in the 21st century in order to “get ahead of the power curve” that is likely to burden the Marine Corps if it fails to adapt. Changing the way Marines recruit is not the intent of these proposals. Instead, these ideas will supplement the tenants of "systematic recruiting." While each proposal has certain limitations, or drawbacks, it is recommended they be studied for their applicability and adapted, as required, to fit the needs of the Marine Corps.

1. Establish Recruiting Capstone Document “Making Marines”- Given the Corps’ oscillating institutional commitment to Marine recruiting throughout the previous 26 years, it is recommended that a “working group” of officers and enlisted personnel who successfully recruited, establish a capstone document capturing the Marine recruiting ethos. This Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) would provide every Marine a clear understanding of how

129 Maj Coleman Interview with LtGen J.W. Klimp D C/S M&RA of 3 June 1999
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and why the Corps’ recruits the way it does and would facilitate an understanding of the Marine Corps’ overall recruiting strategy. This MCDP would be provided to each Marine reinforcing the “every Marine is a recruiter” concept.

2. **Raise Marine Recruiting Standards Without Dramatically Increasing Risk** - Raising recruiting standards as a means of transforming the quality of the Corps has been accomplished by several Commandants since General Wilson, and has had a profound effect upon the Marine Corps’ psyche of being an “elite organization.” Throughout the last decade, Marine recruiting has exceeded its standards regarding the percentage of high school graduates recruited and the percentage of recruits that tested within the upper half of mental group categories I to III. For example, the Corps has recruited an average of 96 percent high school grads, and 65 percent mental group category I-IIIA whereas the goals have been 90-95 percent and 60-63 percent respectively.

Increasing Marine recruiting standards, while other services lower theirs, will allow the Marine Corps to further establish an identity with America as “her elite service.” Raising recruiting standards to a level which Marine recruiters have successfully accomplished for 10 years or more will allow the Corps to reinforce its image as “a cut above the rest” without introducing a great amount of risk.

In addition to raising the recruiting standard to previously sustained levels, the Marine Corps needs to officially eliminate quotas for people testing below mental group categories I-III. Today, the Marine Corps has a recruiting quota of 1 percent category IV personnel (CAT IVs). Eliminating this statistically insignificant number should not have a direct bearing upon the Corps' ability to accomplish the recruiting mission, whereas recruiting those not capable of passing the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery test will be of little value to the Marine Corps. In actuality, recruiting CAT IVs may be a disservice to that individual who will probably be left behind in a “technologically superior” Marine Corps of the 21st century.
3. Implement Marine Mentoring/Recruiting Policy “Every Marine, Recruit a Marine”

For the past 26 years, recruiting has been treated as a "small dirty war" within the Marines that has been fought by only a fraction of the Corps. Given the dramatic domestic challenges adversely shaping the recruiting environment, successfully recruiting the “Strategic Corporal” of the 21st century warrants an “all hands” effort throughout the Corps. The genesis of this proposal is to build upon the mentoring aspect of our leadership philosophy. A major evolution of our ethos would be for every Marine to recruit his replacement (within a four-year window).

Actively mentoring Marines through the "Transformation” of one’s first term of enlistment would "speak volumes" about the responsibility Marines share in sustaining a quality Corps.

Today, the Marine Corps estimates Marines who have recently joined the Marine Corps refer 15 percent of all contracts. Privates that refer two people who join the Marine Corps are meritoriously promoted to private first class. Other Marines, corporal and below, receive a certain number of points toward their cutting score for promotion. Currently, however, the Marine Corps does not track the attrition rate of these referrals, so it is unknown whether or not this program is truly yielding the desired results. Recruits brought into the Marine Corps under this program may very well have a high attrition rate within the delayed entry program or throughout the first term of enlistment. The Marine Corps may not be maximizing the potential of a program offering tremendous potential or may be rewarding Marines through a program that is flawed.

It is recommended that the Marine Corps establish a tracking mechanism to measure the success of referrals. The Marine Corps should continue offering incentives for E-4 and below (points toward cutting score and meritorious promotion), but should tie these incentives to Marines successfully completing Marine Combat Training (MCT), or perhaps MOS-school following recruit training, since most attrition occurs during the first nine months of an enlistment.

Instead of targeting just young Marines to provide referrals, it is recommended the Corps extend lucrative educational incentives to all Marines. For example, create a graduated
"investment incentive" to all officers and enlisted, active-duty and reservists who refer people that join the Marine Corps. The longer a recruit stays in the Corps, the greater the "return" will be for the Marine providing the referral. For example, duty station of choice along with increased educational benefits (a raised ceiling for tuition assistance, post service educational benefits, or monetary stipends such as U.S. Savings Bonds, for those referring at least one person to a recruiter that successfully completes the MOS-school or The Basic School for officers). Like compound interest, the value of this benefit will be leveraged with time, the longer the referred Marine stays in the Corps, the greater the referral benefits.

Influencing every Marine, active duty and reservist, to actively refer young people to join may offset the declining number of WW II, Korean, and Vietnam-era veterans who have, until now, positively influenced people to enlist. Actively engaging all Marines to “tell the Marine Corps story” may also curb the “widening gap” between society and the military at large, negating a declining propensity to enlist among American youth.

4. Capture the Community College Market- The Marine Corps had a viable community college program in the early 1980s offering lucrative incentives and benefits such as guaranteed promotion at a certain rate. CNA studies reveal that the community college market yields mature young people with higher aptitude and greater perseverance (lower first-term attrition), making the community college an ideal market. Revamping the Community College Enlistment Program may dramatically increase the draw of mature prospects with strong character.

One suggestion is to consider extending terms of enlistment/bonus options. Recognizing the value of retaining the Strategic Corporal’s leadership and technical skills, the Corps may offer a mid-point bonus halfway through a Marine’s first term of enlistment. At the halfway mark of a four-year term, a Marine may extend four more years (total of six) and be provided a $40,000 educational opportunity bonus. This may yield a cadre of critical six-year enlistments for specific technical fields or critically undermanned MOSs. Revamping recruiting doctrine, organization, training, equipment and support (DOTES), and prioritizing advertising to
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community-college students will significantly influence progress in this promising market.

5. Performance Based Incentives- Currently, Marine recruiters receive roughly $4,000 dollars a year, tax free, regardless of rank, productivity, or location as “proficiency pay.” This policy may be revised to provide: 1) cost of living allowance based upon geographic location, and 2) “proficiency pay” based strictly upon performance. For example, the recruiter may receive a stipend, such as a $200.00 Government EE Savings bond for education with each person recruited that completes MCT above a 1.75 net accessions per recruiter average for a given FY. This might shift the recruiter’s focus from “slamming bodies” into the delayed entry program toward developing an emphasis on recruiting and mentoring.

6. Personality Profile Tests for Recruiter Screening- Today, the Marine Corps provides profile tests revealing one’s type of personality (e.g.: Myers-Briggs test). While Manpower does not use these tests to determine personnel assignment decisions (“the right person for the right job”), the Marine Corps should reconsider this approach as one part of the recruiter screening team's assessment. Many of the top corporations throughout the business world have adopted this approach such as ITT, John Deere, Merrill Lynch, Pitney Bowes, Rockwell and Wells Fargo. The success of this business practice has been reported in scores of business publications including Harvard Business Review, Business Week, and The Wall Street Journal.130 LtGen Klimp explained that the Corps’ best single indicator of a Marine's likely performance as a recruiter is his record. In other words, it is very difficult to measure someone’s love for, and commitment to, the Marine Corps. He also explained the drawback of these personality type tests is the (unknown) reliability factor.

While it is probable that many Marines attempting to avoid recruiting duty would "game" the test, this may be overcome by issuing personality profile tests days before recruits graduate.

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130 Maj Coleman Interview with Corporate Consultant Richard D. Coleman Sr. of 28 May 1999
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from recruit training. Headquarters screening teams may later use these tests as just one tool for determining the innate traits and characteristics of those best qualified to serve as Marine recruiters. For example, some Marines are better suited to repair black boxes in a mobile maintenance facility than to serve as a recruiter. Selecting the recruiting force with such testing as just one consideration (not as an automatic qualifier/disqualifier) may yield a more effective cadre of potential career recruiters. Today the Air Force is experimenting with such tests and MCRC is evaluating its potential application.131

It is recommended that the Marine Corps introduce personality profile testing to privates for a period of five years, in order to institutionalize the process among Marines, and to "norm" samples for reliability studies. Based upon the results of Marine Corps’ analysis, it is recommended Headquarters Screening Teams use these tests as part of the assessment process.

7. Advertising Through Year 2010- “Trial By Fire” and the "Strategic Corporal"- Marine Corps advertising is envied by other services for its effective appeal in portraying the mystique of becoming a United States Marine. Typically, a (white) male officer has portrayed the transformation from civilian to Marine in various ways since 1973, because this has been the bulk of the Marine Corps’ primary market based upon American demographics.

With American demographics significantly changing over the next ten years, it is recommended that the Marine Corps build upon its successful approach by profiling African Americans, Hispanics, and women, among white males in a commercial spot profiling a “fire team” transformation. A 1998 JWT TV commercial prototype of this was called “Trial By Fire;” however, General Krulak wisely elected to continue with an ad campaign profiling the individual transformation theme, known as "Rite of Passage," until 2001. If ample market analysis of the "Echo Boomers" supports this approach, make the "Strategic Corporal" the centerpiece of the next JWT ad campaign.

131  Maj Coleman Interview with LtGen J.W. Klimp D C/S M&RA of 3 June 1999
It is recommended that JWT/Marine Corps explore tapping into the theme of "elite organization" and the “team transformation” i.e., of the "Crucible," by profiling the “Strategic Corporal” leading a racially diverse fire team in an esoteric portrayal of the "three block war."

The decision to become a Marine is known to be a personal choice, therefor it is important that any ad campaign resonate with the individual, however, belonging to an elite team that is racially representative with America at large may have enormous appeal. Perhaps the personal transformation message may be retained within "team transformation" profile. As a means of focusing upon the “Strategic Corporal,” portray a Marine NCO (Corporal) with sword in Dress Blues. In order not to lose market recognition of the mamaluke icon, continue a complimentary ad campaign profiling the more traditional Officer in Dress Blues with mamaluke sword as well.

Many Marines take their history and tradition for granted, however with the aging population, there is a declining level of military familiarity (history) known among today’s primary market and those primary influencers (parents, uncles, teachers, etc.) of today's youth. It is recommended that the Marine Corps “advertise” its history and naval character through “national” JWT spots as a form of education. In addition, it is important the Marine Corps make an effort for Hollywood to portray the true virtue of the "Strategic Corporal" in a credible manner, as in, Private Ryan. We must “reach out” to Hollywood (lobby) in the form of “workshops” to MCRDs, etc. and encourage them to profile Marines embracing our core values. There are legendary stories to be told! Let us get beyond the morally bankrupt, dysfunctional citizen of Full Metal Jacket and portray Marine core values of honor, courage, and commitment.

8. Recruiter Promotion Mandate- It is vital that HQMC continue to carefully screen people before they are assigned to recruiting duty. The single most important determinant of a Marine's potential success as a recruiter is his record, and based upon one’s proven performance, only the best Marines should be selected for recruiting duty. Marines passed for promotion during or immediately following their tour of recruiting duty have a disastrous effect upon morale of fellow recruiters and Marines likely to be assigned to recruiting duty.
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In order for recruiting duty to be a “sought after” billet, the promotion rate of recruiters must exceed that of any other assignment. Promotion statistics for recruiters should be closely tracked by M&RA ensuring recruiters are promoted at a rate above the Marine Corps' average. Normally, people "successfully" completing a tour of recruiting duty should never be passed over for promotion immediately following a tour of recruiting duty. In such cases, these should be mandatory briefs to the Commandant.

Recruiting duty has a reputation throughout the Corps for “eating its young.” One example of this is that today, executive officers without any recruiting experience are being assigned to districts due to the shortage of LtCols with recruiting experience. This trend may have a profound impact upon the Corps’ ability to successfully recruit in the future. It is recommended that CMC establish promotion board guidance in an ALMAR ensuring all Marines understand CMC's support for Marines successfully performing this arduous duty. The Marine Corps needs to ensure recruiter performance evaluations (rankings), typically based strictly upon net accessions per recruiter, are tempered by board members aware of the demands of this duty, and are not “blindly” compared or ranked against other fields as literal "truth tellers" of one's potential value of service.

9. Establish the Marine Corps as lead service for “America Goes Back to School.” In 1995, the Secretary of Education requested help from DOD in “making schools safer places to learn and raising educational standards of students through ‘America Goes Back To School.’” In an effort to close the “widening gap” between society and the Marine Corps, it is recommended the Marine Corps formally establish "contact teams" of active duty and reserve personnel as volunteers to high schools throughout America. By volunteering as a guest speaker, mentor, coach or tutor (depending upon the schools' need) one acts as a “community resource" capable of establishing a Marine Corps presence in a school and acquainting students with Marine values.

In addition, expand the number of junior ROTC programs for high schools nationwide. Today, the Marine Corps rates 120 JR ROTC programs but has ample funding for only 90. It is
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recommended that the Marine Corps obtain congressional approval and funding for a minimum of 180 schools by 2010. It is important these 180 schools be located among all social-economic groups to broaden exposure to Marine Corps ethos and service culture. It is recommended that management of the JR ROTC programs be moved from MCCDC to MCRC. This program is a viable recruiting/educational program that may be more effective if managed by those responsible for recruiting within the Marine Corps.

Lastly, develop a strategic program, as part of the Marine Corps’ transition assistance program and the national “Troops to Teachers” program, to produce instructors for the JR ROTC programs as well as teachers for schools throughout the nation. Facilitate the process of acquiring teaching credentials and job placement for Marines leaving active duty. Obtain job placement for these (former) Marines in schools nationwide as a means of countering the declining number of role models in schools. The daily interaction with Marine veterans, not directly associated with the recruiting effort, may bolster the Marine Corps’ image among schools nationwide, while helping the federal government achieve educational objectives related to increasing the number of quality teachers.

10. Proportionate Diversity Representation Among All Ranks- Having a proportionate representation of minority officers, as compared to minority enlisted ranks within the Corps, underscores Marine ethos. Unfortunately, since the 1960s, the Marine Corps has experienced a large imbalance between minority officers and minority enlisted. Obviously, the solution requires the need to recruit more minority officers; however, this must be done carefully to avoid the perception of favoritism or of lowering standards. Recruiting an increased number of minority officers is not difficult to do, nor should it be considered a "quota system" requiring standards to be compromised. The solution is to put the right people in the right billets in order to recruit the best-qualified minority officers. "You recruit who you are."

The issue of role models in key billets such as Military Officer Instructor (MOIs), Officer Selection Officer (OSOs), and OSO assistants is an important consideration in improving the
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recruitment of minority officers. A key concern has also been the high attrition among minorities at Officer Candidate School. Selecting minority role models as OCS personnel may bridge perceived cultural gaps for a potential Officer looking at the Marine Corps for the first time. Putting OCS under MCRC may also provide synergism to the officer recruiting and training effort equal to the synergism of enlisted recruiting and training of ERR/WRR under MCRC. In order to reduce officer attrition at OCS, hold RS COs and OSOs accountable for quality. OSOs and RS COs should be evaluated based upon how many candidates successfully complete OCS.

Another way to increase the number of minority officers is to "grow our own." Today, the Marine Corps selects approximately 20 percent of all officers through ECP, MECEP, or BOOST. Tasking FMF commands to submit a certain number of minority applicants, meeting established standards, may increase minority officers within the officer corps. Commissioning the "Strategic Corporal" may be a logical progression of the promotion pyramid, consistent with the evolutionary increase in duties and responsibilities.

132 Maj Coleman Interview with, LtCol Cline, MCRC Officer Selection Department, of 6 April 1999
133 Ibid.
LtGen Victor Krulak wrote that, “the Marine is the Corps, and the Corps is the Marine.” The Marine Corps Concept and Issues document for 1998 reinforces this, “[t]he individual Marine continues to be our most precious asset. We have no higher priority than the successful recruitment of this Nation’s finest young men and women.” Our future as a Corps depends solely upon the ability to recruit mature men and women of good judgment and strong character, citizens of virtue and integrity.

This paper has explored the evolution of Marine recruiting since the inception of the all-volunteer force (AVF) and reviewed the major political, economic, social, and demographic forces that shaped the recruiting environment. By examining our past we may safeguard against future mistakes; however, by examining current success, we may also exploit critical capabilities enabling the Marine Corps to meet recruiting challenges of the 21st century.

Since the end of conscription, shifts in recruitment policy have periodically upset the delicate equilibrium of recruiting the “all volunteer” Marine Corps. Varying priorities inadvertently impaired recruiting efforts and diminished the Marine Corps’ ability to successfully sustain both recruit quantity and quality. It took the concerted effort of two successive Commandants and thousands of recruiters to overcome the Marine manpower crisis of the early 1970s. Likewise, it took the Marine Corps nearly two years to overcome the recruiting challenges of the early 1990s. In both cases, the key to improving recruit quality could be summed up by the adage, “You are what you recruit, and you recruit what you are.”

The Commandant of the Marine Corps sets the tone. The consensus among the active and former Commandants, and other distinguished Marines who used recruiting as a “tool” to rebuild the Corps from within, is that “only the institutional commitment, from the top down,
will determine if the Marine Corps continues to successfully recruit.”

LtGen Klimp acknowledged his concern that, "our institutional commitment is fragile… my greatest fear is the people [senior colonels and Marine general officers] who remember what happened in the 1970s and understand the toil required to fix the Corps, [through recruiting] are quickly leaving the Corps [retiring]."

When the Commanding General of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command was asked, “What are the three most important reasons for our success?” MajGen Parks responded, “People, people, people!” Success depends upon assigning only the very best officers in leadership positions throughout MCRC. In order for the Corps to “build the Strategic Corporal,” it must first assign Marines of virtue to recruit people who share their traits. Success requires retaining a commitment to train and fully resource requirements such as the 105 percent manning level. It includes "taking care of our people," making certain that quality of life and material support for recruiters is maintained. Perhaps most important, success depends upon recognizing the accomplishments of Marines who successfully accomplish the Corps' most arduous peacetime mission, and in making recruiting duty a coveted assignment.

Recruiters not only seek to recruit the "Strategic Corporal" but act in that capacity as well. In the "information age," recruiting decisions made at the tactical level have a strategic impact. Sound thoughts beget sound action. Core values and a strong moral center form the well from which both thought and action may draw. A classic example of the this and the importance of assigning the best Marines as recruiters was evident in the case involving Ed Harris, one of two high school students who tragically murdered 12 fellow students at Columbine High School in Littleton Colorado. The Marine recruiter who rejected Harris for lying about a psychiatric condition prevented enormous damage to the Marine Corps. Many people became better acquainted with Marine ethos due to that recruiter's good judgment.

There is simply no way of accurately predicting the waves of change or how the wake of

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136 Maj Coleman Interview with General C.E. Mundy, 30th CMC, of 6 April 1999
137 Maj Coleman Interview with LtGen Klimp D C/S M&RA of 3 June 1999
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decisions made today will affect the future. The ability to successfully recruit the “Strategic Corporal” depends upon anticipating social, demographic, political, and economic forces that are typically beyond the Marine Corps’ control and exploiting Marine Corps capability within its control. Some trends are more or less clear. In the future, there will be a smaller youth population with a declining propensity to enlist. The gender and ethnic composition of the labor force is dramatically shifting in the midst of declining educational obtainment levels and lower test scores. The proportion of age-qualified men will decline relative to women. The proportion of minority groups within the population is growing and will continue to do so. Intra-service recruiting competition will continue to increase, and the size of the Marine Corps will likely increase by 5,000 before 2010.138

Major domestic forces will transform American society in the 21st century, but the timeless Marine virtues of honor, courage and commitment are being reinforced as never before. Dramatic social, political, economic, and demographic challenges will present challenges in the 21st century, but will also provide great opportunities. The U.S. military is said to be at the crossroads of change, struggling to define its role and justify its existence. This does not appear to be the case for the Marine Corps, which has embraced change as a “fuel” for progress. The Marine Corps’ strategic advantage at the dawn of the 21st century is the “Strategic Corporal.” This is due to the leadership and vision of the “medicine men” who kept the Marine Corps true to its ethos and ensured the manner in which Marines recruited complimented the unique spirit and character of being a Marine. In short, the Marine Corps understands its unique role within the littorals of the 21st century. Remaining true to Marine values and being willing to "go to the mat" with anyone pushing an agenda that anyway attrites Marine ethos, has established a lucid service identity with, and respect of, the American people. This has been instrumental to the Marine Corps' ability to successfully recruit since June 1995.

A Marine evolution in military affairs is taking place, one Marine at a time, one day at a

138 Maj Coleman Interview with LtGen J.W. Klimp D/CS M&RA of 3 June 1999
time. Each day, individuals join the Corps and each day, Marines return to civilian life as productive citizens. The Marine Corps will continually aspire to grow stronger as society evolves; its men and women will reflect the changing demographic makeup of the society from which they are drawn. But so long as its core values are maintained from the recruitment process upward, the Corps will retain its vitality, its sense of mission, and its operational effectiveness for decades to come.
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